Gateway-side follow-up to the shared auth-lib expiry core (delivered via G-2):
- apikey create-key gains optional --expires — absolute ISO-8601 UTC or relative
<N>d/<N>h from now; omitted means non-expiring (opt-in, unchanged default).
Threaded ApiKeyAdminCommand -> parser -> runner into the library's
CreateKeyAsync(..., expiresUtc, ...). list-keys shows an expiry column and an
active/expired/revoked status.
- Dashboard API Keys page surfaces expiry: an Expires column (Never when unset)
and a status badge reading Expired (red) / Expiring (<=7d, amber) / Revoked /
Active. DashboardApiKeySummary.ExpiresUtc projected in DashboardSnapshotService;
StatusBadge maps the new states.
Tests: parser (absolute/relative/invalid/none) + end-to-end past-expiry rejection
through the live verifier; dashboard summary suite green. Docs: Authentication.md
(verification-flow expiry step, CLI table + examples, dashboard badge).
Closes the tracked SEC-10 polish (SEC-10 core was already Done).
The read loop awaited EnqueueWorkerEventAsync inline, which blocks in the bounded
event channel's timed WriteAsync (up to EventChannelFullModeTimeout, default 5s)
when the channel is full with no/slow consumer. A WorkerCommandReply or heartbeat
queued behind an event frame was then stalled, so an in-flight InvokeAsync could
hit CommandTimeout even though the worker replied in time.
Mirror the existing outbound WriteLoopAsync: add an unbounded event staging
channel and a dedicated EventWriteLoopAsync. DispatchEnvelope is now fully
synchronous — the WorkerEvent branch hands the event off with a non-blocking
TryWrite and the read loop never awaits. The event write loop owns the timed
WriteAsync into the bounded channel and the sustained-overflow ProtocolViolation
fault (unchanged contract). Registered in WaitForBackgroundTasks + completed on
close/fault/dispose.
Test: reply arriving after events with a full, consumer-less event channel is
dispatched promptly (no CommandTimeout) — pipe-harness, verified on windev.
Docs: GatewayProcessDesign read/write/event-loop section.
Follow-up to the IPC-02 proto change and IPC-03 headroom default:
- regenerate clients/proto/descriptors/mxaccessgw-client-v1.protoset with the
pinned protoc 34.1 so it carries GatewayHello.max_frame_bytes (IPC-01 descriptor
refresh; ClientProtoInputTests.Descriptor_ContainsEveryContractMessageAndField).
- update GatewayOptionsTests design-default assertion to 16 MiB + 64 KiB reserve.
Worker half of the Wave 3 size/backpressure + write-ordering pass:
- IPC-02: the worker adopts GatewayHello.max_frame_bytes during the handshake
(WorkerFrameProtocolOptions.AdoptNegotiatedMaxMessageBytes) instead of a
hard-coded default; 0 keeps the default, a value above a 256 MiB ceiling is
rejected. Reader and writer share the options instance, applied before the
message loop.
- IPC-04: DrainEvents caps each reply at MaxDrainEventsPerReply (10_000) and
treats max_events = 0 as that cap rather than 'drain the entire queue', so one
diagnostic drain cannot pack a session-killing reply frame.
- WRK-04: WorkerFrameWriter stamps the envelope Sequence at the actual point of
writing (under the write lock) instead of at envelope creation, so the on-wire
order and the stamped sequence always agree under concurrent producers.
- WRK-07: the writer is now a cooperative priority scheduler — callers enqueue at
Control or Event priority and the draining lock-holder writes all control
frames before any event frame, so replies/faults/heartbeats jump ahead of an
event backlog. Per-frame validation/size rejections fail only that frame; a
stream write failure fails all queued frames.
Tests: monotonic gap-free sequence under concurrency, control-before-event
priority (gated stream), negotiated-max adoption, DrainEvents zero-bound.
Worker builds x86 only — verified on windev.
Proto foundation + gateway-side of the size/backpressure pass:
- IPC-02: add GatewayHello.max_frame_bytes (regen Generated/); gateway sends
its negotiated worker-frame max in the handshake so the worker can adopt it
instead of a hard-coded default. Worker read-half lands separately.
- IPC-03: give the pipe frame max envelope-overhead headroom above the public
gRPC cap (WorkerFrameProtocolOptions.EnvelopeOverheadReserveBytes = 64 KiB;
default Worker.MaxMessageBytes bumped to 16 MiB + reserve), cross-validate the
headroom at startup, and pre-check command envelope size in WorkerClient so an
oversized command fails only that correlation (ResourceExhausted) instead of
faulting the whole session.
- IPC-04: reject DrainEvents max_events above a public ceiling in the request
validator (worker per-reply cap lands with the worker half).
Docs: GatewayConfiguration, WorkerFrameProtocol, gateway.md.
Tests: headroom validation, DrainEvents bound, oversized-command per-command
failure (pipe-harness, verified on windev).
Full-host tests passed in isolation but failed 2-4/run under parallel execution on
Windows with 'the process cannot access the file ... because it is being used by
another process' (macOS never sees it — Unix deletes open files). Two shared-state
parallel collisions, discovered while verifying TST-08:
1. Self-signed cert generation. GatewayTlsBootstrapTests sets process-global
Kestrel/TLS env vars that GatewayApplication.Build reads; a parallel host-building
test inherits them mid-run and both generate a cert at the same path, racing on the
fixed-name '<path>.tmp'. Fixes:
- SelfSignedCertificateProvider: stage the PFX in a unique '<path>.<guid>.tmp' instead
of a fixed name, so concurrent/interrupted writers never collide on the temp file
(real robustness: two instances or a restart-during-write no longer clash). The
final atomic Move (last-writer-wins) still yields an equivalent cert.
- TestHostEnvironmentInitializer: default MxGateway__Tls__SelfSignedCertPath to a
per-process temp path so the suite never writes the shared ProgramData default or
fights the deployed service; first host-building test generates, the rest load it.
- GatewayTlsBootstrapTests: [Collection] with DisableParallelization so its global
env-var mutation cannot bleed into parallel tests (new GlobalEnvironmentCollection).
2. AuthStoreHealthCheckTests opened a real SQLite file; Microsoft.Data.Sqlite's
connection pool keeps the .db handle open after 'await using', so the finally
File.Delete threw. Reuse the existing TempDatabaseDirectory helper, which calls
SqliteConnection.ClearAllPools() before deleting.
Server build clean; affected classes 17/17 on macOS. Windows full-suite verified separately.
Empirically verified the full ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests suite exits cleanly:
- macOS: 0 surviving testhost after a full run.
- windev (origin/main worktree): 0 new testhost and 0 new worker processes
after a full run, isolated by process StartTime.
Static audit confirms the prime-suspect fixtures already dispose deterministically
(WorkerClient cancels _stopCts + awaits its read/write/heartbeat tasks with a 5s
timeout; GatewaySession disposes the client; harness/E2E fixtures use await using).
Drop the stale 'leaves orphaned testhost processes' rationale from CLAUDE.md's
Source Update Workflow; keep filtered-run guidance as a speed guideline only.
Separately discovered (tracked in 00-tracking.md change log, NOT part of TST-08):
Windows-only temp-file-lock flakiness in ~4 full-host test classes (Sqlite
connection-pool retaining a temp .db handle; SelfSignedCertificateProvider's
fixed-name gw.pfx.tmp racing teardown) that macOS never surfaces.
- SEC-02: DashboardAuthorizationHandler restricts the loopback and
Authentication:Mode=Disabled bypasses to read-only. They now satisfy only a
Viewer-bearing requirement (AnyDashboardRole), never AdminOnly, so anonymous
localhost can view the dashboard but cannot reach API-key CRUD or session
Close/Kill at the policy layer (previously guarded only by service re-checks).
- SEC-12: DashboardSessionAdminService emits canonical AuditEvents through
IAuditWriter (actions dashboard-close-session / dashboard-kill-worker, category
SessionAdmin) on Success/Failure/Denied, mirroring the API-key audit path so
destructive session actions leave durable, queryable rows.
- SEC-20: drop the unbounded session_id tag from the exported
mxgateway.heartbeats.failed counter (per-session detail stays in the snapshot/log).
Docs updated same-change: CLAUDE.md (read-only loopback + 5-min bearer),
GatewayDashboardDesign.md (bypass scoping + session-admin audit), Metrics.md.
Server build clean; 30/30 targeted + 295/295 Dashboard/Security/App/Metrics sweep.
SEC-07: add QueryActiveAlarmsRequest -> events:read scope arm; fix two tests that
constructed StreamAlarmsRequest instead of QueryActiveAlarmsRequest.
SEC-05: shorten hub-token lifetime 30m -> 5m; document that the ?access_token= query
carriage must never be request-logged.
SEC-08: gateway-side CachingApiKeyVerifier (short TTL, keyed on a hash of the presented
secret) skips the per-call store read+last_used write; CoalescingMarkApiKeyStore bounds
last_used writes to <=1/key/min; identity constraints are cached. Invalidation is wired
at the gateway admin sites (revoke/rotate/delete); short TTL backstops out-of-process CLI.
SEC-11: fixed-window rate limit on POST /auth/login + a per-peer (key-id) failure limiter
checked before VerifyAsync; new MxGateway:Security options bound + validated.
Also fixes regressions from the SEC-01/04/06 commit (c185f62) that a narrow test filter
missed (all now covered by a full-suite checkpoint):
- Rooting check is cross-platform: accepts Windows C:\/UNC forms on Unix so the shipped
appsettings path validates on the macOS dev box, still rejecting bare filenames.
- AddGatewayConfiguration TryAdds a non-production IHostEnvironment fallback so the validator
resolves in minimal test/tooling containers; the real host + apikey CLI register the actual
environment first (TryAdd no-op there).
- Test assembly defaults ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development (ModuleInitializer) so full-host
tests exercise wiring instead of tripping the SEC-04/06 production guards.
- GatewayOptionsTests asserts the SEC-01 CommonApplicationData-derived default (platform-correct).
archreview: SEC-07/05/08/11 (P1). Verified: NonWindows build clean; full gateway suite
747 passed / 42 failed, where all 42 are the pre-existing macOS named-pipe-harness failures
(Unix-socket path limit) and 0 are validation/regression failures.
- SEC-01: derive AuthenticationOptions.SqlitePath / TlsOptions.SelfSignedCertPath
defaults from SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData (was Windows-literal strings
that became CWD-relative files off-Windows); validator rejects non-rooted
overrides; delete the stray C:\ProgramData\...gateway-auth.db files that
materialized under src/; add a tree-hygiene test failing on any *.db under src/.
- SEC-04: GatewayOptionsValidator fails startup when IsProduction() && DisableLogin.
- SEC-06: validator rejects LDAP Transport=None in Production; document the
MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountPassword env override + dev-credential rotation.
Galaxy SnapshotCachePath rooting could not be validator-enforced (bound by the
external GalaxyRepository package, not GatewayOptions) — documented instead.
archreview: SEC-01/04/06 (P1). Verified on the Auth-0.1.4 baseline: Server build
clean, GatewayOptionsValidator + GatewayTreeHygiene tests 53/53.
Bump all four ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.* package refs 0.1.2 -> 0.1.4. The shared
ApiKeyVerifier now rejects any key whose ExpiresUtc is in the past;
existing keys have NULL expiry (never expire), so nothing breaks, and the
auth SQLite DB auto-migrates to schema v3 (nullable expires_utc column) on
first boot. Implement the two IApiKeyAdminStore members added in 0.1.3
(SetScopesAsync/SetEnabledAsync) on the test FakeApiKeyAdminStore.
Build green; no new test failures (the macOS worker-pipe IPC failures are
pre-existing/environmental, identical to the pre-bump baseline).
- IPC-01: regenerate the stale client descriptor set and add ClientProtoInputTests
(semantic, protoc-free) so a missing contract symbol fails the build.
- IPC-20: make publish-client-proto-inputs.ps1 -Check source_code_info-normalized
so it is protoc-version tolerant.
- IPC-19: document + guard the "Generated/ must be committed for net48" rule
(docs/Contracts.md, csproj comment, check-codegen.ps1).
- IPC-09: harden the per-client generate-proto scripts (PATH resolution + pinned
grpcio/protobuf/java version asserts) so regeneration is reproducible.
- TST-03: add .gitea/workflows/ci.yml (portable/java/windows/live jobs) running the
build, tests, client checks, and the codegen guards.
- Also: check-codegen.ps1 Check 3 guards the CLI-02 vendored Rust protos against drift.
archreview: IPC-01/09/19/20 Done, TST-03 In review (pipeline authored + validated,
not yet run on a Gitea runner). Verified on macOS: NonWindows build clean,
ClientProtoInputTests 5/5, -Check exit 0.
build.rs resolved the .proto files via a monorepo-relative path and packaging
relied on `cargo publish --no-verify` to hide the resulting failure. Vendor the
three canonical protos into clients/rust/protos/, resolve them via
CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR (in-repo path preferred, vendored fallback for the packaged
crate), ship them via Cargo.toml `include`, and drop `--no-verify` from
pack-clients.ps1.
archreview: CLI-02 (P1). Verified: cargo fmt/check/test (28) + clippy -D warnings,
and `cargo package` (no --no-verify) compiles standalone in the isolated staging
dir — the out-of-repo proof. Vendored-proto drift is guarded by check-codegen.ps1.
Joseph Doherty