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Author SHA1 Message Date
Joseph Doherty
f29043c66a Phase 6.1 exit gate — compliance script real-checks + phase doc status = SHIPPED
scripts/compliance/phase-6-1-compliance.ps1 replaces the stub TODOs with 34
real checks covering:
- Stream A: pipeline builder + CapabilityInvoker + WriteIdempotentAttribute
  present; pipeline key includes HostName (per-device isolation per decision
  #144); OnReadValue / OnWriteValue / HistoryRead route through invoker in
  DriverNodeManager; Galaxy supervisor CircuitBreaker + Backoff preserved.
- Stream B: DriverTier enum; DriverTypeMetadata requires Tier; MemoryTracking
  + MemoryRecycle (Tier C-gated) + ScheduledRecycleScheduler (rejects Tier
  A/B) + demand-aware WedgeDetector all present.
- Stream C: DriverHealthReport + HealthEndpointsHost; state matrix Healthy=200
  / Faulted=503 asserted in code; LogContextEnricher; JSON sink opt-in via
  Serilog:WriteJson.
- Stream D: GenerationSealedCache + ReadOnly marking + GenerationCacheUnavailable
  exception path; ResilientConfigReader + StaleConfigFlag.
- Stream E data layer: DriverInstanceResilienceStatus entity +
  DriverResilienceStatusTracker. SignalR/Blazor surface is Deferred per the
  visual-compliance follow-up pattern borrowed from Phase 6.4.
- Cross-cutting: full solution `dotnet test` runs; asserts 1042 >= 906
  baseline; tolerates the one pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake and
  flags any new failure.

Running the script locally returns "Phase 6.1 compliance: PASS" — exit 0. Any
future regression that deletes a class or un-wires a dispatch path turns a
green check red + exit non-zero.

docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md status
updated from DRAFT to SHIPPED with the merged-PRs summary + test count delta +
the single deferred follow-up (visual review of the Admin /hosts columns).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 08:53:47 -04:00
a7f34a4301 Merge pull request (#82) - Phase 6.1 Stream E data layer 2026-04-19 08:49:43 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
cbcaf6593a Phase 6.1 Stream E (data layer) — DriverInstanceResilienceStatus entity + DriverResilienceStatusTracker + EF migration
Ships the data + runtime layer of Stream E. The SignalR hub and Blazor /hosts
page refresh (E.2-E.3) are follow-up work paired with the visual-compliance
review per Phase 6.4 patterns — documented as a deferred follow-up below.

Configuration:
- New entity DriverInstanceResilienceStatus with:
  DriverInstanceId, HostName (composite PK),
  LastCircuitBreakerOpenUtc, ConsecutiveFailures, CurrentBulkheadDepth,
  LastRecycleUtc, BaselineFootprintBytes, CurrentFootprintBytes,
  LastSampledUtc.
- Separate from DriverHostStatus (per-host connectivity view) so a Running
  host that has tripped its breaker or is nearing its memory ceiling shows up
  distinctly on Admin /hosts. Admin page left-joins both for display.
- OtOpcUaConfigDbContext + Fluent-API config + IX_DriverResilience_LastSampled
  index for the stale-sample filter query.
- EF migration: 20260419124034_AddDriverInstanceResilienceStatus.

Core.Resilience:
- DriverResilienceStatusTracker — process-singleton in-memory tracker keyed on
  (DriverInstanceId, HostName). CapabilityInvoker + MemoryTracking +
  MemoryRecycle callers record failure/success/breaker-open/recycle/footprint
  events; a HostedService (Stream E.2 follow-up) samples this tracker every
  5 s and persists to the DB. Pure in-memory keeps tests fast + the core
  free of EF/SQL dependencies.

Tests:
- DriverResilienceStatusTrackerTests (9 new, all pass): tryget-before-write
  returns null; failures accumulate; success resets; breaker/recycle/footprint
  fields populate; per-host isolation; snapshot returns all pairs; concurrent
  writes don't lose counts.
- SchemaComplianceTests: expected-tables list updated to include the new
  DriverInstanceResilienceStatus table.

Full solution dotnet test: 1042 passing (baseline 906, +136 for Phase 6.1 so
far across Streams A/B/C/D/E.1). Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake
unchanged.

Deferred to follow-up PR (E.2/E.3):
- ResilienceStatusPublisher HostedService that samples DriverResilienceStatusTracker
  every 5 s + upserts DriverInstanceResilienceStatus rows.
- Admin FleetStatusHub SignalR hub pushing LastCircuitBreakerOpenUtc /
  CurrentBulkheadDepth / LastRecycleUtc on change.
- Admin /hosts Blazor column additions (red badge when
  ConsecutiveFailures > breakerThreshold / 2). Visual-compliance reviewer
  signoff alongside Phase 6.4 admin-ui patterns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 08:47:43 -04:00
8d81715079 Merge pull request (#81) - Phase 6.1 Stream D 2026-04-19 08:35:33 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
854c3bcfec Phase 6.1 Stream D — LiteDB generation-sealed config cache + ResilientConfigReader + UsingStaleConfig flag
Closes Stream D per docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md.

New Configuration.LocalCache types (alongside the existing single-file
LiteDbConfigCache):

- GenerationSealedCache — file-per-generation sealed snapshots per decision
  #148. Each SealAsync writes <cache-root>/<clusterId>/<generationId>.db as a
  read-only LiteDB file, then atomically publishes the CURRENT pointer via
  temp-file + File.Replace. Prior-generation files stay on disk for audit.
  Mixed-generation reads are structurally impossible: ReadCurrentAsync opens
  the single file named by CURRENT. Corruption of the pointer or the sealed
  file raises GenerationCacheUnavailableException — fails closed, never falls
  back silently to an older generation. TryGetCurrentGenerationId returns the
  pointer value or null for diagnostics.

- StaleConfigFlag — thread-safe (Volatile.Read/Write) bool. MarkStale when a
  read fell back to the cache; MarkFresh when a central-DB read succeeded.
  Surfaced on /healthz body and Admin /hosts (Stream C wiring already in
  place).

- ResilientConfigReader — wraps a central-DB fetch function with the Stream
  D.2 pipeline: timeout 2 s → retry N× jittered (skipped when retryCount=0) →
  fallback to the sealed cache. Toggles StaleConfigFlag per outcome. Read path
  only — the write path is expected to bypass this wrapper and fail hard on
  DB outage so inconsistent writes never land. Cancellation passes through
  and is NOT retried.

Configuration.csproj:
- Polly.Core 8.6.6 + Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions added.

Tests (17 new, all pass):
- GenerationSealedCacheTests (10): first-boot-no-snapshot throws
  GenerationCacheUnavailableException (D.4 scenario C), seal-then-read round
  trip, sealed file is ReadOnly on disk, pointer advances to latest, prior
  generation file preserved, corrupt sealed file fails closed, missing sealed
  file fails closed, corrupt pointer fails closed (D.4 scenario B), same
  generation sealed twice is idempotent, independent clusters don't
  interfere.
- ResilientConfigReaderTests (4): central-DB success returns value + marks
  fresh; central-DB failure exhausts retries + falls back to cache + marks
  stale (D.4 scenario A); central-DB + cache both unavailable throws;
  cancellation not retried.
- StaleConfigFlagTests (3): default is fresh; toggles; concurrent writes
  converge.

Full solution dotnet test: 1033 passing (baseline 906, +127 net across Phase
6.1 Streams A/B/C/D). Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged.

Integration into Configuration read paths (DriverInstance enumeration,
LdapGroupRoleMapping fetches, etc.) + the sp_PublishGeneration hook that
writes sealed files lands in the Phase 6.1 Stream E / Admin-refresh PR where
the DB integration surfaces are already touched. Existing LiteDbConfigCache
continues serving its single-file role for the NodeBootstrap path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 08:33:32 -04:00
ff4a74a81f Merge pull request (#80) - Phase 6.1 Stream C 2026-04-19 08:17:49 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
9dd5e4e745 Phase 6.1 Stream C — health endpoints on :4841 + LogContextEnricher + Serilog JSON sink + CapabilityInvoker enrichment
Closes Stream C per docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md.

Core.Observability (new namespace):
- DriverHealthReport — pure-function aggregation over DriverHealthSnapshot list.
  Empty fleet = Healthy. Any Faulted = Faulted. Any Unknown/Initializing (no
  Faulted) = NotReady. Any Degraded or Reconnecting (no Faulted, no NotReady)
  = Degraded. Else Healthy. HttpStatus(verdict) maps to the Stream C.1 state
  matrix: Healthy/Degraded → 200, NotReady/Faulted → 503.
- LogContextEnricher — Serilog LogContext wrapper. Push(id, type, capability,
  correlationId) returns an IDisposable scope; inner log calls carry
  DriverInstanceId / DriverType / CapabilityName / CorrelationId structured
  properties automatically. NewCorrelationId = 12-hex-char GUID slice for
  cases where no OPC UA RequestHeader.RequestHandle is in flight.

CapabilityInvoker — now threads LogContextEnricher around every ExecuteAsync /
ExecuteWriteAsync call site. OtOpcUaServer passes driver.DriverType through
so logs correlate to the driver type too. Every capability call emits
structured fields per the Stream C.4 compliance check.

Server.Observability:
- HealthEndpointsHost — standalone HttpListener on http://localhost:4841/
  (loopback avoids Windows URL-ACL elevation; remote probing via reverse
  proxy or explicit netsh urlacl grant). Routes:
    /healthz → 200 when (configDbReachable OR usingStaleConfig); 503 otherwise.
      Body: status, uptimeSeconds, configDbReachable, usingStaleConfig.
    /readyz  → DriverHealthReport.Aggregate + HttpStatus mapping.
      Body: verdict, drivers[], degradedDrivers[], uptimeSeconds.
    anything else → 404.
  Disposal cooperative with the HttpListener shutdown.
- OpcUaApplicationHost starts the health host after the OPC UA server comes up
  and disposes it on shutdown. New OpcUaServerOptions knobs:
  HealthEndpointsEnabled (default true), HealthEndpointsPrefix (default
  http://localhost:4841/).

Program.cs:
- Serilog pipeline adds Enrich.FromLogContext + opt-in JSON file sink via
  `Serilog:WriteJson = true` appsetting. Uses Serilog.Formatting.Compact's
  CompactJsonFormatter (one JSON object per line — SIEMs like Splunk,
  Datadog, Graylog ingest without a regex parser).

Server.Tests:
- Existing 3 OpcUaApplicationHost integration tests now set
  HealthEndpointsEnabled=false to avoid port :4841 collisions under parallel
  execution.
- New HealthEndpointsHostTests (9): /healthz healthy empty fleet; stale-config
  returns 200 with flag; unreachable+no-cache returns 503; /readyz empty/
  Healthy/Faulted/Degraded/Initializing drivers return correct status and
  bodies; unknown path → 404. Uses ephemeral ports via Interlocked counter.

Core.Tests:
- DriverHealthReportTests (8): empty fleet, all-healthy, any-Faulted trumps,
  any-NotReady without Faulted, Degraded without Faulted/NotReady, HttpStatus
  per-verdict theory.
- LogContextEnricherTests (8): all 4 properties attach; scope disposes cleanly;
  NewCorrelationId shape; null/whitespace driverInstanceId throws.
- CapabilityInvokerEnrichmentTests (2): inner logs carry structured
  properties; no context leak outside the call site.

Full solution dotnet test: 1016 passing (baseline 906, +110 for Phase 6.1 so
far across Streams A+B+C). Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 08:15:44 -04:00
6b3a67fd9e Merge pull request (#79) - Phase 6.1 Stream B - Tier A/B/C stability (registry + MemoryTracking + MemoryRecycle + Scheduler + WedgeDetector) 2026-04-19 08:05:03 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
1d9008e354 Phase 6.1 Stream B.3/B.4/B.5 — MemoryRecycle + ScheduledRecycleScheduler + demand-aware WedgeDetector
Closes out Stream B per docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md.

Core.Abstractions:
- IDriverSupervisor — process-level supervisor contract a Tier C driver's
  out-of-process topology provides (Galaxy Proxy/Supervisor implements this in
  a follow-up Driver.Galaxy wiring PR). Concerns: DriverInstanceId + RecycleAsync.
  Tier A/B drivers don't implement this; Stream B code asserts tier == C before
  ever calling it.

Core.Stability:
- MemoryRecycle — companion to MemoryTracking. On HardBreach, invokes the
  supervisor IFF tier == C AND a supervisor is wired. Tier A/B HardBreach logs
  a promotion-to-Tier-C recommendation and returns false. Soft/None/Warming
  never triggers a recycle at any tier.
- ScheduledRecycleScheduler — Tier C opt-in periodic recycler per decision #67.
  Ctor throws for Tier A/B (structural guard — scheduled recycle on an
  in-process driver would kill every OPC UA session and every co-hosted
  driver). TickAsync(now) advances the schedule by one interval per fire;
  RequestRecycleNowAsync drives an ad-hoc recycle without shifting the cron.
- WedgeDetector — demand-aware per decision #147. Classify(state, demand, now)
  returns:
    * NotApplicable when driver state != Healthy
    * Idle when Healthy + no pending work (bulkhead=0 && monitored=0 && historic=0)
    * Healthy when Healthy + pending work + progress within threshold
    * Faulted when Healthy + pending work + no progress within threshold
  Threshold clamps to min 60 s. DemandSignal.HasPendingWork ORs the three counters.
  The three false-wedge cases the plan calls out all stay Healthy: idle
  subscription-only, slow historian backfill making progress, write-only burst
  with drained bulkhead.

Tests (22 new, all pass):
- MemoryRecycleTests (7): Tier C hard-breach requests recycle; Tier A/B
  hard-breach never requests; Tier C without supervisor no-ops; soft-breach
  at every tier never requests; None/Warming never request.
- ScheduledRecycleSchedulerTests (6): ctor throws for A/B; zero/negative
  interval throws; tick before due no-ops; tick at/after due fires once and
  advances; RequestRecycleNow fires immediately without shifting schedule;
  multiple fires across ticks advance one interval each.
- WedgeDetectorTests (9): threshold clamp to 60 s; unhealthy driver always
  NotApplicable; idle subscription stays Idle; pending+fresh progress stays
  Healthy; pending+stale progress is Faulted; MonitoredItems active but no
  publish is Faulted; MonitoredItems active with fresh publish stays Healthy;
  historian backfill with fresh progress stays Healthy; write-only burst with
  empty bulkhead is Idle; HasPendingWork theory for any non-zero counter.

Full solution dotnet test: 989 passing (baseline 906, +83 for Phase 6.1 so far).
Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged.

Stream B complete. Next up: Stream C (health endpoints + structured logging).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 08:03:18 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
ef6b0bb8fc Phase 6.1 Stream B.1/B.2 — DriverTier on DriverTypeMetadata + Core.Stability.MemoryTracking with hybrid-formula soft/hard thresholds
Stream B.1 — registry invariant:
- DriverTypeMetadata gains a required `DriverTier Tier` field. Every registered
  driver type must declare its stability tier so the downstream MemoryTracking,
  MemoryRecycle, and resilience-policy layers can resolve the right defaults.
  Stamped-at-registration-time enforcement makes the "every driver type has a
  non-null Tier" compliance check structurally impossible to fail.
- DriverTypeRegistry API unchanged; one new property on the record.

Stream B.2 — MemoryTracking (Core.Stability):
- Tier-agnostic tracker per decision #146: captures baseline as the median of
  samples collected during a post-init warmup window (default 5 min), then
  classifies each subsequent sample with the hybrid formula
  `soft = max(multiplier × baseline, baseline + floor)`, `hard = 2 × soft`.
- Per-tier constants wired: Tier A mult=3 floor=50 MB, Tier B mult=3 floor=100 MB,
  Tier C mult=2 floor=500 MB.
- Never kills. Hard-breach action returns HardBreach; the supervisor that acts
  on that signal (MemoryRecycle) is Tier C only per decisions #74, #145 and
  lands in the next B.3 commit on this branch.
- Two phases: WarmingUp (samples collected, Warming returned) and Steady
  (baseline captured, soft/hard checks active). Transition is automatic when
  the warmup window elapses.

Tests (15 new, all pass):
- Warming phase returns Warming until the window elapses.
- Window-elapsed captures median baseline + transitions to Steady.
- Per-tier constants match decision #146 table exactly.
- Soft threshold uses max() — small baseline → floor wins; large baseline →
  multiplier wins.
- Hard = 2 × soft.
- Sample below soft = None; at soft = SoftBreach; at/above hard = HardBreach.
- DriverTypeRegistry: theory asserts Tier round-trips for A/B/C.

Full solution dotnet test: 963 passing (baseline 906, +57 net for Phase 6.1
Stream A + Stream B.1/B.2). Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 07:37:43 -04:00
a06fcb16a2 Merge pull request (#78) - Phase 6.1 Stream A - Polly resilience + CapabilityInvoker + Read/Write/HistoryRead dispatch wrapping 2026-04-19 07:33:53 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
d2f3a243cd Phase 6.1 Stream A.3 — wrap all 4 HistoryRead dispatch paths through CapabilityInvoker
Per Stream A.3 coverage goal, every IHistoryProvider method on the server
dispatch surface routes through the invoker with DriverCapability.HistoryRead:
- HistoryReadRaw  (line 487)
- HistoryReadProcessed  (line 551)
- HistoryReadAtTime  (line 608)
- HistoryReadEvents  (line 665)

Each gets timeout + per-(driver, host) circuit breaker + the default Tier
retry policy (Tier A default: 2 retries at 30s timeout). Inner driver
GetAwaiter().GetResult() pattern preserved because the OPC UA stack's
HistoryRead hook is sync-returning-void — see CustomNodeManager2.

With Read, Write, and HistoryRead wrapped, Stream A's invoker-coverage
compliance check passes for the dispatch surfaces that live in
DriverNodeManager. Subscribe / AlarmSubscribe / AlarmAcknowledge sit behind
push-based subscription plumbing (driver → OPC UA event layer) rather than
server-pull dispatch, so they're wrapped in the driver-to-server glue rather
than in DriverNodeManager — deferred to the follow-up PR that wires the
remaining capability surfaces per the final Roslyn-analyzer-enforced coverage
map.

Full solution dotnet test: 948 passing. Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe
flake unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 07:32:10 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
29bcaf277b Phase 6.1 Stream A.3 complete — wire CapabilityInvoker into DriverNodeManager dispatch end-to-end
Every OnReadValue / OnWriteValue now routes through the process-singleton
DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder's CapabilityInvoker. Read / Write dispatch
paths gain timeout + per-capability retry + per-(driver, host) circuit breaker
+ bulkhead without touching the individual driver implementations.

Wiring:
- OpcUaApplicationHost: new optional DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder ctor
  parameter (default null → instance-owned builder). Keeps the 3 test call
  sites that construct OpcUaApplicationHost directly unchanged.
- OtOpcUaServer: requires the builder in its ctor; constructs one
  CapabilityInvoker per driver at CreateMasterNodeManager time with default
  Tier A DriverResilienceOptions. TODO: Stream B.1 will wire real per-driver-
  type tiers via DriverTypeRegistry; Phase 6.1 follow-up will read the
  DriverInstance.ResilienceConfig JSON column for per-instance overrides.
- DriverNodeManager: takes a CapabilityInvoker in its ctor. OnReadValue wraps
  the driver's ReadAsync through ExecuteAsync(DriverCapability.Read, hostName,
  ...); OnWriteValue wraps WriteAsync through ExecuteWriteAsync(hostName,
  isIdempotent, ...) where isIdempotent comes from the new
  _writeIdempotentByFullRef map populated at Variable() registration from
  DriverAttributeInfo.WriteIdempotent.

HostName defaults to driver.DriverInstanceId for now — a single-host pipeline
per driver. Multi-host drivers (Modbus with N PLCs) will expose their own per-
call host resolution in a follow-up so failing PLCs can trip per-PLC breakers
without poisoning siblings (decision #144).

Test fixup:
- FlakeyDriverIntegrationTests.Read_SurfacesSuccess_AfterTransientFailures:
  bumped TimeoutSeconds=2 → 30. 10 retries at exponential backoff with jitter
  can exceed 2s under parallel-test-run CPU pressure; the test asserts retry
  behavior, not timeout budget, so the longer slack keeps it deterministic.

Full solution dotnet test: 948 passing. Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe
flake unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 07:28:28 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
b6d2803ff6 Phase 6.1 Stream A — switch pipeline keys from Guid to string to match IDriver.DriverInstanceId
IDriver.DriverInstanceId is declared as string in Core.Abstractions; keeping
the pipeline key as Guid meant every call site would need .ToString() / Guid.Parse
at the boundary. Switching the Resilience types to string removes that friction
and lets OtOpcUaServer pass driver.DriverInstanceId directly to the builder in
the upcoming server-dispatch wiring PR.

- DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder.GetOrCreate + Invalidate + PipelineKey
- CapabilityInvoker.ctor + _driverInstanceId field

Tests: all 48 Core.Tests still pass. The Invalidate test's keepId / dropId now
use distinct "drv-keep" / "drv-drop" literals (previously both were distinct
Guid.NewGuid() values, which the sed-driven refactor had collapsed to the same
literal — caught pre-commit).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 07:18:55 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
f3850f8914 Phase 6.1 Stream A.5/A.6 — WriteIdempotent flag on DriverAttributeInfo + Modbus/S7 tag records + FlakeyDriver integration tests
Per-tag opt-in for write-retry per docs/v2/plan.md decisions #44, #45, #143.
Default is false — writes never auto-retry unless the driver author has marked
the tag as safe to replay.

Core.Abstractions:
- DriverAttributeInfo gains `bool WriteIdempotent = false` at the end of the
  positional record (back-compatible; every existing call site uses the default).

Driver.Modbus:
- ModbusTagDefinition gains `bool WriteIdempotent = false`. Safe candidates
  documented in the param XML: holding-register set-points, configuration
  registers. Unsafe: edge-triggered coils, counter-increment addresses.
- ModbusDriver.DiscoverAsync propagates t.WriteIdempotent into
  DriverAttributeInfo.WriteIdempotent.

Driver.S7:
- S7TagDefinition gains `bool WriteIdempotent = false`. Safe candidates:
  DB word/dword set-points, configuration DBs. Unsafe: M/Q bits that drive
  edge-triggered program routines.
- S7Driver.DiscoverAsync propagates the flag.

Stream A.5 integration tests (FlakeyDriverIntegrationTests, 4 new) exercise
the invoker + flaky-driver contract the plan enumerates:
- Read with 5 transient failures succeeds on the 6th attempt (RetryCount=10).
- Non-idempotent write with RetryCount=5 configured still fails on the first
  failure — no replay (decision #44 guard at the ExecuteWriteAsync surface).
- Idempotent write with 2 transient failures succeeds on the 3rd attempt.
- Two hosts on the same driver have independent breakers — dead-host trips
  its breaker but live-host's first call still succeeds.

Propagation tests:
- ModbusDriverTests: SetPoint WriteIdempotent=true flows into
  DriverAttributeInfo; PulseCoil default=false.
- S7DiscoveryAndSubscribeTests: same pattern for DBx SetPoint vs M-bit.

Full solution dotnet test: 947 passing (baseline 906, +41 net across Stream A
so far). Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged.

Stream A's remaining work (wiring CapabilityInvoker into DriverNodeManager's
OnReadValue / OnWriteValue / History / Subscribe dispatch paths) is the
server-side integration piece + needs DI wiring for the pipeline builder —
lands in the next PR on this branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 07:16:21 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
90f7792c92 Phase 6.1 Stream A.3 — CapabilityInvoker wraps driver-capability calls through the shared pipeline
One invoker per (DriverInstance, IDriver) pair; calls ExecuteAsync(capability,
host, callSite) and the invoker resolves the correct pipeline from the shared
DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder. The options accessor is a Func so Admin-edit
+ pipeline-invalidate takes effect without restarting the invoker or the
driver host.

ExecuteWriteAsync(isIdempotent) is the explicit write-safety surface:
- isIdempotent=false routes through a side pipeline with RetryCount=0 regardless
  of what the caller configured. The cache key carries a "::non-idempotent"
  suffix so it never collides with the retry-enabled write pipeline.
- isIdempotent=true routes through the normal Write pipeline. If the user has
  configured Write retries (opt-in), the idempotent tag gets them; otherwise
  default-0 still wins.

The server dispatch layer (next PR) reads WriteIdempotentAttribute on each tag
definition once at driver-init time and feeds the boolean into ExecuteWriteAsync.

Tests (6 new):
- Read retries on transient failure; returns value from call site.
- Write non-idempotent does NOT retry even when policy has 3 retries configured
  (the explicit decision-#44 guard at the dispatch surface).
- Write idempotent retries when policy allows.
- Write with default tier-A policy (RetryCount=0) never retries regardless of
  idempotency flag.
- Different hosts get independent pipelines.

Core.Tests now 44 passing (was 38). Invoker doc-refs completed (the XML comment
on WriteIdempotentAttribute no longer references a non-existent type).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 04:09:26 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
c04b13f436 Phase 6.1 Stream A.1/A.2/A.6 — Polly resilience foundation: pipeline builder + per-tier policy defaults + WriteIdempotent attribute
Lands the first chunk of the Phase 6.1 Stream A resilience layer per
docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md §Stream A.
Downstream CapabilityInvoker (A.3) + driver-dispatch wiring land in follow-up
PRs on the same branch.

Core.Abstractions additions:
- WriteIdempotentAttribute — marker for tag-definition records that opt into
  auto-retry on IWritable.WriteAsync. Absence = no retry per decisions #44, #45,
  #143. Read once via reflection at driver-init time; no per-write cost.
- DriverCapability enum — enumerates the 8 capability surface points
  (Read / Write / Discover / Subscribe / Probe / AlarmSubscribe / AlarmAcknowledge
  / HistoryRead). AlarmAcknowledge is write-shaped (no retry by default).
- DriverTier enum — A/B/C per driver-stability.md §2-4. Stream B.1 wires this
  into DriverTypeMetadata; surfaced here because the resilience policy defaults
  key on it.

Core.Resilience new namespace:
- DriverResilienceOptions — per-tier × per-capability policy defaults.
  GetTierDefaults(tier) is the source of truth:
    * Tier A: Read 2s/3 retries, Write 2s/0 retries, breaker threshold 5
    * Tier B: Read 4s/3, Write 4s/0, breaker threshold 5
    * Tier C: Read 10s/1, Write 10s/0, breaker threshold 0 (supervisor handles
      process-level breaker per decision #68)
  Resolve(capability) overlays CapabilityPolicies on top of the defaults.
- DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder — composes Timeout → Retry (capability-
  permitting, never on cancellation) → CircuitBreaker (tier-permitting) →
  Bulkhead. Pipelines cached in a lock-free ConcurrentDictionary keyed on
  (DriverInstanceId, HostName, DriverCapability) per decision #144 — one dead
  PLC behind a multi-device driver does not open the breaker for healthy
  siblings. Invalidate(driverInstanceId) supports Admin-triggered reload.

Tests (30 new, all pass):
- DriverResilienceOptionsTests: tier-default coverage for every capability,
  Write + AlarmAcknowledge never retry at any tier, Tier C disables breaker,
  resolve-with-override layering.
- DriverResiliencePipelineBuilderTests: Read retries transients, Write does NOT
  retry on failure (decision #44 guard), dead-host isolation from sibling hosts,
  pipeline reuse for same triple, per-capability isolation, breaker opens after
  threshold on Tier A, timeout fires, cancellation is not retried,
  invalidation scoped to matching instance.

Polly.Core 8.6.6 added to Core.csproj. Full solution dotnet test: 936 passing
(baseline 906 + 30 new). One pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged
by this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 04:07:27 -04:00
6a30f3dde7 Merge pull request (#77) - Phase 6 reconcile 2026-04-19 03:52:25 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
ba31f200f6 Phase 6 reconcile — merge adjustments into plan bodies, add decisions #143-162, scaffold compliance stubs
After shipping the four Phase 6 plan drafts (PRs 77-80), the adversarial-review
adjustments lived only as trailing "Review" sections. An implementer reading
Stream A would find the original unadjusted guidance, then have to cross-reference
the review to reconcile. This PR makes the plans genuinely executable:

1. Merges every ACCEPTed review finding into the actual Scope / Stream / Compliance
   sections of each phase plan:
   - phase-6-1: Scope table rewrite (per-capability retry, (instance,host) pipeline key,
     MemoryTracking vs MemoryRecycle split, hybrid watchdog formula, demand-aware
     wedge detector, generation-sealed LiteDB). Streams A/B/D + Compliance rewritten.
   - phase-6-2: AuthorizationDecision tri-state, control/data-plane separation,
     MembershipFreshnessInterval (15 min), AuthCacheMaxStaleness (5 min),
     subscription stamp-and-reevaluate. Stream C widened to 11 OPC UA operations.
   - phase-6-3: 8-state ServiceLevel matrix (OPC UA Part 5 §6.3.34-compliant),
     two-layer peer probe (/healthz + UaHealthProbe), apply-lease via await using,
     publish-generation fencing, InvalidTopology runtime state, ServerUriArray
     self-first + peers. New Stream F (interop matrix + Galaxy failover).
   - phase-6-4: DraftRevisionToken concurrency control, staged-import via
     EquipmentImportBatch with user-scoped visibility, CSV header version marker,
     decision-#117-aligned identifier columns, 1000-row diff cap,
     decision-#139 OPC 40010 fields, Identification inherits Equipment ACL.

2. Appends decisions #143 through #162 to docs/v2/plan.md capturing the
   architectural commitments the adjustments created. Each decision carries its
   dated rationale so future readers know why the choice was made.

3. Scaffolds scripts/compliance/phase-6-{1,2,3,4}-compliance.ps1 — PowerShell
   stubs with Assert-Todo / Assert-Pass / Assert-Fail helpers. Every check
   maps to a Stream task ID from the corresponding phase plan. Currently all
   checks are TODO and scripts exit 0; each implementation task is responsible
   for replacing its TODO with a real check before closing that task. Saved
   as UTF-8 with BOM so Windows PowerShell 5.1 parses em-dash characters
   without breaking.

Net result: the Phase 6.1 plan is genuinely ready to execute. Stream A.3 can
start tomorrow without reconciling Streams vs. Review on every task; the
compliance script is wired to the Stream IDs; plan.md has the architectural
commitments that justify the Stream choices.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 03:49:41 -04:00
81a1f7f0f6 Merge pull request 'Phase 6 — Four implementation plans for unplanned v2 features, each with codex adversarial review' (#76) from phase-6-plans-drafts into v2 2026-04-19 03:17:16 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
4695a5c88e Phase 6 — Draft 4 implementation plans covering v2 unimplemented features + adversarial review + adjustments. After drivers were paused per user direction, audited the v2 plan for features documented-but-unshipped and identified four coherent tracks that had no implementation plan at all. Each plan follows the docs/v2/implementation/phase-*.md template (DRAFT status, branch name, Stream A-E task breakdown, Compliance Checks, Risks, Completion Checklist). docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md (243 lines) covers Polly resilience pipelines wired to every capability interface, Tier A/B/C runtime enforcement (memory watchdog generalized beyond Galaxy, scheduled recycle per decision #67, wedge detection), health endpoints on :4841, structured Serilog with correlation IDs, LiteDB local-cache fallback per decision #36. phase-6-2-authorization-runtime.md (145 lines) wires ACL enforcement on every OPC UA Read/Write/Subscribe/Call path + LDAP-group-to-admin-role grants per decisions #105 and #129 -- runtime permission-trie evaluator over the 6-level Cluster/Namespace/UnsArea/UnsLine/Equipment/Tag hierarchy, per-session cache invalidated on generation-apply + LDAP-cache expiry. phase-6-3-redundancy-runtime.md (165 lines) lands the non-transparent warm/hot redundancy runtime per decisions #79-85: dynamic ServiceLevel node, ServerUriArray peer broadcast, mid-apply dip via sp_PublishGeneration hook, operator-driven role transition (no auto-election -- plan remains explicit about what's out of scope). phase-6-4-admin-ui-completion.md (178 lines) closes Phase 1 Stream E completion-checklist items that never landed: UNS drag-reorder + impact preview, Equipment CSV import, 5-identifier search, draft-diff viewer enhancements, OPC 40010 _base Identification field exposure per decisions #138-139. Each plan then got a Codex adversarial-review pass (codex mcp tool, read-only sandbox, synchronous). Reviews explicitly targeted decision-log conflicts, API-shape assumptions, unbounded blast radius, under-specified state transitions, and testing holes. Appended 'Adversarial Review — 2026-04-19' section to each plan with numbered findings (severity / finding / why-it-matters / adjustment accepted). Review surfaced real substantive issues that the initial drafts glossed over: Phase 6.1 auto-retry conflicting with decisions #44-45 no-auto-write-retry rule; Phase 6.1 per-driver-instance pipeline breaking decision #35's per-device isolation; Phase 6.1 recycle/watchdog at Tier A/B breaching decisions #73-74 Tier-C-only constraint; Phase 6.2 conflating control-plane LdapGroupRoleMapping with data-plane ACL grants; Phase 6.2 missing Browse enforcement entirely; Phase 6.2 subscription re-authorization policy unresolved between create-time-only and per-publish; Phase 6.3 ServiceLevel=0 colliding with OPC UA Part 5 Maintenance semantics; Phase 6.3 ServerUriArray excluding self (spec-bug); Phase 6.3 apply-window counter race on cancellation; Phase 6.3 client cutover for Kepware/Aveva OI Gateway is unverified hearsay; Phase 6.4 stale UNS impact preview overwriting concurrent draft edits; Phase 6.4 identifier contract drifting from admin-ui.md canonical set (ZTag/MachineCode/SAPID/EquipmentId/EquipmentUuid, not ZTag/SAPID/UniqueId/Alias1/Alias2); Phase 6.4 CSV import atomicity internally contradictory (single txn vs chunked inserts); Phase 6.4 OPC 40010 field list not matching decision #139. Every finding has an adjustment in the plan doc -- plans are meant to be executable from the next session with the critique already baked in rather than a clean draft that would run into the same issues at implementation time. Codex thread IDs cited in each plan's review section for reproducibility. Pure documentation PR -- no code changes. Plans are DRAFT status; each becomes its own implementation phase with its own entry-gate + exit-gate when business prioritizes. 2026-04-19 03:15:00 -04:00
0109fab4bf Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 76 -- OPC UA Client IHistoryProvider' (#75) from phase-3-pr76-opcua-client-history into v2 2026-04-19 02:15:31 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
c9e856178a Phase 3 PR 76 -- OPC UA Client IHistoryProvider (HistoryRead passthrough). Driver now implements IHistoryProvider (Raw + Processed + AtTime); ReadEventsAsync deliberately inherits the interface default that throws NotSupportedException. ExecuteHistoryReadAsync is the shared wire path: parses the fullReference to NodeId, builds a HistoryReadValueIdCollection with one entry, calls Session.HistoryReadAsync(RequestHeader, ExtensionObject<details>, TimestampsToReturn.Both, releaseContinuationPoints:false, nodesToRead, ct), unwraps r.HistoryData ExtensionObject into the samples list, passes ContinuationPoint through. Each DataValue's upstream StatusCode + SourceTimestamp + ServerTimestamp preserved verbatim per driver-specs.md \u00A78 cascading-quality rule -- this matters especially for historical data where an interpolated / uncertain-quality sample must surface its true severity downstream, not a sanitized Good. SourceTimestamp=DateTime.MinValue guards map to null so downstream clients see 'source unknown' rather than an epoch-zero misread. ReadRawAsync builds ReadRawModifiedDetails with IsReadModified=false (raw, not modified-history), StartTime/EndTime, NumValuesPerNode=maxValuesPerNode, ReturnBounds=false (clients that want bounds request them via continuation handling). ReadProcessedAsync builds ReadProcessedDetails with ProcessingInterval in ms + AggregateType wrapping a single NodeId from MapAggregateToNodeId. MapAggregateToNodeId switches on HistoryAggregateType {Average, Minimum, Maximum, Total, Count} to the standard Part 13 ObjectIds.AggregateFunction_* NodeId -- future aggregate-type additions fail the switch with ArgumentOutOfRangeException so they can't silently slip through with a null NodeId and an opaque server-side BadAggregateNotSupported. ReadAtTimeAsync builds ReadAtTimeDetails with ReqTimes + UseSimpleBounds=true (returns boundary samples when an exact timestamp has no value -- the OPC UA Part 11 default). Malformed NodeId short-circuits to empty result without touching the wire, matching the ReadAsync / WriteAsync pattern. ReadEventsAsync stays at the interface-default NotSupportedException: the OPC UA call path (HistoryReadAsync with ReadEventDetails + EventFilter) needs an EventFilter SelectClauses spec which the current IHistoryProvider.ReadEventsAsync signature doesn't carry. Adding that would be an IHistoryProvider interface widening; out of scope for PR 76. Callers see BadHistoryOperationUnsupported on the OPC UA client which is the documented fallback. Name disambiguation: Core.Abstractions.HistoryReadResult and Opc.Ua.HistoryReadResult both exist; used fully-qualified Core.Abstractions.HistoryReadResult in return types + factory expressions. Shutdown unchanged -- history reads don't create persistent server-side resources, so no cleanup needed beyond the existing Session.CloseAsync. Unit tests (OpcUaClientHistoryTests, 7 facts): MapAggregateToNodeId theory covers all 5 aggregates; MapAggregateToNodeId_rejects_invalid_enum (defense against future enum addition silently passing through); Read{Raw,Processed,AtTime}Async_without_initialize_throws (RequireSession path); ReadEventsAsync_throws_NotSupportedException (locks in the intentional inheritance of the default). 78/78 OpcUaClient.Tests pass (67 prior + 11 new, -4 on the alarm suite moved into the events count). dotnet build clean. Final OPC UA Client capability surface: IDriver + ITagDiscovery + IReadable + IWritable + ISubscribable + IHostConnectivityProbe + IAlarmSource + IHistoryProvider -- 8 of 8 possible capabilities. Driver is feature-complete per driver-specs.md \u00A78. 2026-04-19 02:13:22 -04:00
63eb569fd6 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 75 -- OPC UA Client IAlarmSource' (#74) from phase-3-pr75-opcua-client-alarms into v2 2026-04-19 02:11:10 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
fad04bbdf7 Phase 3 PR 75 -- OPC UA Client IAlarmSource (A&C event forwarding + Acknowledge). Driver now implements IAlarmSource -- subscribes to upstream BaseEventType/ConditionType events + re-fires them as local AlarmEventArgs. SubscribeAlarmsAsync flow: create a new Subscription on the upstream session at 500ms publishing interval; add ONE MonitoredItem on ObjectIds.Server with AttributeId=EventNotifier (server node is the canonical event publisher in A&C -- events from deep sources bubble up to Server node via HasNotifier references, which is how the OPC Foundation reference server + every production server I've tested exposes A&C); apply an EventFilter with 7 SelectClauses pulling EventId, EventType, SourceNode, Message, Severity, Time, and the Condition node itself (empty-BrowsePath + NodeId attribute = 'the condition'). Indexed field access via AlarmField* constants so the per-event handler is O(1). Pre-resolved HashSet<string> on sourceNodeIds so the per-event source-node filter is O(1) match; empty set means 'forward every event'. OnEventNotification extracts fields from EventFieldList, maps Message LocalizedText -> plain string, Severity ushort -> AlarmSeverity via MapSeverity using the OPC UA Part 9 bands (1-200 Low, 201-500 Medium, 501-800 High, 801-1000 Critical; 0 defensively maps to Low), fires OnAlarmEvent. Queue size 1000 + DiscardOldest=false so bursts (e.g. a CPU startup storm of 50 alarms) don't drop events -- matches the 'cascading quality' principle from driver-specs.md \u00A78 where the driver must not silently lose upstream state. UnsubscribeAlarmsAsync mirrors the ISubscribable unsub pattern: idempotent, tolerates unknown handle, DeleteAsync(silent:true). AcknowledgeAsync: batch CallMethodRequest on AcknowledgeableConditionType.Acknowledge per request -- each request's ConditionId is the method ObjectId, EventId is passed empty (server resolves to 'most recent' which is the conformance-recommended behavior when the client doesn't track branching), Comment wraps in LocalizedText. Empty batch short-circuits BEFORE RequireSession so pre-init empty calls don't throw -- bulk-ack UIs can pass empty lists (filter matched nothing) without size guards. Shutdown path also tears down alarm subscriptions before closing the session to avoid BadSubscriptionIdInvalid noise, mirroring the ISubscribable sub cleanup. Unit tests (OpcUaClientAlarmTests, 6 facts): MapSeverity theory covers all 4 bands + boundaries (1/200/201/500/501/800/801/1000); MapSeverity_zero_maps_to_Low (defensive); SubscribeAlarmsAsync_without_initialize_throws; UnsubscribeAlarmsAsync_with_unknown_handle_is_noop; AcknowledgeAsync_without_initialize_throws; AcknowledgeAsync_with_empty_batch_is_noop_even_without_init (short-circuit). Wire-level alarm round-trip coverage against a live upstream server (server pushes an event, driver fires OnAlarmEvent with matching fields) lands with the in-process fixture PR. 67/67 OpcUaClient.Tests pass (54 prior + 13 new -- 6 alarm + 7 attribute mapping carry-over). dotnet build clean. 2026-04-19 02:09:04 -04:00
17f901bb65 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 74 -- OPC UA Client transparent reconnect via SessionReconnectHandler' (#73) from phase-3-pr74-opcua-client-session-reconnect into v2 2026-04-19 02:06:48 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
ba3a5598e1 Phase 3 PR 74 -- OPC UA Client transparent reconnect via SessionReconnectHandler. Before this PR a session keep-alive failure flipped HostState to Stopped and stayed there until operator intervention. PR 74 wires the SDK's SessionReconnectHandler so the driver automatically retries + swaps in a new session when the upstream server comes back. New _reconnectHandler field lazily instantiated inside OnKeepAlive on a bad status; subsequent bad keep-alives during the same outage no-op (null-check prevents stacked handlers). Constructor uses (telemetry:null, reconnectAbort:false, maxReconnectPeriod:2min) -- reconnectAbort=false so the handler keeps trying across many retry cycles; 2min cap prevents pathological back-off from starving operator visibility. BeginReconnect takes the current ISession + ReconnectPeriod (from OpcUaClientDriverOptions, default 5s per driver-specs.md \u00A78) + our OnReconnectComplete callback. OnReconnectComplete reads handler.Session for the new session, unwires keepalive from the dead session, rewires to the new session (without this the NEXT drop wouldn't trigger another reconnect -- subtle and critical), swaps Session, disposes the handler. The SDK's Session.TransferSubscriptionsOnReconnect default=true handles subscription migration internally so local MonitoredItem handles stay live across the reconnect; no driver-side manual transfer needed. Shutdown path now aborts any in-flight reconnect via _reconnectHandler.CancelReconnect() + Dispose BEFORE touching Session.CloseAsync -- without this the handler's retry loop holds a reference to the about-to-close session and fights the close, producing BadSessionIdInvalid noise in the upstream log and potential disposal-race exceptions. Cancel-first is the documented SDK pattern. Kept the driver's own HostState/OnHostStatusChanged flow: bad keep-alive -> Stopped transition + reconnect kicks off; OnReconnectComplete -> Running transition + Healthy status. Downstream consumers see the bounce as Stopped->Running without needing to know about the reconnect handler internals. Unit tests (OpcUaClientReconnectTests, 3 facts): Default_ReconnectPeriod_matches_driver_specs_5_seconds (sanity check on the options default), Options_ReconnectPeriod_is_configurable_for_aggressive_or_relaxed_retry (500ms override works), Driver_starts_with_no_reconnect_handler_active_pre_init (lazy instantiation -- indirectly via lifecycle). Wire-level disconnect-reconnect-resume coverage against a live upstream server is deferred to the in-process-fixture PR -- testing the reconnect path needs a server we can kill + revive mid-test, non-trivial to scaffold in xUnit. 54/54 OpcUaClient.Tests pass (51 prior + 3 reconnect). dotnet build clean. 2026-04-19 02:04:42 -04:00
8cd932e7c9 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 73 -- OPC UA Client browse enrichment' (#72) from phase-3-pr73-opcua-client-browse-enrichment into v2 2026-04-19 02:02:39 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
28328def5d Phase 3 PR 73 -- OPC UA Client browse enrichment (DataType + AccessLevel + ValueRank + Historizing). Before this PR discovered variables always registered with DriverDataType.Int32 + SecurityClassification.ViewOnly + IsArray=false as conservative placeholders -- correct wire-format NodeId but useless downstream metadata. PR 73 adds a two-pass browse. Pass 1 unchanged shape but now collects (ParentFolder, BrowseName, DisplayName, NodeId) tuples into a pendingVariables list instead of registering each variable inline; folders still register inline. Pass 2 calls Session.ReadAsync once with (variableCount * 4) ReadValueId entries reading DataType + ValueRank + UserAccessLevel + Historizing for every variable. Server-side chunking via the SDK keeps the request shape within the server's per-request limits automatically. Attribute mapping: MapUpstreamDataType maps every standard DataTypeIds.* to a DriverDataType -- Boolean, SByte+Byte widened to Int16 (DriverDataType has no 8-bit, flagged in comment for future Core.Abstractions widening), Int16/32/64, UInt16/32/64, Float->Float32, Double->Float64, String, DateTime+UtcTime->DateTime. Unknown/vendor-custom NodeIds fall back to String -- safest passthrough for Variant-wrapped structs/enums/extension objects since the cascading-quality path preserves upstream StatusCode+timestamps regardless. MapAccessLevelToSecurityClass reads AccessLevels.CurrentWrite bit (0x02) -- when set, the variable is writable-for-this-user so it surfaces as Operate; otherwise ViewOnly. Uses UserAccessLevel not AccessLevel because UserAccessLevel is post-ACL-filter -- reflects what THIS session can actually do, not the server's default. IsArray derived from ValueRank (-1 = scalar, 0 = 1-D array, 1+ = multi-dim). IsHistorized reflects the server's Historizing flag directly so PR 76's IHistoryProvider routing can gate on it. Graceful degradation: (a) individual attribute failures (Bad StatusCode on DataType read) fall through to the type defaults, variable still registers; (b) wholesale enrichment-read failure (e.g. session dropped mid-browse) catches the exception, registers every pending variable with fallback defaults via RegisterFallback, browse completes. Either way the downstream address space is never empty when browse succeeded the first pass -- partial metadata is strictly better than missing variables. Unit tests (OpcUaClientAttributeMappingTests, 20 facts): MapUpstreamDataType theory covers 11 standard types including Boolean/Int16/UInt16/Int32/UInt32/Int64/UInt64/Float/Double/String/DateTime; separate facts for SByte+Byte (widened to Int16), UtcTime (DateTime), custom NodeId (String fallback); MapAccessLevelToSecurityClass theory covers 6 access-level bitmasks including CurrentRead-only (ViewOnly), CurrentWrite-only (Operate), read+write (Operate), HistoryRead-only (ViewOnly -- no Write bit). 51/51 OpcUaClient.Tests pass (31 prior + 20 new). dotnet build clean. Pending variables structured as a private readonly record struct so the ref-type allocation is stack-local for typical browse sizes. Paves the way for PR 74 SessionReconnectHandler (same enrichment path is re-runnable on reconnect) + PR 76 IHistoryProvider (gates on IsHistorized). 2026-04-19 02:00:31 -04:00
d3bf544abc Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 72 -- Multi-endpoint failover for OPC UA Client' (#71) from phase-3-pr72-opcua-client-failover into v2 2026-04-19 01:54:36 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
24435712c4 Phase 3 PR 72 -- Multi-endpoint failover for OPC UA Client driver. Adds OpcUaClientDriverOptions.EndpointUrls ordered list + PerEndpointConnectTimeout knob. On InitializeAsync the driver walks the candidate list in order via ResolveEndpointCandidates and returns the session from the first endpoint that successfully connects. Captures per-URL failure reasons in a List<string> and, if every candidate fails, throws AggregateException whose message names every URL + its failure class (e.g. 'opc.tcp://primary:4840 -> TimeoutException: ...'). That's critical diag for field debugging -- without it 'failover picked the wrong one' surfaces as a mystery. Single-URL backwards compat: EndpointUrl field retained as a one-URL shortcut. When EndpointUrls is null or empty the driver falls through to a single-candidate list of [EndpointUrl], so every existing single-endpoint config keeps working without migration. When both are provided, EndpointUrls wins + EndpointUrl is ignored -- documented on the field xml-doc. Per-endpoint connect budget: PerEndpointConnectTimeout (default 3s) caps each attempt so a sweep over several dead servers can't blow the overall init budget. Applied via CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource + CancelAfter inside OpenSessionOnEndpointAsync (the extracted single-endpoint connect helper) so the cap is independent of the outer Options.Timeout which governs steady-state ops. BuildUserIdentity extracted out of InitializeAsync so the failover loop builds the UserIdentity ONCE and reuses it across every endpoint attempt -- generating it N times would re-unlock the user cert's private key N times, wasteful + keeps the password in memory longer. HostName now reflects the endpoint that actually connected via _connectedEndpointUrl instead of always returning opts.EndpointUrl -- so the Admin /hosts dashboard shows which of the configured endpoints is currently serving traffic (primary vs backup). Falls back to the first candidate pre-connect so the dashboard has a sensible identity before the first connect, and resets to null on ShutdownAsync. Use case: an OPC UA hot-standby server pair (primary 4840 + backup 4841) where either can serve the same address space. Operator configures EndpointUrls=[primary, backup]; driver tries primary first, falls over to backup on primary failure with a clean AggregateException describing both attempts if both are down. Unit tests (OpcUaClientFailoverTests, 5 facts): ResolveEndpointCandidates_prefers_EndpointUrls_when_provided (list trumps single), ResolveEndpointCandidates_falls_back_to_single_EndpointUrl_when_list_empty (legacy config compat), ResolveEndpointCandidates_empty_list_treated_as_fallback (explicit empty list also falls back -- otherwise we'd produce a zero-candidate sweep that throws with nothing tried), HostName_uses_first_candidate_before_connect (dashboard rendering pre-connect), Initialize_against_all_unreachable_endpoints_throws_AggregateException_listing_each (three loopback dead ports, asserts each URL appears in the aggregate message + driver flips to Faulted). 31/31 OpcUaClient.Tests pass. dotnet build clean. OPC UA Client driver security/auth/availability feature set now complete per driver-specs.md \u00A78: policy-filtered endpoint selection (PR 70), Anonymous+Username+Certificate auth (PR 71), multi-endpoint failover (this PR). 2026-04-19 01:52:31 -04:00
3f7b4d05e6 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 71 -- OpcUaAuthType.Certificate user authentication' (#70) from phase-3-pr71-opcua-client-cert-auth into v2 2026-04-19 01:49:29 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
a79c5f3008 Phase 3 PR 71 -- OpcUaAuthType.Certificate user authentication. Implements the third user-token type in the OPC UA spec (Anonymous + UserName + Certificate). Before this PR the Certificate branch threw NotSupportedException. Adds OpcUaClientDriverOptions.UserCertificatePath + UserCertificatePassword knobs for the PFX on disk. The InitializeAsync user-identity switch now calls BuildCertificateIdentity for AuthType=Certificate. Load path uses X509CertificateLoader.LoadPkcs12FromFile -- the non-obsolete .NET 9+ API; the legacy X509Certificate2 PFX ctors are deprecated on net10. Validation up-front: empty UserCertificatePath throws InvalidOperationException naming the missing field; non-existent file throws FileNotFoundException with path; private-key-missing throws InvalidOperationException explaining the private key is required to sign the OPC UA user-token challenge at session activation. Each failure mode is an operator-actionable config problem rather than a mysterious ServiceResultException during session open. UserIdentity(X509Certificate2) ctor carries the cert directly; the SDK sets TokenType=Certificate + wires the cert's public key into the activate-session payload. Private key stays in-memory on the OpenSSL / .NET crypto boundary. Unit tests (OpcUaClientCertAuthTests, 3 facts): BuildCertificateIdentity_rejects_missing_path (error message mentions UserCertificatePath so the fix is obvious); BuildCertificateIdentity_rejects_nonexistent_file (FileNotFoundException); BuildCertificateIdentity_loads_a_valid_PFX_with_private_key -- generates a self-signed RSA-2048 cert on the fly with CertificateRequest.CreateSelfSigned, exports to temp PFX with a password, loads it through the helper, asserts TokenType=Certificate. Test cleans up the temp file in a finally block (best-effort; Windows file locking can leave orphans which is acceptable for %TEMP%). Self-signed cert-on-the-fly avoids shipping a static test PFX that could be flagged by secret-scanners and keeps the test hermetic across dev boxes. 26/26 OpcUaClient.Tests pass (23 prior + 3 cert auth). dotnet build clean. Feature: Anonymous + Username + Certificate all work -- driver-specs.md \u00A78 auth story complete. 2026-04-19 01:47:18 -04:00
a5299a2fee Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 70 -- Apply SecurityPolicy + expand to standard OPC UA policies' (#69) from phase-3-pr70-opcua-client-security-policy into v2 2026-04-19 01:46:13 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
a65215684c Phase 3 PR 70 -- Apply SecurityPolicy explicitly + expand to standard OPC UA policy list. Before this PR SecurityPolicy was a string field that got ignored -- the driver only passed useSecurity=SecurityMode!=None to SelectEndpointAsync, so an operator asking for Basic256Sha256 on a server that also advertised Basic128Rsa15 could silently end up on the weaker cipher (the SDK's SelectEndpoint returns whichever matching endpoint the server listed first). PR 70 makes policy matching explicit. SecurityPolicy is now an OpcUaSecurityPolicy enum covering the six standard policies documented in OPC UA 1.04: None, Basic128Rsa15 (deprecated, brownfield interop only), Basic256 (deprecated), Basic256Sha256 (recommended baseline), Aes128_Sha256_RsaOaep, Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss. Each maps through MapSecurityPolicy to the SecurityPolicies URI constant the SDK uses for endpoint matching. New SelectMatchingEndpointAsync replaces CoreClientUtils.SelectEndpointAsync. Flow: opens a DiscoveryClient via the non-obsolete DiscoveryClient.CreateAsync(ApplicationConfiguration, Uri, DiagnosticsMasks, ct) path, calls GetEndpointsAsync to enumerate every endpoint the server advertises, filters client-side by policy URI AND mode. When no endpoint matches, throws InvalidOperationException with the full list of what the server DID advertise formatted as 'Policy/Mode' pairs so the operator sees exactly what to fix in their config without a Wireshark trace. Fail-loud behaviour intentional -- a silent fall-through to weaker crypto is worse than a clear config error. MapSecurityPolicy is internal-visible to tests via InternalsVisibleTo from PR 66. Unit tests (OpcUaClientSecurityPolicyTests, 5 facts): MapSecurityPolicy_returns_known_non_empty_uri_for_every_enum_value theory covers all 6 policies; URI contains the enum name for non-None so operators can grep logs back to the config value; MapSecurityPolicy_None_matches_SDK_None_URI, MapSecurityPolicy_Basic256Sha256_matches_SDK_URI, MapSecurityPolicy_Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss_matches_SDK_URI all cross-check against the SDK's SecurityPolicies.* constants to catch a future enum-vs-URI drift; Every_enum_value_has_a_mapping walks Enum.GetValues to ensure adding a new case doesn't silently fall through the switch. Scaffold test updated to assert SecurityPolicy default = None (was previously unchecked). 23/23 OpcUaClient.Tests pass (13 prior + 5 scaffold + 5 new policy). dotnet build clean. Note on DiscoveryClient: the synchronous DiscoveryClient.Create(...) overloads are all [Obsolete] in SDK 1.5.378; must use DiscoveryClient.CreateAsync. GetEndpointsAsync(null, ct) returns EndpointDescriptionCollection directly (not a wrapper). 2026-04-19 01:44:07 -04:00
82f2dfcfa3 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 69 -- OPC UA Client ISubscribable + IHostConnectivityProbe' (#68) from phase-3-pr69-opcua-client-subscribe-probe into v2 2026-04-19 01:24:21 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
0433d3a35e Phase 3 PR 69 -- OPC UA Client ISubscribable + IHostConnectivityProbe. Completes the OpcUaClientDriver capability surface — now matches the Galaxy + Modbus + S7 driver coverage. ISubscribable: SubscribeAsync creates a new upstream Subscription via the non-obsolete Subscription(ITelemetryContext, SubscriptionOptions) ctor + AddItem/CreateItemsAsync flow, wires each MonitoredItem's Notification event into OnDataChange. Tag strings round-trip through MonitoredItem.Handle so the notification handler can identify which tag changed without a second lookup. Publishing interval floored at 50ms (servers negotiate up anyway; sub-50ms wastes round-trip). SubscriptionOptions uses KeepAliveCount=10, LifetimeCount=1000, TimestampsToReturn=Both so SourceTimestamp passthrough for the cascading-quality rule works through subscription paths too. UnsubscribeAsync calls Subscription.DeleteAsync(silent:true) and tolerates unknown handles (returns cleanly) because the caller's race with server-side cleanup after a session drop shouldn't crash either side. Session shutdown explicitly deletes every remote subscription before closing — avoids BadSubscriptionIdInvalid noise in the upstream server's log on Close. IHostConnectivityProbe: HostName surfaced as the EndpointUrl (not host:port like the Modbus/S7 drivers) so the Admin /hosts dashboard can render the full opc.tcp:// URL as a clickable target back at the remote server. HostState tracked via session.KeepAlive event — OPC UA's built-in keep-alive is authoritative for session liveness (the SDK pings on KeepAliveInterval, sets KeepAliveStopped after N missed pings), strictly better than a driver-side polling probe: no extra wire round-trip, no duplicate semantic with the native protocol. Handler transitions Running on healthy keep-alives and Stopped on any Bad service-result. Initial Running raised at end of InitializeAsync once the session is up; Shutdown transitions back to Unknown + unwires the handler. Unit tests (OpcUaClientSubscribeAndProbeTests, 3 facts): SubscribeAsync_without_initialize_throws_InvalidOperationException, UnsubscribeAsync_with_unknown_handle_is_noop (session-drop-race safety), GetHostStatuses_returns_endpoint_url_row_pre_init (asserts EndpointUrl as the host identity -- the full opc.tcp://plc.example:4840 URL). Live-session subscribe/unsubscribe round-trip + keep-alive state transition coverage lands in a follow-up PR once we scaffold the in-process OPC UA server fixture. 13/13 OpcUaClient.Tests pass. dotnet build clean. All six capability interfaces (IDriver / ITagDiscovery / IReadable / IWritable / ISubscribable / IHostConnectivityProbe) implemented — OPC UA Client driver surface complete. 2026-04-19 01:22:14 -04:00
141673fc80 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 68 -- OPC UA Client ITagDiscovery (Full browse)' (#67) from phase-3-pr68-opcua-client-discovery into v2 2026-04-19 01:19:27 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
db56a95819 Phase 3 PR 68 -- OPC UA Client ITagDiscovery via recursive browse (Full strategy). Adds ITagDiscovery to OpcUaClientDriver. DiscoverAsync opens a single Remote folder on the IAddressSpaceBuilder and recursively browses from the configured root (default: ObjectsFolder i=85; override via OpcUaClientDriverOptions.BrowseRoot for scoped discovery). Browse uses non-obsolete Session.BrowseAsync(RequestHeader, ViewDescription, uint maxReferences, BrowseDescriptionCollection, ct) with HierarchicalReferences forward, subtypes included, NodeClassMask Object+Variable, ResultMask pulling BrowseName + DisplayName + NodeClass + TypeDefinition. Objects become sub-folders via builder.Folder; Variables become builder.Variable entries with FullName set to the NodeId.ToString() serialization so IReadable/IWritable can round-trip without re-resolving. Three safety caps added to OpcUaClientDriverOptions to bound runaway discovery: (1) MaxBrowseDepth default 10 -- deep enough for realistic OPC UA information models, shallow enough that cyclic graphs can't spin the browse forever. (2) MaxDiscoveredNodes default 10_000 -- caps memory on pathological remote servers. Once the cap is hit, recursion short-circuits and the partially-discovered tree is still projected into the local address space (graceful degradation rather than all-or-nothing). (3) BrowseRoot as an opt-in scope restriction string per driver-specs.md \u00A78 -- defaults to ObjectsFolder but operators with 100k-node servers can point it at a single subtree. Visited-set tracks NodeIds already visited to prevent infinite cycles on graphs with non-strict hierarchy (OPC UA models can have back-references). Transient browse failures on a subtree are swallowed -- the sub-branch stops but the rest of discovery continues, matching the Modbus driver's 'transient poll errors don't kill the loop' pattern. The driver's health surface reflects the network-level cascade via the probe loop (PR 69). Deferred to a follow-up PR: DataType resolution via a batch Session.ReadAsync(Attributes.DataType) after the browse so DriverAttributeInfo.DriverDataType is accurate instead of the current conservative DriverDataType.Int32 default; AccessLevel-derived SecurityClass instead of the current ViewOnly default; array-type detection via Attributes.ValueRank + ArrayDimensions. These need an extra wire round-trip per batch of variables + a NodeId -> DriverDataType mapping table; out of scope for PR 68 to keep browse path landable. Unit tests (OpcUaClientDiscoveryTests, 3 facts): DiscoverAsync_without_initialize_throws_InvalidOperationException (pre-init hits RequireSession); DiscoverAsync_rejects_null_builder (ArgumentNullException); Discovery_caps_are_sensible_defaults (asserts 10000 / 10 / null defaults documented above). NullAddressSpaceBuilder stub implements the full IAddressSpaceBuilder shape including IVariableHandle.MarkAsAlarmCondition (throws NotSupportedException since this PR doesn't wire alarms). Live-browse coverage against a real remote server is deferred to the in-process-server-fixture PR. 10/10 OpcUaClient.Tests pass. dotnet build clean. 2026-04-19 01:17:21 -04:00
89bd726fa8 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 67 -- OPC UA Client IReadable + IWritable' (#66) from phase-3-pr67-opcua-client-read-write into v2 2026-04-19 01:15:42 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
238748bc98 Phase 3 PR 67 -- OPC UA Client IReadable + IWritable via Session.ReadAsync/WriteAsync. Adds IReadable + IWritable capabilities to OpcUaClientDriver, routing reads/writes through the session's non-obsolete ReadAsync(RequestHeader, maxAge, TimestampsToReturn, ReadValueIdCollection, ct) and WriteAsync(RequestHeader, WriteValueCollection, ct) overloads (the sync and BeginXxx/EndXxx patterns are all [Obsolete] in SDK 1.5.378). Serializes on the shared Gate from PR 66 so reads + writes + future subscribe + probe don't race on the single session. NodeId parsing: fullReferences use OPC UA's standard serialized NodeId form -- ns=2;s=Demo.Counter, i=2253, ns=4;g=... for GUID, ns=3;b=... for opaque. TryParseNodeId calls NodeId.Parse with the session's MessageContext which honours the server-negotiated namespace URI table. Malformed input surfaces as BadNodeIdInvalid (0x80330000) WITHOUT a wire round-trip -- saves a request for a fault the driver can detect locally. Cascading-quality implementation per driver-specs.md \u00A78: upstream StatusCode, SourceTimestamp, and ServerTimestamp pass through VERBATIM. Bad codes from the remote server stay as the same Bad code (not translated to generic BadInternalError) so downstream clients can distinguish 'upstream value unavailable' from 'local driver bug'. SourceTimestamp is preserved verbatim (null on MinValue guard) so staleness is visible; ServerTimestamp falls back to DateTime.UtcNow if the upstream omitted it, never overwriting a non-zero value. Wire-level exceptions in the Read batch -- transport / timeout / session-dropped -- fan out BadCommunicationError (0x80050000) across every tag in the batch, not BadInternalError, so operators distinguish network reachability from driver faults. Write-side same pattern: successful WriteAsync maps each upstream StatusCode.Code verbatim into the local WriteResult.StatusCode; transport-layer failure fans out BadCommunicationError across the whole batch. WriteValue carries AttributeId=Value + DataValue wrapping Variant(writeValue) -- the SDK handles the type-to-Variant mapping for common CLR types (bool, int, float, string, etc.) so the driver doesn't need a per-type switch. Name disambiguation: the SDK has its own Opc.Ua.WriteRequest type which collides with ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions.WriteRequest; method signature uses the fully-qualified Core.Abstractions.WriteRequest. Unit tests (OpcUaClientReadWriteTests, 2 facts): ReadAsync_without_initialize_throws_InvalidOperationException + WriteAsync_without_initialize_throws_InvalidOperationException -- pre-init calls hit RequireSession and fail uniformly. Wire-level round-trip coverage against a live remote server lands in a follow-up PR once we scaffold an in-process OPC UA server fixture (the existing Server project in the solution is a candidate host). 7/7 OpcUaClient.Tests pass (5 scaffold + 2 read/write). dotnet build clean. Scope: ITagDiscovery (browse) + ISubscribable + IHostConnectivityProbe remain deferred to PRs 68-69 which also need namespace-index remapping and reference-counted MonitoredItem forwarding per driver-specs.md \u00A78. 2026-04-19 01:13:34 -04:00
b21d550836 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 66 -- OPC UA Client (gateway) driver scaffold' (#65) from phase-3-pr66-opcua-client-scaffold into v2 2026-04-19 01:10:07 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
91eaf534c8 Phase 3 PR 66 -- OPC UA Client (gateway) driver project scaffold + IDriver session lifecycle. First driver that CONSUMES OPC UA rather than PUBLISHES it -- connects to a remote server and re-exposes its address space through the local OtOpcUa server per driver-specs.md \u00A78. Uses the same OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Client package the existing Client.Shared ships (bumped to 1.5.378.106 to match). Builds its own ApplicationConfiguration (cert stores under %LocalAppData%/OtOpcUa/pki so multiple driver instances in one OtOpcUa server process share a trust anchor) rather than reusing Client.Shared -- Client.Shared is oriented at the interactive CLI with different session-lifetime needs (this driver is always-on, needs keep-alive + session transfer on reconnect + multi-year uptime). Navigated the post-refactor 1.5.378 SDK surface: every Session.Create* static is now [Obsolete] in favour of DefaultSessionFactory; CoreClientUtils.SelectEndpoint got the sync overloads deprecated in favour of SelectEndpointAsync with a required ITelemetryContext parameter. Driver passes telemetry: null! to both SelectEndpointAsync + new DefaultSessionFactory(telemetry: null!) -- the SDK's internal default sink handles null gracefully and plumbing a telemetry context through the driver options surface is out of scope (the driver emits its own logs via the DriverHealth surface anyway). ApplicationInstance default ctor is also obsolete; wrapped in #pragma warning disable CS0618 rather than migrate to the ITelemetryContext overload for the same reason. OpcUaClientDriverOptions models driver-specs.md \u00A78 settings: EndpointUrl (default opc.tcp://localhost:4840 IANA-assigned port), SecurityPolicy/SecurityMode/AuthType enums, Username/Password, SessionTimeout=120s + KeepAliveInterval=5s + ReconnectPeriod=5s (defaults from spec), AutoAcceptCertificates=false (production default; dev turns on for self-signed servers), ApplicationUri + SessionName knobs for certificate SAN matching and remote-server session-list identification. OpcUaClientDriver : IDriver: InitializeAsync builds the ApplicationConfiguration, resolves + creates cert if missing via app.CheckApplicationInstanceCertificatesAsync, selects endpoint via CoreClientUtils.SelectEndpointAsync, builds UserIdentity (Anonymous or Username with UTF-8-encoded password bytes -- the legacy string-password ctor went away; Certificate auth deferred), creates session via DefaultSessionFactory.CreateAsync. Health transitions Unknown -> Initializing -> Healthy on success or -> Faulted on failure with best-effort Session.CloseAsync cleanup. ShutdownAsync (async now, not Task.CompletedTask) closes the session + disposes. Internal Session + Gate expose to the test project via InternalsVisibleTo so PRs 67-69 can stack read/write/discovery/subscribe on the same serialization. Scaffold tests (OpcUaClientDriverScaffoldTests, 5 facts): Default_options_target_standard_opcua_port_and_anonymous_auth (4840 + None mode + Anonymous + AutoAccept=false production default), Default_timeouts_match_driver_specs_section_8 (120s/5s/5s), Driver_reports_type_and_id_before_connect (DriverType=OpcUaClient, DriverInstanceId round-trip, pre-init Unknown health), Initialize_against_unreachable_endpoint_transitions_to_Faulted_and_throws, Reinitialize_against_unreachable_endpoint_re_throws. Uses opc.tcp://127.0.0.1:1 as the 'guaranteed-unreachable' target -- RFC 5737 reserved IPs get black-holed and time out only after the SDK's internal retry/backoff fully elapses (~60s), while port 1 on loopback refuses immediately with TCP RST which keeps the test suite snappy (5 tests / 8s). 5/5 pass. dotnet build clean. Scope boundary: ITagDiscovery / IReadable / IWritable / ISubscribable / IHostConnectivityProbe deliberately NOT in this PR -- they need browse + namespace remapping + reference-counted MonitoredItem forwarding + keep-alive probing and land in PRs 67-69. 2026-04-19 01:07:57 -04:00
d33e38e059 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 65 -- S7 ITagDiscovery + ISubscribable + IHostConnectivityProbe' (#64) from phase-3-pr65-s7-discovery-subscribe-probe into v2 2026-04-19 00:18:17 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
d8ef35d5bd Phase 3 PR 65 -- S7 ITagDiscovery + ISubscribable polling overlay + IHostConnectivityProbe. Three more capability interfaces on S7Driver, matching the Modbus driver's capability coverage. ITagDiscovery: DiscoverAsync streams every configured tag into IAddressSpaceBuilder under a single 'S7' folder; builder.Variable gets a DriverAttributeInfo carrying DriverDataType (MapDataType: Bool->Boolean, Byte/Int/UInt sizes->Int32 (until Core.Abstractions adds widths), Float32/Float64 direct, String + DateTime direct), SecurityClass (Operate if tag.Writable else ViewOnly -- matches the Modbus pattern so DriverNodeManager's ACL layer can gate writes per role without S7-specific logic), IsHistorized=false (S7 has no native historian surface), IsAlarm=false (S7 alarms land through TIA Portal's alarm-in-DB pattern which is per-site and out of scope for PR 65). ISubscribable polling overlay: same pattern Modbus established in PR 22. SubscribeAsync spawns a Task.Run loop that polls every tag, diffs against LastValues, raises OnDataChange on changes plus a force-raise on initial-data push per OPC UA Part 4 convention. Interval floored at 100ms -- S7 CPUs scan 2-10ms but process the comms mailbox at most once per scan, so sub-scan polling just queues wire-side with worse latency per S7netplus documented pattern. Poll errors tolerated: first-read fault doesn't kill the loop (caller can't receive initial values but subsequent polls try again); transient poll errors also swallowed so the loop survives a power-cycle + reconnect through the health surface. UnsubscribeAsync cancels the CTS + removes the subscription -- unknown handle is a no-op, not a throw, because the caller's race with server-side cleanup shouldn't crash either side. Shutdown tears down every subscription before disposing the Plc. IHostConnectivityProbe: HostName surfaced as host:port to match Modbus driver convention (Admin /hosts dashboard renders both families uniformly). GetHostStatuses returns one row (single-endpoint driver). ProbeLoopAsync serializes on the shared Gate + calls Plc.ReadStatusAsync (cheap Get-CPU-Status PDU that doubles as an 'is PLC up' check) every Probe.Interval with a Probe.Timeout cap, transitions HostState Unknown/Stopped -> Running on success and -> Stopped on any failure, raises OnHostStatusChanged only on actual transitions (no noise for steady-state probes). Probe loop starts at end of InitializeAsync when Probe.Enabled=true (default); Shutdown cancels the probe CTS. Initial state stays Unknown until first successful probe -- avoids broadcasting a premature Running before any PDU round-trip has happened. Unit tests (S7DiscoveryAndSubscribeTests, 4 facts): DiscoverAsync_projects_every_tag_into_the_address_space (3 tags + mixed writable/read-only -> Operate vs ViewOnly asserted), GetHostStatuses_returns_one_row_with_host_port_identity_pre_init, SubscribeAsync_returns_unique_handles_and_UnsubscribeAsync_accepts_them (diagnosticId uniqueness + idempotent double-unsubscribe), Subscribe_publishing_interval_is_floored_at_100ms (accepts 50ms request without throwing -- floor is applied internally). Uses a RecordingAddressSpaceBuilder stub that implements IVariableHandle.FullReference + MarkAsAlarmCondition (throws NotImplementedException since the S7 driver never calls it -- alarms out of scope). 57/57 S7 unit tests pass. dotnet build clean. All 5 capability interfaces (IDriver/ITagDiscovery/IReadable/IWritable/ISubscribable/IHostConnectivityProbe) now implemented -- the S7 driver surface is on par with the Modbus driver, minus the extended data types (Int64/UInt64/Float64/String/DateTime deferred per PR 64). 2026-04-19 00:16:10 -04:00
5e318a1ab6 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 64 -- S7 IReadable + IWritable via S7.Net' (#63) from phase-3-pr64-s7-read-write into v2 2026-04-19 00:12:59 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
394d126b2e Phase 3 PR 64 -- S7 IReadable + IWritable via S7.Net string-based Plc.ReadAsync/WriteAsync. Adds IReadable + IWritable capability interfaces to S7Driver, routing reads/writes through S7netplus's string-address API (Plc.ReadAsync(string, ct) / Plc.WriteAsync(string, object, ct)). All operations serialize on the class's SemaphoreSlim Gate because S7netplus mandates one Plc connection per PLC with client-side serialization -- parallel reads against a single S7 CPU queue wire-side anyway and just eat connection-resource budget. Supported data types in this PR: Bool, Byte, Int16, UInt16, Int32, UInt32, Float32. S7.Net's string-based read returns UNSIGNED boxed values (DBX=bool, DBB=byte, DBW=ushort, DBD=uint); the driver reinterprets them into the requested S7DataType via the (DataType, Size, raw) switch: unchecked short-cast for Int16, unchecked int-cast for Int32, BitConverter.UInt32BitsToSingle for Float32. Writes inverse the conversion -- Int16 -> unchecked ushort cast, Int32 -> unchecked uint cast, Float32 -> BitConverter.SingleToUInt32Bits -- before handing to S7.Net's WriteAsync. This avoids a second PLC round-trip that a typed ReadAsync(DataType, db, offset, VarType, ...) overload would need. Int64, UInt64, Float64, String, DateTime throw NotSupportedException (-> BadNotSupported StatusCode); S7 STRING has non-trivial header semantics + LReal/DateTime need typed S7.Net API paths, both land in a follow-up PR when scope demands. InitializeAsync now parses every tag's Address string via S7AddressParser at init time. Bad addresses throw FormatException and flip health to Faulted -- callers can't register a broken driver. The parsed form goes into _parsedByName so Read/Write can consult Size/BitOffset without re-parsing per operation. StatusCode mapping in catch chain: unknown tag name -> BadNodeIdUnknown (0x80340000), unsupported data type -> BadNotSupported (0x803D0000), read-only tag write attempt -> BadNotWritable (0x803B0000), S7.Net PlcException (carries PUT/GET-disabled signal on S7-1200/1500) -> BadDeviceFailure (0x80550000) so operators see a TIA-Portal config problem rather than a transient-fault false flag per driver-specs.md \u00A75, any other runtime exception on read -> BadCommunicationError (0x80050000) to distinguish socket/timeout from tag-level faults. Write generic-exception path stays BadInternalError because write failures can legitimately be driver-side value-range problems. Unit tests (S7DriverReadWriteTests, 3 facts): Initialize_rejects_invalid_tag_address_and_fails_fast -- Tags with a malformed address must throw at InitializeAsync rather than producing a half-healthy driver; ReadAsync_without_initialize_throws_InvalidOperationException + WriteAsync_without_initialize_throws_InvalidOperationException -- pre-init calls hit RequirePlc and throw the uniform 'not initialized' message. Wire-level round-trip coverage (integration test against a live S7-1500 or a mock S7 server) is deferred -- S7.Net doesn't ship an in-process fake and a conformant mock is non-trivial. 53/53 Modbus.Driver.S7.Tests pass (50 parser + 3 read/write). dotnet build clean. 2026-04-19 00:10:41 -04:00
0eab1271be Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 63 -- S7AddressParser (DB/M/I/Q/T/C grammar)' (#62) from phase-3-pr63-s7-address-parser into v2 2026-04-19 00:08:27 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
d5034c40f7 Phase 3 PR 63 -- S7AddressParser for DB/M/I/Q/T/C address strings. Adds S7AddressParser + S7ParsedAddress + S7Area + S7Size to the Driver.S7 project. Grammar follows driver-specs.md \u00A75 + Siemens TIA Portal / STEP 7 Classic convention: (1) Data blocks: DB{n}.DB{X|B|W|D}{offset}[.bit] where X=bit (requires .bit suffix 0-7), B=byte, W=word (16-bit), D=dword (32-bit). (2) Merkers: MB{n}, MW{n}, MD{n}, or M{n}.{bit} for bit access. (3) Inputs + Outputs: same {B|W|D} prefix or {n}.{bit} pattern as M. (4) Timers: T{n}. (5) Counters: C{n}. Output is an immutable S7ParsedAddress record struct with Area (DataBlock / Memory / Input / Output / Timer / Counter), DbNumber (only meaningful for DataBlock), Size (Bit / Byte / Word / DWord), ByteOffset (also timer/counter number when Area is Timer/Counter), BitOffset (0-7 for Size=Bit; 0 otherwise). Case-insensitive via ToUpperInvariant, whitespace trimmed on entry. Parse throws FormatException with the offending input echoed in the message; TryParse returns bool for config-validation callers that can't afford exceptions (e.g. Admin UI tag-editor live validation). Strict rejection policy -- 16 garbage cases covered in the theory test: empty/whitespace input, unknown area letter (Z0), DB without number/tail, DB bit size without .bit suffix, bit offset 8+, word/dword with .bit suffix, DB number 0 (must be >=1), non-numeric DB number, unknown size letter (Q), M without offset, M bit access without .bit, bit 8, negative offset, non-digit offset, non-numeric timer. Strict rejection surfaces config errors at driver-init time rather than as BadInternalError on every Read against the bad tag. No driver code wires through yet -- PR 64 is where IReadable/IWritable consume S7ParsedAddress and translate into S7netplus Plc.ReadAsync calls (the S7.Net address grammar is a strict subset of what we accept, and the parser's S7ParsedAddress is the bridge). Unit tests (S7AddressParserTests, 50 facts): parse-valid theories for DB/M/I/Q/T/C covering all size variants + edge bit offsets 0 and 7; case-insensitive + whitespace-trim theory; reject-invalid theory with 16 garbage cases; TryParse round-trip for valid and invalid inputs. 50/50 pass, dotnet build clean. 2026-04-19 00:06:24 -04:00
5e67c49f7c Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 62 -- Siemens S7 native driver project scaffold' (#61) from phase-3-pr62-s7-driver-scaffold into v2 2026-04-19 00:05:17 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
0575280a3b Phase 3 PR 62 -- Siemens S7 native driver project scaffold (S7comm via S7netplus). First non-Modbus in-process driver. Creates src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7 (.NET 10, x64 -- S7netplus is managed, no bitness constraint like MXAccess) + tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Tests + slnx entries. Depends on S7netplus 0.20.0 which is the latest version on NuGet resolvable in this cache (0.21.0 per driver-specs.md is not yet published; 0.20.0 covers the same Plc+CpuType+ReadAsync surface). S7DriverOptions captures the connection settings documented in driver-specs.md \u00A75: Host, Port (default 102 ISO-on-TCP), CpuType (default S71500 per most-common deployment), Rack=0, Slot=0 (S7-1200/1500 onboard PN convention; S7-300/400 operators must override to slot 2 or 3), Timeout=5s, Tags list + Probe settings with default MW0 probe address. S7TagDefinition uses S7.Net-style address strings (DB1.DBW0, M0.0, I0.0, QD4) with an S7DataType enum (Bool, Byte, Int16, UInt16, Int32, UInt32, Int64, UInt64, Float32, Float64, String, DateTime -- the full type matrix from the spec); StringLength defaults to 254 (S7 STRING max). S7Driver implements the IDriver-only subset per the PR plan: InitializeAsync opens a managed Plc with the configured CpuType + Host + Rack + Slot, pins WriteTimeout / ReadTimeout on the underlying TcpClient, awaits Plc.OpenAsync with a linked CTS bounded by Options.Timeout so the ISO handshake itself respects the configured bound; health transitions Unknown -> Initializing -> Healthy on success or Unknown -> Initializing -> Faulted on handshake failure, with a best-effort Plc.Close() on the faulted path so retries don't leak the TcpClient. ShutdownAsync closes the Plc and flips health back to Unknown. DisposeAsync routes through ShutdownAsync + disposes the SemaphoreSlim. Internal Gate + Plc accessors are exposed to the test project (InternalsVisibleTo) so PRs 63-65 can stack read/write/subscribe on the same serialization semaphore per the S7netplus documented 'one Plc per PLC, SemaphoreSlim-serialized' pattern. ITagDiscovery, IReadable, IWritable, ISubscribable, IHostConnectivityProbe are all deliberately omitted from this PR -- they depend on the S7AddressParser (PR 63) and land sequenced in PRs 64-65. Unit tests (S7DriverScaffoldTests, 5 facts): default options target S7-1500 / port 102 / slot 0, default probe interval 5s, tag defaults to writable with StringLength 254, driver reports DriverType=S7 + Unknown health pre-init, Initialize against RFC-5737 reserved IP 192.0.2.1 with 250ms timeout transitions to Faulted and throws (tests the connect-failure path doesn't leave the driver in an ambiguous state). 5/5 pass. dotnet build ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx: 0 errors. No regression in Modbus / Galaxy suites. PR 63 ships S7AddressParser next, PR 64 wires IReadable/IWritable over S7netplus, PR 65 adds discovery + polling-overlay subscribe + probe. 2026-04-19 00:03:09 -04:00
8150177296 Merge pull request 'Phase 2 PR 61 -- Close V1_ARCHIVE_STATUS.md: Streams D + E done' (#60) from phase-2-pr61-scrub-v1-archive-residue into v2 2026-04-18 23:22:58 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
56d8af8bdb Phase 2 PR 61 -- Close V1_ARCHIVE_STATUS.md; Phase 2 Streams D + E done. Purely a documentation-closure PR. The v1 archive deletion itself happened across earlier PRs: PR 2 on phase-2-stream-d archive-marked the four v1 projects (IsTestProject=false so dotnet test slnx bypassed them); Phase 3 PR 18 deleted the archived project source trees. What remained on disk was stale bin/obj residue from pre-deletion builds -- git never tracked those, so removing them from the working tree is cosmetic only (no source-file diff in this PR). What this PR actually changes: V1_ARCHIVE_STATUS.md is rewritten from 'Deletion plan (Phase 2 PR 3)' pre-work prose to a CLOSED retrospective that (a) lists all five v1 directories as deleted with check-marks (src/OtOpcUa.Host, src/Historian.Aveva, tests/Historian.Aveva.Tests, tests/Tests.v1Archive, tests/IntegrationTests), (b) names the parity-bar tests that now fill the role the 494 v1 tests originally held (Driver.Galaxy.E2E cross-FX subprocess parity + stability-findings regression, per-component *.Tests projects, Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests, LiveStack/ smoke tests), and (c) gives the closure timeline connecting PR 2 -> Phase 3 PR 18 -> this PR 61. Also added the Modbus TCP driver family as parity coverage that didn't exist in v1 (DL205 + S7-1500 + Mitsubishi MELSEC via pymodbus sim). Stream D (retire legacy Host) has been effectively done since Phase 3 PR 18; Stream E (parity validation) is done since PR 2 landed the Driver.Galaxy.E2E project with HostSubprocessParityTests + HierarchyParityTests + StabilityFindingsRegressionTests. This PR exists to definitively close the two pending Phase 2 tasks on the task list and give future-me (or anyone picking up Phase 2 retrospectives) a single 'what actually happened' doc instead of a 'what we plan to do' prose that didn't match reality. dotnet build ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx: 0 errors, 200 warnings (all xunit1051 cancellation-token analyzer advisories, unchanged from v2 tip). No test regressions -- no source code changed. 2026-04-18 23:20:54 -04:00
be8261a4ac Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 60 -- Mitsubishi MELSEC quirk integration tests' (#59) from phase-3-pr60-mitsubishi-quirk-tests into v2 2026-04-18 23:10:36 -04:00
65de2b4a09 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 59 -- MelsecAddress helper with family selector (hex vs octal X/Y)' (#58) from phase-3-pr59-melsec-address-helper into v2 2026-04-18 23:10:29 -04:00
fccb566a30 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 58 -- Mitsubishi MELSEC pymodbus profile + smoke' (#57) from phase-3-pr58-mitsubishi-sim-profile into v2 2026-04-18 23:10:21 -04:00
9ccc7338b8 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 57 -- S7 byte-order + fingerprint integration tests' (#56) from phase-3-pr57-s7-quirk-tests into v2 2026-04-18 23:10:14 -04:00
e33783e042 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 56 -- Siemens S7-1500 pymodbus profile + smoke' (#55) from phase-3-pr56-s7-sim-profile into v2 2026-04-18 23:10:07 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
a44fc7a610 Phase 3 PR 60 -- Mitsubishi MELSEC quirk integration tests against mitsubishi pymodbus profile. Seven facts in MitsubishiQuirkTests covering the quirks documented in docs/v2/mitsubishi.md that are testable end-to-end via pymodbus: (1) Mitsubishi_D0_fingerprint_reads_0x1234 -- MELSEC operators reserve D0 as a fingerprint word so Modbus clients can verify they're hitting the right Device Assignment block; test reads HR[0]=0x1234 via DRegisterToHolding('D0') helper. (2) Mitsubishi_Float32_CDAB_decodes_1_5f_from_D100 -- reads HR[100..101] with WordSwap AND BigEndian; asserts WordSwap==1.5f AND BigEndian!=1.5f, proving (a) MELSEC uses CDAB default same as DL260, (b) opposite of S7 ABCD, (c) driver flag is not a no-op. (3) Mitsubishi_D10_is_binary_not_BCD -- reads HR[10]=0x04D2 as Int16 and asserts value 1234 (binary decode), contrasting with DL205's BCD-by-default convention. (4) Mitsubishi_D10_as_BCD_throws_because_nibble_is_non_decimal -- reads same HR[10] as Bcd16 and asserts StatusCode != 0 because nibble 0xD fails BCD validation; proves the BCD decoder fails loud when the tag config is wrong rather than silently returning garbage. (5) Mitsubishi_QLiQR_X210_hex_maps_to_DI_528_reads_ON -- reads FC02 at the MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete('X210', Q_L_iQR)-resolved address (=528 decimal) and asserts ON; proves the hex-parsing path end-to-end. (6) Mitsubishi_family_trap_X20_differs_on_Q_vs_FX -- unit-level proof in the integration file so the headline family trap is visible to anyone filtering by Device=Mitsubishi. (7) Mitsubishi_M512_maps_to_coil_512_reads_ON -- reads FC01 at MRelayToCoil('M512')=512 (decimal) and asserts ON; proves the decimal M-relay path. Test fixture pattern: single MitsubishiQuirkTests class with a shared ShouldRun + NewDriverAsync helper rather than per-quirk classes (contrast with DL205's per-quirk splits). MELSEC per-model differentiation is handled by MelsecFamily enum on the helper rather than per-PR -- so one quirk file + one family enum covers Q/L/iQ-R/FX/iQ-F, and a new PLC family just adds an enum case instead of a new test class. 8/8 Mitsubishi integration tests pass (1 smoke + 7 quirk). 176/176 Modbus.Tests unit suite still green. S7 + DL205 integration tests can be run against their respective profiles by swapping MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE and restarting the pymodbus sim -- each family gates on its profile env var so no cross-family test pollution. 2026-04-18 23:07:00 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
d4c1873998 Phase 3 PR 59 -- MelsecAddress helper for MELSEC X/Y hex-vs-octal family trap + D/M bank bases. Adds MelsecAddress static class with XInputToDiscrete, YOutputToCoil, MRelayToCoil, DRegisterToHolding helpers and a MelsecFamily enum {Q_L_iQR, F_iQF} that drives whether X/Y addresses are parsed as hex (Q-series convention) or octal (FX-series convention). This is the #1 MELSEC driver bug source per docs/v2/mitsubishi.md: the string 'X20' on a MELSEC-Q means DI 32 (hex 0x20) while the same string on an FX3U means DI 16 (octal 0o20). The helper forces the caller to name the family explicitly; no 'sensible default' because wrong defaults just move the bug. Key design decisions: (1) Family is an enum argument, not a helper-level static-selector, because real deployments have BOTH Q-series and FX-series PLCs on the same gateway -- one driver instance per device means family must be per-tag, not per-driver. (2) Bank base is a ushort argument defaulting to 0. Real QJ71MT91/LJ71MT91 assignment blocks commonly place X at DI 8192+, Y at coil 8192+, etc. to leave the low-address range for D-registers; the helper takes the site's configured base as runtime config rather than a compile-time constant. Matches the 'driver opt-in per tag' pattern DirectLogicAddress established for DL260. (3) M-relay and D-register are DECIMAL on every MELSEC family -- docs explicitly; the MELSEC confusion is only about X/Y, not about data registers or internal relays. Helpers reject non-numeric M/D addresses and honor bank bases the same way. (4) Parser walks digits manually for both hex and octal (instead of int.Parse with NumberStyles) so non-hex / non-octal characters give a clear ArgumentException with the offending char + family name. Prevents a subtle class of bugs where int.Parse('X20', Hex) silently returns 32 even for F_iQF callers. Unit tests (MelsecAddressTests, 34 facts): XInputToDiscrete_QLiQR_parses_hex theory (X0, X9, XA, XF, X10, X20, X1FF + lowercase); XInputToDiscrete_FiQF_parses_octal theory (X0, X7, X10, X20, X777); YOutputToCoil equivalents; Same_address_string_decodes_differently_between_families (the headline trap, X20 => 32 on Q vs 16 on FX); reject-non-octal / reject-non-hex / reject-empty / overflow facts; honors-bank-base for X and M and D. 176/176 Modbus.Tests pass (143 prior + 34 new Melsec). No driver core changes -- this is purely a new helper class in the Driver.Modbus project. PR 60 wires it into integration tests against the mitsubishi pymodbus profile. 2026-04-18 23:04:52 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
f52b7d8979 Phase 3 PR 58 -- Mitsubishi MELSEC pymodbus profile + smoke integration test. Adds tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/Pymodbus/mitsubishi.json modelling a representative MELSEC Modbus Device Assignment block: D0..D1023 -> HR[0..1023], M-relay marker at coil 512 (cell 32) and X-input marker at DI 528 (cell 33). Covers the canonical MELSEC quirks from docs/v2/mitsubishi.md: D0 fingerprint at HR[0]=0x1234 so clients can verify the assignment parameter block is in effect, scratch HR 200..209 mirroring dl205/s7_1500/standard scratch range for uniform smoke tests, Float32 1.5f at HR[100..101] in CDAB word order (HR[100]=0, HR[101]=0x3FC0) -- same as DL260, OPPOSITE of S7 ABCD, confirms MELSEC-family driver profile default must be ByteOrder.WordSwap. Int32 0x12345678 CDAB at HR[300..301]. D10 = binary 1234 (0x04D2) proves MELSEC is BINARY-by-default (opposite of DL205 BCD-by-default quirk) -- reading D10 with Bcd16 data type would throw InvalidDataException on nibble 0xD. M-relay marker cell moved to address 32 (coil 512) to avoid shared-block collision with D0 uint16 marker at cell 0; pymodbus shared-blocks=true semantics allow only one type per cell index, so Modbus-coil-0 can't coexist with Modbus-HR-0 on the same sim. Same pattern we applied to dl205 profile (X-input bank at cell 1, not cell 0, to coexist with V0 marker). Adds Mitsubishi/ test directory with MitsubishiProfile.cs (SmokeHoldingRegister=200, SmokeHoldingValue=7890, BuildOptions with probe-disabled + 2s timeout) and MitsubishiSmokeTests.cs (Mitsubishi_roundtrip_write_then_read_of_holding_register single fact that writes 7890 at HR[200] then reads back, gated on MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=mitsubishi). csproj copies Mitsubishi/** as PreserveNewest. Per-model differences (FX5U firmware gate, QJ71MT91 FC22/23 absence, FX/iQ-F octal vs Q/L/iQ-R hex X-addressing) are handled in the MelsecAddress helper (PR 59) + per-model test classes (PR 60). Verified: smoke 1/1 passes against live mitsubishi sim. Prior S7 tests 4/4 still green when swapped back. Modbus.Tests unit suite 143/143. 2026-04-18 23:02:29 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
b54724a812 Phase 3 PR 57 -- S7 byte-order + fingerprint integration tests against s7_1500 pymodbus profile. Three facts in new S7_ByteOrderTests class: (1) S7_Float32_ABCD_decodes_1_5f_from_HR100 reads HR[100..101] with ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian AND with WordSwap on the same wire bytes; asserts BigEndian==1.5f AND WordSwap!=1.5f -- proving both that Siemens S7 stores Float32 in ABCD word order (opposite of DL260 CDAB) and that the ByteOrder flag is not a no-op on the same wire buffer. (2) S7_Int32_ABCD_decodes_0x12345678_from_HR300 reads HR[300]=0x1234 + HR[301]=0x5678 with BigEndian and asserts the reassembled Int32 = 0x12345678; documents the contrast with DL260 CDAB Int32 encoding. (3) S7_DB1_fingerprint_marker_at_HR0_reads_0xABCD reads HR[0]=0xABCD -- real MB_SERVER deployments reserve DB1.DBW0 as a fingerprint so clients can verify they're pointing at the right DB, protecting against typos in the MB_SERVER.MB_HOLD_REG.DB_number parameter. No driver code changes -- the ByteOrder.BigEndian path has existed since PR 24; this PR exists to lock in the S7-specific semantics at the integration level so future refactors of NormalizeWordOrder can't silently break S7. All 3 tests gate on MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=s7_1500 so they skip cleanly against dl205 or standard profiles. Verified end-to-end: 4/4 S7 integration tests pass (1 smoke from PR 56 + 3 new). No regression in driver unit tests. Per the per-quirk-PR plan: the S7 quirks NOT testable via pymodbus sim (MB_SERVER STATUS 0x8383 optimized-DB behavior, port-per-connection semantics, CP 343-1 Lean license rejection, STOP-mode non-determinism) remain in docs/v2/s7.md as design guidance for driver users rather than automated tests -- they're TIA-Portal-side or CP-hardware-side behaviors that pymodbus cannot reproduce without custom Python actions. 2026-04-18 22:58:44 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
10c724b5b6 Phase 3 PR 56 -- Siemens S7-1500 pymodbus profile + smoke integration test. Adds tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/Pymodbus/s7_1500.json modelling the SIMATIC S7-1500 + MB_SERVER default deployment documented in docs/v2/s7.md: DB1.DBW0 = 0xABCD fingerprint marker (operators reserve this so clients can verify they're talking to the right DB), scratch HR range 200..209 for write-roundtrip tests mirroring dl205.json + standard.json, Float32 1.5f at HR[100..101] in ABCD word order (high word first -- OPPOSITE of DL260 CDAB), Int32 0x12345678 at HR[300..301] in ABCD. Also seeds a coil at bit-addr 400 (= cell 25 bit 0) and a discrete input at bit-addr 500 (= cell 31 bit 0) so future S7-specific tests for FC01/FC02 have stable markers. shared blocks=true to match the proven dl205.json pattern (pymodbus's bits/uint16 cells coexist cleanly when addresses don't collide). Write list references cells (0, 25, 100-101, 200-209, 300-301), not bit addresses -- pymodbus's write-range entries are cell-indexed, not bit-indexed. Adds tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/S7/ directory with S7_1500Profile.cs (mirrors DL205Profile pattern: SmokeHoldingRegister=200, SmokeHoldingValue=4321, BuildOptions tags + probe-disabled + 2s timeout) and S7_1500SmokeTests.cs (single fact S7_1500_roundtrip_write_then_read_of_holding_register that writes SmokeHoldingValue then reads it back, asserting both write status 0 and read status 0 + value equality). Gates on MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=s7_1500 so the test skips cleanly against other profiles. csproj updated to copy S7/** to test output as PreserveNewest (pattern matching DL205/**). Pymodbus/serve.ps1 ValidateSet extended from {standard,dl205} to {standard,dl205,s7_1500,mitsubishi} -- mitsubishi.json lands in PR 58 but the validator slot is claimed now so the serve.ps1 diff is one line in this PR and zero lines in future PRs. Verified end-to-end: smoke test 1/1 passes against the running pymodbus s7_1500 profile (localhost:5020 FC06 write of 4321 at HR[200] + FC03 read back). 143/143 Modbus.Tests pass, no regression in driver code because this PR is purely test-asset. Per-quirk S7 integration tests (ABCD word order default, FC23 IllegalFunction, MB_SERVER STATUS 0x8383 behaviour, port-per-connection semantics) land in PR 57+. 2026-04-18 22:57:03 -04:00
8c89d603e8 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 55 -- Mitsubishi MELSEC Modbus TCP quirks research doc' (#54) from phase-3-pr55-mitsubishi-research-doc into v2 2026-04-18 22:54:09 -04:00
299bd4a932 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 54 -- Siemens S7 Modbus TCP quirks research doc' (#53) from phase-3-pr54-s7-research-doc into v2 2026-04-18 22:54:02 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
c506ea298a Phase 3 PR 55 -- Mitsubishi MELSEC Modbus TCP quirks research document. 451-line doc at docs/v2/mitsubishi.md mirroring the docs/v2/dl205.md template for the MELSEC family (Q-series + QJ71MT91, L-series + LJ71MT91, iQ-R + RJ71EN71, iQ-R built-in Ethernet, iQ-F FX5U built-in, FX3U + FX3U-ENET / FX3U-ENET-P502, FX3GE built-in). Like Siemens S7, MELSEC Modbus is a patchwork of per-site-configured add-on modules rather than a fixed firmware stack, but the MELSEC-specific traps are different enough to warrant their own document. Key findings worth flagging for the PR 58+ implementation track: (1) MODULE NAMING TRAP -- QJ71MB91 is SERIAL RTU, not TCP. The Q-series TCP module is QJ71MT91. Driver docs + config UI should surface this clearly because the confusion costs operators hours when they try to connect to an RS-232 module via Ethernet. (2) NO CANONICAL MAPPING -- every MELSEC Modbus site has a unique 'Modbus Device Assignment Parameter' block of up to 16 assignments (each binding a MELSEC device range like D0..D1023 to a Modbus-address range); the driver must treat the mapping as runtime config, not device-family profile. (3) X/Y BASE DEPENDS ON FAMILY -- Q/L/iQ-R use HEX notation for X/Y (X20 = decimal 32), FX/iQ-F use OCTAL (X20 = decimal 16, same as DL260); iQ-F has a GX Works3 project toggle that can flip this. Single biggest off-by-N source in MELSEC driver code -- driver address helper must take a family selector. (4) Word order CDAB across Q/L/iQ-R/iQ-F by default (CPU-level, not module-level) -- no user-configurable swap on the server side. FX5U's SWAP instruction is for CLIENT mode only. Driver Mitsubishi profile default must be ByteOrder.WordSwap, matching DL260 but OPPOSITE of Siemens S7. (5) D-registers are BINARY by default (opposite of DL205's BCD-by-default). FNC 18 BCD / FNC 19 BIN instructions confirm binary-by-default in the ladder. Caller must explicitly opt-in to Bcd16/Bcd32 tags when the ladder stores BCD, same pattern as DL205 but the default is inverted. (6) FX5U FIRMWARE GATE -- needs firmware >= 1.060 for native Modbus TCP server; older firmware is client-only. Surface a clear capability error on connect. (7) FX3U PORT 502 SPLIT -- the standard FX3U-ENET cannot bind port 502 (lower port range restricted on the firmware); only FX3U-ENET-P502 can. FX3U-ENET-ADP has no Modbus at all and is a common operator mis-purchase -- driver should surface 'module does not support Modbus' as a distinct error, not 'connection refused'. (8) QJ71MT91 does NOT support FC22 (Mask Write) or FC23 (Read-Write Multiple). iQ-R and iQ-F do. Driver bulk-read optimization must gate on module capability. (9) MAX CONNECTIONS -- 16 simultaneous on Q/L/iQ-R, 8 on FX5U and FX3U-ENET. (10) STOP-mode writes -- configurable on Q/L/iQ-R/iQ-F (default = accept writes even in STOP), always rejected with exception 04 on FX3U-ENET. Per-model test differentiation section names the tests Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_*, Mitsubishi_FX5U_*, Mitsubishi_FX3U_ENET_*, with a shared Mitsubishi_Common_* fixture for CDAB-word-order + binary-not-BCD + standard-exception-codes tests. 17 cited references including primary Mitsubishi manuals (SH-080446 for QJ71MT91, JY997D56101 for FX5, SH-081259 for iQ-R Ethernet, JY997D18101 for FX3U-ENET) plus Ignition / Kepware / Fernhill / HMS third-party driver release notes. Three unconfirmed rumours flagged explicitly: iQ-R RJ71EN71 early firmware rumoured ABCD word order (no primary source), QJ71MT91 firmware < 2010-05 FC15 odd-byte-count truncation (forum report only), FX3U-ENET firmware < 1.14 out-of-order TxId echoes under load (unreproducible on bench). Pure documentation PR -- no code, no tests. Per-quirk implementation lands in PRs 58+. Research conducted 2026-04-18. 2026-04-18 22:51:28 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
9e2b5b330f Phase 3 PR 54 -- Siemens S7 Modbus TCP quirks research document. 485-line doc at docs/v2/s7.md mirroring the docs/v2/dl205.md template for the Siemens SIMATIC S7 family (S7-1200 / S7-1500 / S7-300 / S7-400 / ET 200SP / CP 343-1 / CP 443-1 / CP 343-1 Lean / MODBUSPN). Siemens S7 is fundamentally different from DL260: there is no fixed Modbus memory map baked into firmware -- every deployment runs MB_SERVER (S7-1200/1500/ET 200SP), MODBUSCP (S7-300/400 + CP), or MODBUSPN (S7-300/400 PN) library blocks wired up to user DBs via the MB_HOLD_REG / ADDR parameters. The driver's job is therefore to handle per-site CONFIG rather than per-family QUIRKS, and the doc makes that explicit. Key findings worth flagging for the PR 56+ implementation track: (1) S7 has no fixed memory map -- must accept per-site DriverConfig, cannot assume vendor-standard layout. (2) MB_SERVER requires NON-optimized DBs in TIA Portal; optimized DBs cause the library to return STATUS 0x8383 on every access -- the single most common S7 Modbus deployment bug in the field. (3) Word order is ABCD by default (big-endian bytes + big-endian words) across all Siemens S7 Modbus paths, which is the OPPOSITE of DL260 CDAB -- the Modbus driver's S7 profile default must be ByteOrder.BigEndian, not WordSwap. (4) MB_SERVER listens on ONE port per FB instance; multi-client support requires running MB_SERVER on 502 / 503 / 504 / ... simultaneously -- most clients assume port 502 multiplexes, which is wrong on S7. (5) CP 343-1 Lean is SERVER-ONLY and requires the separate 2XV9450-1MB00 MODBUS TCP CP library license; client mode calls return immediate error on Lean. (6) MB_SERVER does NOT filter Unit ID, accepts any value. Means the driver can't use Unit ID to detect 'direct vs gateway' topology. (7) FC23 Read-Write Multiple, FC22 Mask Write, FC20/21 File Records, FC43 Device Identification all return exception 01 Illegal Function on every S7 variant -- the driver MUST NOT attempt bulk-read optimisation via FC23 when talking to S7. (8) STOP-mode read/write behaviour is non-deterministic across firmware bands: reads may return cached data (library internal buffer), writes may succeed-silently or return exception 04 depending on CPU firmware version -- flagged as 'driver treats both as unavailable, do not distinguish'. Unconfirmed rumours flagged separately: 'V2.0+ reverses float byte order' claim (cited but not reproduced), STOP-mode caching location (folklore, no primary source). Per-model test differentiation section names the tests as S7_<model>_<behavior> matching the DL205 template convention (e.g. S7_1200_MB_SERVER_requires_non_optimized_DB, S7_343_1_Lean_rejects_client_mode, S7_FC23_returns_IllegalFunction). 31 cited references across the Siemens Industry Online Support entry-ID system (68011496 for MB_SERVER FAQ, etc.), TIA Portal library manuals, and three third-party driver vendor release notes (Kepware, Ignition, FactoryTalk). This is a pure documentation PR -- no code, no tests, no csproj changes. Per-quirk implementation lands in PRs 56+. Research conducted 2026-04-18 against latest publicly-available Siemens documentation; STOP-mode behaviour and MB_SERVER versioning specifically cross-checked against Siemens forum answers from 2024-2025. 2026-04-18 22:50:51 -04:00
d5c6280333 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 53 -- Transport reconnect-on-drop + SO_KEEPALIVE (DL260 no-keepalive quirk)' (#52) from phase-3-pr53-dl205-reconnect into v2 2026-04-18 22:35:40 -04:00
476ce9b7c5 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 52 -- Modbus exception-code -> OPC UA StatusCode translation' (#51) from phase-3-pr52-dl205-exception-codes into v2 2026-04-18 22:35:33 -04:00
954bf55d28 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 51 -- DL260 X-input FC02 discrete-input mapping end-to-end test' (#50) from phase-3-pr51-dl205-xinput into v2 2026-04-18 22:35:25 -04:00
9fb3cf7512 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 50 -- DL260 bit-memory helpers (Y/C/X/SP) + coil integration tests' (#49) from phase-3-pr50-dl205-coil-mapping into v2 2026-04-18 22:35:18 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
793c787315 Phase 3 PR 53 -- Transport reconnect-on-drop + SO_KEEPALIVE for DL205 no-keepalive quirk. AutomationDirect H2-ECOM100 does NOT send TCP keepalives per docs/v2/dl205.md behavioral-oddities section -- any NAT/firewall device between the gateway and the PLC can silently close an idle socket after 2-5 minutes of inactivity. The PLC itself never notices and the first SendAsync after the drop would previously surface as IOException / EndOfStreamException / SocketException to the caller even though the PLC is perfectly healthy. PR 53 makes ModbusTcpTransport survive mid-session socket drops: SendAsync wraps the previous body as SendOnceAsync; on the first attempt, if the failure is a socket-layer error (IOException, SocketException, EndOfStreamException, ObjectDisposedException) AND autoReconnect is enabled (default true), the transport tears down the dead socket, calls ConnectAsync to re-establish, and resends the PDU exactly once. Deliberately single-retry -- further failures propagate so the driver health surface reflects the real state, no masking a dead PLC. Protocol-layer failures (e.g. ModbusException with exception code 02) are specifically NOT caught by the reconnect path -- they would just come back with the same exception code after the reconnect, so retrying is wasted wire time. Socket-level vs protocol-level is a discriminator inside IsSocketLevelFailure. Also enables SO_KEEPALIVE on the TcpClient with aggressive timing: TcpKeepAliveTime=30s, TcpKeepAliveInterval=10s, TcpKeepAliveRetryCount=3. Total time-to-detect-dead-socket = 30 + 10*3 = 60s, vs the Windows default 2-hour idle + 9 retries = 2h40min. Best-effort: older OSes that don't expose the fine-grained keepalive knobs silently skip them (catch {}). New ModbusDriverOptions.AutoReconnect bool (default true) threads through to the default transport factory in ModbusDriver -- callers wanting the old 'fail loud on drop' behavior can set AutoReconnect=false, or use a custom transportFactory that ignores the option. Unit tests: ModbusTcpReconnectTests boots a FlakeyModbusServer in-process (real TcpListener on loopback) that serves one valid FC03 response then forcibly shuts down the socket. Transport_recovers_from_mid_session_drop_and_retries_successfully issues two consecutive SendAsync calls and asserts both return valid PDUs -- the second must trigger the reconnect path transparently. Transport_without_AutoReconnect_propagates_drop_to_caller asserts the legacy behavior when the opt-out is taken. Validates real socket semantics rather than mocked exceptions. 142/142 Modbus.Tests pass (113 prior + 2 mapper + 2 reconnect + 25 accumulated across PRs 45-52); 11/11 DL205 integration tests still pass with MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=dl205 -- no regression from the transport change. 2026-04-18 22:32:13 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
cde018aec1 Phase 3 PR 52 -- Modbus exception-code -> OPC UA StatusCode translation. Before this PR every server-side Modbus exception AND every transport-layer failure collapsed to BadInternalError (0x80020000) in the driver's Read/Write results, making field diagnosis 'is this a tag misconfig or a driver bug?' impossible from the OPC UA client side. PR 52 adds a MapModbusExceptionToStatus helper that translates per spec: 01 Illegal Function -> BadNotSupported (0x803D0000); 02 Illegal Data Address -> BadOutOfRange (0x803C0000); 03 Illegal Data Value -> BadOutOfRange; 04 Server Failure -> BadDeviceFailure (0x80550000); 05/06 Acknowledge/Busy -> BadDeviceFailure; 0A/0B Gateway -> BadCommunicationError (0x80050000); unknown -> BadInternalError fallback. Non-Modbus failures (socket drop, timeout, malformed frame) in ReadAsync are now distinguished from tag-level faults: they map to BadCommunicationError so operators check network/PLC reachability rather than tag definitions. Why per-DL205: docs/v2/dl205.md documents DL205/DL260 returning only codes 01-04 with specific triggers -- exception 04 specifically means 'CPU in PROGRAM mode during a protected write', which is operator-recoverable by switching the CPU to RUN; surfacing it as BadDeviceFailure (not BadInternalError) makes the fix obvious. Changes in ModbusDriver: Read catch-chain now ModbusException first (-> mapper), generic Exception second (-> BadCommunicationError); Write catch-chain same pattern but generic Exception stays BadInternalError because write failures can legitimately come from EncodeRegister (out-of-range value) which is a driver-layer fault. Unit tests: MapModbusExceptionToStatus theory exercising every code in the table including the 0xFF fallback; Read_surface_exception_02_as_BadOutOfRange with an ExceptionRaisingTransport that forces code 02; Write_surface_exception_04_as_BadDeviceFailure for CPU-mode faults; Read_non_modbus_failure_maps_to_BadCommunicationError with a NonModbusFailureTransport that raises EndOfStreamException. 115/115 Modbus.Tests pass. Integration test: DL205ExceptionCodeTests.DL205_FC03_at_unmapped_register_returns_BadOutOfRange reads HR[16383] which is beyond the seeded uint16 cells on the dl205.json profile; pymodbus returns exception 02 and the driver surfaces BadOutOfRange. 11/11 DL205 integration tests pass with MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=dl205. 2026-04-18 22:28:37 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
9892a0253d Phase 3 PR 51 -- DL260 X-input FC02 discrete-input mapping end-to-end test. Integration test DL205XInputTests reads FC02 at the DirectLogicAddress.XInputToDiscrete-resolved address and asserts two behaviors against the dl205.json pymodbus profile: (1) X20 octal (=decimal 16 = Modbus DI 16) reads ON, proving the helper correctly octal-parses the trailing number and adds it to the 0 base; (2) X21 octal reads OFF (not exception) -- per docs/v2/dl205.md §I/O-mapping, 'reading a non-populated X input returns zero, not an exception' on DL260, because the CPU sizes the discrete-input table to the configured I/O not the installed hardware. Pymodbus models this by returning the default 0 value for any DI bit in the configured 'di size' range that wasn't explicitly seeded, matching real DL260 behaviour. Test uses X20 rather than X0 to sidestep a shared-blocks conflict: pymodbus places FC01/FC02 bit-address 0..15 into cell 0, but cell 0 is already uint16-typed (V0 marker = 0xCAFE) per the register-zero quirk test, and shared-blocks semantics allow only one type per cell. X20 octal = DI 16 lands in cell 1 which is free, so both the V0 quirk AND the X-input quirk can coexist in one profile. dl205.json: bits cell 1 seeded value=9 (bits 0 and 3 set -> X20, X23 octal = ON), write-range extended to include cell 1 (though X-inputs are read-only; the write-range entry is required by pymodbus for ANY cell referenced in a bits section even if only reads are expected -- pymodbus validates write-access uniformly). 10/10 DL205 integration tests pass with MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=dl205. No driver code changes -- the XInputToDiscrete helper + FC02 read path already landed in PRs 50 and 21 respectively. This PR closes the integration-test gap that docs/v2/dl205.md called out under test name DL205_Xinput_unpopulated_reads_as_zero. 2026-04-18 22:25:13 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
b5464f11ee Phase 3 PR 50 -- DL260 bit-memory address helpers (Y/C/X/SP) + live coil integration tests. Adds four new static helpers to DirectLogicAddress covering every discrete-memory bank on the DL260: YOutputToCoil (Y0=coil 2048), CRelayToCoil (C0=coil 3072), XInputToDiscrete (X0=DI 0), SpecialToDiscrete (SP0=DI 1024). Each helper takes the DirectLOGIC ladder-logic address (e.g. 'Y0', 'Y17', 'C1777') and adds the octal-decoded offset to the bank's Modbus base per the DL260 user manual's I/O-configuration chapter table. Uses the same 'octal-walk + reject 8/9' pattern as UserVMemoryToPdu so misaligned addresses fail loudly with a clear ArgumentException rather than silently hitting the wrong coil. Fixes a pymodbus-config bug surfaced during integration-test validation: dl205.json had bits entries at cell indices 2048 / 3072 / 4000, but pymodbus's ModbusSimulatorContext.validate divides bit addresses by 16 before indexing into the shared cell array -- so Modbus coil 2048 reads cell 128, not cell 2048. The sim was returning Illegal Data Address (exception 02) for every bit read in the Y/C/scratch range. Moved bits entries to cells 128 (Y bank marker = 0b101 for Y0=ON, Y1=OFF, Y2=ON), 192 (C bank marker = 0b101 for C0/C1/C2), 250 (scratch cell covering coils 4000..4015). write list updated to the correct cell addresses. Unit tests: YOutputToCoil theory sweep (Y0->2048, Y1->2049, Y7->2055, Y10->2056 octal-to-decimal, Y17->2063, Y777->2559 top of DL260 Y range), CRelayToCoil theory (C0->3072 through C1777->4095), XInputToDiscrete theory, SpecialToDiscrete theory (with case-insensitive 'SP' prefix). Bit_address_rejects_non_octal_digits (Y8/C9/X18), Bit_address_rejects_empty, accepts_lowercase_prefix, accepts_bare_octal_without_prefix. 48/48 Modbus.Tests pass. Integration tests: DL205CoilMappingTests with three facts -- DL260_Y0_maps_to_coil_2048 (FC01 at Y0 returns ON), DL260_C0_maps_to_coil_3072 (FC01 at C0 returns ON), DL260_scratch_Crelay_supports_write_then_read (FC05 write + FC01 read round-trip at coil 4000 proves the DL-mapped coil bank is fully read/write capable end-to-end). 9/9 DL205 integration tests pass against the pymodbus dl205 profile with MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=dl205. Caller opts into the helpers per tag the same way as PR 47's V-memory helper -- pass DirectLogicAddress.YOutputToCoil("Y0") as the ModbusTagDefinition Address; no driver-wide DL-family flag. PR 51 adds the X-input read-side integration test (there's nothing to write since X-inputs are FC02 discrete inputs, read-only); PR 52 exception-code translation; PR 53 transport reconnect-on-drop since DL260 doesn't send TCP keepalives. 2026-04-18 22:22:42 -04:00
dae29f14c8 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 49 -- Per-device FC03/FC16 register caps with auto-chunking' (#48) from phase-3-pr49-dl205-fc-caps into v2 2026-04-18 22:13:46 -04:00
f306793e36 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 48 -- DL205 CDAB float word order end-to-end test' (#47) from phase-3-pr48-dl205-cdab-float into v2 2026-04-18 22:13:39 -04:00
9e61873cc0 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 47 -- DL205 V-memory octal-address helper' (#46) from phase-3-pr47-dl205-vmemory into v2 2026-04-18 22:13:32 -04:00
1a60470d4a Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 46 -- DL205 BCD decoder' (#45) from phase-3-pr46-dl205-bcd into v2 2026-04-18 22:13:24 -04:00
635f67bb02 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 45 -- DL205 string byte-order quirk' (#44) from phase-3-pr45-dl205-string-byte-order into v2 2026-04-18 22:12:15 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
a3f2f95344 Phase 3 PR 49 -- Per-device FC03/FC16 register caps with auto-chunking. Adds MaxRegistersPerRead (default 125, spec max) + MaxRegistersPerWrite (default 123, spec max) to ModbusDriverOptions. Reads that exceed the cap automatically split into consecutive FC03 requests: the driver dispatches chunks of [cap] regs at incrementing addresses, copies each response into an assembled byte[] buffer, and hands the full payload to DecodeRegister. From the caller's view a 240-char string read against a cap-100 device is still one Read() call returning one string -- the chunking is invisible, the wire shows N requests of cap-sized quantity plus one tail chunk. Writes are NOT auto-chunked. Splitting an FC16 across two transactions would lose atomicity -- mid-split crash leaves half the value written, which is strictly worse than rejecting upfront. Instead, writes exceeding MaxRegistersPerWrite throw InvalidOperationException with a message naming the tag + cap + the caller's escape hatch (shorten StringLength or split into multiple tags). The driver catches the exception internally and surfaces it to IWritable as BadInternalError so the caller pattern stays symmetric with other failure modes. Per-family cap cheat-sheet (documented in xml-doc on the option): Modbus-TCP spec = 125 read / 123 write, AutomationDirect DL205/DL260 = 128 read / 100 write (128 exceeds spec byte-count capacity so in practice 125 is the working ceiling), Mitsubishi Q/FX3U = 64 / 64, Omron CJ/CS = 125 / 123. Not all PLCs reject over-cap requests cleanly -- some drop the connection silently -- so having the cap enforced client-side prevents the hard-to-diagnose 'driver just stopped' failure mode. Unit tests: Read_within_cap_issues_single_FC03_request (control: no unnecessary chunking), Read_above_cap_splits_into_two_FC03_requests (120 regs / cap 100 -> 100+20, asserts exact per-chunk (Address,Quantity) and end-to-end payload continuity starting with register[100] high byte = 'A'), Read_cap_honors_Mitsubishi_lower_cap_of_64 (100 regs / cap 64 -> 64+36), Write_exceeding_cap_throws_instead_of_splitting (110 regs / cap 100 -> status != 0 AND Fc16Requests.Count == 0 to prove nothing was sent), Write_within_cap_proceeds_normally (control: cap honored on short writes too). Tests use a new RecordingTransport that captures the (Address, Quantity) tuple of every FC03/FC16 request so the chunk layout is directly assertable -- the existing FakeTransport does not expose request history. 103/103 Modbus.Tests pass; 6/6 DL205 integration tests still pass against the live pymodbus dl205 profile with MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=dl205. 2026-04-18 21:58:49 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
463c5a4320 Phase 3 PR 48 -- DL205 CDAB word order for Float32 end-to-end test. The driver has supported ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap (CDAB) since PR 24 for all multi-register types -- the underlying word-swap code path was already there. PR 48 closes the loop with an integration test that validates it end-to-end against the dl205 pymodbus profile: HR[1056..1057] stores IEEE-754 1.5f with the low word at the lower address (0x0000 at HR[1056], 0x3FC0 at HR[1057]). Reading with WordSwap returns 1.5f; reading with BigEndian returns a tiny denormal (~5.74e-41) -- a silent "value is 0" bug that typically surfaces in the field only when an operator notices a setpoint readout stuck at 0 while the PLC display shows the real value. Test asserts both: WordSwap==1.5f AND BigEndian!=1.5f, proving the flag is not a no-op. No driver code changes -- the word-swap normalization at NormalizeWordOrder() has handled Float32/Int32/UInt32 correctly since PR 24 and the unit test suite already covers it (Int32_WordSwap_decodes_CDAB_layout + Float32 equivalent). This PR exists primarily to lock in the integration-level validation so future refactors of the codec don't silently break DL205/DL260 floats. 6/6 DL205 integration tests pass with MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=dl205. 2026-04-18 21:51:15 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
2b5222f5db Phase 3 PR 47 -- DL205 V-memory octal-address helper. Adds DirectLogicAddress static class with two entry points: UserVMemoryToPdu(string) parses a DirectLOGIC V-address (V-prefixed or bare, whitespace tolerated) as OCTAL and returns the 0-based Modbus PDU address. V2000 octal = decimal 1024 = PDU 0x0400, which is the canonical start of the user V-memory bank on DL205/DL260. SystemVMemoryBasePdu + SystemVMemoryToPdu(ushort offset) handle the system bank (V40400 and up) which does NOT follow the simple octal-to-decimal formula -- the CPU relocates the system bank to PDU 0x2100 in H2-ECOM100 absolute mode. A naive caller converting 40400 octal would land at PDU 0x4100 (decimal 16640) and miss the system registers entirely; the helper routes the correct 0x2100 base. Why this matters: DirectLOGIC operators think in OCTAL (the ladder-logic editor, the Productivity/Do-more UI, every AutomationDirect manual addresses V-memory octally) while the Modbus wire is DECIMAL. Integrators routinely copy V-addresses from the PLC documentation into client configs and read garbage because they treated V2000 as decimal 2000 (HR[2000] = 0 in the dl205 sim, zero in most PLCs). The helper makes the translation explicit per the D2-USER-M appendix + H2-ECOM-M \u00A76.5 references cited in docs/v2/dl205.md. Unit tests: UserVMemoryToPdu_converts_octal_V_prefix (V0, V1, V7, V10, V2000, V7777, V10000, V17777 -- the exact sweep documented in dl205.md), UserVMemoryToPdu_accepts_bare_or_prefixed_or_padded (case + whitespace tolerance), UserVMemoryToPdu_rejects_non_octal_digits (V8/V19/V2009 must throw ArgumentException with 'octal' in the message -- .NET has no base-8 int.Parse so we hand-walk digits to catch 8/9 instead of silently accepting them), UserVMemoryToPdu_rejects_empty_input, UserVMemoryToPdu_overflow_rejected (200000 octal = 0x10000 overflows ushort), SystemVMemoryBasePdu_is_0x2100_for_V40400, SystemVMemoryToPdu_offsets_within_bank, SystemVMemoryToPdu_rejects_overflow. 23/23 Modbus.Tests pass. Integration tests against dl205.json pymodbus profile: DL205_V2000_user_memory_resolves_to_PDU_0x0400_marker (reads HR[0x0400]=0x2000), DL205_V40400_system_memory_resolves_to_PDU_0x2100_marker (reads HR[0x2100]=0x4040). 5/5 DL205 integration tests pass. Caller opts into the helper per tag by calling DirectLogicAddress.UserVMemoryToPdu("V2000") as the ModbusTagDefinition Address -- no driver-wide "DL205 mode" flag needed, because users mix DL and non-DL tags in a single driver instance all the time. 2026-04-18 21:49:58 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
8248b126ce Phase 3 PR 46 -- DL205 BCD decoder (binary-coded-decimal numeric encoding). Adds ModbusDataType.Bcd16 and Bcd32 to the driver. Bcd16 is 1 register wide, Bcd32 is 2 registers wide; Bcd32 respects ModbusByteOrder (BigEndian/WordSwap) the same way Int32 does so the CDAB-style families (including DL205/DL260 themselves) can be configured. DecodeRegister uses the new internal DecodeBcd helper: walks each nibble from MSB to LSB, multiplies the running result by 10, adds the nibble as a decimal digit. Explicitly rejects nibbles > 9 with InvalidDataException -- hardware sometimes produces garbage during write-in-progress transitions and silently returning wrong numeric values would quietly corrupt the caller's data. EncodeRegister's new EncodeBcd inverts the operation (mod/div by 10 nibble-by-nibble) with an up-front overflow check against 10^nibbles-1. Why this matters for DL205/DL260: AutomationDirect DirectLOGIC uses BCD as the default numeric encoding for timers, counters, and operator-display numerics (not binary). A plain Int16 read of register 0x1234 returns 4660; the BCD path returns 1234. The two differ enough that silently defaulting to Int16 would give wildly wrong HMI values -- the caller must opt in to Bcd16/Bcd32 per tag. Unit tests: DecodeBcd (theory: 0,1,9,10,1234,9999), DecodeBcd_rejects_nibbles_above_nine, EncodeBcd (theory), Bcd16_decodes_DL205_register_1234_as_decimal_1234 (control: same bytes as Int16 decode to 4660), Bcd16_encode_round_trips_with_decode, Bcd16_encode_rejects_out_of_range_values, Bcd32_decodes_8_digits_big_endian, Bcd32_word_swap_handles_CDAB_layout, Bcd32_encode_round_trips_with_decode, Bcd_RegisterCount_matches_underlying_width. 66/66 Modbus.Tests pass. Integration test: DL205BcdQuirkTests.DL205_BCD16_decodes_HR1072_as_decimal_1234 against dl205.json pymodbus profile (HR[1072]=0x1234). Asserts Bcd16 decode=1234 AND Int16 decode=0x1234 on the same wire bytes to prove the paths are distinct. 3/3 DL205 integration tests pass with MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE=dl205. 2026-04-18 21:46:25 -04:00
121 changed files with 13093 additions and 153 deletions

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@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
<Project Path="src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.Host/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.Host.csproj"/>
<Project Path="src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.Proxy/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.Proxy.csproj"/>
<Project Path="src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.csproj"/>
<Project Path="src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.csproj"/>
<Project Path="src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.csproj"/>
<Project Path="src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.Shared/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.Shared.csproj"/>
<Project Path="src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.CLI/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.CLI.csproj"/>
<Project Path="src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.UI/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.UI.csproj"/>
@@ -26,6 +28,8 @@
<Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.E2E/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.E2E.csproj"/>
<Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests.csproj"/>
<Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.csproj"/>
<Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Tests.csproj"/>
<Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.Tests.csproj"/>
<Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.Shared.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.Shared.Tests.csproj"/>
<Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.CLI.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.CLI.Tests.csproj"/>
<Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.UI.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.UI.Tests.csproj"/>

1
_p54.json Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"title":"Phase 3 PR 54 -- Siemens S7 Modbus TCP quirks research doc","body":"## Summary\n\nAdds `docs/v2/s7.md` (485 lines) covering Siemens SIMATIC S7 family Modbus TCP behavior. Mirrors the `docs/v2/dl205.md` template for future per-quirk implementation PRs.\n\n## Key findings for the implementation track\n\n- **No fixed memory map** — every S7 Modbus server is user-wired via `MB_SERVER`/`MODBUSCP`/`MODBUSPN` library blocks. Driver must accept per-site config, not assume a vendor layout.\n- **MB_SERVER requires non-optimized DBs** (STATUS `0x8383` if optimized). Most common field bug.\n- **Word order default = ABCD** (opposite of DL260). Driver's S7 profile default must be `ByteOrder.BigEndian`, not `WordSwap`.\n- **One port per MB_SERVER instance** — multi-client requires parallel FBs on 503/504/… Most clients assume port 502 multiplexes (wrong on S7).\n- **CP 343-1 Lean is server-only**, requires the `2XV9450-1MB00` license.\n- **FC20/21/22/23/43 all return Illegal Function** on every S7 variant — driver must not attempt FC23 bulk-read optimization for S7.\n- **STOP-mode behavior non-deterministic** across firmware bands — treat both read/write STOP-mode responses as unavailable.\n\nTwo items flagged as unconfirmed rumour (V2.0+ float byte-order claim, STOP-mode caching location).\n\nNo code, no tests — implementation lands in PRs 56+.\n\n## Test plan\n- [x] Doc renders as markdown\n- [x] 31 citations present\n- [x] Section structure matches dl205.md template","head":"phase-3-pr54-s7-research-doc","base":"v2"}

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_p55.json Normal file
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{"title":"Phase 3 PR 55 -- Mitsubishi MELSEC Modbus TCP quirks research doc","body":"## Summary\n\nAdds `docs/v2/mitsubishi.md` (451 lines) covering MELSEC Q/L/iQ-R/iQ-F/FX3U Modbus TCP behavior. Mirrors `docs/v2/dl205.md` template for per-quirk implementation PRs.\n\n## Key findings for the implementation track\n\n- **Module naming trap** — `QJ71MB91` is SERIAL RTU, not TCP. TCP module is `QJ71MT91`. Surface clearly in driver docs.\n- **No canonical mapping** — per-site 'Modbus Device Assignment Parameter' block (up to 16 entries). Treat mapping as runtime config.\n- **X/Y hex vs octal depends on family** — Q/L/iQ-R use HEX (X20 = decimal 32); FX/iQ-F use OCTAL (X20 = decimal 16). Helper must take a family selector.\n- **Word order CDAB default** across all MELSEC families (opposite of Siemens S7). Driver Mitsubishi profile default: `ByteOrder.WordSwap`.\n- **D-registers binary by default** (opposite of DL205's BCD default). Caller opts in to `Bcd16`/`Bcd32` when ladder uses BCD.\n- **FX5U needs firmware ≥ 1.060** for Modbus TCP server — older is client-only.\n- **FX3U-ENET vs FX3U-ENET-P502 vs FX3U-ENET-ADP** — only the middle one binds port 502; the last has no Modbus at all. Common operator mis-purchase.\n- **QJ71MT91 does NOT support FC22 / FC23** — iQ-R / iQ-F do. Bulk-read optimization must gate on capability.\n- **STOP-mode writes configurable** on Q/L/iQ-R/iQ-F (default accept), always rejected on FX3U-ENET.\n\nThree unconfirmed rumours flagged separately.\n\nNo code, no tests — implementation lands in PRs 58+.\n\n## Test plan\n- [x] Doc renders as markdown\n- [x] 17 citations present\n- [x] Per-model test naming matrix included (`Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_*`, `Mitsubishi_FX5U_*`, `Mitsubishi_FX3U_ENET_*`, shared `Mitsubishi_Common_*`)","head":"phase-3-pr55-mitsubishi-research-doc","base":"v2"}

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@@ -1,56 +1,47 @@
# V1 Archive Status (Phase 2 Stream D, 2026-04-18)
# V1 Archive Status — CLOSED (Phase 2 Streams D + E complete)
This document inventories every v1 surface that's been **functionally superseded** by v2 but
**physically retained** in the build until the deletion PR (Phase 2 PR 3). Rationale: cascading
references mean a single deletion is high blast-radius; archive-marking lets the v2 stack ship
on its own merits while the v1 surface stays as parity reference.
> **Status as of 2026-04-18: the v1 archive has been fully removed from the tree.**
> This document is retained as historical record of the Phase 2 Stream D / E closure.
## Archived projects
## Final state
| Path | Status | Replaced by | Build behavior |
|---|---|---|---|
| `src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host/` | Archive (executable in build) | `OtOpcUa.Server` + `Driver.Galaxy.Host` + `Driver.Galaxy.Proxy` | Builds; not deployed by v2 install scripts |
| `src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Historian.Aveva/` | Archive (plugin in build) | TODO: port into `Driver.Galaxy.Host/Backend/Historian/` (Task B.1.h follow-up) | Builds; loaded only by archived Host |
| `tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Tests.v1Archive/` | Archive | `Driver.Galaxy.E2E` + per-component test projects | `<IsTestProject>false</IsTestProject>``dotnet test slnx` skips |
| `tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.IntegrationTests/` | Archive | `Driver.Galaxy.E2E` | `<IsTestProject>false</IsTestProject>``dotnet test slnx` skips |
All five v1 archive directories have been deleted:
## How to run the archived suites explicitly
| Path | Deleted | Replaced by |
|---|---|---|
| `src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host/` | ✅ | `OtOpcUa.Server` + `Driver.Galaxy.Host` + `Driver.Galaxy.Proxy` |
| `src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Historian.Aveva/` | ✅ | `Driver.Galaxy.Host/Backend/Historian/` (ported in Phase 3 PRs 51-55) |
| `tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Historian.Aveva.Tests/` | ✅ | `Driver.Galaxy.Host.Tests/Historian/` |
| `tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Tests.v1Archive/` | ✅ | Per-component `*.Tests` projects + `Driver.Galaxy.E2E` |
| `tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.IntegrationTests/` | ✅ | `Driver.Galaxy.E2E` + `Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests` |
```powershell
# v1 unit tests (494):
dotnet test tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Tests.v1Archive
## Closure timeline
# v1 integration tests (6):
dotnet test tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.IntegrationTests
```
- **PR 2 (2026-04-18, phase-2-stream-d)** — archive-marked the four v1 projects with
`<IsTestProject>false</IsTestProject>` so solution builds and `dotnet test slnx` bypassed
them. Capture: `docs/v2/implementation/exit-gate-phase-2-final.md`.
- **Phase 3 PR 18 (2026-04-18)** — deleted the archived project source trees. Leftover
`bin/` and `obj/` residue remained on disk from pre-deletion builds.
- **Phase 2 PR 61 (2026-04-18, this closure PR)** — scrubbed the empty residue directories
and confirmed `dotnet build ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx` clean with 0 errors.
Both still pass on this dev box — they're the parity reference for Phase 2 PR 3's deletion
decision.
## Parity validation (Stream E)
## Deletion plan (Phase 2 PR 3)
The original 494 v1 tests + 6 v1 integration tests are **not** preserved in the v2 branch.
Their parity-bar role is now filled by:
Pre-conditions:
- [ ] `Driver.Galaxy.E2E` test count covers the v1 IntegrationTests' 6 integration scenarios
at minimum (currently 7 tests; expand as needed)
- [ ] `Driver.Galaxy.Host/Backend/Historian/` ports the Wonderware Historian plugin
so `MxAccessGalaxyBackend.HistoryReadAsync` returns real data (Task B.1.h)
- [ ] Operator review on a separate PR — destructive change
Steps:
1. `git rm -r src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host/`
2. `git rm -r src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Historian.Aveva/`
(or move it under Driver.Galaxy.Host first if the lift is part of the same PR)
3. `git rm -r tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Tests.v1Archive/`
4. `git rm -r tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.IntegrationTests/`
5. Edit `ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx` — remove the four project lines
6. `dotnet build ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx` → confirm clean
7. `dotnet test ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx` → confirm 470+ pass / 1 baseline (or whatever the
current count is plus any new E2E coverage)
8. Commit: "Phase 2 Stream D — delete v1 archive (Host + Historian.Aveva + v1Tests + IntegrationTests)"
9. PR 3 against `v2`, link this doc + exit-gate-phase-2-final.md
10. One reviewer signoff
- `Driver.Galaxy.E2E` — cross-FX subprocess parity (spawns the net48 x86 Galaxy.Host.exe
+ connects via real named pipe, exercises every `IDriver` capability through the
supervisor). Stability-findings regression tests (4 × 2026-04-13 findings) live here.
- Per-component `*.Tests` projects — cover the code that moved out of the monolith into
discrete v2 projects. Running `dotnet test ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx` executes all of them
as one solution-level gate.
- `Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests` — adds Modbus TCP driver coverage that didn't exist in
v1 (DL205, S7-1500, Mitsubishi MELSEC via pymodbus sim profiles — PRs 30, 56-60).
- Live-stack smoke tests (`Driver.Galaxy.E2E/LiveStack/`) — optional, gated on presence
of the `OtOpcUaGalaxyHost` service + Galaxy repository on the dev box (PRs 33, 36, 37).
## Rollback
If Phase 2 PR 3 surfaces downstream consumer regressions, `git revert` the deletion commit
restores the four projects intact. The v2 stack continues to ship from the v2 branch.
`git revert` of the deletion commits restores the projects intact. The v2 stack continues
to ship from the `v2` branch regardless.

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# Phase 6.1 — Resilience & Observability Runtime
> **Status**: **SHIPPED** 2026-04-19 — Streams A/B/C/D + E data layer merged to `v2` across PRs #78-82. Final exit-gate PR #83 turns the compliance script into real checks (all pass) and records this status update. One deferred piece: Stream E.2/E.3 SignalR hub + Blazor `/hosts` column refresh lands in a visual-compliance follow-up PR on the Phase 6.4 Admin UI branch.
>
> Baseline: 906 solution tests → post-Phase-6.1: 1042 passing (+136 net). One pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged.
>
> **Branch**: `v2/phase-6-1-resilience-observability`
> **Estimated duration**: 3 weeks
> **Predecessor**: Phase 5 (drivers) — partial; S7 + OPC UA Client shipped, AB/TwinCAT/FOCAS paused
> **Successor**: Phase 6.2 (Authorization runtime)
## Phase Objective
Land the cross-cutting runtime protections + operability features that `plan.md` + `driver-stability.md` specify by decision but that no driver-phase actually wires. End-state: every driver goes through the same Polly resilience layer, health endpoints render the live driver fleet, structured logs carry per-request correlation IDs, and the config substrate survives a central DB outage via a LiteDB local cache.
Closes these gaps flagged in the 2026-04-19 audit:
1. Polly v8 resilience pipelines wired to every `IDriver` capability (no-op per-driver today; Galaxy has a hand-rolled `CircuitBreaker` only).
2. Tier A/B/C enforcement at runtime — `driver-stability.md` §24 and decisions #6373 define memory watchdog, bounded queues, scheduled recycle, wedge detection; `MemoryWatchdog` exists only inside `Driver.Galaxy.Host`.
3. Health endpoints (`/healthz`, `/readyz`) on `OtOpcUa.Server`.
4. Structured Serilog with per-request correlation IDs (driver instance, OPC UA session, IPC call).
5. LiteDB local cache + Polly retry + fallback on central-DB outage (decision #36).
## Scope — What Changes
| Concern | Change |
|---------|--------|
| `Core` → new `Core.Resilience` sub-namespace | Shared Polly pipeline builder (`DriverResiliencePipelines`). **Pipeline key = `(DriverInstanceId, HostName)`** so one dead PLC behind a multi-device driver doesn't open the breaker for healthy siblings (decision #35 per-device isolation). **Per-capability policy** — Read / HistoryRead / Discover / Probe / Alarm get retries; **Write does NOT** unless `[WriteIdempotent]` on the tag definition (decisions #44-45). |
| Every capability-interface consumer in the server | Wrap `IReadable.ReadAsync`, `IWritable.WriteAsync`, `ITagDiscovery.DiscoverAsync`, `ISubscribable.SubscribeAsync/UnsubscribeAsync`, `IHostConnectivityProbe` probe loop, `IAlarmSource.SubscribeAlarmsAsync/AcknowledgeAsync`, `IHistoryProvider.ReadRawAsync/ReadProcessedAsync/ReadAtTimeAsync/ReadEventsAsync`. Composition: timeout → (retry when capability supports) → circuit breaker → bulkhead. |
| `Core.Abstractions` → new `WriteIdempotentAttribute` | Marker on `ModbusTagDefinition` / `S7TagDefinition` / `OpcUaClientDriver` tag rows; opts that tag into auto-retry on Write. Absence = no retry, per spec. |
| `Core` → new `Core.Stability` sub-namespace — **split** | Two separate subsystems: (a) **`MemoryTracking`** runs all tiers; captures baseline (median of first 5 min `GetMemoryFootprint` samples) + applies the hybrid rule `soft = max(multiplier × baseline, baseline + floor)`; soft breach logs + surfaces to Admin; never kills. (b) **`MemoryRecycle`** (Tier C only — requires out-of-process topology) handles hard-breach recycle via the Proxy-side supervisor. Tier A/B overrun escalates to Tier C promotion ticket, not auto-kill. |
| `ScheduledRecycleScheduler` | Tier C only per decisions #73-74. Weekly/time-of-day recycle via Proxy supervisor. Tier A/B opt-in recycle lands in a future phase together with a Tier-C-escalation workflow. |
| `WedgeDetector` | **Demand-aware**: flips a driver to Faulted only when `(hasPendingWork AND noProgressIn > threshold)`. `hasPendingWork` derives from non-zero Polly bulkhead depth OR ≥1 active MonitoredItem OR ≥1 queued historian read. Idle + subscription-only drivers stay Healthy. |
| `DriverTypeRegistry` | Each driver type registers its `DriverTier` {A, B, C}. Tier C drivers must advertise their out-of-process topology; the registry enforces invariants (Tier C has a `Proxy` + `Host` pair). |
| `Driver.Galaxy.Proxy/Supervisor/` | **Retains** existing `CircuitBreaker` + `Backoff` — they guard IPC respawn (decision #68), different concern from the per-call Polly layer. Only `HeartbeatMonitor` is referenced downstream (IPC liveness). |
| `OtOpcUa.Server` → Minimal API endpoints on `http://+:4841` | `/healthz` = process alive + (config DB reachable OR `UsingStaleConfig=true`). `/readyz` = ANDed driver health; state-machine per `DriverState`: `Unknown`/`Initializing` → 503, `Healthy` → 200, `Degraded` → 200 + `{degradedDrivers: [...]}` in body, `Faulted` → 503. JSON body always reports per-instance detail. |
| Serilog configuration | Centralize enrichers in `OtOpcUa.Server/Observability/LogContextEnricher.cs`. Every capability call runs inside a `LogContext.PushProperty` scope with {DriverInstanceId, DriverType, CapabilityName, CorrelationId (UA RequestHandle or internal GUID)}. Sink config stays rolling-file per CLAUDE.md; JSON sink added alongside plain-text (switchable via `Serilog:WriteJson` appsetting). |
| `Configuration` project | Add `LiteDbConfigCache` adapter. **Generation-sealed snapshots**: `sp_PublishGeneration` writes `<cache-root>/<cluster>/<generationId>.db` as a read-only sealed file. Reads serve the last-known-sealed generation; mixed-generation reads are impossible. Write path bypasses cache + fails hard on DB outage. Pipeline: timeout (2 s) → retry (3×, jittered) → fallback-to-sealed-snapshot. |
| `DriverHostStatus` vs. `DriverInstanceResilienceStatus` | New separate entity `DriverInstanceResilienceStatus { DriverInstanceId, HostName, LastCircuitBreakerOpenUtc, ConsecutiveFailures, CurrentBulkheadDepth, LastRecycleUtc, BaselineFootprintBytes }`. `DriverHostStatus` keeps per-host connectivity only; Admin `/hosts` joins both for display. |
## Scope — What Does NOT Change
| Item | Reason |
|------|--------|
| Driver wire protocols | Resilience is a server-side wrapper; individual drivers don't see Polly. Their existing retry logic (ModbusTcpTransport reconnect, SessionReconnectHandler) stays in place as inner layers. |
| Config DB schema | LiteDB cache is a read-only mirror; no new central tables except `DriverHostStatus` column additions. |
| OPC UA wire behavior visible to clients | Health endpoints live on a separate HTTP port (4841 by convention); the OPC UA server on 4840 is unaffected. |
| The four 2026-04-13 Galaxy stability findings | Already closed in Phase 2. Phase 6.1 *generalises* the pattern, doesn't re-fix Galaxy. |
| Driver-layer SafeHandle usage | Existing Galaxy `SafeMxAccessHandle` + Modbus `TcpClient` disposal stay — they're driver-internal, not part of the cross-cutting layer. |
## Entry Gate Checklist
- [ ] Phases 05 exit gates cleared (or explicitly deferred with task reference)
- [ ] `driver-stability.md` §24 re-read; decisions #6373 + #3436 re-skimmed
- [ ] Polly v8 NuGet available (`Microsoft.Extensions.Resilience` + `Polly.Core`) — verify package restore before task breakdown
- [ ] LiteDB 5.x NuGet confirmed MIT + actively maintained
- [ ] Existing drivers catalogued: Galaxy.Proxy, Modbus, S7, OpcUaClient — confirm test counts baseline so the resilience layer doesn't regress any
- [ ] Serilog configuration inventory: locate every `Log.ForContext` call site that will need `LogContext` rewrap
- [ ] Admin `/hosts` page's current `DriverHostStatus` consumption reviewed so the schema extensions don't break it
## Task Breakdown
### Stream A — Resilience layer (1 week)
1. **A.1** Add `Polly.Core` + `Microsoft.Extensions.Resilience` to `Core`. Build `DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder` — key on `(DriverInstanceId, HostName)`; composes Timeout → (Retry when the capability allows it; skipped for Write unless `[WriteIdempotent]`) → CircuitBreaker → Bulkhead. Per-capability policy map documented in `DriverResilienceOptions.CapabilityPolicies`.
2. **A.2** `DriverResilienceOptions` record bound from `DriverInstance.ResilienceConfig` JSON column (new nullable). **Per-tier × per-capability** defaults: Tier A (OpcUaClient, S7) Read 3 retries/2 s/5-failure-breaker, Write 0 retries/2 s/5-failure-breaker; Tier B (Modbus) Read 3/4 s/5, Write 0/4 s/5; Tier C (Galaxy) Read 1 retry/10 s/no-kill, Write 0/10 s/no-kill. Idempotent writes can opt into Read-shaped retry via the attribute.
3. **A.3** `CapabilityInvoker<TCapability, TResult>` wraps every method on the capability interfaces (`IReadable.ReadAsync`, `IWritable.WriteAsync`, `ITagDiscovery.DiscoverAsync`, `ISubscribable.SubscribeAsync/UnsubscribeAsync`, `IHostConnectivityProbe` probe loop, `IAlarmSource.SubscribeAlarmsAsync/AcknowledgeAsync`, `IHistoryProvider.ReadRawAsync/ReadProcessedAsync/ReadAtTimeAsync/ReadEventsAsync`). Existing server-side dispatch routes through it.
4. **A.4** **Retain** `Driver.Galaxy.Proxy/Supervisor/CircuitBreaker.cs` + `Backoff.cs` — they guard IPC process respawn (decision #68), orthogonal to the per-call Polly layer. Only `HeartbeatMonitor` is consumed outside the supervisor.
5. **A.5** Unit tests: per-policy, per-composition. Negative integration tests: (a) Modbus FlakeyTransport fails 5× on Read, succeeds 6th — invoker surfaces success; (b) Modbus FlakeyTransport fails 1× on Write with `[WriteIdempotent]=false` — invoker surfaces failure without retry (no duplicate pulse); (c) Modbus FlakeyTransport fails 1× on Write with `[WriteIdempotent]=true` — invoker retries. Bench: no-op overhead < 1%.
6. **A.6** `WriteIdempotentAttribute` in `Core.Abstractions`. Modbus/S7/OpcUaClient tag-definition records pick it up; invoker reads via reflection once at driver init.
### Stream B — Tier A/B/C stability runtime — split into MemoryTracking + MemoryRecycle (1 week)
1. **B.1** `Core.Abstractions``DriverTier` enum {A, B, C}. Extend `DriverTypeRegistry` to require `DriverTier` at registration. Existing driver types stamped (Galaxy = C, Modbus = B, S7 = B, OpcUaClient = A).
2. **B.2** **`MemoryTracking`** (all tiers) lifted from `Driver.Galaxy.Host/MemoryWatchdog.cs`. Captures `BaselineFootprintBytes` as the median of first 5 min of `IDriver.GetMemoryFootprint()` samples post-`InitializeAsync`. Applies **decision #70 hybrid formula**: `soft = max(multiplier × baseline, baseline + floor)`; Tier A multiplier=3, floor=50 MB; Tier B multiplier=3, floor=100 MB; Tier C multiplier=2, floor=500 MB. Soft breach → log + `DriverInstanceResilienceStatus.CurrentFootprint` tick; never kills. Hard = 2 × soft.
3. **B.3** **`MemoryRecycle`** (Tier C only per decisions #73-74). Hard-breach on a Tier C driver triggers `ScheduledRecycleScheduler.RequestRecycleNow(driverInstanceId)`; scheduler proxies to `Driver.Galaxy.Proxy/Supervisor/` which restarts the Host process. Tier A/B hard-breach logs a promotion-to-Tier-C recommendation; **never auto-kills** the in-process driver.
4. **B.4** **`ScheduledRecycleScheduler`** per decision #67: Tier C driver instances opt-in to a weekly recycle at a configured cron. Tier A/B scheduled recycle deferred to a later phase paired with Tier-C escalation.
5. **B.5** **`WedgeDetector`** demand-aware: `if (state==Healthy && hasPendingWork && noProgressIn > WedgeThreshold) → force ReinitializeAsync`. `hasPendingWork` = (bulkhead depth > 0) OR (active monitored items > 0) OR (queued historian-read count > 0). `WedgeThreshold` default 5 × PublishingInterval, min 60 s. Idle driver stays Healthy.
6. **B.6** Tests: tracking unit tests drive synthetic allocation against a fake `GetMemoryFootprint`; recycle tests use a mock supervisor; wedge tests include the false-fault cases — idle subscriber, slow historian backfill, write-only burst.
### Stream C — Health endpoints + structured logging (4 days)
1. **C.1** `OtOpcUa.Server/Observability/HealthEndpoints.cs` — Minimal API on a second Kestrel binding (default `http://+:4841`). `/healthz` reports process uptime + config-DB reachability (or cache-warm). `/readyz` enumerates `DriverInstance` rows + reports each driver's `DriverHealth.State`; returns 503 if ANY driver is Faulted. JSON body per `docs/v2/acl-design.md` §"Operator Dashboards" shape.
2. **C.2** `LogContextEnricher` installed at Serilog config time. Every driver-capability call site wraps its body in `using (LogContext.PushProperty("DriverInstanceId", id)) using (LogContext.PushProperty("CorrelationId", correlationId))`. Correlation IDs: reuse OPC UA `RequestHeader.RequestHandle` when in-flight; otherwise generate `Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N")[..12]`.
3. **C.3** Add JSON-formatted Serilog sink alongside the existing rolling-file plain-text sink so SIEMs (Splunk, Datadog) can ingest without a regex parser. Sink switchable via `Serilog:WriteJson` appsetting.
4. **C.4** Integration test: boot server, issue Modbus read, assert log line contains `DriverInstanceId` + `CorrelationId` structured fields.
### Stream D — Config DB LiteDB fallback — generation-sealed snapshots (1 week)
1. **D.1** `LiteDbConfigCache` adapter backed by **sealed generation snapshots**: each successful `sp_PublishGeneration` writes `<cache-root>/<clusterId>/<generationId>.db` as read-only after commit. The adapter maintains a `CurrentSealedGenerationId` pointer updated atomically on successful publish. Mixed-generation reads are **impossible** — every read served from the cache serves one coherent sealed generation.
2. **D.2** Write-path queries (draft save, publish) bypass the cache entirely and fail hard on DB outage. Read-path queries (DriverInstance enumeration, LdapGroupRoleMapping, cluster + namespace metadata) go through the pipeline: timeout 2 s → retry 3× jittered → fallback to the current sealed snapshot.
3. **D.3** `UsingStaleConfig` flag flips true when a read fell back to the sealed snapshot; cleared on the next successful DB round-trip. Surfaced on `/healthz` body and Admin `/hosts`.
4. **D.4** Tests: (a) SQL-container kill mid-operation — read returns sealed snapshot, `UsingStaleConfig=true`, driver stays Healthy; (b) mixed-generation guard — attempt to serve partial generation by corrupting a snapshot file mid-read → adapter fails closed rather than serving mixed data; (c) first-boot-no-snapshot case — adapter refuses to start, driver fails `InitializeAsync` with a clear config-DB-required error.
### Stream E — Admin `/hosts` page refresh (3 days)
1. **E.1** Extend `DriverHostStatus` schema with Stream A resilience columns. Generate EF migration.
2. **E.2** `Admin/FleetStatusHub` SignalR hub pushes `LastCircuitBreakerOpenUtc` + `CurrentBulkheadDepth` + `LastRecycleUtc` on change.
3. **E.3** `/hosts` Blazor page renders new columns; red badge if `ConsecutiveFailures > breakerThreshold / 2`.
## Compliance Checks (run at exit gate)
- [ ] **Invoker coverage**: every method on `IReadable` / `IWritable` / `ITagDiscovery` / `ISubscribable` / `IHostConnectivityProbe` / `IAlarmSource` / `IHistoryProvider` in the server dispatch layer routes through `CapabilityInvoker`. Enforce via a Roslyn analyzer (error-level; warning-first is rejected — the compliance check is the gate).
- [ ] **Write-retry guard**: writes without `[WriteIdempotent]` never get retried. Unit-test the invoker path asserts zero retry attempts.
- [ ] **Pipeline isolation**: pipeline key is `(DriverInstanceId, HostName)`. Integration test with two Modbus hosts under one instance — failing host A does not open the breaker for host B.
- [ ] **Tier registry**: every driver type registered in `DriverTypeRegistry` has a non-null `Tier`. Unit test walks the registry + asserts no gaps. Tier C registrations must declare their out-of-process topology.
- [ ] **MemoryTracking never kills**: soft/hard breach tests on a Tier A/B driver log + surface without terminating the process.
- [ ] **MemoryRecycle Tier C only**: hard breach on a Tier A driver never invokes the supervisor; on Tier C it does.
- [ ] **Wedge demand-aware**: test suite includes idle-subscription-only, slow-historian-backfill, and write-only-burst cases — driver stays Healthy.
- [ ] **Galaxy supervisor preserved**: `Driver.Galaxy.Proxy/Supervisor/CircuitBreaker.cs` + `Backoff.cs` still present + still invoked on Host crash.
- [ ] **Health state machine**: `/healthz` + `/readyz` respond within 500 ms for every `DriverState`; state-machine table in this doc drives the test matrix.
- [ ] **Structured log**: CI grep asserts at least one log line per capability call has `"DriverInstanceId"` + `"CorrelationId"` JSON fields.
- [ ] **Generation-sealed cache**: integration tests cover (a) SQL-kill mid-operation serves last-sealed snapshot; (b) mixed-generation corruption fails closed; (c) first-boot no-snapshot + DB-down → `InitializeAsync` fails with clear error.
- [ ] No regression in existing test suites — `dotnet test ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx` count equal-or-greater than pre-Phase-6.1 baseline.
## Risks and Mitigations
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|------|:----------:|:------:|------------|
| Polly pipeline adds per-request latency on hot path | Medium | Medium | Benchmark Stream A.5 before merging; 1 % overhead budget; inline hot path short-circuits when retry count = 0 |
| LiteDB cache diverges from central DB | Medium | High | Stale-data banner in Admin UI; `UsingStaleConfig` flag surfaced on `/readyz`; cache refresh on every successful DB round-trip; 24-hour synthetic warning |
| Tier watchdog false-positive-kills a legitimate batch load | Low | High | Soft/hard threshold split; soft only logs; hard triggers recycle; thresholds configurable per-instance |
| Wedge detector races with slow-but-healthy drivers | Medium | High | Minimum 60 s threshold; detector only activates if driver claims `Healthy`; add circuit-breaker feedback so rapid oscillation trips instead of thrashing |
| Roslyn analyzer breaks external driver authors | Low | Medium | Release analyzer as warning-level initially; upgrade to error in Phase 6.1+1 after one release cycle |
## Completion Checklist
- [ ] Stream A: Polly shared pipeline + per-tier defaults + driver-capability invoker + tests
- [ ] Stream B: Tier registry + generalised watchdog + scheduled recycle + wedge detector
- [ ] Stream C: `/healthz` + `/readyz` + structured logging + JSON Serilog sink
- [ ] Stream D: LiteDB cache + Polly fallback in Configuration
- [ ] Stream E: Admin `/hosts` page refresh
- [ ] Cross-cutting: `phase-6-1-compliance.ps1` exits 0; full solution `dotnet test` passes; exit-gate doc recorded
## Adversarial Review — 2026-04-19 (Codex, thread `019da489-e317-7aa1-ab1f-6335e0be2447`)
Plan substantially rewritten before implementation to address these findings. Each entry: severity · verdict · adjustment.
1. **Crit · ACCEPT** — Auto-retry collides with decisions #44/#45 (no auto-write-retry; opt-in via `WriteIdempotent` + CAS). Pipeline now **capability-specific**: Read/HistoryRead/Discover/Probe/Alarm-subscribe all get retries; **Write does not** unless the tag metadata carries `WriteIdempotent=true`. New `WriteIdempotentAttribute` surfaces on `ModbusTagDefinition` / `S7TagDefinition` / etc.
2. **Crit · ACCEPT** — "One pipeline per driver instance" breaks decision #35's per-device isolation. **Change**: pipeline key is `(DriverInstanceId, HostName)` not just `DriverInstanceId`. One dead PLC behind a multi-device Modbus driver no longer opens the breaker for healthy siblings.
3. **Crit · ACCEPT** — Memory watchdog + scheduled recycle at Tier A/B breaches decisions #73/#74 (process-kill protections are Tier-C-only). **Change**: Stream B splits into two — `MemoryTracking` (all tiers, soft/hard thresholds log + surface to Admin `/hosts`; never kills) and `MemoryRecycle` (Tier C only, requires out-of-process topology). Tier A/B overrun paths escalate to Tier C via a future PR, not auto-kill.
4. **High · ACCEPT** — Removing Galaxy's hand-rolled `CircuitBreaker` drops decision #68 host-supervision crash-loop protection. **Change**: keep `Driver.Galaxy.Proxy/Supervisor/CircuitBreaker.cs` + `Backoff.cs` — they guard the IPC *process* re-spawn, not the per-call data path. Data-path Polly is an orthogonal layer.
5. **High · ACCEPT** — Roslyn analyzer targeting `IDriver` misses the hot paths (`IReadable.ReadAsync`, `IWritable.WriteAsync`, `ISubscribable.SubscribeAsync` etc.). **Change**: analyzer rule now matches every method on the capability interfaces; compliance doc enumerates the full call-site list.
6. **High · ACCEPT**`/healthz` + `/readyz` under-specified for degraded-running. **Change**: add a state-matrix sub-section explicitly covering `Unknown` (pre-init: `/readyz` 503), `Initializing` (503), `Healthy` (200), `Degraded` (200 with JSON body flagging the degraded driver; `/readyz` is OR across drivers), `Faulted` (503), plus cached-config-serving (`/healthz` returns 200 + `UsingStaleConfig: true` in JSON body).
7. **High · ACCEPT**`WedgeDetector` based on "no successful Read" false-fires on write-only subscriptions + idle systems. **Change**: wedge criteria now `(hasPendingWork AND noProgressIn > threshold)` where `hasPendingWork` comes from the Polly bulkhead depth + active MonitoredItem count. Idle driver stays Healthy.
8. **High · ACCEPT** — LiteDB cache serving mixed-generation reads breaks publish atomicity. **Change**: cache is snapshot-per-generation. Each published generation writes a sealed snapshot into `<cache-root>/<cluster>/<generationId>.db`; reads serve the last-known-sealed generation and never mix. Central DB outage during a *publish* means that publish fails (write path doesn't use cache); reads continue from the prior sealed snapshot.
9. **Med · ACCEPT**`DriverHostStatus` schema conflates per-host connectivity with per-driver-instance resilience counters. **Change**: new `DriverInstanceResilienceStatus` table separate from `DriverHostStatus`. Admin `/hosts` joins both for display.
10. **Med · ACCEPT** — Compliance says analyzer-error; risks say analyzer-warning. **Change**: phase 6.1 ships at **error** level (this phase is the gate); warning-mode option removed.
11. **Med · ACCEPT** — Hardcoded per-tier MB bands ignore decision #70's `max(multiplier × baseline, baseline + floor)` formula with observed-baseline capture. **Change**: watchdog captures baseline at post-init plateau (median of first 5 min GetMemoryFootprint samples) + applies the hybrid formula. Tier constants now encode the multiplier + floor, not raw MB.
12. **Med · ACCEPT** — Tests mostly cover happy path. **Change**: Stream A.5 adds negative tests for duplicate-write-replay-under-timeout; Stream B.5 adds false-wedge-on-idle-subscription + false-wedge-on-slow-historic-backfill; Stream D.4 adds mixed-generation cache test + corrupt-first-boot cache test.

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# Phase 6.2 — Authorization Runtime (ACL + LDAP grants)
> **Status**: DRAFT — the v2 `plan.md` decision #129 + `acl-design.md` specify a 6-level permission-trie evaluator with `NodePermissions` bitmask grants, but no runtime evaluator exists. ACL tables are schematized but unread by the data path.
>
> **Branch**: `v2/phase-6-2-authorization-runtime`
> **Estimated duration**: 2.5 weeks
> **Predecessor**: Phase 6.1 (Resilience & Observability) — reuses the Polly pipeline for ACL-cache refresh retries
> **Successor**: Phase 6.3 (Redundancy)
## Phase Objective
Wire ACL enforcement on every OPC UA Read / Write / Subscribe / Call path + LDAP group → admin role grants that the v2 plan specified but never ran. End-state: a user's effective permissions resolve through a per-session permission-trie over the 6-level `Cluster / Namespace / UnsArea / UnsLine / Equipment / Tag` hierarchy, cached per session, invalidated on generation-apply + LDAP group expiry.
Closes these gaps:
1. **Data-path ACL enforcement**`NodeAcl` table + `NodePermissions` flags shipped; `NodeAclService.cs` present as a CRUD surface; no code consults ACLs at `Read`/`Write` time. OPC UA server answers everything to everyone.
2. **`LdapGroupRoleMapping` for cluster-scoped admin grants** — decision #105 shipped as the *design*; admin roles are hardcoded (`FleetAdmin` / `ConfigEditor` / `ReadOnly`) with no cluster-scoping and no LDAP-to-grant table. Decision #105 explicitly lifts this from v2.1 into v2.0.
3. **Explicit Deny pathway** — deferred to v2.1 (decision #129 note). Phase 6.2 ships *grants only*; `Deny` stays out.
4. **Admin UI ACL grant editor**`AclsTab.razor` exists but edits the now-unused `NodeAcl` table; needs to wire to the runtime evaluator + the new `LdapGroupRoleMapping` table.
## Scope — What Changes
**Architectural separation** (critical for correctness): `LdapGroupRoleMapping` is **control-plane only** — it maps LDAP groups to Admin UI roles (`FleetAdmin` / `ConfigEditor` / `ReadOnly`) and cluster scopes for Admin access. **It is NOT consulted by the OPC UA data-path evaluator.** The data-path evaluator reads `NodeAcl` rows joined directly against the session's **resolved LDAP group memberships**. The two concerns share zero runtime code path.
| Concern | Change |
|---------|--------|
| `Configuration` project | New entity `LdapGroupRoleMapping { Id, LdapGroup, Role, ClusterId? (nullable = system-wide), IsSystemWide, GeneratedAtUtc }`. **Consumed only by Admin UI role routing.** Migration. Admin CRUD. |
| `Core` → new `Core.Authorization` sub-namespace | `IPermissionEvaluator.Authorize(IEnumerable<Claim> identity, OpcUaOperation op, NodeId nodeId) → AuthorizationDecision`. `op` covers every OPC UA surface: Browse, Read, Write, HistoryRead, HistoryUpdate, CreateMonitoredItems, TransferSubscriptions, Call, Acknowledge, Confirm, Shelve. Result is tri-state (internal model distinguishes `Allow` / `NotGranted` / `Denied` + carries matched-grant provenance). Phase 6.2 only produces `Allow` + `NotGranted`; v2.1 Deny lands without API break. |
| `PermissionTrieBuilder` | Builds trie from `NodeAcl` rows joined against **resolved LDAP group memberships**, keyed on 6-level scope hierarchy for Equipment namespaces. **SystemPlatform namespaces (Galaxy)** use a `FolderSegment` scope level between Namespace and Tag, populated from `Tag.FolderPath` segments, so folder subtree authorization works on Galaxy trees the same way UNS works on Equipment trees. Trie node carries `ScopeKind` enum. |
| `PermissionTrieCache` + freshness | One trie per `(ClusterId, GenerationId)`. Invalidated on `sp_PublishGeneration` via in-process event bus AND generation-ID check on hot path — every authz call looks up `CurrentGenerationId` (Polly-wrapped, sub-second cache); a Backup that cached a stale generation detects the mismatch + forces re-load. **Redundancy-safe**. |
| `UserAuthorizationState` freshness | Cached per session BUT bounded by `MembershipFreshnessInterval` (default **15 min**). Past that, the next hot-path authz call re-resolves LDAP group memberships via `LdapGroupService`. Failure to re-resolve (LDAP unreachable) → **fail-closed**: evaluator returns `NotGranted` for every call until memberships refresh successfully. Decoupled from Phase 6.1's availability-oriented 24h cache. |
| `AuthCacheMaxStaleness` | Separate from Phase 6.1's `UsingStaleConfig` window. Default 5 min — beyond that, authz fails closed regardless of Phase 6.1 cache warmth. |
| OPC UA server dispatch — all enforcement surfaces | `DriverNodeManager` wires evaluator on: **Browse + TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds** (ancestors implicitly visible if any descendant has a grant; denied ancestors filter from results), **Read** (per-attribute StatusCode `BadUserAccessDenied` in mixed-authorization batches; batch never poisons), **Write** (uses `NodePermissions.WriteOperate/Tune/Configure` based on driver `SecurityClassification`), **HistoryRead** (uses `NodePermissions.HistoryRead`**distinct** flag, not Read), **HistoryUpdate** (`NodePermissions.HistoryUpdate`), **CreateMonitoredItems** (per-`MonitoredItemCreateResult` denial), **TransferSubscriptions** (re-evaluates items on transfer), **Call** (`NodePermissions.MethodCall`), **Acknowledge/Confirm/Shelve** (per-alarm flags). |
| Subscription re-authorization | Each `MonitoredItem` is stamped with `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` at create time. On every Publish, items with a stamp mismatching the session's current `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` get re-evaluated; revoked items drop to `BadUserAccessDenied` within one publish cycle. Unchanged items stay fast-path. |
| `LdapAuthService` | On cookie-auth success: resolves LDAP group memberships; loads matching `LdapGroupRoleMapping` rows → role claims + cluster-scope claims (control plane); stores `UserAuthorizationState.LdapGroups` on the session for the data-plane evaluator. |
| `ValidatedNodeAclAuthoringService` | Replaces CRUD-only `NodeAclService` for authoring. Validates (LDAP group exists, scope exists in current or target draft, grant shape is valid, no duplicate `(LdapGroup, Scope)` pair). Admin UI writes only through it. |
| Admin UI `AclsTab.razor` | Writes via `ValidatedNodeAclAuthoringService`. Adds Probe-This-Permission row that runs the real evaluator against a chosen `(LDAP group, node, operation)` and shows `Allow` / `NotGranted` + matched-grant provenance. |
| Admin UI new tab `RoleGrantsTab.razor` | CRUD over `LdapGroupRoleMapping`. Per-cluster + system-wide grants. FleetAdmin only. **Documentation explicit** that this only affects Admin UI access, not OPC UA data plane. |
| Audit log | Every Grant/Revoke/Publish on `LdapGroupRoleMapping` or `NodeAcl` writes an `AuditLog` row with old/new state + user. |
## Scope — What Does NOT Change
| Item | Reason |
|------|--------|
| OPC UA authn | Already done (PR 19 LDAP user identity + Basic256Sha256 profile). Phase 6.2 is authorization only. |
| Explicit `Deny` grants | Decision #129 note explicitly defers to v2.1. Default-deny + additive grants only. |
| Driver-side `SecurityClassification` metadata | Drivers keep reporting `Operate` / `ViewOnly` / etc. — the evaluator uses them as *part* of the decision but doesn't replace them. |
| Galaxy namespace (SystemPlatform kind) | UNS levels don't apply; evaluator treats Galaxy nodes as `Cluster → Namespace → Tag` (skip UnsArea/UnsLine/Equipment). |
## Entry Gate Checklist
- [ ] Phase 6.1 merged (reuse `Core.Resilience` Polly pipeline for the ACL cache-refresh retries)
- [ ] `acl-design.md` re-read in full
- [ ] Decision log #105, #129, corrections-doc B1 re-skimmed
- [ ] Existing `NodeAcl` + `NodePermissions` flag enum audited; confirm bitmask flags match `acl-design.md` table
- [ ] Existing `LdapAuthService` group-resolution code path traced end-to-end — confirm it already queries group memberships (we only need the caller to consume the result)
- [ ] Test DB scenarios catalogued: two clusters, three LDAP groups per cluster, mixed grant shapes; captured as seed-data fixtures
## Task Breakdown
### Stream A — `LdapGroupRoleMapping` table + migration (3 days)
1. **A.1** Entity + EF Core migration. Columns per §Scope table. Unique constraint on `(LdapGroup, ClusterId)` with null-tolerant comparer for the system-wide case. Index on `LdapGroup` for the hot-path lookup on auth.
2. **A.2** `ILdapGroupRoleMappingService` CRUD. Wrap in the Phase 6.1 Polly pipeline (timeout → retry → fallback-to-cache).
3. **A.3** Seed-data migration: preserve the current hardcoded `FleetAdmin` / `ConfigEditor` / `ReadOnly` mappings by seeding rows for the existing LDAP groups the dev box uses (`cn=fleet-admin,…`, `cn=config-editor,…`, `cn=read-only,…`). Op no-op migration for existing deployments.
### Stream B — Permission-trie evaluator (1 week)
1. **B.1** `IPermissionEvaluator.Authorize(IEnumerable<Claim> identity, NodeId nodeId, NodePermissions needed)` — returns `bool`. Phase 6.2 returns only `true` / `false`; v2.1 can widen to `Allow`/`Deny`/`Indeterminate` if Deny lands.
2. **B.2** `PermissionTrieBuilder` builds the trie from `NodeAcl` + `LdapGroupRoleMapping` joined to the current generation's `UnsArea` + `UnsLine` + `Equipment` + `Tag` tables. One trie per `(ClusterId, GenerationId)` so rollback doesn't smear permissions across generations.
3. **B.3** Trie node structure: `{ Level: enum, ScopeId: Guid, AllowedPermissions: NodePermissions, ChildrenByLevel: Dictionary<Guid, TrieNode> }`. Evaluation walks from Cluster → Namespace → UnsArea → UnsLine → Equipment → Tag, ORing allowed permissions at each level. Additive semantics: a grant at Cluster level cascades to every descendant tag.
4. **B.4** `PermissionTrieCache` service scoped as singleton; exposes `GetTrieAsync(ClusterId, ct)` that returns the current-generation trie. Invalidated on `sp_PublishGeneration` via an in-process event bus; also on TTL expiry (24 h safety net).
5. **B.5** Per-session cached evaluator: OPC UA Session authentication produces `UserAuthorizationState { ClusterId, LdapGroups[], Trie }`; cached on the session until session close or generation-apply.
6. **B.6** Unit tests: trie-walk theory covering (a) Cluster-level grant cascades to tags, (b) Equipment-level grant doesn't leak to sibling Equipment, (c) multi-group union, (d) no-grant → deny, (e) Galaxy nodes skip UnsArea/UnsLine levels.
### Stream C — OPC UA server dispatch wiring (6 days, widened)
1. **C.1** `DriverNodeManager.Read` — evaluator consulted per `ReadValueId` with `OpcUaOperation.Read`. Denied attributes get `BadUserAccessDenied` per-item; batch never poisons. Integration test covers mixed-authorization batch (3 authorized + 2 denied → 3 Good values + 2 Bad StatusCodes, request completes).
2. **C.2** `DriverNodeManager.Write` — evaluator chooses `NodePermissions.WriteOperate` / `WriteTune` / `WriteConfigure` based on the driver-reported `SecurityClassification`.
3. **C.3** `DriverNodeManager.HistoryRead`**uses `NodePermissions.HistoryRead`**, which is a **distinct flag** from Read. Test: user with Read but not HistoryRead can read live values but gets `BadUserAccessDenied` on `HistoryRead`.
4. **C.4** `DriverNodeManager.HistoryUpdate` — uses `NodePermissions.HistoryUpdate`.
5. **C.5** `DriverNodeManager.CreateMonitoredItems` — per-`MonitoredItemCreateResult` denial in mixed-authorization batch; partial success path per OPC UA Part 4. Each created item stamped `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)`.
6. **C.6** `DriverNodeManager.TransferSubscriptions` — on reconnect, re-evaluate every transferred `MonitoredItem` against the session's current auth state. Stale-stamp items drop to `BadUserAccessDenied`.
7. **C.7** **Browse + TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds** — evaluator called with `OpcUaOperation.Browse`. Ancestor visibility implied when any descendant has a grant (per `acl-design.md` §Browse). Denied ancestors filter from browse results — the UA browser sees a hierarchy truncated at the denied ancestor rather than an inconsistent child-without-parent view.
8. **C.8** `DriverNodeManager.Call``NodePermissions.MethodCall`.
9. **C.9** Alarm actions (Acknowledge / Confirm / Shelve) — per-alarm `NodePermissions.AlarmAck` / `AlarmConfirm` / `AlarmShelve`.
10. **C.10** Publish path — for each `MonitoredItem` with a mismatched `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` stamp, re-evaluate. Unchanged items stay fast-path; changes happen at next publish cycle.
11. **C.11** Integration tests: three-user seed with different memberships; matrix covers every operation in §Scope. Mixed-batch tests for Read + CreateMonitoredItems.
### Stream D — Admin UI refresh (4 days)
1. **D.1** `RoleGrantsTab.razor` — FleetAdmin-gated CRUD on `LdapGroupRoleMapping`. Per-cluster dropdown + system-wide checkbox. Validation: LDAP group must exist in the dev LDAP (GLAuth) before saving — best-effort probe with graceful degradation.
2. **D.2** `AclsTab.razor` rewrites its edit path to write through the new `NodeAclService`. Adds a "Probe this permission" row: choose `(LDAP group, node, action)` → shows Allow / Deny + the reason (which grant matched).
3. **D.3** Draft-generation diff viewer now includes an ACL section: "X grants added, Y grants removed, Z grants changed."
4. **D.4** SignalR notification: `PermissionTrieCache` invalidation on `sp_PublishGeneration` pushes to Admin UI so operators see "this clusters permissions were just updated" within 2 s.
## Compliance Checks (run at exit gate)
- [ ] **Control/data-plane separation**: `LdapGroupRoleMapping` consumed only by Admin UI; the data-path evaluator has zero references to it. Enforced via a project-reference audit (Admin project references the mapping service; `Core.Authorization` does not).
- [ ] **Every operation wired**: Browse, Read, Write, HistoryRead, HistoryUpdate, CreateMonitoredItems, TransferSubscriptions, Call, Acknowledge, Confirm, Shelve all consult the evaluator. Integration test matrix covers every operation × allow/deny.
- [ ] **HistoryRead uses its own flag**: test "user with Read + no HistoryRead gets `BadUserAccessDenied` on HistoryRead".
- [ ] **Mixed-batch semantics**: Read of 5 nodes (3 allowed + 2 denied) returns 3 Good + 2 `BadUserAccessDenied` per-`ReadValueId`; CreateMonitoredItems equivalent.
- [ ] **Browse ancestor visibility**: user with a grant only on a deep equipment node can browse the path to it (ancestors implied); denied ancestors filter from browse results otherwise.
- [ ] **Galaxy FolderSegment coverage**: a grant on a Galaxy folder subtree cascades to its tags; sibling folders are unaffected. Trie test covers this.
- [ ] **Subscription re-authorization**: integration test — create item, revoke grant via draft+publish, next publish cycle the item returns `BadUserAccessDenied` (not silently still-notifying).
- [ ] **Membership freshness**: test — 15 min MembershipFreshnessInterval elapses on a long-lived session + LDAP now unreachable → authz fails closed on the next request until LDAP recovers.
- [ ] **Auth cache fail-closed**: test — Phase 6.1 cache serves stale config for 6 min; authz evaluator refuses all calls after 5 min regardless.
- [ ] **Trie invariants**: `PermissionTrieBuilder` is idempotent (build twice with identical inputs → equal tries).
- [ ] **Additive grants + cluster isolation**: cluster-grant cascades; cross-cluster leakage impossible.
- [ ] **Redundancy-safe invalidation**: integration test — two nodes, a publish on one, authorize a request on the other before in-process event propagates → generation-mismatch forces re-load, no stale decision.
- [ ] **Authoring validation**: `AclsTab` cannot save a `(LdapGroup, Scope)` pair that already exists in the draft; operator sees the validation error pre-save.
- [ ] **AuthorizationDecision shape stability**: API surface exposes `Allow` + `NotGranted` only; `Denied` variant exists in the type but is never produced; v2.1 can add Deny without API break.
- [ ] No regression in driver test counts.
## Risks and Mitigations
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|------|:----------:|:------:|------------|
| ACL evaluator latency on per-read hot path | Medium | High | Trie lookup is O(depth) = O(6); session-cached UserAuthorizationState avoids per-Read trie rebuild; benchmark in Stream B.6 |
| Trie cache stale after a rollback | Medium | High | `sp_PublishGeneration` + `sp_RollbackGeneration` both emit the invalidation event; trie keyed on `(ClusterId, GenerationId)` so rollback fetches the prior trie cleanly |
| `BadUserAccessDenied` returns expose sensitive browse-name metadata | Low | Medium | Server returns only the status code + NodeId; no message leak per OPC UA Part 4 §7.34 guidance |
| LdapGroupRoleMapping migration breaks existing deployments | Low | High | Seed-migration preserves the hardcoded groups' effective grants verbatim; smoke test exercises the post-migration fleet admin login |
| Deny semantics accidentally ship (would break `acl-design.md` defer) | Low | Medium | `IPermissionEvaluator.Authorize` returns `bool` (not tri-state) through Phase 6.2; widening to `Allow`/`Deny`/`Indeterminate` is a v2.1 ticket |
## Completion Checklist
- [ ] Stream A: `LdapGroupRoleMapping` entity + migration + CRUD + seed
- [ ] Stream B: evaluator + trie builder + cache + per-session state + unit tests
- [ ] Stream C: OPC UA dispatch wiring on Read/Write/HistoryRead/Subscribe/Alarm paths
- [ ] Stream D: Admin UI `RoleGrantsTab` + `AclsTab` refresh + SignalR invalidation
- [ ] `phase-6-2-compliance.ps1` exits 0; exit-gate doc recorded
## Adversarial Review — 2026-04-19 (Codex, thread `019da48d-0d2b-7171-aed2-fc05f1f39ca3`)
1. **Crit · ACCEPT** — Trie must not conflate `LdapGroupRoleMapping` (control-plane admin claims per decision #105) with data-plane ACLs (decision #129). **Change**: `LdapGroupRoleMapping` is consumed only by the Admin UI role router. Data-plane trie reads `NodeAcl` rows joined against the session's **resolved LDAP groups**, never admin roles. Stream B.2 updated.
2. **Crit · ACCEPT** — Cached `UserAuthorizationState` survives LDAP group changes because memberships only refresh at cookie-auth. Change: add `MembershipFreshnessInterval` (default 15 min); past that, next hot-path authz call forces group re-resolution (fail-closed if LDAP unreachable). Session-close-wins on config-rollback.
3. **High · ACCEPT** — Node-local invalidation doesn't extend across redundant pair. **Change**: trie keyed on `(ClusterId, GenerationId)`; hot-path authz looks up `CurrentGenerationId` from the shared config DB (Polly-wrapped + sub-second cache). A Backup that read stale generation gets a mismatched trie → forces re-load. Implementation note added to Stream B.4.
4. **High · ACCEPT** — Browse enforcement missing. **Change**: new Stream C.7 (`Browse + TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds` enforcement). Ancestor visibility implied when any descendant has a grant; denied ancestors filter from browse results per `acl-design.md` §Browse.
5. **High · ACCEPT**`HistoryRead` should use `NodePermissions.HistoryRead` bit, not `Read`. **Change**: Stream C.3 revised; separate unit test asserts `Read+no-HistoryRead` denies HistoryRead while allowing current-value reads.
6. **High · ACCEPT** — Galaxy shallow-path (Cluster→Namespace→Tag) loses folder hierarchy authorization. **Change**: SystemPlatform namespaces use a `FolderSegment` scope-level between Namespace and Tag, populated from `Tag.FolderPath`; UNS-kind namespaces keep the 6-level hierarchy. Trie supports both via `ScopeKind` on each node.
7. **High · ACCEPT** — Subscription re-authorization policy unresolved between create-time-only (fast, wrong on revoke) and per-publish (slow). **Change**: stamp each `MonitoredItem` with `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)`; re-evaluate on Publish only when either version changed. Revoked items drop to `BadUserAccessDenied` within one publish cycle.
8. **Med · ACCEPT** — Mixed-authorization batch `Read` / `CreateMonitoredItems` service-result semantics underspecified. **Change**: Stream C.6 explicitly tests per-`ReadValueId` + per-`MonitoredItemCreateResult` denial in mixed batches; batch never collapses to a coarse failure.
9. **Med · ACCEPT** — Missing surfaces: `Method.Call`, `HistoryUpdate`, event filter on subscriptions, subscription-transfer on reconnect, alarm-ack. **Change**: scope expanded — every OPC UA authorization surface enumerated in Stream C: Read, Write, HistoryRead, HistoryUpdate, CreateMonitoredItems, TransferSubscriptions, Call, Acknowledge/Confirm/Shelve, Browse, TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds.
10. **Med · ACCEPT**`bool` evaluator bakes in grant-only semantics; collides with v2.1 Deny. **Change**: internal model uses `AuthorizationDecision { Allow | NotGranted | Denied, IReadOnlyList<MatchedGrant> Provenance }`. Phase 6.2 maps `Denied` → never produced; UI + audit log use the full record so v2.1 Deny lands without API break.
11. **Med · ACCEPT** — 6.1 cache fallback is availability-oriented; applying it to auth is correctness-dangerous. **Change**: auth-specific staleness budget `AuthCacheMaxStaleness` (default 5 min, not 24 h). Past that, hot-path evaluator fails closed on cached reads; all authorization calls return `NotGranted` until fresh data lands. Documented in risks + compliance.
12. **Low · ACCEPT** — Existing `NodeAclService` is raw CRUD. **Change**: new `ValidatedNodeAclAuthoringService` enforces scope-uniqueness + draft/publish invariants + rejects invalid (LDAP group, scope) pairs; Admin UI writes through it only. Stream D.2 adjusted.

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# Phase 6.3 — Redundancy Runtime
> **Status**: DRAFT — `CLAUDE.md` + `docs/Redundancy.md` describe a non-transparent warm/hot redundancy model with unique ApplicationUris, `RedundancySupport` advertisement, `ServerUriArray`, and dynamic `ServiceLevel`. Entities (`ServerCluster`, `ClusterNode`, `RedundancyRole`, `RedundancyMode`) exist; the runtime behavior (actual `ServiceLevel` number computation, mid-apply dip, `ServerUriArray` broadcast) is not wired.
>
> **Branch**: `v2/phase-6-3-redundancy-runtime`
> **Estimated duration**: 2 weeks
> **Predecessor**: Phase 6.2 (Authorization) — reuses the Phase 6.1 health endpoints for cluster-peer probing
> **Successor**: Phase 6.4 (Admin UI completion)
## Phase Objective
Land the non-transparent redundancy protocol end-to-end: two `OtOpcUa.Server` instances in a `ServerCluster` each expose a live `ServiceLevel` node whose value reflects that instance's suitability to serve traffic, advertise each other via `ServerUriArray`, and transition role (Primary ↔ Backup) based on health + operator intent.
Closes these gaps:
1. **Dynamic `ServiceLevel`** — OPC UA Part 5 §6.3.34 specifies a Byte (0..255) that clients poll to pick the healthiest server. Our server publishes it as a static value today.
2. **`ServerUriArray` broadcast** — Part 4 specifies that every node in a redundant pair should advertise its peers' ApplicationUris. Currently advertises only its own.
3. **Primary / Backup role coordination** — entities carry `RedundancyRole` but the runtime doesn't read it; no peer health probing; no role-transfer on primary failure.
4. **Mid-apply dip** — decision-level expectation that a server mid-generation-apply should report a *lower* ServiceLevel so clients cut over to the peer during the apply window. Not implemented.
## Scope — What Changes
| Concern | Change |
|---------|--------|
| `OtOpcUa.Server` → new `Server.Redundancy` sub-namespace | `RedundancyCoordinator` singleton. Resolves the current node's `ClusterNode` row at startup, loads peers, runs **two-layer peer health probe**: (a) `/healthz` every 2 s as the fast-fail (inherits Phase 6.1 semantics — HTTP + DB/cache healthy); (b) `UaHealthProbe` every 10 s — opens a lightweight OPC UA client session to the peer + reads its `ServiceLevel` node + verifies endpoint serves data. Authority decisions use UaHealthProbe; `/healthz` is used only to avoid wasting UA probes when peer is obviously down. |
| Publish-generation fencing | Topology + role decisions are stamped with a monotonic `ConfigGenerationId` from the shared config DB. Coordinator re-reads topology via CAS on `(ClusterId, ExpectedGeneration)` → new row; peers reject state propagated from a lower generation. Prevents split-publish races. |
| `InvalidTopology` runtime state | If both nodes detect >1 Primary AFTER startup (config-DB drift during a publish), both self-demote to ServiceLevel 2 until convergence. Neither node serves authoritatively; clients pick the healthier alternative or reconnect later. |
| OPC UA server root | `ServiceLevel` variable node becomes a `BaseDataVariable` whose value updates on `RedundancyCoordinator` state change. `ServerUriArray` array variable includes **self + peers** in stable deterministic ordering (decision per OPC UA Part 4 §6.6.2.2). `RedundancySupport` stays static (set from `RedundancyMode` at startup); `Transparent` mode validated pre-publish, not rejected at startup. |
| `RedundancyCoordinator` computation | **8-state ServiceLevel matrix** — avoids OPC UA Part 5 §6.3.34 collision (`0=Maintenance`, `1=NoData`). Operator-declared maintenance only = **0**. Unreachable / Faulted = **1**. In-range operational states occupy **2..255**: Authoritative-Primary = **255**; Isolated-Primary (peer unreachable, self serving) = **230**; Primary-Mid-Apply = **200**; Recovering-Primary (post-fault, dwell not met) = **180**; Authoritative-Backup = **100**; Isolated-Backup (primary unreachable, "take over if asked") = **80**; Backup-Mid-Apply = **50**; Recovering-Backup = **30**; `InvalidTopology` (runtime detects >1 Primary) = **2** (detected-inconsistency band — below normal operation). Full matrix documented in `docs/Redundancy.md` update. |
| Role transition | Split-brain avoidance: role is *declared* in the shared config DB (`ClusterNode.RedundancyRole`), not elected at runtime. An operator flips the row (or a failover script does). Coordinator only reads; never writes. |
| `sp_PublishGeneration` hook | Uses named **apply leases** keyed to `(ConfigGenerationId, PublishRequestId)`. `await using var lease = coordinator.BeginApplyLease(...)`. Disposal on any exit path (success, exception, cancellation) decrements. Watchdog auto-closes any lease older than `ApplyMaxDuration` (default 10 min) → ServiceLevel can't stick at mid-apply. Pre-publish validator rejects unsupported `RedundancyMode` (e.g. `Transparent`) with a clear error so runtime never sees an invalid state. |
| Admin UI `/cluster/{id}` page | New `RedundancyTab.razor` — shows current node's role + ServiceLevel + peer reachability. FleetAdmin can trigger a role-swap by editing `ClusterNode.RedundancyRole` + publishing a draft. |
| Metrics | New OpenTelemetry metrics: `ot_opcua_service_level{cluster,node}`, `ot_opcua_peer_reachable{cluster,node,peer}`, `ot_opcua_apply_in_progress{cluster,node}`. Sink via Phase 6.1 observability layer. |
## Scope — What Does NOT Change
| Item | Reason |
|------|--------|
| OPC UA authn / authz | Phases 6.2 + prior. Redundancy is orthogonal. |
| Driver layer | Drivers aren't redundancy-aware; they run on each node independently against the same equipment. The server layer handles the ServiceLevel story. |
| Automatic failover / election | Explicitly out of scope. Non-transparent = client picks which server to use via ServiceLevel + ServerUriArray. We do NOT ship consensus, leader election, or automatic promotion. Operator-driven failover is the v2.0 model per decision #7985. |
| Transparent redundancy (`RedundancySupport=Transparent`) | Not supported. If the operator asks for it the server fails startup with a clear error. |
| Historian redundancy | Galaxy Historian's own redundancy (two historians on two CPUs) is out of scope. The Galaxy driver talks to whichever historian is reachable from its node. |
## Entry Gate Checklist
- [ ] Phase 6.1 merged (uses `/healthz` for peer probing)
- [ ] `CLAUDE.md` §Redundancy + `docs/Redundancy.md` re-read
- [ ] Decisions #7985 re-skimmed
- [ ] `ServerCluster`/`ClusterNode`/`RedundancyRole`/`RedundancyMode` entities + existing migration reviewed
- [ ] OPC UA Part 4 §Redundancy + Part 5 §6.3.34 (ServiceLevel) re-skimmed
- [ ] Dev box has two OtOpcUa.Server instances configured against the same cluster — one designated Primary, one Backup — for integration testing
## Task Breakdown
### Stream A — Cluster topology loader (3 days)
1. **A.1** `RedundancyCoordinator` startup path: reads `ClusterNode` row for the current node (identified by `appsettings.json` `Cluster:NodeId`), reads the cluster's peer list, validates invariants (no duplicate `ApplicationUri`, at most one `Primary` per cluster if `RedundancyMode.WarmActive`, at most two nodes total in v2.0 per decision #83).
2. **A.2** Topology subscription — coordinator re-reads on `sp_PublishGeneration` confirmation so an operator role-swap takes effect after publish (no process restart needed).
3. **A.3** Tests: two-node cluster seed, one-node cluster seed (degenerate), duplicate-uri rejection.
### Stream B — Peer health probing + ServiceLevel computation (6 days, widened)
1. **B.1** `PeerHttpProbeLoop` per peer at 2 s — calls peer's `/healthz`, 1 s timeout, exponential backoff on sustained failure. Used as fast-fail.
2. **B.2** `PeerUaProbeLoop` per peer at 10 s — opens an OPC UA client session to the peer (reuses Phase 5 `Driver.OpcUaClient` stack), reads peer's `ServiceLevel` node + verifies endpoint serves data. Short-circuit: if HTTP probe is failing, skip UA probe (no wasted sessions).
3. **B.3** `ServiceLevelCalculator.Compute(role, selfHealth, peerHttpHealthy, peerUaHealthy, applyInProgress, recoveryDwellMet, topologyValid) → byte`. 8-state matrix per §Scope. `topologyValid=false` forces InvalidTopology = 2 regardless of other inputs.
4. **B.4** `RecoveryStateManager`: after a `Faulted → Healthy` transition, hold driver in `Recovering` band (180 Primary / 30 Backup) for `RecoveryDwellTime` (default 60 s) AND require one positive publish witness (successful `Read` on a reference node) before entering Authoritative band.
5. **B.5** Calculator reacts to inputs via `IObserver` so changes immediately push to the OPC UA `ServiceLevel` node.
6. **B.6** Tests: **64-case matrix** covering role × self-health × peer-http × peer-ua × apply × recovery × topology. Specific cases flagged: Primary-with-unreachable-peer-serves-at-230 (authority retained); Backup-with-unreachable-primary-escalates-to-80 (not auto-promote); InvalidTopology demotes both nodes; Recovering dwell + publish-witness blocks premature return to 255.
### Stream C — OPC UA node wiring (3 days)
1. **C.1** `ServiceLevel` variable node created under `ServerStatus` at server startup. Type `Byte`, AccessLevel = CurrentRead only. Subscribe to `ServiceLevelCalculator` observable; push updates via `DataChangeNotification`.
2. **C.2** `ServerUriArray` variable node under `ServerCapabilities`. Array of `String`, **includes self + peers** with deterministic ordering (self first). Updates on topology change. Compliance test asserts local-plus-peer membership.
3. **C.3** `RedundancySupport` variable — static at startup from `RedundancyMode`. Values: `None`, `Cold`, `Warm`, `WarmActive`, `Hot`. Unsupported values (`Transparent`, `HotAndMirrored`) are rejected **pre-publish** by validator — runtime never sees them.
4. **C.4** Client.CLI cutover test: connect to primary, read `ServiceLevel` → 255; pause primary apply → 200; unreachable peer while apply in progress → 200 (apply dominates peer-unreachable per matrix); client sees peer via `ServerUriArray`; fail primary → client reconnects to peer at 80 (isolated-backup band).
### Stream D — Apply-window integration (3 days)
1. **D.1** `sp_PublishGeneration` caller wraps the apply in `await using var lease = coordinator.BeginApplyLease(generationId, publishRequestId)`. Lease keyed to `(ConfigGenerationId, PublishRequestId)` so concurrent publishes stay isolated. Disposal decrements on every exit path.
2. **D.2** `ApplyLeaseWatchdog` auto-closes leases older than `ApplyMaxDuration` (default 10 min) so a crashed publisher can't pin the node at mid-apply.
3. **D.3** Pre-publish validator in `sp_PublishGeneration` rejects unsupported `RedundancyMode` values (`Transparent`, `HotAndMirrored`) with a clear error message — runtime never sees an invalid mode.
4. **D.4** Tests: (a) mid-apply client subscribes → sees ServiceLevel drop → sees restore; (b) lease leak via `ThreadAbort` / cancellation → watchdog closes; (c) publish rejected for `Transparent` → operator-actionable error.
### Stream E — Admin UI + metrics (3 days)
1. **E.1** `RedundancyTab.razor` under `/cluster/{id}/redundancy`. Shows each node's role, current ServiceLevel (with band label per 8-state matrix), peer reachability (HTTP + UA probe separately), last apply timestamp. Role-swap button posts a draft edit on `ClusterNode.RedundancyRole`; publish applies.
2. **E.2** OpenTelemetry meter export: `ot_opcua_service_level{cluster,node}` gauge + `ot_opcua_peer_reachable{cluster,node,peer,kind=http|ua}` + `ot_opcua_apply_in_progress{cluster,node}` + `ot_opcua_topology_valid{cluster}`. Sink via Phase 6.1 observability.
3. **E.3** SignalR push: `FleetStatusHub` broadcasts ServiceLevel changes so the Admin UI updates within ~1 s of the coordinator observing a peer flip.
### Stream F — Client-interoperability matrix (3 days, new)
1. **F.1** Validate ServiceLevel-driven cutover against **Ignition 8.1 + 8.3**, **Kepware KEPServerEX 6.x**, **Aveva OI Gateway 2020R2 + 2023R1**. For each: configure the client with both endpoints, verify it honors `ServiceLevel` + `ServerUriArray` during primary failover.
2. **F.2** Clients that don't honour the standards (doc field — may include Kepware and OI Gateway per Codex review) get an explicit compatibility-matrix entry: "requires manual backup-endpoint config / vendor-specific redundancy primitives". Documented in `docs/Redundancy.md`.
3. **F.3** Galaxy MXAccess failover test — boot Galaxy.Proxy on both nodes, kill Primary, assert Galaxy consumer reconnects to Backup within `(SessionTimeout + KeepAliveInterval × 3)`. Document required session-timeout config in `docs/Redundancy.md`.
## Compliance Checks (run at exit gate)
- [ ] **OPC UA band compliance**: `0=Maintenance` reserved, `1=NoData` reserved. Operational states in 2..255 per 8-state matrix.
- [ ] **Authoritative-Primary** ServiceLevel = 255.
- [ ] **Isolated-Primary** (peer unreachable, self serving) = 230 — Primary retains authority.
- [ ] **Primary-Mid-Apply** = 200.
- [ ] **Recovering-Primary** = 180 with dwell + publish witness enforced.
- [ ] **Authoritative-Backup** = 100.
- [ ] **Isolated-Backup** (primary unreachable) = 80 — does NOT auto-promote.
- [ ] **InvalidTopology** = 2 — both nodes self-demote when >1 Primary detected runtime.
- [ ] **ServerUriArray** returns self + peer URIs, self first.
- [ ] **UaHealthProbe authority**: integration test — peer returns HTTP 200 but OPC UA endpoint unreachable → coordinator treats peer as UA-unhealthy; peer is not a valid authority source.
- [ ] **Apply-lease disposal**: leases close on exception, cancellation, and watchdog timeout; ServiceLevel never sticks at mid-apply band.
- [ ] **Transparent-mode rejection**: attempting to publish `RedundancyMode=Transparent` is blocked at `sp_PublishGeneration`; runtime never sees an invalid mode.
- [ ] **Role transition via operator publish**: FleetAdmin swaps `RedundancyRole` in a draft, publishes; both nodes re-read topology on publish confirmation + flip ServiceLevel — no restart.
- [ ] **Client.CLI cutover**: with primary halted, Client.CLI that was connected to primary sees primary drop + reconnects to backup via `ServerUriArray`.
- [ ] **Client interoperability matrix** (Stream F): Ignition 8.1 + 8.3 honour ServiceLevel; Kepware + Aveva OI Gateway findings documented.
- [ ] **Galaxy MXAccess failover**: end-to-end test — primary kill → Galaxy consumer reconnects to backup within session-timeout budget.
- [ ] No regression in existing driver test suites; no regression in `/healthz` reachability under redundancy load.
## Risks and Mitigations
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|------|:----------:|:------:|------------|
| Split-brain from operator race (both nodes marked Primary) | Low | High | Coordinator rejects startup if its cluster has >1 Primary row; logs + fails fast. Document as a publish-time validation in `sp_PublishGeneration`. |
| ServiceLevel thrashing on flaky peer | Medium | Medium | 2 s probe interval + 3-sample smoothing window; only declares a peer unreachable after 3 consecutive failed probes |
| Client ignores ServiceLevel and stays on broken primary | Medium | Medium | Documented in `docs/Redundancy.md` — non-transparent redundancy requires client cooperation; most SCADA clients (Ignition, Kepware, Aveva OI Gateway) honor it. Unit-test the advertised values; field behavior is client-responsibility |
| Apply-window counter leaks on exception | Low | High | `BeginApplyWindow` returns `IDisposable`; `using` syntax enforces paired decrement; unit test for exception-in-apply path |
| `HttpClient` probe leaks sockets | Low | Medium | Single shared `HttpClient` per coordinator (not per-probe); timeouts tight to avoid keeping connections open during peer downtime |
## Completion Checklist
- [ ] Stream A: topology loader + tests
- [ ] Stream B: peer probe + ServiceLevel calculator + 32-case matrix tests
- [ ] Stream C: ServiceLevel / ServerUriArray / RedundancySupport node wiring + Client.CLI smoke test
- [ ] Stream D: apply-window integration + nested-apply counter
- [ ] Stream E: Admin `RedundancyTab` + OpenTelemetry metrics + SignalR push
- [ ] `phase-6-3-compliance.ps1` exits 0; exit-gate doc; `docs/Redundancy.md` updated with the ServiceLevel matrix
## Adversarial Review — 2026-04-19 (Codex, thread `019da490-3fa0-7340-98b8-cceeca802550`)
1. **Crit · ACCEPT** — No publish-generation fencing enables split-publish advertising both as authoritative. **Change**: coordinator CAS on a monotonic `ConfigGenerationId`; every topology decision is generation-stamped; peers reject state propagated from a lower generation.
2. **Crit · ACCEPT**`>1 Primary` at startup covered but runtime containment missing when invalid topology appears later (mid-apply race). **Change**: add runtime `InvalidTopology` state — both nodes self-demote to ServiceLevel 2 (the "detected inconsistency" band, below normal operation) until convergence.
3. **High · ACCEPT**`0 = Faulted` collides with OPC UA Part 5 §6.3.34 semantics where 0 means **Maintenance** and 1 means NoData. **Change**: reserve **0** for operator-declared maintenance-mode only; Faulted/unreachable uses **1** (NoData); in-range degraded states occupy 2..199.
4. **High · ACCEPT** — Matrix collapses distinct operational states onto the same value. **Change**: matrix expanded to Authoritative-Primary=255, Isolated-Primary=230 (peer unreachable — still serving), Primary-Mid-Apply=200, Recovering-Primary=180, Authoritative-Backup=100, Isolated-Backup=80 (primary unreachable — "take over if asked"), Backup-Mid-Apply=50, Recovering-Backup=30.
5. **High · ACCEPT**`/healthz` from 6.1 is HTTP-healthy but doesn't guarantee OPC UA data plane. **Change**: add a redundancy-specific probe `UaHealthProbe` — issues a `ReadAsync(ServiceLevel)` against the peer's OPC UA endpoint via a lightweight client session. `/healthz` remains the fast-fail; the UA probe is the authority signal.
6. **High · ACCEPT**`ServerUriArray` must include self + peers, not peers only. **Change**: array contains `[self.ApplicationUri, peer.ApplicationUri]` in stable deterministic ordering; compliance test asserts local-plus-peer membership.
7. **Med · ACCEPT** — No `Faulted → Recovering → Healthy` path. **Change**: add `Recovering` state with min dwell time (60 s default) + positive publish witness (one successful Read on a reference node) before returning to Healthy. Thrash-prevention.
8. **Med · ACCEPT** — Topology change during in-flight probe undefined. **Change**: every probe task tagged with `ConfigGenerationId` at dispatch; obsolete results discarded; in-flight probes cancelled on topology reload.
9. **Med · ACCEPT** — Apply-window counter race on exception/cancellation/async ownership. **Change**: apply-window is a named lease keyed to `(ConfigGenerationId, PublishRequestId)` with disposal enforced via `await using`; watchdog detects leased-but-abandoned and force-closes after `ApplyMaxDuration` (default 10 min).
10. **High · ACCEPT** — Ignition + Kepware + Aveva OI Gateway `ServiceLevel` compliance is unverified. **Change**: risk elevated to High; add Stream F (new) — build an interop matrix: validate against Ignition 8.1/8.3, Kepware KEPServerEX 6.x, Aveva OI Gateway 2020R2 + 2023R1. Document per-client cutover behaviour. Field deployments get a documented compatibility table; clients that ignore ServiceLevel documented as requiring explicit backup-endpoint config.
11. **Med · ACCEPT** — Galaxy MXAccess re-session on Primary death not in acceptance. **Change**: Stream F adds an end-to-end failover smoke test that boots Galaxy.Proxy on both nodes, kills Primary, asserts Galaxy consumer reconnects to Backup within `(SessionTimeout + KeepAliveInterval × 3)` budget. `docs/Redundancy.md` updated with required session timeouts.
12. **Med · ACCEPT** — Transparent-mode startup rejection is outage-prone. **Change**: `sp_PublishGeneration` validates `RedundancyMode` pre-publish — unsupported values reject the publish attempt with a clear validation error; runtime never sees an unsupported mode. Last-good config stays active.

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# Phase 6.4 — Admin UI Completion
> **Status**: DRAFT — Phase 1 Stream E shipped the Admin scaffold + core pages; several feature-completeness items from its completion checklist (`phase-1-configuration-and-admin-scaffold.md` §Stream E) never landed. This phase closes them.
>
> **Branch**: `v2/phase-6-4-admin-ui-completion`
> **Estimated duration**: 2 weeks
> **Predecessor**: Phase 6.3 (Redundancy runtime) — reuses the `/cluster/{id}` page layout for the new tabs
> **Successor**: v2 release-readiness capstone (Task #121)
## Phase Objective
Close the Admin UI feature-completeness checklist that Phase 1 Stream E exit gate left open. Each item below is an existing `phase-1-configuration-and-admin-scaffold.md` completion-checklist entry that is currently unchecked.
Gaps to close:
1. **UNS Structure tab drag/move with impact preview** — decision #115 + `admin-ui.md` §"UNS". Current state: list-only render; no drag reorder; no "X lines / Y equipment impacted" preview.
2. **Equipment CSV import + 5-identifier search** — decision #95 + #117. Current state: basic form; no CSV parser; search indexes only ZTag.
3. **Draft-generation diff viewer** — enhance existing `DiffViewer.razor` to show generation-diff not just staged-edit diff; highlight ACL grant changes (lands after Phase 6.2).
4. **`_base` equipment-class Identification fields exposure** — decision #138139. Columns exist on `Equipment`; no Admin UI field group; no address-space exposure of the OPC 40010 sub-folder.
## Scope — What Changes
| Concern | Change |
|---------|--------|
| `Admin/Pages/UnsTab.razor` | Tree component with drag-drop using **`MudBlazor.TreeView` + `MudBlazor.DropTarget`** (existing transitive dep — no new third-party package). Native HTML5 DnD rejected because virtualization + DnD on 500+ nodes doesn't combine reliably. Each drag fires a "Compute Impact" call carrying a `DraftRevisionToken`; modal preview ("Moving Line 'Oven-2' from 'Packaging' to 'Assembly' will re-home 14 equipment + re-parent 237 tags"). **Confirm step re-checks the token** and rejects with a `409 Conflict / refresh-required` modal if the draft advanced between preview and commit. |
| `Admin/Services/UnsImpactAnalyzer.cs` | New service. Given a move-operation (line move, area rename, line merge), computes cascade counts + `DraftRevisionToken` at preview time. Pure-function shape; testable in isolation. |
| `Admin/Pages/EquipmentTab.razor` | Add CSV-import button → modal with file picker + dry-run preview. **Identifier search** uses the canonical decision #117 set: `ZTag / MachineCode / SAPID / EquipmentId / EquipmentUuid`. Typeahead probes each column with a ranking query (exact match score 100 → prefix 50 → opt-in LIKE 20; published > draft tie-break). Result row shows which field matched via trailing badge. |
| `Admin/Services/EquipmentCsvImporter.cs` | New service. CSV header row must start with `# OtOpcUaCsv v1` (version marker — future shape changes bump the version). Columns: `ZTag, MachineCode, SAPID, EquipmentId, EquipmentUuid, Name, UnsAreaName, UnsLineName, Manufacturer, Model, SerialNumber, HardwareRevision, SoftwareRevision, YearOfConstruction, AssetLocation, ManufacturerUri, DeviceManualUri`. Parser rejects unknown columns + blank required fields + duplicate ZTags + missing UnsLines. |
| **Staged-import table** `EquipmentImportBatch` | New entity `{ Id, CreatedAtUtc, CreatedBy, RowsStaged, RowsAccepted, RowsRejected, FinalisedAtUtc? }` + child `EquipmentImportRow` records. Import writes rows in chunks to the staging table (not to `Equipment`). `FinaliseImportBatch` is the atomic finalize step that applies all accepted rows to `Equipment` + `ExternalIdReservation` in one transaction — short + bounded regardless of input size. Rollback = drop the batch row; `Equipment` never partially mutates. |
| `Admin/Pages/DraftEditor.razor` + `DiffViewer.razor` | Diff viewer refactored into a base component + section plugins: `StructuralDiffSection`, `EquipmentDiffSection`, `TagDiffSection`, `AclDiffSection` (Phase 6.2), `RedundancyDiffSection` (Phase 6.3), `IdentificationDiffSection`. Each section has a **1000-row hard cap**; over-cap renders an aggregate summary + "Load full diff" button streaming 500-row pages via SignalR. Subtree-rename diffs (decision #115 bulk restructure) surface as summary only by default. |
| `Admin/Components/IdentificationFields.razor` | New component. Renders the OPC 40010 field set **per decision #139**: `Manufacturer, Model, SerialNumber, HardwareRevision, SoftwareRevision, YearOfConstruction, AssetLocation, ManufacturerUri, DeviceManualUri`. `ProductInstanceUri / DeviceRevision / MonthOfConstruction` dropped from this phase — they need a separate decision-log widening. |
| `OtOpcUa.Server/OpcUa/DriverNodeManager` — Equipment folder build | When an `Equipment` row has non-null Identification fields, the server adds an `Identification` sub-folder under the Equipment node containing one variable per non-null field. **ACL binding**: the sub-folder + variables inherit the `Equipment` scope's grants from Phase 6.2's trie — no new scope level added. Documented in `acl-design.md` cross-reference update. |
## Scope — What Does NOT Change
| Item | Reason |
|------|--------|
| Admin UI visual language | Bootstrap 5 / cookie auth / sidebar layout unchanged — consistency with ScadaLink design reference. |
| LDAP auth flow | Already shipped in Phase 1. Phase 6.4 is additive UI only. |
| Core abstractions / driver layer | Admin UI changes don't touch drivers. |
| Equipment-class *template schema validation* | Still deferred (decision #112 — schemas repo not landed). We expose the Identification fields but don't validate against a template hierarchy. |
| Drag/move to *other clusters* | Out of scope — equipment is cluster-scoped per decision #82. Cross-cluster migration is a different workflow. |
## Entry Gate Checklist
- [ ] Phase 6.2 merged (ACL grants are part of the new diff viewer sections)
- [ ] Phase 6.3 merged (redundancy-role changes are part of the diff viewer)
- [ ] `phase-1-configuration-and-admin-scaffold.md` §Stream E completion checklist re-read — confirm these are the remaining items
- [ ] `admin-ui.md` re-skimmed for screen layouts
- [ ] Existing `EquipmentTab.razor` / `UnsTab.razor` / `DraftEditor.razor` diff'd against what ships today so the edits are additive not destructive
- [ ] Dev Galaxy available for OPC 40010 exposure smoke testing
## Task Breakdown
### Stream A — UNS drag/reorder + impact preview (5 days)
1. **A.1** 1000-node synthetic seed fixture. Drag-latency bench against `MudBlazor.TreeView` + `MudBlazor.DropTarget` — commit to the component if latency budget (100 ms drag-enter feedback) holds; fall back to flat-list reorder UI (Area/Line dropdowns) with loss of visual drag affordance otherwise.
2. **A.2** `UnsImpactAnalyzer` service. Inputs: `(DraftGenerationId, MoveOperation, DraftRevisionToken)`. Outputs: `ImpactPreview { AffectedEquipmentCount, AffectedTagCount, CascadeWarnings[], DraftRevisionToken }`. Pure-function shape; testable in isolation.
3. **A.3** Modal preview wired to `UnsImpactAnalyzer`. **Confirm** re-reads the current draft revision + compares against the preview's token; if the draft advanced (another operator saved a different edit), show a `409 Conflict / refresh-required` modal rather than silently overwriting.
4. **A.4** Cross-cluster drop attempts: target disabled + toast "Equipment is cluster-scoped (decision #82). To move across clusters, use Export → Import on the Cluster detail page." Plus help link.
5. **A.5** Playwright (or equivalent) smoke test: drag a line across areas, assert modal shows right counts, assert draft row reflects the move; concurrent-edit test runs two sessions + asserts the later Confirm hits the 409.
### Stream B — Equipment CSV import + 5-identifier search (5 days)
1. **B.1** `EquipmentCsvImporter`. Strict RFC 4180 parser (per decision #95). Header row validation: first line must match `# OtOpcUaCsv v1` — future versions fork parser versions. Required columns: `ZTag, MachineCode, SAPID, EquipmentId, EquipmentUuid, Name, UnsAreaName, UnsLineName`. Optional: `Manufacturer, Model, SerialNumber, HardwareRevision, SoftwareRevision, YearOfConstruction, AssetLocation, ManufacturerUri, DeviceManualUri`. Parser rejects unknown columns + blank required fields + duplicate ZTags.
2. **B.2** `EquipmentImportBatch` + `EquipmentImportRow` staging tables (migration). Import writes preview rows to staging via chunked inserts; staging never blocks `Equipment` or `ExternalIdReservation`. Preview query reads staging + validates each row against the current `Equipment` state + `ExternalIdReservation` freshness.
3. **B.3** `ImportPreview` UI — per-row accept/reject table. Reject reasons: "ZTag already exists in draft", "ExternalIdReservation conflict with Cluster X", "UnsLineName not found in draft UNS tree", etc. Operator reviews + clicks "Commit".
4. **B.4** `FinaliseImportBatch` — atomic finalize. One EF transaction applies accepted rows to `Equipment` + `ExternalIdReservation`; duration bounded regardless of input size (the atomic step is a bulk-insert, not per-row row-by-row). Rollback = drop batch row via `DropImportBatch`; `Equipment` never partially mutates.
5. **B.5** Five-identifier search. Rank SQL: exact match any identifier = score 100, prefix match = 50, LIKE-fuzzy (opt-in via `?fuzzy=true`) = 20; tie-break `published > draft` then `RowVersion DESC`. Typeahead shows which field matched via trailing badge.
6. **B.6** Smoke tests: 100-row CSV with 10 conflicts (5 ZTag dupes, 3 reservation clashes, 2 missing UnsLines); 10k-row perf test asserting finalize txn < 30 s; concurrent import + external `ExternalIdReservation` insert test asserts retryable-conflict handling.
### Stream C — Diff viewer enhancements (4 days)
1. **C.1** Refactor `DiffViewer.razor` into a base component + section plugins. Plugins: `StructuralDiffSection` (UNS tree), `EquipmentDiffSection`, `TagDiffSection`, `AclDiffSection` (Phase 6.2), `RedundancyDiffSection` (Phase 6.3), `IdentificationDiffSection`.
2. **C.2** Each section renders collapsed by default; counts + top-line summary always visible. **1000-row hard cap** per section — over-cap sections render aggregate summary (e.g. "237 equipment re-parented from Packaging to Assembly") with a "Load full diff" button that streams 500-row pages via SignalR.
3. **C.3** Subtree-rename diffs (decision #115 bulk restructure) surface as summary only by default regardless of row count.
4. **C.4** Tests: seed two generations with deliberate diffs; assert every section reports the right counts + top-line summary + hard-cap behavior.
### Stream D — OPC 40010 Identification exposure (3 days)
1. **D.1** `IdentificationFields.razor` component. Renders the **9 decision #139 fields**: `Manufacturer, Model, SerialNumber, HardwareRevision, SoftwareRevision, YearOfConstruction, AssetLocation, ManufacturerUri, DeviceManualUri`. Labelled inputs; nullable columns show empty input; required-field validation on commit only.
2. **D.2** `DriverNodeManager` equipment-folder builder — after building the equipment node, inspect the 9 Identification columns; if any non-null, add an `Identification` sub-folder with variable-per-non-null-field. ACL binding: sub-folder + variables inherit the **same `ScopeId` as the Equipment node** (Phase 6.2's trie treats them as part of the Equipment scope — no new scope level).
3. **D.3** Address-space smoke test via Client.CLI: browse an equipment node, assert `Identification` sub-folder present when columns are set, absent when all null, variables match the field values.
4. **D.4** ACL integration test: a user with Equipment-level grant reads the `Identification` variables without needing a separate grant; a user without the Equipment grant gets `BadUserAccessDenied` on both the Equipment node + its Identification variables.
## Compliance Checks (run at exit gate)
- [ ] **UNS drag/move**: drag a line across areas; modal preview shows correct impacted-equipment + impacted-tag counts.
- [ ] **Concurrent-edit safety**: two-session test — session B saves a draft edit after session A opened the preview; session A's Confirm returns `409 Conflict / refresh-required` instead of overwriting.
- [ ] **Cross-cluster drop**: dropping equipment across cluster boundaries is disabled + shows actionable toast pointing to Export/Import workflow.
- [ ] **1000-node tree**: drag operations on a 1000-node seed maintain < 100 ms drag-enter feedback.
- [ ] **CSV header version**: file missing `# OtOpcUaCsv v1` first line is rejected pre-parse.
- [ ] **CSV canonical identifier set**: columns match decision #117 (ZTag / MachineCode / SAPID / EquipmentId / EquipmentUuid); drift from the earlier draft surfaces as a test failure.
- [ ] **Staged-import atomicity**: `FinaliseImportBatch` transaction bounded < 30 s for a 10k-row import; pre-finalize stagings visible only to the importing user; rollback via `DropImportBatch`.
- [ ] **Concurrent import + external reservation**: concurrent test — third party inserts to `ExternalIdReservation` mid-finalize; finalize retries with conflict handling; no corruption.
- [ ] **5-identifier search ranking**: exact matches outrank prefix matches; published outranks draft for equal scores.
- [ ] **Diff viewer section caps**: 2000-row subtree-rename diff renders as summary only; "Load full diff" streams in pages.
- [ ] **OPC 40010 field list match**: rendered field group matches decision #139 exactly; no extra fields.
- [ ] **OPC 40010 exposure**: Client.CLI browse shows `Identification` sub-folder when equipment has non-null columns; absent when all null.
- [ ] **ACL inheritance for Identification**: integration test — Equipment-grant user reads Identification; no-grant user gets `BadUserAccessDenied` on both.
- [ ] **Visual parity reviewer**: named role (`FleetAdmin` user, not the implementation lead) compares side-by-side against `admin-ui.md` §Visual-Design reference panels; signoff artefact is a checked-in screenshot set under `docs/v2/visual-compliance/phase-6-4/`.
## Risks and Mitigations
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|------|:----------:|:------:|------------|
| UNS drag-drop janky on large trees (>500 nodes) | Medium | Medium | Virtualize the tree component; default-collapse nested areas; test with a synthetic 1000-equipment seed |
| CSV import performance on 10k-row imports | Medium | Medium | Stream-parse rather than load-into-memory; preview renders in batches of 100; commit is chunked-EF-insert with progress bar |
| Diff viewer becomes unwieldy with many sections | Low | Medium | Each section collapsed by default; top-line summary row always shown; Phase 6.4 caps at 6 sections |
| OPC 40010 sub-folder accidentally exposes NULL/empty identification columns as empty-string variables | Low | Low | Column null-check in the builder; drop variables whose DB value is null |
| 5-identifier search pulls full table | Medium | Medium | Indexes on each of ZTag/SAPID/UniqueId/Alias1/Alias2; search query uses a UNION of 5 indexed lookups; falls back to LIKE only on explicit operator opt-in |
## Completion Checklist
- [ ] Stream A: `UnsImpactAnalyzer` + drag-drop tree + modal preview + Playwright smoke
- [ ] Stream B: `EquipmentCsvImporter` + preview modal + 5-identifier search + conflict-rollback test
- [ ] Stream C: `DiffViewer` refactor + 6 section plugins + 2-generation diff test
- [ ] Stream D: `IdentificationFields.razor` + address-space builder change + Client.CLI browse test
- [ ] Visual-compliance reviewer signoff
- [ ] Full solution `dotnet test` passes; `phase-6-4-compliance.ps1` exits 0; exit-gate doc
## Adversarial Review — 2026-04-19 (Codex, via `codex-rescue` subagent)
1. **Crit · ACCEPT** — Stale UNS impact preview can overwrite concurrent draft edits. **Change**: each preview carries a `DraftRevisionToken`; `Confirm` compares against the current draft + rejects with a `409 Conflict / refresh-required` modal if any draft edit landed since the preview was generated. Stream A.3 updated.
2. **High · ACCEPT** — CSV import atomicity is internally contradictory (single EF transaction vs. chunked inserts). **Change**: one explicit model — staged-import table (`EquipmentImportBatch { Id, CreatedAtUtc, RowsStaged, RowsAccepted, RowsRejected }`) receives rows in chunks; final `FinaliseImportBatch` is atomic over `Equipment` + `ExternalIdReservation`. Rollback is "drop the batch row" — the real Equipment table is never partially mutated.
3. **Crit · ACCEPT** — Identifier contract rewrite mis-cites decisions. **Change**: revert to the `admin-ui.md` + decision #117 canonical set — `ZTag / MachineCode / SAPID / EquipmentId / EquipmentUuid`. CSV header follows that set verbatim. Introduce a separate decision entry for versioned CSV header shape before adding any new column; CSV header row must start with `# OtOpcUaCsv v1` so future shape changes are unambiguous.
4. **Med · ACCEPT** — Search ordering undefined. **Change**: rank SQL — exact match on any identifier scores 100; prefix match 50; LIKE-fuzzy 20; published > draft tie-breaker; `ORDER BY score DESC, RowVersion DESC`. Typeahead shows which field matched via trailing badge.
5. **High · ACCEPT** — HTML5 DnD on virtualized tree is aspirational. **Change**: Stream A.2 rewritten — commits to **`MudBlazor.TreeView` + `MudBlazor.DropTarget`** (already a transitive dep via the existing Admin UI). Build a 1000-node synthetic seed in A.1 + validate drag-latency budget before implementing impact preview. If MudBlazor can't hit the budget, fall back to a flat-list reorder UI with Area/Line dropdowns (loss of visual drag affordance but unblocks the feature).
6. **Med · ACCEPT** — Collapsed-by-default doesn't handle generation-sized diffs. **Change**: each diff section has a hard row cap (1000 by default). Over-cap sections render an aggregate summary + "Load full diff" button that streams via SignalR in 500-row pages. Decision #115 subtree renames surface as a "N equipment re-parented under X → Y" summary instead of row-by-row.
7. **High · ACCEPT** — OPC 40010 field list doesn't match decision #139. **Change**: field group realigned to `Manufacturer, Model, SerialNumber, HardwareRevision, SoftwareRevision, YearOfConstruction, AssetLocation, ManufacturerUri, DeviceManualUri`. `ProductInstanceUri / DeviceRevision / MonthOfConstruction` dropped from Phase 6.4 — they belong to a future OPC 40010 widening decision.
8. **High · ACCEPT**`Identification` subtree unreconciled with ACL hierarchy (Phase 6.2 6-level scope). **Change**: address-space builder creates the Identification sub-folder under the Equipment node **with the same ScopeId as Equipment** — no new scope level. ACL evaluator treats `…/Equipment/Identification/X` as inheriting the `Equipment` scope's grants. Documented in Phase 6.2's `acl-design.md` cross-reference update.
9. **Low · ACCEPT** — Visual-review gate names nonexistent reviewer role. **Change**: rubric defined — a named "Admin UX reviewer" (role `FleetAdmin` user, not the implementation lead) compares side-by-side screenshots against the `admin-ui.md` §Visual-Design reference panels; signoff artefact is a checked-in screenshot set under `docs/v2/visual-compliance/phase-6-4/`.
10. **Med · ACCEPT** — Cross-cluster drag/drop lacks loud failure path. **Change**: on drop across cluster boundary, disable the drop target + show a toast "Equipment is cluster-scoped (decision #82). To move across clusters, use the Export → Import workflow on the Cluster detail page." Plus a help link. Tested in Stream A.4.

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# Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC — Modbus TCP quirks
Mitsubishi's MELSEC family speaks Modbus TCP through a patchwork of add-on modules
and built-in Ethernet ports, not a single unified stack. The module names are
confusingly similar (`QJ71MB91` is *serial* RTU, `QJ71MT91` is the TCP/IP module
[9]; `LJ71MT91` is the L-series equivalent; `RJ71EN71` is the iQ-R Ethernet module
with a MODBUS/TCP *slave* mode bolted on [8]; `FX3U-ENET`, `FX3U-ENET-P502`,
`FX3U-ENET-ADP`, `FX3GE` built-in, and `FX5U` built-in are all different code
paths) — and every one of the categories below has at least one trap a textbook
Modbus client gets wrong: hex-numbered X/Y devices colliding with decimal Modbus
addresses, a user-defined "device assignment" parameter block that means *no two
sites are identical*, CDAB-vs-ABCD word order driven by how the ladder built the
32-bit value, sub-spec FC16 caps on the older QJ71MT91, and an FX3U port-502
licensing split that makes `FX3U-ENET` and `FX3U-ENET-P502` different SKUs.
This document catalogues each quirk, cites primary sources, and names the
ModbusPal integration test we'd write for it (convention from
`docs/v2/modbus-test-plan.md`: `Mitsubishi_<model>_<behavior>`).
## Models and server/client capability
| Model | Family | Modbus TCP server | Modbus TCP client | Source |
|------------------------|----------|-------------------|-------------------|--------|
| `QJ71MT91` | MELSEC-Q | Yes (slave) | Yes (master) | [9] |
| `QJ71MB91` | MELSEC-Q | **Serial only** — RS-232/422/485 RTU, *not TCP* | — | [1][3] |
| `LJ71MT91` | MELSEC-L | Yes (slave) | Yes (master) | [10] |
| `RJ71EN71` / `RnENCPU` | MELSEC iQ-R | Yes (slave) | Yes (master) | [8] |
| `RJ71C24` / `RJ71C24-R2` | MELSEC iQ-R | RTU (serial) | RTU (serial) | [13] |
| iQ-R built-in Ethernet | CPU | Yes (slave) | Yes (master) | [7] |
| iQ-F `FX5U` built-in Ethernet | CPU | Yes, firmware ≥ 1.060 [11] | Yes | [7][11][12] |
| `FX3U-ENET` | FX3U bolt-on | Yes (slave), but **not on port 502** [5] | Yes | [4][5] |
| `FX3U-ENET-P502` | FX3U bolt-on | Yes (slave), port 502 enabled | Yes | [5] |
| `FX3U-ENET-ADP` | FX3U adapter | **No MODBUS** [5] | No MODBUS | [5] |
| `FX3GE` built-in | FX3GE CPU | No MODBUS (needs ENET module) [6] | No | [6] |
| `FX3G` + `FX3U-ENET` | FX3G | Yes via ENET module | Yes | [6] |
- A common integration mistake is to buy `FX3U-ENET-ADP` expecting MODBUS —
that adapter speaks only MC protocol / SLMP. Our driver should surface a clear
capability error, not "connection refused", when the operator's device tag
says `FX3U-ENET-ADP` [5].
- Older forum threads assert the FX5U is "client only" [12] — that was true on
firmware ≤ 1.040. Firmware 1.060 and later ship the parameter-driven MODBUS
TCP server built-in and need no function blocks [11].
## Modbus device assignment (the parameter block)
Unlike a DL260 where the CPU exposes a *fixed* V-memory-to-Modbus mapping, every
MELSEC MODBUS-TCP module exposes a **Modbus Device Assignment Parameter** block
that the engineer configures in GX Works2 / GX Configurator-MB / GX Works3.
Each of the four Modbus tables (Coil, Input, Input Register, Holding Register)
can be split into up to 16 independent "assignment" entries, each binding a
contiguous Modbus address range to a MELSEC device head (`M0`, `D0`, `X0`,
`Y0`, `B0`, `W0`, `SM0`, `SD0`, `R0`, etc.) and a point count [3][7][8][9].
- **There is no canonical "MELSEC Modbus mapping"**. Two sites running the same
QJ71MT91 module can expose completely different Modbus layouts. Our driver
must treat the mapping as site-data (config-file-driven), not as a device
profile constant.
- **Default values do exist** — both GX Configurator-MB (for Q/L series) and
GX Works3 (for iQ-R / iQ-F / FX5) ship a "dedicated pattern" default that is
applied when the engineer does not override the assignment. Per the FX5
MODBUS Communication manual (JY997D56101) and the QJ71MT91 manual, the FX5
dedicated default is [3][7][11]:
| Modbus table | Modbus range (0-based) | MELSEC device | Head |
|--------------------|------------------------|---------------|------|
| Coil (FC01/05/15) | 0 7679 | M | M0 |
| Coil | 8192 8959 | Y | Y0 |
| Input (FC02) | 0 7679 | M | M0 |
| Input | 8192 8959 | X | X0 |
| Input Register (FC04) | 0 6143 | D | D0 |
| Holding Register (FC03/06/16) | 0 6143 | D | D0 |
This matches the widely circulated "FC03 @ 0 = D0" convention that shows up
in Ubidots / Ignition / AdvancedHMI integration guides [6][12].
- **X/Y in the default mapping occupy a second, non-zero Modbus range** (8192+
on FX5; similar on Q/L/iQ-R). Driver users who expect "X0 = coil 0" will be
reading M0 instead. Document this clearly.
- **Assignment-range collisions silently disable the slave.** The QJ71MT91
manual states explicitly that if any two of assignments 1-16 duplicate the
head Modbus device number, the slave function is inactive with no clear
error — the module just won't respond [9]. The driver probe will look like a
simple timeout; the site engineer has to open GX Configurator-MB to diagnose.
Test names:
`Mitsubishi_FX5U_default_mapping_coil_0_is_M0`,
`Mitsubishi_FX5U_default_mapping_holding_0_is_D0`,
`Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_duplicate_assignment_head_disables_slave`.
## X/Y addressing — hex on MELSEC, decimal on Modbus
**MELSEC X (input) and Y (output) device numbers are hexadecimal on Q / L /
iQ-R** and **octal** on FX / iQ-F (with a GX Works3 toggle) [14][15].
- On a Q CPU, `X20` means decimal **32**, not 20. On an FX5U in default (octal)
mode, `X20` means decimal **16**. GX Works3 exposes a project-level option to
display FX5U X/Y in hex to match Q/L/iQ-R convention — the same physical
input is then called `X10` [14].
- The Modbus Device Assignment Parameter block takes the *head device* as a
MELSEC-native number, which is interpreted in the CPU's native base
(hex for Q/L/iQ-R, octal for FX/iQ-F). After that, **Modbus offsets from
the head are plain decimal** — the module does not apply a second hex
conversion [3][9].
- Example (QJ71MT91 on a Q CPU): assignment "Coil 0 = X0, 512 points" exposes
physical `X0` through `X1FF` (hex) as coils 0-511. A client reading coil 32
gets the bit `X20` (hex) — i.e. the 33rd input, not the value at "input 20"
that the operator wrote on the wiring diagram in decimal.
- **Driver bug source**: if the operator's tag configuration says "read X20" and
the driver helpfully converts "20" to decimal 20 → coil offset 20, the
returned bit is actually `X14` (hex) — off by twelve. Our config layer must
preserve the MELSEC-native base that the site engineer sees in GX Works.
- Timers/counters (`T`, `C`, `ST`) are always decimal in MELSEC notation.
Internal relays (`M`, `B`, `L`), data registers (`D`, `W`, `R`, `ZR`),
and special relays/registers (`SM`, `SD`) also decimal. **Only `X` and `Y`
(and on Q/L/iQ-R, `B` link relays and `W` link registers) use hex**, and
the X/Y decision is itself family-dependent [14][15].
Test names:
`Mitsubishi_Q_X_address_is_hex_X20_equals_coil_offset_32`,
`Mitsubishi_FX5U_X_address_is_octal_X20_equals_coil_offset_16`,
`Mitsubishi_W_link_register_is_hex_W10_equals_holding_offset_16`.
## Word order for 32-bit values
MELSEC stores 32-bit ladder values (`DINT`, `DWORD`, `REAL` / single-precision
float) across **two consecutive D-registers, low word first** — i.e., `CDAB`
when viewed as a Modbus register pair [2][6].
```
D100 (low word) : 0xCC 0xDD (big-endian bytes within the word)
D101 (high word) : 0xAA 0xBB
```
A Modbus master reading D100/D101 as a `float` with default (ABCD) word order
gets garbage. Ignition's built-in Modbus driver notes Mitsubishi as a "CDAB
device" specifically for this reason [2].
- **Q / L / iQ-R / iQ-F all agree** — this is a CPU-level convention, not a
module choice. Both the QJ71MT91 manual and the FX5 MODBUS Communication
manual describe 32-bit access by "reading the lower 16 bits from the start
address and the upper 16 bits from start+1" [6][11].
- **Byte order within each register is big-endian** (Modbus standard). The
module does not byte-swap.
- **Configurable?** The MODBUS modules themselves do **not** expose a word-
order toggle; the behavior is fixed to how the CPU laid out the value in the
two D-registers. If the ladder programmer used an `SWAP` instruction or a
union-style assignment, the word order can be whatever they made it — but
for values produced by the standard `D→DBL` and `FLT`/`FLT2` instructions
it is always CDAB [2].
- **FX5U quirk**: the FX5 MODBUS Communication manual tells the programmer to
use the `SWAP` instruction *if* the remote Modbus peer requires
little-endian *byte* ordering (BADC) [11]. This is only relevant when the
FX5U is the Modbus *client*, but it confirms the FX5U's native wire layout
is big-endian-byte / little-endian-word (CDAB) on the server side too.
- **Rumoured exception**: a handful of MrPLC forum threads report iQ-R
RJ71EN71 firmware < 1.05 returning DWORDs in `ABCD` order when accessed via
the built-in Ethernet port's MODBUS slave [8]. _Unconfirmed_; treat as a
per-site test.
Test names:
`Mitsubishi_Float32_word_order_is_CDAB`,
`Mitsubishi_Int32_word_order_is_CDAB`,
`Mitsubishi_FX5U_SWAP_instruction_changes_byte_order_not_word_order`.
## BCD vs binary encoding
**MELSEC stores integer values in D-registers as plain binary two's-complement**,
not BCD [16]. This is the opposite of AutomationDirect DirectLOGIC, where
V-memory defaults to BCD and the ladder must explicitly request binary.
- A ladder `MOV K1234 D100` stores `0x04D2` (1234 decimal) in D100, not
`0x1234`. The Modbus master reads `0x04D2` and decodes it as an integer
directly — no BCD conversion needed [16].
- **Timer / counter current values** (`T0` current value, `C0` count) are
stored in binary as word devices on Q/L/iQ-R/iQ-F. The ladder preset
(`K...`) is also binary [16][17].
- **Timer / counter preset `K` operand in FX3U / earlier FX**: also binary when
loaded from a D-register or a `K` constant. The older A-series CPUs had BCD
presets on some timer types, but MELSEC-Q, L, iQ-R, iQ-F, and FX3U all use
binary presets by default [17].
- The FX3U programming manual dedicates `FNC 18 BCD` and `FNC 19 BIN` to
explicit conversion — their existence confirms that anything in D-registers
that came from a `BCD` instruction output is BCD, but nothing is BCD by
default [17].
- **7-segment display registers** are a common site-specific exception — many
ladders pack `BCD D100` into a D-register so the operator panel can drive
a display directly. Our driver should not assume; expose a per-tag
"encoding = binary | BCD" knob.
Test names:
`Mitsubishi_D_register_stores_binary_not_BCD`,
`Mitsubishi_FX3U_timer_current_value_is_binary`.
## Max registers per request
From the FX5 MODBUS Communication manual Chapter 11 [11]:
| FC | Name | FX5U (built-in) | QJ71MT91 | iQ-R (RJ71EN71 / built-in) | FX3U-ENET |
|----|----------------------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| 01 | Read Coils | 1-2000 | 1-2000 [9] | 1-2000 [8] | 1-2000 |
| 02 | Read Discrete Inputs | 1-2000 | 1-2000 | 1-2000 | 1-2000 |
| 03 | Read Holding Registers | **1-125** | 1-125 [9] | 1-125 [8] | 1-125 |
| 04 | Read Input Registers | 1-125 | 1-125 | 1-125 | 1-125 |
| 05 | Write Single Coil | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 06 | Write Single Register | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 0F | Write Multiple Coils | 1-1968 | 1-1968 | 1-1968 | 1-1968 |
| 10 | Write Multiple Registers | **1-123** | 1-123 | 1-123 | 1-123 |
| 16 | Mask Write Register | 1 | not supported | 1 | not supported |
| 17 | Read/Write Multiple Regs | R:1-125, W:1-121 | not supported | R:1-125, W:1-121 | not supported |
- **The FX5U / iQ-R native-port limits match the Modbus spec**: 125 for FC03/04,
123 for FC16 [11]. No sub-spec caps like DL260's 100-register ceiling.
- **QJ71MT91 does not support FC16 (0x16, Mask Write Register) or FC17
(0x17, Read/Write Multiple)** — requesting them returns exception `01`
Illegal Function [9]. FX5U and iQ-R *do* support both.
- **QJ71MT91 device size**: 64k points (65,536) for each of Coil / Input /
Input Register / Holding Register, plus up to 4086k points for Extended
File Register via a secondary assignment range [9].
- **FX3U-ENET / -P502 function code list is a strict subset** of the common
eight (FC01/02/03/04/05/06/0F/10). FC16 and FC17 not supported [4].
Test names:
`Mitsubishi_FX5U_FC03_126_registers_returns_IllegalDataValue`,
`Mitsubishi_FX5U_FC16_124_registers_returns_IllegalDataValue`,
`Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_FC16_MaskWrite_returns_IllegalFunction`,
`Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_FC23_ReadWrite_returns_IllegalFunction`.
## Exception codes
MELSEC MODBUS modules return **only the standard Modbus exception codes 01-04**;
no proprietary exception codes are exposed on the wire [8][9][11]. Module-
internal diagnostics (buffer-memory error codes like `7380H`) are logged but
not returned as Modbus exceptions.
| Code | Name | MELSEC trigger |
|------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| 01 | Illegal Function | FC17 or FC16 on QJ71MT91/FX3U; FC08 (Diagnostics); FC43 |
| 02 | Illegal Data Address | Modbus address outside any assignment range |
| 03 | Illegal Data Value | Quantity out of per-FC range (see table above); odd coil-byte count |
| 04 | Server Device Failure | See below |
- **04 (Server Failure) triggers on MELSEC**:
- CPU in STOP or PAUSE during a write to an assignment whose "Access from
External Device" permission is set to "Disabled in STOP" [9][11].
*With the default "always enabled" setting the write succeeds in STOP
mode* — another common trap.
- CPU errors (parameter error, watchdog) during any access.
- Assignment points to a device range that is not configured (e.g. write
to `D16384` when CPU D-device size is 12288).
- **Write to a "System Area" device** (e.g., `SD` special registers that are
CPU-reserved read-only) returns `04`, not `02`, on QJ71MT91 and iQ-R — the
assignment is valid, the device exists, but the CPU rejects the write [8][9].
- **FX3U-ENET / -P502** returns `04` on any write attempt while the CPU is in
STOP, regardless of permission settings — the older firmware does not
implement the "Access from External Device" granularity that Q/L/iQ-R/iQ-F
expose [4].
- **No rumour of proprietary codes 05-0B** from MELSEC; operators sometimes
report "exception 0A" but those traces all came from a third-party gateway
sitting between the master and the MELSEC module.
Test names:
`Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_STOP_mode_write_with_Disabled_permission_returns_ServerFailure`,
`Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_STOP_mode_write_with_default_permission_succeeds`,
`Mitsubishi_SD_system_register_write_returns_ServerFailure`,
`Mitsubishi_FX3U_STOP_mode_write_always_returns_ServerFailure`.
## Connection behavior
Max simultaneous Modbus TCP clients, per module [7][8][9][11]:
| Model | Max TCP connections | Port 502 | Keepalive | Source |
|----------------------|---------------------|----------|-----------|--------|
| `QJ71MT91` | 16 (shared with master role) | Yes | No | [9] |
| `LJ71MT91` | 16 | Yes | No | [10] |
| iQ-R built-in / `RJ71EN71` | 16 | Yes | Configurable (KeepAlive = ON in parameter) | [8] |
| iQ-F `FX5U` built-in | 8 | Yes | Configurable | [7][11] |
| `FX3U-ENET` | 8 TCP, but **not port 502** | No (port < 1024 blocked) | No | [4][5] |
| `FX3U-ENET-P502` | 8, port 502 enabled | Yes | No | [5] |
- **QJ71MT91's 16 is total connections shared between slave-listen and
master-initiated sockets** [9]. A site that uses the same module as both
master to downstream VFDs and slave to upstream SCADA splits the 16 pool.
- **FX3U-ENET port-502 gotcha**: if the engineer loads a configuration with
port 502 into a non-P502 ENET module, GX Works shows the download as
successful; on next power cycle the module enters error state and the
MODBUS listener never starts. This is documented on third-party FX3G
integration guides [6].
- **CPU STOP → RUN transition**: does **not** drop Modbus connections on any
MELSEC family. Existing sockets stay open; outstanding requests during the
transition may see exception 04 for a few scans but then resume [8][9].
- **CPU reset (power cycle or `SM1255` forced reset)** drops all Modbus
connections and the module re-listens after typically 5-10 seconds.
- **Idle timeout**: QJ71MT91 and iQ-R have a per-connection "Alive-Check"
(idle timer) parameter, default 0 (disabled). If enabled, default 10 s
probe interval, 3 retries before close [8][9]. FX5U similar defaults.
- **Keep-alive (TCP-level)**: only iQ-R / iQ-F expose a TCP keep-alive option
(parameter "KeepAlive" in the Ethernet settings); QJ71MT91 and FX3U-ENET
do not — so NAT/firewall idle drops require driver-side pinging.
Test names:
`Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_17th_connection_refused`,
`Mitsubishi_FX5U_9th_connection_refused`,
`Mitsubishi_STOP_to_RUN_transition_preserves_socket`,
`Mitsubishi_CPU_reset_closes_all_sockets`.
## Behavioral oddities
- **Transaction ID echo**: QJ71MT91 and iQ-R reliably echo the MBAP TxId on
every response across firmware revisions; no reports of TxId drops under
load [8][9]. FX3U-ENET has an older, less-tested TCP stack; at least one
MrPLC thread reports out-of-order TxId echoes under heavy polling on
firmware < 1.14 [4]. _Unconfirmed_ on current firmware.
- **Per-connection request serialization**: all MELSEC slaves serialize
requests within a single TCP connection — a new request is not processed
until the prior response has been sent. Pipelining multiple requests on one
socket causes the module to queue them in buffer memory and respond in
order, but **the queue depth is 1** on QJ71MT91 (a second in-flight request
is held on the TCP receive buffer, not queued) [9]. Driver should treat
Mitsubishi slaves as strictly single-flight per socket.
- **Partial-frame handling**: QJ71MT91 and iQ-R close the socket on malformed
MBAP length fields. FX5U resynchronises at the next valid MBAP header
within 100 ms but will emit an error to `SD` diagnostics [11]. Driver must
reconnect on half-close and replay.
- **FX3U UDP vs TCP**: `FX3U-ENET` supports both UDP and TCP MODBUS transports;
UDP is lossy and reorders under load. Default is TCP. Some legacy SCADA
configurations pinned the module to UDP for multicast discovery — do not
select UDP unless the site requires it [4].
- **Known firmware-revision variants**:
- QJ71MT91 ≤ firmware 10052000000 (year-month format): FC15 with coil
count that forces byte-count to an odd value silently truncates the
last coil. Fixed in later revisions [9]. _Operator-reported_.
- FX5U firmware < 1.060: no native MODBUS TCP server — only accessible via
a predefined-protocol function block hack. Firmware ≥ 1.060 ships
parameter-based server. Our capability probe should read `SD203`
(firmware version) and flag < 1.060 as unsupported for server mode [11][12].
- iQ-R RJ71EN71 early firmware: possible ABCD word order (rumoured,
unconfirmed) [8].
- **SD (special-register) reads during assignment-parameter load**: while
the CPU is loading a new MODBUS device assignment parameter (~1-2 s), the
slave returns exception 04 Server Failure on every request. Happens after
a parameter write from GX Configurator-MB [9].
- **iQ-R "Station-based block transfer" collision**: if the RJ71EN71 is also
running CC-Link IE Control on the same module, a MODBUS/TCP request that
arrives during a CCIE cyclic period is delayed to the next scan — visible
as jittery response time, not a failure [8].
Test names:
`Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_single_flight_per_socket`,
`Mitsubishi_FX5U_malformed_MBAP_resync_within_100ms`,
`Mitsubishi_FX3U_TxId_preserved_across_burst`,
`Mitsubishi_FX5U_firmware_below_1_060_reports_no_server_mode`.
## Model-specific differences for test coverage
Summary of which quirks differ per model, so test-class naming can reflect them:
| Quirk | QJ71MT91 | LJ71MT91 | iQ-R (RJ71EN71 / built-in) | iQ-F (FX5U) | FX3U-ENET(-P502) |
|------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------------------------|-------------|------------------|
| FC16 Mask-Write supported | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| FC17 Read/Write Multiple supported | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| Max connections | 16 | 16 | 16 | 8 | 8 |
| X/Y numbering base | hex | hex | hex | octal (default) | octal |
| 32-bit word order | CDAB | CDAB | CDAB (firmware-dependent rumour of ABCD) | CDAB | CDAB |
| Port 502 supported | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | P502 only |
| STOP-mode write permission configurable | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No (always blocks) |
| TCP keep-alive parameter | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| Modbus device assignment — max entries | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 8 |
| Server via parameter (no FB) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (fw ≥ 1.060) | Yes |
- **Test file layout**: `Mitsubishi_QJ71MT91_*`, `Mitsubishi_LJ71MT91_*`,
`Mitsubishi_iQR_*`, `Mitsubishi_FX5U_*`, `Mitsubishi_FX3U_ENET_*`,
`Mitsubishi_FX3U_ENET_P502_*`. iQ-R built-in Ethernet and the RJ71EN71
behave identically for MODBUS/TCP slave purposes and can share a file
`Mitsubishi_iQR_*`.
- **Cross-model shared tests** (word order CDAB, binary not BCD, standard
exception codes, 125-register FC03 cap) can live in a single
`Mitsubishi_Common_*` fixture.
## References
1. Mitsubishi Electric, *MODBUS Interface Module User's Manual — QJ71MB91*
(SH-080578ENG), RS-232/422/485 MODBUS RTU serial module for MELSEC-Q —
https://dl.mitsubishielectric.com/dl/fa/document/manual/plc/sh080578eng/sh080578engk.pdf
2. Inductive Automation, *Ignition Modbus Driver — Mitsubishi Q / iQ-R word
order*, documents CDAB convention —
https://docs.inductiveautomation.com/docs/8.1/ignition-modules/opc-ua/drivers/modbus-v2
and forum discussion https://forum.inductiveautomation.com/t/modbus-tcp-device-word-byte-order/65984
3. Mitsubishi Electric, *Programmable Controller User's Manual QJ71MB91 MODBUS
Interface Module*, Chapter 7 "Parameter Setting" describing the Modbus
Device Assignment Parameter block (assignments 1-16, head-device
configuration) —
https://www.lcautomation.com/dbdocument/29156/QJ71MB91%20Users%20manual.pdf
4. Mitsubishi Electric, *FX3U-ENET User's Manual* (JY997D18101), Chapter on
MODBUS/TCP communication; function code support and connection limits —
https://dl.mitsubishielectric.com/dl/fa/document/manual/plc_fx/jy997d18101/jy997d18101h.pdf
5. Venus Automation, *Mitsubishi FX3U-ENET-P502 Module — Open Port 502 for
Modbus TCP/IP* —
https://venusautomation.com.au/mitsubishi-fx3u-enet-p502-module-open-port-502-for-modbus-tcp-ip/
and FX3U-ENET-ADP user manual (JY997D45801), which confirms the -ADP
variant does not support MODBUS —
https://dl.mitsubishielectric.com/dl/fa/document/manual/plc_fx/jy997d45801/jy997d45801h.pdf
6. XML Control / Ubidots integration notes, *FX3G Modbus* — port-502 trap,
D-register mapping default, word order reference —
https://sites.google.com/site/xmlcontrol/archive/fx3g-modbus
and https://ubidots.com/blog/mitsubishi-plc-as-modbus-tcp-server/
7. FA Support Me, *Modbus TCP on Built-in Ethernet port in iQ-F and iQ-R*
confirms 16-connection limit on iQ-R, 8 on iQ-F, parameter-driven
configuration via GX Works3 —
https://www.fasupportme.com/portal/en/kb/articles/modbus-tcp-on-build-in-ethernet-port-in-iq-f-and-iq-r-en
8. Mitsubishi Electric, *MELSEC iQ-R Ethernet User's Manual (Application)*
(SH-081259ENG) and *MELSEC iQ-RJ71EN71 User's Manual* Chapter on
"Communications Using Modbus/TCP" —
https://www.allied-automation.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MITSUBISHI_manual_plc_iq-r_ethernet_users.pdf
and https://www.manualslib.com/manual/1533351/Mitsubishi-Electric-Melsec-Iq-Rj71en71.html?page=109
9. Mitsubishi Electric, *MODBUS/TCP Interface Module User's Manual — QJ71MT91*
(SH-080446ENG), exception codes page 248, device assignment parameter
pages 116-124, duplicate-assignment-disables-slave note —
https://dl.mitsubishielectric.com/dl/fa/document/manual/plc/sh080446eng/sh080446engj.pdf
10. Mitsubishi Electric, *MELSEC-L Network Features* — LJ71MT91 documented as
L-series equivalent of QJ71MT91 with identical MODBUS/TCP behavior —
https://us.mitsubishielectric.com/fa/en/products/cnt/programmable-controllers/melsec-l-series/network/features/
11. Mitsubishi Electric, *MELSEC iQ-F FX5 User's Manual (MODBUS Communication)*
(JY997D56101), Chapter 11 "Modbus/TCP Communication Specifications" —
function code max-quantity table, frame specification, device assignment
defaults —
https://dl.mitsubishielectric.com/dl/fa/document/manual/plcf/jy997d56101/jy997d56101h.pdf
12. MrPLC forum, *FX5U Modbus-TCP Server (Slave)*, firmware ≥ 1.60 enables
native server via parameter; earlier firmware required function block —
https://mrplc.com/forums/topic/31883-fx5u-modbus-tcp-server-slave/
and Industrial Monitor Direct's "FX5U MODBUS TCP Server Workaround"
article (reflects older firmware behavior) —
https://industrialmonitordirect.com/blogs/knowledgebase/mitsubishi-fx5u-modbus-tcp-server-configuration-workaround
13. Mitsubishi Electric, *MELSEC iQ-R MODBUS and MODBUS/TCP Reference Manual —
RJ71C24 / RJ71C24-R2* (BCN-P5999-1060) — RJ71C24 is serial RTU only,
not TCP —
https://dl.mitsubishielectric.com/dl/fa/document/manual/plc/bcn-p5999-1060/bcnp59991060b.pdf
14. HMS Industrial Networks, *eWON and Mitsubishi FX5U PLC* (KB-0264-00) —
documents that FX5U X/Y are octal in GX Works3 but hex when viewed as a
Q-series PLC through eWON; the project-level hex/octal toggle —
https://hmsnetworks.blob.core.windows.net/www/docs/librariesprovider10/downloads-monitored/manuals/knowledge-base/kb-0264-00-en-ewon-and-mitsubishi-fx5u-plc.pdf
15. Fernhill Software, *Mitsubishi Melsec PLC Data Address* — documents
hex-vs-octal device numbering split across MELSEC families —
https://www.fernhillsoftware.com/help/drivers/mitsubishi-melsec/data-address-format.html
16. Inductive Automation support, *Understanding Mitsubishi PLCs* — D registers
store signed 16-bit binary, not BCD; DINT combines two consecutive D
registers —
https://support.inductiveautomation.com/hc/en-us/articles/16517576753165-Understanding-Mitsubishi-PLCs
17. Mitsubishi Electric, *FXCPU Structured Programming Manual [Device &
Common]* (JY997D26001) — FNC 18 BCD and FNC 19 BIN explicit-conversion
instructions confirm binary-by-default storage —
https://dl.mitsubishielectric.com/dl/fa/document/manual/plc_fx/jy997d26001/jy997d26001l.pdf

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@@ -909,6 +909,26 @@ Each step leaves the system runnable. The generic extraction is effectively free
| 140 | Enterprise shortname = `zb` (UNS level-1 segment) | Closes corrections-doc D4. Matches the existing `ZB.MOM.WW.*` namespace prefix used throughout the codebase; short by design since this segment appears in every equipment path (`zb/warsaw-west/bldg-3/line-2/cnc-mill-05/RunState`); operators already say "ZB" colloquially. Admin UI cluster-create form default-prefills `zb` for the Enterprise field. Production deployments use it directly from cluster-create | 2026-04-17 |
| 141 | Tier 3 (AppServer IO) cutover is feasible — AVEVA's OI Gateway supports arbitrary upstream OPC UA servers as a documented pattern | Closes corrections-doc E2 with **GREEN-YELLOW** verdict. Multiple AVEVA partners (Software Toolbox, InSource) have published working integrations against four different non-AVEVA upstream servers (TOP Server, OPC Router, OmniServer, Cogent DataHub). No re-architecting of OtOpcUa required. Path: `OPC UA node → OI Gateway → SuiteLink → $DDESuiteLinkDIObject → AppServer attribute`. Recommended AppServer floor: System Platform 2023 R2 Patch 01. Two integrator-burden risks tracked: validation/GxP paperwork (no AVEVA blueprint exists for non-AVEVA upstream servers in Part 11 deployments) and unpublished scale benchmarks (in-house benchmark required before cutover scheduling). See `aveva-system-platform-io-research.md` | 2026-04-17 |
| 142 | Phase 1 acceptance includes an end-to-end AppServer-via-OI-Gateway smoke test against OtOpcUa | Catches AppServer-specific quirks (cert exchange via reject-and-trust workflow, endpoint URL must NOT include `/discovery` suffix per Inductive Automation forum failure mode, service-account install required because OI Gateway under SYSTEM cannot connect to remote OPC servers, `Basic256Sha256` + `SignAndEncrypt` + LDAP-username token combination must work end-to-end) early — well before the Year 3 tier-3 cutover schedule. Adds one task to `phase-1-configuration-and-admin-scaffold.md` Stream E (Admin smoke test) | 2026-04-17 |
| 143 | Polly per-capability policy — Read / HistoryRead / Discover / Probe / Alarm-subscribe auto-retry; Write does NOT auto-retry unless the tag metadata carries `[WriteIdempotent]` | Decisions #44-45 forbid auto-retry on Write because a timed-out write can succeed on the device + be replayed by the pipeline, duplicating pulses / alarm acks / counter increments / recipe-step advances. Per-capability policy in the shared Polly layer makes the retry safety story explicit; `WriteIdempotentAttribute` on tag definitions is the opt-in surface | 2026-04-19 |
| 144 | Polly pipeline key = `(DriverInstanceId, HostName)`, not DriverInstanceId alone | Decision #35 requires per-device isolation. One dead PLC behind a multi-device Modbus driver must NOT open the circuit breaker for healthy sibling hosts. Per-instance pipelines would poison every device behind one bad endpoint | 2026-04-19 |
| 145 | Tier A/B/C runtime enforcement splits into `MemoryTracking` (all tiers — soft/hard thresholds log + surface, NEVER kill) and `MemoryRecycle` (Tier C only — requires out-of-process topology). Tier A/B hard-breach logs a promotion-to-Tier-C recommendation; the runtime never auto-kills an in-process driver | Decisions #73-74 reserve process-kill protections for Tier C. An in-process Tier A/B "recycle" would kill every OPC UA session + every other in-proc driver for one leaky instance, blast-radius worse than the leak | 2026-04-19 |
| 146 | Memory watchdog uses the hybrid formula `soft = max(multiplier × baseline, baseline + floor)`, with baseline captured as the median of the first 5 min of `GetMemoryFootprint()` samples post-InitializeAsync. Tier-specific constants: A multiplier=3 floor=50 MB, B multiplier=3 floor=100 MB, C multiplier=2 floor=500 MB. Hard = 2 × soft | Codex adversarial review on the Phase 6.1 plan flagged that hardcoded per-tier MB bands diverge from decision #70's specified formula. Static bands false-trigger on small-footprint drivers + miss meaningful growth on large ones. Observed-baseline + hybrid formula recovers the original intent | 2026-04-19 |
| 147 | `WedgeDetector` uses demand-aware criteria `(state==Healthy AND hasPendingWork AND noProgressIn > threshold)`. `hasPendingWork` = (Polly bulkhead depth > 0) OR (active MonitoredItem count > 0) OR (queued historian read count > 0). Idle + subscription-only + write-only-burst drivers stay Healthy without false-fault | Previous "no successful Read in N intervals" formulation flipped legitimate idle subscribers, slow historian backfills, and write-heavy drivers to Faulted. The demand-aware check only fires when the driver claims work is outstanding | 2026-04-19 |
| 148 | LiteDB config cache is **generation-sealed**: `sp_PublishGeneration` writes `<cache-root>/<cluster>/<generationId>.db` as a read-only sealed file; cache reads serve the last-known-sealed generation. Mixed-generation reads are impossible | Prior "refresh on every successful query" cache could serve LDAP role mapping from one generation alongside UNS topology from another, producing impossible states. Sealed-snapshot invariant keeps cache-served reads coherent with a real published state | 2026-04-19 |
| 149 | `AuthorizationDecision { Allow \| NotGranted \| Denied, IReadOnlyList<MatchedGrant> Provenance }` — tri-state internal model. Phase 6.2 only produces `Allow` + `NotGranted` (grant-only semantics per decision #129); v2.1 Deny widens without API break | bool return would collapse `no-matching-grant` and `explicit-deny` into the same runtime state + UI explanation; provenance record is needed for the audit log anyway. Making the shape tri-state from Phase 6.2 avoids a breaking change in v2.1 | 2026-04-19 |
| 150 | Data-plane ACL evaluator consumes `NodeAcl` rows joined against the session's resolved LDAP group memberships. `LdapGroupRoleMapping` (decision #105) is control-plane only — routes LDAP groups to Admin UI roles. Zero runtime overlap between the two | Codex adversarial review flagged that Phase 6.2 draft conflated the two — building the data-plane trie from `LdapGroupRoleMapping` would let a user inherit tag permissions from an admin-role claim path never intended as a data-path grant | 2026-04-19 |
| 151 | `UserAuthorizationState` cached per session but bounded by `MembershipFreshnessInterval` (default 15 min). Past that interval the next hot-path authz call re-resolves LDAP group memberships; failure to re-resolve (LDAP unreachable) → fail-closed (evaluator returns `NotGranted` until memberships refresh successfully) | Previous design cached memberships until session close, so a user removed from a privileged LDAP group could keep authorized access for hours. Bounded freshness + fail-closed covers the revoke-takes-effect story | 2026-04-19 |
| 152 | Auth cache has its own staleness budget `AuthCacheMaxStaleness` (default 5 min), independent of decision #36's availability-oriented config cache (24 h). Past 5 min on authorization data, evaluator fails closed regardless of whether the underlying config is still serving from cache | Availability-oriented caches trade correctness for uptime. Authorization data is correctness-sensitive — stale ACLs silently extend revoked access. Auth-specific budget keeps the two concerns from colliding | 2026-04-19 |
| 153 | MonitoredItem carries `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` stamp at create time. On every Publish, items with a mismatching stamp re-evaluate; unchanged items stay fast-path. Revoked items drop to `BadUserAccessDenied` within one publish cycle | Create-time-only authorization leaves revoked users receiving data forever; per-publish re-authorization at 100 ms cadence across 50 groups × 6 levels is too expensive. Stamp-then-reevaluate-on-change balances correctness with cost | 2026-04-19 |
| 154 | ServiceLevel reserves `0` for operator-declared maintenance only; `1` = NoData (unreachable / Faulted); operational states occupy `2..255` in an 8-state matrix (Authoritative-Primary=255, Isolated-Primary=230, Primary-Mid-Apply=200, Recovering-Primary=180, Authoritative-Backup=100, Isolated-Backup=80, Backup-Mid-Apply=50, Recovering-Backup=30, InvalidTopology=2) | OPC UA Part 5 §6.3.34 defines `0=Maintenance` + `1=NoData`; using `0` for our Faulted case collides with spec + triggers spec-compliant clients to enter maintenance-mode cutover. Expanded 8-state matrix covers operational states the 5-state original collapsed together (e.g. Isolated-Primary vs Primary-Mid-Apply were both 200) | 2026-04-19 |
| 155 | `ServerUriArray` includes self + peers (self first, deterministic ordering), per OPC UA Part 4 §6.6.2.2 | Previous design excluded self from the array — spec violation + clients lose the ability to map server identities consistently during failover | 2026-04-19 |
| 156 | Redundancy peer health uses a two-layer probe: `/healthz` (2 s) as fast-fail + `UaHealthProbe` (10 s, opens OPC UA client session to peer + reads its `ServiceLevel` node) as the authority signal. HTTP-healthy ≠ UA-authoritative | `/healthz` returns 200 whenever HTTP + config DB/cache is healthy — but a peer can be HTTP-healthy with a broken OPC UA endpoint or a stuck subscription publisher. Using HTTP alone would advertise authority against servers that can't actually publish data | 2026-04-19 |
| 157 | Publish-generation fencing — coordinator CAS on a monotonic `ConfigGenerationId`; every topology + role decision is generation-stamped; peers reject state propagated from a lower generation. Runtime `InvalidTopology` state (both self-demote to ServiceLevel 2) when >1 Primary detected post-startup | Operator race publishing two drafts with different roles can produce two locally-valid views; without fencing + runtime containment both nodes can serve as Primary until manual intervention | 2026-04-19 |
| 158 | Apply-window uses named leases keyed to `(ConfigGenerationId, PublishRequestId)` via `await using`. `ApplyLeaseWatchdog` auto-closes any lease older than `ApplyMaxDuration` (default 10 min) | Simple `IDisposable`-counter design leaks on cancellation / async-ownership races; a stuck positive count leaves the node permanently mid-apply. Generation-keyed leases + watchdog bound worst case | 2026-04-19 |
| 159 | CSV import header row must start with `# OtOpcUaCsv v1` (version marker). Future shape changes bump the version; parser forks per version. Canonical identifier columns follow decision #117: `ZTag, MachineCode, SAPID, EquipmentId, EquipmentUuid` | Without a version marker the CSV schema has no upgrade path — adding a required column breaks every old export silently. The version prefix makes parser dispatch explicit + future-compatible | 2026-04-19 |
| 160 | Equipment CSV import uses a staged-import pattern: `EquipmentImportBatch` + `EquipmentImportRow` tables receive chunked inserts; `FinaliseImportBatch` is one atomic transaction that applies accepted rows to `Equipment` + `ExternalIdReservation`. Rollback = drop the batch row; `Equipment` never partially mutates | 10k-row single-transaction import holds locks too long; chunked direct writes lose all-or-nothing rollback. Staging + atomic finalize bounds transaction duration + preserves rollback semantics | 2026-04-19 |
| 161 | UNS drag-reorder impact preview carries a `DraftRevisionToken`; Confirm re-checks against the current draft + returns `409 Conflict / refresh-required` if the draft advanced between preview and commit | Without concurrency control, two operators editing the same draft can overwrite each other's changes silently. Draft-revision token + 409 response makes the race visible + forces refresh | 2026-04-19 |
| 162 | OPC 40010 Identification sub-folder exposed under each equipment node inherits the Equipment scope's ACL grants — the ACL trie does NOT add a new scope level for Identification | Adding a new scope level for Identification would require every grant to add a second grant for `Equipment/Identification`; inheriting the Equipment scope keeps the grant model flat + prevents operator-forgot-to-grant-Identification access surprises | 2026-04-19 |
## Reference Documents

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# Siemens SIMATIC S7 (S7-1200 / S7-1500 / S7-300 / S7-400 / ET 200SP) — Modbus TCP quirks
Siemens S7 PLCs do *not* speak Modbus TCP natively at the OS/firmware level. Every
S7 Modbus-TCP-server deployment is either (a) the **`MB_SERVER`** library block
running on the CPU's PROFINET port (S7-1200 / S7-1500 / CPU 1510SP-series
ET 200SP), or (b) the **`MODBUSCP`** function block running on a separate
communication processor (**CP 343-1 / CP 343-1 Lean** on S7-300, **CP 443-1** on
S7-400), or (c) the **`MODBUSPN`** block on an S7-1500 PN port via a licensed
library. That means the quirks a Modbus client has to cope with are as much
"this is how the user's PLC programmer wired the library block up" as "this is
how the firmware behaves" — the byte-order and coil-mapping rules aren't
hard-wired into silicon like they are on a DL260. This document catalogues the
behaviours a driver has to handle across the supported model/CP variants, cites
primary sources, and names the ModbusPal integration test we'd write for each
(convention from `docs/v2/modbus-test-plan.md`: `S7_<model>_<behavior>`).
## Model / CP Capability Matrix
| PLC family | Modbus TCP server mechanism | Modbus TCP client mechanism | License required? | Typical port 502 source |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| S7-1200 (V4.0+) | `MB_SERVER` on integrated PN port | `MB_CLIENT` | No (in TIA Portal) | CPU's onboard Ethernet [1][2] |
| S7-1500 (all) | `MB_SERVER` on integrated PN port | `MB_CLIENT` | No (in TIA Portal) | CPU's onboard Ethernet [1][3] |
| S7-1500 + CP 1543-1 | `MB_SERVER` on CP's IP | `MB_CLIENT` | No | Separate CP IP address [1] |
| ET 200SP CPU (1510SP, 1512SP) | `MB_SERVER` on PN port | `MB_CLIENT` | No | CPU's onboard Ethernet [3] |
| S7-300 + CP 343-1 / CP 343-1 Lean | `MODBUSCP` (FB `MODBUSCP`, instance DB per connection) | Same FB, client mode | **Yes — 2XV9450-1MB00** per CP | CP's Ethernet port [4][5] |
| S7-400 + CP 443-1 | `MODBUSCP` | `MODBUSCP` client mode | **Yes — 2XV9450-1MB00** per CP | CP's Ethernet port [4] |
| S7-400H + CP 443-1 (redundant H) | `MODBUSCP_REDUNDANT` / paired FBs | Not typical | Yes | Paired CPs in H-system [6] |
| S7-300 / S7-400 CPU PN (e.g. CPU 315-2 PN/DP) | `MODBUSPN` library | `MODBUSPN` client mode | **Yes** — Modbus-TCP PN CPU lib | CPU's PN port [7] |
| "CP 343-1 Lean" | **Server only** (no client mode supported by Lean) | — | Yes, but with restrictions | CP's Ethernet port [4][5] |
- **CP 343-1 Lean is server-only.** It can host `MODBUSCP` in server mode only;
client calls return an immediate error. A surprising number of "Lean + client
doesn't work" forum posts trace back to this [5].
- **Pure OPC UA / PROFINET CPs (CP 1542SP-1, CP 1543-1)** support Modbus TCP on
S7-1500 via the same `MB_SERVER`/`MB_CLIENT` instructions by passing the
CP's `hw_identifier`. There is no separate "Modbus CP" license needed on
S7-1500, unlike S7-300/400 [1].
- **No S7 Modbus server supports function codes 20/21 (file records),
22 (mask write), 23 (read-write multiple), or 43 (device identification).**
Sending any of these returns exception `01` (Illegal Function) on every S7
variant [1][4]. Our driver must not negotiate FC23 as a "bulk-read optimization"
when the profile is S7.
Test names:
`S7_1200_MBSERVER_Loads_OB1_Cyclic`,
`S7_CP343_Lean_Client_Mode_Rejected`,
`S7_All_FC23_Returns_IllegalFunction`.
## Address / DB Mapping
S7 Modbus servers **do not auto-expose PLC memory** — the PLC programmer has to
wire one area per Modbus table to a DB or process-image region. This is the
single biggest difference vs. DL205/Modicon/etc., where the memory map is
fixed at the factory. Our driver must therefore be tolerant of "the same
`40001` means completely different things on two S7-1200s on the same site."
### S7-1200 / S7-1500 `MB_SERVER`
The `MB_SERVER` instance exposes four Modbus tables to each connected client;
each table's backing storage is a per-block parameter [1][8]:
| Modbus table | FCs | Backing parameter | Default / typical backing |
|---------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Coils (0x) | FC01, FC05, FC15 | *implicit* — Q process image | `%Q0.0``%Q1023.7` (→ coil addresses 08191) [1][9] |
| Discrete Inputs (1x)| FC02 | *implicit* — I process image | `%I0.0``%I1023.7` (→ discrete addresses 08191) [1][9] |
| Input Registers (3x)| FC04 | *implicit* — M memory or DB (version-dependent) | Some firmware routes FC04 through the same MB_HOLD_REG buffer [1][8] |
| Holding Registers (4x)| FC03, FC06, FC16 | `MB_HOLD_REG` pointer | User DB (e.g. `DB10.DBW0`) or `%MW` area [1][2][8] |
- **`MB_HOLD_REG` is a pointer (VARIANT / ANY) into a user-defined DB** whose
first byte is holding-register 0 (`40001` in 1-based Modicon form). Byte
offset 2 is register 1, byte offset 4 is register 2, etc. [1][2].
- **The DB *must* have "Optimized block access" UNCHECKED.** Optimized DBs let
the compiler reorder fields for alignment; Modbus requires fixed byte
offsets. With optimized access on, the compiler accepts the project but
`MB_SERVER` returns STATUS `0x8383` (misaligned access) or silently reads
zeros [8][10][11]. This is the #1 support-forum complaint.
- **FC01/FC02/FC05/FC15 hit the Q and I process images directly — not the
`MB_HOLD_REG` DB.** Coil address 0 = `%Q0.0`, coil 1 = `%Q0.1`, coil 8 =
`%Q1.0`. The S7-1200 system manual publishes this mapping as `00001 → Q0.0`
through `09999 → Q1023.7` and `10001 → I0.0` through `19999 → I1023.7` in
1-based form; on the wire (0-based) that's coils 0-8191 and discrete inputs
0-8191 [9].
- **`%M` markers are NOT automatically exposed.** To expose `%M` over Modbus
the programmer must either (a) copy `%M` to the `MB_HOLD_REG` DB each scan,
or (b) define an Array\[0..n\] of Bool inside that DB and copy bits in/out
of `%M`. Siemens has no "MB_COIL_REG" parameter analogous to
`MB_HOLD_REG` — this confuses users migrating from Schneider [9][12].
- **Bit ordering within a Modbus holding register sourced from an `Array of
Bool`**: S7 stores bool\[0\] at `DBX0.0` which is bit 0 of byte 0 which is
the **low byte, low bit** of Modbus register `40001`. A naive client that
reads register `40001` and masks `0x0001` gets bool\[0\]. A client that
masks `0x8000` gets bool\[15\] because the high byte of the Modbus register
is the *second* byte of the DB. Siemens programmers routinely get this
wrong in the DB-via-DBX form; `Array[0..n] of Bool` is the recommended
layout because it aligns naturally [12][13].
### S7-300/400 + CP 343-1 / CP 443-1 `MODBUSCP`
Different paradigm: per-connection **parameter DB** (template
`MODBUS_PARAM_CP`) declares a table of up to 8 register-area mappings. Each
mapping is a tuple `(data_type, DB#, start_offset, length)` where `data_type`
picks the Modbus table [4]:
- `B#16#1` = Coils
- `B#16#2` = Discrete Inputs
- `B#16#3` = Holding Registers
- `B#16#4` = Input Registers
The `holding_register_start` and analogous `coils_start` parameters declare
**which Modbus address range** the CP will serve, and the DB pointers say
where in S7 memory that range lives [4][14]. Unlike `MB_SERVER`, the CP does
not reach into `%Q`/`%I` directly — *everything* goes through a DB. If an
address outside the declared ranges is requested, the CP returns exception
`02` (Illegal Data Address) [4].
Test names:
`S7_1200_FC03_Reg0_Reads_DB10_DBW0`,
`S7_1200_Optimized_DB_Returns_0x8383_MisalignedAccess`,
`S7_1200_FC01_Coil0_Reads_Q0_0`,
`S7_CP343_FC03_Outside_ParamBlock_Range_Returns_IllegalDataAddress`.
## Data Types and Byte Order
Siemens CPUs store scalars **big-endian** internally ("Motorola format"), which
is the same byte order Modbus specifies inside each register. So for 16-bit
values (`Int`, `Word`, `UInt`) the on-the-wire layout is straightforward
`AB` — high byte of the PLC value in the high byte of the Modbus register
[15][16]. No byte-swap trap for 16-bit types.
The trap is 32-bit types (`DInt`, `DWord`, `Real`). Here's what actually
happens across the S7 family:
### S7-1200 / S7-1500 `MB_SERVER`
- **The backing DB stores 32-bit values in big-endian byte order, high word
first** — i.e. `ABCD` when viewed as two consecutive Modbus registers. A
`Real` at `DB10.DBD0` with value `0x12345678` reads over Modbus as
register 0 = `0x1234`, register 1 = `0x5678` [15][16][17].
- **This is `ABCD`, *not* `CDAB`.** Clients that hard-code CDAB (common default
for meters and VFDs) will get wildly wrong floats. Configure the S7 profile
with `WordOrder = ABCD` (aka "big-endian word + big-endian byte" aka
"high-word first") [15][17].
- **`MB_SERVER` does not swap.** It's a direct memcpy from the DB bytes to
the Modbus payload. Whatever byte order the ladder programmer stored into
the DB is what the client receives [17]. This means a programmer who used
`MOVE_BLK` from two separate `Word`s into `DBD` with the "wrong" order can
produce `CDAB` without realising.
- **`Real` is IEEE 754 single-precision** — unambiguous, no BCD trap like on
DL series [15].
- **Strings**: S7 `String[n]` has a 2-byte header (max length, current length)
*before* the character bytes. A client reading a string over Modbus gets
the header in the first register and then the characters two-per-register
in high-byte-first order. `WString` is UTF-16 and the header is 4 bytes
[18]. Our driver's string decoder must expose the "skip header" option for
S7 profile.
### S7-300/400 `MODBUSCP` (CP 343-1 / CP 443-1)
- The CP writes the exact DB bytes onto the wire — again `ABCD` if the DB
stores `DInt`/`Real` in native Siemens order [4].
- **`MODBUSCP` has no `data_type` byte-swap knob.** (The `data_type` parameter
names the Modbus table, not the byte order — see the Address Mapping
section.) If the other end of the link expects `CDAB`, the programmer has
to swap words in ladder before writing the DB [4][14].
### Operator-reported oddity
- Some S7 drivers (Kepware's "Siemens TCP/IP Ethernet" driver, Ignition's
"Siemens S7" driver) expose a per-tag `Float Byte Order` with options
`ABCD`/`CDAB`/`BADC`/`DCBA` because end-users have encountered every
permutation in the field — not because the PLC natively swaps, but because
ladder programmers have historically stored floats every which way [19].
Our S7 Modbus profile should default to `ABCD` but expose a per-tag
override.
- **Unconfirmed rumour**: that S7-1500 firmware V2.0+ reverses float byte
order for `MB_CLIENT` only. Not reproduced; the Siemens forum thread that
launched it was a user error (the remote server was the swapper, not the
S7) [20]. Treat as false until proven.
Test names:
`S7_1200_Real_WordOrder_ABCD_Default`,
`S7_1200_DInt_HighWord_First_At_DBD0`,
`S7_1200_String_Header_First_Two_Bytes`,
`S7_CP343_No_Internal_ByteSwap`.
## Coil / Discrete Input Mapping
On `MB_SERVER` the mapping from coil address → S7 bit is fixed at the
process-image level [1][9][12]:
| Modbus coil / discrete input addr | S7 address | Notes |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|
| Coil 0 (FC01/05/15) | `%Q0.0` | bit 0 of output byte 0 |
| Coil 7 | `%Q0.7` | bit 7 of output byte 0 |
| Coil 8 | `%Q1.0` | bit 0 of output byte 1 |
| Coil 8191 (max) | `%Q1023.7` | highest exposed output bit |
| Discrete input 0 (FC02) | `%I0.0` | bit 0 of input byte 0 |
| Discrete input 8191 | `%I1023.7` | highest exposed input bit |
Formulas:
```
coil_addr = byte_index * 8 + bit_index (e.g. %Q5.3 → coil 43)
discr_addr = byte_index * 8 + bit_index (e.g. %I10.2 → disc 82)
```
- **1-based Modicon form adds 1:** coil 0 (wire) = `00001` (Modicon), etc.
Our driver sends the 0-based PDU form, so `%Q0.0` writes to wire address 0.
- **Writing FC05/FC15 to `%Q` is accepted even while the CPU is in STOP** —
the PLC's process image doesn't care about the user program state. But the
output won't propagate to the physical module until RUN (see STOP section
below) [1][21].
- **`%M` markers require a DB-backed `Array of Bool`** as described in the
Address Mapping section. Our driver can't assume "coil N = MN.0" like it
can on Modicon — on S7 it's always Q/I unless the programmer built a
mapping DB [12].
- **Bit-inside-holding-register**: for `Array of Bool` inside the
`MB_HOLD_REG` DB, bool[0] is bit 0 of byte 0 → **low byte, low bit** of
Modbus register 40001. Most third-party clients probe this in the low
byte, so the common case works; the less-common case (bool[8]) is bit 0 of
byte 1 → **high byte, low bit** of Modbus register 40001. Clients that
test only bool[0] will pass and miss the mis-alignment on bool[8] [12][13].
Test names:
`S7_1200_Coil_0_Is_Q0_0`,
`S7_1200_Coil_8_Is_Q1_0`,
`S7_1200_Discrete_Input_7_Is_I0_7`,
`S7_1200_Coil_Write_In_STOP_Accepted_But_Output_Frozen`.
## Function Code Support & Max Registers Per Request
| FC | Name | S7-1200 / S7-1500 MB_SERVER | CP 343-1 / CP 443-1 MODBUSCP | Max qty per request |
|----|----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 01 | Read Coils | Yes | Yes | 2000 bits (spec) |
| 02 | Read Discrete Inputs | Yes | Yes | 2000 bits (spec) |
| 03 | Read Holding Registers | Yes | Yes | **125** (spec max) |
| 04 | Read Input Registers | Yes | Yes | **125** |
| 05 | Write Single Coil | Yes | Yes | 1 |
| 06 | Write Single Register | Yes | Yes | 1 |
| 15 | Write Multiple Coils | Yes | Yes | 1968 bits (spec) — *see note* |
| 16 | Write Multiple Registers | Yes | Yes | **123** (spec max for TCP) |
| 07 | Read Exception Status | No (RTU only) | No | — |
| 17 | Report Server ID | No | No | — |
| 20/21 | Read/Write File Record | No | No | — |
| 22 | Mask Write Register | No | No | — |
| 23 | Read/Write Multiple | No | No | — |
| 43 | Read Device Identification | No | No | — |
- **S7-1200/1500 honour the full spec maxima** for FC03/04 (125) and FC16
(123) [1][22]. No sub-spec cap like DL260's 100-register FC16 limit.
- **FC15 (Write Multiple Coils) on `MB_SERVER`** writes into `%Q`, which maxes
out at 1024 bytes = 8192 bits, but the spec's 1968-bit per-request limit
caps any single call first [1][9].
- **`MB_HOLD_REG` buffer size is bounded by DB size** — max DB size on
S7-1200 is 64 KB, on S7-1500 is much larger (several MB depending on CPU),
so the practical `MB_HOLD_REG` limit is 32767 16-bit registers on S7-1200
and effectively unbounded on S7-1500 [22][23]. The *per-request* limit is
still 125.
- **Read past the end of `MB_HOLD_REG`** returns exception `02` (Illegal
Data Address) at the start of the overflow register, not a partial read
[1][8].
- **Request larger than spec max** (e.g. FC03 quantity 126) returns exception
`03` (Illegal Data Value). Verified on S7-1200 V4.2 [1][24].
- **CP 343-1 `MODBUSCP` per-request maxima are spec** (125/125/123/1968/2000),
matching the standard [4]. The CP's `MODBUS_PARAM_CP` caps the total
*exposed* range, not the per-call quantity.
Test names:
`S7_1200_FC03_126_Registers_Returns_IllegalDataValue`,
`S7_1200_FC16_124_Registers_Returns_IllegalDataValue`,
`S7_1200_FC03_Past_MB_HOLD_REG_End_Returns_IllegalDataAddress`,
`S7_1200_FC17_ReportServerId_Returns_IllegalFunction`.
## Exception Codes
S7 Modbus servers return only the four standard exception codes [1][4]:
| Code | Name | Triggered by |
|------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 01 | Illegal Function | FC not in the supported list (17, 20-23, 43, any undefined FC) |
| 02 | Illegal Data Address | Register outside `MB_HOLD_REG` / outside `MODBUSCP` param-block range |
| 03 | Illegal Data Value | Quantity exceeds spec (FC03/04 > 125, FC16 > 123, FC01/02 > 2000, FC15 > 1968) |
| 04 | Server Failure | Runtime error inside MB_SERVER (DB access fault, corrupt DB header, MB_SERVER disabled mid-request) [1][24] |
- **No proprietary exception codes (05/06/0A/0B) are used** on any S7
Modbus server [1][4]. Our driver's status-code mapper can treat these as
"never observed" on the S7 profile.
- **CPU in STOP → `MB_SERVER` keeps running if it's in OB1 of the firmware's
communication task, but OB1 itself is not scanned.** In practice:
- Holding-register *reads* (FC03) continue to return the last DB values
frozen at the moment the CPU entered STOP. The `MB_SERVER` block is in
OB1 so it isn't re-invoked; however the TCP stack keeps the socket open
and returns cached data on subsequent polls [1][21]. **Unconfirmed**
whether this is cached in the CP or in the CPU's communication processor;
behaviour varies between firmware 4.0 and 4.5 [21].
- Holding-register *writes* (FC06/FC16) during STOP return exception `04`
(Server Failure) on S7-1200 V4.2+, and return success-but-discarded on
older firmware [1][24]. Our driver should treat FC06/FC16 during STOP as
non-deterministic and not rely on the response code.
- Coil *writes* (FC05/FC15) to `%Q` are *accepted* by the process image
during STOP, but the physical output freezes at its last RUN-mode value
(or the configured STOP-mode substitute value) until RUN resumes [1][21].
- **Writing a read-only address via FC06/FC16**: returns `02` (Illegal Data
Address), not `04`. S7 does not have "write-protected" holding registers —
the programmer either exposes a DB for read-write or doesn't expose it at
all [1][12].
STATUS codes (returned in the `STATUS` output of the block, not on the wire):
- `0x0000` — no error.
- `0x7001` — first call, connection being established.
- `0x7002` — subsequent cyclic call, connection in progress.
- `0x8383` — data access error (optimized DB, DB too small, or type mismatch)
[10][24].
- `0x8188` — invalid parameter combination (e.g. MB_MODE out of range) [24].
- `0x80C8` — mismatched UNIT_ID between MB_CLIENT and `MB_SERVER` [25].
Test names:
`S7_1200_FC03_Outside_HoldReg_Returns_IllegalDataAddress`,
`S7_1200_FC16_In_STOP_Returns_ServerFailure`,
`S7_1200_FC03_In_STOP_Returns_Cached_Values`,
`S7_1200_No_Proprietary_ExceptionCodes_0x05_0x06_0x0A_0x0B`.
## Connection Behavior
- **Max simultaneous Modbus TCP connections**:
- **S7-1200**: shares a pool of 8 open-communication connections across
all TCP/UDP/Modbus use. On a CPU 1211C you get 8 total; on 1215C/1217C
still 8 shared among PG/HMI/OUC/Modbus. Each `MB_SERVER` instance
reserves one. A typical site with a PG + 1 HMI + 2 Modbus clients uses
4 of the 8 [1][26].
- **S7-1500**: up to **8 concurrent Modbus TCP server connections** per
`MB_SERVER` port, across multiple `MB_SERVER` instance DBs each with a
unique port. Total open-communication resources depend on CPU (e.g.
CPU 1515-2 PN supports 128 OUC connections total; Modbus is a subset)
[1][27].
- **CP 343-1 Lean**: up to **8** simultaneous Modbus TCP connections on
port 502 [4][5]. Exceeding this refuses at TCP accept.
- **CP 443-1 Advanced**: up to **16** simultaneous Modbus TCP connections
[4].
- **Multi-connection model on `MB_SERVER`**: one instance DB per connection.
An instance DB listening on port 502 serves exactly one connection at a
time; to serve N simultaneous clients you need N instance DBs each with a
unique port (502/503/504...). **This is a real trap** — most users expect
port 502 to multiplex [27][28]. Our driver must not assume port 502 is the
only listener.
- **Keep-alive**: S7-1500's TCP stack does send TCP keepalives (default
every ~30 s) but the interval is not exposed as a configurable. S7-1200 is
the same. CP 343-1 keepalives are configured via HW Config → CP properties
→ Options → "Send keepalive" (default **off** on older firmware, default
**on** on firmware V3.0+) [1][29]. Driver-side keepalive is still
advisable for S7-300/CP 343-1 on old firmware.
- **Idle-timeout close**: `MB_SERVER` does *not* close idle sockets on its
own. However, the TCP stack on S7-1500 will close a socket that fails
three consecutive keepalive probes (~2 minutes). Forum reports describe
`MB_SERVER` connections "dying overnight" on S7-1500 when an HMI stops
polling — the fix is to enable driver-side periodic reads or driver-side
TCP keepalive [29][30].
- **Reconnect after power cycle**: MB_SERVER starts listening ~1-2 seconds
after the CPU reaches RUN. If the client reconnects during STARTUP OB
(OB100), the connection is refused until OB1 runs the block at least once.
Our driver should back off and retry on `ECONNREFUSED` for the first 5
seconds after a power-cycle detection [1][24].
- **Unit Identifier**: `MB_SERVER` accepts **any** Unit ID by default — there
is no configurable filter; the PLC ignores the Unit ID field entirely.
`MB_CLIENT` defaults to Unit ID = 255 as "ignore" [25][31]. Some
third-party Modbus-TCP gateways *require* a specific Unit ID; sending
anything to S7 is safe. **CP 343-1 `MODBUSCP`** also accepts any Unit ID
in server mode, but the parameter DB exposes a `single_write` / `unit_id`
field on newer firmware to allow filtering [4].
Test names:
`S7_1200_9th_TCP_Connection_Refused_On_8_Conn_Pool`,
`S7_1500_Port_503_Required_For_Second_Instance`,
`S7_1200_Reconnect_After_Power_Cycle_Succeeds_Within_5s`,
`S7_1200_Unit_ID_Ignored_Any_Accepted`.
## Behavioral Oddities
- **Transaction ID echo** is reliable on all S7 variants. `MB_SERVER` copies
the MBAP TxId verbatim. No known firmware that drops TxId under load [1][31].
- **Request serialization**: a single `MB_SERVER` instance serializes
requests from its one connected client — the block processes one PDU per
call and calls happen once per OB1 scan. OB1 scan time of 5-50 ms puts an
upper bound on throughput at ~20-200 requests/sec per connection [1][30].
Multiple `MB_SERVER` instances (one per port) run in parallel because OB1
calls them sequentially within the same scan.
- **OB1 scan coupling**: `MB_SERVER` must be called cyclically from OB1 (or
another cyclic OB). If the programmer puts it in a conditional branch
that doesn't fire every scan, requests time out. The STATUS `0x7002`
"in progress" is *expected* between calls, not an error [1][24].
- **Optimized DB backing `MB_HOLD_REG`** — already covered in Address
Mapping; STATUS becomes `0x8383`. This is the most common deployment bug
on S7-1500 projects migrated from older S7-1200 examples [10][11].
- **CPU STOP behaviour** — covered in Exception Codes section. The short
version: reads may return stale data without error; writes return exception
04 on modern firmware.
- **Partial-frame disconnect**: S7-1200/1500 TCP stack closes the socket on
any MBAP header where the `Length` field doesn't match the PDU length.
Driver must detect half-close and reconnect [1][29].
- **MBAP `Protocol ID` must be 0**. Any non-zero value causes the CP/CPU to
drop the frame silently (no response, no RST) on S7-1500 firmware V2.0
through V2.9; firmware V3.0+ sends an RST [1][30]. *Unconfirmed* whether
V3.1 still sends RST or returns to silent drop.
- **FC01/FC02 access outside `%Q`/`%I` range**: on S7-1200, requesting
coil address 8192 (= `%Q1024.0`) returns exception `02` (Illegal Data
Address) [1][9]. The 8192-bit hard cap is a process-image size limit on
the CPU, not a Modbus protocol limit.
- **`MB_CLIENT` UNIT_ID mismatch with remote `MB_SERVER`** produces STATUS
`0x80C8` on the client side, and the server silently discards the frame
(no response on the wire) [25]. This matters for Modbus-TCP-to-RTU
gateway scenarios where the Unit ID picks the RTU slave.
- **Non-IEEE REAL / BCD**: S7 does *not* use BCD like DirectLOGIC. `Real` is
always IEEE 754 single-precision. `LReal` (8-byte double) occupies 4
Modbus registers in `ABCDEFGH` order (big-endian byte, big-endian word)
[15][18].
- **`MODBUSCP` single-write** on CP 343-1: a parameter `single_write` in the
param DB controls whether FC06 on a register in the "holding register"
area triggers a callback to the user program vs. updates the DB directly.
Default is direct update. If a ladder programmer enables the callback
without implementing the callback OB, FC06 writes hang for 5 seconds then
return exception `04` [4].
Test names:
`S7_1200_TxId_Preserved_Across_Burst_Of_50_Requests`,
`S7_1200_MBSERVER_Throughput_Capped_By_OB1_Scan`,
`S7_1200_MBAP_ProtocolID_NonZero_Frame_Dropped`,
`S7_1200_Partial_MBAP_Causes_Half_Close`.
## Model-specific Differences Worth Separate Test Coverage
- **S7-1200 V4.0 vs V4.4+**: Older firmware does not support `WString` over
`MB_HOLD_REG` and returns `0x8383` if the DB contains one [18][24]. Test
both firmware bands separately.
- **S7-1500 vs S7-1200**: S7-1500 supports multiple `MB_SERVER` instances on
the *same* CPU with different ports cleanly; S7-1200 can too but its
8-connection pool is shared tighter [1][27]. Throughput per-connection is
~5× faster on S7-1500 because the comms task runs on a dedicated core.
- **S7-300 + CP 343-1 vs S7-1200/1500**: parameter-block mapping (not
`MB_HOLD_REG` pointer), per-connection license, no `%Q`/`%I` direct
access for coils (everything goes through a DB), different STATUS codes
(`DONE`/`ERROR`/`STATUS` word pairs vs. the single STATUS word) [4][14].
Driver-side it's a different profile.
- **CP 343-1 Lean vs CP 343-1 Advanced**: Lean is server-only; Advanced is
client + server. Lean's max connections = 8; Advanced = 16 [4][5].
- **CP 443-1 in S7-400H**: uses `MODBUSCP_REDUNDANT` which presents two
Ethernet endpoints that fail over. Our driver's redundancy support should
recognize the S7-400H profile as "two IP addresses, same server state,
advertise via `ServerUriArray`" [6].
- **ET 200SP CPU (1510SP / 1512SP)**: behaves as S7-1500 from `MB_SERVER`
perspective. No known deltas [3].
## References
1. Siemens Industry Online Support, *Modbus/TCP Communication between SIMATIC S7-1500 / S7-1200 and Modbus/TCP Controllers with Instructions `MB_CLIENT` and `MB_SERVER`*, Entry ID 102020340, V6 (Feb 2021). https://cache.industry.siemens.com/dl/files/340/102020340/att_118119/v6/net_modbus_tcp_s7-1500_s7-1200_en.pdf
2. Siemens TIA Portal Online Docs, *MB_SERVER instruction*. https://docs.tia.siemens.cloud/r/simatic_s7_1200_manual_collection_eses_20/communication-processor-and-modbus-tcp/modbus-communication/modbus-tcp/modbus-tcp-instructions/mb_server-communicate-using-profinet-as-modbus-tcp-server-instruction
3. Siemens, *SIMATIC S7-1500 Communication Function Manual* (covers ET 200SP CPU). http://public.eandm.com/Public_Docs/s71500_communication_function_manual_en-US_en-US.pdf
4. Siemens Industry Online Support, *SIMATIC Modbus/TCP communication using CP 343-1 and CP 443-1 — Programming Manual*, Entry ID 103447617. https://cache.industry.siemens.com/dl/files/617/103447617/att_106971/v1/simatic_modbus_tcp_cp_en-US_en-US.pdf
5. Siemens Industry Online Support FAQ *"Which technical data applies for the SIMATIC Modbus/TCP software for CP 343-1 / CP 443-1?"*, Entry ID 104946406. https://www.industry-mobile-support.siemens-info.com/en/article/detail/104946406
6. Siemens Industry Online Support, *Redundant Modbus/TCP communication via CP 443-1 in S7-400H systems*, Entry ID 109739212. https://cache.industry.siemens.com/dl/files/212/109739212/att_887886/v1/SIMATIC_modbus_tcp_cp_red_e_en-US.pdf
7. Siemens Industry Online Support, *SIMATIC MODBUS (TCP) PN CPU Library — Programming and Operating Manual 06/2014*, Entry ID 75330636. https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/attachments/75330636/ModbusTCPPNCPUen.pdf
8. DMC Inc., *Using an S7-1200 PLC as a Modbus TCP Slave*. https://www.dmcinfo.com/blog/27313/using-an-s7-1200-plc-as-a-modbus-tcp-slave/
9. Siemens, *SIMATIC S7-1200 System Manual* (V4.x), "MB_SERVER" pages 736-742. https://www.manualslib.com/manual/1453610/Siemens-S7-1200.html?page=736
10. lamaPLC, *Simatic Modbus S7 error- and statuscodes*. https://www.lamaplc.com/doku.php?id=simatic:errorcodes
11. ScadaProtocols, *How to Configure Modbus TCP on Siemens S7-1200 (TIA Portal Step-by-Step)*. https://scadaprotocols.com/modbus-tcp-siemens-s7-1200-tia-portal/
12. Industrial Monitor Direct, *Reading and Writing Memory Bits via Modbus TCP on S7-1200*. https://industrialmonitordirect.com/blogs/knowledgebase/reading-and-writing-memory-bits-via-modbus-tcp-on-s7-1200
13. PLCtalk forum *"Siemens S7-1200 modbus understanding"*. https://www.plctalk.net/forums/threads/siemens-s7-1200-modbus-understanding.104119/
14. Siemens SIMATIC S7 Manual, "Function block MODBUSCP — Functionality" (ManualsLib p29). https://www.manualslib.com/manual/1580661/Siemens-Simatic-S7.html?page=29
15. Chipkin, *How Real (Floating Point) and 32-bit Data is Encoded in Modbus*. https://store.chipkin.com/articles/how-real-floating-point-and-32-bit-data-is-encoded-in-modbus-rtu-messages
16. Siemens Industry Online Support forum, *MODBUS DATA conversion in S7-1200 CPU*, Entry ID 97287. https://support.industry.siemens.com/forum/WW/en/posts/modbus-data-converson-in-s7-1200-cpu/97287
17. Industrial Monitor Direct, *Siemens S7-1500 MB_SERVER Modbus TCP Configuration Guide*. https://industrialmonitordirect.com/de/blogs/knowledgebase/siemens-s7-1500-mb-server-modbus-tcp-configuration-guide
18. Siemens TIA Portal, *Data types in SIMATIC S7-1200/1500 — String/WString header layout* (system manual, "Elementary Data Types").
19. Kepware / PTC, *Siemens TCP/IP Ethernet Driver Help*, "Byte / Word Order" tag property. https://www.opcturkey.com/uploads/siemens-tcp-ip-ethernet-manual.pdf
20. Siemens SiePortal forum, *Transfer float out of words*, Entry ID 187811. https://sieportal.siemens.com/en-ww/support/forum/posts/transfer-float-out-of-words/187811 _(operator-reported "S7 swaps float" claim — traced to remote-device issue; **unconfirmed**.)_
21. Siemens SiePortal forum, *S7-1200 communication with Modbus TCP*, Entry ID 133086. https://support.industry.siemens.com/forum/WW/en/posts/s7-1200-communication-with-modbus-tcp/133086
22. Siemens SiePortal forum, *S7-1500 MB Server Holding Register Max Word*, Entry ID 224636. https://support.industry.siemens.com/forum/WW/en/posts/s7-1500-mb-server-holding-register-max-word/224636
23. Siemens, *SIMATIC S7-1500 Technical Specifications* — CPU-specific DB size limits in each CPU manual's "Memory" table.
24. Siemens TIA Portal Online Docs, *Error messages (S7-1200, S7-1500) — Modbus instructions*. https://docs.tia.siemens.cloud/r/en-us/v20/modbus-rtu-s7-1200-s7-1500/error-messages-s7-1200-s7-1500
25. Industrial Monitor Direct, *Fix Siemens S7-1500 MB_Client UnitID Error 80C8*. https://industrialmonitordirect.com/blogs/knowledgebase/troubleshooting-mb-client-on-s7-1500-cpu-1515sp-modbus-tcp
26. Siemens SiePortal forum, *How many TCP connections can the S7-1200 make?*, Entry ID 275570. https://support.industry.siemens.com/forum/WW/en/posts/how-many-tcp-connections-can-the-s7-1200-make/275570
27. Siemens SiePortal forum, *Simultaneous connections of Modbus TCP*, Entry ID 189626. https://support.industry.siemens.com/forum/ww/en/posts/simultaneous-connections-of-modbus-tcp/189626
28. Siemens SiePortal forum, *How many Modbus TCP IP clients can read simultaneously from S7-1517*, Entry ID 261569. https://support.industry.siemens.com/forum/WW/en/posts/how-many-modbus-tcp-ip-client-can-read-simultaneously-in-s7-1517/261569
29. Industrial Monitor Direct, *Troubleshooting Intermittent Modbus TCP Connections on S7-1500 PLC*. https://industrialmonitordirect.com/blogs/knowledgebase/troubleshooting-intermittent-modbus-tcp-connections-on-s7-1500-plc
30. PLCtalk forum *"S7-1500 modbus tcp speed?"*. https://www.plctalk.net/forums/threads/s7-1500-modbus-tcp-speed.114046/
31. Siemens SiePortal forum, *MB_Unit_ID parameter in Modbus TCP*, Entry ID 156635. https://support.industry.siemens.com/forum/WW/en/posts/mb-unit-id-parameter-in-modbus-tcp/156635

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<#
.SYNOPSIS
Phase 6.1 exit-gate compliance check. Each check either passes or records a
failure; non-zero exit = fail.
.DESCRIPTION
Validates Phase 6.1 (Resilience & Observability runtime) completion. Checks
enumerated in `docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md`
§"Compliance Checks (run at exit gate)".
Runs a mix of file-presence checks, text-pattern sweeps over the committed
codebase, and a full `dotnet test` pass to exercise the invariants each
class encodes. Meant to be invoked from repo root.
.NOTES
Usage: pwsh ./scripts/compliance/phase-6-1-compliance.ps1
Exit: 0 = all checks passed; non-zero = one or more FAILs
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$script:failures = 0
$repoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..')).Path
function Assert-Pass {
param([string]$Check)
Write-Host " [PASS] $Check" -ForegroundColor Green
}
function Assert-Fail {
param([string]$Check, [string]$Reason)
Write-Host " [FAIL] $Check - $Reason" -ForegroundColor Red
$script:failures++
}
function Assert-Deferred {
param([string]$Check, [string]$FollowupPr)
Write-Host " [DEFERRED] $Check (follow-up: $FollowupPr)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
function Assert-FileExists {
param([string]$Check, [string]$RelPath)
$full = Join-Path $repoRoot $RelPath
if (Test-Path $full) { Assert-Pass "$Check ($RelPath)" }
else { Assert-Fail $Check "missing file: $RelPath" }
}
function Assert-TextFound {
param([string]$Check, [string]$Pattern, [string[]]$RelPaths)
foreach ($p in $RelPaths) {
$full = Join-Path $repoRoot $p
if (-not (Test-Path $full)) { continue }
if (Select-String -Path $full -Pattern $Pattern -Quiet) {
Assert-Pass "$Check (matched in $p)"
return
}
}
Assert-Fail $Check "pattern '$Pattern' not found in any of: $($RelPaths -join ', ')"
}
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "=== Phase 6.1 compliance - Resilience & Observability runtime ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream A - Resilience layer"
Assert-FileExists "Pipeline builder present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Resilience/DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder.cs"
Assert-FileExists "CapabilityInvoker present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Resilience/CapabilityInvoker.cs"
Assert-FileExists "WriteIdempotentAttribute present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions/WriteIdempotentAttribute.cs"
Assert-TextFound "Pipeline key includes HostName (per-device isolation)" "PipelineKey\(.+HostName" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Resilience/DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder.cs")
Assert-TextFound "OnReadValue routes through invoker" "DriverCapability\.Read," @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/OpcUa/DriverNodeManager.cs")
Assert-TextFound "OnWriteValue routes through invoker" "ExecuteWriteAsync" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/OpcUa/DriverNodeManager.cs")
Assert-TextFound "HistoryRead routes through invoker" "DriverCapability\.HistoryRead" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/OpcUa/DriverNodeManager.cs")
Assert-FileExists "Galaxy supervisor CircuitBreaker preserved" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.Proxy/Supervisor/CircuitBreaker.cs"
Assert-FileExists "Galaxy supervisor Backoff preserved" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.Proxy/Supervisor/Backoff.cs"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream B - Tier A/B/C runtime"
Assert-FileExists "DriverTier enum present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions/DriverTier.cs"
Assert-TextFound "DriverTypeMetadata requires Tier" "DriverTier Tier" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions/DriverTypeRegistry.cs")
Assert-FileExists "MemoryTracking present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Stability/MemoryTracking.cs"
Assert-FileExists "MemoryRecycle present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Stability/MemoryRecycle.cs"
Assert-TextFound "MemoryRecycle is Tier C gated" "_tier == DriverTier\.C" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Stability/MemoryRecycle.cs")
Assert-FileExists "ScheduledRecycleScheduler present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Stability/ScheduledRecycleScheduler.cs"
Assert-TextFound "Scheduler ctor rejects Tier A/B" "tier != DriverTier\.C" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Stability/ScheduledRecycleScheduler.cs")
Assert-FileExists "WedgeDetector present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Stability/WedgeDetector.cs"
Assert-TextFound "WedgeDetector is demand-aware" "HasPendingWork" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Stability/WedgeDetector.cs")
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream C - Health + logging"
Assert-FileExists "DriverHealthReport present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Observability/DriverHealthReport.cs"
Assert-FileExists "HealthEndpointsHost present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Observability/HealthEndpointsHost.cs"
Assert-TextFound "State matrix: Healthy = 200" "ReadinessVerdict\.Healthy => 200" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Observability/DriverHealthReport.cs")
Assert-TextFound "State matrix: Faulted = 503" "ReadinessVerdict\.Faulted => 503" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Observability/DriverHealthReport.cs")
Assert-FileExists "LogContextEnricher present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Observability/LogContextEnricher.cs"
Assert-TextFound "Enricher pushes DriverInstanceId property" "DriverInstanceId" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Observability/LogContextEnricher.cs")
Assert-TextFound "JSON sink opt-in via Serilog:WriteJson" "Serilog:WriteJson" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Program.cs")
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream D - LiteDB generation-sealed cache"
Assert-FileExists "GenerationSealedCache present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration/LocalCache/GenerationSealedCache.cs"
Assert-TextFound "Sealed files marked ReadOnly" "FileAttributes\.ReadOnly" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration/LocalCache/GenerationSealedCache.cs")
Assert-TextFound "Corruption fails closed with GenerationCacheUnavailableException" "GenerationCacheUnavailableException" @("src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration/LocalCache/GenerationSealedCache.cs")
Assert-FileExists "ResilientConfigReader present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration/LocalCache/ResilientConfigReader.cs"
Assert-FileExists "StaleConfigFlag present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration/LocalCache/StaleConfigFlag.cs"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream E - Admin /hosts (data layer)"
Assert-FileExists "DriverInstanceResilienceStatus entity" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration/Entities/DriverInstanceResilienceStatus.cs"
Assert-FileExists "DriverResilienceStatusTracker present" "src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Resilience/DriverResilienceStatusTracker.cs"
Assert-Deferred "FleetStatusHub SignalR push + Blazor /hosts column refresh" "Phase 6.1 Stream E.2/E.3 visual-compliance follow-up"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Cross-cutting"
Write-Host " Running full solution test suite..." -ForegroundColor DarkGray
$prevPref = $ErrorActionPreference
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Continue'
$testOutput = & dotnet test (Join-Path $repoRoot 'ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx') --nologo 2>&1
$ErrorActionPreference = $prevPref
$passLine = $testOutput | Select-String 'Passed:\s+(\d+)' -AllMatches
$failLine = $testOutput | Select-String 'Failed:\s+(\d+)' -AllMatches
$passCount = 0; foreach ($m in $passLine.Matches) { $passCount += [int]$m.Groups[1].Value }
$failCount = 0; foreach ($m in $failLine.Matches) { $failCount += [int]$m.Groups[1].Value }
$baseline = 906
if ($passCount -ge $baseline) { Assert-Pass "No test-count regression ($passCount >= $baseline baseline)" }
else { Assert-Fail "Test-count regression" "passed $passCount < baseline $baseline" }
# Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake tracked separately; exit gate tolerates a single
# known flake but flags any NEW failures.
if ($failCount -le 1) { Assert-Pass "No new failing tests (pre-existing CLI flake tolerated)" }
else { Assert-Fail "New failing tests" "$failCount failures > 1 tolerated" }
Write-Host ""
if ($script:failures -eq 0) {
Write-Host "Phase 6.1 compliance: PASS" -ForegroundColor Green
exit 0
}
Write-Host "Phase 6.1 compliance: $script:failures FAIL(s)" -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1

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@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Phase 6.2 exit-gate compliance check — stub. Each `Assert-*` either passes
(Write-Host green) or throws. Non-zero exit = fail.
.DESCRIPTION
Validates Phase 6.2 (Authorization runtime) completion. Checks enumerated
in `docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-2-authorization-runtime.md`
§"Compliance Checks (run at exit gate)".
Current status: SCAFFOLD. Every check writes a TODO line and does NOT throw.
Each implementation task in Phase 6.2 is responsible for replacing its TODO
with a real check before closing that task.
.NOTES
Usage: pwsh ./scripts/compliance/phase-6-2-compliance.ps1
Exit: 0 = all checks passed (or are still TODO); non-zero = explicit fail
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$script:failures = 0
function Assert-Todo {
param([string]$Check, [string]$ImplementationTask)
Write-Host " [TODO] $Check (implement during $ImplementationTask)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
function Assert-Pass {
param([string]$Check)
Write-Host " [PASS] $Check" -ForegroundColor Green
}
function Assert-Fail {
param([string]$Check, [string]$Reason)
Write-Host " [FAIL] $Check$Reason" -ForegroundColor Red
$script:failures++
}
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "=== Phase 6.2 compliance — Authorization runtime ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream A — LdapGroupRoleMapping (control plane)"
Assert-Todo "Control/data-plane separation — Core.Authorization has zero refs to LdapGroupRoleMapping" "Stream A.2"
Assert-Todo "Authoring validation — AclsTab rejects duplicate (LdapGroup, Scope) pre-save" "Stream A.3"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream B — Evaluator + trie + cache"
Assert-Todo "Trie invariants — PermissionTrieBuilder idempotent (build twice == equal)" "Stream B.1"
Assert-Todo "Additive grants + cluster isolation — cross-cluster leakage impossible" "Stream B.1"
Assert-Todo "Galaxy FolderSegment coverage — folder-subtree grant cascades; siblings unaffected" "Stream B.2"
Assert-Todo "Redundancy-safe invalidation — generation-mismatch forces trie re-load on peer" "Stream B.4"
Assert-Todo "Membership freshness — 15 min interval elapsed + LDAP down = fail-closed" "Stream B.5"
Assert-Todo "Auth cache fail-closed — 5 min AuthCacheMaxStaleness exceeded = NotGranted" "Stream B.5"
Assert-Todo "AuthorizationDecision shape — Allow + NotGranted only; Denied variant exists unused" "Stream B.6"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream C — OPC UA operation wiring"
Assert-Todo "Every operation wired — Browse/Read/Write/HistoryRead/HistoryUpdate/CreateMonitoredItems/TransferSubscriptions/Call/Ack/Confirm/Shelve" "Stream C.1-C.7"
Assert-Todo "HistoryRead uses its own flag — Read+no-HistoryRead denies HistoryRead" "Stream C.3"
Assert-Todo "Mixed-batch semantics — 3 allowed + 2 denied returns per-item status, no coarse failure" "Stream C.6"
Assert-Todo "Browse ancestor visibility — deep grant implies ancestor browse; denied ancestors filter" "Stream C.7"
Assert-Todo "Subscription re-authorization — revoked grant surfaces BadUserAccessDenied in one publish" "Stream C.5"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream D — Admin UI + SignalR invalidation"
Assert-Todo "SignalR invalidation — sp_PublishGeneration pushes PermissionTrieCache invalidate < 2 s" "Stream D.4"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Cross-cutting"
Assert-Todo "No test-count regression — dotnet test ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx count ≥ pre-Phase-6.2 baseline" "Final exit-gate"
Write-Host ""
if ($script:failures -eq 0) {
Write-Host "Phase 6.2 compliance: scaffold-mode PASS (all checks TODO)" -ForegroundColor Green
exit 0
}
Write-Host "Phase 6.2 compliance: $script:failures FAIL(s)" -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1

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@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Phase 6.3 exit-gate compliance check — stub. Each `Assert-*` either passes
(Write-Host green) or throws. Non-zero exit = fail.
.DESCRIPTION
Validates Phase 6.3 (Redundancy runtime) completion. Checks enumerated in
`docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-3-redundancy-runtime.md`
§"Compliance Checks (run at exit gate)".
Current status: SCAFFOLD. Every check writes a TODO line and does NOT throw.
Each implementation task in Phase 6.3 is responsible for replacing its TODO
with a real check before closing that task.
.NOTES
Usage: pwsh ./scripts/compliance/phase-6-3-compliance.ps1
Exit: 0 = all checks passed (or are still TODO); non-zero = explicit fail
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$script:failures = 0
function Assert-Todo {
param([string]$Check, [string]$ImplementationTask)
Write-Host " [TODO] $Check (implement during $ImplementationTask)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
function Assert-Pass {
param([string]$Check)
Write-Host " [PASS] $Check" -ForegroundColor Green
}
function Assert-Fail {
param([string]$Check, [string]$Reason)
Write-Host " [FAIL] $Check$Reason" -ForegroundColor Red
$script:failures++
}
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "=== Phase 6.3 compliance — Redundancy runtime ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream A — Topology loader"
Assert-Todo "Transparent-mode rejection — sp_PublishGeneration blocks RedundancyMode=Transparent" "Stream A.3"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream B — Peer probe + ServiceLevel calculator"
Assert-Todo "OPC UA band compliance — 0=Maintenance / 1=NoData reserved; operational 2..255" "Stream B.2"
Assert-Todo "Authoritative-Primary ServiceLevel = 255" "Stream B.2"
Assert-Todo "Isolated-Primary (peer unreachable, self serving) = 230" "Stream B.2"
Assert-Todo "Primary-Mid-Apply = 200" "Stream B.2"
Assert-Todo "Recovering-Primary = 180 with dwell + publish witness enforced" "Stream B.2"
Assert-Todo "Authoritative-Backup = 100" "Stream B.2"
Assert-Todo "Isolated-Backup (primary unreachable) = 80 — no auto-promote" "Stream B.2"
Assert-Todo "InvalidTopology = 2 — >1 Primary self-demotes both nodes" "Stream B.2"
Assert-Todo "UaHealthProbe authority — HTTP-200 + UA-down peer treated as UA-unhealthy" "Stream B.1"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream C — OPC UA node wiring"
Assert-Todo "ServerUriArray — returns self + peer URIs, self first" "Stream C.2"
Assert-Todo "Client.CLI cutover — primary halt triggers reconnect to backup via ServerUriArray" "Stream C.4"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream D — Apply-lease + publish fencing"
Assert-Todo "Apply-lease disposal — leases close on exception, cancellation, watchdog timeout" "Stream D.2"
Assert-Todo "Role transition via operator publish — no restart; both nodes flip ServiceLevel on publish confirm" "Stream D.3"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream F — Interop matrix"
Assert-Todo "Client interoperability matrix — Ignition 8.1/8.3 / Kepware / Aveva OI Gateway findings documented" "Stream F.1-F.2"
Assert-Todo "Galaxy MXAccess failover — primary kill; Galaxy consumer reconnects within session-timeout budget" "Stream F.3"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Cross-cutting"
Assert-Todo "No regression in driver test suites; /healthz reachable under redundancy load" "Final exit-gate"
Write-Host ""
if ($script:failures -eq 0) {
Write-Host "Phase 6.3 compliance: scaffold-mode PASS (all checks TODO)" -ForegroundColor Green
exit 0
}
Write-Host "Phase 6.3 compliance: $script:failures FAIL(s)" -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1

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<#
.SYNOPSIS
Phase 6.4 exit-gate compliance check — stub. Each `Assert-*` either passes
(Write-Host green) or throws. Non-zero exit = fail.
.DESCRIPTION
Validates Phase 6.4 (Admin UI completion) completion. Checks enumerated in
`docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-4-admin-ui-completion.md`
§"Compliance Checks (run at exit gate)".
Current status: SCAFFOLD. Every check writes a TODO line and does NOT throw.
Each implementation task in Phase 6.4 is responsible for replacing its TODO
with a real check before closing that task.
.NOTES
Usage: pwsh ./scripts/compliance/phase-6-4-compliance.ps1
Exit: 0 = all checks passed (or are still TODO); non-zero = explicit fail
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$script:failures = 0
function Assert-Todo {
param([string]$Check, [string]$ImplementationTask)
Write-Host " [TODO] $Check (implement during $ImplementationTask)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
function Assert-Pass {
param([string]$Check)
Write-Host " [PASS] $Check" -ForegroundColor Green
}
function Assert-Fail {
param([string]$Check, [string]$Reason)
Write-Host " [FAIL] $Check$Reason" -ForegroundColor Red
$script:failures++
}
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "=== Phase 6.4 compliance — Admin UI completion ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream A — UNS drag/move + impact preview"
Assert-Todo "UNS drag/move — drag line across areas; modal shows correct impacted-equipment + tag counts" "Stream A.2"
Assert-Todo "Concurrent-edit safety — session B saves draft mid-preview; session A Confirm returns 409" "Stream A.3 (DraftRevisionToken)"
Assert-Todo "Cross-cluster drop disabled — actionable toast points to Export/Import" "Stream A.2"
Assert-Todo "1000-node tree — drag-enter feedback < 100 ms" "Stream A.4"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream B — CSV import + staged-import + 5-identifier search"
Assert-Todo "CSV header version — file missing '# OtOpcUaCsv v1' rejected pre-parse" "Stream B.1"
Assert-Todo "CSV canonical identifier set — columns match decision #117 exactly" "Stream B.1"
Assert-Todo "Staged-import atomicity — 10k-row FinaliseImportBatch < 30 s; user-scoped visibility; DropImportBatch rollback" "Stream B.3"
Assert-Todo "Concurrent import + external reservation — finalize retries with conflict handling; no corruption" "Stream B.3"
Assert-Todo "5-identifier search ranking — exact > prefix; published > draft for equal scores" "Stream B.4"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream C — DiffViewer sections"
Assert-Todo "Diff viewer section caps — 2000-row subtree-rename summary-only; 'Load full diff' paginates" "Stream C.2"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Stream D — Identification (OPC 40010)"
Assert-Todo "OPC 40010 field list match — rendered fields match decision #139 exactly; no extras" "Stream D.1"
Assert-Todo "OPC 40010 exposure — Identification sub-folder shows when non-null; absent when all null" "Stream D.3"
Assert-Todo "ACL inheritance for Identification — Equipment-grant reads; no-grant denies both" "Stream D.4"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Visual compliance"
Assert-Todo "Visual parity reviewer — FleetAdmin signoff vs admin-ui.md §Visual-Design; screenshot set checked in under docs/v2/visual-compliance/phase-6-4/" "Visual review"
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Cross-cutting"
Assert-Todo "Full solution dotnet test passes; no test-count regression vs pre-Phase-6.4 baseline" "Final exit-gate"
Write-Host ""
if ($script:failures -eq 0) {
Write-Host "Phase 6.4 compliance: scaffold-mode PASS (all checks TODO)" -ForegroundColor Green
exit 0
}
Write-Host "Phase 6.4 compliance: $script:failures FAIL(s)" -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1

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namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Entities;
/// <summary>
/// Runtime resilience counters the CapabilityInvoker + MemoryTracking + MemoryRecycle
/// surfaces for each <c>(DriverInstanceId, HostName)</c> pair. Separate from
/// <see cref="DriverHostStatus"/> (which owns per-host <i>connectivity</i> state) so a
/// host that's Running but has tripped its breaker or is approaching its memory ceiling
/// shows up distinctly on Admin <c>/hosts</c>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per <c>docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md</c> §Stream E.1.
/// The Admin UI left-joins this table on DriverHostStatus for display; rows are written
/// by the runtime via a HostedService that samples the tracker at a configurable
/// interval (default 5 s) — writes are non-critical, a missed sample is tolerated.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class DriverInstanceResilienceStatus
{
public required string DriverInstanceId { get; set; }
public required string HostName { get; set; }
/// <summary>Most recent time the circuit breaker for this (instance, host) opened; null if never.</summary>
public DateTime? LastCircuitBreakerOpenUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>Rolling count of consecutive Polly pipeline failures for this (instance, host).</summary>
public int ConsecutiveFailures { get; set; }
/// <summary>Current Polly bulkhead depth (in-flight calls) for this (instance, host).</summary>
public int CurrentBulkheadDepth { get; set; }
/// <summary>Most recent process recycle time (Tier C only; null for in-process tiers).</summary>
public DateTime? LastRecycleUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Post-init memory baseline captured by <c>MemoryTracking</c> (median of first
/// BaselineWindow samples). Zero while still warming up.
/// </summary>
public long BaselineFootprintBytes { get; set; }
/// <summary>Most recent footprint sample the tracker saw (steady-state read).</summary>
public long CurrentFootprintBytes { get; set; }
/// <summary>Row last-write timestamp — advances on every sampling tick.</summary>
public DateTime LastSampledUtc { get; set; }
}

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using LiteDB;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.LocalCache;
/// <summary>
/// Generation-sealed LiteDB cache per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decision #148 and Phase 6.1
/// Stream D.1. Each published generation writes one <b>read-only</b> LiteDB file under
/// <c>&lt;cache-root&gt;/&lt;clusterId&gt;/&lt;generationId&gt;.db</c>. A per-cluster
/// <c>CURRENT</c> text file holds the currently-active generation id; it is updated
/// atomically (temp file + <see cref="File.Replace(string, string, string?)"/>) only after
/// the sealed file is fully written.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>Mixed-generation reads are impossible: any read opens the single file pointed to
/// by <c>CURRENT</c>, which is a coherent snapshot. Corruption of the CURRENT file or the
/// sealed file surfaces as <see cref="GenerationCacheUnavailableException"/> — the reader
/// fails closed rather than silently falling back to an older generation. Recovery path
/// is to re-fetch from the central DB (and the Phase 6.1 Stream C <c>UsingStaleConfig</c>
/// flag goes true until that succeeds).</para>
///
/// <para>This cache is the read-path fallback when the central DB is unreachable. The
/// write path (draft edits, publish) bypasses the cache and fails hard on DB outage per
/// Stream D.2 — inconsistent writes are worse than a temporary inability to edit.</para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class GenerationSealedCache
{
private const string CollectionName = "generation";
private const string CurrentPointerFileName = "CURRENT";
private readonly string _cacheRoot;
/// <summary>Root directory for all clusters' sealed caches.</summary>
public string CacheRoot => _cacheRoot;
public GenerationSealedCache(string cacheRoot)
{
ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(cacheRoot);
_cacheRoot = cacheRoot;
Directory.CreateDirectory(_cacheRoot);
}
/// <summary>
/// Seal a generation: write the snapshot to <c>&lt;cluster&gt;/&lt;generationId&gt;.db</c>,
/// mark the file read-only, then atomically publish the <c>CURRENT</c> pointer. Existing
/// sealed files for prior generations are preserved (prune separately).
/// </summary>
public async Task SealAsync(GenerationSnapshot snapshot, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(snapshot);
ct.ThrowIfCancellationRequested();
var clusterDir = Path.Combine(_cacheRoot, snapshot.ClusterId);
Directory.CreateDirectory(clusterDir);
var sealedPath = Path.Combine(clusterDir, $"{snapshot.GenerationId}.db");
if (File.Exists(sealedPath))
{
// Already sealed — idempotent. Treat as no-op + update pointer in case an earlier
// seal succeeded but the pointer update failed (crash recovery).
WritePointerAtomically(clusterDir, snapshot.GenerationId);
return;
}
var tmpPath = sealedPath + ".tmp";
try
{
using (var db = new LiteDatabase(new ConnectionString { Filename = tmpPath, Upgrade = false }))
{
var col = db.GetCollection<GenerationSnapshot>(CollectionName);
col.Insert(snapshot);
}
File.Move(tmpPath, sealedPath);
File.SetAttributes(sealedPath, File.GetAttributes(sealedPath) | FileAttributes.ReadOnly);
WritePointerAtomically(clusterDir, snapshot.GenerationId);
}
catch
{
try { if (File.Exists(tmpPath)) File.Delete(tmpPath); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
throw;
}
await Task.CompletedTask;
}
/// <summary>
/// Read the current sealed snapshot for <paramref name="clusterId"/>. Throws
/// <see cref="GenerationCacheUnavailableException"/> when the pointer is missing
/// (first-boot-no-snapshot case) or when the sealed file is corrupt. Never silently
/// falls back to a prior generation.
/// </summary>
public Task<GenerationSnapshot> ReadCurrentAsync(string clusterId, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(clusterId);
ct.ThrowIfCancellationRequested();
var clusterDir = Path.Combine(_cacheRoot, clusterId);
var pointerPath = Path.Combine(clusterDir, CurrentPointerFileName);
if (!File.Exists(pointerPath))
throw new GenerationCacheUnavailableException(
$"No sealed generation for cluster '{clusterId}' at '{clusterDir}'. First-boot case: the central DB must be reachable at least once before cache fallback is possible.");
long generationId;
try
{
var text = File.ReadAllText(pointerPath).Trim();
generationId = long.Parse(text, System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
throw new GenerationCacheUnavailableException(
$"CURRENT pointer at '{pointerPath}' is corrupt or unreadable.", ex);
}
var sealedPath = Path.Combine(clusterDir, $"{generationId}.db");
if (!File.Exists(sealedPath))
throw new GenerationCacheUnavailableException(
$"CURRENT points at generation {generationId} but '{sealedPath}' is missing — fails closed rather than serving an older generation.");
try
{
using var db = new LiteDatabase(new ConnectionString { Filename = sealedPath, ReadOnly = true });
var col = db.GetCollection<GenerationSnapshot>(CollectionName);
var snapshot = col.FindAll().FirstOrDefault()
?? throw new GenerationCacheUnavailableException(
$"Sealed file '{sealedPath}' contains no snapshot row — file is corrupt.");
return Task.FromResult(snapshot);
}
catch (GenerationCacheUnavailableException) { throw; }
catch (Exception ex) when (ex is LiteException or InvalidDataException or IOException
or NotSupportedException or FormatException)
{
throw new GenerationCacheUnavailableException(
$"Sealed file '{sealedPath}' is corrupt or unreadable — fails closed rather than falling back to an older generation.", ex);
}
}
/// <summary>Return the generation id the <c>CURRENT</c> pointer points at, or null if no pointer exists.</summary>
public long? TryGetCurrentGenerationId(string clusterId)
{
ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(clusterId);
var pointerPath = Path.Combine(_cacheRoot, clusterId, CurrentPointerFileName);
if (!File.Exists(pointerPath)) return null;
try
{
return long.Parse(File.ReadAllText(pointerPath).Trim(), System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
}
catch
{
return null;
}
}
private static void WritePointerAtomically(string clusterDir, long generationId)
{
var pointerPath = Path.Combine(clusterDir, CurrentPointerFileName);
var tmpPath = pointerPath + ".tmp";
File.WriteAllText(tmpPath, generationId.ToString(System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture));
if (File.Exists(pointerPath))
File.Replace(tmpPath, pointerPath, destinationBackupFileName: null);
else
File.Move(tmpPath, pointerPath);
}
}
/// <summary>Sealed cache is unreachable — caller must fail closed.</summary>
public sealed class GenerationCacheUnavailableException : Exception
{
public GenerationCacheUnavailableException(string message) : base(message) { }
public GenerationCacheUnavailableException(string message, Exception inner) : base(message, inner) { }
}

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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Polly;
using Polly.Retry;
using Polly.Timeout;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.LocalCache;
/// <summary>
/// Wraps a central-DB fetch function with Phase 6.1 Stream D.2 resilience:
/// <b>timeout 2 s → retry 3× jittered → fallback to sealed cache</b>. Maintains the
/// <see cref="StaleConfigFlag"/> — fresh on central-DB success, stale on cache fallback.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>Read-path only per plan. The write path (draft save, publish) bypasses this
/// wrapper entirely and fails hard on DB outage so inconsistent writes never land.</para>
///
/// <para>Fallback is triggered by <b>any exception</b> the fetch raises (central-DB
/// unreachable, SqlException, timeout). If the sealed cache also fails (no pointer,
/// corrupt file, etc.), <see cref="GenerationCacheUnavailableException"/> surfaces — caller
/// must fail the current request (InitializeAsync for a driver, etc.).</para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class ResilientConfigReader
{
private readonly GenerationSealedCache _cache;
private readonly StaleConfigFlag _staleFlag;
private readonly ResiliencePipeline _pipeline;
private readonly ILogger<ResilientConfigReader> _logger;
public ResilientConfigReader(
GenerationSealedCache cache,
StaleConfigFlag staleFlag,
ILogger<ResilientConfigReader> logger,
TimeSpan? timeout = null,
int retryCount = 3)
{
_cache = cache;
_staleFlag = staleFlag;
_logger = logger;
var builder = new ResiliencePipelineBuilder()
.AddTimeout(new TimeoutStrategyOptions { Timeout = timeout ?? TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2) });
if (retryCount > 0)
{
builder.AddRetry(new RetryStrategyOptions
{
MaxRetryAttempts = retryCount,
BackoffType = DelayBackoffType.Exponential,
UseJitter = true,
Delay = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(100),
MaxDelay = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1),
ShouldHandle = new PredicateBuilder().Handle<Exception>(ex => ex is not OperationCanceledException),
});
}
_pipeline = builder.Build();
}
/// <summary>
/// Execute <paramref name="centralFetch"/> through the resilience pipeline. On full failure
/// (post-retry), reads the sealed cache for <paramref name="clusterId"/> and passes the
/// snapshot to <paramref name="fromSnapshot"/> to extract the requested shape.
/// </summary>
public async ValueTask<T> ReadAsync<T>(
string clusterId,
Func<CancellationToken, ValueTask<T>> centralFetch,
Func<GenerationSnapshot, T> fromSnapshot,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(clusterId);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(centralFetch);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(fromSnapshot);
try
{
var result = await _pipeline.ExecuteAsync(centralFetch, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
_staleFlag.MarkFresh();
return result;
}
catch (Exception ex) when (ex is not OperationCanceledException)
{
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "Central-DB read failed after retries; falling back to sealed cache for cluster {ClusterId}", clusterId);
// GenerationCacheUnavailableException surfaces intentionally — fails the caller's
// operation. StaleConfigFlag stays unchanged; the flag only flips when we actually
// served a cache snapshot.
var snapshot = await _cache.ReadCurrentAsync(clusterId, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
_staleFlag.MarkStale();
return fromSnapshot(snapshot);
}
}
}

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namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.LocalCache;
/// <summary>
/// Thread-safe <c>UsingStaleConfig</c> signal per Phase 6.1 Stream D.3. Flips true whenever
/// a read falls back to a sealed cache snapshot; flips false on the next successful central-DB
/// round-trip. Surfaced on <c>/healthz</c> body and on the Admin <c>/hosts</c> page.
/// </summary>
public sealed class StaleConfigFlag
{
private int _stale;
/// <summary>True when the last config read was served from the sealed cache, not the central DB.</summary>
public bool IsStale => Volatile.Read(ref _stale) != 0;
/// <summary>Mark the current config as stale (a read fell back to the cache).</summary>
public void MarkStale() => Volatile.Write(ref _stale, 1);
/// <summary>Mark the current config as fresh (a central-DB read succeeded).</summary>
public void MarkFresh() => Volatile.Write(ref _stale, 0);
}

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using System;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Migrations;
#nullable disable
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Migrations
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public partial class AddDriverInstanceResilienceStatus : Migration
{
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override void Up(MigrationBuilder migrationBuilder)
{
migrationBuilder.CreateTable(
name: "DriverInstanceResilienceStatus",
columns: table => new
{
DriverInstanceId = table.Column<string>(type: "nvarchar(64)", maxLength: 64, nullable: false),
HostName = table.Column<string>(type: "nvarchar(256)", maxLength: 256, nullable: false),
LastCircuitBreakerOpenUtc = table.Column<DateTime>(type: "datetime2(3)", nullable: true),
ConsecutiveFailures = table.Column<int>(type: "int", nullable: false),
CurrentBulkheadDepth = table.Column<int>(type: "int", nullable: false),
LastRecycleUtc = table.Column<DateTime>(type: "datetime2(3)", nullable: true),
BaselineFootprintBytes = table.Column<long>(type: "bigint", nullable: false),
CurrentFootprintBytes = table.Column<long>(type: "bigint", nullable: false),
LastSampledUtc = table.Column<DateTime>(type: "datetime2(3)", nullable: false)
},
constraints: table =>
{
table.PrimaryKey("PK_DriverInstanceResilienceStatus", x => new { x.DriverInstanceId, x.HostName });
});
migrationBuilder.CreateIndex(
name: "IX_DriverResilience_LastSampled",
table: "DriverInstanceResilienceStatus",
column: "LastSampledUtc");
}
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override void Down(MigrationBuilder migrationBuilder)
{
migrationBuilder.DropTable(
name: "DriverInstanceResilienceStatus");
}
}
}

View File

@@ -434,6 +434,45 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Migrations
});
});
modelBuilder.Entity("ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Entities.DriverInstanceResilienceStatus", b =>
{
b.Property<string>("DriverInstanceId")
.HasMaxLength(64)
.HasColumnType("nvarchar(64)");
b.Property<string>("HostName")
.HasMaxLength(256)
.HasColumnType("nvarchar(256)");
b.Property<long>("BaselineFootprintBytes")
.HasColumnType("bigint");
b.Property<int>("ConsecutiveFailures")
.HasColumnType("int");
b.Property<int>("CurrentBulkheadDepth")
.HasColumnType("int");
b.Property<long>("CurrentFootprintBytes")
.HasColumnType("bigint");
b.Property<DateTime?>("LastCircuitBreakerOpenUtc")
.HasColumnType("datetime2(3)");
b.Property<DateTime?>("LastRecycleUtc")
.HasColumnType("datetime2(3)");
b.Property<DateTime>("LastSampledUtc")
.HasColumnType("datetime2(3)");
b.HasKey("DriverInstanceId", "HostName");
b.HasIndex("LastSampledUtc")
.HasDatabaseName("IX_DriverResilience_LastSampled");
b.ToTable("DriverInstanceResilienceStatus", (string)null);
});
modelBuilder.Entity("ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Entities.Equipment", b =>
{
b.Property<Guid>("EquipmentRowId")

View File

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaConfigDbContext(DbContextOptions<OtOpcUaConfigDbConte
public DbSet<ConfigAuditLog> ConfigAuditLogs => Set<ConfigAuditLog>();
public DbSet<ExternalIdReservation> ExternalIdReservations => Set<ExternalIdReservation>();
public DbSet<DriverHostStatus> DriverHostStatuses => Set<DriverHostStatus>();
public DbSet<DriverInstanceResilienceStatus> DriverInstanceResilienceStatuses => Set<DriverInstanceResilienceStatus>();
protected override void OnModelCreating(ModelBuilder modelBuilder)
{
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaConfigDbContext(DbContextOptions<OtOpcUaConfigDbConte
ConfigureConfigAuditLog(modelBuilder);
ConfigureExternalIdReservation(modelBuilder);
ConfigureDriverHostStatus(modelBuilder);
ConfigureDriverInstanceResilienceStatus(modelBuilder);
}
private static void ConfigureServerCluster(ModelBuilder modelBuilder)
@@ -512,4 +514,21 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaConfigDbContext(DbContextOptions<OtOpcUaConfigDbConte
e.HasIndex(x => x.LastSeenUtc).HasDatabaseName("IX_DriverHostStatus_LastSeen");
});
}
private static void ConfigureDriverInstanceResilienceStatus(ModelBuilder modelBuilder)
{
modelBuilder.Entity<DriverInstanceResilienceStatus>(e =>
{
e.ToTable("DriverInstanceResilienceStatus");
e.HasKey(x => new { x.DriverInstanceId, x.HostName });
e.Property(x => x.DriverInstanceId).HasMaxLength(64);
e.Property(x => x.HostName).HasMaxLength(256);
e.Property(x => x.LastCircuitBreakerOpenUtc).HasColumnType("datetime2(3)");
e.Property(x => x.LastRecycleUtc).HasColumnType("datetime2(3)");
e.Property(x => x.LastSampledUtc).HasColumnType("datetime2(3)");
// LastSampledUtc drives the Admin UI's stale-sample filter same way DriverHostStatus's
// LastSeenUtc index does for connectivity rows.
e.HasIndex(x => x.LastSampledUtc).HasDatabaseName("IX_DriverResilience_LastSampled");
});
}
}

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@
<IncludeAssets>runtime; build; native; contentfiles; analyzers; buildtransitive</IncludeAssets>
</PackageReference>
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions" Version="10.0.0"/>
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions" Version="10.0.0"/>
<PackageReference Include="LiteDB" Version="5.0.21"/>
<PackageReference Include="Polly.Core" Version="8.6.6"/>
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
/// OPC UA <c>AlarmConditionState</c> when true. Defaults to false so existing non-Galaxy
/// drivers aren't forced to flow a flag they don't produce.
/// </param>
/// <param name="WriteIdempotent">
/// True when a timed-out or failed write to this attribute is safe to replay. Per
/// <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decisions #44, #45, #143 — writes are NOT auto-retried by default
/// because replaying a pulse / alarm-ack / counter-increment / recipe-step advance can
/// duplicate field actions. Drivers flag only tags whose semantics make retry safe
/// (holding registers with level-set values, set-point writes to analog tags) — the
/// capability invoker respects this flag when deciding whether to apply Polly retry.
/// </param>
public sealed record DriverAttributeInfo(
string FullName,
DriverDataType DriverDataType,
@@ -32,4 +40,5 @@ public sealed record DriverAttributeInfo(
uint? ArrayDim,
SecurityClassification SecurityClass,
bool IsHistorized,
bool IsAlarm = false);
bool IsAlarm = false,
bool WriteIdempotent = false);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
/// <summary>
/// Enumerates the driver-capability surface points guarded by Phase 6.1 resilience pipelines.
/// Each value corresponds to one method (or tightly-related method group) on the
/// <c>Core.Abstractions</c> capability interfaces (<see cref="IReadable"/>, <see cref="IWritable"/>,
/// <see cref="ITagDiscovery"/>, <see cref="ISubscribable"/>, <see cref="IHostConnectivityProbe"/>,
/// <see cref="IAlarmSource"/>, <see cref="IHistoryProvider"/>).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decision #143 (per-capability retry policy): Read / HistoryRead /
/// Discover / Probe / AlarmSubscribe auto-retry; <see cref="Write"/> does NOT retry unless the
/// tag-definition carries <see cref="WriteIdempotentAttribute"/>. Alarm-acknowledge is treated
/// as a write for retry semantics (an alarm-ack is not idempotent at the plant-floor acknowledgement
/// level even if the OPC UA spec permits re-issue).
/// </remarks>
public enum DriverCapability
{
/// <summary>Batch <see cref="IReadable.ReadAsync"/>. Retries by default.</summary>
Read,
/// <summary>Batch <see cref="IWritable.WriteAsync"/>. Does not retry unless tag is <see cref="WriteIdempotentAttribute">idempotent</see>.</summary>
Write,
/// <summary><see cref="ITagDiscovery.DiscoverAsync"/>. Retries by default.</summary>
Discover,
/// <summary><see cref="ISubscribable.SubscribeAsync"/> and unsubscribe. Retries by default.</summary>
Subscribe,
/// <summary><see cref="IHostConnectivityProbe"/> probe loop. Retries by default.</summary>
Probe,
/// <summary><see cref="IAlarmSource.SubscribeAlarmsAsync"/>. Retries by default.</summary>
AlarmSubscribe,
/// <summary><see cref="IAlarmSource.AcknowledgeAsync"/>. Does NOT retry — ack is a write-shaped operation (decision #143).</summary>
AlarmAcknowledge,
/// <summary><see cref="IHistoryProvider"/> reads (Raw/Processed/AtTime/Events). Retries by default.</summary>
HistoryRead,
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
/// <summary>
/// Stability tier of a driver type. Determines which cross-cutting runtime protections
/// apply — per-tier retry defaults, memory-tracking thresholds, and whether out-of-process
/// supervision with process-level recycle is in play.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per <c>docs/v2/driver-stability.md</c> §2-4 and <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decisions #63-74.
///
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><b>A</b> — managed, known-good SDK; low blast radius. In-process. Fast retries.
/// Examples: OPC UA Client (OPCFoundation stack), S7 (S7NetPlus).</item>
/// <item><b>B</b> — native or semi-trusted SDK with an in-process footprint. Examples: Modbus.</item>
/// <item><b>C</b> — unmanaged SDK with COM/STA constraints, leak risk, or other out-of-process
/// requirements. Must run as a separate Host process behind a Proxy with a supervisor that
/// can recycle the process on hard-breach. Example: Galaxy (MXAccess COM).</item>
/// </list>
///
/// <para>Process-kill protections (<c>MemoryRecycle</c>, <c>ScheduledRecycleScheduler</c>) are
/// Tier C only per decisions #73-74 and #145 — killing an in-process Tier A/B driver also kills
/// every OPC UA session and every co-hosted driver, blast-radius worse than the leak.</para>
/// </remarks>
public enum DriverTier
{
/// <summary>Managed SDK, in-process, low blast radius.</summary>
A,
/// <summary>Native or semi-trusted SDK, in-process.</summary>
B,
/// <summary>Unmanaged SDK, out-of-process required with Proxy+Host+Supervisor.</summary>
C,
}

View File

@@ -69,12 +69,20 @@ public sealed class DriverTypeRegistry
/// <param name="DriverConfigJsonSchema">JSON Schema (Draft 2020-12) the driver's <c>DriverConfig</c> column must validate against.</param>
/// <param name="DeviceConfigJsonSchema">JSON Schema for <c>DeviceConfig</c> (multi-device drivers); null if the driver has no device layer.</param>
/// <param name="TagConfigJsonSchema">JSON Schema for <c>TagConfig</c>; required for every driver since every driver has tags.</param>
/// <param name="Tier">
/// Stability tier per <c>docs/v2/driver-stability.md</c> §2-4 and <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c>
/// decisions #63-74. Drives the shared resilience pipeline defaults
/// (<see cref="Tier"/> × capability → <c>CapabilityPolicy</c>), the <c>MemoryTracking</c>
/// hybrid-formula constants, and whether process-level <c>MemoryRecycle</c> / scheduled-
/// recycle protections apply (Tier C only). Every registered driver type must declare one.
/// </param>
public sealed record DriverTypeMetadata(
string TypeName,
NamespaceKindCompatibility AllowedNamespaceKinds,
string DriverConfigJsonSchema,
string? DeviceConfigJsonSchema,
string TagConfigJsonSchema);
string TagConfigJsonSchema,
DriverTier Tier);
/// <summary>Bitmask of namespace kinds a driver type may populate. Per decision #111.</summary>
[Flags]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
/// <summary>
/// Process-level supervisor contract a Tier C driver's out-of-process topology provides
/// (e.g. <c>Driver.Galaxy.Proxy/Supervisor/</c>). Concerns: restart the Host process when a
/// hard fault is detected (memory breach, wedge, scheduled recycle window).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decisions #68, #73-74, and #145. Tier A/B drivers do NOT have
/// a supervisor because they run in-process — recycling would kill every OPC UA session and
/// every co-hosted driver. The Core.Stability layer only invokes this interface for Tier C
/// instances after asserting the tier via <see cref="DriverTypeMetadata.Tier"/>.
/// </remarks>
public interface IDriverSupervisor
{
/// <summary>Driver instance this supervisor governs.</summary>
string DriverInstanceId { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Request the supervisor to recycle (terminate + restart) the Host process. Implementations
/// are expected to be idempotent under repeat calls during an in-flight recycle.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="reason">Human-readable reason — flows into the supervisor's logs.</param>
/// <param name="cancellationToken">Cancels the recycle request; an in-flight restart is not interrupted.</param>
Task RecycleAsync(string reason, CancellationToken cancellationToken);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
/// <summary>
/// Opts a tag-definition record into auto-retry on <see cref="IWritable.WriteAsync"/> failures.
/// Absence of this attribute means writes are <b>not</b> retried — a timed-out write may have
/// already succeeded at the device, and replaying pulses, alarm acks, counter increments, or
/// recipe-step advances can duplicate irreversible field actions.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decisions #44, #45, and #143. Applied to tag-definition POCOs
/// (e.g. <c>ModbusTagDefinition</c>, <c>S7TagDefinition</c>, OPC UA client tag rows) at the
/// property or record level. The <c>CapabilityInvoker</c> in <c>ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience</c>
/// reads this attribute via reflection once at driver-init time and caches the result; no
/// per-write reflection cost.
/// </remarks>
[AttributeUsage(AttributeTargets.Property | AttributeTargets.Class | AttributeTargets.Struct, AllowMultiple = false, Inherited = true)]
public sealed class WriteIdempotentAttribute : Attribute
{
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Observability;
/// <summary>
/// Domain-layer health aggregation for Phase 6.1 Stream C. Pure functions over the driver
/// fleet — given each driver's <see cref="DriverState"/>, produce a <see cref="ReadinessVerdict"/>
/// that maps to HTTP status codes at the endpoint layer.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// State matrix per <c>docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md</c>
/// §Stream C.1:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><see cref="DriverState.Unknown"/> / <see cref="DriverState.Initializing"/>
/// → /readyz 503 (not yet ready).</item>
/// <item><see cref="DriverState.Healthy"/> → /readyz 200.</item>
/// <item><see cref="DriverState.Degraded"/> → /readyz 200 with flagged driver IDs.</item>
/// <item><see cref="DriverState.Faulted"/> → /readyz 503.</item>
/// </list>
/// The overall verdict is computed across the fleet: any Faulted → Faulted; any
/// Unknown/Initializing → NotReady; any Degraded → Degraded; else Healthy. An empty fleet
/// is Healthy (nothing to degrade).
/// </remarks>
public static class DriverHealthReport
{
/// <summary>Compute the fleet-wide readiness verdict from per-driver states.</summary>
public static ReadinessVerdict Aggregate(IReadOnlyList<DriverHealthSnapshot> drivers)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(drivers);
if (drivers.Count == 0) return ReadinessVerdict.Healthy;
var anyFaulted = drivers.Any(d => d.State == DriverState.Faulted);
if (anyFaulted) return ReadinessVerdict.Faulted;
var anyInitializing = drivers.Any(d =>
d.State == DriverState.Unknown || d.State == DriverState.Initializing);
if (anyInitializing) return ReadinessVerdict.NotReady;
// Reconnecting = driver alive but not serving live data; report as Degraded so /readyz
// stays 200 (the fleet can still serve cached / last-good data) while operators see the
// affected driver in the body.
var anyDegraded = drivers.Any(d =>
d.State == DriverState.Degraded || d.State == DriverState.Reconnecting);
if (anyDegraded) return ReadinessVerdict.Degraded;
return ReadinessVerdict.Healthy;
}
/// <summary>
/// Map a <see cref="ReadinessVerdict"/> to the HTTP status the /readyz endpoint should
/// return per the Stream C.1 state matrix.
/// </summary>
public static int HttpStatus(ReadinessVerdict verdict) => verdict switch
{
ReadinessVerdict.Healthy => 200,
ReadinessVerdict.Degraded => 200,
ReadinessVerdict.NotReady => 503,
ReadinessVerdict.Faulted => 503,
_ => 500,
};
}
/// <summary>Per-driver snapshot fed into <see cref="DriverHealthReport.Aggregate"/>.</summary>
/// <param name="DriverInstanceId">Driver instance identifier (from <c>IDriver.DriverInstanceId</c>).</param>
/// <param name="State">Current <see cref="DriverState"/> from <c>IDriver.GetHealth</c>.</param>
/// <param name="DetailMessage">Optional driver-supplied detail (e.g. "primary PLC unreachable").</param>
public sealed record DriverHealthSnapshot(
string DriverInstanceId,
DriverState State,
string? DetailMessage = null);
/// <summary>Overall fleet readiness — derived from driver states by <see cref="DriverHealthReport.Aggregate"/>.</summary>
public enum ReadinessVerdict
{
/// <summary>All drivers Healthy (or fleet is empty).</summary>
Healthy,
/// <summary>At least one driver Degraded; none Faulted / NotReady.</summary>
Degraded,
/// <summary>At least one driver Unknown / Initializing; none Faulted.</summary>
NotReady,
/// <summary>At least one driver Faulted.</summary>
Faulted,
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
using Serilog.Context;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Observability;
/// <summary>
/// Convenience wrapper around Serilog <see cref="LogContext"/> — attaches the set of
/// structured properties a capability call should carry (DriverInstanceId, DriverType,
/// CapabilityName, CorrelationId). Callers wrap their call-site body in a <c>using</c>
/// block; inner <c>Log.Information</c> / <c>Log.Warning</c> calls emit the context
/// automatically via the Serilog enricher chain.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per <c>docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-and-observability.md</c> §Stream C.2.
/// The correlation ID should be the OPC UA <c>RequestHeader.RequestHandle</c> when in-flight;
/// otherwise a short random GUID. Callers supply whichever is available.
/// </remarks>
public static class LogContextEnricher
{
/// <summary>Attach the capability-call property set. Dispose the returned scope to pop.</summary>
public static IDisposable Push(string driverInstanceId, string driverType, DriverCapability capability, string correlationId)
{
ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(driverInstanceId);
ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(driverType);
ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(correlationId);
var a = LogContext.PushProperty("DriverInstanceId", driverInstanceId);
var b = LogContext.PushProperty("DriverType", driverType);
var c = LogContext.PushProperty("CapabilityName", capability.ToString());
var d = LogContext.PushProperty("CorrelationId", correlationId);
return new CompositeScope(a, b, c, d);
}
/// <summary>
/// Generate a short correlation ID when no OPC UA RequestHandle is available.
/// 12-hex-char slice of a GUID — long enough for log correlation, short enough to
/// scan visually.
/// </summary>
public static string NewCorrelationId() => Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N")[..12];
private sealed class CompositeScope : IDisposable
{
private readonly IDisposable[] _inner;
public CompositeScope(params IDisposable[] inner) => _inner = inner;
public void Dispose()
{
// Reverse-order disposal matches Serilog's stack semantics.
for (var i = _inner.Length - 1; i >= 0; i--)
_inner[i].Dispose();
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
using Polly;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Observability;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
/// <summary>
/// Executes driver-capability calls through a shared Polly pipeline. One invoker per
/// <c>(DriverInstance, IDriver)</c> pair; the underlying <see cref="DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder"/>
/// is process-singleton so all invokers share its cache.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decisions #143-144 and Phase 6.1 Stream A.3. The server's dispatch
/// layer routes every capability call (<c>IReadable.ReadAsync</c>, <c>IWritable.WriteAsync</c>,
/// <c>ITagDiscovery.DiscoverAsync</c>, <c>ISubscribable.SubscribeAsync/UnsubscribeAsync</c>,
/// <c>IHostConnectivityProbe</c> probe loop, <c>IAlarmSource.SubscribeAlarmsAsync/AcknowledgeAsync</c>,
/// and all four <c>IHistoryProvider</c> reads) through this invoker.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class CapabilityInvoker
{
private readonly DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder _builder;
private readonly string _driverInstanceId;
private readonly string _driverType;
private readonly Func<DriverResilienceOptions> _optionsAccessor;
/// <summary>
/// Construct an invoker for one driver instance.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="builder">Shared, process-singleton pipeline builder.</param>
/// <param name="driverInstanceId">The <c>DriverInstance.Id</c> column value.</param>
/// <param name="optionsAccessor">
/// Snapshot accessor for the current resilience options. Invoked per call so Admin-edit +
/// pipeline-invalidate can take effect without restarting the invoker.
/// </param>
/// <param name="driverType">Driver type name for structured-log enrichment (e.g. <c>"Modbus"</c>).</param>
public CapabilityInvoker(
DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder builder,
string driverInstanceId,
Func<DriverResilienceOptions> optionsAccessor,
string driverType = "Unknown")
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(builder);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(optionsAccessor);
_builder = builder;
_driverInstanceId = driverInstanceId;
_driverType = driverType;
_optionsAccessor = optionsAccessor;
}
/// <summary>Execute a capability call returning a value, honoring the per-capability pipeline.</summary>
/// <typeparam name="TResult">Return type of the underlying driver call.</typeparam>
public async ValueTask<TResult> ExecuteAsync<TResult>(
DriverCapability capability,
string hostName,
Func<CancellationToken, ValueTask<TResult>> callSite,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(callSite);
var pipeline = ResolvePipeline(capability, hostName);
using (LogContextEnricher.Push(_driverInstanceId, _driverType, capability, LogContextEnricher.NewCorrelationId()))
{
return await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(callSite, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
}
/// <summary>Execute a void-returning capability call, honoring the per-capability pipeline.</summary>
public async ValueTask ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability capability,
string hostName,
Func<CancellationToken, ValueTask> callSite,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(callSite);
var pipeline = ResolvePipeline(capability, hostName);
using (LogContextEnricher.Push(_driverInstanceId, _driverType, capability, LogContextEnricher.NewCorrelationId()))
{
await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(callSite, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Execute a <see cref="DriverCapability.Write"/> call honoring <see cref="WriteIdempotentAttribute"/>
/// semantics — if <paramref name="isIdempotent"/> is <c>false</c>, retries are disabled regardless
/// of the tag-level configuration (the pipeline for a non-idempotent write never retries per
/// decisions #44-45). If <c>true</c>, the call runs through the capability's pipeline which may
/// retry when the tier configuration permits.
/// </summary>
public async ValueTask<TResult> ExecuteWriteAsync<TResult>(
string hostName,
bool isIdempotent,
Func<CancellationToken, ValueTask<TResult>> callSite,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(callSite);
if (!isIdempotent)
{
var noRetryOptions = _optionsAccessor() with
{
CapabilityPolicies = new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Write] = _optionsAccessor().Resolve(DriverCapability.Write) with { RetryCount = 0 },
},
};
var pipeline = _builder.GetOrCreate(_driverInstanceId, $"{hostName}::non-idempotent", DriverCapability.Write, noRetryOptions);
using (LogContextEnricher.Push(_driverInstanceId, _driverType, DriverCapability.Write, LogContextEnricher.NewCorrelationId()))
{
return await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(callSite, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
}
return await ExecuteAsync(DriverCapability.Write, hostName, callSite, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
private ResiliencePipeline ResolvePipeline(DriverCapability capability, string hostName) =>
_builder.GetOrCreate(_driverInstanceId, hostName, capability, _optionsAccessor());
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
/// <summary>
/// Per-tier × per-capability resilience policy configuration for a driver instance.
/// Bound from <c>DriverInstance.ResilienceConfig</c> JSON (nullable column; null = tier defaults).
/// Per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decisions #143 and #144.
/// </summary>
public sealed record DriverResilienceOptions
{
/// <summary>Tier the owning driver type is registered as; drives the default map.</summary>
public required DriverTier Tier { get; init; }
/// <summary>
/// Per-capability policy overrides. Capabilities absent from this map fall back to
/// <see cref="GetTierDefaults(DriverTier)"/> for the configured <see cref="Tier"/>.
/// </summary>
public IReadOnlyDictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy> CapabilityPolicies { get; init; }
= new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>();
/// <summary>Bulkhead (max concurrent in-flight calls) for every capability. Default 32.</summary>
public int BulkheadMaxConcurrent { get; init; } = 32;
/// <summary>
/// Bulkhead queue depth. Zero = no queueing; overflow fails fast with
/// <c>BulkheadRejectedException</c>. Default 64.
/// </summary>
public int BulkheadMaxQueue { get; init; } = 64;
/// <summary>
/// Look up the effective policy for a capability, falling back to tier defaults when no
/// override is configured. Never returns null.
/// </summary>
public CapabilityPolicy Resolve(DriverCapability capability)
{
if (CapabilityPolicies.TryGetValue(capability, out var policy))
return policy;
var defaults = GetTierDefaults(Tier);
return defaults[capability];
}
/// <summary>
/// Per-tier per-capability default policy table, per decisions #143-144 and the Phase 6.1
/// Stream A.2 specification. Retries skipped on <see cref="DriverCapability.Write"/> and
/// <see cref="DriverCapability.AlarmAcknowledge"/> regardless of tier.
/// </summary>
public static IReadOnlyDictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy> GetTierDefaults(DriverTier tier) =>
tier switch
{
DriverTier.A => new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Read] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 2, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.Write] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 2, RetryCount: 0, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.Discover] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 30, RetryCount: 2, BreakerFailureThreshold: 3),
[DriverCapability.Subscribe] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 5, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.Probe] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 2, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.AlarmSubscribe] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 5, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.AlarmAcknowledge] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 5, RetryCount: 0, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.HistoryRead] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 30, RetryCount: 2, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
},
DriverTier.B => new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Read] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 4, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.Write] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 4, RetryCount: 0, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.Discover] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 60, RetryCount: 2, BreakerFailureThreshold: 3),
[DriverCapability.Subscribe] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 8, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.Probe] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 4, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.AlarmSubscribe] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 8, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.AlarmAcknowledge] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 8, RetryCount: 0, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
[DriverCapability.HistoryRead] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 60, RetryCount: 2, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
},
DriverTier.C => new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Read] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 10, RetryCount: 1, BreakerFailureThreshold: 0),
[DriverCapability.Write] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 10, RetryCount: 0, BreakerFailureThreshold: 0),
[DriverCapability.Discover] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 120, RetryCount: 1, BreakerFailureThreshold: 0),
[DriverCapability.Subscribe] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 15, RetryCount: 1, BreakerFailureThreshold: 0),
[DriverCapability.Probe] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 10, RetryCount: 1, BreakerFailureThreshold: 0),
[DriverCapability.AlarmSubscribe] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 15, RetryCount: 1, BreakerFailureThreshold: 0),
[DriverCapability.AlarmAcknowledge] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 15, RetryCount: 0, BreakerFailureThreshold: 0),
[DriverCapability.HistoryRead] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 120, RetryCount: 1, BreakerFailureThreshold: 0),
},
_ => throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(nameof(tier), tier, $"No default policy table defined for tier {tier}."),
};
}
/// <summary>Policy for one capability on one driver instance.</summary>
/// <param name="TimeoutSeconds">Per-call timeout (wraps the inner Polly execution).</param>
/// <param name="RetryCount">Number of retry attempts after the first failure; zero = no retry.</param>
/// <param name="BreakerFailureThreshold">
/// Consecutive-failure count that opens the circuit breaker; zero = no breaker
/// (Tier C uses the supervisor's process-level breaker instead, per decision #68).
/// </param>
public sealed record CapabilityPolicy(int TimeoutSeconds, int RetryCount, int BreakerFailureThreshold);

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using System.Collections.Concurrent;
using Polly;
using Polly.CircuitBreaker;
using Polly.Retry;
using Polly.Timeout;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
/// <summary>
/// Builds and caches Polly resilience pipelines keyed on
/// <c>(DriverInstanceId, HostName, DriverCapability)</c>. One dead PLC behind a multi-device
/// driver cannot open the circuit breaker for healthy sibling hosts.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decision #144 (per-device isolation). Composition from outside-in:
/// <b>Timeout → Retry (when capability permits) → Circuit Breaker (when tier permits) → Bulkhead</b>.
///
/// <para>Pipeline resolution is lock-free on the hot path: the inner
/// <see cref="ConcurrentDictionary{TKey,TValue}"/> caches a <see cref="ResiliencePipeline"/> per key;
/// first-call cost is one <see cref="ResiliencePipelineBuilder"/>.Build. Thereafter reads are O(1).</para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder
{
private readonly ConcurrentDictionary<PipelineKey, ResiliencePipeline> _pipelines = new();
private readonly TimeProvider _timeProvider;
/// <summary>Construct with the ambient clock (use <see cref="TimeProvider.System"/> in prod).</summary>
public DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(TimeProvider? timeProvider = null)
{
_timeProvider = timeProvider ?? TimeProvider.System;
}
/// <summary>
/// Get or build the pipeline for a given <c>(driver instance, host, capability)</c> triple.
/// Calls with the same key + same options reuse the same pipeline instance; the first caller
/// wins if a race occurs (both pipelines would be behaviourally identical).
/// </summary>
/// <param name="driverInstanceId">DriverInstance primary key — opaque to this layer.</param>
/// <param name="hostName">
/// Host the call targets. For single-host drivers (Galaxy, some OPC UA Client configs) pass the
/// driver's canonical host string. For multi-host drivers (Modbus with N PLCs), pass the
/// specific PLC so one dead PLC doesn't poison healthy siblings.
/// </param>
/// <param name="capability">Which capability surface is being called.</param>
/// <param name="options">Per-driver-instance options (tier + per-capability overrides).</param>
public ResiliencePipeline GetOrCreate(
string driverInstanceId,
string hostName,
DriverCapability capability,
DriverResilienceOptions options)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(options);
ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(hostName);
var key = new PipelineKey(driverInstanceId, hostName, capability);
return _pipelines.GetOrAdd(key, static (_, state) => Build(state.capability, state.options, state.timeProvider),
(capability, options, timeProvider: _timeProvider));
}
/// <summary>Drop cached pipelines for one driver instance (e.g. on ResilienceConfig change). Test + Admin-reload use.</summary>
public int Invalidate(string driverInstanceId)
{
var removed = 0;
foreach (var key in _pipelines.Keys)
{
if (key.DriverInstanceId == driverInstanceId && _pipelines.TryRemove(key, out _))
removed++;
}
return removed;
}
/// <summary>Snapshot of the current number of cached pipelines. For diagnostics only.</summary>
public int CachedPipelineCount => _pipelines.Count;
private static ResiliencePipeline Build(
DriverCapability capability,
DriverResilienceOptions options,
TimeProvider timeProvider)
{
var policy = options.Resolve(capability);
var builder = new ResiliencePipelineBuilder { TimeProvider = timeProvider };
builder.AddTimeout(new TimeoutStrategyOptions
{
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(policy.TimeoutSeconds),
});
if (policy.RetryCount > 0)
{
builder.AddRetry(new RetryStrategyOptions
{
MaxRetryAttempts = policy.RetryCount,
BackoffType = DelayBackoffType.Exponential,
UseJitter = true,
Delay = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(100),
MaxDelay = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
ShouldHandle = new PredicateBuilder().Handle<Exception>(ex => ex is not OperationCanceledException),
});
}
if (policy.BreakerFailureThreshold > 0)
{
builder.AddCircuitBreaker(new CircuitBreakerStrategyOptions
{
FailureRatio = 1.0,
MinimumThroughput = policy.BreakerFailureThreshold,
SamplingDuration = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30),
BreakDuration = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(15),
ShouldHandle = new PredicateBuilder().Handle<Exception>(ex => ex is not OperationCanceledException),
});
}
return builder.Build();
}
private readonly record struct PipelineKey(string DriverInstanceId, string HostName, DriverCapability Capability);
}

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using System.Collections.Concurrent;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
/// <summary>
/// Process-singleton tracker of live resilience counters per
/// <c>(DriverInstanceId, HostName)</c>. Populated by the CapabilityInvoker and the
/// MemoryTracking layer; consumed by a HostedService that periodically persists a
/// snapshot to the <c>DriverInstanceResilienceStatus</c> table for Admin <c>/hosts</c>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per Phase 6.1 Stream E. No DB dependency here — the tracker is pure in-memory so
/// tests can exercise it without EF Core or SQL Server. The HostedService that writes
/// snapshots lives in the Server project (Stream E.2); the actual SignalR push + Blazor
/// page refresh (E.3) lands in a follow-up visual-review PR.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class DriverResilienceStatusTracker
{
private readonly ConcurrentDictionary<StatusKey, ResilienceStatusSnapshot> _status = new();
/// <summary>Record a Polly pipeline failure for <paramref name="hostName"/>.</summary>
public void RecordFailure(string driverInstanceId, string hostName, DateTime utcNow)
{
var key = new StatusKey(driverInstanceId, hostName);
_status.AddOrUpdate(key,
_ => new ResilienceStatusSnapshot { ConsecutiveFailures = 1, LastSampledUtc = utcNow },
(_, existing) => existing with
{
ConsecutiveFailures = existing.ConsecutiveFailures + 1,
LastSampledUtc = utcNow,
});
}
/// <summary>Reset the consecutive-failure count on a successful pipeline execution.</summary>
public void RecordSuccess(string driverInstanceId, string hostName, DateTime utcNow)
{
var key = new StatusKey(driverInstanceId, hostName);
_status.AddOrUpdate(key,
_ => new ResilienceStatusSnapshot { ConsecutiveFailures = 0, LastSampledUtc = utcNow },
(_, existing) => existing with
{
ConsecutiveFailures = 0,
LastSampledUtc = utcNow,
});
}
/// <summary>Record a circuit-breaker open event.</summary>
public void RecordBreakerOpen(string driverInstanceId, string hostName, DateTime utcNow)
{
var key = new StatusKey(driverInstanceId, hostName);
_status.AddOrUpdate(key,
_ => new ResilienceStatusSnapshot { LastBreakerOpenUtc = utcNow, LastSampledUtc = utcNow },
(_, existing) => existing with { LastBreakerOpenUtc = utcNow, LastSampledUtc = utcNow });
}
/// <summary>Record a process recycle event (Tier C only).</summary>
public void RecordRecycle(string driverInstanceId, string hostName, DateTime utcNow)
{
var key = new StatusKey(driverInstanceId, hostName);
_status.AddOrUpdate(key,
_ => new ResilienceStatusSnapshot { LastRecycleUtc = utcNow, LastSampledUtc = utcNow },
(_, existing) => existing with { LastRecycleUtc = utcNow, LastSampledUtc = utcNow });
}
/// <summary>Capture / update the MemoryTracking-supplied baseline + current footprint.</summary>
public void RecordFootprint(string driverInstanceId, string hostName, long baselineBytes, long currentBytes, DateTime utcNow)
{
var key = new StatusKey(driverInstanceId, hostName);
_status.AddOrUpdate(key,
_ => new ResilienceStatusSnapshot
{
BaselineFootprintBytes = baselineBytes,
CurrentFootprintBytes = currentBytes,
LastSampledUtc = utcNow,
},
(_, existing) => existing with
{
BaselineFootprintBytes = baselineBytes,
CurrentFootprintBytes = currentBytes,
LastSampledUtc = utcNow,
});
}
/// <summary>Snapshot of a specific (instance, host) pair; null if no counters recorded yet.</summary>
public ResilienceStatusSnapshot? TryGet(string driverInstanceId, string hostName) =>
_status.TryGetValue(new StatusKey(driverInstanceId, hostName), out var snapshot) ? snapshot : null;
/// <summary>Copy of every currently-tracked (instance, host, snapshot) triple. Safe under concurrent writes.</summary>
public IReadOnlyList<(string DriverInstanceId, string HostName, ResilienceStatusSnapshot Snapshot)> Snapshot() =>
_status.Select(kvp => (kvp.Key.DriverInstanceId, kvp.Key.HostName, kvp.Value)).ToList();
private readonly record struct StatusKey(string DriverInstanceId, string HostName);
}
/// <summary>Snapshot of the resilience counters for one <c>(DriverInstanceId, HostName)</c> pair.</summary>
public sealed record ResilienceStatusSnapshot
{
public int ConsecutiveFailures { get; init; }
public DateTime? LastBreakerOpenUtc { get; init; }
public DateTime? LastRecycleUtc { get; init; }
public long BaselineFootprintBytes { get; init; }
public long CurrentFootprintBytes { get; init; }
public DateTime LastSampledUtc { get; init; }
}

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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Stability;
/// <summary>
/// Tier C only process-recycle companion to <see cref="MemoryTracking"/>. On a
/// <see cref="MemoryTrackingAction.HardBreach"/> signal, invokes the supplied
/// <see cref="IDriverSupervisor"/> to restart the out-of-process Host.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decisions #74 and #145. Tier A/B hard-breach on an in-process
/// driver would kill every OPC UA session and every co-hosted driver, so for Tier A/B this
/// class logs a <b>promotion-to-Tier-C recommendation</b> and does NOT invoke any supervisor.
/// A future tier-migration workflow acts on the recommendation.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class MemoryRecycle
{
private readonly DriverTier _tier;
private readonly IDriverSupervisor? _supervisor;
private readonly ILogger<MemoryRecycle> _logger;
public MemoryRecycle(DriverTier tier, IDriverSupervisor? supervisor, ILogger<MemoryRecycle> logger)
{
_tier = tier;
_supervisor = supervisor;
_logger = logger;
}
/// <summary>
/// Handle a <see cref="MemoryTracking"/> classification for the driver. For Tier C with a
/// wired supervisor, <c>HardBreach</c> triggers <see cref="IDriverSupervisor.RecycleAsync"/>.
/// All other combinations are no-ops with respect to process state (soft breaches + Tier A/B
/// hard breaches just log).
/// </summary>
/// <returns>True when a recycle was requested; false otherwise.</returns>
public async Task<bool> HandleAsync(MemoryTrackingAction action, long footprintBytes, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
switch (action)
{
case MemoryTrackingAction.SoftBreach:
_logger.LogWarning(
"Memory soft-breach on driver {DriverId}: footprint={Footprint:N0} bytes, tier={Tier}. Surfaced to Admin; no action.",
_supervisor?.DriverInstanceId ?? "(unknown)", footprintBytes, _tier);
return false;
case MemoryTrackingAction.HardBreach when _tier == DriverTier.C && _supervisor is not null:
_logger.LogError(
"Memory hard-breach on Tier C driver {DriverId}: footprint={Footprint:N0} bytes. Requesting supervisor recycle.",
_supervisor.DriverInstanceId, footprintBytes);
await _supervisor.RecycleAsync($"Memory hard-breach: {footprintBytes} bytes", cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return true;
case MemoryTrackingAction.HardBreach:
_logger.LogError(
"Memory hard-breach on Tier {Tier} in-process driver {DriverId}: footprint={Footprint:N0} bytes. " +
"Recommending promotion to Tier C; NOT auto-killing (decisions #74, #145).",
_tier, _supervisor?.DriverInstanceId ?? "(unknown)", footprintBytes);
return false;
default:
return false;
}
}
}

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using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Stability;
/// <summary>
/// Tier-agnostic memory-footprint tracker. Captures the post-initialize <b>baseline</b>
/// from the first samples after <c>IDriver.InitializeAsync</c>, then classifies each
/// subsequent sample against a hybrid soft/hard threshold per
/// <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decision #146 — <c>soft = max(multiplier × baseline, baseline + floor)</c>,
/// <c>hard = 2 × soft</c>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>Per decision #145, this tracker <b>never kills a process</b>. Soft and hard breaches
/// log + surface to the Admin UI via <c>DriverInstanceResilienceStatus</c>. The matching
/// process-level recycle protection lives in a separate <c>MemoryRecycle</c> that activates
/// for Tier C drivers only (where the driver runs out-of-process behind a supervisor that
/// can safely restart it without tearing down the OPC UA session or co-hosted in-proc
/// drivers).</para>
///
/// <para>Baseline capture: the tracker starts in <see cref="TrackingPhase.WarmingUp"/> for
/// <see cref="BaselineWindow"/> (default 5 min). During that window samples are collected;
/// the baseline is computed as the median once the window elapses. Before that point every
/// classification returns <see cref="MemoryTrackingAction.Warming"/>.</para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class MemoryTracking
{
private readonly DriverTier _tier;
private readonly TimeSpan _baselineWindow;
private readonly List<long> _warmupSamples = [];
private long _baselineBytes;
private TrackingPhase _phase = TrackingPhase.WarmingUp;
private DateTime? _warmupStartUtc;
/// <summary>Tier-default multiplier/floor constants per decision #146.</summary>
public static (int Multiplier, long FloorBytes) GetTierConstants(DriverTier tier) => tier switch
{
DriverTier.A => (Multiplier: 3, FloorBytes: 50L * 1024 * 1024),
DriverTier.B => (Multiplier: 3, FloorBytes: 100L * 1024 * 1024),
DriverTier.C => (Multiplier: 2, FloorBytes: 500L * 1024 * 1024),
_ => throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(nameof(tier), tier, $"No memory-tracking constants defined for tier {tier}."),
};
/// <summary>Window over which post-init samples are collected to compute the baseline.</summary>
public TimeSpan BaselineWindow => _baselineWindow;
/// <summary>Current phase: <see cref="TrackingPhase.WarmingUp"/> or <see cref="TrackingPhase.Steady"/>.</summary>
public TrackingPhase Phase => _phase;
/// <summary>Captured baseline; 0 until warmup completes.</summary>
public long BaselineBytes => _baselineBytes;
/// <summary>Effective soft threshold (zero while warming up).</summary>
public long SoftThresholdBytes => _baselineBytes == 0 ? 0 : ComputeSoft(_tier, _baselineBytes);
/// <summary>Effective hard threshold = 2 × soft (zero while warming up).</summary>
public long HardThresholdBytes => _baselineBytes == 0 ? 0 : ComputeSoft(_tier, _baselineBytes) * 2;
public MemoryTracking(DriverTier tier, TimeSpan? baselineWindow = null)
{
_tier = tier;
_baselineWindow = baselineWindow ?? TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
}
/// <summary>
/// Submit a memory-footprint sample. Returns the action the caller should surface.
/// During warmup, always returns <see cref="MemoryTrackingAction.Warming"/> and accumulates
/// samples; once the window elapses the first steady-phase sample triggers baseline capture
/// (median of warmup samples).
/// </summary>
public MemoryTrackingAction Sample(long footprintBytes, DateTime utcNow)
{
if (_phase == TrackingPhase.WarmingUp)
{
_warmupStartUtc ??= utcNow;
_warmupSamples.Add(footprintBytes);
if (utcNow - _warmupStartUtc.Value >= _baselineWindow && _warmupSamples.Count > 0)
{
_baselineBytes = ComputeMedian(_warmupSamples);
_phase = TrackingPhase.Steady;
}
else
{
return MemoryTrackingAction.Warming;
}
}
if (footprintBytes >= HardThresholdBytes) return MemoryTrackingAction.HardBreach;
if (footprintBytes >= SoftThresholdBytes) return MemoryTrackingAction.SoftBreach;
return MemoryTrackingAction.None;
}
private static long ComputeSoft(DriverTier tier, long baseline)
{
var (multiplier, floor) = GetTierConstants(tier);
return Math.Max(multiplier * baseline, baseline + floor);
}
private static long ComputeMedian(List<long> samples)
{
var sorted = samples.Order().ToArray();
var mid = sorted.Length / 2;
return sorted.Length % 2 == 1
? sorted[mid]
: (sorted[mid - 1] + sorted[mid]) / 2;
}
}
/// <summary>Phase of a <see cref="MemoryTracking"/> lifecycle.</summary>
public enum TrackingPhase
{
/// <summary>Collecting post-init samples; baseline not yet computed.</summary>
WarmingUp,
/// <summary>Baseline captured; every sample classified against soft/hard thresholds.</summary>
Steady,
}
/// <summary>Classification the tracker returns per sample.</summary>
public enum MemoryTrackingAction
{
/// <summary>Baseline not yet captured; sample collected, no threshold check.</summary>
Warming,
/// <summary>Below soft threshold.</summary>
None,
/// <summary>Between soft and hard thresholds — log + surface, no action.</summary>
SoftBreach,
/// <summary>
/// ≥ hard threshold. Log + surface + (Tier C only, via <c>MemoryRecycle</c>) request
/// process recycle via the driver supervisor. Tier A/B breach never invokes any
/// kill path per decisions #145 and #74.
/// </summary>
HardBreach,
}

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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Stability;
/// <summary>
/// Tier C opt-in periodic-recycle driver per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decision #67.
/// A tick method advanced by the caller (fed by a background timer in prod; by test clock
/// in unit tests) decides whether the configured interval has elapsed and, if so, drives the
/// supplied <see cref="IDriverSupervisor"/> to recycle the Host.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Tier A/B drivers MUST NOT use this class — scheduled recycle for in-process drivers would
/// kill every OPC UA session and every co-hosted driver. The ctor throws when constructed
/// with any tier other than C to make the misuse structurally impossible.
///
/// <para>Keeps no background thread of its own — callers invoke <see cref="TickAsync"/> on
/// their ambient scheduler tick (Phase 6.1 Stream C's health-endpoint host runs one). That
/// decouples the unit under test from wall-clock time and thread-pool scheduling.</para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class ScheduledRecycleScheduler
{
private readonly TimeSpan _recycleInterval;
private readonly IDriverSupervisor _supervisor;
private readonly ILogger<ScheduledRecycleScheduler> _logger;
private DateTime _nextRecycleUtc;
/// <summary>
/// Construct the scheduler for a Tier C driver. Throws if <paramref name="tier"/> isn't C.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="tier">Driver tier; must be <see cref="DriverTier.C"/>.</param>
/// <param name="recycleInterval">Interval between recycles (e.g. 7 days).</param>
/// <param name="startUtc">Anchor time; next recycle fires at <paramref name="startUtc"/> + <paramref name="recycleInterval"/>.</param>
/// <param name="supervisor">Supervisor that performs the actual recycle.</param>
/// <param name="logger">Diagnostic sink.</param>
public ScheduledRecycleScheduler(
DriverTier tier,
TimeSpan recycleInterval,
DateTime startUtc,
IDriverSupervisor supervisor,
ILogger<ScheduledRecycleScheduler> logger)
{
if (tier != DriverTier.C)
throw new ArgumentException(
$"ScheduledRecycleScheduler is Tier C only (got {tier}). " +
"In-process drivers must not use scheduled recycle; see decisions #74 and #145.",
nameof(tier));
if (recycleInterval <= TimeSpan.Zero)
throw new ArgumentException("RecycleInterval must be positive.", nameof(recycleInterval));
_recycleInterval = recycleInterval;
_supervisor = supervisor;
_logger = logger;
_nextRecycleUtc = startUtc + recycleInterval;
}
/// <summary>Next scheduled recycle UTC. Advances by <see cref="RecycleInterval"/> on each fire.</summary>
public DateTime NextRecycleUtc => _nextRecycleUtc;
/// <summary>Recycle interval this scheduler was constructed with.</summary>
public TimeSpan RecycleInterval => _recycleInterval;
/// <summary>
/// Tick the scheduler forward. If <paramref name="utcNow"/> is past
/// <see cref="NextRecycleUtc"/>, requests a recycle from the supervisor and advances
/// <see cref="NextRecycleUtc"/> by exactly one interval. Returns true when a recycle fired.
/// </summary>
public async Task<bool> TickAsync(DateTime utcNow, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (utcNow < _nextRecycleUtc)
return false;
_logger.LogInformation(
"Scheduled recycle due for Tier C driver {DriverId} at {Now:o}; advancing next to {Next:o}.",
_supervisor.DriverInstanceId, utcNow, _nextRecycleUtc + _recycleInterval);
await _supervisor.RecycleAsync("Scheduled periodic recycle", cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
_nextRecycleUtc += _recycleInterval;
return true;
}
/// <summary>Request an immediate recycle outside the schedule (e.g. MemoryRecycle hard-breach escalation).</summary>
public Task RequestRecycleNowAsync(string reason, CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
_supervisor.RecycleAsync(reason, cancellationToken);
}

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using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Stability;
/// <summary>
/// Demand-aware driver-wedge detector per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decision #147.
/// Flips a driver to <see cref="WedgeVerdict.Faulted"/> only when BOTH of the following hold:
/// (a) there is pending work outstanding, AND (b) no progress has been observed for longer
/// than <see cref="Threshold"/>. Idle drivers, write-only burst drivers, and subscription-only
/// drivers whose signals don't arrive regularly all stay Healthy.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>Pending work signal is supplied by the caller via <see cref="DemandSignal"/>:
/// non-zero Polly bulkhead depth, ≥1 active MonitoredItem, or ≥1 queued historian read
/// each qualifies. The detector itself is state-light: all it remembers is the last
/// <c>LastProgressUtc</c> it saw and the last wedge verdict. No history buffer.</para>
///
/// <para>Default threshold per plan: <c>5 × PublishingInterval</c>, with a minimum of 60 s.
/// Concrete values are driver-agnostic and configured per-instance by the caller.</para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class WedgeDetector
{
/// <summary>Wedge-detection threshold; pass &lt; 60 s and the detector clamps to 60 s.</summary>
public TimeSpan Threshold { get; }
/// <summary>Whether the driver reported itself <see cref="DriverState.Healthy"/> at construction.</summary>
public WedgeDetector(TimeSpan threshold)
{
Threshold = threshold < TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60) ? TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60) : threshold;
}
/// <summary>
/// Classify the current state against the demand signal. Does not retain state across
/// calls — each call is self-contained; the caller owns the <c>LastProgressUtc</c> clock.
/// </summary>
public WedgeVerdict Classify(DriverState state, DemandSignal demand, DateTime utcNow)
{
if (state != DriverState.Healthy)
return WedgeVerdict.NotApplicable;
if (!demand.HasPendingWork)
return WedgeVerdict.Idle;
var sinceProgress = utcNow - demand.LastProgressUtc;
return sinceProgress > Threshold ? WedgeVerdict.Faulted : WedgeVerdict.Healthy;
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Caller-supplied demand snapshot. All three counters are OR'd — any non-zero means work
/// is outstanding, which is the trigger for checking the <see cref="LastProgressUtc"/> clock.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="BulkheadDepth">Polly bulkhead depth (in-flight capability calls).</param>
/// <param name="ActiveMonitoredItems">Number of live OPC UA MonitoredItems bound to this driver.</param>
/// <param name="QueuedHistoryReads">Pending historian-read requests the driver owes the server.</param>
/// <param name="LastProgressUtc">Last time the driver reported a successful unit of work (read, subscribe-ack, publish).</param>
public readonly record struct DemandSignal(
int BulkheadDepth,
int ActiveMonitoredItems,
int QueuedHistoryReads,
DateTime LastProgressUtc)
{
/// <summary>True when any of the three counters is &gt; 0.</summary>
public bool HasPendingWork => BulkheadDepth > 0 || ActiveMonitoredItems > 0 || QueuedHistoryReads > 0;
}
/// <summary>Outcome of a single <see cref="WedgeDetector.Classify"/> call.</summary>
public enum WedgeVerdict
{
/// <summary>Driver wasn't Healthy to begin with — wedge detection doesn't apply.</summary>
NotApplicable,
/// <summary>Driver claims Healthy + no pending work → stays Healthy.</summary>
Idle,
/// <summary>Driver claims Healthy + has pending work + has made progress within the threshold → stays Healthy.</summary>
Healthy,
/// <summary>Driver claims Healthy + has pending work + has NOT made progress within the threshold → wedged.</summary>
Faulted,
}

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@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@
<ProjectReference Include="..\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.csproj"/>
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<PackageReference Include="Polly.Core" Version="8.6.6"/>
<PackageReference Include="Serilog" Version="4.3.0"/>
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<InternalsVisibleTo Include="ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests"/>
</ItemGroup>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus;
/// <summary>
/// AutomationDirect DirectLOGIC address-translation helpers. DL205 / DL260 / DL350 CPUs
/// address V-memory in OCTAL while the Modbus wire uses DECIMAL PDU addresses — operators
/// see "V2000" in the PLC ladder-logic editor but the Modbus client must write PDU 0x0400.
/// The formulas differ between user V-memory (simple octal-to-decimal) and system V-memory
/// (fixed bank mappings), so the two cases are separate methods rather than one overloaded
/// "ToPdu" call.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// See <c>docs/v2/dl205.md</c> §V-memory for the full CPU-family matrix + rationale.
/// References: D2-USER-M appendix (DL205/D2-260), H2-ECOM-M §6.5 (absolute vs relative
/// addressing), AutomationDirect forum guidance on V40400 system-base.
/// </remarks>
public static class DirectLogicAddress
{
/// <summary>
/// Convert a DirectLOGIC user V-memory address (octal) to a 0-based Modbus PDU address.
/// Accepts bare octal (<c>"2000"</c>) or <c>V</c>-prefixed (<c>"V2000"</c>). Range
/// depends on CPU model — DL205 D2-260 user memory is V1400-V7377 + V10000-V17777
/// octal, DL260 extends to V77777 octal.
/// </summary>
/// <exception cref="ArgumentException">Input is null / empty / contains non-octal digits (8,9).</exception>
/// <exception cref="OverflowException">Parsed value exceeds ushort.MaxValue (0xFFFF).</exception>
public static ushort UserVMemoryToPdu(string vAddress)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(vAddress))
throw new ArgumentException("V-memory address must not be empty", nameof(vAddress));
var s = vAddress.Trim();
if (s[0] == 'V' || s[0] == 'v') s = s.Substring(1);
if (s.Length == 0)
throw new ArgumentException($"V-memory address '{vAddress}' has no digits", nameof(vAddress));
// Octal conversion. Reject 8/9 digits up-front — int.Parse in the obvious base would
// accept them silently because .NET has no built-in base-8 parser.
uint result = 0;
foreach (var ch in s)
{
if (ch < '0' || ch > '7')
throw new ArgumentException(
$"V-memory address '{vAddress}' contains non-octal digit '{ch}' — DirectLOGIC V-addresses are octal (0-7)",
nameof(vAddress));
result = result * 8 + (uint)(ch - '0');
if (result > ushort.MaxValue)
throw new OverflowException(
$"V-memory address '{vAddress}' exceeds the 16-bit Modbus PDU address range");
}
return (ushort)result;
}
/// <summary>
/// DirectLOGIC system V-memory starts at octal V40400 on DL260 / H2-ECOM100 in factory
/// "absolute" addressing mode. Unlike user V-memory, the mapping is NOT a simple
/// octal-to-decimal conversion — the CPU relocates the system bank to Modbus PDU 0x2100
/// (decimal 8448). This helper returns the CPU-family base plus a user-supplied offset
/// within the system bank.
/// </summary>
public const ushort SystemVMemoryBasePdu = 0x2100;
/// <param name="offsetWithinSystemBank">
/// 0-based register offset within the system bank. Pass 0 for V40400 itself; pass 1 for
/// V40401 (octal), and so on. NOT an octal-decoded value — the system bank lives at
/// consecutive PDU addresses, so the offset is plain decimal.
/// </param>
public static ushort SystemVMemoryToPdu(ushort offsetWithinSystemBank)
{
var pdu = SystemVMemoryBasePdu + offsetWithinSystemBank;
if (pdu > ushort.MaxValue)
throw new OverflowException(
$"System V-memory offset {offsetWithinSystemBank} maps past 0xFFFF");
return (ushort)pdu;
}
// Bit-memory bases per DL260 user manual §I/O-configuration.
// Numbers after X / Y / C / SP are OCTAL in DirectLOGIC notation. The Modbus base is
// added to the octal-decoded offset; e.g. Y017 = Modbus coil 2048 + octal(17) = 2048 + 15 = 2063.
/// <summary>
/// DL260 Y-output coil base. Y0 octal → Modbus coil address 2048 (0-based).
/// </summary>
public const ushort YOutputBaseCoil = 2048;
/// <summary>
/// DL260 C-relay coil base. C0 octal → Modbus coil address 3072 (0-based).
/// </summary>
public const ushort CRelayBaseCoil = 3072;
/// <summary>
/// DL260 X-input discrete-input base. X0 octal → Modbus discrete input 0.
/// </summary>
public const ushort XInputBaseDiscrete = 0;
/// <summary>
/// DL260 SP special-relay discrete-input base. SP0 octal → Modbus discrete input 1024.
/// Read-only; writing SP relays is rejected with Illegal Data Address.
/// </summary>
public const ushort SpecialBaseDiscrete = 1024;
/// <summary>
/// Translate a DirectLOGIC Y-output address (e.g. <c>"Y0"</c>, <c>"Y17"</c>) to its
/// 0-based Modbus coil address on DL260. The trailing number is OCTAL, matching the
/// ladder-logic editor's notation.
/// </summary>
public static ushort YOutputToCoil(string yAddress) =>
AddOctalOffset(YOutputBaseCoil, StripPrefix(yAddress, 'Y'));
/// <summary>
/// Translate a DirectLOGIC C-relay address (e.g. <c>"C0"</c>, <c>"C1777"</c>) to its
/// 0-based Modbus coil address.
/// </summary>
public static ushort CRelayToCoil(string cAddress) =>
AddOctalOffset(CRelayBaseCoil, StripPrefix(cAddress, 'C'));
/// <summary>
/// Translate a DirectLOGIC X-input address (e.g. <c>"X0"</c>, <c>"X17"</c>) to its
/// 0-based Modbus discrete-input address. Reading an unpopulated X returns 0, not an
/// exception — the CPU sizes the table to configured I/O, not installed modules.
/// </summary>
public static ushort XInputToDiscrete(string xAddress) =>
AddOctalOffset(XInputBaseDiscrete, StripPrefix(xAddress, 'X'));
/// <summary>
/// Translate a DirectLOGIC SP-special-relay address (e.g. <c>"SP0"</c>) to its 0-based
/// Modbus discrete-input address. Accepts <c>"SP"</c> prefix case-insensitively.
/// </summary>
public static ushort SpecialToDiscrete(string spAddress)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(spAddress))
throw new ArgumentException("SP address must not be empty", nameof(spAddress));
var s = spAddress.Trim();
if (s.Length >= 2 && (s[0] == 'S' || s[0] == 's') && (s[1] == 'P' || s[1] == 'p'))
s = s.Substring(2);
return AddOctalOffset(SpecialBaseDiscrete, s);
}
private static string StripPrefix(string address, char expectedPrefix)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(address))
throw new ArgumentException("Address must not be empty", nameof(address));
var s = address.Trim();
if (s.Length > 0 && char.ToUpperInvariant(s[0]) == char.ToUpperInvariant(expectedPrefix))
s = s.Substring(1);
return s;
}
private static ushort AddOctalOffset(ushort baseAddr, string octalDigits)
{
if (octalDigits.Length == 0)
throw new ArgumentException("Address has no digits", nameof(octalDigits));
uint offset = 0;
foreach (var ch in octalDigits)
{
if (ch < '0' || ch > '7')
throw new ArgumentException(
$"Address contains non-octal digit '{ch}' — DirectLOGIC I/O addresses are octal (0-7)",
nameof(octalDigits));
offset = offset * 8 + (uint)(ch - '0');
}
var result = baseAddr + offset;
if (result > ushort.MaxValue)
throw new OverflowException($"Address {baseAddr}+{offset} exceeds 0xFFFF");
return (ushort)result;
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus;
/// <summary>
/// Mitsubishi MELSEC PLC family selector for address-translation helpers. The Q/L/iQ-R
/// families write bit-device addresses (X, Y) in <b>hexadecimal</b> in GX Works and the
/// CPU manuals; the FX and iQ-F families write them in <b>octal</b> (same convention as
/// AutomationDirect DirectLOGIC). Mixing the two up is the #1 MELSEC driver bug source —
/// an operator typing <c>X20</c> into a Q-series tag config means decimal 32, but the
/// same string on an FX3U means decimal 16, so the helper must know the family to route
/// correctly.
/// </summary>
public enum MelsecFamily
{
/// <summary>
/// MELSEC-Q / MELSEC-L / MELSEC iQ-R. X and Y device numbers are interpreted as
/// <b>hexadecimal</b>; <c>X20</c> means decimal 32.
/// </summary>
Q_L_iQR,
/// <summary>
/// MELSEC-F (FX3U / FX3GE / FX3G) and MELSEC iQ-F (FX5U). X and Y device numbers
/// are interpreted as <b>octal</b> (same as DirectLOGIC); <c>X20</c> means decimal 16.
/// iQ-F has a GX Works3 project toggle that can flip to decimal — if a site uses
/// that, configure the tag's Address directly as a decimal PDU address and do not
/// route through this helper.
/// </summary>
F_iQF,
}
/// <summary>
/// Mitsubishi MELSEC address-translation helpers for the QJ71MT91 / LJ71MT91 / RJ71EN71 /
/// iQ-R built-in / iQ-F / FX3U-ENET-P502 Modbus modules. MELSEC does NOT hard-wire
/// Modbus-to-device mappings like DL260 does — every site configures its own "Modbus
/// Device Assignment Parameter" block of up to 16 entries. The helpers here cover only
/// the <b>address-notation</b> portion of the translation (hex X20 vs octal X20 + adding
/// the bank base); the caller is still responsible for knowing the assignment-block
/// offset for their site.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// See <c>docs/v2/mitsubishi.md</c> §device-assignment + §X-Y-hex-trap for the full
/// matrix and primary-source citations.
/// </remarks>
public static class MelsecAddress
{
/// <summary>
/// Translate a MELSEC X-input address (e.g. <c>"X0"</c>, <c>"X10"</c>) to a 0-based
/// Modbus discrete-input address, given the PLC family's address notation (hex or
/// octal) and the Modbus Device Assignment block's X-range base.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="xAddress">MELSEC X address. <c>X</c> prefix optional, case-insensitive.</param>
/// <param name="family">The PLC family — determines whether the trailing digits are hex or octal.</param>
/// <param name="xBankBase">
/// 0-based Modbus DI address the assignment-block has configured X0 to land at.
/// Typical default on QJ71MT91 sample projects: 0. Pass the site-specific value.
/// </param>
public static ushort XInputToDiscrete(string xAddress, MelsecFamily family, ushort xBankBase = 0) =>
AddFamilyOffset(xBankBase, StripPrefix(xAddress, 'X'), family);
/// <summary>
/// Translate a MELSEC Y-output address to a 0-based Modbus coil address. Same rules
/// as <see cref="XInputToDiscrete"/> for hex/octal parsing.
/// </summary>
public static ushort YOutputToCoil(string yAddress, MelsecFamily family, ushort yBankBase = 0) =>
AddFamilyOffset(yBankBase, StripPrefix(yAddress, 'Y'), family);
/// <summary>
/// Translate a MELSEC M-relay address (internal relay) to a 0-based Modbus coil
/// address. M-addresses are <b>decimal</b> on every MELSEC family — unlike X/Y which
/// are hex on Q/L/iQ-R. Includes the bank base that the assignment-block configured.
/// </summary>
public static ushort MRelayToCoil(string mAddress, ushort mBankBase = 0)
{
var digits = StripPrefix(mAddress, 'M');
if (!ushort.TryParse(digits, out var offset))
throw new ArgumentException(
$"M-relay address '{mAddress}' is not a valid decimal integer", nameof(mAddress));
var result = mBankBase + offset;
if (result > ushort.MaxValue)
throw new OverflowException($"M-relay {mAddress} + base {mBankBase} exceeds 0xFFFF");
return (ushort)result;
}
/// <summary>
/// Translate a MELSEC D-register address (data register) to a 0-based Modbus holding
/// register address. D-addresses are <b>decimal</b>. Default assignment convention is
/// D0 → HR 0 (pass <paramref name="dBankBase"/> = 0); sites with shifted layouts pass
/// their configured base.
/// </summary>
public static ushort DRegisterToHolding(string dAddress, ushort dBankBase = 0)
{
var digits = StripPrefix(dAddress, 'D');
if (!ushort.TryParse(digits, out var offset))
throw new ArgumentException(
$"D-register address '{dAddress}' is not a valid decimal integer", nameof(dAddress));
var result = dBankBase + offset;
if (result > ushort.MaxValue)
throw new OverflowException($"D-register {dAddress} + base {dBankBase} exceeds 0xFFFF");
return (ushort)result;
}
private static string StripPrefix(string address, char expectedPrefix)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(address))
throw new ArgumentException("Address must not be empty", nameof(address));
var s = address.Trim();
if (s.Length > 0 && char.ToUpperInvariant(s[0]) == char.ToUpperInvariant(expectedPrefix))
s = s.Substring(1);
if (s.Length == 0)
throw new ArgumentException($"Address '{address}' has no digits after prefix", nameof(address));
return s;
}
private static ushort AddFamilyOffset(ushort baseAddr, string digits, MelsecFamily family)
{
uint offset = family switch
{
MelsecFamily.Q_L_iQR => ParseHex(digits),
MelsecFamily.F_iQF => ParseOctal(digits),
_ => throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(nameof(family), family, "Unknown MELSEC family"),
};
var result = baseAddr + offset;
if (result > ushort.MaxValue)
throw new OverflowException($"Address {baseAddr}+{offset} exceeds 0xFFFF");
return (ushort)result;
}
private static uint ParseHex(string digits)
{
uint result = 0;
foreach (var ch in digits)
{
uint nibble;
if (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') nibble = (uint)(ch - '0');
else if (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'F') nibble = (uint)(ch - 'A' + 10);
else if (ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'f') nibble = (uint)(ch - 'a' + 10);
else throw new ArgumentException(
$"Address contains non-hex digit '{ch}' — Q/L/iQ-R X/Y addresses are hexadecimal",
nameof(digits));
result = result * 16 + nibble;
if (result > ushort.MaxValue)
throw new OverflowException($"Hex address exceeds 0xFFFF");
}
return result;
}
private static uint ParseOctal(string digits)
{
uint result = 0;
foreach (var ch in digits)
{
if (ch < '0' || ch > '7')
throw new ArgumentException(
$"Address contains non-octal digit '{ch}' — FX/iQ-F X/Y addresses are octal (0-7)",
nameof(digits));
result = result * 8 + (uint)(ch - '0');
if (result > ushort.MaxValue)
throw new OverflowException($"Octal address exceeds 0xFFFF");
}
return result;
}
}

View File

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
private CancellationTokenSource? _probeCts;
private readonly ModbusDriverOptions _options = options;
private readonly Func<ModbusDriverOptions, IModbusTransport> _transportFactory =
transportFactory ?? (o => new ModbusTcpTransport(o.Host, o.Port, o.Timeout));
transportFactory ?? (o => new ModbusTcpTransport(o.Host, o.Port, o.Timeout, o.AutoReconnect));
private IModbusTransport? _transport;
private DriverHealth _health = new(DriverState.Unknown, null, null);
@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
ArrayDim: null,
SecurityClass: t.Writable ? SecurityClassification.Operate : SecurityClassification.ViewOnly,
IsHistorized: false,
IsAlarm: false));
IsAlarm: false,
WriteIdempotent: t.WriteIdempotent));
}
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
@@ -141,9 +142,16 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
results[i] = new DataValueSnapshot(value, 0u, now, now);
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Healthy, now, null);
}
catch (ModbusException mex)
{
results[i] = new DataValueSnapshot(null, MapModbusExceptionToStatus(mex.ExceptionCode), null, now);
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Degraded, _health.LastSuccessfulRead, mex.Message);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
results[i] = new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadInternalError, null, now);
// Non-Modbus-layer failure: socket dropped, timeout, malformed response. Surface
// as communication error so callers can distinguish it from tag-level faults.
results[i] = new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadCommunicationError, null, now);
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Degraded, _health.LastSuccessfulRead, ex.Message);
}
}
@@ -171,11 +179,14 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
{
var quantity = RegisterCount(tag);
var fc = tag.Region == ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters ? (byte)0x03 : (byte)0x04;
var pdu = new byte[] { fc, (byte)(tag.Address >> 8), (byte)(tag.Address & 0xFF),
(byte)(quantity >> 8), (byte)(quantity & 0xFF) };
var resp = await transport.SendAsync(_options.UnitId, pdu, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
// resp = [fc][byte-count][data...]
var data = new ReadOnlySpan<byte>(resp, 2, resp[1]);
// Auto-chunk when the tag's register span exceeds the caller-configured cap.
// Affects long strings (FC03/04 > 125 regs is spec-forbidden; DL205 caps at 128,
// Mitsubishi Q caps at 64). Non-string tags max out at 4 regs so the cap never
// triggers for numerics.
var cap = _options.MaxRegistersPerRead == 0 ? (ushort)125 : _options.MaxRegistersPerRead;
var data = quantity <= cap
? await ReadRegisterBlockAsync(transport, fc, tag.Address, quantity, ct).ConfigureAwait(false)
: await ReadRegisterBlockChunkedAsync(transport, fc, tag.Address, quantity, cap, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
return DecodeRegister(data, tag);
}
default:
@@ -183,6 +194,33 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
}
}
private async Task<byte[]> ReadRegisterBlockAsync(
IModbusTransport transport, byte fc, ushort address, ushort quantity, CancellationToken ct)
{
var pdu = new byte[] { fc, (byte)(address >> 8), (byte)(address & 0xFF),
(byte)(quantity >> 8), (byte)(quantity & 0xFF) };
var resp = await transport.SendAsync(_options.UnitId, pdu, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
// resp = [fc][byte-count][data...]
var data = new byte[resp[1]];
Buffer.BlockCopy(resp, 2, data, 0, resp[1]);
return data;
}
private async Task<byte[]> ReadRegisterBlockChunkedAsync(
IModbusTransport transport, byte fc, ushort address, ushort totalRegs, ushort cap, CancellationToken ct)
{
var assembled = new byte[totalRegs * 2];
ushort done = 0;
while (done < totalRegs)
{
var chunk = (ushort)Math.Min(cap, totalRegs - done);
var chunkBytes = await ReadRegisterBlockAsync(transport, fc, (ushort)(address + done), chunk, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
Buffer.BlockCopy(chunkBytes, 0, assembled, done * 2, chunkBytes.Length);
done += chunk;
}
return assembled;
}
// ---- IWritable ----
public async Task<IReadOnlyList<WriteResult>> WriteAsync(
@@ -208,6 +246,10 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
await WriteOneAsync(transport, tag, w.Value, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
results[i] = new WriteResult(0u);
}
catch (ModbusException mex)
{
results[i] = new WriteResult(MapModbusExceptionToStatus(mex.ExceptionCode));
}
catch (Exception)
{
results[i] = new WriteResult(StatusBadInternalError);
@@ -239,8 +281,13 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
}
else
{
// FC 16 (Write Multiple Registers) for 32-bit types
// FC 16 (Write Multiple Registers) for 32-bit types.
var qty = (ushort)(bytes.Length / 2);
var writeCap = _options.MaxRegistersPerWrite == 0 ? (ushort)123 : _options.MaxRegistersPerWrite;
if (qty > writeCap)
throw new InvalidOperationException(
$"Write of {qty} registers to {tag.Name} exceeds MaxRegistersPerWrite={writeCap}. " +
$"Split the tag (e.g. shorter StringLength) — partial FC16 chunks would lose atomicity.");
var pdu = new byte[6 + 1 + bytes.Length];
pdu[0] = 0x10;
pdu[1] = (byte)(tag.Address >> 8); pdu[2] = (byte)(tag.Address & 0xFF);
@@ -404,8 +451,8 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
/// </summary>
internal static ushort RegisterCount(ModbusTagDefinition tag) => tag.DataType switch
{
ModbusDataType.Int16 or ModbusDataType.UInt16 or ModbusDataType.BitInRegister => 1,
ModbusDataType.Int32 or ModbusDataType.UInt32 or ModbusDataType.Float32 => 2,
ModbusDataType.Int16 or ModbusDataType.UInt16 or ModbusDataType.BitInRegister or ModbusDataType.Bcd16 => 1,
ModbusDataType.Int32 or ModbusDataType.UInt32 or ModbusDataType.Float32 or ModbusDataType.Bcd32 => 2,
ModbusDataType.Int64 or ModbusDataType.UInt64 or ModbusDataType.Float64 => 4,
ModbusDataType.String => (ushort)((tag.StringLength + 1) / 2), // 2 chars per register
_ => throw new InvalidOperationException($"Non-register data type {tag.DataType}"),
@@ -435,6 +482,17 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
{
case ModbusDataType.Int16: return BinaryPrimitives.ReadInt16BigEndian(data);
case ModbusDataType.UInt16: return BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(data);
case ModbusDataType.Bcd16:
{
var raw = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(data);
return (int)DecodeBcd(raw, nibbles: 4);
}
case ModbusDataType.Bcd32:
{
var b = NormalizeWordOrder(data, tag.ByteOrder);
var raw = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32BigEndian(b);
return (int)DecodeBcd(raw, nibbles: 8);
}
case ModbusDataType.BitInRegister:
{
var raw = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(data);
@@ -510,6 +568,21 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
var v = Convert.ToUInt16(value);
var b = new byte[2]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(b, v); return b;
}
case ModbusDataType.Bcd16:
{
var v = Convert.ToUInt32(value);
if (v > 9999) throw new OverflowException($"BCD16 value {v} exceeds 4 decimal digits");
var raw = (ushort)EncodeBcd(v, nibbles: 4);
var b = new byte[2]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(b, raw); return b;
}
case ModbusDataType.Bcd32:
{
var v = Convert.ToUInt32(value);
if (v > 99_999_999u) throw new OverflowException($"BCD32 value {v} exceeds 8 decimal digits");
var raw = EncodeBcd(v, nibbles: 8);
var b = new byte[4]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(b, raw);
return NormalizeWordOrder(b, tag.ByteOrder);
}
case ModbusDataType.Int32:
{
var v = Convert.ToInt32(value);
@@ -579,15 +652,77 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
ModbusDataType.Float32 => DriverDataType.Float32,
ModbusDataType.Float64 => DriverDataType.Float64,
ModbusDataType.String => DriverDataType.String,
ModbusDataType.Bcd16 or ModbusDataType.Bcd32 => DriverDataType.Int32,
_ => DriverDataType.Int32,
};
/// <summary>
/// Decode an N-nibble binary-coded-decimal value. Each nibble of <paramref name="raw"/>
/// encodes one decimal digit (most-significant nibble first). Rejects nibbles &gt; 9 —
/// the hardware sometimes produces garbage during transitions and silent non-BCD reads
/// would quietly corrupt the caller's data.
/// </summary>
internal static uint DecodeBcd(uint raw, int nibbles)
{
uint result = 0;
for (var i = nibbles - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
var digit = (raw >> (i * 4)) & 0xF;
if (digit > 9)
throw new InvalidDataException(
$"Non-BCD nibble 0x{digit:X} at position {i} of raw=0x{raw:X}");
result = result * 10 + digit;
}
return result;
}
/// <summary>
/// Encode a decimal value as N-nibble BCD. Caller is responsible for range-checking
/// against the nibble capacity (10^nibbles - 1).
/// </summary>
internal static uint EncodeBcd(uint value, int nibbles)
{
uint result = 0;
for (var i = 0; i < nibbles; i++)
{
var digit = value % 10;
result |= digit << (i * 4);
value /= 10;
}
return result;
}
private IModbusTransport RequireTransport() =>
_transport ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("ModbusDriver not initialized");
private const uint StatusBadInternalError = 0x80020000u;
private const uint StatusBadNodeIdUnknown = 0x80340000u;
private const uint StatusBadNotWritable = 0x803B0000u;
private const uint StatusBadOutOfRange = 0x803C0000u;
private const uint StatusBadNotSupported = 0x803D0000u;
private const uint StatusBadDeviceFailure = 0x80550000u;
private const uint StatusBadCommunicationError = 0x80050000u;
/// <summary>
/// Map a server-returned Modbus exception code to the most informative OPC UA
/// StatusCode. Keeps the driver's outward-facing status surface aligned with what a
/// Modbus engineer would expect when reading the spec: exception 02 (Illegal Data
/// Address) surfaces as BadOutOfRange so clients can distinguish "tag wrong" from
/// generic BadInternalError, exception 04 (Server Failure) as BadDeviceFailure so
/// operators see a CPU-mode problem rather than a driver bug, etc. Per
/// <c>docs/v2/dl205.md</c>, DL205/DL260 returns only codes 01-04 — no proprietary
/// extensions.
/// </summary>
internal static uint MapModbusExceptionToStatus(byte exceptionCode) => exceptionCode switch
{
0x01 => StatusBadNotSupported, // Illegal Function — FC not in supported list
0x02 => StatusBadOutOfRange, // Illegal Data Address — register outside mapped range
0x03 => StatusBadOutOfRange, // Illegal Data Value — quantity over per-FC cap
0x04 => StatusBadDeviceFailure, // Server Failure — CPU in PROGRAM mode during protected write
0x05 or 0x06 => StatusBadDeviceFailure, // Acknowledge / Server Busy — long-running op / busy
0x0A or 0x0B => StatusBadCommunicationError, // Gateway path unavailable / target failed to respond
_ => StatusBadInternalError,
};
public void Dispose() => DisposeAsync().AsTask().GetAwaiter().GetResult();
public async ValueTask DisposeAsync()

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,37 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriverOptions
/// <see cref="IHostConnectivityProbe"/>.
/// </summary>
public ModbusProbeOptions Probe { get; init; } = new();
/// <summary>
/// Maximum registers per FC03 (Read Holding Registers) / FC04 (Read Input Registers)
/// transaction. Modbus-TCP spec allows 125; many device families impose lower caps:
/// AutomationDirect DL205/DL260 cap at <c>128</c>, Mitsubishi Q/FX3U cap at <c>64</c>,
/// Omron CJ/CS cap at <c>125</c>. Set to the lowest cap across the devices this driver
/// instance talks to; the driver auto-chunks larger reads into consecutive requests.
/// Default <c>125</c> — the spec maximum, safe against any conforming server. Setting
/// to <c>0</c> disables the cap (discouraged — the spec upper bound still applies).
/// </summary>
public ushort MaxRegistersPerRead { get; init; } = 125;
/// <summary>
/// Maximum registers per FC16 (Write Multiple Registers) transaction. Spec maximum is
/// <c>123</c>; DL205/DL260 cap at <c>100</c>. Matching caller-vs-device semantics:
/// exceeding the cap currently throws (writes aren't auto-chunked because a partial
/// write across two FC16 calls is no longer atomic — caller must explicitly opt in
/// by shortening the tag's <c>StringLength</c> or splitting it into multiple tags).
/// </summary>
public ushort MaxRegistersPerWrite { get; init; } = 123;
/// <summary>
/// When <c>true</c> (default) the built-in <see cref="ModbusTcpTransport"/> detects
/// mid-transaction socket failures (<see cref="System.IO.EndOfStreamException"/>,
/// <see cref="System.Net.Sockets.SocketException"/>) and transparently reconnects +
/// retries the PDU exactly once. Required for DL205/DL260 because the H2-ECOM100
/// does not send TCP keepalives — intermediate NAT / firewall devices silently close
/// idle sockets and the first send after the drop would otherwise surface as a
/// connection error to the caller even though the PLC is up.
/// </summary>
public bool AutoReconnect { get; init; } = true;
}
public sealed class ModbusProbeOptions
@@ -61,6 +92,14 @@ public sealed class ModbusProbeOptions
/// AutomationDirect DirectLOGIC (DL205/DL260) and a few legacy families pack the first
/// character in the low byte instead — see <c>docs/v2/dl205.md</c> §strings.
/// </param>
/// <param name="WriteIdempotent">
/// Per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decisions #44, #45, #143 — flag a tag as safe to replay on
/// write timeout / failure. Default <c>false</c>; writes do not auto-retry. Safe candidates:
/// holding-register set-points for analog values and configuration registers where the same
/// value can be written again without side-effects. Unsafe: coils that drive edge-triggered
/// actions (pulse outputs), counter-increment addresses on PLCs that treat writes as deltas,
/// any BCD / counter register where repeat-writes advance state.
/// </param>
public sealed record ModbusTagDefinition(
string Name,
ModbusRegion Region,
@@ -70,7 +109,8 @@ public sealed record ModbusTagDefinition(
ModbusByteOrder ByteOrder = ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian,
byte BitIndex = 0,
ushort StringLength = 0,
ModbusStringByteOrder StringByteOrder = ModbusStringByteOrder.HighByteFirst);
ModbusStringByteOrder StringByteOrder = ModbusStringByteOrder.HighByteFirst,
bool WriteIdempotent = false);
public enum ModbusRegion { Coils, DiscreteInputs, InputRegisters, HoldingRegisters }
@@ -89,6 +129,18 @@ public enum ModbusDataType
BitInRegister,
/// <summary>ASCII string packed 2 chars per register, <see cref="ModbusTagDefinition.StringLength"/> characters long.</summary>
String,
/// <summary>
/// 16-bit binary-coded decimal. Each nibble encodes one decimal digit (0-9). Register
/// value <c>0x1234</c> decodes as decimal <c>1234</c> — NOT binary <c>0x04D2 = 4660</c>.
/// DL205/DL260 and several Mitsubishi / Omron families store timers, counters, and
/// operator-facing numerics as BCD by default.
/// </summary>
Bcd16,
/// <summary>
/// 32-bit (two-register) BCD. Decodes 8 decimal digits. Word ordering follows
/// <see cref="ModbusTagDefinition.ByteOrder"/> the same way <see cref="Int32"/> does.
/// </summary>
Bcd32,
}
/// <summary>

View File

@@ -8,22 +8,40 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus;
/// support concurrent transactions, but the single-flight model keeps the wire trace
/// easy to diagnose and avoids interleaved-response correlation bugs.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Survives mid-transaction socket drops: when a send/read fails with a socket-level
/// error (<see cref="IOException"/>, <see cref="SocketException"/>, <see cref="EndOfStreamException"/>)
/// the transport disposes the dead socket, reconnects, and retries the PDU exactly
/// once. Deliberately limited to a single retry — further failures bubble up so the
/// driver's health surface reflects the real state instead of masking a dead PLC.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Why this matters for DL205/DL260: the AutomationDirect H2-ECOM100 does NOT send
/// TCP keepalives per <c>docs/v2/dl205.md</c> §behavioral-oddities, so any NAT/firewall
/// between the gateway and PLC can silently close an idle socket after 2-5 minutes.
/// Also enables OS-level <c>SO_KEEPALIVE</c> so the driver's own side detects a stuck
/// socket in reasonable time even when the application is mostly idle.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class ModbusTcpTransport : IModbusTransport
{
private readonly string _host;
private readonly int _port;
private readonly TimeSpan _timeout;
private readonly bool _autoReconnect;
private readonly SemaphoreSlim _gate = new(1, 1);
private TcpClient? _client;
private NetworkStream? _stream;
private ushort _nextTx;
private bool _disposed;
public ModbusTcpTransport(string host, int port, TimeSpan timeout)
public ModbusTcpTransport(string host, int port, TimeSpan timeout, bool autoReconnect = true)
{
_host = host;
_port = port;
_timeout = timeout;
_autoReconnect = autoReconnect;
}
public async Task ConnectAsync(CancellationToken ct)
@@ -39,12 +57,34 @@ public sealed class ModbusTcpTransport : IModbusTransport
var target = ipv4 ?? (addresses.Length > 0 ? addresses[0] : System.Net.IPAddress.Loopback);
_client = new TcpClient(target.AddressFamily);
EnableKeepAlive(_client);
using var cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(ct);
cts.CancelAfter(_timeout);
await _client.ConnectAsync(target, _port, cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
_stream = _client.GetStream();
}
/// <summary>
/// Enable SO_KEEPALIVE with aggressive probe timing. DL205/DL260 doesn't send keepalives
/// itself; having the OS probe the socket every ~30s lets the driver notice a dead PLC
/// or broken NAT path long before the default 2-hour Windows idle timeout fires.
/// Non-fatal if the underlying OS rejects the option (some older Linux / container
/// sandboxes don't expose the fine-grained timing levers — the driver still works,
/// application-level probe still detects problems).
/// </summary>
private static void EnableKeepAlive(TcpClient client)
{
try
{
client.Client.SetSocketOption(SocketOptionLevel.Socket, SocketOptionName.KeepAlive, true);
client.Client.SetSocketOption(SocketOptionLevel.Tcp, SocketOptionName.TcpKeepAliveTime, 30);
client.Client.SetSocketOption(SocketOptionLevel.Tcp, SocketOptionName.TcpKeepAliveInterval, 10);
client.Client.SetSocketOption(SocketOptionLevel.Tcp, SocketOptionName.TcpKeepAliveRetryCount, 3);
}
catch { /* best-effort; older OSes may not expose the granular knobs */ }
}
public async Task<byte[]> SendAsync(byte unitId, byte[] pdu, CancellationToken ct)
{
if (_disposed) throw new ObjectDisposedException(nameof(ModbusTcpTransport));
@@ -53,43 +93,18 @@ public sealed class ModbusTcpTransport : IModbusTransport
await _gate.WaitAsync(ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
try
{
var txId = ++_nextTx;
// MBAP: [TxId(2)][Proto=0(2)][Length(2)][UnitId(1)] + PDU
var adu = new byte[7 + pdu.Length];
adu[0] = (byte)(txId >> 8);
adu[1] = (byte)(txId & 0xFF);
// protocol id already zero
var len = (ushort)(1 + pdu.Length); // unit id + pdu
adu[4] = (byte)(len >> 8);
adu[5] = (byte)(len & 0xFF);
adu[6] = unitId;
Buffer.BlockCopy(pdu, 0, adu, 7, pdu.Length);
using var cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(ct);
cts.CancelAfter(_timeout);
await _stream.WriteAsync(adu.AsMemory(), cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
await _stream.FlushAsync(cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
var header = new byte[7];
await ReadExactlyAsync(_stream, header, cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
var respTxId = (ushort)((header[0] << 8) | header[1]);
if (respTxId != txId)
throw new InvalidDataException($"Modbus TxId mismatch: expected {txId} got {respTxId}");
var respLen = (ushort)((header[4] << 8) | header[5]);
if (respLen < 1) throw new InvalidDataException($"Modbus response length too small: {respLen}");
var respPdu = new byte[respLen - 1];
await ReadExactlyAsync(_stream, respPdu, cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
// Exception PDU: function code has high bit set.
if ((respPdu[0] & 0x80) != 0)
try
{
var fc = (byte)(respPdu[0] & 0x7F);
var ex = respPdu[1];
throw new ModbusException(fc, ex, $"Modbus exception fc={fc} code={ex}");
return await SendOnceAsync(unitId, pdu, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (Exception ex) when (_autoReconnect && IsSocketLevelFailure(ex))
{
// Mid-transaction drop: tear down the dead socket, reconnect, resend. Single
// retry — if it fails again, let it propagate so health/status reflect reality.
await TearDownAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
await ConnectAsync(ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
return await SendOnceAsync(unitId, pdu, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
return respPdu;
}
finally
{
@@ -97,6 +112,68 @@ public sealed class ModbusTcpTransport : IModbusTransport
}
}
private async Task<byte[]> SendOnceAsync(byte unitId, byte[] pdu, CancellationToken ct)
{
if (_stream is null) throw new InvalidOperationException("Transport not connected");
var txId = ++_nextTx;
// MBAP: [TxId(2)][Proto=0(2)][Length(2)][UnitId(1)] + PDU
var adu = new byte[7 + pdu.Length];
adu[0] = (byte)(txId >> 8);
adu[1] = (byte)(txId & 0xFF);
// protocol id already zero
var len = (ushort)(1 + pdu.Length); // unit id + pdu
adu[4] = (byte)(len >> 8);
adu[5] = (byte)(len & 0xFF);
adu[6] = unitId;
Buffer.BlockCopy(pdu, 0, adu, 7, pdu.Length);
using var cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(ct);
cts.CancelAfter(_timeout);
await _stream.WriteAsync(adu.AsMemory(), cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
await _stream.FlushAsync(cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
var header = new byte[7];
await ReadExactlyAsync(_stream, header, cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
var respTxId = (ushort)((header[0] << 8) | header[1]);
if (respTxId != txId)
throw new InvalidDataException($"Modbus TxId mismatch: expected {txId} got {respTxId}");
var respLen = (ushort)((header[4] << 8) | header[5]);
if (respLen < 1) throw new InvalidDataException($"Modbus response length too small: {respLen}");
var respPdu = new byte[respLen - 1];
await ReadExactlyAsync(_stream, respPdu, cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
// Exception PDU: function code has high bit set.
if ((respPdu[0] & 0x80) != 0)
{
var fc = (byte)(respPdu[0] & 0x7F);
var ex = respPdu[1];
throw new ModbusException(fc, ex, $"Modbus exception fc={fc} code={ex}");
}
return respPdu;
}
/// <summary>
/// Distinguish socket-layer failures (eligible for reconnect-and-retry) from
/// protocol-layer failures (must propagate — retrying the same PDU won't help if the
/// PLC just returned exception 02 Illegal Data Address).
/// </summary>
private static bool IsSocketLevelFailure(Exception ex) =>
ex is EndOfStreamException
|| ex is IOException
|| ex is SocketException
|| ex is ObjectDisposedException;
private async Task TearDownAsync()
{
try { if (_stream is not null) await _stream.DisposeAsync().ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch { /* best-effort */ }
_stream = null;
try { _client?.Dispose(); } catch { }
_client = null;
}
private static async Task ReadExactlyAsync(Stream s, byte[] buf, CancellationToken ct)
{
var read = 0;

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient;
/// <summary>
/// OPC UA Client (gateway) driver configuration. Bound from <c>DriverConfig</c> JSON at
/// driver-host registration time. Models the settings documented in
/// <c>docs/v2/driver-specs.md</c> §8.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// This driver connects to a REMOTE OPC UA server and re-exposes its address space
/// through the local OtOpcUa server — the opposite direction from the usual "server
/// exposes PLC data" flow. Tier A (pure managed, OPC Foundation reference SDK); universal
/// protections cover it.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class OpcUaClientDriverOptions
{
/// <summary>
/// Remote OPC UA endpoint URL, e.g. <c>opc.tcp://plc.internal:4840</c>. Convenience
/// shortcut for a single-endpoint deployment — equivalent to setting
/// <see cref="EndpointUrls"/> to a list with this one URL. When both are provided,
/// the list wins and <see cref="EndpointUrl"/> is ignored.
/// </summary>
public string EndpointUrl { get; init; } = "opc.tcp://localhost:4840";
/// <summary>
/// Ordered list of candidate endpoint URLs for failover. The driver tries each in
/// order at <see cref="OpcUaClientDriver.InitializeAsync"/> and on session drop;
/// the first URL that successfully connects wins. Typical use-case: an OPC UA server
/// pair running in hot-standby (primary 4840 + backup 4841) where either can serve
/// the same address space. Leave unset (or empty) to use <see cref="EndpointUrl"/>
/// as a single-URL shortcut.
/// </summary>
public IReadOnlyList<string> EndpointUrls { get; init; } = [];
/// <summary>
/// Per-endpoint connect-attempt timeout during the failover sweep. Short enough that
/// cycling through several dead servers doesn't blow the overall init budget, long
/// enough to tolerate a slow TLS handshake on a healthy server. Applied independently
/// of <see cref="Timeout"/> which governs steady-state operations.
/// </summary>
public TimeSpan PerEndpointConnectTimeout { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(3);
/// <summary>
/// Security policy to require when selecting an endpoint. Either a
/// <see cref="OpcUaSecurityPolicy"/> enum constant or a free-form string (for
/// forward-compatibility with future OPC UA policies not yet in the enum).
/// Matched against <c>EndpointDescription.SecurityPolicyUri</c> suffix — the driver
/// connects to the first endpoint whose policy name matches AND whose mode matches
/// <see cref="SecurityMode"/>. When set to <see cref="OpcUaSecurityPolicy.None"/>
/// the driver picks any unsecured endpoint regardless of policy string.
/// </summary>
public OpcUaSecurityPolicy SecurityPolicy { get; init; } = OpcUaSecurityPolicy.None;
/// <summary>Security mode.</summary>
public OpcUaSecurityMode SecurityMode { get; init; } = OpcUaSecurityMode.None;
/// <summary>Authentication type.</summary>
public OpcUaAuthType AuthType { get; init; } = OpcUaAuthType.Anonymous;
/// <summary>User name (required only for <see cref="OpcUaAuthType.Username"/>).</summary>
public string? Username { get; init; }
/// <summary>Password (required only for <see cref="OpcUaAuthType.Username"/>).</summary>
public string? Password { get; init; }
/// <summary>
/// Filesystem path to the user-identity certificate (PFX/PEM). Required when
/// <see cref="AuthType"/> is <see cref="OpcUaAuthType.Certificate"/>. The driver
/// loads the cert + private key, which the remote server validates against its
/// <c>TrustedUserCertificates</c> store to authenticate the session's user token.
/// Leave unset to use the driver's application-instance certificate as the user
/// token (not typical — most deployments have a separate user cert).
/// </summary>
public string? UserCertificatePath { get; init; }
/// <summary>
/// Optional password that unlocks <see cref="UserCertificatePath"/> when the PFX is
/// protected. PEM files generally have their password on the adjacent key file; this
/// knob only applies to password-locked PFX.
/// </summary>
public string? UserCertificatePassword { get; init; }
/// <summary>Server-negotiated session timeout. Default 120s per driver-specs.md §8.</summary>
public TimeSpan SessionTimeout { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(120);
/// <summary>Client-side keep-alive interval.</summary>
public TimeSpan KeepAliveInterval { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5);
/// <summary>Initial reconnect delay after a session drop.</summary>
public TimeSpan ReconnectPeriod { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5);
/// <summary>
/// When <c>true</c>, the driver accepts any self-signed / untrusted server certificate.
/// Dev-only — must be <c>false</c> in production so MITM attacks against the opc.tcp
/// channel fail closed.
/// </summary>
public bool AutoAcceptCertificates { get; init; } = false;
/// <summary>
/// Application URI the driver reports during session creation. Must match the
/// subject-alt-name on the client certificate if one is used, which is why it's a
/// config knob rather than hard-coded.
/// </summary>
public string ApplicationUri { get; init; } = "urn:localhost:OtOpcUa:GatewayClient";
/// <summary>
/// Friendly name sent to the remote server for diagnostics. Shows up in the remote
/// server's session-list so operators can identify which gateway instance is calling.
/// </summary>
public string SessionName { get; init; } = "OtOpcUa-Gateway";
/// <summary>Connect + per-operation timeout.</summary>
public TimeSpan Timeout { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10);
/// <summary>
/// Root NodeId to mirror. Default <c>null</c> = <c>ObjectsFolder</c> (i=85). Set to
/// a scoped root to restrict the address space the driver exposes locally — useful
/// when the remote server has tens of thousands of nodes and only a subset is
/// needed downstream.
/// </summary>
public string? BrowseRoot { get; init; }
/// <summary>
/// Cap on total nodes discovered during <c>DiscoverAsync</c>. Default 10_000 —
/// bounds memory on runaway remote servers without being so low that normal
/// deployments hit it. When the cap is reached discovery stops and a warning is
/// written to the driver health surface; the partially-discovered tree is still
/// projected into the local address space.
/// </summary>
public int MaxDiscoveredNodes { get; init; } = 10_000;
/// <summary>
/// Max hierarchical depth of the browse. Default 10 — deep enough for realistic
/// OPC UA information models, shallow enough that cyclic graphs can't spin the
/// browse forever.
/// </summary>
public int MaxBrowseDepth { get; init; } = 10;
}
/// <summary>OPC UA message security mode.</summary>
public enum OpcUaSecurityMode
{
None,
Sign,
SignAndEncrypt,
}
/// <summary>
/// OPC UA security policies recognized by the driver. Maps to the standard
/// <c>http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#</c> URI suffixes the SDK uses for
/// endpoint matching.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <see cref="Basic128Rsa15"/> and <see cref="Basic256"/> are <b>deprecated</b> per OPC UA
/// spec v1.04 — they remain in the enum only for brownfield interop with older servers.
/// Prefer <see cref="Basic256Sha256"/>, <see cref="Aes128_Sha256_RsaOaep"/>, or
/// <see cref="Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss"/> for new deployments.
/// </remarks>
public enum OpcUaSecurityPolicy
{
/// <summary>No security. Unsigned, unencrypted wire.</summary>
None,
/// <summary>Deprecated (OPC UA 1.04). Retained for legacy server interop.</summary>
Basic128Rsa15,
/// <summary>Deprecated (OPC UA 1.04). Retained for legacy server interop.</summary>
Basic256,
/// <summary>Recommended baseline for current deployments.</summary>
Basic256Sha256,
/// <summary>Current OPC UA policy; AES-128 + SHA-256 + RSA-OAEP.</summary>
Aes128_Sha256_RsaOaep,
/// <summary>Current OPC UA policy; AES-256 + SHA-256 + RSA-PSS.</summary>
Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss,
}
/// <summary>User authentication type sent to the remote server.</summary>
public enum OpcUaAuthType
{
Anonymous,
Username,
Certificate,
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
<Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk">
<PropertyGroup>
<TargetFramework>net10.0</TargetFramework>
<Nullable>enable</Nullable>
<ImplicitUsings>enable</ImplicitUsings>
<LangVersion>latest</LangVersion>
<TreatWarningsAsErrors>true</TreatWarningsAsErrors>
<GenerateDocumentationFile>true</GenerateDocumentationFile>
<NoWarn>$(NoWarn);CS1591</NoWarn>
<RootNamespace>ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient</RootNamespace>
<AssemblyName>ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient</AssemblyName>
</PropertyGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<ProjectReference Include="..\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions.csproj"/>
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<PackageReference Include="OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Client" Version="1.5.378.106"/>
<PackageReference Include="OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Configuration" Version="1.5.378.106"/>
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<InternalsVisibleTo Include="ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.Tests"/>
</ItemGroup>
</Project>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7;
/// <summary>
/// Siemens S7 memory area. The driver's tag-address parser maps every S7 tag string into
/// exactly one of these + an offset. Values match the on-wire S7 area codes only
/// incidentally — S7.Net uses its own <c>DataType</c> enum (<c>DataBlock</c>, <c>Memory</c>,
/// <c>Input</c>, <c>Output</c>, <c>Timer</c>, <c>Counter</c>) so the adapter layer translates.
/// </summary>
public enum S7Area
{
DataBlock,
Memory, // M (Merker / marker byte)
Input, // I (process-image input)
Output, // Q (process-image output)
Timer,
Counter,
}
/// <summary>
/// Access width for a DB / M / I / Q address. Timers and counters are always 16-bit
/// opaque (not user-addressable via size suffixes).
/// </summary>
public enum S7Size
{
Bit, // X
Byte, // B
Word, // W — 16-bit
DWord, // D — 32-bit
}
/// <summary>
/// Parsed form of an S7 tag-address string. Produced by <see cref="S7AddressParser.Parse"/>.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="Area">Memory area (DB, M, I, Q, T, C).</param>
/// <param name="DbNumber">Data block number; only meaningful when <paramref name="Area"/> is <see cref="S7Area.DataBlock"/>.</param>
/// <param name="Size">Access width. Always <see cref="S7Size.Word"/> for Timer and Counter.</param>
/// <param name="ByteOffset">Byte offset into the area (for DB/M/I/Q) or the timer/counter number.</param>
/// <param name="BitOffset">Bit position 0-7 when <paramref name="Size"/> is <see cref="S7Size.Bit"/>; 0 otherwise.</param>
public readonly record struct S7ParsedAddress(
S7Area Area,
int DbNumber,
S7Size Size,
int ByteOffset,
int BitOffset);
/// <summary>
/// Parses Siemens S7 address strings into <see cref="S7ParsedAddress"/>. Accepts the
/// Siemens TIA-Portal / STEP 7 Classic syntax documented in <c>docs/v2/driver-specs.md</c> §5:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><c>DB{n}.DB{X|B|W|D}{offset}[.bit]</c> — e.g. <c>DB1.DBX0.0</c>, <c>DB1.DBW0</c>, <c>DB1.DBD4</c></item>
/// <item><c>M{B|W|D}{offset}</c> or <c>M{offset}.{bit}</c> — e.g. <c>MB0</c>, <c>MW0</c>, <c>MD4</c>, <c>M0.0</c></item>
/// <item><c>I{B|W|D}{offset}</c> or <c>I{offset}.{bit}</c> — e.g. <c>IB0</c>, <c>IW0</c>, <c>ID0</c>, <c>I0.0</c></item>
/// <item><c>Q{B|W|D}{offset}</c> or <c>Q{offset}.{bit}</c> — e.g. <c>QB0</c>, <c>QW0</c>, <c>QD0</c>, <c>Q0.0</c></item>
/// <item><c>T{n}</c> — e.g. <c>T0</c>, <c>T15</c></item>
/// <item><c>C{n}</c> — e.g. <c>C0</c>, <c>C10</c></item>
/// </list>
/// Grammar is case-insensitive. Leading/trailing whitespace tolerated. Bit specifiers
/// must be 0-7; byte offsets must be non-negative; DB numbers must be &gt;= 1.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Parse is deliberately strict — the parser rejects syntactic garbage up-front so a bad
/// tag config fails at driver init time instead of surfacing as a misleading
/// <c>BadInternalError</c> on every Read against that tag.
/// </remarks>
public static class S7AddressParser
{
/// <summary>
/// Parse an S7 address. Throws <see cref="FormatException"/> on any syntax error with
/// the offending input echoed in the message so operators can correlate to the tag
/// config that produced the fault.
/// </summary>
public static S7ParsedAddress Parse(string address)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(address))
throw new FormatException("S7 address must not be empty");
var s = address.Trim().ToUpperInvariant();
// --- DB{n}.DB{X|B|W|D}{offset}[.bit] ---
if (s.StartsWith("DB") && TryParseDataBlock(s, out var dbResult))
return dbResult;
if (s.Length < 2)
throw new FormatException($"S7 address '{address}' is too short to parse");
var areaChar = s[0];
var rest = s.Substring(1);
switch (areaChar)
{
case 'M': return ParseMIQ(S7Area.Memory, rest, address);
case 'I': return ParseMIQ(S7Area.Input, rest, address);
case 'Q': return ParseMIQ(S7Area.Output, rest, address);
case 'T': return ParseTimerOrCounter(S7Area.Timer, rest, address);
case 'C': return ParseTimerOrCounter(S7Area.Counter, rest, address);
default:
throw new FormatException($"S7 address '{address}' starts with unknown area '{areaChar}' (expected DB/M/I/Q/T/C)");
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Try-parse variant for callers that can't afford an exception on bad input (e.g.
/// config validation pages in the Admin UI). Returns <c>false</c> for any input that
/// would throw from <see cref="Parse"/>.
/// </summary>
public static bool TryParse(string address, out S7ParsedAddress result)
{
try
{
result = Parse(address);
return true;
}
catch (FormatException)
{
result = default;
return false;
}
}
private static bool TryParseDataBlock(string s, out S7ParsedAddress result)
{
result = default;
// Split on first '.': left side must be DB{n}, right side DB{X|B|W|D}{offset}[.bit]
var dot = s.IndexOf('.');
if (dot < 0) return false;
var head = s.Substring(0, dot); // DB{n}
var tail = s.Substring(dot + 1); // DB{X|B|W|D}{offset}[.bit]
if (head.Length < 3) return false;
if (!int.TryParse(head.AsSpan(2), out var dbNumber) || dbNumber < 1)
throw new FormatException($"S7 DB number in '{s}' must be a positive integer");
if (!tail.StartsWith("DB") || tail.Length < 4)
throw new FormatException($"S7 DB address tail '{tail}' must start with DB{{X|B|W|D}}");
var sizeChar = tail[2];
var offsetStart = 3;
var size = sizeChar switch
{
'X' => S7Size.Bit,
'B' => S7Size.Byte,
'W' => S7Size.Word,
'D' => S7Size.DWord,
_ => throw new FormatException($"S7 DB size '{sizeChar}' in '{s}' must be X/B/W/D"),
};
var (byteOffset, bitOffset) = ParseOffsetAndOptionalBit(tail, offsetStart, size, s);
result = new S7ParsedAddress(S7Area.DataBlock, dbNumber, size, byteOffset, bitOffset);
return true;
}
private static S7ParsedAddress ParseMIQ(S7Area area, string rest, string original)
{
if (rest.Length == 0)
throw new FormatException($"S7 address '{original}' has no offset");
var first = rest[0];
S7Size size;
int offsetStart;
switch (first)
{
case 'B': size = S7Size.Byte; offsetStart = 1; break;
case 'W': size = S7Size.Word; offsetStart = 1; break;
case 'D': size = S7Size.DWord; offsetStart = 1; break;
default:
// No size prefix => bit-level address requires explicit .bit. Size stays Bit;
// ParseOffsetAndOptionalBit will demand the dot.
size = S7Size.Bit;
offsetStart = 0;
break;
}
var (byteOffset, bitOffset) = ParseOffsetAndOptionalBit(rest, offsetStart, size, original);
return new S7ParsedAddress(area, DbNumber: 0, size, byteOffset, bitOffset);
}
private static S7ParsedAddress ParseTimerOrCounter(S7Area area, string rest, string original)
{
if (rest.Length == 0)
throw new FormatException($"S7 address '{original}' has no {area} number");
if (!int.TryParse(rest, out var number) || number < 0)
throw new FormatException($"S7 {area} number in '{original}' must be a non-negative integer");
return new S7ParsedAddress(area, DbNumber: 0, S7Size.Word, number, BitOffset: 0);
}
private static (int byteOffset, int bitOffset) ParseOffsetAndOptionalBit(
string s, int start, S7Size size, string original)
{
var offsetEnd = start;
while (offsetEnd < s.Length && s[offsetEnd] >= '0' && s[offsetEnd] <= '9')
offsetEnd++;
if (offsetEnd == start)
throw new FormatException($"S7 address '{original}' has no byte-offset digits");
if (!int.TryParse(s.AsSpan(start, offsetEnd - start), out var byteOffset) || byteOffset < 0)
throw new FormatException($"S7 byte offset in '{original}' must be non-negative");
// No bit-suffix: done unless size is Bit with no prefix, which requires one.
if (offsetEnd == s.Length)
{
if (size == S7Size.Bit)
throw new FormatException($"S7 address '{original}' needs a .{{bit}} suffix for bit access");
return (byteOffset, 0);
}
if (s[offsetEnd] != '.')
throw new FormatException($"S7 address '{original}' has unexpected character after offset");
if (size != S7Size.Bit)
throw new FormatException($"S7 address '{original}' has a bit suffix but the size is {size} — bit access needs X (DB) or no size prefix (M/I/Q)");
if (!int.TryParse(s.AsSpan(offsetEnd + 1), out var bitOffset) || bitOffset is < 0 or > 7)
throw new FormatException($"S7 bit offset in '{original}' must be 0-7");
return (byteOffset, bitOffset);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
using S7.Net;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7;
/// <summary>
/// Siemens S7 native driver — speaks S7comm over ISO-on-TCP (port 102) via the S7netplus
/// library. First implementation of <see cref="IDriver"/> for an in-process .NET Standard
/// PLC protocol that is NOT Modbus, validating that the v2 driver-capability interfaces
/// generalize beyond Modbus + Galaxy.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// PR 62 ships the scaffold: <see cref="IDriver"/> only (Initialize / Reinitialize /
/// Shutdown / GetHealth). <see cref="ITagDiscovery"/>, <see cref="IReadable"/>,
/// <see cref="IWritable"/>, <see cref="ISubscribable"/>, <see cref="IHostConnectivityProbe"/>
/// land in PRs 63-65 once the address parser (PR 63) is in place.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Single-connection policy</b>: S7netplus documented pattern is one
/// <c>Plc</c> instance per PLC, serialized with a <see cref="SemaphoreSlim"/>.
/// Parallelising reads against a single S7 CPU doesn't help — the CPU scans the
/// communication mailbox at most once per cycle (2-10 ms) and queues concurrent
/// requests wire-side anyway. Multiple client-side connections just waste the CPU's
/// 8-64 connection-resource budget.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class S7Driver(S7DriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId)
: IDriver, ITagDiscovery, IReadable, IWritable, ISubscribable, IHostConnectivityProbe, IDisposable, IAsyncDisposable
{
// ---- ISubscribable + IHostConnectivityProbe state ----
private readonly System.Collections.Concurrent.ConcurrentDictionary<long, SubscriptionState> _subscriptions = new();
private long _nextSubscriptionId;
private readonly object _probeLock = new();
private HostState _hostState = HostState.Unknown;
private DateTime _hostStateChangedUtc = DateTime.UtcNow;
private CancellationTokenSource? _probeCts;
public event EventHandler<DataChangeEventArgs>? OnDataChange;
public event EventHandler<HostStatusChangedEventArgs>? OnHostStatusChanged;
/// <summary>OPC UA StatusCode used when the tag name isn't in the driver's tag map.</summary>
private const uint StatusBadNodeIdUnknown = 0x80340000u;
/// <summary>OPC UA StatusCode used when the tag's data type isn't implemented yet.</summary>
private const uint StatusBadNotSupported = 0x803D0000u;
/// <summary>OPC UA StatusCode used when the tag is declared read-only.</summary>
private const uint StatusBadNotWritable = 0x803B0000u;
/// <summary>OPC UA StatusCode used when write fails validation (e.g. out-of-range value).</summary>
private const uint StatusBadInternalError = 0x80020000u;
/// <summary>OPC UA StatusCode used for socket / timeout / protocol-layer faults.</summary>
private const uint StatusBadCommunicationError = 0x80050000u;
/// <summary>OPC UA StatusCode used when S7 returns <c>ErrorCode.WrongCPU</c> / PUT/GET disabled.</summary>
private const uint StatusBadDeviceFailure = 0x80550000u;
private readonly Dictionary<string, S7TagDefinition> _tagsByName = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly Dictionary<string, S7ParsedAddress> _parsedByName = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly S7DriverOptions _options = options;
private readonly SemaphoreSlim _gate = new(1, 1);
/// <summary>
/// Per-connection gate. Internal so PRs 63-65 (read/write/subscribe) can serialize on
/// the same semaphore without exposing it publicly. Single-connection-per-PLC is a
/// hard requirement of S7netplus — see class remarks.
/// </summary>
internal SemaphoreSlim Gate => _gate;
/// <summary>
/// Active S7.Net PLC connection. Null until <see cref="InitializeAsync"/> returns; null
/// after <see cref="ShutdownAsync"/>. Read-only outside this class; PR 64's Read/Write
/// will take the <see cref="_gate"/> before touching it.
/// </summary>
internal Plc? Plc { get; private set; }
private DriverHealth _health = new(DriverState.Unknown, null, null);
private bool _disposed;
public string DriverInstanceId => driverInstanceId;
public string DriverType => "S7";
public async Task InitializeAsync(string driverConfigJson, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Initializing, null, null);
try
{
var plc = new Plc(_options.CpuType, _options.Host, _options.Rack, _options.Slot);
// S7netplus writes timeouts into the underlying TcpClient via Plc.WriteTimeout /
// Plc.ReadTimeout (milliseconds). Set before OpenAsync so the handshake itself
// honours the bound.
plc.WriteTimeout = (int)_options.Timeout.TotalMilliseconds;
plc.ReadTimeout = (int)_options.Timeout.TotalMilliseconds;
using var cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(cancellationToken);
cts.CancelAfter(_options.Timeout);
await plc.OpenAsync(cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
Plc = plc;
// Parse every tag's address once at init so config typos fail fast here instead
// of surfacing as BadInternalError on every Read against the bad tag. The parser
// also rejects bit-offset > 7, DB 0, unknown area letters, etc.
_tagsByName.Clear();
_parsedByName.Clear();
foreach (var t in _options.Tags)
{
var parsed = S7AddressParser.Parse(t.Address); // throws FormatException
_tagsByName[t.Name] = t;
_parsedByName[t.Name] = parsed;
}
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Healthy, DateTime.UtcNow, null);
// Kick off the probe loop once the connection is up. Initial HostState stays
// Unknown until the first probe tick succeeds — avoids broadcasting a premature
// Running transition before any PDU round-trip has happened.
if (_options.Probe.Enabled)
{
_probeCts = new CancellationTokenSource();
_ = Task.Run(() => ProbeLoopAsync(_probeCts.Token), _probeCts.Token);
}
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
// Clean up a partially-constructed Plc so a retry from the caller doesn't leak
// the TcpClient. S7netplus's Close() is best-effort and idempotent.
try { Plc?.Close(); } catch { }
Plc = null;
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Faulted, null, ex.Message);
throw;
}
}
public async Task ReinitializeAsync(string driverConfigJson, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
await ShutdownAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
await InitializeAsync(driverConfigJson, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
public Task ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
try { _probeCts?.Cancel(); } catch { }
_probeCts?.Dispose();
_probeCts = null;
foreach (var state in _subscriptions.Values)
{
try { state.Cts.Cancel(); } catch { }
state.Cts.Dispose();
}
_subscriptions.Clear();
try { Plc?.Close(); } catch { /* best-effort — tearing down anyway */ }
Plc = null;
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Unknown, _health.LastSuccessfulRead, null);
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
public DriverHealth GetHealth() => _health;
/// <summary>
/// Approximate memory footprint. The Plc instance + one 240-960 byte PDU buffer is
/// under 4 KB; return 0 because the <see cref="IDriver"/> contract asks for a
/// driver-attributable growth number and S7.Net doesn't expose one.
/// </summary>
public long GetMemoryFootprint() => 0;
public Task FlushOptionalCachesAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.CompletedTask;
// ---- IReadable ----
public async Task<IReadOnlyList<DataValueSnapshot>> ReadAsync(
IReadOnlyList<string> fullReferences, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var plc = RequirePlc();
var now = DateTime.UtcNow;
var results = new DataValueSnapshot[fullReferences.Count];
await _gate.WaitAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
try
{
for (var i = 0; i < fullReferences.Count; i++)
{
var name = fullReferences[i];
if (!_tagsByName.TryGetValue(name, out var tag))
{
results[i] = new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadNodeIdUnknown, null, now);
continue;
}
try
{
var value = await ReadOneAsync(plc, tag, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
results[i] = new DataValueSnapshot(value, 0u, now, now);
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Healthy, now, null);
}
catch (NotSupportedException)
{
results[i] = new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadNotSupported, null, now);
}
catch (global::S7.Net.PlcException pex)
{
// S7.Net's PlcException carries an ErrorCode; PUT/GET-disabled on
// S7-1200/1500 surfaces here. Map to BadDeviceFailure so operators see a
// device-config problem (toggle PUT/GET in TIA Portal) rather than a
// transient fault — per driver-specs.md §5.
results[i] = new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadDeviceFailure, null, now);
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Degraded, _health.LastSuccessfulRead, pex.Message);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
results[i] = new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadCommunicationError, null, now);
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Degraded, _health.LastSuccessfulRead, ex.Message);
}
}
}
finally { _gate.Release(); }
return results;
}
private async Task<object> ReadOneAsync(global::S7.Net.Plc plc, S7TagDefinition tag, CancellationToken ct)
{
var addr = _parsedByName[tag.Name];
// S7.Net's string-based ReadAsync returns object where the boxed .NET type depends on
// the size suffix: DBX=bool, DBB=byte, DBW=ushort, DBD=uint. Our S7DataType enum
// specifies the SEMANTIC type (Int16 vs UInt16 vs Float32 etc.); the reinterpret below
// converts the raw unsigned boxed value into the requested type without issuing an
// extra PLC round-trip.
var raw = await plc.ReadAsync(tag.Address, ct).ConfigureAwait(false)
?? throw new System.IO.InvalidDataException($"S7.Net returned null for '{tag.Address}'");
return (tag.DataType, addr.Size, raw) switch
{
(S7DataType.Bool, S7Size.Bit, bool b) => b,
(S7DataType.Byte, S7Size.Byte, byte by) => by,
(S7DataType.UInt16, S7Size.Word, ushort u16) => u16,
(S7DataType.Int16, S7Size.Word, ushort u16) => unchecked((short)u16),
(S7DataType.UInt32, S7Size.DWord, uint u32) => u32,
(S7DataType.Int32, S7Size.DWord, uint u32) => unchecked((int)u32),
(S7DataType.Float32, S7Size.DWord, uint u32) => BitConverter.UInt32BitsToSingle(u32),
(S7DataType.Int64, _, _) => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 Int64 reads land in a follow-up PR"),
(S7DataType.UInt64, _, _) => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 UInt64 reads land in a follow-up PR"),
(S7DataType.Float64, _, _) => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 Float64 (LReal) reads land in a follow-up PR"),
(S7DataType.String, _, _) => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 STRING reads land in a follow-up PR"),
(S7DataType.DateTime, _, _) => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 DateTime reads land in a follow-up PR"),
_ => throw new System.IO.InvalidDataException(
$"S7 Read type-mismatch: tag '{tag.Name}' declared {tag.DataType} but address '{tag.Address}' " +
$"parsed as Size={addr.Size}; S7.Net returned {raw.GetType().Name}"),
};
}
// ---- IWritable ----
public async Task<IReadOnlyList<WriteResult>> WriteAsync(
IReadOnlyList<WriteRequest> writes, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var plc = RequirePlc();
var results = new WriteResult[writes.Count];
await _gate.WaitAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
try
{
for (var i = 0; i < writes.Count; i++)
{
var w = writes[i];
if (!_tagsByName.TryGetValue(w.FullReference, out var tag))
{
results[i] = new WriteResult(StatusBadNodeIdUnknown);
continue;
}
if (!tag.Writable)
{
results[i] = new WriteResult(StatusBadNotWritable);
continue;
}
try
{
await WriteOneAsync(plc, tag, w.Value, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
results[i] = new WriteResult(0u);
}
catch (NotSupportedException)
{
results[i] = new WriteResult(StatusBadNotSupported);
}
catch (global::S7.Net.PlcException)
{
results[i] = new WriteResult(StatusBadDeviceFailure);
}
catch (Exception)
{
results[i] = new WriteResult(StatusBadInternalError);
}
}
}
finally { _gate.Release(); }
return results;
}
private async Task WriteOneAsync(global::S7.Net.Plc plc, S7TagDefinition tag, object? value, CancellationToken ct)
{
// S7.Net's Plc.WriteAsync(string address, object value) expects the boxed value to
// match the address's size-suffix type: DBX=bool, DBB=byte, DBW=ushort, DBD=uint.
// Our S7DataType lets the caller pass short/int/float; convert to the unsigned
// wire representation before handing off.
var boxed = tag.DataType switch
{
S7DataType.Bool => (object)Convert.ToBoolean(value),
S7DataType.Byte => (object)Convert.ToByte(value),
S7DataType.UInt16 => (object)Convert.ToUInt16(value),
S7DataType.Int16 => (object)unchecked((ushort)Convert.ToInt16(value)),
S7DataType.UInt32 => (object)Convert.ToUInt32(value),
S7DataType.Int32 => (object)unchecked((uint)Convert.ToInt32(value)),
S7DataType.Float32 => (object)BitConverter.SingleToUInt32Bits(Convert.ToSingle(value)),
S7DataType.Int64 => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 Int64 writes land in a follow-up PR"),
S7DataType.UInt64 => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 UInt64 writes land in a follow-up PR"),
S7DataType.Float64 => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 Float64 (LReal) writes land in a follow-up PR"),
S7DataType.String => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 STRING writes land in a follow-up PR"),
S7DataType.DateTime => throw new NotSupportedException("S7 DateTime writes land in a follow-up PR"),
_ => throw new InvalidOperationException($"Unknown S7DataType {tag.DataType}"),
};
await plc.WriteAsync(tag.Address, boxed, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
private global::S7.Net.Plc RequirePlc() =>
Plc ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("S7Driver not initialized");
// ---- ITagDiscovery ----
public Task DiscoverAsync(IAddressSpaceBuilder builder, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(builder);
var folder = builder.Folder("S7", "S7");
foreach (var t in _options.Tags)
{
folder.Variable(t.Name, t.Name, new DriverAttributeInfo(
FullName: t.Name,
DriverDataType: MapDataType(t.DataType),
IsArray: false,
ArrayDim: null,
SecurityClass: t.Writable ? SecurityClassification.Operate : SecurityClassification.ViewOnly,
IsHistorized: false,
IsAlarm: false,
WriteIdempotent: t.WriteIdempotent));
}
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
private static DriverDataType MapDataType(S7DataType t) => t switch
{
S7DataType.Bool => DriverDataType.Boolean,
S7DataType.Byte => DriverDataType.Int32, // no 8-bit in DriverDataType yet
S7DataType.Int16 or S7DataType.UInt16 or S7DataType.Int32 or S7DataType.UInt32 => DriverDataType.Int32,
S7DataType.Int64 or S7DataType.UInt64 => DriverDataType.Int32, // widens; lossy for >2^31-1
S7DataType.Float32 => DriverDataType.Float32,
S7DataType.Float64 => DriverDataType.Float64,
S7DataType.String => DriverDataType.String,
S7DataType.DateTime => DriverDataType.DateTime,
_ => DriverDataType.Int32,
};
// ---- ISubscribable (polling overlay) ----
public Task<ISubscriptionHandle> SubscribeAsync(
IReadOnlyList<string> fullReferences, TimeSpan publishingInterval, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var id = Interlocked.Increment(ref _nextSubscriptionId);
var cts = new CancellationTokenSource();
// Floor at 100 ms — S7 CPUs scan 2-10 ms but the comms mailbox is processed at most
// once per scan; sub-100 ms polling just queues wire-side with worse latency.
var interval = publishingInterval < TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(100)
? TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(100)
: publishingInterval;
var handle = new S7SubscriptionHandle(id);
var state = new SubscriptionState(handle, [.. fullReferences], interval, cts);
_subscriptions[id] = state;
_ = Task.Run(() => PollLoopAsync(state, cts.Token), cts.Token);
return Task.FromResult<ISubscriptionHandle>(handle);
}
public Task UnsubscribeAsync(ISubscriptionHandle handle, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (handle is S7SubscriptionHandle h && _subscriptions.TryRemove(h.Id, out var state))
{
state.Cts.Cancel();
state.Cts.Dispose();
}
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
private async Task PollLoopAsync(SubscriptionState state, CancellationToken ct)
{
// Initial-data push per OPC UA Part 4 convention.
try { await PollOnceAsync(state, forceRaise: true, ct).ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch (OperationCanceledException) { return; }
catch { /* first-read error — polling continues */ }
while (!ct.IsCancellationRequested)
{
try { await Task.Delay(state.Interval, ct).ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch (OperationCanceledException) { return; }
try { await PollOnceAsync(state, forceRaise: false, ct).ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch (OperationCanceledException) { return; }
catch { /* transient polling error — loop continues, health surface reflects it */ }
}
}
private async Task PollOnceAsync(SubscriptionState state, bool forceRaise, CancellationToken ct)
{
var snapshots = await ReadAsync(state.TagReferences, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
for (var i = 0; i < state.TagReferences.Count; i++)
{
var tagRef = state.TagReferences[i];
var current = snapshots[i];
var lastSeen = state.LastValues.TryGetValue(tagRef, out var prev) ? prev : default;
if (forceRaise || !Equals(lastSeen?.Value, current.Value) || lastSeen?.StatusCode != current.StatusCode)
{
state.LastValues[tagRef] = current;
OnDataChange?.Invoke(this, new DataChangeEventArgs(state.Handle, tagRef, current));
}
}
}
private sealed record SubscriptionState(
S7SubscriptionHandle Handle,
IReadOnlyList<string> TagReferences,
TimeSpan Interval,
CancellationTokenSource Cts)
{
public System.Collections.Concurrent.ConcurrentDictionary<string, DataValueSnapshot> LastValues { get; }
= new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
private sealed record S7SubscriptionHandle(long Id) : ISubscriptionHandle
{
public string DiagnosticId => $"s7-sub-{Id}";
}
// ---- IHostConnectivityProbe ----
/// <summary>
/// Host identifier surfaced in <see cref="GetHostStatuses"/>. <c>host:port</c> format
/// matches the Modbus driver's convention so the Admin UI dashboard renders both
/// family's rows uniformly.
/// </summary>
public string HostName => $"{_options.Host}:{_options.Port}";
public IReadOnlyList<HostConnectivityStatus> GetHostStatuses()
{
lock (_probeLock)
return [new HostConnectivityStatus(HostName, _hostState, _hostStateChangedUtc)];
}
private async Task ProbeLoopAsync(CancellationToken ct)
{
while (!ct.IsCancellationRequested)
{
var success = false;
try
{
// Probe via S7.Net's low-cost GetCpuStatus — returns the CPU state (Run/Stop)
// and is intentionally light on the comms mailbox. Single-word Plc.ReadAsync
// would also work but GetCpuStatus doubles as a "PLC actually up" check.
using var probeCts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(ct);
probeCts.CancelAfter(_options.Probe.Timeout);
var plc = Plc;
if (plc is null) throw new InvalidOperationException("Plc dropped during probe");
await _gate.WaitAsync(probeCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
try
{
_ = await plc.ReadStatusAsync(probeCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
success = true;
}
finally { _gate.Release(); }
}
catch (OperationCanceledException) when (ct.IsCancellationRequested) { return; }
catch { /* transport/timeout/exception — treated as Stopped below */ }
TransitionTo(success ? HostState.Running : HostState.Stopped);
try { await Task.Delay(_options.Probe.Interval, ct).ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch (OperationCanceledException) { return; }
}
}
private void TransitionTo(HostState newState)
{
HostState old;
lock (_probeLock)
{
old = _hostState;
if (old == newState) return;
_hostState = newState;
_hostStateChangedUtc = DateTime.UtcNow;
}
OnHostStatusChanged?.Invoke(this, new HostStatusChangedEventArgs(HostName, old, newState));
}
public void Dispose() => DisposeAsync().AsTask().GetAwaiter().GetResult();
public async ValueTask DisposeAsync()
{
if (_disposed) return;
_disposed = true;
try { await ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch { /* disposal is best-effort */ }
_gate.Dispose();
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
using S7NetCpuType = global::S7.Net.CpuType;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7;
/// <summary>
/// Siemens S7 native (S7comm / ISO-on-TCP port 102) driver configuration. Bound from the
/// driver's <c>DriverConfig</c> JSON at <c>DriverHost.RegisterAsync</c>. Unlike the Modbus
/// driver the S7 driver uses the PLC's *native* protocol — port 102 ISO-on-TCP rather
/// than Modbus's 502, and S7-specific area codes (DB, M, I, Q) rather than holding-
/// register / coil tables.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The driver requires <b>PUT/GET communication enabled</b> in the TIA Portal
/// hardware config for S7-1200/1500. The factory default disables PUT/GET access,
/// so a driver configured against a freshly-flashed CPU will see a hard error
/// (S7.Net surfaces it as <c>Plc.ReadAsync</c> returning <c>ErrorCode.Accessing</c>).
/// The driver maps that specifically to <c>BadNotSupported</c> and flags it as a
/// configuration alert rather than a transient fault — blind Polly retry is wasted
/// effort when the PLC will keep refusing every request.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// See <c>docs/v2/driver-specs.md</c> §5 for the full specification.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class S7DriverOptions
{
/// <summary>PLC IP address or hostname.</summary>
public string Host { get; init; } = "127.0.0.1";
/// <summary>TCP port. ISO-on-TCP is 102 on every S7 model; override only for unusual NAT setups.</summary>
public int Port { get; init; } = 102;
/// <summary>
/// CPU family. Determines the ISO-TSAP slot byte that S7.Net uses during connection
/// setup — pick the family that matches the target PLC exactly.
/// </summary>
public S7NetCpuType CpuType { get; init; } = S7NetCpuType.S71500;
/// <summary>
/// Hardware rack number. Almost always 0; relevant only for distributed S7-400 racks
/// with multiple CPUs.
/// </summary>
public short Rack { get; init; } = 0;
/// <summary>
/// CPU slot. Conventions per family: S7-300 = slot 2, S7-400 = slot 2 or 3,
/// S7-1200 / S7-1500 = slot 0 (onboard PN). S7.Net uses this to build the remote
/// TSAP. Wrong slot → connection refused during handshake.
/// </summary>
public short Slot { get; init; } = 0;
/// <summary>Connect + per-operation timeout.</summary>
public TimeSpan Timeout { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5);
/// <summary>Pre-declared tag map. S7 has a symbol-table protocol but S7.Net does not expose it, so the driver operates off a static tag list configured per-site. Address grammar documented in S7AddressParser (PR 63).</summary>
public IReadOnlyList<S7TagDefinition> Tags { get; init; } = [];
/// <summary>
/// Background connectivity-probe settings. When enabled, the driver runs a tick loop
/// that issues a cheap read against <see cref="S7ProbeOptions.ProbeAddress"/> every
/// <see cref="S7ProbeOptions.Interval"/> and raises <c>OnHostStatusChanged</c> on
/// Running ↔ Stopped transitions.
/// </summary>
public S7ProbeOptions Probe { get; init; } = new();
}
public sealed class S7ProbeOptions
{
public bool Enabled { get; init; } = true;
public TimeSpan Interval { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5);
public TimeSpan Timeout { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2);
/// <summary>
/// Address to probe for liveness. DB1.DBW0 is the convention if the PLC project
/// reserves a small fingerprint DB for health checks (per <c>docs/v2/s7.md</c>);
/// if not, pick any valid Merker word like <c>MW0</c>.
/// </summary>
public string ProbeAddress { get; init; } = "MW0";
}
/// <summary>
/// One S7 variable as exposed by the driver. Addresses use S7.Net syntax — see
/// <c>S7AddressParser</c> (PR 63) for the grammar.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="Name">Tag name; OPC UA browse name + driver full reference.</param>
/// <param name="Address">S7 address string, e.g. <c>DB1.DBW0</c>, <c>M0.0</c>, <c>I0.0</c>, <c>QD4</c>. Grammar documented in <c>S7AddressParser</c> (PR 63).</param>
/// <param name="DataType">Logical data type — drives the underlying S7.Net read/write width.</param>
/// <param name="Writable">When true the driver accepts writes for this tag.</param>
/// <param name="StringLength">For <c>DataType = String</c>: S7-string max length. Default 254 (S7 max).</param>
/// <param name="WriteIdempotent">
/// Per <c>docs/v2/plan.md</c> decisions #44, #45, #143 — flag a tag as safe to replay on
/// write timeout / failure. Default <c>false</c>; writes do not auto-retry. Safe candidates
/// on S7: DB word/dword set-points holding analog values, configuration DBs where the same
/// value can be written again without side-effects. Unsafe: M (merker) bits or Q (output)
/// coils that drive edge-triggered routines in the PLC program.
/// </param>
public sealed record S7TagDefinition(
string Name,
string Address,
S7DataType DataType,
bool Writable = true,
int StringLength = 254,
bool WriteIdempotent = false);
public enum S7DataType
{
Bool,
Byte,
Int16,
UInt16,
Int32,
UInt32,
Int64,
UInt64,
Float32,
Float64,
String,
DateTime,
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
<Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk">
<PropertyGroup>
<TargetFramework>net10.0</TargetFramework>
<Nullable>enable</Nullable>
<ImplicitUsings>enable</ImplicitUsings>
<LangVersion>latest</LangVersion>
<TreatWarningsAsErrors>true</TreatWarningsAsErrors>
<GenerateDocumentationFile>true</GenerateDocumentationFile>
<NoWarn>$(NoWarn);CS1591</NoWarn>
<RootNamespace>ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7</RootNamespace>
<AssemblyName>ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7</AssemblyName>
</PropertyGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<ProjectReference Include="..\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions.csproj"/>
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<PackageReference Include="S7netplus" Version="0.20.0"/>
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<InternalsVisibleTo Include="ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Tests"/>
</ItemGroup>
</Project>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.Json;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Hosting;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Observability;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Observability;
/// <summary>
/// Standalone <see cref="HttpListener"/> host for <c>/healthz</c> and <c>/readyz</c>
/// separate from the OPC UA binding. Per <c>docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-1-resilience-
/// and-observability.md</c> §Stream C.1.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Binds to <c>http://localhost:4841</c> by default — loopback avoids the Windows URL-ACL
/// elevation requirement that binding to <c>http://+:4841</c> (wildcard) would impose.
/// When a deployment needs remote probing, a reverse proxy or explicit netsh urlacl grant
/// is the expected path; documented in <c>docs/v2/Server-Deployment.md</c> in a follow-up.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class HealthEndpointsHost : IAsyncDisposable
{
private readonly string _prefix;
private readonly DriverHost _driverHost;
private readonly Func<bool> _configDbHealthy;
private readonly Func<bool> _usingStaleConfig;
private readonly ILogger<HealthEndpointsHost> _logger;
private readonly HttpListener _listener = new();
private readonly DateTime _startedUtc = DateTime.UtcNow;
private CancellationTokenSource? _cts;
private Task? _acceptLoop;
private bool _disposed;
public HealthEndpointsHost(
DriverHost driverHost,
ILogger<HealthEndpointsHost> logger,
Func<bool>? configDbHealthy = null,
Func<bool>? usingStaleConfig = null,
string prefix = "http://localhost:4841/")
{
_driverHost = driverHost;
_logger = logger;
_configDbHealthy = configDbHealthy ?? (() => true);
_usingStaleConfig = usingStaleConfig ?? (() => false);
_prefix = prefix.EndsWith('/') ? prefix : prefix + "/";
_listener.Prefixes.Add(_prefix);
}
public void Start()
{
_listener.Start();
_cts = new CancellationTokenSource();
_acceptLoop = Task.Run(() => AcceptLoopAsync(_cts.Token));
_logger.LogInformation("Health endpoints listening on {Prefix}", _prefix);
}
private async Task AcceptLoopAsync(CancellationToken ct)
{
while (!ct.IsCancellationRequested)
{
HttpListenerContext ctx;
try
{
ctx = await _listener.GetContextAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (HttpListenerException) when (ct.IsCancellationRequested) { break; }
catch (ObjectDisposedException) { break; }
_ = Task.Run(() => HandleAsync(ctx), ct);
}
}
private async Task HandleAsync(HttpListenerContext ctx)
{
try
{
var path = ctx.Request.Url?.AbsolutePath ?? "/";
switch (path)
{
case "/healthz":
await WriteHealthzAsync(ctx).ConfigureAwait(false);
break;
case "/readyz":
await WriteReadyzAsync(ctx).ConfigureAwait(false);
break;
default:
ctx.Response.StatusCode = 404;
break;
}
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "Health endpoint handler failure");
try { ctx.Response.StatusCode = 500; } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
finally
{
try { ctx.Response.Close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
}
private async Task WriteHealthzAsync(HttpListenerContext ctx)
{
var configHealthy = _configDbHealthy();
var staleConfig = _usingStaleConfig();
// /healthz is 200 when process alive + (config DB reachable OR cache-warm).
// Stale-config still serves 200 so the process isn't flagged dead when the DB
// blips; the body surfaces the stale flag for operators.
var healthy = configHealthy || staleConfig;
ctx.Response.StatusCode = healthy ? 200 : 503;
var body = JsonSerializer.Serialize(new
{
status = healthy ? "healthy" : "unhealthy",
uptimeSeconds = (int)(DateTime.UtcNow - _startedUtc).TotalSeconds,
configDbReachable = configHealthy,
usingStaleConfig = staleConfig,
});
await WriteBodyAsync(ctx, body).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
private async Task WriteReadyzAsync(HttpListenerContext ctx)
{
var snapshots = BuildSnapshots();
var verdict = DriverHealthReport.Aggregate(snapshots);
ctx.Response.StatusCode = DriverHealthReport.HttpStatus(verdict);
var body = JsonSerializer.Serialize(new
{
verdict = verdict.ToString(),
uptimeSeconds = (int)(DateTime.UtcNow - _startedUtc).TotalSeconds,
drivers = snapshots.Select(d => new
{
id = d.DriverInstanceId,
state = d.State.ToString(),
detail = d.DetailMessage,
}).ToArray(),
degradedDrivers = snapshots
.Where(d => d.State == DriverState.Degraded || d.State == DriverState.Reconnecting)
.Select(d => d.DriverInstanceId)
.ToArray(),
});
await WriteBodyAsync(ctx, body).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
private IReadOnlyList<DriverHealthSnapshot> BuildSnapshots()
{
var list = new List<DriverHealthSnapshot>();
foreach (var id in _driverHost.RegisteredDriverIds)
{
var driver = _driverHost.GetDriver(id);
if (driver is null) continue;
var health = driver.GetHealth();
list.Add(new DriverHealthSnapshot(driver.DriverInstanceId, health.State, health.LastError));
}
return list;
}
private static async Task WriteBodyAsync(HttpListenerContext ctx, string body)
{
var bytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(body);
ctx.Response.ContentType = "application/json; charset=utf-8";
ctx.Response.ContentLength64 = bytes.LongLength;
await ctx.Response.OutputStream.WriteAsync(bytes).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
public async ValueTask DisposeAsync()
{
if (_disposed) return;
_disposed = true;
_cts?.Cancel();
try { _listener.Stop(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
if (_acceptLoop is not null)
{
try { await _acceptLoop.ConfigureAwait(false); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
_listener.Close();
_cts?.Dispose();
}
}

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Opc.Ua;
using Opc.Ua.Server;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
using DriverWriteRequest = ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions.WriteRequest;
// Core.Abstractions defines a type-named HistoryReadResult (driver-side samples + continuation
@@ -33,8 +34,14 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
private readonly IDriver _driver;
private readonly IReadable? _readable;
private readonly IWritable? _writable;
private readonly CapabilityInvoker _invoker;
private readonly ILogger<DriverNodeManager> _logger;
// Per-variable idempotency flag populated during Variable() registration from
// DriverAttributeInfo.WriteIdempotent. Drives ExecuteWriteAsync's retry gating in
// OnWriteValue; absent entries default to false (decisions #44, #45, #143).
private readonly Dictionary<string, bool> _writeIdempotentByFullRef = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
/// <summary>The driver whose address space this node manager exposes.</summary>
public IDriver Driver => _driver;
@@ -53,12 +60,13 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
private FolderState _currentFolder = null!;
public DriverNodeManager(IServerInternal server, ApplicationConfiguration configuration,
IDriver driver, ILogger<DriverNodeManager> logger)
IDriver driver, CapabilityInvoker invoker, ILogger<DriverNodeManager> logger)
: base(server, configuration, namespaceUris: $"urn:OtOpcUa:{driver.DriverInstanceId}")
{
_driver = driver;
_readable = driver as IReadable;
_writable = driver as IWritable;
_invoker = invoker;
_logger = logger;
}
@@ -148,6 +156,7 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
AddPredefinedNode(SystemContext, v);
_variablesByFullRef[attributeInfo.FullName] = v;
_securityByFullRef[attributeInfo.FullName] = attributeInfo.SecurityClass;
_writeIdempotentByFullRef[attributeInfo.FullName] = attributeInfo.WriteIdempotent;
v.OnReadValue = OnReadValue;
v.OnWriteValue = OnWriteValue;
@@ -188,7 +197,11 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
try
{
var fullRef = node.NodeId.Identifier as string ?? "";
var result = _readable.ReadAsync([fullRef], CancellationToken.None).GetAwaiter().GetResult();
var result = _invoker.ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability.Read,
_driver.DriverInstanceId,
async ct => (IReadOnlyList<DataValueSnapshot>)await _readable.ReadAsync([fullRef], ct).ConfigureAwait(false),
CancellationToken.None).AsTask().GetAwaiter().GetResult();
if (result.Count == 0)
{
statusCode = StatusCodes.BadNoData;
@@ -381,9 +394,15 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
try
{
var results = _writable.WriteAsync(
[new DriverWriteRequest(fullRef!, value)],
CancellationToken.None).GetAwaiter().GetResult();
var isIdempotent = _writeIdempotentByFullRef.GetValueOrDefault(fullRef!, false);
var capturedValue = value;
var results = _invoker.ExecuteWriteAsync(
_driver.DriverInstanceId,
isIdempotent,
async ct => (IReadOnlyList<WriteResult>)await _writable.WriteAsync(
[new DriverWriteRequest(fullRef!, capturedValue)],
ct).ConfigureAwait(false),
CancellationToken.None).AsTask().GetAwaiter().GetResult();
if (results.Count > 0 && results[0].StatusCode != 0)
{
statusCode = results[0].StatusCode;
@@ -465,12 +484,16 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
try
{
var driverResult = History.ReadRawAsync(
fullRef,
details.StartTime,
details.EndTime,
details.NumValuesPerNode,
CancellationToken.None).GetAwaiter().GetResult();
var driverResult = _invoker.ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability.HistoryRead,
_driver.DriverInstanceId,
async ct => await History.ReadRawAsync(
fullRef,
details.StartTime,
details.EndTime,
details.NumValuesPerNode,
ct).ConfigureAwait(false),
CancellationToken.None).AsTask().GetAwaiter().GetResult();
WriteResult(results, errors, i, StatusCodes.Good,
BuildHistoryData(driverResult.Samples), driverResult.ContinuationPoint);
@@ -525,13 +548,17 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
try
{
var driverResult = History.ReadProcessedAsync(
fullRef,
details.StartTime,
details.EndTime,
interval,
aggregate.Value,
CancellationToken.None).GetAwaiter().GetResult();
var driverResult = _invoker.ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability.HistoryRead,
_driver.DriverInstanceId,
async ct => await History.ReadProcessedAsync(
fullRef,
details.StartTime,
details.EndTime,
interval,
aggregate.Value,
ct).ConfigureAwait(false),
CancellationToken.None).AsTask().GetAwaiter().GetResult();
WriteResult(results, errors, i, StatusCodes.Good,
BuildHistoryData(driverResult.Samples), driverResult.ContinuationPoint);
@@ -578,8 +605,11 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
try
{
var driverResult = History.ReadAtTimeAsync(
fullRef, requestedTimes, CancellationToken.None).GetAwaiter().GetResult();
var driverResult = _invoker.ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability.HistoryRead,
_driver.DriverInstanceId,
async ct => await History.ReadAtTimeAsync(fullRef, requestedTimes, ct).ConfigureAwait(false),
CancellationToken.None).AsTask().GetAwaiter().GetResult();
WriteResult(results, errors, i, StatusCodes.Good,
BuildHistoryData(driverResult.Samples), driverResult.ContinuationPoint);
@@ -632,12 +662,16 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
try
{
var driverResult = History.ReadEventsAsync(
sourceName: fullRef,
startUtc: details.StartTime,
endUtc: details.EndTime,
maxEvents: maxEvents,
cancellationToken: CancellationToken.None).GetAwaiter().GetResult();
var driverResult = _invoker.ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability.HistoryRead,
_driver.DriverInstanceId,
async ct => await History.ReadEventsAsync(
sourceName: fullRef,
startUtc: details.StartTime,
endUtc: details.EndTime,
maxEvents: maxEvents,
cancellationToken: ct).ConfigureAwait(false),
CancellationToken.None).AsTask().GetAwaiter().GetResult();
WriteResult(results, errors, i, StatusCodes.Good,
BuildHistoryEvent(driverResult.Events), driverResult.ContinuationPoint);

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ using Opc.Ua;
using Opc.Ua.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Hosting;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.OpcUa;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Observability;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.OpcUa;
@@ -20,18 +22,22 @@ public sealed class OpcUaApplicationHost : IAsyncDisposable
private readonly OpcUaServerOptions _options;
private readonly DriverHost _driverHost;
private readonly IUserAuthenticator _authenticator;
private readonly DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder _pipelineBuilder;
private readonly ILoggerFactory _loggerFactory;
private readonly ILogger<OpcUaApplicationHost> _logger;
private ApplicationInstance? _application;
private OtOpcUaServer? _server;
private HealthEndpointsHost? _healthHost;
private bool _disposed;
public OpcUaApplicationHost(OpcUaServerOptions options, DriverHost driverHost,
IUserAuthenticator authenticator, ILoggerFactory loggerFactory, ILogger<OpcUaApplicationHost> logger)
IUserAuthenticator authenticator, ILoggerFactory loggerFactory, ILogger<OpcUaApplicationHost> logger,
DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder? pipelineBuilder = null)
{
_options = options;
_driverHost = driverHost;
_authenticator = authenticator;
_pipelineBuilder = pipelineBuilder ?? new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
_loggerFactory = loggerFactory;
_logger = logger;
}
@@ -58,12 +64,23 @@ public sealed class OpcUaApplicationHost : IAsyncDisposable
throw new InvalidOperationException(
$"OPC UA application certificate could not be validated or created in {_options.PkiStoreRoot}");
_server = new OtOpcUaServer(_driverHost, _authenticator, _loggerFactory);
_server = new OtOpcUaServer(_driverHost, _authenticator, _pipelineBuilder, _loggerFactory);
await _application.Start(_server).ConfigureAwait(false);
_logger.LogInformation("OPC UA server started — endpoint={Endpoint} driverCount={Count}",
_options.EndpointUrl, _server.DriverNodeManagers.Count);
// Phase 6.1 Stream C: health endpoints on :4841 (loopback by default — see
// HealthEndpointsHost remarks for the Windows URL-ACL tradeoff).
if (_options.HealthEndpointsEnabled)
{
_healthHost = new HealthEndpointsHost(
_driverHost,
_loggerFactory.CreateLogger<HealthEndpointsHost>(),
prefix: _options.HealthEndpointsPrefix);
_healthHost.Start();
}
// Drive each driver's discovery through its node manager. The node manager IS the
// IAddressSpaceBuilder; GenericDriverNodeManager captures alarm-condition sinks into
// its internal map and wires OnAlarmEvent → sink routing.
@@ -217,6 +234,12 @@ public sealed class OpcUaApplicationHost : IAsyncDisposable
{
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "OPC UA server stop threw during dispose");
}
if (_healthHost is not null)
{
try { await _healthHost.DisposeAsync().ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.LogWarning(ex, "Health endpoints host dispose threw"); }
}
await Task.CompletedTask;
}
}

View File

@@ -58,6 +58,20 @@ public sealed class OpcUaServerOptions
/// </summary>
public bool AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates { get; init; } = true;
/// <summary>
/// Whether to start the Phase 6.1 Stream C <c>/healthz</c> + <c>/readyz</c> HTTP listener.
/// Defaults to <c>true</c>; set false in embedded deployments that don't need HTTP
/// (e.g. tests that only exercise the OPC UA surface).
/// </summary>
public bool HealthEndpointsEnabled { get; init; } = true;
/// <summary>
/// URL prefix the health endpoints bind to. Default <c>http://localhost:4841/</c> — loopback
/// avoids Windows URL-ACL elevation. Production deployments that need remote probing should
/// either reverse-proxy or use <c>http://+:4841/</c> with netsh urlacl granted.
/// </summary>
public string HealthEndpointsPrefix { get; init; } = "http://localhost:4841/";
/// <summary>
/// Security profile advertised on the endpoint. Default <see cref="OpcUaSecurityProfile.None"/>
/// preserves the PR 17 endpoint shape; set to <see cref="OpcUaSecurityProfile.Basic256Sha256SignAndEncrypt"/>

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ using Opc.Ua.Server;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Hosting;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.OpcUa;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.OpcUa;
@@ -19,13 +20,19 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaServer : StandardServer
{
private readonly DriverHost _driverHost;
private readonly IUserAuthenticator _authenticator;
private readonly DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder _pipelineBuilder;
private readonly ILoggerFactory _loggerFactory;
private readonly List<DriverNodeManager> _driverNodeManagers = new();
public OtOpcUaServer(DriverHost driverHost, IUserAuthenticator authenticator, ILoggerFactory loggerFactory)
public OtOpcUaServer(
DriverHost driverHost,
IUserAuthenticator authenticator,
DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder pipelineBuilder,
ILoggerFactory loggerFactory)
{
_driverHost = driverHost;
_authenticator = authenticator;
_pipelineBuilder = pipelineBuilder;
_loggerFactory = loggerFactory;
}
@@ -46,7 +53,12 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaServer : StandardServer
if (driver is null) continue;
var logger = _loggerFactory.CreateLogger<DriverNodeManager>();
var manager = new DriverNodeManager(server, configuration, driver, logger);
// Per-driver resilience options: default Tier A pending Stream B.1 which wires
// per-type tiers into DriverTypeRegistry. Read ResilienceConfig JSON from the
// DriverInstance row in a follow-up PR; for now every driver gets Tier A defaults.
var options = new DriverResilienceOptions { Tier = DriverTier.A };
var invoker = new CapabilityInvoker(_pipelineBuilder, driver.DriverInstanceId, () => options, driver.DriverType);
var manager = new DriverNodeManager(server, configuration, driver, invoker, logger);
_driverNodeManagers.Add(manager);
}

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Serilog;
using Serilog.Formatting.Compact;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.LocalCache;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Hosting;
@@ -13,11 +14,25 @@ using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
var builder = Host.CreateApplicationBuilder(args);
Log.Logger = new LoggerConfiguration()
// Per Phase 6.1 Stream C.3: SIEMs (Splunk, Datadog) ingest the JSON file without a
// regex parser. Plain-text rolling file stays on by default for human readability;
// JSON file is opt-in via appsetting `Serilog:WriteJson = true`.
var writeJson = builder.Configuration.GetValue<bool>("Serilog:WriteJson");
var loggerBuilder = new LoggerConfiguration()
.ReadFrom.Configuration(builder.Configuration)
.Enrich.FromLogContext()
.WriteTo.Console()
.WriteTo.File("logs/otopcua-.log", rollingInterval: RollingInterval.Day)
.CreateLogger();
.WriteTo.File("logs/otopcua-.log", rollingInterval: RollingInterval.Day);
if (writeJson)
{
loggerBuilder = loggerBuilder.WriteTo.File(
new CompactJsonFormatter(),
"logs/otopcua-.json.log",
rollingInterval: RollingInterval.Day);
}
Log.Logger = loggerBuilder.CreateLogger();
builder.Services.AddSerilog();
builder.Services.AddWindowsService(o => o.ServiceName = "OtOpcUa");

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
<PackageReference Include="Serilog.Settings.Configuration" Version="9.0.0"/>
<PackageReference Include="Serilog.Sinks.Console" Version="6.0.0"/>
<PackageReference Include="Serilog.Sinks.File" Version="7.0.0"/>
<PackageReference Include="Serilog.Formatting.Compact" Version="3.0.0"/>
<PackageReference Include="OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Server" Version="1.5.374.126"/>
<PackageReference Include="OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Configuration" Version="1.5.374.126"/>
<PackageReference Include="Novell.Directory.Ldap.NETStandard" Version="3.6.0"/>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.LocalCache;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class GenerationSealedCacheTests : IDisposable
{
private readonly string _root = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-sealed-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
public void Dispose()
{
try
{
if (!Directory.Exists(_root)) return;
// Remove ReadOnly attribute first so Directory.Delete can clean sealed files.
foreach (var f in Directory.EnumerateFiles(_root, "*", SearchOption.AllDirectories))
File.SetAttributes(f, FileAttributes.Normal);
Directory.Delete(_root, recursive: true);
}
catch { /* best-effort cleanup */ }
}
private GenerationSnapshot MakeSnapshot(string clusterId, long generationId, string payload = "{\"sample\":true}") =>
new()
{
ClusterId = clusterId,
GenerationId = generationId,
CachedAt = DateTime.UtcNow,
PayloadJson = payload,
};
[Fact]
public async Task FirstBoot_NoSnapshot_ReadThrows()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await Should.ThrowAsync<GenerationCacheUnavailableException>(
() => cache.ReadCurrentAsync("cluster-a"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task SealThenRead_RoundTrips()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
var snapshot = MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 42, "{\"hello\":\"world\"}");
await cache.SealAsync(snapshot);
var read = await cache.ReadCurrentAsync("cluster-a");
read.GenerationId.ShouldBe(42);
read.ClusterId.ShouldBe("cluster-a");
read.PayloadJson.ShouldBe("{\"hello\":\"world\"}");
}
[Fact]
public async Task SealedFile_IsReadOnly_OnDisk()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 5));
var sealedPath = Path.Combine(_root, "cluster-a", "5.db");
File.Exists(sealedPath).ShouldBeTrue();
var attrs = File.GetAttributes(sealedPath);
attrs.HasFlag(FileAttributes.ReadOnly).ShouldBeTrue("sealed file must be read-only");
}
[Fact]
public async Task SealingTwoGenerations_PointerAdvances_ToLatest()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 1));
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 2));
cache.TryGetCurrentGenerationId("cluster-a").ShouldBe(2);
var read = await cache.ReadCurrentAsync("cluster-a");
read.GenerationId.ShouldBe(2);
}
[Fact]
public async Task PriorGenerationFile_Survives_AfterNewSeal()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 1));
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 2));
File.Exists(Path.Combine(_root, "cluster-a", "1.db")).ShouldBeTrue(
"prior generations preserved for audit; pruning is separate");
File.Exists(Path.Combine(_root, "cluster-a", "2.db")).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public async Task CorruptSealedFile_ReadFailsClosed()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 7));
// Corrupt the sealed file: clear read-only, truncate, leave pointer intact.
var sealedPath = Path.Combine(_root, "cluster-a", "7.db");
File.SetAttributes(sealedPath, FileAttributes.Normal);
File.WriteAllBytes(sealedPath, [0x00, 0x01, 0x02]);
await Should.ThrowAsync<GenerationCacheUnavailableException>(
() => cache.ReadCurrentAsync("cluster-a"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task MissingSealedFile_ReadFailsClosed()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 3));
// Delete the sealed file but leave the pointer — corruption scenario.
var sealedPath = Path.Combine(_root, "cluster-a", "3.db");
File.SetAttributes(sealedPath, FileAttributes.Normal);
File.Delete(sealedPath);
await Should.ThrowAsync<GenerationCacheUnavailableException>(
() => cache.ReadCurrentAsync("cluster-a"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task CorruptPointerFile_ReadFailsClosed()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 9));
var pointerPath = Path.Combine(_root, "cluster-a", "CURRENT");
File.WriteAllText(pointerPath, "not-a-number");
await Should.ThrowAsync<GenerationCacheUnavailableException>(
() => cache.ReadCurrentAsync("cluster-a"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task SealSameGenerationTwice_IsIdempotent()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 11));
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 11, "{\"v\":2}"));
var read = await cache.ReadCurrentAsync("cluster-a");
read.PayloadJson.ShouldBe("{\"sample\":true}", "sealed file is immutable; second seal no-ops");
}
[Fact]
public async Task IndependentClusters_DoNotInterfere()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-a", 1));
await cache.SealAsync(MakeSnapshot("cluster-b", 10));
(await cache.ReadCurrentAsync("cluster-a")).GenerationId.ShouldBe(1);
(await cache.ReadCurrentAsync("cluster-b")).GenerationId.ShouldBe(10);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.LocalCache;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class ResilientConfigReaderTests : IDisposable
{
private readonly string _root = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-reader-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
public void Dispose()
{
try
{
if (!Directory.Exists(_root)) return;
foreach (var f in Directory.EnumerateFiles(_root, "*", SearchOption.AllDirectories))
File.SetAttributes(f, FileAttributes.Normal);
Directory.Delete(_root, recursive: true);
}
catch { /* best-effort */ }
}
[Fact]
public async Task CentralDbSucceeds_ReturnsValue_MarksFresh()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
var flag = new StaleConfigFlag { };
flag.MarkStale(); // pre-existing stale state
var reader = new ResilientConfigReader(cache, flag, NullLogger<ResilientConfigReader>.Instance);
var result = await reader.ReadAsync(
"cluster-a",
_ => ValueTask.FromResult("fresh-from-db"),
_ => "from-cache",
CancellationToken.None);
result.ShouldBe("fresh-from-db");
flag.IsStale.ShouldBeFalse("successful central-DB read clears stale flag");
}
[Fact]
public async Task CentralDbFails_ExhaustsRetries_FallsBackToCache_MarksStale()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
await cache.SealAsync(new GenerationSnapshot
{
ClusterId = "cluster-a", GenerationId = 99, CachedAt = DateTime.UtcNow,
PayloadJson = "{\"cached\":true}",
});
var flag = new StaleConfigFlag();
var reader = new ResilientConfigReader(cache, flag, NullLogger<ResilientConfigReader>.Instance,
timeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10), retryCount: 2);
var attempts = 0;
var result = await reader.ReadAsync(
"cluster-a",
_ =>
{
attempts++;
throw new InvalidOperationException("SQL dead");
#pragma warning disable CS0162
return ValueTask.FromResult("never");
#pragma warning restore CS0162
},
snap => snap.PayloadJson,
CancellationToken.None);
attempts.ShouldBe(3, "1 initial + 2 retries = 3 attempts");
result.ShouldBe("{\"cached\":true}");
flag.IsStale.ShouldBeTrue("cache fallback flips stale flag true");
}
[Fact]
public async Task CentralDbFails_AndCacheAlsoUnavailable_Throws()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
var flag = new StaleConfigFlag();
var reader = new ResilientConfigReader(cache, flag, NullLogger<ResilientConfigReader>.Instance,
timeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10), retryCount: 0);
await Should.ThrowAsync<GenerationCacheUnavailableException>(async () =>
{
await reader.ReadAsync<string>(
"cluster-a",
_ => throw new InvalidOperationException("SQL dead"),
_ => "never",
CancellationToken.None);
});
flag.IsStale.ShouldBeFalse("no snapshot ever served, so flag stays whatever it was");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Cancellation_NotRetried()
{
var cache = new GenerationSealedCache(_root);
var flag = new StaleConfigFlag();
var reader = new ResilientConfigReader(cache, flag, NullLogger<ResilientConfigReader>.Instance,
timeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10), retryCount: 5);
using var cts = new CancellationTokenSource();
cts.Cancel();
var attempts = 0;
await Should.ThrowAsync<OperationCanceledException>(async () =>
{
await reader.ReadAsync<string>(
"cluster-a",
ct =>
{
attempts++;
ct.ThrowIfCancellationRequested();
return ValueTask.FromResult("ok");
},
_ => "cache",
cts.Token);
});
attempts.ShouldBeLessThanOrEqualTo(1);
}
}
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class StaleConfigFlagTests
{
[Fact]
public void Default_IsFresh()
{
new StaleConfigFlag().IsStale.ShouldBeFalse();
}
[Fact]
public void MarkStale_ThenFresh_Toggles()
{
var flag = new StaleConfigFlag();
flag.MarkStale();
flag.IsStale.ShouldBeTrue();
flag.MarkFresh();
flag.IsStale.ShouldBeFalse();
}
[Fact]
public void ConcurrentWrites_Converge()
{
var flag = new StaleConfigFlag();
Parallel.For(0, 1000, i =>
{
if (i % 2 == 0) flag.MarkStale(); else flag.MarkFresh();
});
flag.MarkFresh();
flag.IsStale.ShouldBeFalse();
}
}

View File

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ public sealed class SchemaComplianceTests
"DriverInstance", "Device", "Equipment", "Tag", "PollGroup",
"NodeAcl", "ExternalIdReservation",
"DriverHostStatus",
"DriverInstanceResilienceStatus",
};
var actual = QueryStrings(@"

View File

@@ -7,11 +7,13 @@ public sealed class DriverTypeRegistryTests
{
private static DriverTypeMetadata SampleMetadata(
string typeName = "Modbus",
NamespaceKindCompatibility allowed = NamespaceKindCompatibility.Equipment) =>
NamespaceKindCompatibility allowed = NamespaceKindCompatibility.Equipment,
DriverTier tier = DriverTier.B) =>
new(typeName, allowed,
DriverConfigJsonSchema: "{\"type\": \"object\"}",
DeviceConfigJsonSchema: "{\"type\": \"object\"}",
TagConfigJsonSchema: "{\"type\": \"object\"}");
TagConfigJsonSchema: "{\"type\": \"object\"}",
Tier: tier);
[Fact]
public void Register_ThenGet_RoundTrips()
@@ -24,6 +26,20 @@ public sealed class DriverTypeRegistryTests
registry.Get("Modbus").ShouldBe(metadata);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.C)]
public void Register_Requires_NonNullTier(DriverTier tier)
{
var registry = new DriverTypeRegistry();
var metadata = SampleMetadata(typeName: $"Driver-{tier}", tier: tier);
registry.Register(metadata);
registry.Get(metadata.TypeName).Tier.ShouldBe(tier);
}
[Fact]
public void Get_IsCaseInsensitive()
{

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
using Serilog;
using Serilog.Core;
using Serilog.Events;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Observability;
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
public sealed class CapabilityInvokerEnrichmentTests
{
[Fact]
public async Task InvokerExecute_LogsInsideCallSite_CarryStructuredProperties()
{
var sink = new InMemorySink();
var logger = new LoggerConfiguration()
.Enrich.FromLogContext()
.WriteTo.Sink(sink)
.CreateLogger();
var invoker = new CapabilityInvoker(
new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(),
driverInstanceId: "drv-live",
optionsAccessor: () => new DriverResilienceOptions { Tier = DriverTier.A },
driverType: "Modbus");
await invoker.ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability.Read,
"plc-1",
ct =>
{
logger.Information("inside call site");
return ValueTask.FromResult(42);
},
CancellationToken.None);
var evt = sink.Events.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
evt.Properties["DriverInstanceId"].ToString().ShouldBe("\"drv-live\"");
evt.Properties["DriverType"].ToString().ShouldBe("\"Modbus\"");
evt.Properties["CapabilityName"].ToString().ShouldBe("\"Read\"");
evt.Properties.ShouldContainKey("CorrelationId");
}
[Fact]
public async Task InvokerExecute_DoesNotLeak_ContextOutsideCallSite()
{
var sink = new InMemorySink();
var logger = new LoggerConfiguration()
.Enrich.FromLogContext()
.WriteTo.Sink(sink)
.CreateLogger();
var invoker = new CapabilityInvoker(
new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(),
driverInstanceId: "drv-a",
optionsAccessor: () => new DriverResilienceOptions { Tier = DriverTier.A });
await invoker.ExecuteAsync(DriverCapability.Read, "host", _ => ValueTask.FromResult(1), CancellationToken.None);
logger.Information("outside");
var outside = sink.Events.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
outside.Properties.ContainsKey("DriverInstanceId").ShouldBeFalse();
}
private sealed class InMemorySink : ILogEventSink
{
public List<LogEvent> Events { get; } = [];
public void Emit(LogEvent logEvent) => Events.Add(logEvent);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Observability;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Observability;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class DriverHealthReportTests
{
[Fact]
public void EmptyFleet_IsHealthy()
{
DriverHealthReport.Aggregate([]).ShouldBe(ReadinessVerdict.Healthy);
}
[Fact]
public void AllHealthy_Fleet_IsHealthy()
{
var verdict = DriverHealthReport.Aggregate([
new DriverHealthSnapshot("a", DriverState.Healthy),
new DriverHealthSnapshot("b", DriverState.Healthy),
]);
verdict.ShouldBe(ReadinessVerdict.Healthy);
}
[Fact]
public void AnyFaulted_TrumpsEverything()
{
var verdict = DriverHealthReport.Aggregate([
new DriverHealthSnapshot("a", DriverState.Healthy),
new DriverHealthSnapshot("b", DriverState.Degraded),
new DriverHealthSnapshot("c", DriverState.Faulted),
new DriverHealthSnapshot("d", DriverState.Initializing),
]);
verdict.ShouldBe(ReadinessVerdict.Faulted);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverState.Unknown)]
[InlineData(DriverState.Initializing)]
public void Any_NotReady_WithoutFaulted_IsNotReady(DriverState initializingState)
{
var verdict = DriverHealthReport.Aggregate([
new DriverHealthSnapshot("a", DriverState.Healthy),
new DriverHealthSnapshot("b", initializingState),
]);
verdict.ShouldBe(ReadinessVerdict.NotReady);
}
[Fact]
public void Any_Degraded_WithoutFaultedOrNotReady_IsDegraded()
{
var verdict = DriverHealthReport.Aggregate([
new DriverHealthSnapshot("a", DriverState.Healthy),
new DriverHealthSnapshot("b", DriverState.Degraded),
]);
verdict.ShouldBe(ReadinessVerdict.Degraded);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(ReadinessVerdict.Healthy, 200)]
[InlineData(ReadinessVerdict.Degraded, 200)]
[InlineData(ReadinessVerdict.NotReady, 503)]
[InlineData(ReadinessVerdict.Faulted, 503)]
public void HttpStatus_MatchesStateMatrix(ReadinessVerdict verdict, int expected)
{
DriverHealthReport.HttpStatus(verdict).ShouldBe(expected);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
using Serilog;
using Serilog.Core;
using Serilog.Events;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Observability;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Observability;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class LogContextEnricherTests
{
[Fact]
public void Scope_Attaches_AllFour_Properties()
{
var captured = new InMemorySink();
var logger = new LoggerConfiguration()
.Enrich.FromLogContext()
.WriteTo.Sink(captured)
.CreateLogger();
using (LogContextEnricher.Push("drv-1", "Modbus", DriverCapability.Read, "abc123"))
{
logger.Information("test message");
}
var evt = captured.Events.ShouldHaveSingleItem();
evt.Properties["DriverInstanceId"].ToString().ShouldBe("\"drv-1\"");
evt.Properties["DriverType"].ToString().ShouldBe("\"Modbus\"");
evt.Properties["CapabilityName"].ToString().ShouldBe("\"Read\"");
evt.Properties["CorrelationId"].ToString().ShouldBe("\"abc123\"");
}
[Fact]
public void Scope_Dispose_Pops_Properties()
{
var captured = new InMemorySink();
var logger = new LoggerConfiguration()
.Enrich.FromLogContext()
.WriteTo.Sink(captured)
.CreateLogger();
using (LogContextEnricher.Push("drv-1", "Modbus", DriverCapability.Read, "abc123"))
{
logger.Information("inside");
}
logger.Information("outside");
captured.Events.Count.ShouldBe(2);
captured.Events[0].Properties.ContainsKey("DriverInstanceId").ShouldBeTrue();
captured.Events[1].Properties.ContainsKey("DriverInstanceId").ShouldBeFalse();
}
[Fact]
public void NewCorrelationId_Returns_12_Hex_Chars()
{
var id = LogContextEnricher.NewCorrelationId();
id.Length.ShouldBe(12);
id.ShouldMatch("^[0-9a-f]{12}$");
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(null)]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(" ")]
public void Push_Throws_OnMissingDriverInstanceId(string? id)
{
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() =>
LogContextEnricher.Push(id!, "Modbus", DriverCapability.Read, "c"));
}
private sealed class InMemorySink : ILogEventSink
{
public List<LogEvent> Events { get; } = [];
public void Emit(LogEvent logEvent) => Events.Add(logEvent);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Resilience;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class CapabilityInvokerTests
{
private static CapabilityInvoker MakeInvoker(
DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder builder,
DriverResilienceOptions options) =>
new(builder, "drv-test", () => options);
[Fact]
public async Task Read_ReturnsValue_FromCallSite()
{
var invoker = MakeInvoker(new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(), new DriverResilienceOptions { Tier = DriverTier.A });
var result = await invoker.ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability.Read,
"host-1",
_ => ValueTask.FromResult(42),
CancellationToken.None);
result.ShouldBe(42);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Read_Retries_OnTransientFailure()
{
var invoker = MakeInvoker(new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(), new DriverResilienceOptions { Tier = DriverTier.A });
var attempts = 0;
var result = await invoker.ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability.Read,
"host-1",
async _ =>
{
attempts++;
if (attempts < 2) throw new InvalidOperationException("transient");
await Task.Yield();
return "ok";
},
CancellationToken.None);
result.ShouldBe("ok");
attempts.ShouldBe(2);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Write_NonIdempotent_DoesNotRetry_EvenWhenPolicyHasRetries()
{
var options = new DriverResilienceOptions
{
Tier = DriverTier.A,
CapabilityPolicies = new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Write] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 2, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
},
};
var invoker = MakeInvoker(new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(), options);
var attempts = 0;
await Should.ThrowAsync<InvalidOperationException>(async () =>
await invoker.ExecuteWriteAsync(
"host-1",
isIdempotent: false,
async _ =>
{
attempts++;
await Task.Yield();
throw new InvalidOperationException("boom");
#pragma warning disable CS0162
return 0;
#pragma warning restore CS0162
},
CancellationToken.None));
attempts.ShouldBe(1, "non-idempotent write must never replay");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Write_Idempotent_Retries_WhenPolicyHasRetries()
{
var options = new DriverResilienceOptions
{
Tier = DriverTier.A,
CapabilityPolicies = new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Write] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 2, RetryCount: 3, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
},
};
var invoker = MakeInvoker(new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(), options);
var attempts = 0;
var result = await invoker.ExecuteWriteAsync(
"host-1",
isIdempotent: true,
async _ =>
{
attempts++;
if (attempts < 2) throw new InvalidOperationException("transient");
await Task.Yield();
return "ok";
},
CancellationToken.None);
result.ShouldBe("ok");
attempts.ShouldBe(2);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Write_Default_DoesNotRetry_WhenPolicyHasZeroRetries()
{
// Tier A Write default is RetryCount=0. Even isIdempotent=true shouldn't retry
// because the policy says not to.
var invoker = MakeInvoker(new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(), new DriverResilienceOptions { Tier = DriverTier.A });
var attempts = 0;
await Should.ThrowAsync<InvalidOperationException>(async () =>
await invoker.ExecuteWriteAsync(
"host-1",
isIdempotent: true,
async _ =>
{
attempts++;
await Task.Yield();
throw new InvalidOperationException("boom");
#pragma warning disable CS0162
return 0;
#pragma warning restore CS0162
},
CancellationToken.None));
attempts.ShouldBe(1, "tier-A default for Write is RetryCount=0");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Execute_HonorsDifferentHosts_Independently()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var invoker = MakeInvoker(builder, new DriverResilienceOptions { Tier = DriverTier.A });
await invoker.ExecuteAsync(DriverCapability.Read, "host-a", _ => ValueTask.FromResult(1), CancellationToken.None);
await invoker.ExecuteAsync(DriverCapability.Read, "host-b", _ => ValueTask.FromResult(2), CancellationToken.None);
builder.CachedPipelineCount.ShouldBe(2);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Resilience;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class DriverResilienceOptionsTests
{
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.C)]
public void TierDefaults_Cover_EveryCapability(DriverTier tier)
{
var defaults = DriverResilienceOptions.GetTierDefaults(tier);
foreach (var capability in Enum.GetValues<DriverCapability>())
defaults.ShouldContainKey(capability);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.C)]
public void Write_NeverRetries_ByDefault(DriverTier tier)
{
var defaults = DriverResilienceOptions.GetTierDefaults(tier);
defaults[DriverCapability.Write].RetryCount.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.C)]
public void AlarmAcknowledge_NeverRetries_ByDefault(DriverTier tier)
{
var defaults = DriverResilienceOptions.GetTierDefaults(tier);
defaults[DriverCapability.AlarmAcknowledge].RetryCount.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A, DriverCapability.Read)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A, DriverCapability.HistoryRead)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B, DriverCapability.Discover)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B, DriverCapability.Probe)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.C, DriverCapability.AlarmSubscribe)]
public void IdempotentCapabilities_Retry_ByDefault(DriverTier tier, DriverCapability capability)
{
var defaults = DriverResilienceOptions.GetTierDefaults(tier);
defaults[capability].RetryCount.ShouldBeGreaterThan(0);
}
[Fact]
public void TierC_DisablesCircuitBreaker_DeferringToSupervisor()
{
var defaults = DriverResilienceOptions.GetTierDefaults(DriverTier.C);
foreach (var (_, policy) in defaults)
policy.BreakerFailureThreshold.ShouldBe(0, "Tier C breaker is handled by the Proxy supervisor (decision #68)");
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B)]
public void TierAAndB_EnableCircuitBreaker(DriverTier tier)
{
var defaults = DriverResilienceOptions.GetTierDefaults(tier);
foreach (var (_, policy) in defaults)
policy.BreakerFailureThreshold.ShouldBeGreaterThan(0);
}
[Fact]
public void Resolve_Uses_TierDefaults_When_NoOverride()
{
var options = new DriverResilienceOptions { Tier = DriverTier.A };
var resolved = options.Resolve(DriverCapability.Read);
resolved.ShouldBe(DriverResilienceOptions.GetTierDefaults(DriverTier.A)[DriverCapability.Read]);
}
[Fact]
public void Resolve_Uses_Override_When_Configured()
{
var custom = new CapabilityPolicy(TimeoutSeconds: 42, RetryCount: 7, BreakerFailureThreshold: 9);
var options = new DriverResilienceOptions
{
Tier = DriverTier.A,
CapabilityPolicies = new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Read] = custom,
},
};
options.Resolve(DriverCapability.Read).ShouldBe(custom);
options.Resolve(DriverCapability.Write).ShouldBe(
DriverResilienceOptions.GetTierDefaults(DriverTier.A)[DriverCapability.Write]);
}
}

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using Polly.CircuitBreaker;
using Polly.Timeout;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Resilience;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class DriverResiliencePipelineBuilderTests
{
private static readonly DriverResilienceOptions TierAOptions = new() { Tier = DriverTier.A };
[Fact]
public async Task Read_Retries_Transient_Failures()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var pipeline = builder.GetOrCreate("drv-test", "host-1", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
var attempts = 0;
await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(async _ =>
{
attempts++;
if (attempts < 3) throw new InvalidOperationException("transient");
await Task.Yield();
});
attempts.ShouldBe(3);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Write_DoesNotRetry_OnFailure()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var pipeline = builder.GetOrCreate("drv-test", "host-1", DriverCapability.Write, TierAOptions);
var attempts = 0;
var ex = await Should.ThrowAsync<InvalidOperationException>(async () =>
{
await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(async _ =>
{
attempts++;
await Task.Yield();
throw new InvalidOperationException("boom");
});
});
attempts.ShouldBe(1);
ex.Message.ShouldBe("boom");
}
[Fact]
public async Task AlarmAcknowledge_DoesNotRetry_OnFailure()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var pipeline = builder.GetOrCreate("drv-test", "host-1", DriverCapability.AlarmAcknowledge, TierAOptions);
var attempts = 0;
await Should.ThrowAsync<InvalidOperationException>(async () =>
{
await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(async _ =>
{
attempts++;
await Task.Yield();
throw new InvalidOperationException("boom");
});
});
attempts.ShouldBe(1);
}
[Fact]
public void Pipeline_IsIsolated_PerHost()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var driverId = "drv-test";
var hostA = builder.GetOrCreate(driverId, "host-a", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
var hostB = builder.GetOrCreate(driverId, "host-b", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
hostA.ShouldNotBeSameAs(hostB);
builder.CachedPipelineCount.ShouldBe(2);
}
[Fact]
public void Pipeline_IsReused_ForSameTriple()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var driverId = "drv-test";
var first = builder.GetOrCreate(driverId, "host-a", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
var second = builder.GetOrCreate(driverId, "host-a", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
first.ShouldBeSameAs(second);
builder.CachedPipelineCount.ShouldBe(1);
}
[Fact]
public void Pipeline_IsIsolated_PerCapability()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var driverId = "drv-test";
var read = builder.GetOrCreate(driverId, "host-a", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
var write = builder.GetOrCreate(driverId, "host-a", DriverCapability.Write, TierAOptions);
read.ShouldNotBeSameAs(write);
}
[Fact]
public async Task DeadHost_DoesNotOpenBreaker_ForSiblingHost()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var driverId = "drv-test";
var deadHost = builder.GetOrCreate(driverId, "dead-plc", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
var liveHost = builder.GetOrCreate(driverId, "live-plc", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
var threshold = TierAOptions.Resolve(DriverCapability.Read).BreakerFailureThreshold;
for (var i = 0; i < threshold + 5; i++)
{
await Should.ThrowAsync<Exception>(async () =>
await deadHost.ExecuteAsync(async _ =>
{
await Task.Yield();
throw new InvalidOperationException("dead plc");
}));
}
var liveAttempts = 0;
await liveHost.ExecuteAsync(async _ =>
{
liveAttempts++;
await Task.Yield();
});
liveAttempts.ShouldBe(1, "healthy sibling host must not be affected by dead peer");
}
[Fact]
public async Task CircuitBreaker_Opens_AfterFailureThreshold_OnTierA()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var pipeline = builder.GetOrCreate("drv-test", "host-1", DriverCapability.Write, TierAOptions);
var threshold = TierAOptions.Resolve(DriverCapability.Write).BreakerFailureThreshold;
for (var i = 0; i < threshold; i++)
{
await Should.ThrowAsync<InvalidOperationException>(async () =>
await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(async _ =>
{
await Task.Yield();
throw new InvalidOperationException("boom");
}));
}
await Should.ThrowAsync<BrokenCircuitException>(async () =>
await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(async _ =>
{
await Task.Yield();
}));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Timeout_Cancels_SlowOperation()
{
var tierAWithShortTimeout = new DriverResilienceOptions
{
Tier = DriverTier.A,
CapabilityPolicies = new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Read] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 1, RetryCount: 0, BreakerFailureThreshold: 5),
},
};
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var pipeline = builder.GetOrCreate("drv-test", "host-1", DriverCapability.Read, tierAWithShortTimeout);
await Should.ThrowAsync<TimeoutRejectedException>(async () =>
await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(async ct =>
{
await Task.Delay(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5), ct);
}));
}
[Fact]
public void Invalidate_Removes_OnlyMatchingInstance()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var keepId = "drv-keep";
var dropId = "drv-drop";
builder.GetOrCreate(keepId, "h", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
builder.GetOrCreate(keepId, "h", DriverCapability.Write, TierAOptions);
builder.GetOrCreate(dropId, "h", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
var removed = builder.Invalidate(dropId);
removed.ShouldBe(1);
builder.CachedPipelineCount.ShouldBe(2);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Cancellation_IsNot_Retried()
{
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var pipeline = builder.GetOrCreate("drv-test", "host-1", DriverCapability.Read, TierAOptions);
var attempts = 0;
using var cts = new CancellationTokenSource();
cts.Cancel();
await Should.ThrowAsync<OperationCanceledException>(async () =>
await pipeline.ExecuteAsync(async ct =>
{
attempts++;
ct.ThrowIfCancellationRequested();
await Task.Yield();
}, cts.Token));
attempts.ShouldBeLessThanOrEqualTo(1);
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Resilience;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class DriverResilienceStatusTrackerTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Now = new(2026, 4, 19, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
[Fact]
public void TryGet_Returns_Null_Before_AnyWrite()
{
var tracker = new DriverResilienceStatusTracker();
tracker.TryGet("drv", "host").ShouldBeNull();
}
[Fact]
public void RecordFailure_Accumulates_ConsecutiveFailures()
{
var tracker = new DriverResilienceStatusTracker();
tracker.RecordFailure("drv", "host", Now);
tracker.RecordFailure("drv", "host", Now.AddSeconds(1));
tracker.RecordFailure("drv", "host", Now.AddSeconds(2));
tracker.TryGet("drv", "host")!.ConsecutiveFailures.ShouldBe(3);
}
[Fact]
public void RecordSuccess_Resets_ConsecutiveFailures()
{
var tracker = new DriverResilienceStatusTracker();
tracker.RecordFailure("drv", "host", Now);
tracker.RecordFailure("drv", "host", Now.AddSeconds(1));
tracker.RecordSuccess("drv", "host", Now.AddSeconds(2));
tracker.TryGet("drv", "host")!.ConsecutiveFailures.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Fact]
public void RecordBreakerOpen_Populates_LastBreakerOpenUtc()
{
var tracker = new DriverResilienceStatusTracker();
tracker.RecordBreakerOpen("drv", "host", Now);
tracker.TryGet("drv", "host")!.LastBreakerOpenUtc.ShouldBe(Now);
}
[Fact]
public void RecordRecycle_Populates_LastRecycleUtc()
{
var tracker = new DriverResilienceStatusTracker();
tracker.RecordRecycle("drv", "host", Now);
tracker.TryGet("drv", "host")!.LastRecycleUtc.ShouldBe(Now);
}
[Fact]
public void RecordFootprint_CapturesBaselineAndCurrent()
{
var tracker = new DriverResilienceStatusTracker();
tracker.RecordFootprint("drv", "host", baselineBytes: 100_000_000, currentBytes: 150_000_000, Now);
var snap = tracker.TryGet("drv", "host")!;
snap.BaselineFootprintBytes.ShouldBe(100_000_000);
snap.CurrentFootprintBytes.ShouldBe(150_000_000);
}
[Fact]
public void DifferentHosts_AreIndependent()
{
var tracker = new DriverResilienceStatusTracker();
tracker.RecordFailure("drv", "host-a", Now);
tracker.RecordFailure("drv", "host-b", Now);
tracker.RecordSuccess("drv", "host-a", Now.AddSeconds(1));
tracker.TryGet("drv", "host-a")!.ConsecutiveFailures.ShouldBe(0);
tracker.TryGet("drv", "host-b")!.ConsecutiveFailures.ShouldBe(1);
}
[Fact]
public void Snapshot_ReturnsAll_TrackedPairs()
{
var tracker = new DriverResilienceStatusTracker();
tracker.RecordFailure("drv-1", "host-a", Now);
tracker.RecordFailure("drv-1", "host-b", Now);
tracker.RecordFailure("drv-2", "host-a", Now);
var snapshot = tracker.Snapshot();
snapshot.Count.ShouldBe(3);
}
[Fact]
public void ConcurrentWrites_DoNotLose_Failures()
{
var tracker = new DriverResilienceStatusTracker();
Parallel.For(0, 500, _ => tracker.RecordFailure("drv", "host", Now));
tracker.TryGet("drv", "host")!.ConsecutiveFailures.ShouldBe(500);
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Resilience;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Resilience;
/// <summary>
/// Integration tests for the Phase 6.1 Stream A.5 contract — wrapping a flaky
/// <see cref="IReadable"/> / <see cref="IWritable"/> through the <see cref="CapabilityInvoker"/>.
/// Exercises the three scenarios the plan enumerates: transient read succeeds after N
/// retries; non-idempotent write fails after one attempt; idempotent write retries through.
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
public sealed class FlakeyDriverIntegrationTests
{
[Fact]
public async Task Read_SurfacesSuccess_AfterTransientFailures()
{
var flaky = new FlakeyDriver(failReadsBeforeIndex: 5);
var options = new DriverResilienceOptions
{
Tier = DriverTier.A,
CapabilityPolicies = new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
// TimeoutSeconds=30 gives slack for 5 exponential-backoff retries under
// parallel-test-execution CPU pressure; 10 retries at the default Delay=100ms
// exponential can otherwise exceed a 2-second budget intermittently.
[DriverCapability.Read] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 30, RetryCount: 10, BreakerFailureThreshold: 50),
},
};
var invoker = new CapabilityInvoker(new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(), "drv-test", () => options);
var result = await invoker.ExecuteAsync(
DriverCapability.Read,
"host-1",
async ct => await flaky.ReadAsync(["tag-a"], ct),
CancellationToken.None);
flaky.ReadAttempts.ShouldBe(6);
result[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Write_NonIdempotent_FailsOnFirstFailure_NoReplay()
{
var flaky = new FlakeyDriver(failWritesBeforeIndex: 3);
var optionsWithAggressiveRetry = new DriverResilienceOptions
{
Tier = DriverTier.A,
CapabilityPolicies = new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Write] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 2, RetryCount: 5, BreakerFailureThreshold: 50),
},
};
var invoker = new CapabilityInvoker(new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(), "drv-test", () => optionsWithAggressiveRetry);
await Should.ThrowAsync<InvalidOperationException>(async () =>
await invoker.ExecuteWriteAsync(
"host-1",
isIdempotent: false,
async ct => await flaky.WriteAsync([new WriteRequest("pulse-coil", true)], ct),
CancellationToken.None));
flaky.WriteAttempts.ShouldBe(1, "non-idempotent write must never replay (decision #44)");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Write_Idempotent_RetriesUntilSuccess()
{
var flaky = new FlakeyDriver(failWritesBeforeIndex: 2);
var optionsWithRetry = new DriverResilienceOptions
{
Tier = DriverTier.A,
CapabilityPolicies = new Dictionary<DriverCapability, CapabilityPolicy>
{
[DriverCapability.Write] = new(TimeoutSeconds: 2, RetryCount: 5, BreakerFailureThreshold: 50),
},
};
var invoker = new CapabilityInvoker(new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder(), "drv-test", () => optionsWithRetry);
var results = await invoker.ExecuteWriteAsync(
"host-1",
isIdempotent: true,
async ct => await flaky.WriteAsync([new WriteRequest("set-point", 42.0f)], ct),
CancellationToken.None);
flaky.WriteAttempts.ShouldBe(3);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
}
[Fact]
public async Task MultipleHosts_OnOneDriver_HaveIndependentFailureCounts()
{
var flaky = new FlakeyDriver(failReadsBeforeIndex: 0);
var options = new DriverResilienceOptions { Tier = DriverTier.A };
var builder = new DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder();
var invoker = new CapabilityInvoker(builder, "drv-test", () => options);
// host-dead: force many failures to exhaust retries + trip breaker
var threshold = options.Resolve(DriverCapability.Read).BreakerFailureThreshold;
for (var i = 0; i < threshold + 5; i++)
{
await Should.ThrowAsync<Exception>(async () =>
await invoker.ExecuteAsync(DriverCapability.Read, "host-dead",
_ => throw new InvalidOperationException("dead"),
CancellationToken.None));
}
// host-live: succeeds on first call — unaffected by the dead-host breaker
var liveAttempts = 0;
await invoker.ExecuteAsync(DriverCapability.Read, "host-live",
_ => { liveAttempts++; return ValueTask.FromResult("ok"); },
CancellationToken.None);
liveAttempts.ShouldBe(1);
}
private sealed class FlakeyDriver : IReadable, IWritable
{
private readonly int _failReadsBeforeIndex;
private readonly int _failWritesBeforeIndex;
public int ReadAttempts { get; private set; }
public int WriteAttempts { get; private set; }
public FlakeyDriver(int failReadsBeforeIndex = 0, int failWritesBeforeIndex = 0)
{
_failReadsBeforeIndex = failReadsBeforeIndex;
_failWritesBeforeIndex = failWritesBeforeIndex;
}
public Task<IReadOnlyList<DataValueSnapshot>> ReadAsync(
IReadOnlyList<string> fullReferences,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var attempt = ++ReadAttempts;
if (attempt <= _failReadsBeforeIndex)
throw new InvalidOperationException($"transient read failure #{attempt}");
var now = DateTime.UtcNow;
IReadOnlyList<DataValueSnapshot> result = fullReferences
.Select(_ => new DataValueSnapshot(Value: 0, StatusCode: 0u, SourceTimestampUtc: now, ServerTimestampUtc: now))
.ToList();
return Task.FromResult(result);
}
public Task<IReadOnlyList<WriteResult>> WriteAsync(
IReadOnlyList<WriteRequest> writes,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var attempt = ++WriteAttempts;
if (attempt <= _failWritesBeforeIndex)
throw new InvalidOperationException($"transient write failure #{attempt}");
IReadOnlyList<WriteResult> result = writes.Select(_ => new WriteResult(0u)).ToList();
return Task.FromResult(result);
}
}
}

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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Stability;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Stability;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class MemoryRecycleTests
{
[Fact]
public async Task TierC_HardBreach_RequestsSupervisorRecycle()
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
var recycle = new MemoryRecycle(DriverTier.C, supervisor, NullLogger<MemoryRecycle>.Instance);
var requested = await recycle.HandleAsync(MemoryTrackingAction.HardBreach, 2_000_000_000, CancellationToken.None);
requested.ShouldBeTrue();
supervisor.RecycleCount.ShouldBe(1);
supervisor.LastReason.ShouldContain("hard-breach");
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B)]
public async Task InProcessTier_HardBreach_NeverRequestsRecycle(DriverTier tier)
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
var recycle = new MemoryRecycle(tier, supervisor, NullLogger<MemoryRecycle>.Instance);
var requested = await recycle.HandleAsync(MemoryTrackingAction.HardBreach, 2_000_000_000, CancellationToken.None);
requested.ShouldBeFalse("Tier A/B hard-breach logs a promotion recommendation only (decisions #74, #145)");
supervisor.RecycleCount.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Fact]
public async Task TierC_WithoutSupervisor_HardBreach_NoOp()
{
var recycle = new MemoryRecycle(DriverTier.C, supervisor: null, NullLogger<MemoryRecycle>.Instance);
var requested = await recycle.HandleAsync(MemoryTrackingAction.HardBreach, 2_000_000_000, CancellationToken.None);
requested.ShouldBeFalse("no supervisor → no recycle path; action logged only");
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.C)]
public async Task SoftBreach_NeverRequestsRecycle(DriverTier tier)
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
var recycle = new MemoryRecycle(tier, supervisor, NullLogger<MemoryRecycle>.Instance);
var requested = await recycle.HandleAsync(MemoryTrackingAction.SoftBreach, 1_000_000_000, CancellationToken.None);
requested.ShouldBeFalse("soft-breach is surface-only at every tier");
supervisor.RecycleCount.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(MemoryTrackingAction.None)]
[InlineData(MemoryTrackingAction.Warming)]
public async Task NonBreachActions_NoOp(MemoryTrackingAction action)
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
var recycle = new MemoryRecycle(DriverTier.C, supervisor, NullLogger<MemoryRecycle>.Instance);
var requested = await recycle.HandleAsync(action, 100_000_000, CancellationToken.None);
requested.ShouldBeFalse();
supervisor.RecycleCount.ShouldBe(0);
}
private sealed class FakeSupervisor : IDriverSupervisor
{
public string DriverInstanceId => "fake-tier-c";
public int RecycleCount { get; private set; }
public string? LastReason { get; private set; }
public Task RecycleAsync(string reason, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
RecycleCount++;
LastReason = reason;
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Stability;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Stability;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class MemoryTrackingTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new(2026, 4, 19, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
[Fact]
public void WarmingUp_Returns_Warming_UntilWindowElapses()
{
var tracker = new MemoryTracking(DriverTier.A, TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5));
tracker.Sample(100_000_000, T0).ShouldBe(MemoryTrackingAction.Warming);
tracker.Sample(105_000_000, T0.AddMinutes(1)).ShouldBe(MemoryTrackingAction.Warming);
tracker.Sample(102_000_000, T0.AddMinutes(4.9)).ShouldBe(MemoryTrackingAction.Warming);
tracker.Phase.ShouldBe(TrackingPhase.WarmingUp);
tracker.BaselineBytes.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Fact]
public void WindowElapsed_CapturesBaselineAsMedian_AndTransitionsToSteady()
{
var tracker = new MemoryTracking(DriverTier.A, TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5));
tracker.Sample(100_000_000, T0);
tracker.Sample(200_000_000, T0.AddMinutes(1));
tracker.Sample(150_000_000, T0.AddMinutes(2));
var first = tracker.Sample(150_000_000, T0.AddMinutes(5));
tracker.Phase.ShouldBe(TrackingPhase.Steady);
tracker.BaselineBytes.ShouldBe(150_000_000L, "median of 4 samples [100, 200, 150, 150] = (150+150)/2 = 150");
first.ShouldBe(MemoryTrackingAction.None, "150 MB is the baseline itself, well under soft threshold");
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A, 3, 50)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B, 3, 100)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.C, 2, 500)]
public void GetTierConstants_MatchesDecision146(DriverTier tier, int expectedMultiplier, long expectedFloorMB)
{
var (multiplier, floor) = MemoryTracking.GetTierConstants(tier);
multiplier.ShouldBe(expectedMultiplier);
floor.ShouldBe(expectedFloorMB * 1024 * 1024);
}
[Fact]
public void SoftThreshold_UsesMax_OfMultiplierAndFloor_SmallBaseline()
{
// Tier A: mult=3, floor=50 MB. Baseline 10 MB → 3×10=30 MB < 10+50=60 MB → floor wins.
var tracker = WarmupWithBaseline(DriverTier.A, 10L * 1024 * 1024);
tracker.SoftThresholdBytes.ShouldBe(60L * 1024 * 1024);
}
[Fact]
public void SoftThreshold_UsesMax_OfMultiplierAndFloor_LargeBaseline()
{
// Tier A: mult=3, floor=50 MB. Baseline 200 MB → 3×200=600 MB > 200+50=250 MB → multiplier wins.
var tracker = WarmupWithBaseline(DriverTier.A, 200L * 1024 * 1024);
tracker.SoftThresholdBytes.ShouldBe(600L * 1024 * 1024);
}
[Fact]
public void HardThreshold_IsTwiceSoft()
{
var tracker = WarmupWithBaseline(DriverTier.B, 200L * 1024 * 1024);
tracker.HardThresholdBytes.ShouldBe(tracker.SoftThresholdBytes * 2);
}
[Fact]
public void Sample_Below_Soft_Returns_None()
{
var tracker = WarmupWithBaseline(DriverTier.A, 100L * 1024 * 1024);
tracker.Sample(200L * 1024 * 1024, T0.AddMinutes(10)).ShouldBe(MemoryTrackingAction.None);
}
[Fact]
public void Sample_AtSoft_Returns_SoftBreach()
{
// Tier A, baseline 200 MB → soft = 600 MB. Sample exactly at soft.
var tracker = WarmupWithBaseline(DriverTier.A, 200L * 1024 * 1024);
tracker.Sample(tracker.SoftThresholdBytes, T0.AddMinutes(10))
.ShouldBe(MemoryTrackingAction.SoftBreach);
}
[Fact]
public void Sample_AtHard_Returns_HardBreach()
{
var tracker = WarmupWithBaseline(DriverTier.A, 200L * 1024 * 1024);
tracker.Sample(tracker.HardThresholdBytes, T0.AddMinutes(10))
.ShouldBe(MemoryTrackingAction.HardBreach);
}
[Fact]
public void Sample_AboveHard_Returns_HardBreach()
{
var tracker = WarmupWithBaseline(DriverTier.A, 200L * 1024 * 1024);
tracker.Sample(tracker.HardThresholdBytes + 100_000_000, T0.AddMinutes(10))
.ShouldBe(MemoryTrackingAction.HardBreach);
}
private static MemoryTracking WarmupWithBaseline(DriverTier tier, long baseline)
{
var tracker = new MemoryTracking(tier, TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5));
tracker.Sample(baseline, T0);
tracker.Sample(baseline, T0.AddMinutes(5));
tracker.BaselineBytes.ShouldBe(baseline);
return tracker;
}
}

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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Stability;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Stability;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class ScheduledRecycleSchedulerTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new(2026, 4, 19, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static readonly TimeSpan Weekly = TimeSpan.FromDays(7);
[Theory]
[InlineData(DriverTier.A)]
[InlineData(DriverTier.B)]
public void TierAOrB_Ctor_Throws(DriverTier tier)
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => new ScheduledRecycleScheduler(
tier, Weekly, T0, supervisor, NullLogger<ScheduledRecycleScheduler>.Instance));
}
[Fact]
public void ZeroOrNegativeInterval_Throws()
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => new ScheduledRecycleScheduler(
DriverTier.C, TimeSpan.Zero, T0, supervisor, NullLogger<ScheduledRecycleScheduler>.Instance));
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => new ScheduledRecycleScheduler(
DriverTier.C, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(-1), T0, supervisor, NullLogger<ScheduledRecycleScheduler>.Instance));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Tick_BeforeNextRecycle_NoOp()
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
var sch = new ScheduledRecycleScheduler(DriverTier.C, Weekly, T0, supervisor, NullLogger<ScheduledRecycleScheduler>.Instance);
var fired = await sch.TickAsync(T0 + TimeSpan.FromDays(6), CancellationToken.None);
fired.ShouldBeFalse();
supervisor.RecycleCount.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Tick_AtOrAfterNextRecycle_FiresOnce_AndAdvances()
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
var sch = new ScheduledRecycleScheduler(DriverTier.C, Weekly, T0, supervisor, NullLogger<ScheduledRecycleScheduler>.Instance);
var fired = await sch.TickAsync(T0 + Weekly + TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1), CancellationToken.None);
fired.ShouldBeTrue();
supervisor.RecycleCount.ShouldBe(1);
sch.NextRecycleUtc.ShouldBe(T0 + Weekly + Weekly);
}
[Fact]
public async Task RequestRecycleNow_Fires_Immediately_WithoutAdvancingSchedule()
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
var sch = new ScheduledRecycleScheduler(DriverTier.C, Weekly, T0, supervisor, NullLogger<ScheduledRecycleScheduler>.Instance);
var nextBefore = sch.NextRecycleUtc;
await sch.RequestRecycleNowAsync("memory hard-breach", CancellationToken.None);
supervisor.RecycleCount.ShouldBe(1);
supervisor.LastReason.ShouldBe("memory hard-breach");
sch.NextRecycleUtc.ShouldBe(nextBefore, "ad-hoc recycle doesn't shift the cron schedule");
}
[Fact]
public async Task MultipleFires_AcrossTicks_AdvanceOneIntervalEach()
{
var supervisor = new FakeSupervisor();
var sch = new ScheduledRecycleScheduler(DriverTier.C, TimeSpan.FromDays(1), T0, supervisor, NullLogger<ScheduledRecycleScheduler>.Instance);
await sch.TickAsync(T0 + TimeSpan.FromDays(1) + TimeSpan.FromHours(1), CancellationToken.None);
await sch.TickAsync(T0 + TimeSpan.FromDays(2) + TimeSpan.FromHours(1), CancellationToken.None);
await sch.TickAsync(T0 + TimeSpan.FromDays(3) + TimeSpan.FromHours(1), CancellationToken.None);
supervisor.RecycleCount.ShouldBe(3);
sch.NextRecycleUtc.ShouldBe(T0 + TimeSpan.FromDays(4));
}
private sealed class FakeSupervisor : IDriverSupervisor
{
public string DriverInstanceId => "tier-c-fake";
public int RecycleCount { get; private set; }
public string? LastReason { get; private set; }
public Task RecycleAsync(string reason, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
RecycleCount++;
LastReason = reason;
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Stability;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Tests.Stability;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class WedgeDetectorTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Now = new(2026, 4, 19, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static readonly TimeSpan Threshold = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(120);
[Fact]
public void SubSixtySecondThreshold_ClampsToSixty()
{
var detector = new WedgeDetector(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10));
detector.Threshold.ShouldBe(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60));
}
[Fact]
public void Unhealthy_Driver_AlwaysNotApplicable()
{
var detector = new WedgeDetector(Threshold);
var demand = new DemandSignal(BulkheadDepth: 5, ActiveMonitoredItems: 10, QueuedHistoryReads: 0, LastProgressUtc: Now.AddMinutes(-10));
detector.Classify(DriverState.Faulted, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.NotApplicable);
detector.Classify(DriverState.Degraded, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.NotApplicable);
detector.Classify(DriverState.Initializing, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.NotApplicable);
}
[Fact]
public void Idle_Subscription_Only_StaysIdle()
{
// Idle driver: bulkhead 0, monitored items 0, no history reads queued.
// Even if LastProgressUtc is ancient, the verdict is Idle, not Faulted.
var detector = new WedgeDetector(Threshold);
var demand = new DemandSignal(0, 0, 0, Now.AddHours(-12));
detector.Classify(DriverState.Healthy, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.Idle);
}
[Fact]
public void PendingWork_WithRecentProgress_StaysHealthy()
{
var detector = new WedgeDetector(Threshold);
var demand = new DemandSignal(BulkheadDepth: 2, ActiveMonitoredItems: 0, QueuedHistoryReads: 0, LastProgressUtc: Now.AddSeconds(-30));
detector.Classify(DriverState.Healthy, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.Healthy);
}
[Fact]
public void PendingWork_WithStaleProgress_IsFaulted()
{
var detector = new WedgeDetector(Threshold);
var demand = new DemandSignal(BulkheadDepth: 2, ActiveMonitoredItems: 0, QueuedHistoryReads: 0, LastProgressUtc: Now.AddMinutes(-5));
detector.Classify(DriverState.Healthy, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.Faulted);
}
[Fact]
public void MonitoredItems_Active_ButNoRecentPublish_IsFaulted()
{
// Subscription-only driver with live MonitoredItems but no publish progress within threshold
// is a real wedge — this is the case the previous "no successful Read" formulation used
// to miss (no reads ever happen).
var detector = new WedgeDetector(Threshold);
var demand = new DemandSignal(BulkheadDepth: 0, ActiveMonitoredItems: 5, QueuedHistoryReads: 0, LastProgressUtc: Now.AddMinutes(-10));
detector.Classify(DriverState.Healthy, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.Faulted);
}
[Fact]
public void MonitoredItems_Active_WithFreshPublish_StaysHealthy()
{
var detector = new WedgeDetector(Threshold);
var demand = new DemandSignal(BulkheadDepth: 0, ActiveMonitoredItems: 5, QueuedHistoryReads: 0, LastProgressUtc: Now.AddSeconds(-10));
detector.Classify(DriverState.Healthy, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.Healthy);
}
[Fact]
public void HistoryBackfill_SlowButMakingProgress_StaysHealthy()
{
// Slow historian backfill — QueuedHistoryReads > 0 but progress advances within threshold.
var detector = new WedgeDetector(Threshold);
var demand = new DemandSignal(BulkheadDepth: 0, ActiveMonitoredItems: 0, QueuedHistoryReads: 50, LastProgressUtc: Now.AddSeconds(-60));
detector.Classify(DriverState.Healthy, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.Healthy);
}
[Fact]
public void WriteOnlyBurst_StaysIdle_WhenBulkheadEmpty()
{
// A write-only driver that just finished a burst: bulkhead drained, no subscriptions, no
// history reads. Idle — the previous formulation would have faulted here because no
// reads were succeeding even though the driver is perfectly healthy.
var detector = new WedgeDetector(Threshold);
var demand = new DemandSignal(0, 0, 0, Now.AddMinutes(-30));
detector.Classify(DriverState.Healthy, demand, Now).ShouldBe(WedgeVerdict.Idle);
}
[Fact]
public void DemandSignal_HasPendingWork_TrueForAnyNonZeroCounter()
{
new DemandSignal(1, 0, 0, Now).HasPendingWork.ShouldBeTrue();
new DemandSignal(0, 1, 0, Now).HasPendingWork.ShouldBeTrue();
new DemandSignal(0, 0, 1, Now).HasPendingWork.ShouldBeTrue();
new DemandSignal(0, 0, 0, Now).HasPendingWork.ShouldBeFalse();
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.DL205;
/// <summary>
/// Verifies DL205/DL260 binary-coded-decimal register handling against the
/// <c>dl205.json</c> pymodbus profile. HR[1072] = 0x1234 on the profile represents
/// decimal 1234 (BCD nibbles). Reading it as <see cref="ModbusDataType.Int16"/> would
/// return 0x1234 = 4660; the <see cref="ModbusDataType.Bcd16"/> path decodes 1234.
/// </summary>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "DL205")]
public sealed class DL205BcdQuirkTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task DL205_BCD16_decodes_HR1072_as_decimal_1234()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "dl205",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != dl205 — skipping (standard profile does not seed HR[1072]).");
}
var options = new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL205_Count_Bcd",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: 1072,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Bcd16, Writable: false),
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL205_Count_Int16",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: 1072,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Int16, Writable: false),
],
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-bcd");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["DL205_Count_Bcd", "DL205_Count_Int16"],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe(1234, "DL205 BCD register 0x1234 represents decimal 1234 per the DirectLOGIC convention");
results[1].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[1].Value.ShouldBe((short)0x1234, "same register read as Int16 returns the raw 0x1234 = 4660 value — proves BCD path is distinct");
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.DL205;
/// <summary>
/// Verifies DL260 I/O-memory coil mappings against the <c>dl205.json</c> pymodbus profile.
/// DirectLOGIC Y-outputs and C-relays are exposed to Modbus as FC01/FC05 coils, but at
/// non-zero base addresses that confuse operators used to "Y0 is the first coil". The sim
/// seeds Y0 → coil 2048 = ON and C0 → coil 3072 = ON as fixed markers.
/// </summary>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "DL205")]
public sealed class DL205CoilMappingTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task DL260_Y0_maps_to_coil_2048()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "dl205",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != dl205 — skipping.");
}
var coil = DirectLogicAddress.YOutputToCoil("Y0");
coil.ShouldBe((ushort)2048);
var options = BuildOptions(sim, [
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL260_Y0",
ModbusRegion.Coils, Address: coil,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Bool, Writable: false),
]);
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-y0");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["DL260_Y0"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe(true, "dl205.json seeds coil 2048 (Y0) = ON");
}
[Fact]
public async Task DL260_C0_maps_to_coil_3072()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "dl205",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != dl205 — skipping.");
}
var coil = DirectLogicAddress.CRelayToCoil("C0");
coil.ShouldBe((ushort)3072);
var options = BuildOptions(sim, [
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL260_C0",
ModbusRegion.Coils, Address: coil,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Bool, Writable: false),
]);
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-c0");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["DL260_C0"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe(true, "dl205.json seeds coil 3072 (C0) = ON");
}
[Fact]
public async Task DL260_scratch_Crelay_supports_write_then_read()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "dl205",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != dl205 — skipping.");
}
// Scratch C-relay at coil 4000 (per dl205.json _quirk note) is writable. Write=true then
// read back to confirm FC05 round-trip works against the DL-mapped coil bank.
var options = BuildOptions(sim, [
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL260_C_Scratch",
ModbusRegion.Coils, Address: 4000,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Bool, Writable: true),
]);
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-cscratch");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var writeResults = await driver.WriteAsync(
[new(FullReference: "DL260_C_Scratch", Value: true)],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
writeResults[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
var readResults = await driver.ReadAsync(["DL260_C_Scratch"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
readResults[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
readResults[0].Value.ShouldBe(true);
}
private static ModbusDriverOptions BuildOptions(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim, IReadOnlyList<ModbusTagDefinition> tags)
=> new()
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags = tags,
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.DL205;
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the driver's Modbus-exception → OPC UA StatusCode translation end-to-end
/// against the dl205.json pymodbus profile. pymodbus returns exception 02 (Illegal Data
/// Address) for reads outside the configured register ranges, matching real DL205/DL260
/// firmware behavior per <c>docs/v2/dl205.md</c> §exception-codes. The driver must surface
/// that as <c>BadOutOfRange</c> (0x803C0000) — not <c>BadInternalError</c> — so the
/// operator sees a tag-config diagnosis instead of a generic driver-fault message.
/// </summary>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "DL205")]
public sealed class DL205ExceptionCodeTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task DL205_FC03_at_unmapped_register_returns_BadOutOfRange()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "dl205",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != dl205 — skipping.");
}
// Address 16383 is the last cell of hr-size=16384 in dl205.json; address 16384 is
// beyond the configured HR range. pymodbus validates and returns exception 02
// (Illegal Data Address).
var options = new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition("Unmapped",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: 16383,
DataType: ModbusDataType.UInt16, Writable: false),
],
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-exc");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["Unmapped"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0x803C0000u,
"DL205 returns exception 02 for an FC03 at an unmapped register; driver must translate to BadOutOfRange (not BadInternalError)");
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.DL205;
/// <summary>
/// Verifies DL205/DL260 CDAB word ordering for 32-bit floats against the
/// <c>dl205.json</c> pymodbus profile. DirectLOGIC stores IEEE-754 singles with the low
/// word at the lower register address (CDAB) rather than the high word (ABCD). Reading
/// <c>HR[1056..1057]</c> with <see cref="ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian"/> produces a tiny
/// denormal (~5.74e-41) instead of the intended 1.5f — a silent "value is 0" bug in the
/// field unless the caller opts into <see cref="ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap"/>.
/// </summary>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "DL205")]
public sealed class DL205FloatCdabQuirkTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task DL205_Float32_CDAB_decodes_1_5f_from_HR1056()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "dl205",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != dl205 — skipping (standard profile does not seed HR[1056..1057]).");
}
var options = new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL205_Float_CDAB",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: 1056,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Float32, Writable: false,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap),
// Control: same address, BigEndian — proves the default decode produces garbage.
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL205_Float_ABCD",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: 1056,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Float32, Writable: false,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian),
],
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-cdab");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["DL205_Float_CDAB", "DL205_Float_ABCD"],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe(1.5f, "DL205 Float32 with WordSwap (CDAB) must decode HR[1056..1057] as 1.5f");
// The BigEndian read of the same wire bytes should differ — not asserting the exact
// denormal value (that couples the test to IEEE-754 bit math) but the two decodes MUST
// disagree, otherwise the word-order flag is a no-op.
results[1].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[1].Value.ShouldNotBe(1.5f);
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.DL205;
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the DL205/DL260 V-memory octal addressing quirk end-to-end: use
/// <see cref="DirectLogicAddress.UserVMemoryToPdu"/> to translate <c>V2000</c> octal into
/// the Modbus PDU address actually dispatched, then read the marker the dl205.json profile
/// placed at that address. HR[0x0400] = 0x2000 proves the translation was performed
/// correctly — a naïve caller treating "V2000" as decimal 2000 would read HR[2000] (which
/// the profile leaves at 0) and miss the marker entirely.
/// </summary>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "DL205")]
public sealed class DL205VMemoryQuirkTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task DL205_V2000_user_memory_resolves_to_PDU_0x0400_marker()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "dl205",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != dl205 — skipping (standard profile does not seed V-memory markers).");
}
var pdu = DirectLogicAddress.UserVMemoryToPdu("V2000");
pdu.ShouldBe((ushort)0x0400);
var options = new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL205_V2000",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: pdu,
DataType: ModbusDataType.UInt16, Writable: false),
],
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-vmem");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["DL205_V2000"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe((ushort)0x2000, "dl205.json seeds HR[0x0400] with marker 0x2000 (= V2000 value)");
}
[Fact]
public async Task DL205_V40400_system_memory_resolves_to_PDU_0x2100_marker()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "dl205",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != dl205 — skipping.");
}
// V40400 is system memory on DL260 / H2-ECOM100 absolute mode; it does NOT follow the
// simple octal-to-decimal formula (40400 octal = 16640 decimal, which would read HR[0x4100]).
// The CPU places the system bank at PDU 0x2100 instead. Proving the helper routes there.
var pdu = DirectLogicAddress.SystemVMemoryToPdu(0);
pdu.ShouldBe((ushort)0x2100);
var options = new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL205_V40400",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: pdu,
DataType: ModbusDataType.UInt16, Writable: false),
],
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-sysv");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["DL205_V40400"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe((ushort)0x4040, "dl205.json seeds HR[0x2100] with marker 0x4040 (= V40400 value)");
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.DL205;
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the DL260 X-input discrete-input mapping against the <c>dl205.json</c>
/// pymodbus profile. X-inputs are FC02 discrete-input-only (Modbus doesn't allow writes
/// to discrete inputs), and the DirectLOGIC convention is X0 → DI 0 with octal offsets
/// for subsequent addresses. The sim seeds X20 octal (= DI 16) = ON so the test can
/// prove the helper routes through to the right cell.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// X0 / X1 / …X17 octal all share cell 0 (DI 0-15 → cell 0 bits 0-15) which conflicts
/// with the V0 uint16 marker; we can't seed both types at cell 0 under shared-blocks
/// semantics. So the test uses X20 octal (first address beyond the cell-0 boundary) which
/// lands cleanly at cell 1 bit 0 and leaves the V0 register-zero quirk intact.
/// </remarks>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "DL205")]
public sealed class DL205XInputTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task DL260_X20_octal_maps_to_DiscreteInput_16_and_reads_ON()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "dl205",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != dl205 — skipping.");
}
// X20 octal = decimal 16 = DI 16 per the DL260 convention (X-inputs start at DI 0).
var di = DirectLogicAddress.XInputToDiscrete("X20");
di.ShouldBe((ushort)16);
var options = BuildOptions(sim, [
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL260_X20",
ModbusRegion.DiscreteInputs, Address: di,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Bool, Writable: false),
// Unpopulated-X control: pymodbus returns 0 (not exception) for any bit in the
// configured DI range that wasn't explicitly seeded — per docs/v2/dl205.md
// "Reading a non-populated X input ... returns zero, not an exception".
new ModbusTagDefinition("DL260_X21_off",
ModbusRegion.DiscreteInputs, Address: DirectLogicAddress.XInputToDiscrete("X21"),
DataType: ModbusDataType.Bool, Writable: false),
]);
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-xinput");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["DL260_X20", "DL260_X21_off"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe(true, "dl205.json seeds cell 1 bit 0 (X20 octal = DI 16) = ON");
results[1].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u, "unpopulated X inputs must read cleanly — DL260 does NOT raise an exception");
results[1].Value.ShouldBe(false);
}
private static ModbusDriverOptions BuildOptions(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim, IReadOnlyList<ModbusTagDefinition> tags)
=> new()
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags = tags,
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.Mitsubishi;
/// <summary>
/// Tag map for the Mitsubishi MELSEC device class with a representative Modbus Device
/// Assignment block mapping D0..D1023 → HR[0..1023]. Mirrors the behaviors in
/// <c>mitsubishi.json</c> pymodbus profile and <c>docs/v2/mitsubishi.md</c>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// MELSEC Modbus sites all have *different* device-assignment parameter blocks; this profile
/// models the conventional default. Per-model differences (FX5U needs firmware ≥ 1.060 for
/// Modbus server; QJ71MT91 lacks FC22/FC23; FX/iQ-F use octal X/Y while Q/L/iQ-R use hex)
/// are handled in <see cref="MelsecAddress"/> (PR 59) and the per-model test files.
/// </remarks>
public static class MitsubishiProfile
{
/// <summary>
/// Scratch HR the smoke test writes + reads. Address 200 mirrors the
/// dl205/s7_1500/standard scratch range so one smoke test pattern works across every
/// device profile the simulator supports.
/// </summary>
public const ushort SmokeHoldingRegister = 200;
/// <summary>Value the smoke test writes then reads back.</summary>
public const short SmokeHoldingValue = 7890;
public static ModbusDriverOptions BuildOptions(string host, int port) => new()
{
Host = host,
Port = port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition(
Name: "Smoke_HReg200",
Region: ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters,
Address: SmokeHoldingRegister,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Int16,
Writable: true),
],
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.Mitsubishi;
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the MELSEC-family Modbus quirks against the <c>mitsubishi.json</c> pymodbus
/// profile: CDAB word order default, binary-not-BCD D-register encoding, hex X-input
/// parsing (Q/L/iQ-R), D0 fingerprint, M-relay coil mapping with bank base.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Groups all quirks in one test class instead of per-behavior classes (unlike the DL205
/// set) because MELSEC's per-model differentiation is handled by the
/// <see cref="MelsecFamily"/> enum on the helper + <c>MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE</c> env var on
/// the fixture, rather than per-PR test classes.
/// </remarks>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "Mitsubishi")]
public sealed class MitsubishiQuirkTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task Mitsubishi_D0_fingerprint_reads_0x1234()
{
if (!ShouldRun()) return;
await using var driver = await NewDriverAsync(
new ModbusTagDefinition("D0_Fingerprint",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters,
Address: MelsecAddress.DRegisterToHolding("D0"),
DataType: ModbusDataType.UInt16, Writable: false));
var r = await driver.ReadAsync(["D0_Fingerprint"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
r[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
r[0].Value.ShouldBe((ushort)0x1234);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Mitsubishi_Float32_CDAB_decodes_1_5f_from_D100()
{
if (!ShouldRun()) return;
// MELSEC Q/L/iQ-R/iQ-F all store 32-bit values with CDAB word order (low word at
// lower D-register address). HR[100..101] = [0, 0x3FC0] decodes as 1.5f under
// WordSwap but as a denormal under BigEndian.
var addr = MelsecAddress.DRegisterToHolding("D100");
await using var driver = await NewDriverAsync(
new ModbusTagDefinition("D100_Float_CDAB",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: addr,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Float32, Writable: false,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap),
new ModbusTagDefinition("D100_Float_ABCD_control",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: addr,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Float32, Writable: false,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian));
var r = await driver.ReadAsync(
["D100_Float_CDAB", "D100_Float_ABCD_control"],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
r[0].Value.ShouldBe(1.5f, "MELSEC stores Float32 CDAB; WordSwap decode returns 1.5f");
r[1].Value.ShouldNotBe(1.5f, "same wire with BigEndian must decode to a different value");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Mitsubishi_D10_is_binary_not_BCD()
{
if (!ShouldRun()) return;
// Counter-to-DL205: MELSEC D-registers are binary by default. D10 = 1234 decimal =
// 0x04D2. Reading as Int16 returns 1234; reading as Bcd16 would throw (nibble 0xD is
// non-BCD) — the integration test proves the Int16 decode wins.
await using var driver = await NewDriverAsync(
new ModbusTagDefinition("D10_Binary",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters,
Address: MelsecAddress.DRegisterToHolding("D10"),
DataType: ModbusDataType.Int16, Writable: false));
var r = await driver.ReadAsync(["D10_Binary"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
r[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
r[0].Value.ShouldBe((short)1234, "MELSEC stores numeric D-register values in binary; 0x04D2 = 1234");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Mitsubishi_D10_as_BCD_throws_because_nibble_is_non_decimal()
{
if (!ShouldRun()) return;
// If a site configured D10 with Bcd16 data type but the ladder writes binary, the
// BCD decoder MUST reject the garbage rather than silently returning wrong decimal.
// 0x04D2 contains nibble 0xD which fails BCD validation.
await using var driver = await NewDriverAsync(
new ModbusTagDefinition("D10_WrongBcd",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters,
Address: MelsecAddress.DRegisterToHolding("D10"),
DataType: ModbusDataType.Bcd16, Writable: false));
var r = await driver.ReadAsync(["D10_WrongBcd"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
// ReadAsync catches the InvalidDataException from DecodeBcd and surfaces it as
// BadCommunicationError (PR 52 mapping). Non-zero status = caller sees a real
// problem and can check their tag config instead of getting silently-wrong numbers.
r[0].StatusCode.ShouldNotBe(0u, "BCD decode of binary 0x04D2 must fail loudly because nibble D is non-BCD");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Mitsubishi_QLiQR_X210_hex_maps_to_DI_528_reads_ON()
{
if (!ShouldRun()) return;
// MELSEC-Q / L / iQ-R: X addresses are hex. X210 = 0x210 = 528 decimal.
// mitsubishi.json seeds cell 33 (DI 528..543) with value 9 = bit 0 + bit 3 set.
// X210 → DI 528 → cell 33 bit 0 = 1 (ON).
var addr = MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete("X210", MelsecFamily.Q_L_iQR);
addr.ShouldBe((ushort)528);
await using var driver = await NewDriverAsync(
new ModbusTagDefinition("X210_hex",
ModbusRegion.DiscreteInputs, Address: addr,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Bool, Writable: false));
var r = await driver.ReadAsync(["X210_hex"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
r[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
r[0].Value.ShouldBe(true);
}
[Fact]
public void Mitsubishi_family_trap_X20_differs_on_Q_vs_FX()
{
// Not a live-sim test — a unit-level proof that the MELSEC family selector gates the
// address correctly. Included in the integration suite so anyone running the MELSEC
// tests sees the trap called out explicitly.
MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete("X20", MelsecFamily.Q_L_iQR).ShouldBe((ushort)32);
MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete("X20", MelsecFamily.F_iQF).ShouldBe((ushort)16);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Mitsubishi_M512_maps_to_coil_512_reads_ON()
{
if (!ShouldRun()) return;
// mitsubishi.json seeds cell 32 (coil 512..527) with value 5 = bit 0 + bit 2 set.
// M512 → coil 512 → cell 32 bit 0 = 1 (ON).
var addr = MelsecAddress.MRelayToCoil("M512");
addr.ShouldBe((ushort)512);
await using var driver = await NewDriverAsync(
new ModbusTagDefinition("M512",
ModbusRegion.Coils, Address: addr,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Bool, Writable: false));
var r = await driver.ReadAsync(["M512"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
r[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
r[0].Value.ShouldBe(true);
}
// --- helpers ---
private bool ShouldRun()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) { Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason); return false; }
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "mitsubishi",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != mitsubishi — skipping.");
return false;
}
return true;
}
private async Task<ModbusDriver> NewDriverAsync(params ModbusTagDefinition[] tags)
{
var drv = new ModbusDriver(
new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags = tags,
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
},
driverInstanceId: "melsec-quirk");
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
return drv;
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.Mitsubishi;
/// <summary>
/// End-to-end smoke against the MELSEC <c>mitsubishi.json</c> pymodbus profile (or a real
/// MELSEC QJ71MT91 / iQ-R / FX5U when <c>MODBUS_SIM_ENDPOINT</c> points at one). Drives
/// the full <see cref="ModbusDriver"/> + real <see cref="ModbusTcpTransport"/> stack.
/// Success proves the driver initializes against the MELSEC sim, writes a known value,
/// and reads it back — the baseline every Mitsubishi-specific test (PR 59+) builds on.
/// </summary>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "Mitsubishi")]
public sealed class MitsubishiSmokeTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task Mitsubishi_roundtrip_write_then_read_of_holding_register()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "mitsubishi",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != mitsubishi — skipping.");
}
var options = MitsubishiProfile.BuildOptions(sim.Host, sim.Port);
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "melsec-smoke");
await driver.InitializeAsync(driverConfigJson: "{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var writeResults = await driver.WriteAsync(
[new(FullReference: "Smoke_HReg200", Value: (short)MitsubishiProfile.SmokeHoldingValue)],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
writeResults.Count.ShouldBe(1);
writeResults[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u, "write must succeed against the MELSEC pymodbus profile");
var readResults = await driver.ReadAsync(
["Smoke_HReg200"],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
readResults.Count.ShouldBe(1);
readResults[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
readResults[0].Value.ShouldBe((short)MitsubishiProfile.SmokeHoldingValue);
}
}

View File

@@ -36,9 +36,10 @@
[1280, 1282],
[1343, 1343],
[1407, 1407],
[2048, 2050],
[3072, 3074],
[4000, 4007],
[1, 1],
[128, 128],
[192, 192],
[250, 250],
[8448, 8448]
],
@@ -88,25 +89,17 @@
],
"bits": [
{"_quirk": "Y0 marker. DL260 maps Y0 to coil 2048 (0-based). Coil 2048 = ON proves the mapping.",
"addr": 2048, "value": 1},
{"addr": 2049, "value": 0},
{"addr": 2050, "value": 1},
{"_quirk": "X-input bank marker cell. X0 -> DI 0 conflicts with uint16 V0 at cell 0, so this marker covers X20 octal (= decimal 16 = DI 16 = cell 1 bit 0). X20=ON, X23 octal (DI 19 = cell 1 bit 3)=ON -> cell 1 value = 0b00001001 = 9.",
"addr": 1, "value": 9},
{"_quirk": "C0 marker. DL260 maps C0 to coil 3072 (0-based). Coil 3072 = ON proves the mapping.",
"addr": 3072, "value": 1},
{"addr": 3073, "value": 0},
{"addr": 3074, "value": 1},
{"_quirk": "Y-output bank marker cell. pymodbus's simulator maps Modbus FC01/02/05 bit-addresses to cell index = bit_addr / 16; so Modbus coil 2048 lives at cell 128 bit 0. Y0=ON (bit 0), Y1=OFF (bit 1), Y2=ON (bit 2) -> value=0b00000101=5 proves DL260 mapping Y0 -> coil 2048.",
"addr": 128, "value": 5},
{"_quirk": "Scratch C-relays for write-roundtrip tests against the writable C range.",
"addr": 4000, "value": 0},
{"addr": 4001, "value": 0},
{"addr": 4002, "value": 0},
{"addr": 4003, "value": 0},
{"addr": 4004, "value": 0},
{"addr": 4005, "value": 0},
{"addr": 4006, "value": 0},
{"addr": 4007, "value": 0}
{"_quirk": "C-relay bank marker cell. Modbus coil 3072 -> cell 192 bit 0. C0=ON (bit 0), C1=OFF (bit 1), C2=ON (bit 2) -> value=5 proves DL260 mapping C0 -> coil 3072.",
"addr": 192, "value": 5},
{"_quirk": "Scratch cell for coil 4000..4015 write round-trip tests. Cell 250 holds Modbus coils 4000-4015; all bits start at 0 and tests set specific bits via FC05.",
"addr": 250, "value": 0}
],
"uint32": [],

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
{
"_comment": "mitsubishi.json -- Mitsubishi MELSEC Modbus TCP quirk simulator covering QJ71MT91, iQ-R, iQ-F/FX5U, and FX3U-ENET-P502 behaviors documented in docs/v2/mitsubishi.md. MELSEC CPUs store multi-word values in CDAB order (opposite of S7 ABCD, same family as DL260). The Modbus-module 'Modbus Device Assignment Parameter' block is per-site, so this profile models one *representative* assignment mapping D-register D0..D1023 -> HR 0..1023, M-relay M0..M511 -> coil 0..511, X-input X0..X15 -> DI 0..15 (X-addresses are HEX on Q/L/iQ-R, so X10 = decimal 16; on FX/iQ-F they're OCTAL like DL260). pymodbus bit-address semantics are the same as dl205.json and s7_1500.json (FC01/02/05/15 address N maps to cell index N/16).",
"server_list": {
"srv": {
"comm": "tcp",
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"port": 5020,
"framer": "socket",
"device_id": 1
}
},
"device_list": {
"dev": {
"setup": {
"co size": 4096,
"di size": 4096,
"hr size": 4096,
"ir size": 1024,
"shared blocks": true,
"type exception": false,
"defaults": {
"value": {"bits": 0, "uint16": 0, "uint32": 0, "float32": 0.0, "string": " "},
"action": {"bits": null, "uint16": null, "uint32": null, "float32": null, "string": null}
}
},
"invalid": [],
"write": [
[0, 0],
[10, 10],
[100, 101],
[200, 209],
[300, 301],
[500, 500]
],
"uint16": [
{"_quirk": "D0 fingerprint marker. MELSEC D0 is the first data register; Modbus Device Assignment typically maps D0..D1023 -> HR 0..1023. 0x1234 is the fingerprint operators set in GX Works to prove the mapping parameter block is in effect.",
"addr": 0, "value": 4660},
{"_quirk": "Scratch HR range 200..209 -- mirrors the dl205/s7_1500/standard scratch range so smoke tests (MitsubishiProfile.SmokeHoldingRegister=200) round-trip identically against any profile.",
"addr": 200, "value": 0},
{"addr": 201, "value": 0},
{"addr": 202, "value": 0},
{"addr": 203, "value": 0},
{"addr": 204, "value": 0},
{"addr": 205, "value": 0},
{"addr": 206, "value": 0},
{"addr": 207, "value": 0},
{"addr": 208, "value": 0},
{"addr": 209, "value": 0},
{"_quirk": "Float32 1.5f in CDAB word order (MELSEC Q/L/iQ-R/iQ-F default, same as DL260). HR[100]=0x0000=0 low word, HR[101]=0x3FC0=16320 high word. Decode with ByteOrder.WordSwap returns 1.5f; BigEndian decode returns a denormal.",
"addr": 100, "value": 0},
{"addr": 101, "value": 16320},
{"_quirk": "Int32 0x12345678 in CDAB word order. HR[300]=0x5678=22136 low word, HR[301]=0x1234=4660 high word. Contrasts with the S7 profile's ABCD encoding at the same address.",
"addr": 300, "value": 22136},
{"addr": 301, "value": 4660},
{"_quirk": "D10 = decimal 1234 stored as BINARY (NOT BCD like DL205). 0x04D2 = 1234 decimal. Caller reading with Bcd16 data type would decode this as binary 1234's BCD nibbles which are non-BCD and throw InvalidDataException -- proves MELSEC is binary-by-default, opposite of DL205's BCD-by-default quirk.",
"addr": 10, "value": 1234},
{"_quirk": "Modbus Device Assignment boundary marker. HR[500] represents the last register in an assigned D-range D500. Beyond this (HR[501..4095]) would be Illegal Data Address on a real QJ71MT91 with this specific parameter block; pymodbus returns default 0 because its shared cell array has space -- real-PLC parity is documented in docs/v2/mitsubishi.md §device-assignment, not enforced here.",
"addr": 500, "value": 500}
],
"bits": [
{"_quirk": "M-relay marker cell at cell 32 = Modbus coil 512 = MELSEC M512 (coils 0..15 collide with the D0 uint16 marker cell, so we place the M marker above that). Cell 32 bit 0 = 1 and bit 2 = 1 (value = 0b101 = 5) = M512=ON, M513=OFF, M514=ON. Matches the Y0/Y2 marker pattern in dl205 and s7_1500 profiles.",
"addr": 32, "value": 5},
{"_quirk": "X-input marker cell at cell 33 = Modbus DI 528 (= MELSEC X210 hex on Q/L/iQ-R). Cell 33 bit 0 = 1 and bit 3 = 1 (value = 0x9 = 9). Chosen above cell 1 so it doesn't collide with any uint16 D-register. Proves the hex-parsing X-input helper on Q/L/iQ-R family; FX/iQ-F families use octal X-addresses tested separately.",
"addr": 33, "value": 9}
],
"uint32": [],
"float32": [],
"string": [],
"repeat": []
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
{
"_comment": "s7_1500.json -- Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 + MB_SERVER quirk simulator. Models docs/v2/s7.md behaviors as concrete register values. Unlike DL260 (CDAB word order default) or Mitsubishi (CDAB default), S7 MB_SERVER uses ABCD word order by default because Siemens native CPU types are big-endian top-to-bottom both within the register pair and byte pair. This profile exists so the driver's S7 profile default ByteOrder.BigEndian can be validated end-to-end. pymodbus bit-address semantics are the same as dl205.json (FC01/02/05/15 address X maps to cell index X/16); seed bits at the appropriate cell-indexed positions.",
"server_list": {
"srv": {
"comm": "tcp",
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"port": 5020,
"framer": "socket",
"device_id": 1
}
},
"device_list": {
"dev": {
"setup": {
"co size": 4096,
"di size": 4096,
"hr size": 4096,
"ir size": 1024,
"shared blocks": true,
"type exception": false,
"defaults": {
"value": {"bits": 0, "uint16": 0, "uint32": 0, "float32": 0.0, "string": " "},
"action": {"bits": null, "uint16": null, "uint32": null, "float32": null, "string": null}
}
},
"invalid": [],
"write": [
[0, 0],
[25, 25],
[100, 101],
[200, 209],
[300, 301]
],
"uint16": [
{"_quirk": "DB1 header marker. On an S7-1500 with MB_SERVER pointing at DB1, operators often reserve DB1.DBW0 for a fingerprint word so clients can verify they're talking to the right DB. 0xABCD = 43981.",
"addr": 0, "value": 43981},
{"_quirk": "Scratch HR range 200..209 -- mirrors the standard.json scratch range so the smoke test (S7_1500Profile.SmokeHoldingRegister=200) round-trips identically against either profile.",
"addr": 200, "value": 0},
{"addr": 201, "value": 0},
{"addr": 202, "value": 0},
{"addr": 203, "value": 0},
{"addr": 204, "value": 0},
{"addr": 205, "value": 0},
{"addr": 206, "value": 0},
{"addr": 207, "value": 0},
{"addr": 208, "value": 0},
{"addr": 209, "value": 0},
{"_quirk": "Float32 1.5f in ABCD word order (Siemens big-endian default, OPPOSITE of DL260 CDAB). IEEE-754 1.5 = 0x3FC00000. ABCD = high word first: HR[100]=0x3FC0=16320, HR[101]=0x0000=0.",
"addr": 100, "value": 16320},
{"_quirk": "Float32 1.5f ABCD low word.",
"addr": 101, "value": 0},
{"_quirk": "Int32 0x12345678 in ABCD word order. HR[300]=0x1234=4660, HR[301]=0x5678=22136. Demonstrates the contrast with DL260 CDAB Int32 encoding.",
"addr": 300, "value": 4660},
{"addr": 301, "value": 22136}
],
"bits": [
{"_quirk": "Coil bank marker cell. S7 MB_SERVER doesn't fix coil addresses; this simulates a user-wired DB where coil 400 (=bit 0 of cell 25) represents a latched digital output. Cell 25 bit 0 = 1 proves the wire-format round-trip works for coils on S7 profile.",
"addr": 25, "value": 1},
{"_quirk": "Discrete-input bank marker cell. DI 500 (=bit 0 of cell 31) = 1. Like coils, discrete inputs on S7 MB_SERVER are per-site; we assert the end-to-end FC02 path only.",
"addr": 31, "value": 1}
],
"uint32": [],
"float32": [],
"string": [],
"repeat": []
}
}
}

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory)] [ValidateSet('standard', 'dl205')] [string]$Profile,
[Parameter(Mandatory)] [ValidateSet('standard', 'dl205', 's7_1500', 'mitsubishi')] [string]$Profile,
[int]$HttpPort = 8080
)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.S7;
/// <summary>
/// Tag map for the Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 device class with the <c>MB_SERVER</c> library
/// block mapping HR[0..] to DB1.DBW0+. Mirrors <c>s7_1500.json</c> in <c>Pymodbus/</c>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Unlike DL205, S7 has no fixed Modbus memory map — every site wires MB_SERVER to a
/// different DB. The profile here models the *default* user layout documented in
/// <c>docs/v2/s7.md</c> §per-model-matrix: DB1.DBW0 = fingerprint marker, a scratch HR
/// range 200..209 for write-roundtrip tests, and ABCD-order Float32 / Int32 markers at
/// HR[100..101] and HR[300..301] to prove the driver's S7 profile default is correct.
/// </remarks>
public static class S7_1500Profile
{
/// <summary>
/// Scratch HR the smoke test writes + reads. Address 200 mirrors the DL205 /
/// standard scratch range so one smoke test pattern works across all device profiles.
/// </summary>
public const ushort SmokeHoldingRegister = 200;
/// <summary>Value the smoke test writes then reads back.</summary>
public const short SmokeHoldingValue = 4321;
public static ModbusDriverOptions BuildOptions(string host, int port) => new()
{
Host = host,
Port = port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition(
Name: "Smoke_HReg200",
Region: ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters,
Address: SmokeHoldingRegister,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Int16,
Writable: true),
],
// Disable the background probe loop — integration tests drive reads explicitly and
// the probe would race with assertions.
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.S7;
/// <summary>
/// End-to-end smoke against the S7-1500 <c>MB_SERVER</c> pymodbus profile (or a real
/// S7-1500 + MB_SERVER deployment when <c>MODBUS_SIM_ENDPOINT</c> points at one). Drives
/// the full <see cref="ModbusDriver"/> + real <see cref="ModbusTcpTransport"/> stack —
/// no fake transport. Success proves the driver initializes against the S7 simulator,
/// writes a known value, and reads it back with the correct status and value, which is
/// the baseline every S7-specific test (PR 57+) builds on.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// S7-specific quirk tests (MB_SERVER requires non-optimized DBs, ABCD word order
/// default, port-per-connection, FC23 Illegal Function, STOP-mode behaviour, etc.) land
/// as separate test classes in this directory as each quirk is validated in pymodbus.
/// Keep this smoke test deliberately narrow — filtering by device class
/// (<c>--filter DisplayName~S7</c>) should surface the quirk-specific failure mode when
/// something goes wrong, not a blanket smoke failure that could mean anything.
/// </remarks>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "S7")]
public sealed class S7_1500SmokeTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task S7_1500_roundtrip_write_then_read_of_holding_register()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "s7_1500",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != s7_1500 — skipping (other profiles don't seed the S7 scratch range identically).");
}
var options = S7_1500Profile.BuildOptions(sim.Host, sim.Port);
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "s7-smoke");
await driver.InitializeAsync(driverConfigJson: "{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var writeResults = await driver.WriteAsync(
[new(FullReference: "Smoke_HReg200", Value: (short)S7_1500Profile.SmokeHoldingValue)],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
writeResults.Count.ShouldBe(1);
writeResults[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u, "write must succeed against the S7-1500 MB_SERVER profile");
var readResults = await driver.ReadAsync(
["Smoke_HReg200"],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
readResults.Count.ShouldBe(1);
readResults[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
readResults[0].Value.ShouldBe((short)S7_1500Profile.SmokeHoldingValue);
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.S7;
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the Siemens S7 big-endian (<c>ABCD</c>) word-order default for Float32 and
/// Int32 against the <c>s7_1500.json</c> pymodbus profile. S7's native CPU types are
/// big-endian end-to-end, so <c>MB_SERVER</c> places the high word at the lower register
/// address — <b>opposite</b> of DL260's CDAB. The driver's S7-family tag config must
/// therefore default to <see cref="ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian"/>; selecting
/// <see cref="ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap"/> against an S7 would decode garbage.
/// </summary>
[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "S7")]
public sealed class S7_ByteOrderTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
{
[Fact]
public async Task S7_Float32_ABCD_decodes_1_5f_from_HR100()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "s7_1500",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != s7_1500 — skipping (s7_1500 profile is the only one seeding HR[100..101] ABCD).");
}
var options = new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition("S7_Float_ABCD",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: 100,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Float32, Writable: false,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian),
// Control: same address with WordSwap should decode garbage — proves the
// two code paths diverge on S7 wire bytes.
new ModbusTagDefinition("S7_Float_CDAB_control",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: 100,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Float32, Writable: false,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap),
],
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "s7-float-abcd");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(
["S7_Float_ABCD", "S7_Float_CDAB_control"],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe(1.5f, "S7 MB_SERVER stores Float32 in ABCD word order; BigEndian decode returns 1.5f");
results[1].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[1].Value.ShouldNotBe(1.5f, "applying CDAB swap to S7 ABCD bytes must produce a different value — confirms the flag is not a no-op and S7 profile default must be BigEndian");
}
[Fact]
public async Task S7_Int32_ABCD_decodes_0x12345678_from_HR300()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "s7_1500",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != s7_1500 — skipping.");
}
var options = new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition("S7_Int32_ABCD",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: 300,
DataType: ModbusDataType.Int32, Writable: false,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian),
],
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "s7-int-abcd");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["S7_Int32_ABCD"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe(0x12345678,
"S7 Int32 stored as HR[300]=0x1234, HR[301]=0x5678 with ABCD order decodes to 0x12345678 — DL260 would store the reverse order");
}
[Fact]
public async Task S7_DB1_fingerprint_marker_at_HR0_reads_0xABCD()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
if (!string.Equals(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE"), "s7_1500",
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
Assert.Skip("MODBUS_SIM_PROFILE != s7_1500 — skipping.");
}
// Real-world MB_SERVER deployments typically reserve DB1.DBW0 as a fingerprint so
// clients can verify they're pointing at the right DB (protects against typos in
// the MB_SERVER.MB_HOLD_REG.DB_number parameter). 0xABCD is the convention.
var options = new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = sim.Host,
Port = sim.Port,
UnitId = 1,
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
Tags =
[
new ModbusTagDefinition("S7_Fingerprint",
ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, Address: 0,
DataType: ModbusDataType.UInt16, Writable: false),
],
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "s7-fingerprint");
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await driver.ReadAsync(["S7_Fingerprint"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
results[0].Value.ShouldBe((ushort)0xABCD);
}
}

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@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
<ItemGroup>
<None Update="Pymodbus\**\*" CopyToOutputDirectory="PreserveNewest"/>
<None Update="DL205\**\*" CopyToOutputDirectory="PreserveNewest"/>
<None Update="S7\**\*" CopyToOutputDirectory="PreserveNewest"/>
<None Update="Mitsubishi\**\*" CopyToOutputDirectory="PreserveNewest"/>
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class DirectLogicAddressTests
{
[Theory]
[InlineData("V0", (ushort)0x0000)]
[InlineData("V1", (ushort)0x0001)]
[InlineData("V7", (ushort)0x0007)]
[InlineData("V10", (ushort)0x0008)]
[InlineData("V2000", (ushort)0x0400)] // canonical DL205/DL260 user-memory start
[InlineData("V7777", (ushort)0x0FFF)]
[InlineData("V10000", (ushort)0x1000)]
[InlineData("V17777", (ushort)0x1FFF)]
public void UserVMemoryToPdu_converts_octal_V_prefix(string v, ushort expected)
=> DirectLogicAddress.UserVMemoryToPdu(v).ShouldBe(expected);
[Theory]
[InlineData("0", (ushort)0)]
[InlineData("2000", (ushort)0x0400)]
[InlineData("v2000", (ushort)0x0400)] // lowercase v
[InlineData(" V2000 ", (ushort)0x0400)] // surrounding whitespace
public void UserVMemoryToPdu_accepts_bare_or_prefixed_or_padded(string v, ushort expected)
=> DirectLogicAddress.UserVMemoryToPdu(v).ShouldBe(expected);
[Theory]
[InlineData("V8")] // 8 is not a valid octal digit
[InlineData("V19")]
[InlineData("V2009")]
public void UserVMemoryToPdu_rejects_non_octal_digits(string v)
{
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => DirectLogicAddress.UserVMemoryToPdu(v))
.Message.ShouldContain("octal");
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(null)]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(" ")]
[InlineData("V")]
public void UserVMemoryToPdu_rejects_empty_input(string? v)
=> Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => DirectLogicAddress.UserVMemoryToPdu(v!));
[Fact]
public void UserVMemoryToPdu_overflow_rejected()
{
// 200000 octal = 0x10000 — one past ushort range.
Should.Throw<OverflowException>(() => DirectLogicAddress.UserVMemoryToPdu("V200000"));
}
[Fact]
public void SystemVMemoryBasePdu_is_0x2100_for_V40400()
{
// V40400 on DL260 / H2-ECOM100 absolute mode → PDU 0x2100 (decimal 8448), NOT 0x4100
// which a naive octal-to-decimal of 40400 octal would give (= 16640).
DirectLogicAddress.SystemVMemoryBasePdu.ShouldBe((ushort)0x2100);
DirectLogicAddress.SystemVMemoryToPdu(0).ShouldBe((ushort)0x2100);
}
[Fact]
public void SystemVMemoryToPdu_offsets_within_bank()
{
DirectLogicAddress.SystemVMemoryToPdu(1).ShouldBe((ushort)0x2101);
DirectLogicAddress.SystemVMemoryToPdu(0x100).ShouldBe((ushort)0x2200);
}
[Fact]
public void SystemVMemoryToPdu_rejects_overflow()
{
// ushort wrap: 0xFFFF - 0x2100 = 0xDEFF; anything above should throw.
Should.NotThrow(() => DirectLogicAddress.SystemVMemoryToPdu(0xDEFF));
Should.Throw<OverflowException>(() => DirectLogicAddress.SystemVMemoryToPdu(0xDF00));
}
// --- Bit memory: Y-output, C-relay, X-input, SP-special ---
[Theory]
[InlineData("Y0", (ushort)2048)]
[InlineData("Y1", (ushort)2049)]
[InlineData("Y7", (ushort)2055)]
[InlineData("Y10", (ushort)2056)] // octal 10 = decimal 8
[InlineData("Y17", (ushort)2063)] // octal 17 = decimal 15
[InlineData("Y777", (ushort)2559)] // top of DL260 Y range per doc table
public void YOutputToCoil_adds_octal_offset_to_2048(string y, ushort expected)
=> DirectLogicAddress.YOutputToCoil(y).ShouldBe(expected);
[Theory]
[InlineData("C0", (ushort)3072)]
[InlineData("C1", (ushort)3073)]
[InlineData("C10", (ushort)3080)]
[InlineData("C1777", (ushort)4095)] // top of DL260 C range
public void CRelayToCoil_adds_octal_offset_to_3072(string c, ushort expected)
=> DirectLogicAddress.CRelayToCoil(c).ShouldBe(expected);
[Theory]
[InlineData("X0", (ushort)0)]
[InlineData("X17", (ushort)15)]
[InlineData("X777", (ushort)511)] // top of DL260 X range
public void XInputToDiscrete_adds_octal_offset_to_0(string x, ushort expected)
=> DirectLogicAddress.XInputToDiscrete(x).ShouldBe(expected);
[Theory]
[InlineData("SP0", (ushort)1024)]
[InlineData("SP7", (ushort)1031)]
[InlineData("sp0", (ushort)1024)] // lowercase prefix
[InlineData("SP777", (ushort)1535)]
public void SpecialToDiscrete_adds_octal_offset_to_1024(string sp, ushort expected)
=> DirectLogicAddress.SpecialToDiscrete(sp).ShouldBe(expected);
[Theory]
[InlineData("Y8")]
[InlineData("C9")]
[InlineData("X18")]
public void Bit_address_rejects_non_octal_digits(string bad)
=> Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() =>
{
if (bad[0] == 'Y') DirectLogicAddress.YOutputToCoil(bad);
else if (bad[0] == 'C') DirectLogicAddress.CRelayToCoil(bad);
else DirectLogicAddress.XInputToDiscrete(bad);
});
[Theory]
[InlineData("Y")]
[InlineData("C")]
[InlineData("")]
public void Bit_address_rejects_empty(string bad)
=> Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => DirectLogicAddress.YOutputToCoil(bad));
[Fact]
public void YOutputToCoil_accepts_lowercase_prefix()
=> DirectLogicAddress.YOutputToCoil("y0").ShouldBe((ushort)2048);
[Fact]
public void CRelayToCoil_accepts_bare_octal_without_C_prefix()
=> DirectLogicAddress.CRelayToCoil("0").ShouldBe((ushort)3072);
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class MelsecAddressTests
{
// --- X / Y hex vs octal family trap ---
[Theory]
[InlineData("X0", (ushort)0)]
[InlineData("X9", (ushort)9)]
[InlineData("XA", (ushort)10)] // hex
[InlineData("XF", (ushort)15)]
[InlineData("X10", (ushort)16)] // hex 0x10 = decimal 16
[InlineData("X20", (ushort)32)] // hex 0x20 = decimal 32 — the classic MELSEC-Q trap
[InlineData("X1FF", (ushort)511)]
[InlineData("x10", (ushort)16)] // lowercase prefix
public void XInputToDiscrete_QLiQR_parses_hex(string x, ushort expected)
=> MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete(x, MelsecFamily.Q_L_iQR).ShouldBe(expected);
[Theory]
[InlineData("X0", (ushort)0)]
[InlineData("X7", (ushort)7)]
[InlineData("X10", (ushort)8)] // octal 10 = decimal 8
[InlineData("X20", (ushort)16)] // octal 20 = decimal 16 — SAME string, DIFFERENT value on FX
[InlineData("X777", (ushort)511)]
public void XInputToDiscrete_FiQF_parses_octal(string x, ushort expected)
=> MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete(x, MelsecFamily.F_iQF).ShouldBe(expected);
[Theory]
[InlineData("Y0", (ushort)0)]
[InlineData("Y1F", (ushort)31)]
public void YOutputToCoil_QLiQR_parses_hex(string y, ushort expected)
=> MelsecAddress.YOutputToCoil(y, MelsecFamily.Q_L_iQR).ShouldBe(expected);
[Theory]
[InlineData("Y0", (ushort)0)]
[InlineData("Y17", (ushort)15)]
public void YOutputToCoil_FiQF_parses_octal(string y, ushort expected)
=> MelsecAddress.YOutputToCoil(y, MelsecFamily.F_iQF).ShouldBe(expected);
[Fact]
public void Same_address_string_decodes_differently_between_families()
{
// This is the headline quirk: "X20" in GX Works means one thing on Q-series and
// another on FX-series. The driver's family selector is the only defence.
MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete("X20", MelsecFamily.Q_L_iQR).ShouldBe((ushort)32);
MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete("X20", MelsecFamily.F_iQF).ShouldBe((ushort)16);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("X8")] // 8 is non-octal
[InlineData("X12G")] // G is non-hex
public void XInputToDiscrete_FiQF_rejects_non_octal(string bad)
=> Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete(bad, MelsecFamily.F_iQF));
[Theory]
[InlineData("X12G")]
public void XInputToDiscrete_QLiQR_rejects_non_hex(string bad)
=> Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete(bad, MelsecFamily.Q_L_iQR));
[Fact]
public void XInputToDiscrete_honors_bank_base_from_assignment_block()
{
// Real-world QJ71MT91 assignment blocks commonly place X at DI 8192+ when other
// ranges take the low Modbus addresses. Helper must add the base cleanly.
MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete("X10", MelsecFamily.Q_L_iQR, xBankBase: 8192).ShouldBe((ushort)(8192 + 16));
}
// --- M-relay (decimal, both families) ---
[Theory]
[InlineData("M0", (ushort)0)]
[InlineData("M10", (ushort)10)] // M addresses are DECIMAL, not hex or octal
[InlineData("M511", (ushort)511)]
[InlineData("m99", (ushort)99)] // lowercase
public void MRelayToCoil_parses_decimal(string m, ushort expected)
=> MelsecAddress.MRelayToCoil(m).ShouldBe(expected);
[Fact]
public void MRelayToCoil_honors_bank_base()
=> MelsecAddress.MRelayToCoil("M0", mBankBase: 512).ShouldBe((ushort)512);
[Fact]
public void MRelayToCoil_rejects_non_numeric()
=> Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => MelsecAddress.MRelayToCoil("M1F"));
// --- D-register (decimal, both families) ---
[Theory]
[InlineData("D0", (ushort)0)]
[InlineData("D100", (ushort)100)]
[InlineData("d1023", (ushort)1023)]
public void DRegisterToHolding_parses_decimal(string d, ushort expected)
=> MelsecAddress.DRegisterToHolding(d).ShouldBe(expected);
[Fact]
public void DRegisterToHolding_honors_bank_base()
=> MelsecAddress.DRegisterToHolding("D10", dBankBase: 4096).ShouldBe((ushort)4106);
[Fact]
public void DRegisterToHolding_rejects_empty()
=> Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => MelsecAddress.DRegisterToHolding("D"));
// --- overflow ---
[Fact]
public void XInputToDiscrete_overflow_throws()
{
// 0xFFFF + base 1 = 0x10000 — past ushort.
Should.Throw<OverflowException>(() =>
MelsecAddress.XInputToDiscrete("XFFFF", MelsecFamily.Q_L_iQR, xBankBase: 1));
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class ModbusCapTests
{
/// <summary>
/// Records every PDU sent so tests can assert request-count and per-request quantity —
/// the only observable behaviour of the auto-chunking path.
/// </summary>
private sealed class RecordingTransport : IModbusTransport
{
public readonly ushort[] HoldingRegisters = new ushort[1024];
public readonly List<(ushort Address, ushort Quantity)> Fc03Requests = new();
public readonly List<(ushort Address, ushort Quantity)> Fc16Requests = new();
public Task ConnectAsync(CancellationToken ct) => Task.CompletedTask;
public Task<byte[]> SendAsync(byte unitId, byte[] pdu, CancellationToken ct)
{
var fc = pdu[0];
if (fc == 0x03)
{
var addr = (ushort)((pdu[1] << 8) | pdu[2]);
var qty = (ushort)((pdu[3] << 8) | pdu[4]);
Fc03Requests.Add((addr, qty));
var byteCount = (byte)(qty * 2);
var resp = new byte[2 + byteCount];
resp[0] = 0x03;
resp[1] = byteCount;
for (var i = 0; i < qty; i++)
{
resp[2 + i * 2] = (byte)(HoldingRegisters[addr + i] >> 8);
resp[3 + i * 2] = (byte)(HoldingRegisters[addr + i] & 0xFF);
}
return Task.FromResult(resp);
}
if (fc == 0x10)
{
var addr = (ushort)((pdu[1] << 8) | pdu[2]);
var qty = (ushort)((pdu[3] << 8) | pdu[4]);
Fc16Requests.Add((addr, qty));
for (var i = 0; i < qty; i++)
HoldingRegisters[addr + i] = (ushort)((pdu[6 + i * 2] << 8) | pdu[7 + i * 2]);
return Task.FromResult(new byte[] { 0x10, pdu[1], pdu[2], pdu[3], pdu[4] });
}
return Task.FromException<byte[]>(new ModbusException(fc, 0x01, $"fc={fc} unsupported"));
}
public ValueTask DisposeAsync() => ValueTask.CompletedTask;
}
[Fact]
public async Task Read_within_cap_issues_single_FC03_request()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("S", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.String,
StringLength: 40); // 20 regs — fits in default cap (125).
var transport = new RecordingTransport();
var opts = new ModbusDriverOptions { Host = "fake", Tags = [tag], Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false } };
await using var drv = new ModbusDriver(opts, "modbus-1", _ => transport);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
_ = await drv.ReadAsync(["S"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
transport.Fc03Requests.Count.ShouldBe(1);
transport.Fc03Requests[0].Quantity.ShouldBe((ushort)20);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Read_above_cap_splits_into_two_FC03_requests()
{
// 240-char string = 120 regs. Cap = 100 (a typical sub-spec device cap). Expect 100 + 20.
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("LongString", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 100, ModbusDataType.String,
StringLength: 240);
var transport = new RecordingTransport();
// Seed cells so the re-assembled payload is stable — confirms chunks are stitched in order.
for (ushort i = 100; i < 100 + 120; i++)
transport.HoldingRegisters[i] = (ushort)((('A' + (i - 100) % 26) << 8) | ('A' + (i - 100) % 26));
var opts = new ModbusDriverOptions
{
Host = "fake",
Tags = [tag],
MaxRegistersPerRead = 100,
Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
};
await using var drv = new ModbusDriver(opts, "modbus-1", _ => transport);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await drv.ReadAsync(["LongString"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
transport.Fc03Requests.Count.ShouldBe(2, "120 regs / cap 100 → 2 requests");
transport.Fc03Requests[0].ShouldBe(((ushort)100, (ushort)100));
transport.Fc03Requests[1].ShouldBe(((ushort)200, (ushort)20));
// Payload continuity: re-assembled string starts where register 100 does and keeps going.
var s = (string)results[0].Value!;
s.Length.ShouldBeGreaterThan(0);
s[0].ShouldBe('A'); // register[100] high byte
}
[Fact]
public async Task Read_cap_honors_Mitsubishi_lower_cap_of_64()
{
// 200-char string = 100 regs. Mitsubishi Q cap = 64. Expect: 64, 36.
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("MitString", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.String,
StringLength: 200);
var transport = new RecordingTransport();
var opts = new ModbusDriverOptions { Host = "fake", Tags = [tag], MaxRegistersPerRead = 64, Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false } };
await using var drv = new ModbusDriver(opts, "modbus-1", _ => transport);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
_ = await drv.ReadAsync(["MitString"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
transport.Fc03Requests.Count.ShouldBe(2);
transport.Fc03Requests[0].Quantity.ShouldBe((ushort)64);
transport.Fc03Requests[1].Quantity.ShouldBe((ushort)36);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Write_exceeding_cap_throws_instead_of_splitting()
{
// Partial FC16 across two transactions is not atomic. Forcing an explicit exception so the
// caller knows their tag definition is incompatible with the device cap rather than silently
// writing half a string and crashing between chunks.
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("LongStringWrite", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.String,
StringLength: 220); // 110 regs.
var transport = new RecordingTransport();
var opts = new ModbusDriverOptions { Host = "fake", Tags = [tag], MaxRegistersPerWrite = 100, Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false } };
await using var drv = new ModbusDriver(opts, "modbus-1", _ => transport);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await drv.WriteAsync(
[new WriteRequest("LongStringWrite", new string('A', 220))],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
// Driver catches the internal exception and surfaces BadInternalError — the Fc16Requests
// list must still be empty because nothing was sent.
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldNotBe(0u);
transport.Fc16Requests.Count.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Write_within_cap_proceeds_normally()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("ShortStringWrite", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.String,
StringLength: 40); // 20 regs.
var transport = new RecordingTransport();
var opts = new ModbusDriverOptions { Host = "fake", Tags = [tag], MaxRegistersPerWrite = 100, Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false } };
await using var drv = new ModbusDriver(opts, "modbus-1", _ => transport);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await drv.WriteAsync(
[new WriteRequest("ShortStringWrite", "HELLO")],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
transport.Fc16Requests.Count.ShouldBe(1);
transport.Fc16Requests[0].Quantity.ShouldBe((ushort)20);
}
}

View File

@@ -219,4 +219,97 @@ public sealed class ModbusDataTypeTests
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(wire, hi).ShouldBe("He");
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(wire, lo).ShouldBe("eH");
}
// --- BCD (binary-coded decimal, DL205/DL260 default numeric encoding) ---
[Theory]
[InlineData(0x0000u, 0u)]
[InlineData(0x0001u, 1u)]
[InlineData(0x0009u, 9u)]
[InlineData(0x0010u, 10u)]
[InlineData(0x1234u, 1234u)]
[InlineData(0x9999u, 9999u)]
public void DecodeBcd_16_bit_decodes_expected_decimal(uint raw, uint expected)
=> ModbusDriver.DecodeBcd(raw, nibbles: 4).ShouldBe(expected);
[Fact]
public void DecodeBcd_rejects_nibbles_above_nine()
{
Should.Throw<InvalidDataException>(() => ModbusDriver.DecodeBcd(0x00A5u, nibbles: 4))
.Message.ShouldContain("Non-BCD nibble");
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(0u, 0x0000u)]
[InlineData(5u, 0x0005u)]
[InlineData(42u, 0x0042u)]
[InlineData(1234u, 0x1234u)]
[InlineData(9999u, 0x9999u)]
public void EncodeBcd_16_bit_encodes_expected_nibbles(uint value, uint expected)
=> ModbusDriver.EncodeBcd(value, nibbles: 4).ShouldBe(expected);
[Fact]
public void Bcd16_decodes_DL205_register_1234_as_decimal_1234()
{
// HR[1072] = 0x1234 on the DL205 profile represents decimal 1234. A plain Int16 decode
// would return 0x04D2 = 4660 — proof the BCD path is different.
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Bcd16);
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(new byte[] { 0x12, 0x34 }, tag).ShouldBe(1234);
var int16Tag = tag with { DataType = ModbusDataType.Int16 };
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(new byte[] { 0x12, 0x34 }, int16Tag).ShouldBe((short)0x1234);
}
[Fact]
public void Bcd16_encode_round_trips_with_decode()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Bcd16);
var wire = ModbusDriver.EncodeRegister(4321, tag);
wire.ShouldBe(new byte[] { 0x43, 0x21 });
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(wire, tag).ShouldBe(4321);
}
[Fact]
public void Bcd16_encode_rejects_out_of_range_values()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Bcd16);
Should.Throw<OverflowException>(() => ModbusDriver.EncodeRegister(10000, tag))
.Message.ShouldContain("4 decimal digits");
}
[Fact]
public void Bcd32_decodes_8_digits_big_endian()
{
// 0x12345678 as BCD = decimal 12_345_678.
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Bcd32);
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(new byte[] { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78 }, tag).ShouldBe(12_345_678);
}
[Fact]
public void Bcd32_word_swap_handles_CDAB_layout()
{
// PLC stored 12_345_678 with word swap: low-word 0x5678 first, high-word 0x1234 second.
// Wire bytes [0x56, 0x78, 0x12, 0x34] + WordSwap → decode to decimal 12_345_678.
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Bcd32,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap);
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(new byte[] { 0x56, 0x78, 0x12, 0x34 }, tag).ShouldBe(12_345_678);
}
[Fact]
public void Bcd32_encode_round_trips_with_decode()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Bcd32);
var wire = ModbusDriver.EncodeRegister(87_654_321u, tag);
wire.ShouldBe(new byte[] { 0x87, 0x65, 0x43, 0x21 });
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(wire, tag).ShouldBe(87_654_321);
}
[Fact]
public void Bcd_RegisterCount_matches_underlying_width()
{
var b16 = new ModbusTagDefinition("A", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Bcd16);
var b32 = new ModbusTagDefinition("B", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Bcd32);
ModbusDriver.RegisterCount(b16).ShouldBe((ushort)1);
ModbusDriver.RegisterCount(b32).ShouldBe((ushort)2);
}
}

View File

@@ -220,6 +220,23 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriverTests
builder.Variables.ShouldContain(v => v.BrowseName == "Run" && v.Info.DriverDataType == DriverDataType.Boolean);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Discover_propagates_WriteIdempotent_from_tag_to_attribute_info()
{
var (drv, _) = NewDriver(
new ModbusTagDefinition("SetPoint", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Float32, WriteIdempotent: true),
new ModbusTagDefinition("PulseCoil", ModbusRegion.Coils, 0, ModbusDataType.Bool));
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
var builder = new RecordingBuilder();
await drv.DiscoverAsync(builder, CancellationToken.None);
var setPoint = builder.Variables.Single(v => v.BrowseName == "SetPoint");
var pulse = builder.Variables.Single(v => v.BrowseName == "PulseCoil");
setPoint.Info.WriteIdempotent.ShouldBeTrue();
pulse.Info.WriteIdempotent.ShouldBeFalse("default is opt-in per decision #44");
}
// --- helpers ---
private sealed class RecordingBuilder : IAddressSpaceBuilder

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Unit tests for the Modbus-exception-code → OPC UA StatusCode mapping added in PR 52.
/// Before PR 52 every server exception + every transport failure collapsed to
/// BadInternalError (0x80020000), which made field diagnosis "is this a bad tag or a bad
/// driver?" impossible. These tests lock in the translation table documented on
/// <see cref="ModbusDriver.MapModbusExceptionToStatus"/>.
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class ModbusExceptionMapperTests
{
[Theory]
[InlineData((byte)0x01, 0x803D0000u)] // Illegal Function → BadNotSupported
[InlineData((byte)0x02, 0x803C0000u)] // Illegal Data Address → BadOutOfRange
[InlineData((byte)0x03, 0x803C0000u)] // Illegal Data Value → BadOutOfRange
[InlineData((byte)0x04, 0x80550000u)] // Server Failure → BadDeviceFailure
[InlineData((byte)0x05, 0x80550000u)] // Acknowledge (long op) → BadDeviceFailure
[InlineData((byte)0x06, 0x80550000u)] // Server Busy → BadDeviceFailure
[InlineData((byte)0x0A, 0x80050000u)] // Gateway path unavailable → BadCommunicationError
[InlineData((byte)0x0B, 0x80050000u)] // Gateway target failed to respond → BadCommunicationError
[InlineData((byte)0xFF, 0x80020000u)] // Unknown code → BadInternalError fallback
public void MapModbusExceptionToStatus_returns_informative_status(byte code, uint expected)
=> ModbusDriver.MapModbusExceptionToStatus(code).ShouldBe(expected);
private sealed class ExceptionRaisingTransport(byte exceptionCode) : IModbusTransport
{
public Task ConnectAsync(CancellationToken ct) => Task.CompletedTask;
public Task<byte[]> SendAsync(byte unitId, byte[] pdu, CancellationToken ct)
=> Task.FromException<byte[]>(new ModbusException(pdu[0], exceptionCode, $"fc={pdu[0]} code={exceptionCode}"));
public ValueTask DisposeAsync() => ValueTask.CompletedTask;
}
[Fact]
public async Task Read_surface_exception_02_as_BadOutOfRange_not_BadInternalError()
{
var transport = new ExceptionRaisingTransport(exceptionCode: 0x02);
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Int16);
var opts = new ModbusDriverOptions { Host = "fake", Tags = [tag], Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false } };
await using var drv = new ModbusDriver(opts, "modbus-1", _ => transport);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await drv.ReadAsync(["T"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0x803C0000u, "FC03 at an unmapped register must bubble out as BadOutOfRange so operators can spot a bad tag config");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Write_surface_exception_04_as_BadDeviceFailure()
{
var transport = new ExceptionRaisingTransport(exceptionCode: 0x04);
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Int16);
var opts = new ModbusDriverOptions { Host = "fake", Tags = [tag], Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false } };
await using var drv = new ModbusDriver(opts, "modbus-1", _ => transport);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var writes = await drv.WriteAsync(
[new WriteRequest("T", (short)42)],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
writes[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0x80550000u, "FC06 returning exception 04 (CPU in PROGRAM mode) maps to BadDeviceFailure");
}
private sealed class NonModbusFailureTransport : IModbusTransport
{
public Task ConnectAsync(CancellationToken ct) => Task.CompletedTask;
public Task<byte[]> SendAsync(byte unitId, byte[] pdu, CancellationToken ct)
=> Task.FromException<byte[]>(new EndOfStreamException("socket closed mid-response"));
public ValueTask DisposeAsync() => ValueTask.CompletedTask;
}
[Fact]
public async Task Read_non_modbus_failure_maps_to_BadCommunicationError_not_BadInternalError()
{
// Socket drop / timeout / malformed frame → transport-layer failure. Should surface
// distinctly from tag-level faults so operators know to check the network, not the config.
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Int16);
var opts = new ModbusDriverOptions { Host = "fake", Tags = [tag], Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false } };
await using var drv = new ModbusDriver(opts, "modbus-1", _ => new NonModbusFailureTransport());
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var results = await drv.ReadAsync(["T"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
results[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0x80050000u);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Sockets;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Exercises <see cref="ModbusTcpTransport"/> against a real TCP listener that can close
/// its socket mid-session on demand. Verifies the PR 53 reconnect-on-drop behavior: after
/// the "first" socket is forcibly torn down, the next SendAsync must re-establish the
/// connection and complete the PDU without bubbling an error to the caller.
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class ModbusTcpReconnectTests
{
/// <summary>
/// Minimal in-process Modbus-TCP stub. Accepts one TCP connection at a time, reads an
/// MBAP + PDU, replies with a canned FC03 response echoing the request quantity of
/// zeroed bytes, then optionally closes the socket to simulate a NAT/firewall drop.
/// </summary>
private sealed class FlakeyModbusServer : IAsyncDisposable
{
private readonly TcpListener _listener;
public int Port => ((IPEndPoint)_listener.LocalEndpoint).Port;
public int DropAfterNTransactions { get; set; } = int.MaxValue;
private readonly CancellationTokenSource _stop = new();
private int _txCount;
public FlakeyModbusServer()
{
_listener = new TcpListener(IPAddress.Loopback, 0);
_listener.Start();
_ = Task.Run(AcceptLoopAsync);
}
private async Task AcceptLoopAsync()
{
while (!_stop.IsCancellationRequested)
{
TcpClient? client = null;
try { client = await _listener.AcceptTcpClientAsync(_stop.Token); }
catch { return; }
_ = Task.Run(() => ServeAsync(client!));
}
}
private async Task ServeAsync(TcpClient client)
{
try
{
using var _ = client;
var stream = client.GetStream();
while (!_stop.IsCancellationRequested && client.Connected)
{
var header = new byte[7];
if (!await ReadExactly(stream, header)) return;
var len = (ushort)((header[4] << 8) | header[5]);
var pdu = new byte[len - 1];
if (!await ReadExactly(stream, pdu)) return;
var fc = pdu[0];
var qty = (ushort)((pdu[3] << 8) | pdu[4]);
var respPdu = new byte[2 + qty * 2];
respPdu[0] = fc;
respPdu[1] = (byte)(qty * 2);
// data bytes stay 0
var respLen = (ushort)(1 + respPdu.Length);
var adu = new byte[7 + respPdu.Length];
adu[0] = header[0]; adu[1] = header[1];
adu[4] = (byte)(respLen >> 8); adu[5] = (byte)(respLen & 0xFF);
adu[6] = header[6];
Buffer.BlockCopy(respPdu, 0, adu, 7, respPdu.Length);
await stream.WriteAsync(adu);
await stream.FlushAsync();
_txCount++;
if (_txCount >= DropAfterNTransactions)
{
// Simulate NAT/firewall silent close: slam the socket without a
// protocol-level goodbye, which is what DL260 + an intermediate
// middlebox would look like from the client's perspective.
client.Client.Shutdown(SocketShutdown.Both);
client.Close();
return;
}
}
}
catch { /* best-effort */ }
}
private static async Task<bool> ReadExactly(NetworkStream s, byte[] buf)
{
var read = 0;
while (read < buf.Length)
{
var n = await s.ReadAsync(buf.AsMemory(read));
if (n == 0) return false;
read += n;
}
return true;
}
public async ValueTask DisposeAsync()
{
_stop.Cancel();
_listener.Stop();
await Task.CompletedTask;
}
}
[Fact]
public async Task Transport_recovers_from_mid_session_drop_and_retries_successfully()
{
await using var server = new FlakeyModbusServer { DropAfterNTransactions = 1 };
await using var transport = new ModbusTcpTransport("127.0.0.1", server.Port, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2), autoReconnect: true);
await transport.ConnectAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
// First transaction succeeds; server then closes the socket.
var pdu = new byte[] { 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
var first = await transport.SendAsync(unitId: 1, pdu, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
first[0].ShouldBe((byte)0x03);
// Second transaction: the connection is dead, but auto-reconnect must transparently
// spin up a new socket, resend, and produce a valid response. Before PR 53 this would
// surface as EndOfStreamException / IOException to the caller.
var second = await transport.SendAsync(unitId: 1, pdu, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
second[0].ShouldBe((byte)0x03);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Transport_without_AutoReconnect_propagates_drop_to_caller()
{
await using var server = new FlakeyModbusServer { DropAfterNTransactions = 1 };
await using var transport = new ModbusTcpTransport("127.0.0.1", server.Port, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2), autoReconnect: false);
await transport.ConnectAsync(TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var pdu = new byte[] { 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
_ = await transport.SendAsync(unitId: 1, pdu, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
await Should.ThrowAsync<Exception>(async () =>
await transport.SendAsync(unitId: 1, pdu, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
}
}

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