feat(security): apikey --expires CLI flag + dashboard expiry/staleness badge (SEC-10 polish)

Gateway-side follow-up to the shared auth-lib expiry core (delivered via G-2):

- apikey create-key gains optional --expires — absolute ISO-8601 UTC or relative
  <N>d/<N>h from now; omitted means non-expiring (opt-in, unchanged default).
  Threaded ApiKeyAdminCommand -> parser -> runner into the library's
  CreateKeyAsync(..., expiresUtc, ...). list-keys shows an expiry column and an
  active/expired/revoked status.
- Dashboard API Keys page surfaces expiry: an Expires column (Never when unset)
  and a status badge reading Expired (red) / Expiring (<=7d, amber) / Revoked /
  Active. DashboardApiKeySummary.ExpiresUtc projected in DashboardSnapshotService;
  StatusBadge maps the new states.

Tests: parser (absolute/relative/invalid/none) + end-to-end past-expiry rejection
through the live verifier; dashboard summary suite green. Docs: Authentication.md
(verification-flow expiry step, CLI table + examples, dashboard badge).

Closes the tracked SEC-10 polish (SEC-10 core was already Done).

archreview/remediation/00-tracking.md

@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ Findings the review flagged as one coordinated design pass — sequence them tog
 | 2026-07-09 | P0 tier executed via parallel agents. GWC-01/02/03, TST-02, TST-12, CLI-01, CLI-03 → `Done` (NonWindows build clean; gateway 135/135 targeted tests pass, Go `go test ./...` + `-race` pass, Rust `test`/`clippy -D warnings` pass). |
 | 2026-07-09 | Windows full-suite temp-file-lock flakiness (discovered via TST-08) → **fixed** (commit `11a716a`). Two shared-state parallel collisions that macOS never surfaces: (1) self-signed cert generation — `SelfSignedCertificateProvider` now stages the PFX in a unique `<path>.<guid>.tmp` (was a fixed name that concurrent/interrupted writers collided on); `TestHostEnvironmentInitializer` defaults the cert path to a per-process temp dir (so the suite never writes shared `ProgramData` or fights the deployed service); `GatewayTlsBootstrapTests` moved to a `DisableParallelization` collection so its process-global env-var mutation can't bleed into parallel tests. (2) `AuthStoreHealthCheckTests` — reuse the existing `TempDatabaseDirectory` helper (`SqliteConnection.ClearAllPools()` before delete) so the Microsoft.Data.Sqlite pool releases the temp `.db` handle. **windev-verified:** 3 consecutive full-suite runs all **793 passed / 2 failed, 0 new orphans** (was flaky 2–4 fails, count-varying). The 2 stable remaining failures are pre-existing windev-environmental (`SelfSignedCertificateProviderTests.GenerateCertificate_HasExpectedSansEkuAndValidity` machine-name/FQDN SAN assertion; `EventStreamServiceTests…TracksAggregateQueueDepth` timing) — both pass on macOS, unrelated to this change. |
 | 2026-07-09 | P1 TST-08 (orphaned testhost) → `Done` by evidence: the claimed leak does **not** reproduce. Full `ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests` suite exits cleanly on macOS (0 survivors) and on the Windows dev box (windev, `origin/main` worktree: 0 new `testhost` and 0 new `ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Worker` processes after a full run, isolated by StartTime). Static audit confirms the prime-suspect fixtures already dispose deterministically (WorkerClient cancels its `_stopCts` + awaits read/write/heartbeat tasks with a 5 s timeout; GatewaySession disposes the client; E2E/harness fixtures use `await using`). CLAUDE.md "Source Update Workflow" updated to drop the stale "leaves orphaned testhost processes" rationale (filtered runs kept as a speed guideline). **Discovered separately (NOT TST-08, still open):** Windows-only temp-file-lock flakiness in ~4 full-host test classes — `AuthStoreHealthCheckTests` (Microsoft.Data.Sqlite connection-pool holds the temp `.db` handle after `await using`, so the finally `File.Delete` throws "used by another process"), `GatewayTlsBootstrapTests`/`DashboardCookieOptionsTests`/`DashboardHubsRegistrationTests` (a `gw.pfx.tmp` handle from `SelfSignedCertificateProvider`'s fixed-name `path+".tmp"` atomic-write racing teardown). Count varies run-to-run (2–4 fails); macOS never sees it (Unix allows deleting open files). Fix = `SqliteConnection.ClearAllPools()` before temp delete + a unique/guarded `.tmp` name; verify on windev. |
+| 2026-07-09 | SEC-10 polish (gateway-side follow-up to the G-2 auth-lib core) → done. `apikey create-key` gains an optional `--expires` (absolute ISO-8601 UTC or relative `<N>d`/`<N>h`; omit = non-expiring, opt-in) threaded through `ApiKeyAdminCommand`/parser/runner into the library's `CreateKeyAsync(..., expiresUtc, ...)`; `list-keys` shows an expiry column + `active`/`expired`/`revoked` status. Dashboard API Keys page surfaces expiry: an `Expires` column (`Never` when unset) and a status badge reading `Expired` (red) / `Expiring` (≤7 days, amber) / `Revoked` / `Active` (`DashboardApiKeySummary.ExpiresUtc` projected in `DashboardSnapshotService`; `StatusBadge` maps the new states). Server build clean; targeted tests 32/32 (parser abs/relative/invalid + end-to-end past-expiry rejection via the live verifier) + dashboard 28/28. Docs: `docs/Authentication.md` (verification flow expiry step, CLI table + examples, dashboard badge). SEC-10 was already `Done` (core); this closes the tracked polish. |
 | 2026-07-09 | P1 Wave 3 (event-channel decoupling). GWC-04 → `Done`. `WorkerClient`'s read loop awaited `EnqueueWorkerEventAsync` inline, which blocks in the bounded event channel's timed `WriteAsync` (≤ `EventChannelFullModeTimeout`, 5 s) when the channel is full with a slow/absent `StreamEvents` consumer — stalling any `WorkerCommandReply`/heartbeat queued behind an event frame, so an in-flight `InvokeAsync` could hit `CommandTimeout` despite a timely worker reply. Fix mirrors the existing outbound `WriteLoopAsync`: an unbounded event **staging** channel + a dedicated `EventWriteLoopAsync`; `DispatchEnvelope` is now fully synchronous and the `WorkerEvent` branch hands off with a non-blocking `TryWrite`, so the read loop never awaits event enqueue. The event write loop owns the timed write + the sustained-overflow `ProtocolViolation` fault (unchanged contract); registered in `WaitForBackgroundTasks`, completed on close/fault/dispose. Server build clean (0 warnings); non-pipe event tests 37/38 (the 1 is the known parallel-load `EventStreamServiceTests…TracksAggregateQueueDepth` timing flake — passes in isolation). New pipe-harness test (reply after events with a full consumer-less channel dispatches without `CommandTimeout`) verified on windev. Docs: GatewayProcessDesign read/write/event-loop section. Commit `32d6b48`. **Wave 3 complete.** |
 | 2026-07-09 | P1 Wave 3 (size/backpressure topology + write ordering). IPC-02/03/04 + WRK-04/07 → `Done`. **Size negotiation (IPC-02):** added `GatewayHello.max_frame_bytes` (regen `Generated/` + `clients/proto` descriptor refresh with pinned protoc 34.1); the gateway sends its negotiated worker-frame max and the worker adopts it (`WorkerFrameProtocolOptions.AdoptNegotiatedMaxMessageBytes`, 0 = keep default, >256 MiB rejected) instead of a hard-coded default. **Headroom (IPC-03):** the pipe frame max now sits `EnvelopeOverheadReserveBytes` (64 KiB) above the public gRPC cap (default `Worker.MaxMessageBytes` 16 MiB→16 MiB+64 KiB), cross-validated at startup; `WorkerClient` pre-checks command envelope size and fails only the offending correlation (`ResourceExhausted`) instead of `SetFaulted`ing the session. **Drain bound (IPC-04):** gateway request validator rejects `DrainEvents max_events` above 10 000; the worker caps each reply at `MaxDrainEventsPerReply` (10 000) and treats `max_events = 0` as that cap, not "drain all". **Sequence (WRK-04):** `WorkerFrameWriter` stamps the envelope `Sequence` at the point of writing under the write lock, so wire order and stamped sequence always agree under concurrent producers. **Priority (WRK-07):** the worker writer is now a cooperative priority scheduler — control frames (reply/fault/heartbeat/shutdown-ack) drain ahead of event frames; per-frame validation/size rejections fail only that frame, a stream failure fails all queued. Docs same-change (GatewayConfiguration, WorkerFrameProtocol, gateway.md). **Verified:** macOS NonWindows build clean + validator/grpc tests green; **windev** x86 worker builds clean, `Worker.Tests` 352 passed / 0 failed / 11 skipped (incl. new monotonic-sequence, control-before-event priority, negotiated-max, drain-bound tests), gateway `Tests` 799 passed / 3 failed — all 3 pre-existing windev-environmental (SelfSigned SAN + 2 `EventStreamServiceTests` timing, both pass in isolation). Commits `c8b3a22` (gateway half), `ebe6aea` (worker half), `309296f` (descriptor + default-expectation refresh). GWC-04 (event-channel decoupling) is the remaining Wave 3 item. |
 | 2026-07-09 | P1 S-misc (dashboard/observability hardening). SEC-02/12/20 → `Done`. SEC-02: `DashboardAuthorizationHandler` restricts the loopback + `Authentication:Mode=Disabled` bypasses to read-only (they satisfy a Viewer-bearing requirement but never `AdminOnly`), closing the policy-layer gap where anonymous localhost was authorized for Admin surfaces. SEC-12: `DashboardSessionAdminService` now emits canonical `AuditEvent`s (`dashboard-close-session`/`dashboard-kill-worker`, category `SessionAdmin`) through `IAuditWriter` on Success/Failure/Denied, so Close/Kill land durable audit rows. SEC-20: dropped the unbounded `session_id` tag from the exported `mxgateway.heartbeats.failed` counter. Docs updated same-change (CLAUDE.md, GatewayDashboardDesign.md, Metrics.md). Server build clean (0 warnings); targeted classes 30/30 pass; broader Dashboard+Security+GatewayApplication+Metrics sweep 295/295 pass. |

docs/Authentication.md

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ The pepper is intentionally not stored alongside the hash: an attacker who exfil
 
 1. Parse the `Authorization` header into a `ParsedApiKey`.
 2. Look up the `ApiKeyRecord` by `KeyId` through `IApiKeyStore.FindByKeyIdAsync`.
-3. Reject revoked records (`RevokedUtc is not null`).
+3. Reject revoked records (`RevokedUtc is not null`) and expired records (`ExpiresUtc` in the past). Expiry is opt-in — keys created without an expiry never expire; an expired key fails opaquely, indistinguishable to the client from any other auth failure.
 4. Hash the presented secret with the configured pepper.
 5. Compare hashes with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals` to avoid timing oracles.
 6. Record a `LastUsedUtc` timestamp via `MarkKeyUsedAsync` and return an `ApiKeyIdentity`.
@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ public static ApiKeyRecord Read(SqliteDataReader reader)
 
 Because `RotateAsync` clears `revoked_utc`, rotating a previously revoked key reactivates it. The dashboard API Keys page therefore offers the Rotate (and Revoke) actions only for keys whose status is `Active`; revoked keys instead show a Delete action that calls `DeleteAsync`, so an operator can permanently remove a revoked row without ever risking un-revocation as a side effect of a rotation.
 
+The dashboard API Keys page also surfaces expiry: each row shows an `Expires` column (`Never` when unset) and a status badge that reads `Expired` (past expiry, red), `Expiring` (within seven days, amber), `Revoked`, or `Active`. This is display-only staleness surfacing; expiry is set at creation time via the `apikey create-key --expires` CLI, not from the dashboard.
+
 ### Audit trail
 
 `SqliteApiKeyAuditStore` (`IApiKeyAuditStore`) appends `ApiKeyAuditEntry` values to the `api_key_audit` table and stamps each row with a UTC timestamp inside the store rather than trusting the caller. `ListRecentAsync` returns the most recent rows ordered by `audit_id` descending and projects them into `ApiKeyAuditRecord`. Rows are kept even after the referenced key is revoked because the audit history is the durable record of administrative action; the `key_id` column is nullable to accommodate non-key-scoped events such as `init-db`.
@@ -226,8 +228,8 @@ The supported subcommands match `ApiKeyAdminCommandKind` exactly:
 | Subcommand | Required options | Behaviour |
 |------------|------------------|-----------|
 | `init-db` | none | Runs the migrator and records an audit entry. |
-| `create-key` | `--key-id`, `--display-name` | Generates a new secret, stores its peppered hash and optional constraints, and prints the assembled `mxgw_<keyId>_<secret>` token. |
-| `list-keys` | none | Lists every stored key with its scopes, constraints, and revocation state. |
+| `create-key` | `--key-id`, `--display-name` | Generates a new secret, stores its peppered hash and optional constraints, and prints the assembled `mxgw_<keyId>_<secret>` token. Optional `--expires` sets an expiry (absolute ISO-8601 UTC, or a relative `<N>d`/`<N>h` from now); omit it for a non-expiring key. |
+| `list-keys` | none | Lists every stored key with its scopes, constraints, revocation state, and expiry (`active`/`expired`/`revoked`). |
 | `revoke-key` | `--key-id` | Sets `revoked_utc` if the key is currently active. |
 | `rotate-key` | `--key-id` | Replaces the secret hash and prints the new token. |
 
@@ -237,6 +239,8 @@ Examples:
 mxgateway apikey init-db
 mxgateway apikey create-key --key-id ops.alice --display-name "Alice (ops)" --scopes read,write
 mxgateway apikey create-key --key-id area1.reader --display-name "Area 1 reader" --scopes invoke:read,metadata:read --read-subtree "Area1/*" --browse-subtree "Area1/*"
+mxgateway apikey create-key --key-id ops.temp --display-name "Temp contractor" --scopes invoke:read --expires 90d
+mxgateway apikey create-key --key-id ops.audit --display-name "Audit window" --scopes metadata:read --expires 2027-01-01T00:00:00Z
 mxgateway apikey list-keys --json
 mxgateway apikey revoke-key --key-id ops.alice
 mxgateway apikey rotate-key --key-id ops.alice

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Dashboard/Components/Pages/ApiKeysPage.razor

@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ else
                             <th scope="col">Constraints</th>
                             <th scope="col">Created</th>
                             <th scope="col">Last Used</th>
+                            <th scope="col">Expires</th>
                             @if (CanManageApiKeys)
                             {
                                 <th scope="col">Actions</th>
@@ -175,12 +176,13 @@ else
                         {
                             <tr>
                                 <td><code>@key.KeyId</code></td>
-                                <td><StatusBadge Text="@(key.RevokedUtc is null ? "Active" : "Revoked")" /></td>
+                                <td><StatusBadge Text="@KeyStatus(key)" /></td>
                                 <td>@DashboardDisplay.Text(key.DisplayName)</td>
                                 <td>@DashboardDisplay.Text(string.Join(", ", key.Scopes.Order(StringComparer.Ordinal)))</td>
                                 <td>@DashboardDisplay.Text(ConstraintText(key.Constraints))</td>
                                 <td>@DashboardDisplay.DateTime(key.CreatedUtc)</td>
                                 <td>@DashboardDisplay.DateTime(key.LastUsedUtc)</td>
+                                <td>@(key.ExpiresUtc is null ? "Never" : DashboardDisplay.DateTime(key.ExpiresUtc))</td>
                                 @if (CanManageApiKeys)
                                 {
                                     <td>
@@ -468,6 +470,35 @@ else
         }
     }
 
+    // Window before an expiry within which a key is flagged as "Expiring" (warn) rather than "Active".
+    private static readonly TimeSpan ExpiringSoonWindow = TimeSpan.FromDays(7);
+
+    // Status vocabulary understood by StatusBadge: Revoked wins over expiry; a past expiry is Expired
+    // (bad), an expiry inside ExpiringSoonWindow is Expiring (warn), otherwise Active (SEC-10).
+    private static string KeyStatus(DashboardApiKeySummary key)
+    {
+        if (key.RevokedUtc is not null)
+        {
+            return "Revoked";
+        }
+
+        if (key.ExpiresUtc is { } expiresAt)
+        {
+            DateTimeOffset now = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
+            if (expiresAt <= now)
+            {
+                return "Expired";
+            }
+
+            if (expiresAt - now <= ExpiringSoonWindow)
+            {
+                return "Expiring";
+            }
+        }
+
+        return "Active";
+    }
+
     private static string ConstraintText(ApiKeyConstraints constraints)
     {
         if (constraints.IsEmpty)

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Dashboard/Components/Shared/StatusBadge.razor

@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
     {
         "Ready" or "Healthy" or "Active" => StatusState.Ok,
         "Creating" or "StartingWorker" or "WaitingForPipe" or "InitializingWorker" or "Closing"
-            or "Stale" or "Degraded" => StatusState.Warn,
-        "Faulted" or "Unavailable" => StatusState.Bad,
+            or "Stale" or "Degraded" or "Expiring" => StatusState.Warn,
+        "Faulted" or "Unavailable" or "Expired" => StatusState.Bad,
         _ => StatusState.Idle,
     };
 }

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Dashboard/DashboardApiKeySummary.cs

@@ -9,4 +9,5 @@ public sealed record DashboardApiKeySummary(
     ApiKeyConstraints Constraints,
     DateTimeOffset CreatedUtc,
     DateTimeOffset? LastUsedUtc,
-    DateTimeOffset? RevokedUtc);
+    DateTimeOffset? RevokedUtc,
+    DateTimeOffset? ExpiresUtc = null);

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Dashboard/DashboardSnapshotService.cs

@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ public sealed class DashboardSnapshotService : IDashboardSnapshotService
                     Constraints: ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Deserialize(key.ConstraintsJson),
                     CreatedUtc: key.CreatedUtc,
                     LastUsedUtc: key.LastUsedUtc,
-                    RevokedUtc: key.RevokedUtc))
+                    RevokedUtc: key.RevokedUtc,
+                    ExpiresUtc: key.ExpiresUtc))
                 .ToArray();
 
             Volatile.Write(ref _apiKeySummaries, summaries);

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Security/Authentication/ApiKeyAdminCliRunner.cs

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyAdminCliRunner(ApiKeyAdminCommands commands)
                 Required(command.DisplayName),
                 command.Scopes,
                 ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Serialize(command.Constraints),
+                command.ExpiresUtc,
                 remoteAddress: null,
                 cancellationToken)
             .ConfigureAwait(false);
@@ -134,8 +135,16 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyAdminCliRunner(ApiKeyAdminCommands commands)
 
         foreach (ApiKeyAdminListedKey key in result.Keys)
         {
-            string revoked = key.RevokedUtc is null ? "active" : "revoked";
-            await output.WriteLineAsync($"{key.KeyId}\t{key.DisplayName}\t{revoked}\t{string.Join(',', key.Scopes)}")
+            string status = key.RevokedUtc is not null
+                ? "revoked"
+                : key.ExpiresUtc is { } expiresAt && expiresAt <= DateTimeOffset.UtcNow
+                    ? "expired"
+                    : "active";
+            string expiry = key.ExpiresUtc is { } expires
+                ? expires.ToUniversalTime().ToString("u", System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture)
+                : "-";
+            await output.WriteLineAsync(
+                    $"{key.KeyId}\t{key.DisplayName}\t{status}\t{expiry}\t{string.Join(',', key.Scopes)}")
                 .ConfigureAwait(false);
         }
     }
@@ -150,7 +159,8 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyAdminCliRunner(ApiKeyAdminCommands commands)
             Constraints: ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Deserialize(key.ConstraintsJson),
             CreatedUtc: key.CreatedUtc,
             LastUsedUtc: key.LastUsedUtc,
-            RevokedUtc: key.RevokedUtc);
+            RevokedUtc: key.RevokedUtc,
+            ExpiresUtc: key.ExpiresUtc);
     }
 
     private static string Required(string? value)

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Security/Authentication/ApiKeyAdminCommand.cs

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ public sealed record ApiKeyAdminCommand(
     string? KeyId,
     string? DisplayName,
     IReadOnlySet<string> Scopes,
-    ApiKeyConstraints Constraints);
+    ApiKeyConstraints Constraints,
+    DateTimeOffset? ExpiresUtc = null);

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Security/Authentication/ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser.cs

@@ -82,9 +82,11 @@ public static class ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser
         string? displayName = GetOption(options, "display-name");
         IReadOnlySet<string> scopes = ParseScopes(GetOption(options, "scopes"));
         ApiKeyConstraints constraints;
+        DateTimeOffset? expiresUtc;
         try
         {
             constraints = ParseConstraints(options);
+            expiresUtc = ParseExpiry(GetOption(options, "expires"));
         }
         catch (FormatException exception)
         {
@@ -111,7 +113,8 @@ public static class ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser
             KeyId: keyId,
             DisplayName: displayName,
             Scopes: scopes,
-            Constraints: constraints));
+            Constraints: constraints,
+            ExpiresUtc: expiresUtc));
     }
 
     private static bool TryParseKind(string value, out ApiKeyAdminCommandKind kind)
@@ -233,6 +236,42 @@ public static class ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser
             ReadHistorizedOnly: HasFlag(options, "read-historized-only"));
     }
 
+    // Parses the optional --expires value into an absolute UTC expiry (SEC-10). Accepts a relative
+    // "<N>d"/"<N>h" duration from now (operator-friendly) or an absolute ISO-8601 instant/date
+    // (assumed UTC). Null/blank means no expiry — expiry stays opt-in, preserving prior behaviour.
+    private static DateTimeOffset? ParseExpiry(string? value)
+    {
+        if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value))
+        {
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        string trimmed = value.Trim();
+        char unit = char.ToLowerInvariant(trimmed[^1]);
+        if (unit is 'd' or 'h'
+            && int.TryParse(
+                trimmed[..^1],
+                System.Globalization.NumberStyles.None,
+                System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,
+                out int amount))
+        {
+            TimeSpan offset = unit == 'd' ? TimeSpan.FromDays(amount) : TimeSpan.FromHours(amount);
+            return DateTimeOffset.UtcNow + offset;
+        }
+
+        if (DateTimeOffset.TryParse(
+                trimmed,
+                System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,
+                System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles.AssumeUniversal | System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles.AdjustToUniversal,
+                out DateTimeOffset parsed))
+        {
+            return parsed;
+        }
+
+        throw new FormatException(
+            "--expires must be a relative duration ('<N>d' or '<N>h') or an absolute ISO-8601 UTC timestamp.");
+    }
+
     private static int? ParseNullableInt(string? value)
     {
         if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value))

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Security/Authentication/ApiKeyAdminListedKey.cs

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ public sealed record ApiKeyAdminListedKey(
     ApiKeyConstraints Constraints,
     DateTimeOffset CreatedUtc,
     DateTimeOffset? LastUsedUtc,
-    DateTimeOffset? RevokedUtc);
+    DateTimeOffset? RevokedUtc,
+    DateTimeOffset? ExpiresUtc = null);

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests/Security/Authentication/ApiKeyAdminCliRunnerTests.cs

@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyAdminCliRunnerTests : IDisposable
         Assert.Contains(auditRecords, record => record.EventType == "create-key" && record.KeyId == "operator01");
     }
 
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Verifies that a key created with an already-past <c>--expires</c> is rejected by the verifier
+    /// — the CLI expiry wiring reaches the store and the library enforces it end-to-end (SEC-10).
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task CreateKeyAsync_WithPastExpiry_KeyIsRejectedByVerifier()
+    {
+        await using ServiceProvider services = BuildServices(CreateTempDatabasePath());
+        ApiKeyAdminCliRunner runner = services.GetRequiredService<ApiKeyAdminCliRunner>();
+        StringWriter output = new();
+
+        await runner.RunAsync(
+            new ApiKeyAdminCommand(
+                Kind: ApiKeyAdminCommandKind.CreateKey,
+                Json: true,
+                SqlitePath: null,
+                Pepper: null,
+                KeyId: "operator01",
+                DisplayName: "Operator",
+                Scopes: new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.Ordinal) { "session:open" },
+                Constraints: ApiKeyConstraints.Empty,
+                ExpiresUtc: DateTimeOffset.UtcNow - TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1)),
+            output,
+            CancellationToken.None);
+
+        string apiKey = ReadApiKey(output.ToString());
+
+        IApiKeyVerifier verifier = services.GetRequiredService<IApiKeyVerifier>();
+        ApiKeyVerification verification = await verifier.VerifyAsync($"Bearer {apiKey}", CancellationToken.None);
+
+        Assert.False(verification.Succeeded);
+    }
+
     /// <summary>Verifies that ListKeysAsync does not print the raw secret.</summary>
     /// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
     [Fact]

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests/Security/Authentication/ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParserTests.cs

@@ -52,6 +52,61 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParserTests
         Assert.Contains("events:read", result.Command.Scopes);
     }
 
+    /// <summary>A create-key command without --expires leaves the key non-expiring (opt-in, SEC-10).</summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void Parse_CreateKeyCommand_WithoutExpires_HasNoExpiry()
+    {
+        ApiKeyAdminParseResult result = ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser.Parse(
+            ["apikey", "create-key", "--key-id", "operator01", "--display-name", "Operator", "--scopes", "session:open"]);
+
+        Assert.NotNull(result.Command);
+        Assert.Null(result.Command.ExpiresUtc);
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>An absolute ISO-8601 --expires value is parsed to that exact UTC instant (SEC-10).</summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void Parse_CreateKeyCommand_WithAbsoluteExpires_ParsesInstant()
+    {
+        ApiKeyAdminParseResult result = ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser.Parse(
+            ["apikey", "create-key", "--key-id", "operator01", "--display-name", "Operator", "--scopes", "session:open",
+             "--expires", "2030-01-02T03:04:05Z"]);
+
+        Assert.NotNull(result.Command);
+        Assert.Equal(
+            new DateTimeOffset(2030, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, TimeSpan.Zero),
+            result.Command.ExpiresUtc);
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>A relative "&lt;N&gt;d" --expires value resolves to a future UTC instant (SEC-10).</summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void Parse_CreateKeyCommand_WithRelativeExpires_ResolvesToFuture()
+    {
+        DateTimeOffset before = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
+        ApiKeyAdminParseResult result = ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser.Parse(
+            ["apikey", "create-key", "--key-id", "operator01", "--display-name", "Operator", "--scopes", "session:open",
+             "--expires", "30d"]);
+
+        Assert.NotNull(result.Command);
+        Assert.NotNull(result.Command.ExpiresUtc);
+        Assert.InRange(
+            result.Command.ExpiresUtc!.Value,
+            before + TimeSpan.FromDays(30) - TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1),
+            DateTimeOffset.UtcNow + TimeSpan.FromDays(30) + TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1));
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>An unparseable --expires value fails at parse time (SEC-10).</summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void Parse_CreateKeyCommand_WithInvalidExpires_Fails()
+    {
+        ApiKeyAdminParseResult result = ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser.Parse(
+            ["apikey", "create-key", "--key-id", "operator01", "--display-name", "Operator", "--scopes", "session:open",
+             "--expires", "not-a-date"]);
+
+        Assert.Null(result.Command);
+        Assert.NotNull(result.Error);
+        Assert.Contains("--expires", result.Error, StringComparison.Ordinal);
+    }
+
     /// <summary>
     ///     A create-key command with a non-canonical scope
     ///     string (e.g. CLAUDE.md's stale <c>invoke</c> instead of <c>invoke:read</c>)