I-1: a PUT/GET-disabled CPU (every read denied) stayed Faulted with
LastSuccessfulRead frozen, so the comms-loss watchdog reconnected and
re-subscribed it every 90 s forever. Both access-denied arms now also record
an answer: Faulted is kept (worst state wins), the stamp advances, and the
sticky write fault still clears only on a real success. Pinned end to end in
Runtime.Tests: the real S7Driver under the real DriverInstanceActor watchdog
is not reconnected across 2x the threshold; the control (every read timing
out) is.
Minors:
- m-1: injectable pass clock (UtcNow); "LastSuccessfulRead advanced" is now
asserted strictly, including the write-refusal case.
- m-2: the editor uses S7TagShapeRules.IsByteAnchored instead of its own list.
- m-3: a release that races an init publish also cancels the probe loop the
publish started after the release took its snapshot.
- m-4: a retained poll failing during a lifecycle operation writes no health.
- m-5: a multi-var chunk that fell back memoises its members refused alone.
- m-7: access-denied needs S7.Net's exact wording and no transport fault in
the chain.
- m-8: sync teardown clears the write-side Degraded owner; a sync Dispose
racing a running shutdown is tested.
Refs #742
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
- The background probe reported the host Stopped whenever a read pass held
_gate past the probe deadline: contention is the connection being used,
not lost. A contended tick now gives no verdict (counted for tests); a
real probe failure still reports Stopped. A tick that races a teardown no
longer reopens a connection on an uninitialised driver.
- S7DriverProbe deserialised S7DriverOptions directly, whose Timeout is a
TimeSpan no config names, so "timeoutMs" was ignored and every handshake
waited the whole Test Connect budget. The handshake and test read are now
bounded by timeoutMs, capped by the caller's timeout.
Refs #742
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
A span's block is the union of its members' ranges, so one member that runs
past the DB's real end (or over-declares a STRING) made the CPU refuse the
whole block, and every neighbour within it was Bad on every poll. The
planner's stated invariant (a grouped read cannot fault where per-tag reads
would succeed) was false; the multi-var path already fell back, spans did not.
- A refused multi-member span hands its members back; they are read one at a
time for that pass, bypassing the multi-var pass.
- _noGroup remembers the members refused on their own (or every member when
none was) and keeps them out of later plans, so the rest group again. It is
cleared by every initialize publish. Non-refusal span failures are
unchanged (every member stamped).
- The once-per-tag refusal Warning memo (R07:H4) is now also cleared by the
publish, and shutdown resets the write-side Degraded owner, as documented.
- Live gate: MW10 + MD254 (2 bytes past the 256-byte M area) merged into one
refused block; MW10 keeps reading 4097 on every pass.
Refs #742
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
No read or write loop checked _plcDead between items: on a frozen-but-
established peer the first op blew its deadline and marked the handle dead,
and every remaining span / tag / write still went to the wire and could wait
its own deadline under _gate (a 20-span pass ~100 s), with Degraded and the
comms-loss watchdog's clock deferred until the pass ended.
- The span loop, the multi-var chunk loop, the per-tag loop and the write
loop stamp BadCommunicationError without I/O once _plcDead is set.
- A multi-var chunk that dies on a transport loss (socket / IO / timeout /
ConnectionError) marks the handle dead instead of falling back to one
doomed per-tag read per member. The framing class is deliberately excluded
there: snap7/S7.Net report a multi-var with one refused item as
ReadData(WrongNumberReceivedBytes) over a healthy stream.
- Live gate via an in-test freezable TCP proxy (counts request frames, not
seconds). Mutation shows S7.Net 0.20 already self-closes on a cancelled op,
so the gate pins the end-to-end property; the driver guard itself is proven
by the unit tests (an op that ignores its token keeps the socket open).
Refs #742
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
A deterministic PLC refusal (object does not exist, address out of range,
type inconsistent...) degraded driver health, and an all-refused driver (a
wrong DB number) sat Degraded with LastSuccessfulRead frozen, so the 90 s
comms-loss watchdog reconnected it forever against a reachable PLC.
- IsRefusal / IsAccessDenied classify over the whole exception chain. Live
probe on the snap7 fixture: S7.Net's READ paths raise the item error as a
BARE Exception ("Received error from PLC: ..."), its write paths as
PlcException(WriteData). The old PlcException-only match missed the read
shape entirely, so a real read access-denied was BadCommunicationError +
Degraded instead of the Faulted PUT/GET alert; the Test Connect probe had
the same blind spot.
- A refusal (read or write) is BadDeviceFailure with a once-per-tag Warning,
no health write and no reopen; it counts as answered, so it advances
LastSuccessfulRead and restores Healthy after a comms fault. An undecodable
buffer (S7ValueRangeException) also counts as answered.
- A write batch the CPU answered without a failure advances
LastSuccessfulRead and retires a Degraded the write side itself published.
- Tests that used ReadData as their generic "device fault" now use SendData
so their Degraded leg is still exercised.
Refs #742
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Overlapping InitializeAsync calls (the actor's fire-and-forget init plus a
retry tick) could leak an opened PLC connection and orphan a probe loop: no
gate guarded the lifecycle, only _gate for I/O.
- _lifecycleGate (the Modbus pattern) serialises Initialize / Reinitialize /
Shutdown / Dispose; teardown waits a bounded time, then tears down anyway.
- Every initialize and teardown starts a lifecycle generation. Health writes
(init, read/write passes, poll errors, shutdown) and the init publish carry
it and are dropped once it has moved on, so an abandoned init never
publishes over a later shutdown and a shutdown's final write never clobbers
a newer init. A superseded init disposes what it opened and throws.
- The init publish (options, tag tables, Plc, probe loop) happens under _gate;
the tag tables are built fresh and swapped by one reference write instead of
being cleared in place under live poll passes.
- Read/write passes re-check initialization under _gate, so a pass that waited
out a teardown cannot reopen a connection on a shut-down driver.
- The semaphores are no longer disposed: Dispose can race a running shutdown.
Refs #742
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
The init-time tag guards THREW: one mis-authored tag (DB1.DBZ0, DB1.DBW0 typed
Float64, T5 typed Int32, a writable Bool array) faulted the whole driver and the
actor retried the same init every 10 s forever, darkening every tag on the PLC.
Neither the editor nor the deploy gate checked any of it.
- S7AddressParser moves to S7.Contracts (same namespace) and a new
S7TagShapeRules there is the single authority on servable shapes.
- S7TagDefinitionFactory.FromTagConfig applies it, so the AdminUI editor, the
deploy gate (Inspect, with the specific reason) and the driver init refuse
the same tags. Init now skips a refused tag (ISkippedTagReporter) instead of
throwing; the throwing RejectUnsupportedTagConfigs is gone.
- New rules on top of the old guards: a narrow type at the wrong access width
(every read failed) and a Bool array not starting at bit 0 (U4: DB1.DBX0.3
silently read bit 0 of bytes 0..n).
- AdminUI test fixtures that used addresses the driver could never serve
(DB1.DBS0, a browse "SomeAddress", Int32/Float32 on DBW) now use real ones.
Refs #742
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Since #516 a DriverConfig change is stop + respawn, so DriverSpawnPlan.ToApplyDelta
was always empty and the in-place path had no producer. #663 and #664 were both
latent bugs in it. This deletes it:
- host: ApplyChildDelta, _pendingDelta, HandleApplyResult and HandleDeltaApplied
- plan: DriverSpawnPlan.ToApplyDelta
- actor: the ApplyDelta, ApplyResult and DeltaApplied messages, the Connected
reinit handler and the mid-connect AdoptConfigDuringInit
- tests: the actor tests that drove the seam
IDriver.ReinitializeAsync and each driver's implementation and unit tests stay.
Comments and docs that cited AdoptConfigDuringInit as the reason a driver must
release prior state at init now cite the IDriver contract and overlapping
retries, which still apply.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
S7.Net's own STRING/DT encoders throw ArgumentException; that fell into the
generic write catch (BadCommunicationError + Degraded health). Now surfaced as
S7ValueRangeException like the WSTRING/DATE codecs.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
New S7DataType members WString/Char/WChar/Dtl/Date/Tod/Time/S5Time mapped onto existing
DriverDataType (String / DateTime / Int32 ms); writes refuse out-of-range with BadOutOfRange.
Optional localTsap/remoteTsap/connectionType through options, factory JSON, probe and AdminUI form.
NegotiatedPduSize snapshotted at connect and exposed via GetDiagnostics (DriverHealth has no bag).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
FOCAS, AbLegacy, AbCip, TwinCAT, S7 and OpcUaClient orphaned the previous
probe/recycle/fixed-tree loops and clients when re-initialised on a live driver.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
Array nodes were forced read-only for every driver. A new single authority,
Core.Abstractions DriverArrayWriteSupport, says which (driver, element type)
pairs encode a whole-array write: Modbus (Coils / numeric HoldingRegisters),
S7 (Byte/Int16/UInt16/Int32/UInt32/Float32), OpcUaClient (pass-through) and
Galaxy (Boolean/Int32/Int64/Float/Double/String/DateTime). Everything else
stays read-only, so the server never advertises a write the driver refuses.
- Composer derives RawTagPlan.ArrayWritable + UnsReferenceVariable
.BackingArrayWritable at compose time (both seams, byte-parity); the
applier's one writability rule is Writable && (!IsArray || ArrayWritable)
for materialise and surgical paths, raw and UNS alike.
- ArrayWritable is on the classifier's surgical raw-tag whitelist and
mirrored on the UNS record (UnsReferenceBackingParityTests updated).
- Node manager refuses a wrong-length / non-array value on an array node
(BadTypeMismatch) and any IndexRange write (BadWriteNotSupported) inline,
before dispatch; WriteOperate/ACL gates and the revert are unchanged.
- Per-driver parity tests pin the table against the real Modbus write path,
S7 EncodeArrayBlock and Galaxy MxValueEncoder (UInt32/UInt64 excluded:
array covariance reinterprets their bits).
- Over-the-wire proof in OpcUaServer.IntegrationTests (ArrayWriteWireTests).
- ValueRank > 1 documented as out of scope by decision (docs/Uns.md).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
- Galaxy: deadline bounds the wait, not the subscribe RPC; BadTimeout for all tags and late handles unsubscribed; doc comment relocated
- S7: probe connect runs on the connect deadline so a timeout opens the backoff window
- S7: a successful write only retires a Faulted the write side owns
- S7: null array elements rejected (BadTypeMismatch); multi-PDU array writes documented non-atomic
- S7 integration: array write test gated on S7_SIM_ALLOW_WRITES=1
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
STAB-21 ConnectionBackoff in EnsureConnectedAsync; STAB-22 write-pass accumulator with a
write-side Faulted that a clean read does not erase; _health on the Volatile idiom;
S7-016 contiguous array write (Bool arrays stay refused).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
The driver stamps DateTime.UtcNow at init and again per read pass; under CPU
contention both land in the same tick, so the strict greater-than assertions
flaked (reproduced 1/40 under load, sibling test A_cancelled_pass_still_flushes...
failed identically with equal timestamps). Test-only race; no production defect.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
#556 item 1 — leading whitespace defeated every Inspect's pre-filter. Seven
factories (Modbus/S7/AbCip/AbLegacy/TwinCAT/FOCAS/Mqtt) tested
`reference[0] != '{'`, so a padded blob returned EMPTY and a tag the driver
refuses deployed clean. The check now trims first, matching the idiom
Sql/Calculation/MTConnect/OpcUaClient already used. The raw reference is still
what is handed to the mapper — the driver reads the stored blob, not a trimmed
copy — so the gate keeps mirroring the runtime rather than becoming lenient.
Both directions are pinned: a padded blob the mapper accepts still draws
nothing, and one that is not object-framed AFTER trimming still draws nothing
(it is not an equipment-tag TagConfig at all).
Six of the seven mappers hand the blob to a whitespace-tolerant
JsonDocument.Parse, so their verdict is unchanged by padding. MQTT is the
exception: both its readers carry the same framing gate, so a padded blob is
genuinely refused — which is why the untrimmed pre-filter was a real defect
there and not a cosmetic mismatch.
#556 item 2 — FOCAS and MQTT appended advisories unconditionally and then gated
the catch-all rejection message on `warnings.Count == 0`, so an advisory (which
fires on ACCEPTED blobs too, and says nothing about a refusal) silently
swallowed the only message naming a refusal nothing else can. The two classes
now accumulate in SEPARATE lists and the backstop gates on the rejection count
alone — structural, not string matching. MQTT's swallow was reachable in
production (a padded blob its readers refuse while every describe branch finds
the parsed document well-formed); FOCAS's backstop is currently unreachable by
audit, so its guard is protective.
#557 item 2 — decided and pinned: KEEP the union verdict. Evidence:
FromSparkplugTagConfig hard-codes PayloadFormat=Json and never consults the key;
only MqttSubscriptionManager (the Plain ingest path) decodes by it; and
MqttTagConfigModel.ToJson deliberately omits the key entirely in Sparkplug mode
(#513). So a Sparkplug driver genuinely serves the tag and rejecting it would be
stricter than the runtime. The cost — served behaviour depends on the driver's
MqttMode, which no tag row records — is paid by an ADVISORY naming the key and
the mode dependency, not by changing the verdict, so both gates keep agreeing.
The same invalid value on a blob the union REFUSES stays a rejection; the class
is decided by the accept gate, never by the key.
Falsified: reverting Modbus's trim reddens the padded-rejection theory;
neutering MQTT's backstop guard to the pre-#556 shape reddens the
advisory-plus-unnameable-rejection test; disabling the #557 advisory reddens the
contract pin; and for FOCAS, removing a describe branch alone stays green (the
backstop covers it) while additionally neutering the guard goes red.
Gitea #551.
1. CSV import ran no driver-typed config gate. Its typed columns were always
strictly parsed, but the free-form TagConfigJson column reached the database
unread, so a CSV could author a tag the driver rejects — one that deploys
green and reads BadNodeIdUnknown forever. RawTagCsvMapper.Parse now names the
offending row in the staged review grid, and RawTreeService enforces the same
gate on CreateTag/UpdateTag/ImportTags: a form cannot be the guarantee (the
API and any future caller reach none of them, and this repo has no bUnit).
A rejected import row is an ERROR — the batch inserts nothing and the row is
named — never a skip.
Note the brief's premise that manual entry rides ImportTagsAsync is wrong:
RawManualTagEntryModal commits row-by-row via CreateTagAsync, which is why
the gate had to land on all three write paths.
2/3. The seven pre-#549 Inspect methods ran a hand-list of DescribeInvalidEnum
checks, so every rejection cause not on the list was invisible. They are now
ACCEPT-GATE-FIRST (the MTConnect/Sql/OpcUaClient/Calculation shape): ask the
driver's own reader for the verdict, then explain the refusal, with a
catch-all so "the parse rejects but Inspect said nothing" is unreachable.
That closes S7's absent dataType, AbCip members[], Modbus stringByteOrder and
the type-dependent guards, plus causes the issue did not name (absent
region/address/tagPath/symbolPath/topic, TwinCAT Structure, MQTT's Sparkplug
tuple). FOCAS and MQTT keep advisories about ACCEPTED blobs, so they
diagnose rather than return empty.
Authoring half: ModbusTagConfigModel gains stringByteOrder;
AbCipTagConfigModel asks the new AbCipTagDefinitionFactory.DescribeInvalidMember;
S7TagConfigModel captures whether the SOURCE blob declared dataType and asks
S7TagDefinitionFactory.DataTypeKey/DeclaresDataType. One authority per rule.
4. Doc sweep: the six factory Inspect summaries, EquipmentTagConfigInspector's
class remarks and AdminOperationsActor's comment all claimed invalid enums are
"silently defaulted by the lenient runtime" — false since R2-11 Phase C made
the runtime reads strict. They describe rejections now.
Rename S7EquipmentTagParser -> S7TagDefinitionFactory; TryParse(reference)
-> FromTagConfig(tagConfig, rawPath, out def) (drops the leading-{ heuristic,
keys the def by RawPath, adds inverse ToTagConfig). Replace S7DriverOptions.Tags
(pre-declared S7TagDefinition list) with RawTags (IReadOnlyList<RawTagEntry>);
the driver builds its RawPath->def table from RawTags at Initialize via the
factory (skip+log on miss), resolver is byName-only, DiscoverAsync + init guards
+ address pre-parse now run off that table. Factory retires the pre-declared DTO
tag path (RawTags binding only). Cli BuildOptions serialises typed defs to
RawTagEntry. Tests migrated to a S7RawTags helper + FromTagConfig; parser test
files renamed. Coordinator's EquipmentTagConfigInspector S7 rename left to Wave-B
coordinator; Driver.S7.IntegrationTests (Docker-gated) left red per scope.
Driver.S7 + Cli build green; Driver.S7.Tests 264/264, S7.Cli.Tests 49/49.
R2-11 Phase C. All six equipment-tag parsers (Modbus/S7/AbCip/AbLegacy/
TwinCAT/Focas) now read enum fields via the new TagConfigJson.TryReadEnumStrict:
absent -> fallback, valid -> parsed, present-but-invalid (typo) -> TryParse
returns false -> EquipmentTagRefResolver.TryResolve false -> driver surfaces
BadNodeIdUnknown, instead of the old lenient path that silently defaulted a
typo to a wrong-width Good.
Modbus flips all three enum fields (region/dataType/byteOrder); the other five
flip dataType. The deploy-time Deployment:TagConfigValidationMode=Error gate is
unchanged and remains the operator pre-flight.
Coverage:
- Six *EquipmentTagParserStrictnessTests inverted from Freeze_typo_* (lenient)
to Typo_*_rejects_the_tag + Valid_*_still_parses.
- TagConfigJsonTests.TryReadEnumStrict_rejects_only_invalid matrix.
- Driver-level end-to-end proof:
AbCipEquipmentTagTests.Driver_read_of_a_typod_dataType_ref_surfaces_BadNodeIdUnknown
drives the real AbCipDriver.ReadAsync through resolve->status.
Golden parity corpus has no typo'd enums, so the flip is a no-op there.
Full solution builds clean; all six driver suites + core + parity + gate green.
The R2-01 live gate (S7_1500ConnectTimeoutOutageTests, docker-pause blackhole)
surfaced a real gap the offline fakes couldn't: S7.Net's ReadTimeout/WriteTimeout
map to the TcpClient's ReceiveTimeout/SendTimeout, which govern only SYNCHRONOUS
socket calls — the async read/write paths S7.Net uses ignore them. On an
established-but-frozen peer (frozen PLC / firewall DROP / cable pulled mid-flow,
TCP session still open) a read blocked until the OS TCP stack gave up (minutes),
silently wedging the poll loop: no Bad tick, no reconnect. STAB-14 fixed only the
CONNECT leg (EnsureConnectedAsync CancelAfter); this is its READ-leg sibling.
- New S7OperationDeadline: bounds every data-plane wire op with a wall-clock
ceiling (= _options.Timeout), surfacing an overrun as TimeoutException. Applied
in S7PlcAdapter to Read/ReadBytes/Write/WriteBytes/ReadStatus. OpenAsync is left
to EnsureConnectedAsync's own CancelAfter (not double-bounded).
- IsS7ConnectionFatal now classifies TimeoutException fatal → handle marked dead →
next EnsureConnectedAsync reopens (connect-timeout fix takes over from there).
- Tests: 5 S7OperationDeadline unit tests (deadline / token-honouring / caller-
cancel-passthrough / resultless), 1 driver-reaction test (read TimeoutException
→ reopen). Driver.S7.Tests 260/260.
- Live gate S7_1500ConnectTimeoutOutageTests now GREEN against the real snap7 sim
(8s: baseline Good -> pause blackhole -> Bad tick -> unpause -> recovered Good).
Inject the custom UnwrappedCapabilityCallAnalyzer as an OutputItemType=Analyzer
ProjectReference from Directory.Build.props (excluding the analyzer + its test
project) so OTOPCUA0001 runs on every src/ and tests/ compilation — it previously
enforced its CapabilityInvoker-wrapping rule against nothing but its own 31 unit
tests (the 'built-but-never-wired' failure mode).
Triage of the ~280 surfaced hits, three categories:
1. RESILIENCE-DISPATCH-GAP (7 sites, DriverInstanceActor x6 + GenericDriverNodeManager
x1): a REAL, previously-untracked gap the analyzer caught on first wiring — the
Phase 6.1 CapabilityInvoker resilience pipeline (retry/breaker/bulkhead/telemetry)
is constructed ONLY in tests and was never wired into the production dispatch
layer. Scoped per-site #pragma with a greppable RESILIENCE-DISPATCH-GAP marker
explicitly noting these are tracked-but-not-intentional, pending the dispatch-wiring
remediation (filed as a follow-up). Keeps the analyzer live everywhere else in
those projects so a NEW unwrapped call still fails the build.
2. Driver-INTERNAL self-calls (3 sites, AbCipAlarmProjection x2 + S7Driver x1):
a driver's own poll/ack path calling its own capability method. The invoker wraps
the driver from the dispatch layer OUTWARD; a driver re-wrapping its own internal
calls would double-wrap. Genuinely intentional — scoped #pragma with that rationale.
3. Wire-level test suites + manual-testing CLIs (12 projects): invoke drivers directly
by design — the analyzer's own documented intentional case. Project-level NoWarn
with a comment.
Verified: full solution build green, 0 OTOPCUA0001 hits; analyzer's 31 tests pass;
negative control — dropping one dispatch-gap pragma re-fires OTOPCUA0001 and fails
the Runtime build, proving the analyzer is genuinely live tree-wide, not disabled.
The S7 Plc was opened once in InitializeAsync and never re-opened: a transient
PLC reboot / network blip permanently killed the driver until redeploy. Introduce
an IS7Plc / IS7PlcFactory seam (mirrors TwinCAT's ITwinCATClientFactory) and a lazy
EnsureConnectedAsync that disposes a dead handle and re-opens a fresh connection on
the next data call. Reads/writes mark the handle dead on a connection-fatal fault
(socket drop / ErrorCode.ConnectionError) but NOT on a data-address error; the probe
loop routes through EnsureConnectedAsync as a backstop.
The seam also closes the S7 TEST-1 gap — the reconnect state machine is now unit-
testable without a live PLC (S7.Net.Plc is sealed with no in-process fake).
Verification:
- 4 deterministic unit guards (fatal→reopen, data-error→no-reopen, raw socket→reopen,
reopen-fail→degrade-then-recover); full S7 unit suite 234/234 green.
- LIVE end-to-end proof against real python-snap7 (S7_1500ReconnectTests, double-gated
on sim reachability + S7_RECONNECT_BOUNCE_CMD): bounced the container, driver observed
the outage and resumed Good reads with NO redeploy. Baseline smoke 3/3 still green.
Re-review at 7286d320. S7-015 (Medium): a Writable array tag had no WriteArrayAsync path
and silently returned BadCommunicationError on write; now rejected at init with a clear
NotSupportedException (read-only arrays still accepted) + TDD. S7-016 (factory JSON can't
produce array tags; needs AdminUI DTO) deferred.
Joseph Doherty