The shared spec states the active tier "Fails (503) on a standby or
role-member-but-not-leader node", and the same spec maps Degraded to HTTP 200.
ActiveNodeDecision.Evaluate returned Degraded for exactly that case, so the tier
answered 200 on every node and could not distinguish an active node from a
standby over HTTP at all - only the response body differed.
The consequence was live, not theoretical: OtOpcUa's Traefik routes the admin UI
by this probe (docker-dev/traefik-dynamic.yml, scripts/install/traefik-dynamic.yml),
so both central nodes always passed and the leader-pinning the design called for
has silently never worked. Found while running the overview dashboard's live
acceptance, which reads the same tier and showed all six rig nodes as Active.
Filed as lmxopcua#494.
Role-member-but-not-leader now returns Unhealthy. The other two branches are
unchanged: a node that lacks the role stays Healthy (the probe is irrelevant to
it), and the startup-safety path still returns Degraded when the ActorSystem or
cluster is not yet available.
Blast radius is one consumer. OtOpcUa is the only user of the role-filtered mode;
ScadaBridge deliberately uses its own OldestNodeActiveHealthCheck (leadership is
address-ordered and diverges from the singleton host), and MxGateway and
HistorianGateway have no Akka cluster.
Version 0.2.1, three packages published to the Gitea feed and restore-verified.
70 tests pass.
Found by the live rig, and invisible to every unit test that existed.
LeaderResolver and InstanceCard.ClusterDataLine both looked the cluster view up
under the check name "akka-cluster". ScadaBridge registers the shared
AkkaClusterHealthCheck under that name; OtOpcUa registers the SAME check as
"akka". So once the OtOpcUa rig was rebuilt on Health 0.2.0 and started
publishing data.leader, its groups still rendered with no leader chip and no
evidence line - and a group with no votes is a legitimate state, so nothing
looked wrong. ScadaBridge's four groups were fully populated the whole time,
which is what made it look like the feature worked.
Both now find the entry by the DATA KEY ("leader"), which is the part of the
contract the shared check actually owns rather than the part each consumer names
for itself.
Regression tests: the leader is found under akka-cluster, akka, and an arbitrary
future name; and an entry that publishes data WITHOUT a leader (ScadaBridge's
localdb check, whose data carries replication counters) does not get picked in
preference to the one that answers the question. Every prior fixture used
ScadaBridge's name, which is precisely why this got through.
After the fix all seven cluster groups render a leader chip with zero
split-brain flags - design section 9 check 2 now passes for BOTH products.
174 tests, 0 warnings.
Found during the live acceptance run. The host calls UseStaticWebAssets only when
the environment is literally "Development", so running the build output under any
other name - checking a staging registry locally, say - leaves the Theme RCL's
assets under _content/ unresolvable. The failure is silent and unhelpful: the page
returns 200 with its markup fully present and renders as a blank white screen,
because every stylesheet 404s. Calling it unconditionally is a no-op once
published (the manifest is gone and the assets are real files on disk), so the
only thing it changes is that failure. The container was never affected.
Phase 4 results recorded in the ledger: 7 of 9 design section 9 checks fully pass,
2 pass for ScadaBridge and are blocked for OtOpcUa pending a rig redeploy.
Notable live evidence:
- Leader chip moved from site-c-a to site-c-b when site-c-a was stopped, and the
split-brain chip appeared while the pair was self-formed then cleared once it
genuinely joined.
- Kill to Unreachable took two failing sweeps (the damping working as designed);
recovery landed on the first good poll.
- Five consecutive page loads in 0.00-0.02s all showed the same "last sweep"
timestamp, which is cache-first stated as a measurement.
- Freezing the probed endpoints while auto-refresh stayed RUNNING froze the poller
mid-sweep and the cards aged into STALE on their own - staleness is computed at
render, so a stuck poller needs no explicit stall detection.
The run also surfaced a pre-existing rig defect in both products: self-first Akka
seed lists mean a pair booted cold self-forms two 1-member clusters that never
join. After a --force-recreate every ScadaBridge node named ITSELF leader and every
node answered /health/active 200; restarting ONE node of each pair converged them
to one Leader plus one Active plus one Standby. That is the user's own open backlog
item (docs/plans/2026-07-22-initjoin-selfform-fallback.md, unexecuted), and the
dashboard made it visible fleet-wide in one screen.
170 tests, 0 warnings.
Closes Phase 3 of the overview-dashboard plan (tasks 3.7-3.9).
Self-observability
- OverviewMetrics: an observable gauge read from the published snapshot at scrape
time, so the metric and the page cannot disagree about what the dashboard
believes, plus a sweep-duration histogram. Instrument names follow the family
METRIC-CONVENTIONS spec (overview.instance.status / overview.poll.duration,
unit s) rather than the plan's literal zb_ names; Prometheus renders them as
overview_instance_status and overview_poll_duration_seconds. Labels are
application/node/group - "node", not "instance", because Prometheus stamps its
own instance label on every scraped series and a colliding metric label is
silently renamed exported_instance. Instances never probed emit nothing: the
enum's zero ordinal is Up, so a placeholder would publish the single most
reassuring answer about a node nobody has heard from.
- Two readiness checks make the dashboard's own /health/ready mean something:
registry-loaded (reports the counts it bound) and last-poll-cycle-completed,
which catches the failure where Kestrel is fine, the page still renders, and
every card on it is quietly frozen. The heartbeat is stamped by the sweep, not
derived from the snapshot's timestamp - the poller publishes the registry
before it probes anything, so a stuck poller would otherwise look healthy.
No cycle yet is Degraded inside the grace window and Unhealthy past it, so a
restart does not fail readiness for its first seconds and a poller that never
started cannot hide behind "still starting".
Configuration
- appsettings.json ships tuning defaults with an EMPTY Applications list, so a
deployment that supplies no registry fails at ConfigPreflight naming the key
instead of booting into a dashboard of nothing.
- Three registries, because reachability genuinely differs: Development is the
host-reachable subset (4 instances), Docker is the full 16-instance fleet by
container DNS name. The rigs publish almost no per-node HTTP port to the host
- OtOpcUa publishes none (only Traefik :9200, load-balanced across the central
pair, so it cannot identify a node) and ScadaBridge keeps site :8084
container-internal. Ports were established by probing the running rigs, not
read off the compose files, because the two disagree: OtOpcUa site nodes serve
health on :8080, not the :9000 their compose anchor implies.
- Real Serilog sinks, not the family's empty "Serilog": {}. AddZbSerilog drives
sinks entirely from configuration and adds none of its own, so the empty
section produces an app that logs NOWHERE - verified against the running
HistorianGateway container, whose log stream is completely empty for exactly
this reason. The HttpClient level override matters too: 16 instances on a 10s
cadence emit several Information lines a second of pure probe noise.
Container
- HistorianGateway-pattern runtime-only image; the compose stack joins the three
rig networks as external, so bringing the dashboard up or down cannot disturb
a rig. The Dockerfile clears ASPNETCORE_HTTP_PORTS as well as ASPNETCORE_URLS:
on .NET 8+ the base image declares its binding via the former, and clearing
only the latter leaves Kestrel logging "Overriding address(es)" every boot.
No healthcheck - aspnet:10.0 has neither curl nor wget, and adding a
--healthcheck entry point to production code to satisfy Compose is not a
trade worth making.
Tests
- BootTests boot the real Program.cs: every endpoint anonymous, the page
rendering from cache while nothing it watches is reachable, the Meters
allowlist proven by an end-to-end /metrics scrape, and both refuse-to-boot
paths (missing registry, stale window inside the poll interval).
The registry is supplied via environment variables, not
ConfigureAppConfiguration, because ConfigPreflight runs before Build() - when
the factory's callbacks are applied - and would not see them.
170 tests, 0 warnings. Verified live against the running rigs: 16 cards, 16
gauge series, page and gauge agreeing exactly.
Tasks 3.4-3.6 of the overview-dashboard plan.
Polling (3.4/3.5):
- OverviewPollerService: one timer at the fastest configured cadence, each
target polled when its own interval is due, fan-out per sweep, no retries
(the next tick is the retry, so damping stays the only place that decides
whether a failure is worth showing).
- OverviewSnapshotStore: atomic swap of a complete immutable graph plus a
change event. Pages read it and never probe — the cache-first requirement.
- LeaderResolver: per-group leader from akka-cluster data, with the
split-brain flag scoped to members that are actually answering, so an
ordinary failover is not misread as a disagreement.
UI (3.6): ThemeShell + StatusPill/TechCard composition against the mockup;
instance cards carry the status stripe (dashed for Unreachable), the check
detail list and the raw ready/active signal line.
Two defects found by verification rather than by review:
- The active tier answers with a status code and an EMPTY body, but the client
demanded parseable JSON on every probe — so a healthy pair rendered as
"role unknown" instead of Active/Standby. Split into ProbeAsync (ready tier,
body is the payload) and ProbeStatusAsync (active tier, code is the answer).
Caught by a live smoke run against two fake health endpoints; the poller
tests now serve an empty body so they hold the fix.
- SweepAsync published even when cancellation was already requested, leaving a
half-probed registry as the store's final state on shutdown. It now checks
the token itself rather than relying on the transport to throw.
Also: app.UseAntiforgery() is required despite the anonymous-by-design
pipeline — AddRazorComponents stamps antiforgery metadata unconditionally and
the endpoint middleware hard-fails without it (every page was 500). Chosen
over DisableAntiforgery() so a future form is protected by default.
147 tests, 0 warnings. Live-verified end to end against fake endpoints:
Up/Unreachable/Active/Standby, leader chip, cluster-data line, KPI counts.
Phase 3 tasks 3.1-3.3 of docs/plans/2026-07-22-overview-dashboard-impl-plan.md.
Scaffold (3.1): a plain directory in scadaproj (NOT a nested git repo), slnx over
src/ + tests/, HistorianGateway-pattern Directory.Build.props (warnings-as-errors)
and nuget.config (nuget.org * + the Gitea feed scoped to ZB.MOM.WW.*). Inline
package pins, no CPM — the app convention here. NO Auth/Audit/Secrets packages:
the dashboard is anonymous and read-only by requirement.
Registry (3.2): OverviewOptions/ApplicationEntry/InstanceEntry bound from the
"Overview" section, plus EffectiveTimings resolving instance > application >
global overrides in ONE place so no caller re-implements the precedence.
OverviewOptionsValidator (OptionsValidatorBase + AddValidatedOptions) rejects an
empty registry, applications with no instances, duplicate names, non-absolute or
non-http(s) URLs, and non-positive intervals — and checks stale > poll on the
EFFECTIVE values, since an override at either level can invert that on one
instance while the globals look fine. A ConfigPreflight presence check runs before
the host is built so a missing registry fails with the key name, not with
"Applications must have at least 1 entry".
Health client (3.3): ZbHealthReport DTOs for the canonical ZbHealthWriter body,
with per-entry `data` kept as JsonElement — it is an open contract, and binding it
to concrete types would break the moment a check adds a field. 200 AND 503 are
both parseable answers (503 carries the body naming the failing check); only a
transport failure or a non-canonical body is a failed probe, which is why
Unreachable stays distinct from Down. Host shutdown propagates as cancellation
rather than being recorded as every instance timing out.
Status model: Up/Degraded/Down/Unreachable + Active/Standby/Unknown/NotApplicable,
with two-strike flap damping — a failing observation only replaces a good state
after 2 consecutive failures, while recovery is immediate (damping suppresses
false alarms; symmetric damping would just make them linger).
53 tests green, 0 warnings in Debug and Release. Tests for the validator, the
client golden payloads (with AND without `data`, so a partly-bumped fleet renders)
and the derivation table are front-loaded here from task 3.8 so this batch is
verified rather than pending.
Also pins AngleSharp 1.5.2 test-side: bunit 1.40.0 pulls 1.2.0, which trips NU1902
and therefore the warnings-as-errors gate (same fix HistorianGateway made in
6bc005d).
Phase 0 of docs/plans/2026-07-22-overview-dashboard-impl-plan.md: give the
canonical health JSON a structured channel so the family overview dashboard can
read each Akka cluster's current leader.
- ZbHealthWriter: optional `"data": {...}` per entry, sourced from
HealthReportEntry.Data, emitted only when non-empty. Per-property JsonIgnore
(NOT a global DefaultIgnoreCondition) so `"description": null` still renders —
payloads from data-less checks stay byte-identical to 0.1.0.
- AkkaClusterHealthCheck: BuildClusterData publishes this node's own view —
leader (omitted while unknown), selfAddress, selfRoles (sorted), memberCount,
unreachableCount — on every result path. The startup-safety paths (no
ActorSystem / cluster inaccessible) stay description-only.
- Tests: writer data emit/omit (raw-JSON assert on the omit case), and a real
single-node self-joined cluster via Akka.TestKit.Xunit2 for the data values.
70 tests green (25/39/6).
- Version 0.1.0 -> 0.2.0; 3 packages published to the Gitea feed and
restore-verified from a scratch consumer, which serves data.leader live.
Per-cluster mesh Phase 6 merged to OtOpcUa master 2839deb5 (pushed 2026-07-24).
Records the split into one 2-node mesh per application Cluster, the consumer-visible
per-Cluster ServiceLevel/Primary scoping (two+ Primaries fleet-wide by design, no
wire-contract change), the SplitTopologyTransportValidator, pair-local secrets, and
the deferred live gate.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
Phase 4 merged + pushed (tip 3a590a0c): driver-only nodes run with no ConfigDb
connection string. Consumer-visible ServiceLevel change — a DB-less site node
now holds 240/250 with central SQL down (survive-alone), where a DB-backed node
would drop to 0/100. Phases 0a/0b/1/2/3/4 done; 5-7 not started.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
Update the OtOpcUa entry: the per-cluster mesh election-scoping fix now has Phases
0a/0b/1/2/3 merged + pushed (tip d01b0695). Phase 2 = ClusterClient command transport
(MeshTransport:Mode dark switch). Phase 3 = config fetch-and-cache — a FetchAndCache
driver node boots + serves last-known-good with central SQL down (extends the #485
availability guarantee consumers like ScadaBridge rely on); a failed fetch is 'no answer',
never an empty config. Live gate caught + fixed a Status==Sealed serve-gate deadlock.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
Options investigation (Aspire standalone/HealthChecks.UI/Gatus/Homepage/
Grafana vs custom) → decision: custom ZB.MOM.WW.Overview Blazor app in the
family look. Design: anonymous read-only single pane, appsettings registry
of all four apps' instances, cache-first poller on a configurable timer,
configurable staleness timeout, Active/Standby from /health/active, and
per-cluster Akka leader chips (needs Health 0.2.0 optional per-entry data).
Impl plan: phased + code-verified — Phase 0 Health 0.2.0 (writer data field
+ AkkaClusterHealthCheck cluster view), Phase 1 ScadaBridge site-node
MapZbHealth PR (:8084; role-scoped active check), Phase 2 OtOpcUa bump,
Phase 3 the app (:5320), Phase 4 live rig acceptance. Mockup is the visual
reference: real Theme tokens + embedded IBM Plex, all card states incl.
stale + split-brain. Ready to execute in a fresh session.
Corrects the same-day report: PR searches for 'quic' missed work named
'artery'. Artery is landing rapidly on upstream dev as Artery-TCP (openspec
#8313; framing/handshake G1-G2; parallel lanes #8356/#8357; large-message
streamId 3 #8352; MNTR/CI for both transports), with Serialization.V2 in
parallel. TCP-first resolves §7's forward note: pipeline benefits arrive
without libmsquic, dropping the §6 platform constraints from the 1.6
adoption path. No previews or public benchmarks yet.
Two research reports (2026-07-22):
- akka_msquic_transport.md: what a QUIC transport on Akka 1.5.62 would take,
the 1.5-vs-1.6 pipeline delta that gates the benefits, .NET-native
alternatives (managed sockets ranked first), and measured throughput
evidence (PR #4594: transport swap is throughput-neutral).
- akka_multidc_clusters.md: JVM multi-DC semantics mapped onto the
central-pair + site-pairs topology, the stalled Akka.NET port (#3261 /
PR #4111), per-system fit vs the OtOpcUa mesh program, and the
before-Phase-2 decision point.
Recommendation in both: don't build; track upstream.
Both are consumer-visible, so they belong in the index rather than only in the
repo. The downing strategy moved to AutoDowning because a two-node OtOpcUa pair
on keep-oldest could not survive a crash of the oldest node — the same defect and
the same fix as ScadaBridge cf3bd52f, which is where the analysis came from. And
the redundancy Primary is now the oldest Up driver member rather than the role
leader, which changes which node advertises ServiceLevel 250 after a restart —
relevant to anything selecting a server by ServiceLevel.
Also notes that the four NU1903 advisories which broke ScadaBridge's fresh
restores were breaking OtOpcUa's too, and that the election remains scoped per
Akka cluster until the per-cluster mesh work lands.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
The #485/#486 fixes changed nothing structural about OtOpcUa — same drivers,
same dual-namespace scheme, same Galaxy flow — so the row is mostly untouched.
What DID change is a fact any OPC UA consumer depends on, and ScadaBridge is
mid-cutover onto exactly this address space: a transient ConfigDb error used to
empty the served address space (a PureRemove of every node, observed live and it
stayed empty), stop every driver and clear every subscription, while still
reporting the deploy Applied. A consumer would have seen all bindings go bad
with nothing upstream admitting a problem. Recorded on the OtOpcUa row.
Also fixes real drift found while checking: the OtOpcUa LocalDb adoption design
was sitting UNTRACKED here and unreferenced by the index, even though the
LocalDb row claims the adoption designs live in this repo. Now committed,
referenced alongside the ScadaBridge one, and its stale header corrected —
it still said Phase 1 was "not yet executed" against lib 0.1.1, when Phase 1
shipped and merged against 0.1.3. Phase 2 designed but not executed, on both
the doc and the row.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
Two defects about a node whose LocalDb file is lost, the second only reachable
once the first was fixed:
- 0.1.2 — a converged pair prunes its oplog to empty on ack, and snapshot
detection read an empty oplog as 'no gap possible'. The steady state of a
healthy pair was the one state from which a rebuilt node could never be
back-filled.
- 0.1.3 — with back-fill working, the rebuilt node's OWN writes were silently
dropped: last_applied_remote_seq is a watermark in the peer's seq space and a
rebuilt peer numbers from 1, so the healthy node's stale watermark made the
sending side skip its whole oplog.
Both found by the OtOpcUa LocalDb Phase 1 live gate on the docker-dev rig and
reproduced offline as RED tests first. 149/149 pass.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
The other half of the rebuilt-peer story, and only reachable once 0.1.2 made
back-fill work: with the wiped node repopulated and writing again, its writes
never reached its peer.
last_applied_remote_seq is a watermark in the PEER's seq space, and a rebuilt
peer is a new database whose oplog numbers from 1. Two things then went wrong,
and both had to be fixed — the first alone leaves data stuck:
- The healthy node kept advertising the OLD peer's watermark, and the sending
side seeds its pump from exactly that number, so the rebuilt node skipped its
entire oplog. The watermark (and the observed peer clock) is now reset when
the peer's node id changes. last_acked_seq is deliberately NOT reset: it
describes our own oplog's pruned horizon and is what tells a rebuilt peer it
needs a snapshot — clearing it would turn 0.1.2's back-fill back off.
- A peer claiming to have applied more of our stream than we have ever produced
can only be remembering a previous incarnation of us. That claim is now
rejected in favour of starting from the beginning; LWW makes the re-send
harmless. This mirrors the clamp RecordPeerAckAsync already applies to acks.
Found on the OtOpcUa docker-dev rig, where the healthy node held watermark 10
while the rebuilt peer's oplog was seqs 1-3 and its last_acked stayed 0 — the
peer never accepted a single one. Covered by a test that converges with one
peer, replaces it with a fresh database, and requires a write on the new peer
to arrive: RED before this fix, green after. 149/149 pass.
Version 0.1.3.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
The lib row still claimed ScadaBridge was the only consumer (verified
2026-07-20); OtOpcUa's Phase 1 adoption merged 2026-07-21. Records 0.1.2 and
the wiped-peer snapshot fix it carries.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
A converged pair prunes its oplog on ack, so "no oplog rows at all" is the
steady state of a healthy pair — not an anomaly. ComputeSnapshotRequiredAsync
measured the peer's gap against the oldest surviving oplog row and treated an
empty oplog as "no gap possible", which made that steady state the one state
from which a wiped peer could never be healed: it reconnected with an empty
database and a zero watermark, was told it needed no snapshot, and stayed
empty indefinitely.
With an empty oplog the oldest seq we could still stream is one past
last_acked_seq — ack-pruning is the only thing that empties the oplog without
also flagging needs_snapshot, and it deletes exactly seq <= last_acked_seq.
Measuring the gap against that heals the wiped peer and leaves every other
case identical: a converged peer's watermark equals last_acked_seq (no
snapshot), and a pair that has never written anything has both at zero.
Found by the OtOpcUa LocalDb Phase 1 live gate (check 4), which recorded it as
a documented limitation. Covered by a test that reproduces the live-gate
scenario through the real session stack: RED before this fix (the wiped side
never converges, 15 s timeout), green after. 148/148 pass.
Version 0.1.2.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
Phases 1 and 2 landed on ScadaBridge main together as PR #23
(merge 28ca04d7) on 2026-07-20 and were pushed to origin. The
component row still described both as unmerged branches.
Verified before editing: main..feat/localdb-phase1 and
main..feat/localdb-phase2 are both empty, main == origin/main,
and SiteReplicationActor/ReplicationService have no hits left in
main's tree.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts
The row still said "Adopted by ScadaBridge (Phase 1 only)" and "Phase 2 is NOT
started". Both phases are now complete with a 10-check live gate PASS.
Also records what the row could not have said before: the 0.1.1 parent-
directory boot fix, that ScadaBridge is the library's ONLY consumer (verified —
OtOpcUa, mxgw and HistorianGateway have no LocalDb reference at all), the
deliberate never-registered status of notification_lists/smtp_configurations
and why, and the three operational constraints an operator has to know
(stop/start a pair together, the TombstoneRetention resurrection bound, and
MaxBatchSize batching by row count against a 4 MB gRPC cap).
Replication remains default-OFF and no production deployment has it enabled.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts
Closes criterion 5 of ScadaBridge/docs/known-issues/2026-07-20-localdb-disk-io-
error-under-load.md §9: Phase 1 shipped only correctness and convergence tests,
so nothing exercised many pooled per-operation connections writing a REGISTERED
table (capture trigger + zb_hlc_next UDF) concurrently — which is exactly the
shape the ScadaBridge site nodes run under load.
8 writers x 250 inserts, one fresh pooled connection per operation, with
concurrent readers churning the pool and the WAL index throughout. Asserts both
that every write lands and that the oplog captured each exactly once, so a
trigger that dropped or double-counted under contention fails it.
Written during the 2026-07-20 disk-I/O incident investigation and left
uncommitted; the incident itself was root-caused to host-side sqlite3 access on
a bind-mounted WAL database, not a library defect.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts
SQLite creates the database FILE on demand but never its parent DIRECTORY, and
SqliteLocalDb opens the file eagerly in its constructor — so a configured path
under a not-yet-existing directory was a hard startup failure ("SQLite Error
14: unable to open database file") rather than a first run that just worked.
Relative defaults like ./data/app.db hit it routinely; a containerized consumer
escapes only when a volume mount happens to create the directory first.
ScadaBridge found this during LocalDb Phase 2 and worked around it app-side
(SiteLocalDbDirectory.Ensure). Every other consumer still had the gap, so the
guarantee belongs here.
The standing objection to a library that creates directories is that it can
mask a mis-typed path by silently starting an empty database. That does not
apply: SQLite ALREADY does exactly that for a mis-typed file NAME. Refusing to
create the directory protects nothing — it only makes the two halves of one
path behave inconsistently and turns the directory half into an opaque error.
A creation failure (permissions, read-only mount) now throws an
InvalidOperationException naming the directory and the cause, instead of
surfacing as SQLite error 14. That is a change of exception type, but only on a
path that already failed hard.
Both behaviours are pinned and verified to fail with the call removed.
147 tests pass, 0 warnings. Published to the Gitea feed at 0.1.1.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts
Environment.SetEnvironmentVariable/GetEnvironmentVariable mutate the
process-wide environ; concurrent setenv/getenv across parallel xunit test
classes is a documented crash/flake source on glibc even with unique
variable names. Group the six classes that touch process env vars into a
DisableParallelization=true collection so they run serially against each
other while everything else keeps running in parallel.
Was 'no app adoption yet'. Now records the honest state: ScadaBridge site nodes
adopted Phase 1 on an UNMERGED branch, replication wired but default-OFF and
live-proven on the docker rig's site-a pair only, Phase 2 not started, no other
app adopted, no production deployment replicating.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts