A driver builds its RawPath -> definition table at init and tolerates a
per-tag miss: an unmappable TagConfig, an unparseable address, a
capability-matrix rejection. That tolerance is right -- one bad tag must not
take down the other few thousand. What was missing is any statement of the
fact afterwards. A skip is not an error and happens before any read, so the
driver stays Healthy, errors/5 min stays 0, Last error stays empty, and Last
read advances live off the tags that did map. On the wonder Makino in #540
that reading held while focas-z-34184 ignored 20 of its 22 tags.
New optional capability ISkippedTagReporter, backed by a shared
SkippedTagLedger so the reset/commit/cap rules are one implementation rather
than one per driver. The report -- authored count, exact skipped count, and a
capped sample of RawPath + reason -- rides DriverHealthChanged to a new Tags
column on /hosts, over the Phase 5 telemetry stream. No table: a driver-only
node has no ConfigDb to write to, the lesson from #521.
The issue named eight drivers. It is twelve -- every driver in
DriverTypeNames.All has an authored-tag skip path. Calculation (no scriptId),
MTConnect (no readable DataItem id), Galaxy (no attributeRef) and OpcUaClient
(no nodeId) were unlisted, and OpcUaClient's was the quietest of the twelve:
NamespaceMap drops such an entry with a bare `continue` and not even a log
line. SkippedTagReporterFleetTests pins the invariant reflectively over every
IDriver in src/Drivers/, so a thirteenth cannot re-introduce the silence.
Sql drops a tag at TWO points and its report is the union of both: a blob
that does not map, AND an identifier the 8.1 catalog gate rejects against the
live catalog. The second is what schema drift produces -- a renamed column, a
dropped view -- months after a deployment sealed green, and reporting only
the first would have that driver claim "0 skipped" while polling half its
tags, which is worse than reporting nothing because the column would then be
actively reassuring.
Deliberately additive to driver state, never a change of it. Latching
non-Healthy for a config problem would satisfy both halves of the #527
comms-loss conjunction -- 90 s without a successful read AND non-Healthy --
and a driver whose tags were ALL skipped has no successful reads by
construction, so it would reconnect-loop forever against a healthy device.
Three details that are load-bearing rather than incidental:
- The skip digest is part of the publish fingerprint. A skipped tag leaves
every other fingerprint component identical to a clean driver's, so without
it PublishHealthSnapshot's dedup swallows exactly the publish carrying the
signal -- the trap that already bit the rediscovery and host-status
channels. The digest covers the sample, not just the counts: a redeploy
that fixes one tag and breaks another leaves both counts unchanged.
- The count is exact; only the sample is capped, and the tooltip says so when
it is showing fewer than it counted. A truncated list that looked complete
would have an operator fix twenty tags and believe the job done.
- The ledger stages and commits, so an init that throws part-way leaves the
previous report standing. A partial snapshot would read as "we now skip
fewer tags", the opposite of the truth.
The proto field needs no companion presence flag, unlike host_statuses: a
singular message field carries real presence in proto3, and a has_ flag would
collide with protoc's generated HasSkippedTags.
Verified red-first three ways: dropping SkippedTagDigest from the fingerprint
fails the two dedup tests, removing the seam from one driver fails the fleet
guard, and dropping the catalog-gate leg fails the Sql union test. Full
solution builds with zero new warnings against 4e22f024.
Authoring FOCAS tags through /raw -> Browse device... produced tags the driver
could never read. Every committed tag read BadNodeIdUnknown forever, and the
failure was silent end to end: the AdminUI accepted it, the deploy gate sealed
green, and the driver reported Healthy with 0 errors while ignoring the tags.
Net effect: the whole fixed-tree surface could not be published through any v3
authoring path. Found cutting wonder-app-vd03 over to v3 against a real Makino
Pro 5 / Fanuc 30i, where 0 of 20 committed tags read while two hand-authored
MACRO: tags on the same device read Good.
A captured browse leaf's id IS its DriverAttributeInfo.FullName, and the fixed
tree emitted "{deviceHost}/{path}" there -- an internal cache key, not an
address. Both authoring paths wrote it verbatim into TagConfig.address, and
FocasAddress.TryParse accepts no such form, so the driver skipped the tags at
init.
Fixed at the emitter rather than by stripping the host at commit, which fixes
the browse-commit flow and the manual picker's tree-select together and leaves
one canonical address form:
- FocasAddress gains a fourth kind, FIXED:<path>, and moves to Contracts so the
AdminUI and ControlPlane can parse without referencing the runtime driver
(#526). A FIXED: read is served from the fixed-tree snapshot the poll loop
already maintains -- no area read, no connection. Writes refuse: nothing in
that tree is a writable location on the CNC.
- The address carries no device. A tag's device comes from its Device row, and
a second routing channel for one fact is what created this defect.
- An authored FIXED: tag arms the fixed-tree poll loop by itself. Enabled
defaults false and the browser force-enables it only for a browse, so the
operator would otherwise browse, commit, deploy, and land on a driver whose
loop never starts -- every tag Bad with a correct address.
- Fixed-tree values are now dated from the last answered poll and go
BadCommunicationError once it is stale (8 cadences, floored at 30s). The poll
loop swallows a failed tick by design, so a dead CNC would otherwise serve its
last snapshot as Good indefinitely -- harmless while nothing could bind to the
tree, not harmless now.
Guardrails, so this class cannot recur silently:
- FocasTagConfigModel.Validate() runs the real parser instead of a non-empty
check, and FocasTagDefinitionFactory.Inspect() warns at the deploy gate, which
covers CSV/API config that never touches the modal.
- The manual picker offered axis/spindle/program/status "parameter groups" --
none of which is a FOCAS addressing space -- and its own default value,
axis:5, was unusable. It now composes PMC / PARAM: / MACRO: through
FocasAddress, so what it emits is parseable by construction.
Tests assert addresses ROUND-TRIP through the parser rather than matching an
expected string: the previous FocasAddressBuilderTests pinned "axis:5" exactly,
which is how a green suite coexisted with a picker nobody could use. Verified
red-first against the old emitter. FOCAS 308, AdminUI 1095, ControlPlane 169,
Core 581 -- all pass, 0 warnings.
The remaining half of #540 -- a driver reporting Healthy/0 errors while
skipping tags at init -- is fleet-wide (eight drivers do this) and is filed
separately rather than patched per-driver.
Also adds the two fixture connection strings to both docker-dev centrals, so
the rig can author + browse the Postgres and Oracle fixtures on 10.100.0.35.
SqlDriverProbe.DefaultDialectFor was left SqlServer-only when the provider
gates were widened, so AdminUI Test Connect failed for both new providers
with InvalidOperationException while Deploy and browse worked. Found by the
live chrome/AdminUI gate the plan deferred, not by any test: every case in
SqlDriverProbeTests builds its probe through ForTest(), which injects the
dialect and never reaches the production switch.
Widen the switch arm-for-arm with SqlDriverFactoryExtensions.CreateDialect,
and cover the gate directly via an internal seam — plus a reserved-provider
falsification control and an end-to-end production-constructor case.
Two disposable docker fixtures (postgres:17-alpine on 15432, gvenzl/oracle-free:
23-slim on 11521) shaped like the existing mssql one — project label, distinct
container name, healthcheck, one-shot seed service — plus a live suite per
provider, gated on SQL_PG_* / SQL_ORACLE_* and skipping clean offline.
Each suite covers what a DIALECT can get wrong, rather than re-running the
provider-agnostic read semantics already pinned against SQL Server and SQLite:
liveness + catalog load, a KeyValue read, the provider's own row-limit syntax via
topByTimestamp (LIMIT 1 / FETCH FIRST 1 ROWS ONLY, where T-SQL emits TOP 1),
identifier case-folding through the design §8.1 catalog gate, and the AdminUI
browse walk driven through SqlDriverBrowser.
Two seed decisions are load-bearing rather than scaffolding:
- The Postgres schema is owned by a role the suite is NOT; the connecting login
holds USAGE + SELECT only. That is the exact provisioning PostgresDialect's
ListSchemasSql exists for (information_schema.schemata lists only schemas the
role OWNS, so a granted-not-owning poller would see none and every tag would be
rejected). A fixture that owned its own schema would pass either way.
- Every identifier in both seeds is created UNQUOTED, so the catalogs hold
lower-case (Postgres) and UPPER-case (Oracle) spellings. The case-folding legs
author the opposite case and pin SqlCatalog.TryMatch's REAL contract — exact
ordinal first, then a UNIQUE case-insensitive match whose catalog spelling is
substituted — which on both providers is what makes mixed-case authoring work
at all, since both dialects emit case-sensitive double-quoted identifiers.
Connection strings are composed through dialect.Factory.CreateConnectionString-
Builder() and the abstract DbConnectionStringBuilder indexer, so the csproj keeps
its no-direct-provider-reference discipline; every key used was verified accepted
through that indexer. The csproj gains only Driver.Sql.Browser, for the browse leg.
Live-run evidence (local OrbStack, both images arm64): Postgres 5/5 green;
Oracle 6/6 green after the ORA-01745 dialect fix this suite found. Offline the
whole project is 33 skipped / 0 failed.
Found by the new OracleReadTests against a real Oracle 23 Free: EVERY Oracle
driver instance failed its Initialize-time catalog load, and every AdminUI browse
of a table's columns threw, with
ORA-01745: invalid host/bind variable name
Oracle rejects a bind variable named after a reserved word, and the catalog
readers bind a parameter whose base name is `table` (SqlCatalogLoader /
SqlBrowseSession bind `schema` + `table`), so `ListColumnsSql` could not execute
at all. The provider was structurally non-functional.
OracleDialect now namespaces every marker/bind name through one `p_` constant
(`:p_k0` / `p_k0`), which a reserved word can never collide with, and its catalog
SQL is respelled to match. Prefixing everything rather than carrying a
reserved-word list is deliberate: the list is long and version-dependent, and a
future base name (`date`, `user`, `comment`, `level`…) would silently re-open the
same hole. Marker and bind name are derived from the same constant, so they
cannot drift apart.
No offline test could have caught this — only a server parses the SQL — so the
regression test asserts the invariant that made it possible (a bind name is never
the bare base name), with `table` called out explicitly.
Live evidence: 6/6 OracleReadTests red with ORA-01745 before, 6/6 green after,
against gvenzl/oracle-free:23-slim.
The fixture Agent flips to AllowPut = true (its comment rewritten: writes are in
scope now that the driver implements IWritable) and the suite grows three
env-gated write legs, all still Assert.Skip-clean with no Agent reachable.
Devices.xml gains a DataItem, and that is the deliberate part. The write target
has to be one the SHDR adapter NEVER feeds, or the assertion races the stream --
but it must NOT be the existing never-fed fixture_block: the first successful
write takes an item off UNAVAILABLE for the life of the container, which would
silently rob Read_maps_an_unavailable_observation_to_BadNoCommunication of its
subject. So fixture_writeback (free-text EVENT, PROGRAM_COMMENT) is a separate,
dedicated target, overridable via MTCONNECT_WRITE_TARGET for a run pointed at a
real machine tool.
The three legs:
* Round trip -- driver write accepted, then the injected value read back off
/current over plain HTTP (not through the parser under test) AND through the
driver's own ReadAsync. The value carries a TickCount64 suffix: the Agent
keeps an injected observation for the container's life, so a constant would
be satisfied by a previous run's leftover.
* Agent refusal -> BadCommunicationError. The design doc doubted this leg was
constructible ("an id in the probe but refused by the agent"); it is, and the
mechanism is BuildWriteTargets. Write targets are derived from the tags the
BINDING serves, with the device resolved from the probe model and falling
back to the configured deviceName -- so an authored tag naming an id the
Agent never declared, on a driver whose deviceName IS set, resolves to a real
URL and is POSTed. That is exactly the shape a stale tag has after a DataItem
is renamed. The second half of the test is the falsifiability control: the
SAME unknown id with NO deviceName has no URL and must be refused locally as
BadNodeIdUnknown. Two different codes is what proves the first write actually
reached the Agent rather than being short-circuited into a look-alike.
* Disabled gate -- write.enabled absent returns BadNotWritable AND /current is
unchanged from the snapshot taken just before, which is what distinguishes
"refused" from "reported refused and sent anyway".
RAN LIVE, not just compiled: the fixture was brought up locally (OrbStack,
MTCONNECT_AGENT_HOST_PORT=5555 -- macOS AirPlay squats :5000) and the whole
suite passed 15/15, 0 skipped. Evidence beyond the green: the Agent reports
<ProgramComment dataItemId="fixture_writeback">OTOPCUA-WRITE-2CBCB530</...> and
its log carries "Error processing request:
/OtFixtureCnc?otopcua_no_such_data_item_2CBCB3D9=refuse-me" -- the refusal leg
demonstrably went to the wire. Offline (no Agent) the suite is 15 skipped, 0
failed; build 0 warnings / 0 errors.
Note for anyone reading agent.cfg: BufferSize = 14 is an EXPONENT (2^14 = 16384
observations), not a 14-deep ring, and /current is answered from the Agent's
per-DataItem checkpoint anyway -- so eviction is not a hazard for a write
read-back even on this busy fixture stream.
LiveOptions/ConfigJson/LiveDriverAsync gained writeEnabled + deviceName
parameters, both defaulted off/null so every pre-existing test still runs
against the shipped read-only driver whatever the Agent's AllowPut says. The
config JSON sources write.enabled FROM the options object, so the parsed config
can never disagree with the options a test thinks it built.
Widens the two provider gates so an authored `{"provider":"Postgres"}` or
`{"provider":"Oracle"}` binds that provider's own dialect instead of failing
"not available in this build":
- `SqlDriverFactoryExtensions.CreateDialect` gains a Postgres and an Oracle
arm. There is deliberately no fallback arm — a default resolving to
SqlServerDialect would construct happily and then emit T-SQL at a Postgres
or Oracle server. The rejection message now names the three supported and
the two still-reserved providers.
- `SqlDriverBrowser.DefaultDialectSelector` widens identically, so a provider
the runtime constructs is also browsable; MySql/Odbc keep resolving to null
and the caller keeps reporting them as unavailable.
Tests: the existing rejected-provider controls flip from Postgres to MySql
(factory) and Odbc (browser) so the reserved half stays falsifiable, and the
new legs assert the bound dialect TYPE rather than mere construction —
"no throw" alone would pass against a SqlServer fallback.
Doc-comment sweep (contract addition, one line each): the "v1 constructs
SqlServer only" / "reserved for P2" claims in SqlProvider, SqlDriverConfigDto,
ISqlDialect.Provider and SqlServerDialect are now false and were corrected in
the same change.
TryFormatValue's catch filter named only FormatException / InvalidCastException
/ OverflowException, and the call sits OUTSIDE WriteAsync's per-slot try. But
Convert.ToString falls back to the value's OWN ToString/IFormattable - arbitrary
caller code that may throw anything - so any other exception escaped WriteAsync
uncaught and failed the entire batch, breaking the documented never-throws
per-slot contract. Broadened to a catch-all; the slot gets BadTypeMismatch and
the exception is logged at Warning (TryFormatValue became an instance method to
reach _logger). One unformattable value now costs its own slot and nothing more.
Falsification checked, not assumed: restoring the narrow filter makes the new
test fail with a raw "System.InvalidOperationException : this formatter is
broken" propagating out of WriteAsync - i.e. it fails for the contract-breach
reason, not on an assertion.
Two tests added:
- a value whose ToString throws InvalidOperationException is refused
BadTypeMismatch while the *following* good slot still writes (the load-bearing
half - it proves the batch survived).
- mid-batch cancellation: cancellation injected from inside slot 1's own
formatting, so slot 0 has provably already reached the Agent. It keeps its
real Good outcome while slots 1-2 fill BadCommunicationError. Reporting a
landed write as failed is worse than reporting a failure, and a fill that
started at 0 instead of i would do exactly that.
Tests: 534 passed / 0 failed (was 532). Solution build: 0 errors, no warnings
in any MTConnect project.
MTConnectDriver now implements IWritable over the Task-1 agent-client seam
(WriteObservationAsync -> the Agent's AllowPut POST surface). A write is
OBSERVATION INJECTION, not machine command: it sets what the Agent reports for
a DataItem, is visible to every consumer of that Agent, and is overwritten by
the next adapter/SHDR update. Off at two independent gates, both off by default
- the Agent's own AllowPut and the driver's write.enabled (Task 0).
Per-slot refusal order (never throws, strict N-in/N-out batch shape):
write disabled -> BadNotWritable
no live client -> BadNotConnected (ReadAsync's existing convention)
reference unresolved -> BadNodeIdUnknown
no resolvable device -> BadNodeIdUnknown
CONDITION category -> BadNotWritable
null / non-scalar value -> BadTypeMismatch
agent refusal OR throw -> BadCommunicationError
OperationCanceledException fills the remaining slots and returns. The Agent's
refusal text is logged at Warning and never enters DriverHealth.LastError
(type-only discipline); a refused write leaves health untouched.
Device-name resolution: TagBinding gains WriteTargetsByDataItemId, built in
BuildBinding from a probe-model walk that remembers which device each DataItem
was declared under (name, or id when nameless) plus its category. Falls back to
options.DeviceName; unresolvable -> BadNodeIdUnknown rather than a guess.
Values render via Convert.ToString(..., InvariantCulture) - so a Boolean writes
the invariant string "True"/"False", NOT "1"/"0". Arrays are refused rather
than rendered: Convert.ToString would emit the literal "System.Double[]", which
the Agent stores happily and which is invisible until read-back.
FINDING - the CurrentWrite bit does NOT key on SecurityClassification, and the
discovery stamping below is therefore cosmetic. Traced end to end: a browsed
leaf's SecurityClass survives into the browse session's AttributeInfo
(CapturedTreeBrowseSession.cs:53) and stops there - RawBrowseModal never reads
it, RawBrowseCommitMapper.MapLeaf hardcodes TagAccessLevel.Read, and Tag has no
SecurityClass column. AddressSpaceComposer:746/:809 sets Writable purely from
Tag.AccessLevel == ReadWrite; AddressSpaceApplier ANDs !IsArray;
OtOpcUaNodeManager.ComposeAccessLevel:2002 composes CurrentWrite from that
alone. Driver capability is never consulted at compose time either - IWritable
is checked only at runtime in DriverInstanceActor:755. Consequences: (a) raw
tags already committed keep their authored AccessLevel, so nothing this commit
does makes an existing node writable; (b) an operator must still set the tag to
ReadWrite for an MTConnect write to be reachable over OPC UA; (c) conversely a
ReadWrite tag on a non-IWritable driver has always advertised CurrentWrite and
failed only at the actor - pre-existing, not touched here.
Discovery stamps CanWrite(writeEnabled, dataItem) = write.enabled && !CONDITION
-> Operate, else ViewOnly - kept honest so the browse never advertises a tier
the write path would refuse (MQTT's CanWrite principle), with the caveat above
recorded verbatim at the call site.
Status-code constants are spelled WITHOUT MqttDriver's "Status" prefix, to
match the two this file already declares (BadCommunicationError,
BadNotConnected). StatusCodeParityTests strips either spelling and passes.
TDD: WriteAsync landed first as a NotImplementedException scaffold - 19 of 20
new tests red on behaviour, 1 (the capability assertion) green on the scaffold
- then implemented. MTConnectFactoryTests' "not_writable" characterization test
is rewritten to pin the new truth, and is the guard for the concrete-return
contract the factory remark explains.
Tests: 532 passed / 0 failed (was ~509). Full solution build: 0 errors,
0 warnings; OTOPCUA0001 clean.
ISqlDialect gains ParameterMarker (the token in the SQL text), ParameterBindName
(the DbParameter.ParameterName) and ConfigureCommand (per-command provider setup,
where Oracle will set BindByName). SQL Server and the test SQLite dialect answer
"@"+name for both spellings and no-op the hook, so SQL Server behaviour is
byte-identical — every existing expected-SQL assertion passes untouched.
SqlGroupPlanner drops its hardcoded @k/@w consts and mints base names (k0..kN, w)
that the dialect spells; SqlQueryPlan carries the emitted markers AND the matching
bind names, so SqlPollReader keeps copying the plan's pairing rather than
re-deriving a provider convention (the two diverge on ODP.NET: ":k0" in the text,
bare "k0" on the parameter). SqlCatalogLoader and SqlBrowseSession bind
schema/table through the dialect, so their bind names cannot drift from the
markers in the dialect-owned catalog SQL. Every parameter-carrying command site
calls ConfigureCommand before its first parameter.
Controlled by a new test-only ColonMarkerDialect (":name" markers, bare bind
names) that really executes against the SQLite fixture. Each leg was falsified
against the pre-change behaviour: the planner emitted "@k0", the reader bound
":k0", and a hardcoded "@schema" in the loader failed catalog load outright.
All three legs pass against the patched AbCip fixture: the edit modal and the
manual-entry grid both browse the live nine-tag symbol table, and an unreachable
device degrades to the graceful error chip while the modal still saves.
The gate also found a defect unrelated to this change and filed it as #539: the
AbCip discovery path (LibplctagTagEnumerator, LibplctagTemplateReader) passes
libplctag the bare host, so an authored non-default EtherNet/IP port is dropped
and the browse reaches whatever answers on 44818 — #534's defect surviving in the
discovery half. Discovered because the first negative-leg endpoint differed from
the fixture only by port, which never reached the wire.
The last dangling #468 item: RawTagModal / RawManualTagEntryModal passed a
'{}' stub as GetDriverConfigJson, so the AbCip/TwinCAT/FOCAS pickers'
'Browse controller' captured against no endpoint. Both now resolve the
merged Driver+Device config per open and forward a live accessor; review
found and fixed a stale-open race (a superseded open could install another
device's config). 8 new component-class tests; AdminUI suite 1064/1064.
RawBrowseModal's identical race shape deferred to deferment.md §0.1.
Live /run gate pending (rig + fixture staged).
Records the outcome in the design doc §6 (including the stale-open race the
review found and fixed in both modals), closes the follow-up in the tracking
doc and the universal-browser plan, and registers RawBrowseModal's shared
race shape in deferment.md §0.1 as the deliberate leftover.
The tracking doc and program-design §9 still showed Wave 0's live gate open —
it closed 2026-08-01 (c2c3c522). Both now record Waves 0-2 complete.
New design doc for the one residual item: the raw modals' typed tag editors
pass a '{}' stub as GetDriverConfigJson, so the AbCip/TwinCAT/FOCAS pickers'
Browse button captures against no endpoint and can never succeed. Decision:
wire the merged Driver+Device config through (the RawBrowseModal/Test-connect
seam already exists), not hide the button.
The register said "14 issues remain open" and recorded #491 as an open live
gate with "no gate-passed commit exists". Both were false: the tracker has
been at 0 open since 2026-08-04, and #491's gate passed that morning after
finding a production-fatal defect the "code complete" reading had missed.
Re-derived every count from its source of truth rather than from this file:
the Gitea API (0 open; closure dates for all 14), a parse of every
docs/plans/*.tasks.json (31 open tasks across 6 files), and a listing of
code-reviews/ (10 unreviewed projects, 3 retained Wonderware modules).
That surfaced three things reading the file could not:
- §6.2 was missing a live plan file that §5 lists as an open gate, so the
two sections disagreed on whether the work existed.
- §5 cited that file at a date that does not exist in docs/plans/.
- The gate's stated blocker has expired — it needed an operator sign-in,
and docker-dev has since disabled AdminUI login, so it is runnable now.
Also records a correction rather than a status flip: archreview 03/S4
("primary gate default-allows on unknown role") is the same shape as a
decision deliberately taken in PrimaryGatePolicy.ShouldRecordHistorizedValues,
where an unknown role captures. Defensible there, not in a write gate — so
closing 03/S4 must not generalise one rule across both.
Third round running in which this file's own bookkeeping was what broke,
after the dangling pre-amend SHAs and the truncation. The trailer now says
so, and says to re-derive rather than re-read.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Ran on the docker-dev central pair against the local HistorianGateway container talking to the real
AVEVA Historian on wonder-sql-vd03 (VPN up), with the host image rebuilt at e7fbe977.
Two things about the setup matter more than the results:
The value source had to be DRIVEN. Both the project Modbus fixture and oee-modbus-sim hold static
registers, and a static source produces no dependency-mux fan-out at all — the recorder captures
once at deploy and then goes quiet, which reads exactly like a broken recorder. Hand-written
Modbus FC6 writes put the value stream under the gate's control, which is what makes the rate
measurements below mean anything. The project fixture was also brought back up on the docker host
and MAIN-modbus-dev repointed to it, undoing the temporary :1502 repoint the read-back leg made.
The poison tag is the real shape, not a synthetic fault: GATE491-B's historianTagname was CHANGED
on an EXISTING tag, which Issue 5 guarantees is never provisioned, so its writes fail permanently
against a historian that has no such tag. That is how #538 was reached in the first place.
#537 — both nodes up: the Secondary logged the suppression line once and its outbox file froze
while the Primary's kept growing; 6 value changes x 2 tags gave WriteLiveValues{ok} +12 exactly,
where the pre-fix measurement was twice that. Failover: stopping the Primary made the survivor log
"now the recording Primary ... resuming value capture" and pick up every subsequent change. Return:
the restarted node was demoted, logged suppression, and the rate stayed at one node.
#538 — the quarantine fired with the tag named; 5 value changes over 30s gave ok +5 and error +5,
exactly one write per tag per change against a 2s drain interval.
The decisive leg is the IDLE one: 40s with no value changes left both counters unchanged and the
outbox byte size flat. The driven-rate legs only show a rate that happens to look right; a pre-fix
build re-writes its queued healthy entries on every drain pass whether or not anything new arrives,
so its counters climb during a quiet window with no input at all. Flat counters over idle is the
observation the bug cannot produce.
Incidental finding, recorded against Issue 5 rather than treated as a fix: a node RESTART cures an
unprovisioned tag. central-2's boot logged provisioning (dispatched=2, requested=2, ensured=2,
failed=0) and the poison tag started succeeding, because a full address-space rebuild treats every
historized tag as added and re-runs EnsureTags — where the incremental deploy that introduced the
renamed tag did not. So an operator who restarts a node while diagnosing "my tag isn't historizing"
makes the symptom disappear without learning the cause.
Docs only; no production code changed.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Both defects were found by #491's live gate against a real HistorianGateway and filed rather than
fixed at the time, because each one's fix is a design decision rather than a patch.
#537 — both nodes of a redundant pair captured every value, so the historian received duplicate
live samples for every historized tag (measured: the gateway's write counter advanced twice per
value and halved when one central was stopped).
The recorder now reads a capture gate per value, fed from the new
PrimaryGatePolicy.ShouldRecordHistorizedValues through IHistorizationRoleView — a third verdict on
the same RedundancyRoleView object, registered unconditionally on driver nodes rather than
alongside the alarm section's IRedundancyRoleView (which only exists when that section is enabled;
piggybacking is the #511 registration accident).
Two things are deliberate and easy to get backwards:
* It gates the CAPTURE, not the drain — the opposite of the alarm sink. That queue is in LocalDb
and replicates, so the Secondary already holds the Primary's rows. The historization outbox is
a node-local FasterLog replicating to nobody, so a drain-only gate would leave the standby
appending forever to a queue no one empties: unbounded disk, then a flood of stale duplicates
the moment it is promoted. Entries a node already captured are still drained by that node.
* The peer it stands down for must RECORD THE SAME REFS, not merely hold the same rows — a
Primary in this node's own per-cluster mesh. A node carrying no cluster-scoped role cannot
establish that and never stands down: under a fleet-wide election the elected Primary is
usually running a different cluster's configuration, and deferring to it would end this
cluster's historization silently, with the drain reporting success on an empty outbox forever.
That is the scope mismatch that once suspended the alarm drain on every node of the rig.
An unknown role captures, matching the alarm drain — a duplicate sample is recoverable, a hole in
the trend is not.
#538 — the drain writes every per-tag group and then acks all-or-nothing (deliberate: RemoveAsync
truncates THROUGH an id, so partial acking could drop older unwritten entries). One permanently
failing tag therefore pinned the FIFO head while every healthy tag in the batch was re-submitted
to the historian on every pass, indefinitely — duplicate samples and an outbox that never
truncated, observed live at 8.3 MB from a single unprovisionable tag.
The drain now tracks consecutive failures per historian tag and abandons that tag's entries once
it exceeds MaxWriteAttempts (new, default 5), so the head advances. The counter only advances on a
pass where some OTHER tag wrote successfully: that is what separates "this tag is poison" from
"the backend is down". A count-only quarantine looks identical on the poison-tag case and silently
discards the whole backlog during an ordinary gateway restart, turning a duplicate-samples bug
into a lost-history one. Abandonment is also deferred until every failing tag is over budget, so
nothing is discarded on a pass that could not have advanced the head anyway. Each abandonment logs
a Warning naming the tag; the total rides RecorderStatus.AbandonedEntries.
Capacity also gains a non-zero default (500,000 entries) as the disk backstop for the one case the
quarantine deliberately cannot resolve — a historian refusing every write, where retaining is
correct. Set 0 to restore unbounded retention.
Every new test was falsified by reverting the production change it guards, and each one reddens
alone:
* drop the backend-reachable evidence -> only A_backend_that_fails_every_tag_abandons_nothing
* never abandon -> only A_permanently_failing_tag_is_abandoned_so_healthy_tags_stop_being_rewritten
* latch the capture gate at construction -> only The_capture_gate_is_re_read_per_value...
* treat any Primary as a scope peer -> only the two scope-mismatch cases
Full suite green. (Four OpcUaClient.Browser failures during the run were the opc-plc fixture being
down on the shared Docker host; brought it back up and they pass.)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
The 2026-08-01 run closed every leg except read-back, which no reachable historian could
serve that day (the LAN instance accepts writes but serves no reads under a licence tag-count
violation; the licensed one needed the VPN). With the VPN up the run was repeated against
wonder-sql-vd03 and the remaining legs pass:
- EnsureTags provisioning: ensured=2, failed=0 — the path the LAN box could not exercise at
all (it is RemoteGrpc-only and that CAP was not listening).
- Read-back: two Modbus registers carrying DISTINCT NON-ZERO constants were historized, and
each read back as its own value (HR20 -> 8224, HR3 -> 120, quality 192). A first attempt
read back 0, which proves nothing — the same trap #536 recorded, so the proof was rebuilt
on values a crossed or fabricated answer could not fake.
Found during the run and FILED rather than fixed:
- #538 — one permanently-failing tag re-writes every healthy tag on every drain pass, forever.
DrainOnceAsync writes EVERY per-tag group and then acks all-or-nothing, so a tag whose
historian tag does not exist stops the FIFO head advancing while the healthy tags' values
are re-submitted every drain interval; the outbox never truncates (Capacity defaults to 0 =
unbounded, observed at 8.3 MB). The all-or-nothing ack is deliberate — RemoveAsync truncates
THROUGH an id, so partial acking could drop older unwritten entries — so the fix changes the
outbox contract and does not belong in this commit.
Also re-confirmed live: EnsureTags provisioning fires only for newly-ADDED historized tags, so
flipping an existing tag's historianTagname provisions nothing (Issue 5 of
2026-06-27-historian-gateway-integration-issues.md).
No production code changes — the recorder fix shipped in ad744734.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Ran #491's live gate against a real ZB.MOM.WW.HistorianGateway talking to a real AVEVA
Historian, and it found a production-fatal defect on the first value it ever saw.
ContinuousHistorizationRecorder.OnValueChangedAsync touched `Self` after awaiting
IHistorizationOutbox.AppendAsync(...).ConfigureAwait(false). ConfigureAwait(false) discards
Akka's ActorTaskScheduler synchronization context, so `Self` — which reads ActorBase.Context —
threw NotSupportedException. The throw escaped into supervision, which RESTARTED the actor;
because production seeds an EMPTY ref set (the deployed set arrives later via
UpdateHistorizedRefs), the restart silently discarded every historized ref. Net effect: one
value captured, then nothing, with no further error to show for it. Fixed by capturing
`IActorRef self = Self` before the await — the idiom the GetStatus handler already applied to
Sender.
Thirteen unit tests missed it because InMemoryOutbox.AppendAsync returned
ValueTask.CompletedTask: a completed ValueTask never yields, so the continuation ran inline
with the context still installed. The production FasterLog outbox fsyncs per entry and does
yield. The first regression test was itself vacuous — `await Task.Yield()` posts back to the
CAPTURED context, so the append still completed on the actor thread and reverting the fix left
the test green. The fake must complete on a POOL thread (Task.Delay(1).ConfigureAwait(false)),
as a real fsync does; with that, reverting the fix reddens exactly one test.
The rig could not run this gate at all: docker-dev carried ServerHistorian__* but no
ContinuousHistorization__* keys, so the recorder could never spawn. Both centrals now carry
them (default OFF — the recorder needs ContinuousHistorization:Enabled AND
ServerHistorian:Enabled), with the outbox on the per-node named volume so it survives a
container recreate. ServerHistorian__UseTls was hard-coded true and is now parameterized; a
plaintext h2c gateway was unreachable without it.
Gate results: outbox append, drain, WriteLiveValues accepted by a real historian, and restart
convergence (capture resumes after a restart with no new deployment) all pass. The read-back
hop is NOT proven — the LAN historian accepts writes but serves no reads under a "License
violation: Database tag count exceeds license tag count", and the licensed corporate one needs
the VPN. EnsureTags provisioning is likewise unexercised there (RemoteGrpc-only, and that CAP
is not listening). #491 stays open for the read-back hop alone.
Also recorded, not fixed: the recorder has NO Primary gate, unlike the alarm store-and-forward
sink, so both nodes of a redundant pair send duplicate live values. Gating it would introduce a
failover window with no capture — that is a design decision, not a cleanup.
Evidence: docs/plans/2026-08-01-continuous-historization-live-gate.md
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
A browse-committed AB CIP / TwinCAT / FOCAS tag bound with its model's DEFAULT
data type, not the one the device reported. A browsed REAL committed as
`{"tagPath":"Pump_1_Speed","dataType":"DInt"}` — and those three drivers decode
the wire bytes by that field, not by the raw row's OPC UA DataType — so the tag
read four bytes of a float through an integer decoder and published a plausible
wrong number with no error raised anywhere. FOCAS was missed when #536 was filed.
The type is CARRIED, not derived. Reverse-mapping the leaf's driver-agnostic
DriverDataType looks like the smaller fix and is wrong: SInt/Int/DInt/USInt/UInt
all collapse into Int32 on the way out of the driver, so that version would bind
a 16-bit INT as a 32-bit DINT while appearing to fix the REAL. Drivers now state
their own type name on DriverAttributeInfo.NativeDataType, which reaches the
picker as AttributeInfo.AddressFields["dataType"] and the commit mapper from
there. A leaf that states nothing keeps the model default — the pre-#536
behaviour, kept deliberately as the fallback rather than a guess.
Numeric strings are refused before parsing: Enum.TryParse accepts "9" for any
enum and Enum.IsDefined then confirms it, so an unguarded parse would bind a tag
to a type nobody named. A test caught this in the first version of the guard.
--- and the other half, which the fixture was hiding ---
Test Connect on a device with NO authored tags — every AB CIP device at the
moment an operator first presses the button — reported "CIP handshake failed"
against a healthy controller. That was written down as a fixture limitation
("ab_server doesn't implement @raw_cpu_type"). Both halves of that were wrong:
* @raw_cpu_type is not a libplctag special tag at all (only @raw, @tags and
@udt/ are), so it goes out as an ordinary symbolic name that no controller
defines, and the controller's "tag does not exist" IS the successful answer.
* ab_server answered an unresolvable tag path with CIP 0x03 where a Logix
controller answers 0x04 — ErrorBadParam vs ErrorNotFound, which the probe
classifies oppositely. Fixed in vendored patch 0002.
* With the fixture then telling the truth, the real defect surfaced:
AbCipDriverProbe.IsReachableException matched the native C status spellings
("STATUS_NOT_FOUND"), but libplctag.NET throws with the MANAGED enum name
("ErrorNotFound"). Those substrings can never match, so the reachable
classification could not fire on the exception path — which is the path every
no-authored-tags probe takes. This was failing on real hardware too, not just
against the sim. It now recovers the Status and defers to IsReachableStatus,
so there is one classification rather than two that can drift.
Rejected: switching the fallback to @tags. libplctag builds a tag-listing tag
with NO network I/O, so it reports OK against any TCP listener — measured green
against a Mosquitto broker.
Verification: full solution suite green. Falsification runs confirm exactly the
intended tests go red — 9 for the type carry, 3 (the reachable statuses only) for
the probe classification. Live on docker-dev: browse-committed TestString/
Motor_Run/TestSINT now store String/Bool/SInt, alongside last session's
Pump_1_Speed still holding the wrong DInt. TestSINT is the falsifier — its row
DataType is Int32, identical to TestDINT's, so no reverse map could have produced
"SInt".
Known consequence: pre-existing browse-committed tags keep their wrong dataType;
the fix applies to new commits only.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
The AbCip controller browse could never be verified end to end: libplctag's
ab_server answers CIP service 0x55 (Get Instance Attribute List) on the Symbol
Object class with "unsupported", so the `@tags` walk had no backend. #468's own
definition of done offered a sim that serves `@tags` as an alternative to real
hardware; this is that.
The fixture now applies a vendored patch teaching ab_server to serve the Symbol
Object listing, with partial-transfer paging. Correctness is checked against
libplctag's own `list_tags_logix` rather than against our decoder — our decoder
is the thing under test, so its agreement would prove nothing. The clone is also
pinned to a concrete tag: the Dockerfile called `--branch release` "pinned" while
tracking a branch that moves.
That immediately exposed a real defect. CipSymbolObjectDecoder advanced to an
even byte boundary after each symbol name, but entries are packed with no
padding — libplctag walks them by sizeof(entry) + string_len, and a captured
reply confirms it. Any odd-length name therefore desynchronised every entry
behind it, and odd-length names are ordinary. In the live browse below,
`Motor_Run` is 9 bytes and first on the wire, so the old decoder would have
shown that one tag and silently dropped the other eight.
Every existing multi-entry test passed throughout, because the test builder
padded exactly as the decoder did: the two agreed with each other and neither
agreed with a controller. The builder no longer pads, and the layout is pinned
by a captured reply (CipSymbolObjectWireCaptureTests) instead of by a second
statement of the assumption. Restoring the alignment step reddens exactly the
three new tests and none of the 29 others.
Live gate on docker-dev, all three of #468's criteria:
- populated tree — all nine seeded tags render as leaves, in wire order
- refresh re-captures
- leaf commit — Pump_1_Speed + TestDINT saved with their CIP tag paths
The gate also surfaced two things it was not asked about: browse-commit drops
the discovered data type, so a browsed REAL commits as a DINT and the driver
decodes it as one (filed as #536), and Test Connect fails against this fixture
regardless of the device because it probes `@raw_cpu_type` (documented).
TwinCAT and FOCAS still have no browsable backend; #468's AbCip half is closed,
theirs is not.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Joseph Doherty