Review m-1. The bind moves from Program.cs into
Host.Configuration.ScriptingOptionsBinding.Bind, which binds the
section and clamps it. Program.cs calls it, and
ScriptingOptionsBindingTests drives it with in-memory configuration.
Every documented key takes a non-default value, so a misspelled
property or key goes red instead of silently falling back to the
defaults. The tests also cover a clamped bind (1e300 / 1024 / 0, three
adjustments), an absent section, and the sibling LogFilePath /
LogTopicMinLevel keys leaving the bind untouched.
Refs #731#734
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Program.cs binds ScriptingOptions from Scripting:* once, clamps every
numeric knob through ScriptingOptions.Sanitized (logging a Warning per
adjustment) and registers the one instance. It now reaches all three
script seams: RoslynVirtualTagEvaluator, the scripted-alarm engine
built in DriverHostActor (new trailing Props parameter, wired in
WithOtOpcUaRuntimeActors) and every Calculation driver (node options
as the base, per-driver config keys override one knob on a copy).
ScriptRunGuard sanitizes again in its ctor and computes the stuck
threshold with a saturating multiply, so an absurd
StuckOrphanQuarantineFactor can no longer throw OverflowException on
a refused run.
Refs #731#734
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Ruling refinement on I1. Only timeouts are strikes, so a never-returning
while(true), which times out once and is then only refused, was never
quarantined, and that defeated E1. A refusal now quarantines immediately
when the orphan it was refused behind has been executing for longer than
ScriptingOptions.StuckOrphanQuarantineFactor x the script's timeout
(default 10, so 20 s at the 2 s default; 0 or less disables it). It uses
the same quarantine path: one Error, otopcua.script.quarantined with
reason=stuck, Bad, lifted on source change or redeploy. A young orphan
(a short overrun) is still a plain refusal.
The guard stamps the run's start (Stopwatch timestamp) when the pool
picks it up and clears it when the run really finishes.
Tests: the 30-trigger while(true) regression (paced) now ends
quarantined with reason "stuck", still with exactly one orphan and a
healthy sibling. Positive control: a 2x overrun is refused, not
quarantined, and evaluates again once the orphan completes. A factor of
0 disables the rule. Docs (ScriptEditor "Runtime safety", VirtualTags)
and the seam remarks are updated.
Refs #734
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
BoundedApiKeyStore kept the set (volatile) and its DateTimeOffset stamp (non-volatile, 16 bytes) in separate
fields, so a reader could pair a new set with an old stamp or read a torn stamp; they are now one immutable
snapshot behind a volatile reference. An inner store that cannot list ids now switches the set off with a
per-instance flag instead of writing KnownIdSet = false into the shared ApiKeyStoreGuardOptions.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Coordinator ruling (I6): until ServiceLevel consumes IOpcUaEndpointState (F-C1), the probe must not sit on
the Active tier of a fused node, because Traefik routes the AdminUI on /health/active. Driver-only nodes keep
it on Ready + Active; admin-only nodes do not register it. Pinned per role.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
- I1 ScriptRunGuard: a run refused because the previous one is still
executing is a Bad publish plus otopcua.script.run_refused, and no longer
a quarantine strike. Only a timeout (and an allocation breach) counts;
a refusal neither adds to nor resets the timeout streak; a completed run
(value or throw) resets it. On a 1 Hz trigger with a 2 s budget a single
4 s overrun is one timeout plus two refusals and must not quarantine.
Tests updated across the guard, the alarm engine, the Calculation
evaluator and the VT evaluator, plus
Refusals_neither_count_toward_nor_reset_the_timeout_streak.
- I3 ScriptedAlarmEngine: the quality bucket is tracked only after the
predicate completes (or in the inputs-not-ready path), so the tracked
bucket is the last one annotated. A refused or quarantined predicate
used to re-track the input bucket Good before the attempt and then flip
it Bad, emitting QualityChanged on every push. The run-guard tests now
count emissions (exactly 1 across N pushes, refused and quarantined
cases), with a healthy sibling's dispatch count as the positive control
that every push was processed. Both were red before the fix.
Refs #734
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
BoundedApiKeyStore's negative cache was keyed by key id, so a flood of DISTINCT well-formed
otua_<random>_x credentials missed it every time and cost one SQL query per attempt under the
SDK's SessionManager-wide lock, no credential needed (R03:3.3).
- IApiKeyStore.ListKeyIdsAsync (default null = unsupported; ConfigDbApiKeyStore lists every
ApiKeyId): the bounded store keeps a known-id set refreshed every StoreCacheSeconds
(single-flight, failed refresh keeps the previous set) and refuses an unknown id without a store
read ({outcome=unknown_id}).
- A process-wide miss budget (token bucket, Security:ApiKeys:MissBurst=100 /
MissRefillPerSecond=20, ApiKeyStoreGuardOptions) bounds lookups that reach the store and miss
while no set is available; a hit refunds its token. Per-endpoint accounting needs the
OpcUaServer impersonation seam to carry the client address — follow-up.
- docs/security.md: the new knobs, and the known-cluster gate's documented fail-open window at
central boot (R03:4.2) plus the async PSK refresh (R03:3.4).
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
- ApiKeyOptionsValidator (ValidateOnStart on any driver/admin node): a blank or placeholder
Security:ApiKeys:Pepper fails host start instead of rejecting every key after a green boot (R03:2.3).
- JWT is finished and opt-in by key (R03:2.4): with Security:Jwt:SigningKey set, a Bearer scheme
(JwtBearerAuthenticationHandler over JwtTokenService.TryValidate / BuildValidationParameters, fail
closed) accepts the tokens /auth/token mints; the default scheme is a cookie-or-bearer policy scheme
and the fallback policy names it, so /api/* and every RequireAuthorization endpoint take a browser
session OR a machine token. JwtOptions are validated at start (JwtOptionsValidator). Without a key,
/auth/token is not mapped (404, not the former constructor 500) and no bearer scheme exists.
A direct AddJwtBearer needs Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer in
Directory.Packages.props (not this lane's file) — the handler is a drop-in to swap.
- AuthenticationStateAuditActorAccessor is the registered IAuditActorAccessor: the Blazor circuit's
principal first, HttpContext as the fallback (R03:2.5). HttpAuditActorAccessor shares its resolver.
- CookieAuthenticationStateProvider (unregistered, fire-and-forget ping loop) is deleted (R03:1.5/2.5).
- /auth/login logs the LDAP exception at Warning before answering 503 (R03:2.7).
- Admin operations reply with a fixed message + correlation id instead of ex.Message (R03:4.1).
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
A failed SDK start (port in use, PKI unwritable, bad OpcUa:* override) was one Error line: the
node stayed /health/ready 200, joined its mesh, could be elected driver Primary and acked deploys
through the Null sink while every client got connection-refused.
- IOpcUaEndpointState / OpcUaEndpointState: the start outcome is a fact the hosted service
maintains (NotStarted / Started / Failed / Stopped + reason).
- OpcUaEndpointHealthCheck ("opcua-endpoint", Ready + Active) is Unhealthy unless Started;
registered by AddOtOpcUaHealth(hasAdmin, hasDriver) on driver-role nodes.
- A driver-only node rethrows the start failure (Program.cs's fatal handler exits non-zero so
the supervisor restarts it); a fused node keeps its AdminUI up but is visibly not ready.
- StopAsync detaches the sinks and then STOPS the SDK (the port closes, clients get
connection-refused rather than a stale, inert endpoint); DisposeAsync is idempotent with it.
- The ServiceLevel calculator / redundancy election live in Cluster + Runtime (not this lane);
the fact is exposed for the Wave 3 follow-up to consume.
Tests: port-in-use ⇒ state Failed, probe Unhealthy, real /health/ready and /health/active 503
(positive control: 200 once Started); driver-only rethrows; StopAsync closes the port and
DisposeAsync twice is a no-op; the probe registration is on both tiers for driver nodes only.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
A timed-out script is abandoned, not stopped, and every seam re-ran it on the
next trigger, leaking one pool thread per trigger (R03:1.1, R05:2, R07:L1).
A shared ScriptRunGuard, keyed per script instance, now:
- refuses a run while that script's previous orphan is still executing
(Bad "previous evaluation still running" + otopcua.script.run_refused);
- quarantines after 3 consecutive non-completions or an allocation-budget
breach (sampled with GC.GetAllocatedBytesForCurrentThread; default 64 MB):
no further dispatch, Bad quality, one Error, otopcua.script.quarantined,
cleared on source change / redeploy / reset;
- starts the budget clock when the pool picks the run up, so starvation is
no longer charged to the script (R07:P5), and cancels the evaluator token
on timeout.
Wired into RoslynVirtualTagEvaluator, CalculationEvaluator (new async
EvaluateAsync; the driver's pump and timer ticks now await the run behind a
SemaphoreSlim gate) and ScriptedAlarmEngine (a non-completing predicate
holds state and annotates the condition BadInternalError). ScriptingOptions
(Scripting:MaxAllocBytesPerRun, Scripting:QuarantineAfterConsecutiveTimeouts)
carries the knobs; the Calculation driver config accepts the same two keys.
Tests: guard unit suite (incl. the 30-trigger runaway leaving one orphan with
a healthy sibling as positive control), per-seam refusal/quarantine/reset
tests. The S12 race test now uses one vtag id per loop: twelve concurrent
evaluations of ONE id is a shape production never produces and the guard
refuses by design.
Refs #734
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Review R08:1.1: an uncapped HistoryRead-Raw (NumValuesPerNode = 0) read a
tag's whole window into memory on every backend (SQL TOP(int.MaxValue),
QuestDB LIMIT, Gateway max_values = int.MaxValue + a second snapshot copy).
New ServerHistorian:MaxRawValuesPerRead (default 10 000; <= 0 unbounded with
a Validate() warning; 1 raised to 2). Each backend data source takes it,
reports it as IHistorianDataSource.MaxRawValuesPerRead (the Gateway: min
with a strict gateway's learned ceiling), so the node manager's existing
RawPageLimit paging serves N = 0 and N > cap as pages of at most the cap
with a continuation point. Independently, a backend raw read asking for 0
or more than the cap reads cap + 1 rows and is REFUSED
(HistoryReadLimitExceededException => BadTooManyOperations) when the window
holds more - never answered truncated, since the server's paging reads a
short answer as the last page. Bound through the Host registry, the
SqlServer/QuestDb providers and GatewayHistorian.CreateDataSource.
Tests: options (default/binding/warnings), provider binding, Gateway unit +
through a real SDK node manager (uncapped -> 999/998/998/605 + CPs), and a
conformance case for the SQL backends.
Refs #736
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Clears CommentChecker findings in src/ (3,280 -> 209, the remainder being false
positives like PLC-5/IEEE-754/M0.0) by adding missing summaries/params/returns,
normalising inheritdoc usage, and removing Gitea/review tracking IDs while keeping
the rationale they annotated. Comment-only: comment-stripped sources are identical
to the parent commit.
Item 1: IHistorianDataSource.MaxRawValuesPerRead (Gateway: learned ceiling - 16 = L; 0 elsewhere, guard-tested).
RawPageLimit plans every raw page on top of #692's lookahead: with L > 0 the read (page P + boundary ties k
+ lookahead) is <= L, P = min(N, L - k - 1) (uncapped: L - k - 1); no room => straight to the tie-cluster
over-fetch (never an uncapped or underflowing request). One re-plan + re-read when the read taught a new
limit or was refused for crowding pre-window rows (HistoryReadLimitExceededException.PreWindowRows): the
page shrinks by them. Over-fetch bound min(MaxTieClusterOverfetch, L - 1); slice size never 0.
Review fixes: F1 a window starting at/before the epoch counts AVEVA's synthetic row as pre-window (a
ceiling-truncated read was reported complete); F2 the page path disables ReverseRawReader's own re-run
(cold end-only ceiling 20/N=3000 cost 3,023 reads, now <= 40); F3 crowded look-back re-read around, not
refused; F4 the #687 crowding re-read room at least doubles (up to 8 re-reads), so a cluster of hundreds
just before a resume point no longer fails on a default gateway; a crowding refusal that leaves no room
is BadTooManyOperations, never a tick-by-tick cursor.
Item 2: ServerHistorian:EventReadHorizon (default 00:00:00 = exact, unchanged). When set, every fresh
HistoryReadEvents window's earlier bound is raised to now - horizon (both directions, all backends).
Lossy by design; documented.
Item 3 (native TimeAverage/Total re-check) stays blocked on historiangw#27.
1. The at-or-after bound read on a forward-only backend (Gateway) ends at
now + ReverseRawReader.LookAhead instead of DateTime.MaxValue (the gateway
only checks start <= end, so a year-9999 end reached AVEVA); a bound beyond
the horizon is not found without a read. SqlServer/QuestDB keep MaxValue:
they bind it safely and may hold samples further ahead. The Gateway fake now
refuses far-future ends, so the missing-end-bound test is no longer vacuous.
3. No data and no bound found (whole read empty) => GoodNoData, no values —
the pre-bounds answer (6.5.3.2: success only if one or both bounds exist).
A one-value page whose start bound is missing first checks there is data or
a found end bound.
4. ServerHistorian:HonorReturnBounds (default true); false ignores ReturnBounds
as before #691, including the modified-read Bad_InvalidArgument.
- HistoryUpdate Primary gate now reads IHistoryUpdateRoleView (PrimaryGatePolicy.ShouldServeHistoryUpdate):
the data-plane verdict but CLOSED until this node's first redundancy snapshot, so both pair nodes cannot
accept in the pre-join boot window. Single nodes open on their own singleton's first snapshot; admin-only
nodes register no view => no gate. DriverHostActor publishes it at every Primary-verdict publish point.
- SqlServer v1: the updater throws NotSupportedException on every arm; the node manager maps it to a
node-level BadHistoryOperationUnsupported (was per-item under a Good node for UpdateData/DeleteAtTime).
HistoryWrite bit still advertised on v1 (not knowable at materialise time) — documented.
- The update plan is evaluated before the Primary gate: an unservable request (Remove, IsDeleteModified,
not historized, no updater) is BadHistoryOperationUnsupported off-Primary, not BadInvalidState.
- Local-kind SourceTimestamp converted to UTC before the future-skew compare and sent as UTC.
- Hosted-service wiring extracted to BuildHistoryUpdatePosture and tested (gate source, skew, clock).
- Docs: Historian.md (boot window, ordering, node-level v1, HistoryWrite bit), CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- HistoryUpdate items with SourceTimestamp > now + ServerHistorian:HistoryUpdateMaxFutureSkew
(default 1 day, <=0 disables) => BadOutOfRange in the node manager (every backend, never sent);
clock injected via OtOpcUaNodeManager.Clock (host TimeProvider).
- HistoryUpdate is Primary-only: off-Primary => BadInvalidState per node, after authorization,
same IDriverPrimaryRoleSource verdict as the native-ack gate; HistoryRead ungated.
- SqlServer: base schema requirement back to v1; SupportsModifiedTrail (v>=2). On v1 with
AutoCreateSchema=false: writes/reads/events/retention work, modified reads + HistoryUpdate =>
BadHistoryOperationUnsupported with nothing sent, retention skips SampleModified, one Warning per boot.
- QuestDB integration test pinning wall-clock TTL (far-future row evicts only partitions older
than the TTL by the wall clock), with a positive control.
- Docs: Historian.md, Configuration.md, security.md, CLAUDE.md (incl. QuestDB retry duplicates,
#674.4 anonymous-readable trail with ACL off, #674.5 not implemented).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
M1: the time-weighted family (incl. Total, formerly a pushed-down SUM) streams
raw window rows into the C# evaluator. New shared knob
ServerHistorian:MaxTimeWeightedRawRows (default 1,000,000; <=0 unbounded with a
Validate warning) flows through HistorianBackendRegistry into both providers.
The window query is capped at cap+1 (SQL Server TOP (@maxRows), QuestDB LIMIT $4);
one row past the cap throws the new Core.Abstractions
HistoryReadLimitExceededException, which the node manager maps to
BadTooManyOperations for that node. Not counted as a backend health failure;
bound rows are not counted; per-sample aggregates are not capped.
M2: reverse Interpolative is anchored at the later time (Part 13): points at
End - i*interval, emitted latest first. 10:00->09:00 @1h yields 10:00.
L1: Partial bit (0x4, = Opc.Ua.AggregateBits.Partial) on non-Bad results of a
truncated last interval (time-weighted family; per-sample family is a follow-up).
L2/L3: aligned with the SDK AggregateCalculator.GetTimeBasedStatusCode
(decompiled from Opc.Ua.Server 1.5.378.106): TreatUncertainAsBad=false counts
Uncertain time (Uncertain samples, held-into-outage, extrapolation) as Good
time; data but no non-Bad time => generic Bad (0x80000000); BadNoData only
when there is no data at all. Consequence: a live tag's latest interval reads
Good (documented).
L5: release note no longer claims Total matches the Gateway Integral exactly
(AVEVA's divisor is unverified); it notes Total is now evaluated in C# and
subject to the cap.
Tests: unit (reverse Interpolative x3, Partial, Bad vs BadNoData incl. an
open-ended outage, cap helpers, SDK bit oracles); conformance (reverse
Interpolative, raw-row cap at/over/0, bounds not counted, health unaffected);
node manager BadTooManyOperations; options default + warning. Each new
behaviour falsified by mutation (aggregator x9, data-source cap checks on
both backends against the real DBs, node-manager catch).
A SIGKILLed Primary stays an unreachable-but-not-downed member until
auto-down, and the redundancy singleton usually dies with it, so the
standby's cached snapshot kept naming it Primary and nobody captured for
~30 s. DriverHostActor now holds its own ReachabilityEvent (+MemberUp)
subscription, caches the last snapshot, and excludes unreachable peers
from the historization peer-is-Primary predicate only, republishing just
the capture verdict on a reachability change. Alarm drain and the Primary
data-plane verdict are unchanged. Gated by
ContinuousHistorization:CaptureWhilePrimaryUnreachable (default true).
Tests: message-driven cases with real ReachabilityEvents (incl. a
falsification control on the drain/data-plane verdicts) plus a real
two-node cluster crash test with downing disabled.
- I-1: QuestDbConnection caps Npgsql Maximum Pool Size at 24 (DefaultMaxPoolSize)
when the connection string does not set it; an explicit value is kept. The
effective value is logged once at Information.
- M-1: QuestDbTagCatalog.EnsureAsync waits for the tag table's sequenced commits
and re-checks before inserting, so it no longer overwrites a provisioner row
(unit/description) that is committed but not yet applied. Integration test
reproduces the clobber against real QuestDB (falsified).
- M-3: the pre-1970 drop Warning is rate-limited per tag (once per 10 min);
DroppedPre1970 still counts every sample.
- M-5: QuestDbHistorianProvider is IAsyncDisposable/IDisposable and disposes the
shared Npgsql pool; Program.cs registers the provider through a factory and
every seam resolves it from the container, so DI disposes it at shutdown.
- M-8, M-9: docs fixes (HistoryUpdate transaction wording; folded duplicate
HistoryUpdate paragraph). Pool-size docs updated for the new default cap.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
- Historian.md: Empty samples always Bad (writer/updater/read clamp),
long-name refusal, 5 s bootstrap failure cache, AtTime after now, info-bit
masking, HistoryUpdate does NOT type-check (M-1 decision), DeleteRaw
needs both bounds, reverse Raw paging, the historian/historization metric
prefixes, and provisioning numeric-only lines qualified as Gateway.
- CLAUDE.md numeric-only lines qualified as Gateway backend.
- Stale 'sole historian' lines in DriverLifecycle, ServiceHosting and the
retired Wonderware stub; Client.CLI exit-code contract.
- ServerHistorianOptions: Endpoint/Backend XML docs untangled, Validate()
indented; Program.cs comments are backend-neutral; T10 week-test day count.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
- OtOpcUaNodeManager overrides HistoryUpdateData / HistoryDeleteRawModified / HistoryDeleteAtTime,
block-bridging to the optional IHistorianDataUpdater under the shared HistoryRead batch limiter +
deadline. Insert/Replace/Update map to HistoryUpdateMode; Remove, IsDeleteModified, events and
structure data are BadHistoryOperationUnsupported. Per-item codes stitched back in request order
(MinValue SourceTimestamp => BadInvalidTimestamp, untypeable value => BadTypeMismatch); success
clears the base's pre-seeded Unsupported error.
- HistoryWrite AccessLevel bit OR-ed in for historized nodes when an updater is wired (raw + UNS);
it is dispatch-load-bearing in the SDK base. OtOpcUaSdkServer.SetHistorianDataUpdater; the hosted
service assigns it from an optional HistorianUpdaterHolder before SetSink, clears it on stop.
- AuthorizeHistoryUpdate: ACL on => scoped OpcUaOperation.HistoryUpdate decision (replaces the role
check); ACL off => #563 key re-check + new OpcUaDataPlaneRoles.HistoryUpdate role, conferred by
ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper only from a Cluster-scoped HistoryUpdate grant (WriteOperate does not).
- AdminUI ACL editor offers NodePermissions.HistoryUpdate.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
Review R1:
- M1 (#609): DriverHostActor.StopChild releases the instance's resilience state before evicting the hub.
- m2 (#597): DriverHostActor publishes ShouldServiceAsPrimary() to IDriverPrimaryRoleSource at start and on
cluster membership changes (deduped), so the native-ack gate denies in a pair's boot window.
- m4 (#601): ApplyCachedArtifact returns false on empty/malformed bytes; the cached revision is not adopted,
Direct mode goes Stale (no RUNNING FROM CACHE), FetchAndCache lands Steady-with-no-revision and a
re-dispatch of the same revision really applies.
- m3 (#603): LocalDbReplicationPolicy splits into CapturesChanges (PeerAddress||ApiKey, registration) and
SharesRowsWithPeer (ApiKey && (PeerAddress||SyncListenPort>0), alarm drain gate).
- m5 (#618): Program.cs catch-all filters HostAbortedException (design-time tooling).
- m6 (Cluster-002): ClusterRoleInfo seeds only Up/WeaklyUp members.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
- Native-condition Acknowledge on a non-Primary node returns BadInvalidState (nothing
routed/applied/reported) via NativeAlarmAckPrimaryGate, fed from
IDriverPrimaryRoleSource by OtOpcUaServerHostedService.
- A re-ack carrying a comment reports one comment event (Acked/Confirmed unchanged).
- TimedShelve applies its requested duration and the scripted projection carries
UnshelveAtUtc, so ShelvingState/UnshelveTime counts down instead of ~24.8 days.
- Native re-ack still routed to the driver (deliberate: documented retry path), pinned.
- AdminUI /alerts client ack/shelve path test; docs/AlarmTracking.md decisions incl.
accepted SDK EventsMonitored residual (item 6).
- Also #599/03/S20: RemoveEquipmentSubtree severs inverse Organizes edges.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
The drain gate counted SyncListenPort; a port with no ApiKey shares nothing (fail-closed
passive endpoint), and an ApiKey-only passive node shares its queue but was never gated.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
ConfigureSharedLogger had no production caller, so the pool's only
diagnostics (first-wins options conflicts, scheduler/close failures)
went to NullLogger. DriverFactoryBootstrap now configures it from the
driver registry factory and from the AbCip/AbLegacy probe factories
(admin-only nodes reach the pool only through Test Connect). Wiring tests
reset the pool to a null logger first, so removing the call goes red
(verified).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
The old AdminUI cannot author the per-driver transport key (#576), so the
'pin before upgrading' recipe had no working path. A node-level appsetting
(env Drivers__AbCip__DefaultTransport) now supplies the default for AbCip
drivers with no key: explicit key > node default > compiled Native. Bound
and validated unconditionally (bad value fails host start); the driver
factory and the Test Connect probe both read it so they agree. AbCip.md
upgrade recipe rewritten around the key; Configuration.md documents it.
Also documents first-wins for AllowPacking/probe and host-alias throttles
(final review M6) and moves the status-bit note out of AbCip.md (M5).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
- AbCip/AbLegacy driver forms gain a Transport InputSelect; FromOptions/ToOptions now carry
Transport, so saving any other field no longer silently reverts Native to libplctag.
- Both drivers log the constructed transport once per init.
- AbCip factory now takes the host ILoggerFactory (it ran on NullLogger in production, hiding
every AbCip log line); DriverFactoryBootstrap passes it.
- Gate results: AdminUI /run (T19) native, inverted (dead port) and libplctag legs.