Phase 3 PR 31 — Live-LDAP integration test + Active Directory compatibility. Closes LMX follow-up #4 with 6 live-bind tests in Server.Tests/LdapUserAuthenticatorLiveTests.cs against the dev GLAuth instance at localhost:3893 (skipped cleanly when unreachable via Assert.Skip + a clear SkipReason — matches the GalaxyRepositoryLiveSmokeTests pattern). Coverage: valid credentials bind + surface DisplayName; wrong password fails; unknown user fails; empty credentials fail pre-flight without touching the directory; writeop user's memberOf maps through GroupToRole to WriteOperate (the exact string WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed expects); admin user surfaces all four mapped roles (WriteOperate + WriteTune + WriteConfigure + AlarmAck) proving memberOf parsing doesn't stop after the first match. While wiring this up, the authenticator's hard-coded user-lookup filter 'uid=<name>' didn't match GLAuth (which keys users by cn and doesn't populate uid) — AND it doesn't match Active Directory either, which uses sAMAccountName. Added UserNameAttribute to LdapOptions (default 'uid' for RFC 2307 backcompat) so deployments override to 'cn' / 'sAMAccountName' / 'userPrincipalName' as the directory requires; authenticator filter now interpolates the configured attribute. The default stays 'uid' so existing test fixtures and OpenLDAP installs keep working without a config change — a regression guard in LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests.LdapOptions_default_UserNameAttribute_is_uid_for_rfc2307_compat pins this so a future 'helpful' default change can't silently break anyone.

Active Directory compatibility. LdapOptions xml-doc expanded with a cheat-sheet covering Server (DC FQDN), Port 389 vs 636, UseTls=true under AD LDAP-signing enforcement, dedicated read-only service account DN, sAMAccountName vs userPrincipalName vs cn trade-offs, memberOf DN shape (CN=Group,OU=...,DC=... with the CN= RDN stripped to become the GroupToRole key), and the explicit 'nested groups NOT expanded' call-out (LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN / tokenGroups is a future authenticator enhancement, not a config change). docs/security.md §'Active Directory configuration' adds a complete appsettings.json snippet with realistic AD group names (OPCUA-Operators → WriteOperate, OPCUA-Engineers → WriteConfigure, OPCUA-AlarmAck → AlarmAck, OPCUA-Tuners → WriteTune), LDAPS port 636, TLS on, insecure-LDAP off, and operator-facing notes on each field. LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests (5 unit guards): ExtractFirstRdnValue parses AD-style 'CN=OPCUA-Operators,OU=...,DC=...' DNs correctly (case-preserving — operators' GroupToRole keys stay readable); also handles mixed case and spaces in group names ('Domain Users'); also works against the OpenLDAP ou=<group>,ou=groups shape (GLAuth) so one extractor tolerates both memberOf formats common in the field; EscapeLdapFilter escapes the RFC 4515 injection set (\, *, (, ), \0) so a malicious login like 'admin)(cn=*' can't break out of the filter; default UserNameAttribute regression guard.
Test posture — Server.Tests Unit: 43 pass / 0 fail (38 prior + 5 new AD-compat guards). Server.Tests LiveLdap category: 6 pass / 0 fail against running GLAuth (would skip cleanly without). Server build clean, 0 errors, 0 warnings.
Deferred: the session-identity end-to-end check (drive a full OPC UA UserName session, then read a 'whoami' node to verify the role landed on RoleBasedIdentity). That needs a test-only address-space node and is scoped for a separate PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
         <Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.Proxy.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.Proxy.Tests.csproj"/>
         <Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.E2E/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.E2E.csproj"/>
         <Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests.csproj"/>
+        <Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.csproj"/>
         <Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.Shared.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.Shared.Tests.csproj"/>
         <Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.CLI.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.CLI.Tests.csproj"/>
         <Project Path="tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.UI.Tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.UI.Tests.csproj"/>

docs/security.md

@@ -348,6 +348,44 @@ The project uses [GLAuth](https://github.com/glauth/glauth) v2.4.0 as the LDAP s
 
 Enable LDAP in `appsettings.json` under `Authentication.Ldap`. See [Configuration Guide](Configuration.md) for the full property reference.
 
+### Active Directory configuration
+
+Production deployments typically point at Active Directory instead of GLAuth. Only four properties differ from the dev defaults: `Server`, `Port`, `UserNameAttribute`, and `ServiceAccountDn`. The same `GroupToRole` mechanism works — map your AD security groups to OPC UA roles.
+
+```json
+{
+  "OpcUaServer": {
+    "Ldap": {
+      "Enabled": true,
+      "Server": "dc01.corp.example.com",
+      "Port": 636,
+      "UseTls": true,
+      "AllowInsecureLdap": false,
+      "SearchBase": "DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com",
+      "ServiceAccountDn": "CN=OpcUaSvc,OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com",
+      "ServiceAccountPassword": "<from your secret store>",
+      "DisplayNameAttribute": "displayName",
+      "GroupAttribute": "memberOf",
+      "UserNameAttribute": "sAMAccountName",
+      "GroupToRole": {
+        "OPCUA-Operators": "WriteOperate",
+        "OPCUA-Engineers": "WriteConfigure",
+        "OPCUA-AlarmAck": "AlarmAck",
+        "OPCUA-Tuners": "WriteTune"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- `UserNameAttribute: "sAMAccountName"` is the critical AD override — the default `uid` is not populated on AD user entries, so the user-DN lookup returns no results without it. Use `userPrincipalName` instead if operators log in with `user@corp.example.com` form.
+- `Port: 636` + `UseTls: true` is required under AD's LDAP-signing enforcement. AD increasingly rejects plain-LDAP bind; set `AllowInsecureLdap: false` to refuse fallback.
+- `ServiceAccountDn` should name a dedicated read-only service principal — not a privileged admin. The account needs read access to user and group entries in the search base.
+- `memberOf` values come back as full DNs like `CN=OPCUA-Operators,OU=OPC UA Security Groups,OU=Groups,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com`. The authenticator strips the leading `CN=` RDN value so operators configure `GroupToRole` with readable group common-names.
+- Nested group membership is **not** expanded — assign users directly to the role-mapped groups, or pre-flatten membership in AD. `LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN` / `tokenGroups` expansion is an authenticator enhancement, not a config change.
+
 ### Security Considerations
 
 - LDAP credentials are transmitted in plaintext over the OPC UA channel unless transport security is enabled. Use `Basic256Sha256-SignAndEncrypt` for production deployments.

docs/v2/lmx-followups.md

@@ -27,46 +27,56 @@ only exposes `ReadRawAsync` + `ReadProcessedAsync`.
 - Integration test: OPC UA client calls `HistoryReadAtTime` / `HistoryReadEvents`,
   value flows through IPC to the Host's `HistorianDataSource`, back to the client.
 
-## 2. Write-gating by role
+## 2. Write-gating by role — **DONE (PR 26)**
 
-**Status**: `RoleBasedIdentity.Roles` populated on the session (PR 19) but
-`DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue` doesn't consult it.
+Landed in PR 26. `WriteAuthzPolicy` in `Server/Security/` maps
+`SecurityClassification` → required role (`FreeAccess` → no role required,
+`Operate`/`SecuredWrite` → `WriteOperate`, `Tune` → `WriteTune`,
+`Configure`/`VerifiedWrite` → `WriteConfigure`, `ViewOnly` → deny regardless).
+`DriverNodeManager` caches the classification per variable during discovery and
+checks the session's roles (via `IRoleBearer`) in `OnWriteValue` before calling
+`IWritable.WriteAsync`. Roles do not cascade — a session with `WriteOperate`
+can't write a `Tune` attribute unless it also carries `WriteTune`.
 
-CLAUDE.md defines the role set: `ReadOnly` / `WriteOperate` / `WriteTune` /
-`WriteConfigure` / `AlarmAck`. Each `DriverAttributeInfo.SecurityClassification`
-maps to a required role for writes.
+See `feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md` in memory for the architectural directive
+that authz stays at the server layer and never delegates to driver-specific auth.
 
-**To do**:
-- Add a `RoleRequirements` table: `SecurityClassification` → required role.
-- `OnWriteValue` reads `context.UserIdentity` → cast to `RoleBasedIdentity`
-  → check role membership before calling `IWritable.WriteAsync`. Return
-  `BadUserAccessDenied` on miss.
-- Unit test against a fake `ISystemContext` with varying role sets.
+## 3. Admin UI client-cert trust management — **DONE (PR 28)**
 
-## 3. Admin UI client-cert trust management
+PR 28 shipped `/certificates` in the Admin UI. `CertTrustService` reads the OPC
+UA server's PKI store root (`OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot` — default
+`%ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki`) and lists rejected + trusted certs by parsing the
+`.der` files directly, so it has no `Opc.Ua` dependency and runs on any
+Admin host that can reach the shared PKI directory.
 
-**Status**: Server side auto-accepts untrusted client certs when the
-`AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` option is true (dev default).
-Production deployments want operator-controlled trust via the Admin UI.
+Operator actions: Trust (moves `rejected/certs/*.der` → `trusted/certs/*.der`),
+Delete rejected, Revoke trust. The OPC UA stack re-reads the trusted store on
+each new client handshake, so no explicit reload signal is needed —
+operators retry the rejected client's connection after trusting.
 
-**To do**:
-- Surface the server's rejected-certificate store in the Admin UI.
-- Page to move certs between `rejected` / `trusted`.
-- Flip `AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` to false once Admin UI is the
-  trust gate.
+Deferred: flipping `AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` to `false` as the
+deployment default. That's a production-hardening config change, not a code
+gap — the Admin UI is now ready to be the trust gate.
 
-## 4. Live-LDAP integration test
+## 4. Live-LDAP integration test — **DONE (PR 31)**
 
-**Status**: PR 19 unit-tested the auth-flow shape; the live bind path is
-exercised only by the pre-existing `Admin.Tests/LdapLiveBindTests.cs` which
-uses the same Novell library against a running GLAuth at `localhost:3893`.
+PR 31 shipped `Server.Tests/LdapUserAuthenticatorLiveTests.cs` — 6 live-bind
+tests against the dev GLAuth instance at `localhost:3893`, skipped cleanly
+when the port is unreachable. Covers: valid bind, wrong password, unknown
+user, empty credentials, single-group → WriteOperate mapping, multi-group
+admin user surfacing all mapped roles.
 
-**To do**:
-- Add `OpcUaServerIntegrationTests.Valid_username_authenticates_against_live_ldap`
-  with the same skip-when-unreachable guard.
-- Assert `session.Identity` on the server side carries the expected role
-  after bind — requires exposing a test hook or reading identity from a
-  new `IHostConnectivityProbe`-style "whoami" variable in the address space.
+Also added `UserNameAttribute` to `LdapOptions` (default `uid` for RFC 2307
+compat) so Active Directory deployments can configure `sAMAccountName` /
+`userPrincipalName` without code changes. `LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests`
+(5 unit guards) pins the AD-shape DN parsing + filter escape behaviors. See
+`docs/security.md` §"Active Directory configuration" for the AD appsettings
+snippet.
+
+Deferred: asserting `session.Identity` end-to-end on the server side (i.e.
+drive a full OPC UA session with username/password, then read an
+`IHostConnectivityProbe`-style "whoami" node to verify the role surfaced).
+That needs a test-only address-space node and is a separate PR.
 
 ## 5. Full Galaxy live-service smoke test against the merged v2 stack
 

docs/v2/modbus-test-plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# Modbus driver — test plan + device-quirk catalog
+
+The Modbus TCP driver unit tests (PRs 21–24) cover the protocol surface against an
+in-memory fake transport. They validate the codec, state machine, and function-code
+routing against a textbook Modbus server. That's necessary but not sufficient: real PLC
+populations disagree with the spec in small, device-specific ways, and a driver that
+passes textbook tests can still misbehave against actual equipment.
+
+This doc is the harness-and-quirks playbook. The project it describes lives at
+`tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/` — scaffolded in PR 30 with
+the simulator fixture, DL205 profile stub, and one write/read smoke test. Each
+confirmed DL205 quirk lands in a follow-up PR as a named test in that project.
+
+## Harness
+
+**Chosen simulator: ModbusPal** (Java, scriptable). Rationale:
+- Scriptable enough to mimic device-specific behaviors (non-standard register
+  layouts, custom exception codes, intentional response delays).
+- Runs locally, no CI dependency. Tests skip when `localhost:502` (or the configured
+  simulator endpoint) isn't reachable.
+- Free + long-maintained — physical PLC bench is unavailable in most dev
+  environments, and renting cloud PLCs isn't worth the per-test cost.
+
+**Setup pattern** (not yet codified in a script — will land alongside the integration
+test project):
+1. Install ModbusPal, load the per-device `.xmpp` profile from
+   `tests/Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/ModbusPal/` (TBD directory).
+2. Start the simulator listening on `localhost:502` (or override via
+   `MODBUS_SIM_ENDPOINT` env var).
+3. `dotnet test` the integration project — tests auto-skip when the endpoint is
+   unreachable, so forgetting to start the simulator doesn't wedge CI.
+
+## Per-device quirk catalog
+
+### AutomationDirect DL205
+
+First known target device. Quirks to document and cover with named tests (to be
+filled in when user validates each behavior in ModbusPal with a DL205 profile):
+
+- **Word order for 32-bit values**: _pending_ — confirm whether DL205 uses ABCD
+  (Modbus TCP standard) or CDAB (Siemens-style word-swap) for Int32/UInt32/Float32.
+  Test name: `DL205_Float32_word_order_is_CDAB` (or `ABCD`, whichever proves out).
+- **Register-zero access**: _pending_ — some DL205 configurations reject FC03 at
+  register 0 with exception code 02 (illegal data address). If confirmed, the
+  integration test suite verifies `ModbusProbeOptions.ProbeAddress` default of 0
+  triggers the rejection and operators must override; test name:
+  `DL205_FC03_at_register_0_returns_IllegalDataAddress`.
+- **Coil addressing base**: _pending_ — DL205 documentation sometimes uses 1-based
+  coil addresses; verify the driver's zero-based addressing matches the physical
+  PLC without an off-by-one adjustment.
+- **Maximum registers per FC03**: _pending_ — Modbus spec caps at 125; some DL205
+  models enforce a lower limit (e.g., 64). Test name:
+  `DL205_FC03_beyond_max_registers_returns_IllegalDataValue`.
+- **Response framing under sustained load**: _pending_ — the driver's
+  single-flight semaphore assumes the server pairs requests/responses by
+  transaction id; at least one DL205 firmware revision is reported to drop the
+  TxId under load. If reproduced in ModbusPal we add a retry + log-and-continue
+  path to `ModbusTcpTransport`.
+- **Exception code on coil write to a protected bit**: _pending_ — some DL205
+  setups protect internal coils; the driver should surface the PLC's exception
+  PDU as `BadNotWritable` rather than `BadInternalError`.
+
+_User action item_: as each quirk is validated in ModbusPal, replace the _pending_
+marker with the confirmed behavior and file a named test in the integration suite.
+
+### Future devices
+
+One section per device class, same shape as DL205. Quirks that apply across
+multiple devices (e.g., "all AB PLCs use CDAB") can be noted in the cross-device
+patterns section below once we have enough data points.
+
+## Cross-device patterns
+
+Once multiple device catalogs accumulate, quirks that recur across two or more
+vendors get promoted into driver defaults or opt-in options:
+
+- _(empty — filled in as catalogs grow)_
+
+## Test conventions
+
+- **One named test per quirk.** `DL205_word_order_is_CDAB_for_Float32` is easier to
+  diagnose on failure than a generic `Float32_roundtrip`. The `DL205_` prefix makes
+  filtering by device class trivial (`--filter "DisplayName~DL205"`).
+- **Skip with a clear SkipReason.** Follow the pattern from
+  `GalaxyRepositoryLiveSmokeTests`: check reachability in the fixture, capture
+  a `SkipReason` string, and have each test call `Assert.Skip(SkipReason)` when
+  it's set. Don't throw — skipped tests read cleanly in CI logs.
+- **Use the real `ModbusTcpTransport`.** Integration tests exercise the wire
+  protocol end-to-end. The in-memory `FakeTransport` from the unit test suite is
+  deliberately not used here — its value is speed + determinism, which doesn't
+  help reproduce device-specific issues.
+- **Don't depend on ModbusPal state between tests.** Each test resets the
+  simulator's register bank or uses a unique address range. Avoid relying on
+  "previous test left value at register 10" setups that flake when tests run in
+  parallel or re-order.
+
+## Next concrete PRs
+
+- **PR 30 — Integration test project + DL205 profile scaffold** — **DONE**.
+  Shipped `tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests` with
+  `ModbusSimulatorFixture` (TCP-probe, skips with a clear `SkipReason` when the
+  endpoint is unreachable), `DL205/DL205Profile.cs` (tag map stub — one
+  writable holding register at address 100), and `DL205/DL205SmokeTests.cs`
+  (write-then-read round-trip). `ModbusPal/` directory holds the README
+  pointing at the to-be-committed `DL205.xmpp` profile.
+- **PR 31+**: one PR per confirmed DL205 quirk, landing the named test + any
+  driver-side adjustment (e.g., retry on dropped TxId) needed to pass it. Drop
+  the `DL205.xmpp` profile into `ModbusPal/` alongside the first quirk PR.

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin/Components/Layout/MainLayout.razor

@@ -5,15 +5,17 @@
         <h5 class="mb-4">OtOpcUa Admin</h5>
         <ul class="nav flex-column">
             <li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/">Overview</a></li>
+            <li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/fleet">Fleet status</a></li>
             <li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/clusters">Clusters</a></li>
             <li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/reservations">Reservations</a></li>
+            <li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/certificates">Certificates</a></li>
         </ul>
 
         <div class="mt-5">
             <AuthorizeView>
                 <Authorized>
                     <div class="small text-light">
-                        Signed in as <strong>@context.User.Identity?.Name</strong>
+                        Signed in as <a class="text-light" href="/account"><strong>@context.User.Identity?.Name</strong></a>
                     </div>
                     <div class="small text-muted">
                         @string.Join(", ", context.User.Claims.Where(c => c.Type.EndsWith("/role")).Select(c => c.Value))

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin/Components/Pages/Account.razor

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+@page "/account"
+@attribute [Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization.Authorize]
+@using System.Security.Claims
+@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services
+
+<h1 class="mb-4">My account</h1>
+
+<AuthorizeView>
+    <Authorized>
+        @{
+            var username = context.User.FindFirst(ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier)?.Value ?? "—";
+            var displayName = context.User.Identity?.Name ?? "—";
+            var roles = context.User.Claims
+                .Where(c => c.Type == ClaimTypes.Role).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
+            var ldapGroups = context.User.Claims
+                .Where(c => c.Type == "ldap_group").Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
+        }
+
+        <div class="row g-4">
+            <div class="col-md-6">
+                <div class="card">
+                    <div class="card-body">
+                        <h5 class="card-title">Identity</h5>
+                        <dl class="row mb-0">
+                            <dt class="col-sm-4">Username</dt><dd class="col-sm-8"><code>@username</code></dd>
+                            <dt class="col-sm-4">Display name</dt><dd class="col-sm-8">@displayName</dd>
+                        </dl>
+                    </div>
+                </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="col-md-6">
+                <div class="card">
+                    <div class="card-body">
+                        <h5 class="card-title">Admin roles</h5>
+                        @if (roles.Count == 0)
+                        {
+                            <p class="text-muted mb-0">No Admin roles mapped — sign-in would have been blocked, so if you're seeing this, the session claim is likely stale.</p>
+                        }
+                        else
+                        {
+                            <div class="mb-2">
+                                @foreach (var r in roles)
+                                {
+                                    <span class="badge bg-primary me-1">@r</span>
+                                }
+                            </div>
+                            <small class="text-muted">LDAP groups: @(ldapGroups.Count == 0 ? "(none surfaced)" : string.Join(", ", ldapGroups))</small>
+                        }
+                    </div>
+                </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="col-12">
+                <div class="card">
+                    <div class="card-body">
+                        <h5 class="card-title">Capabilities</h5>
+                        <p class="text-muted small">
+                            Each Admin role grants a fixed capability set per <code>admin-ui.md</code> §Admin Roles.
+                            Pages below reflect what this session can access; the route's <code>[Authorize]</code> guard
+                            is the ground truth — this table mirrors it for readability.
+                        </p>
+                        <table class="table table-sm align-middle mb-0">
+                            <thead>
+                                <tr>
+                                    <th>Capability</th>
+                                    <th>Required role(s)</th>
+                                    <th class="text-end">You have it?</th>
+                                </tr>
+                            </thead>
+                            <tbody>
+                            @foreach (var cap in Capabilities)
+                            {
+                                var has = cap.RequiredRoles.Any(r => roles.Contains(r, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
+                                <tr>
+                                    <td>@cap.Name<br /><small class="text-muted">@cap.Description</small></td>
+                                    <td>@string.Join(" or ", cap.RequiredRoles)</td>
+                                    <td class="text-end">
+                                        @if (has)
+                                        {
+                                            <span class="badge bg-success">Yes</span>
+                                        }
+                                        else
+                                        {
+                                            <span class="badge bg-secondary">No</span>
+                                        }
+                                    </td>
+                                </tr>
+                            }
+                            </tbody>
+                        </table>
+                    </div>
+                </div>
+            </div>
+        </div>
+
+        <div class="mt-4">
+            <form method="post" action="/auth/logout">
+                <button class="btn btn-outline-danger" type="submit">Sign out</button>
+            </form>
+        </div>
+    </Authorized>
+</AuthorizeView>
+
+@code {
+    private sealed record Capability(string Name, string Description, string[] RequiredRoles);
+
+    // Kept in sync with Program.cs authorization policies + each page's [Authorize] attribute.
+    // When a new page or policy is added, extend this list so operators can self-service check
+    // whether their session has access without trial-and-error navigation.
+    private static readonly IReadOnlyList<Capability> Capabilities =
+    [
+        new("View clusters + fleet status",
+            "Read-only access to the cluster list, fleet dashboard, and generation history.",
+            [AdminRoles.ConfigViewer, AdminRoles.ConfigEditor, AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
+        new("Edit configuration drafts",
+            "Create and edit draft generations, manage namespace bindings and node ACLs. CanEdit policy.",
+            [AdminRoles.ConfigEditor, AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
+        new("Publish generations",
+            "Promote a draft to Published — triggers node roll-out. CanPublish policy.",
+            [AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
+        new("Manage certificate trust",
+            "Trust rejected client certs + revoke trust. FleetAdmin-only because the trust decision gates OPC UA client access.",
+            [AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
+        new("Manage external-ID reservations",
+            "Reserve / release external IDs that map into Galaxy contained names.",
+            [AdminRoles.ConfigEditor, AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
+    ];
+}

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin/Components/Pages/Certificates.razor

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+@page "/certificates"
+@attribute [Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization.Authorize(Roles = AdminRoles.FleetAdmin)]
+@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services
+@inject CertTrustService Certs
+@inject AuthenticationStateProvider AuthState
+@inject ILogger<Certificates> Log
+
+<h1 class="mb-4">Certificate trust</h1>
+
+<div class="alert alert-info small mb-4">
+    PKI store root <code>@Certs.PkiStoreRoot</code>. Trusting a rejected cert moves the file into the trusted store — the OPC UA server picks up the change on the next client handshake, so operators should retry the rejected client's connection after trusting.
+</div>
+
+@if (_status is not null)
+{
+    <div class="alert alert-@_statusKind alert-dismissible">
+        @_status
+        <button type="button" class="btn-close" @onclick="ClearStatus"></button>
+    </div>
+}
+
+<h2 class="h4">Rejected (@_rejected.Count)</h2>
+@if (_rejected.Count == 0)
+{
+    <p class="text-muted">No rejected certificates. Clients that fail to handshake with an untrusted cert land here.</p>
+}
+else
+{
+    <table class="table table-sm align-middle">
+        <thead><tr><th>Subject</th><th>Issuer</th><th>Thumbprint</th><th>Valid</th><th class="text-end">Actions</th></tr></thead>
+        <tbody>
+        @foreach (var c in _rejected)
+        {
+            <tr>
+                <td>@c.Subject</td>
+                <td>@c.Issuer</td>
+                <td><code class="small">@c.Thumbprint</code></td>
+                <td class="small">@c.NotBefore.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd") → @c.NotAfter.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd")</td>
+                <td class="text-end">
+                    <button class="btn btn-sm btn-success me-1" @onclick="() => TrustAsync(c)">Trust</button>
+                    <button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-danger" @onclick="() => DeleteRejectedAsync(c)">Delete</button>
+                </td>
+            </tr>
+        }
+        </tbody>
+    </table>
+}
+
+<h2 class="h4 mt-5">Trusted (@_trusted.Count)</h2>
+@if (_trusted.Count == 0)
+{
+    <p class="text-muted">No client certs have been explicitly trusted. The server's own application cert lives in <code>own/</code> and is not listed here.</p>
+}
+else
+{
+    <table class="table table-sm align-middle">
+        <thead><tr><th>Subject</th><th>Issuer</th><th>Thumbprint</th><th>Valid</th><th class="text-end">Actions</th></tr></thead>
+        <tbody>
+        @foreach (var c in _trusted)
+        {
+            <tr>
+                <td>@c.Subject</td>
+                <td>@c.Issuer</td>
+                <td><code class="small">@c.Thumbprint</code></td>
+                <td class="small">@c.NotBefore.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd") → @c.NotAfter.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd")</td>
+                <td class="text-end">
+                    <button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-danger" @onclick="() => UntrustAsync(c)">Revoke</button>
+                </td>
+            </tr>
+        }
+        </tbody>
+    </table>
+}
+
+@code {
+    private IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> _rejected = [];
+    private IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> _trusted = [];
+    private string? _status;
+    private string _statusKind = "success";
+
+    protected override void OnInitialized() => Reload();
+
+    private void Reload()
+    {
+        _rejected = Certs.ListRejected();
+        _trusted = Certs.ListTrusted();
+    }
+
+    private async Task TrustAsync(CertInfo c)
+    {
+        if (Certs.TrustRejected(c.Thumbprint))
+        {
+            await LogActionAsync("cert.trust", c);
+            Set($"Trusted cert {c.Subject} ({Short(c.Thumbprint)}).", "success");
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            Set($"Could not trust {Short(c.Thumbprint)} — file missing; another admin may have already handled it.", "warning");
+        }
+        Reload();
+    }
+
+    private async Task DeleteRejectedAsync(CertInfo c)
+    {
+        if (Certs.DeleteRejected(c.Thumbprint))
+        {
+            await LogActionAsync("cert.delete.rejected", c);
+            Set($"Deleted rejected cert {c.Subject} ({Short(c.Thumbprint)}).", "success");
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            Set($"Could not delete {Short(c.Thumbprint)} — file missing.", "warning");
+        }
+        Reload();
+    }
+
+    private async Task UntrustAsync(CertInfo c)
+    {
+        if (Certs.UntrustCert(c.Thumbprint))
+        {
+            await LogActionAsync("cert.untrust", c);
+            Set($"Revoked trust for {c.Subject} ({Short(c.Thumbprint)}).", "success");
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            Set($"Could not revoke {Short(c.Thumbprint)} — file missing.", "warning");
+        }
+        Reload();
+    }
+
+    private async Task LogActionAsync(string action, CertInfo c)
+    {
+        // Cert trust changes are operator-initiated and security-sensitive — Serilog captures the
+        // user + thumbprint trail. CertTrustService also logs at Information on each filesystem
+        // move/delete; this line ties the action to the authenticated admin user so the two logs
+        // correlate. DB-level ConfigAuditLog persistence is deferred — its schema is
+        // cluster-scoped and cert actions are cluster-agnostic.
+        var state = await AuthState.GetAuthenticationStateAsync();
+        var user = state.User.Identity?.Name ?? "(anonymous)";
+        Log.LogInformation("Admin cert action: user={User} action={Action} thumbprint={Thumbprint} subject={Subject}",
+            user, action, c.Thumbprint, c.Subject);
+    }
+
+    private void Set(string message, string kind)
+    {
+        _status = message;
+        _statusKind = kind;
+    }
+
+    private void ClearStatus() => _status = null;
+
+    private static string Short(string thumbprint) =>
+        thumbprint.Length > 12 ? thumbprint[..12] + "…" : thumbprint;
+}

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin/Components/Pages/Fleet.razor

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+@page "/fleet"
+@using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore
+@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration
+@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Entities
+@inject IServiceScopeFactory ScopeFactory
+@implements IDisposable
+
+<h1 class="mb-4">Fleet status</h1>
+
+<div class="d-flex align-items-center mb-3 gap-2">
+    <button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-primary" @onclick="RefreshAsync" disabled="@_refreshing">
+        @if (_refreshing) { <span class="spinner-border spinner-border-sm me-1" /> }
+        Refresh
+    </button>
+    <span class="text-muted small">
+        Auto-refresh every @RefreshIntervalSeconds s. Last updated: @(_lastRefreshUtc?.ToString("HH:mm:ss 'UTC'") ?? "—")
+    </span>
+</div>
+
+@if (_rows is null)
+{
+    <p>Loading…</p>
+}
+else if (_rows.Count == 0)
+{
+    <div class="alert alert-info">
+        No node state recorded yet. Nodes publish their state to the central DB on each poll; if
+        this list is empty, either no nodes have been registered or the poller hasn't run yet.
+    </div>
+}
+else
+{
+    <div class="row g-3 mb-4">
+        <div class="col-md-3">
+            <div class="card"><div class="card-body">
+                <h6 class="text-muted mb-1">Nodes</h6>
+                <div class="fs-3">@_rows.Count</div>
+            </div></div>
+        </div>
+        <div class="col-md-3">
+            <div class="card border-success"><div class="card-body">
+                <h6 class="text-muted mb-1">Applied</h6>
+                <div class="fs-3 text-success">@_rows.Count(r => r.Status == "Applied")</div>
+            </div></div>
+        </div>
+        <div class="col-md-3">
+            <div class="card border-warning"><div class="card-body">
+                <h6 class="text-muted mb-1">Stale</h6>
+                <div class="fs-3 text-warning">@_rows.Count(r => IsStale(r))</div>
+            </div></div>
+        </div>
+        <div class="col-md-3">
+            <div class="card border-danger"><div class="card-body">
+                <h6 class="text-muted mb-1">Failed</h6>
+                <div class="fs-3 text-danger">@_rows.Count(r => r.Status == "Failed")</div>
+            </div></div>
+        </div>
+    </div>
+
+    <table class="table table-hover align-middle">
+        <thead>
+            <tr>
+                <th>Node</th>
+                <th>Cluster</th>
+                <th>Generation</th>
+                <th>Status</th>
+                <th>Last applied</th>
+                <th>Last seen</th>
+                <th>Error</th>
+            </tr>
+        </thead>
+        <tbody>
+        @foreach (var r in _rows)
+        {
+            <tr class="@RowClass(r)">
+                <td><code>@r.NodeId</code></td>
+                <td>@r.ClusterId</td>
+                <td>@(r.GenerationId?.ToString() ?? "—")</td>
+                <td>
+                    <span class="badge @StatusBadge(r.Status)">@(r.Status ?? "—")</span>
+                </td>
+                <td>@FormatAge(r.AppliedAt)</td>
+                <td class="@(IsStale(r) ? "text-warning" : "")">@FormatAge(r.SeenAt)</td>
+                <td class="text-truncate" style="max-width: 320px;" title="@r.Error">@r.Error</td>
+            </tr>
+        }
+        </tbody>
+    </table>
+}
+
+@code {
+    // Refresh cadence. 5s matches FleetStatusPoller's poll interval — the dashboard always sees
+    // the most recent published state without polling ahead of the broadcaster.
+    private const int RefreshIntervalSeconds = 5;
+
+    private List<FleetNodeRow>? _rows;
+    private bool _refreshing;
+    private DateTime? _lastRefreshUtc;
+    private Timer? _timer;
+
+    protected override async Task OnInitializedAsync()
+    {
+        await RefreshAsync();
+        _timer = new Timer(async _ => await InvokeAsync(RefreshAsync),
+            state: null,
+            dueTime: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(RefreshIntervalSeconds),
+            period: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(RefreshIntervalSeconds));
+    }
+
+    private async Task RefreshAsync()
+    {
+        if (_refreshing) return;
+        _refreshing = true;
+        try
+        {
+            using var scope = ScopeFactory.CreateScope();
+            var db = scope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<OtOpcUaConfigDbContext>();
+            var rows = await db.ClusterNodeGenerationStates.AsNoTracking()
+                .Join(db.ClusterNodes.AsNoTracking(), s => s.NodeId, n => n.NodeId, (s, n) => new FleetNodeRow(
+                    s.NodeId, n.ClusterId, s.CurrentGenerationId,
+                    s.LastAppliedStatus != null ? s.LastAppliedStatus.ToString() : null,
+                    s.LastAppliedError, s.LastAppliedAt, s.LastSeenAt))
+                .OrderBy(r => r.ClusterId)
+                .ThenBy(r => r.NodeId)
+                .ToListAsync();
+            _rows = rows;
+            _lastRefreshUtc = DateTime.UtcNow;
+        }
+        finally
+        {
+            _refreshing = false;
+            StateHasChanged();
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static bool IsStale(FleetNodeRow r)
+    {
+        if (r.SeenAt is null) return true;
+        return (DateTime.UtcNow - r.SeenAt.Value) > TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
+    }
+
+    private static string RowClass(FleetNodeRow r) => r.Status switch
+    {
+        "Failed" => "table-danger",
+        _ when IsStale(r) => "table-warning",
+        _ => "",
+    };
+
+    private static string StatusBadge(string? status) => status switch
+    {
+        "Applied" => "bg-success",
+        "Failed" => "bg-danger",
+        "Applying" => "bg-info",
+        _ => "bg-secondary",
+    };
+
+    private static string FormatAge(DateTime? t)
+    {
+        if (t is null) return "—";
+        var age = DateTime.UtcNow - t.Value;
+        if (age.TotalSeconds < 60) return $"{(int)age.TotalSeconds}s ago";
+        if (age.TotalMinutes < 60) return $"{(int)age.TotalMinutes}m ago";
+        if (age.TotalHours < 24) return $"{(int)age.TotalHours}h ago";
+        return t.Value.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm 'UTC'");
+    }
+
+    public void Dispose() => _timer?.Dispose();
+
+    internal sealed record FleetNodeRow(
+        string NodeId, string ClusterId, long? GenerationId,
+        string? Status, string? Error, DateTime? AppliedAt, DateTime? SeenAt);
+}

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin/Program.cs

@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ builder.Services.AddScoped<ReservationService>();
 builder.Services.AddScoped<DraftValidationService>();
 builder.Services.AddScoped<AuditLogService>();
 
+// Cert-trust management — reads the OPC UA server's PKI store root so rejected client certs
+// can be promoted to trusted via the Admin UI. Singleton: no per-request state, just
+// filesystem operations.
+builder.Services.Configure<CertTrustOptions>(builder.Configuration.GetSection(CertTrustOptions.SectionName));
+builder.Services.AddSingleton<CertTrustService>();
+
 // LDAP auth — parity with ScadaLink's LdapAuthService (decision #102).
 builder.Services.Configure<LdapOptions>(
     builder.Configuration.GetSection("Authentication:Ldap"));

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin/Services/CertTrustOptions.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Points the Admin UI at the OPC UA Server's PKI store root so
+///     <see cref="CertTrustService"/> can list and move certs between the
+///     <c>rejected/</c> and <c>trusted/</c> directories the server maintains. Must match the
+///     <c>OpcUaServer:PkiStoreRoot</c> the Server process is configured with.
+/// </summary>
+public sealed class CertTrustOptions
+{
+    public const string SectionName = "CertTrust";
+
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     Absolute path to the PKI root. Defaults to
+    ///     <c>%ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki</c> — matches <c>OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot</c>'s
+    ///     default so a standard side-by-side install needs no override.
+    /// </summary>
+    public string PkiStoreRoot { get; init; } =
+        Path.Combine(
+            Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData),
+            "OtOpcUa", "pki");
+}

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin/Services/CertTrustService.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Metadata for a certificate file found in one of the OPC UA server's PKI stores. The
+///     <see cref="FilePath"/> is the absolute path of the DER/CRT file the stack created when it
+///     rejected the cert (for <see cref="CertStoreKind.Rejected"/>) or when an operator trusted
+///     it (for <see cref="CertStoreKind.Trusted"/>).
+/// </summary>
+public sealed record CertInfo(
+    string Thumbprint,
+    string Subject,
+    string Issuer,
+    DateTime NotBefore,
+    DateTime NotAfter,
+    string FilePath,
+    CertStoreKind Store);
+
+public enum CertStoreKind
+{
+    Rejected,
+    Trusted,
+}
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Filesystem-backed view over the OPC UA server's PKI store. The Opc.Ua stack uses a
+///     Directory-typed store — each cert is a <c>.der</c> file under <c>{root}/{store}/certs/</c>
+///     with a filename derived from subject + thumbprint. This service exposes operators for the
+///     Admin UI: list rejected, list trusted, trust a rejected cert (move to trusted), remove a
+///     rejected cert (delete), untrust a previously trusted cert (delete from trusted).
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+///     The Admin process is separate from the Server process; this service deliberately has no
+///     Opc.Ua dependency — it works on the on-disk layout directly so it can run on the Admin
+///     host even when the Server isn't installed locally, as long as the PKI root is reachable
+///     (typical deployment has Admin + Server side-by-side on the same machine).
+///
+///     Trust/untrust requires the Server to re-read its trust list. The Opc.Ua stack re-reads
+///     the Directory store on each new incoming connection, so there's no explicit signal
+///     needed — the next client handshake picks up the change. Operators should retry the
+///     rejected client's connection after trusting.
+/// </remarks>
+public sealed class CertTrustService
+{
+    private readonly CertTrustOptions _options;
+    private readonly ILogger<CertTrustService> _logger;
+
+    public CertTrustService(IOptions<CertTrustOptions> options, ILogger<CertTrustService> logger)
+    {
+        _options = options.Value;
+        _logger = logger;
+    }
+
+    public string PkiStoreRoot => _options.PkiStoreRoot;
+
+    public IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> ListRejected() => ListStore(CertStoreKind.Rejected);
+    public IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> ListTrusted() => ListStore(CertStoreKind.Trusted);
+
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     Move the cert with <paramref name="thumbprint"/> from the rejected store to the
+    ///     trusted store. No-op returns false if the rejected file doesn't exist (already moved
+    ///     by another operator, or thumbprint mismatch). Overwrites an existing trusted copy
+    ///     silently — idempotent.
+    /// </summary>
+    public bool TrustRejected(string thumbprint)
+    {
+        var cert = FindInStore(CertStoreKind.Rejected, thumbprint);
+        if (cert is null) return false;
+
+        var trustedDir = CertsDir(CertStoreKind.Trusted);
+        Directory.CreateDirectory(trustedDir);
+        var destPath = Path.Combine(trustedDir, Path.GetFileName(cert.FilePath));
+        File.Move(cert.FilePath, destPath, overwrite: true);
+        _logger.LogInformation("Trusted cert {Thumbprint} (subject={Subject}) — moved {From} → {To}",
+            cert.Thumbprint, cert.Subject, cert.FilePath, destPath);
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    public bool DeleteRejected(string thumbprint) => DeleteFromStore(CertStoreKind.Rejected, thumbprint);
+    public bool UntrustCert(string thumbprint) => DeleteFromStore(CertStoreKind.Trusted, thumbprint);
+
+    private bool DeleteFromStore(CertStoreKind store, string thumbprint)
+    {
+        var cert = FindInStore(store, thumbprint);
+        if (cert is null) return false;
+        File.Delete(cert.FilePath);
+        _logger.LogInformation("Deleted cert {Thumbprint} (subject={Subject}) from {Store} store",
+            cert.Thumbprint, cert.Subject, store);
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    private CertInfo? FindInStore(CertStoreKind store, string thumbprint) =>
+        ListStore(store).FirstOrDefault(c =>
+            string.Equals(c.Thumbprint, thumbprint, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
+
+    private IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> ListStore(CertStoreKind store)
+    {
+        var dir = CertsDir(store);
+        if (!Directory.Exists(dir)) return [];
+
+        var results = new List<CertInfo>();
+        foreach (var path in Directory.EnumerateFiles(dir))
+        {
+            // Skip CRL sidecars + private-key files — trust operations only concern public certs.
+            var ext = Path.GetExtension(path);
+            if (!ext.Equals(".der", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
+                !ext.Equals(".crt", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
+                !ext.Equals(".cer", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+            {
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            try
+            {
+                var cert = X509CertificateLoader.LoadCertificateFromFile(path);
+                results.Add(new CertInfo(
+                    cert.Thumbprint, cert.Subject, cert.Issuer,
+                    cert.NotBefore.ToUniversalTime(), cert.NotAfter.ToUniversalTime(),
+                    path, store));
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                // A malformed file in the store shouldn't take down the page. Surface it in logs
+                // but skip — operators see the other certs and can clean the bad file manually.
+                _logger.LogWarning(ex, "Failed to parse cert at {Path} — skipping", path);
+            }
+        }
+        return results;
+    }
+
+    private string CertsDir(CertStoreKind store) =>
+        Path.Combine(_options.PkiStoreRoot, store == CertStoreKind.Rejected ? "rejected" : "trusted", "certs");
+}

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/OpcUa/DriverNodeManager.cs

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
 using Opc.Ua;
 using Opc.Ua.Server;
 using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
 using DriverWriteRequest = ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions.WriteRequest;
 
 namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.OpcUa;
@@ -35,6 +36,12 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
     private FolderState? _driverRoot;
     private readonly Dictionary<string, BaseDataVariableState> _variablesByFullRef = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
 
+    // PR 26: SecurityClassification per variable, populated during Variable() registration.
+    // OnWriteValue looks up the classification here to gate the write by the session's roles.
+    // Drivers never enforce authz themselves — the classification is discovery-time metadata
+    // only (feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md).
+    private readonly Dictionary<string, SecurityClassification> _securityByFullRef = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+
     // Active building folder — set per Folder() call so Variable() lands under the right parent.
     // A stack would support nested folders; we use a single current folder because IAddressSpaceBuilder
     // returns a child builder per Folder call and the caller threads nesting through those references.
@@ -122,6 +129,7 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
             _currentFolder.AddChild(v);
             AddPredefinedNode(SystemContext, v);
             _variablesByFullRef[attributeInfo.FullName] = v;
+            _securityByFullRef[attributeInfo.FullName] = attributeInfo.SecurityClass;
 
             v.OnReadValue = OnReadValue;
             v.OnWriteValue = OnWriteValue;
@@ -337,6 +345,22 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
         var fullRef = node.NodeId.Identifier as string;
         if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(fullRef)) return StatusCodes.BadNodeIdUnknown;
 
+        // PR 26: server-layer write authorization. Look up the attribute's classification
+        // (populated during Variable() in Discover) and check the session's roles against the
+        // policy table. Drivers don't participate in this decision — IWritable.WriteAsync
+        // never sees a request we'd have refused here.
+        if (_securityByFullRef.TryGetValue(fullRef!, out var classification))
+        {
+            var roles = context.UserIdentity is IRoleBearer rb ? rb.Roles : [];
+            if (!WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(classification, roles))
+            {
+                _logger.LogInformation(
+                    "Write denied for {FullRef}: classification={Classification} userRoles=[{Roles}]",
+                    fullRef, classification, string.Join(",", roles));
+                return new ServiceResult(StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied);
+            }
+        }
+
         try
         {
             var results = _writable.WriteAsync(

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/OpcUa/OtOpcUaServer.cs

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaServer : StandardServer
     ///     managers can gate writes by role via <c>session.Identity</c>. Anonymous identity still
     ///     uses the stack's default.
     /// </summary>
-    private sealed class RoleBasedIdentity : UserIdentity
+    private sealed class RoleBasedIdentity : UserIdentity, IRoleBearer
     {
         public IReadOnlyList<string> Roles { get; }
         public string? Display { get; }

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Security/IRoleBearer.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Minimal interface a <see cref="Opc.Ua.IUserIdentity"/> implementation can expose so
+///     <see cref="ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.OpcUa.DriverNodeManager"/> can read the session's
+///     resolved roles without a hard dependency on any specific identity subtype. Implemented
+///     by <c>OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity</c>; tests implement it with stub identities to
+///     drive the authz policy under different role sets.
+/// </summary>
+public interface IRoleBearer
+{
+    IReadOnlyList<string> Roles { get; }
+}

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Security/LdapOptions.cs

@@ -2,11 +2,37 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
 
 /// <summary>
 ///     LDAP settings for the OPC UA server's UserName token validator. Bound from
-///     <c>appsettings.json</c> <c>OpcUaServer:Ldap</c>. Defaults match the GLAuth dev instance
-///     (localhost:3893, dc=lmxopcua,dc=local). Production deployments set <see cref="UseTls"/>
-///     true, populate <see cref="ServiceAccountDn"/> for search-then-bind, and maintain
-///     <see cref="GroupToRole"/> with the real LDAP group names.
+///     <c>appsettings.json</c> <c>OpcUaServer:Ldap</c>. Defaults target the GLAuth dev instance
+///     (localhost:3893, <c>dc=lmxopcua,dc=local</c>) for the stock inner-loop setup. Production
+///     deployments are expected to point at Active Directory; see <see cref="UserNameAttribute"/>
+///     and the per-field xml-docs for the AD-specific overrides.
 /// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+///     <para><b>Active Directory cheat-sheet</b>:</para>
+///     <list type="bullet">
+///         <item><see cref="Server"/>: one of the domain controllers, or the domain FQDN (will round-robin DCs).</item>
+///         <item><see cref="Port"/>: <c>389</c> (LDAP) or <c>636</c> (LDAPS); use 636 + <see cref="UseTls"/> in production.</item>
+///         <item><see cref="UseTls"/>: <c>true</c>. AD increasingly rejects plain-LDAP bind under LDAP-signing enforcement.</item>
+///         <item><see cref="AllowInsecureLdap"/>: <c>false</c>. Dev escape hatch only.</item>
+///         <item><see cref="SearchBase"/>: <c>DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com</c> — your domain's base DN.</item>
+///         <item><see cref="ServiceAccountDn"/>: a dedicated service principal with read access to user + group entries
+///         (e.g. <c>CN=OpcUaSvc,OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com</c>). Never a privileged admin.</item>
+///         <item><see cref="UserNameAttribute"/>: <c>sAMAccountName</c> (classic login name) or <c>userPrincipalName</c>
+///         (user@domain form). Default is <c>uid</c> which AD does <b>not</b> populate, so this override is required.</item>
+///         <item><see cref="DisplayNameAttribute"/>: <c>displayName</c> gives the human name; <c>cn</c> works too but is less rich.</item>
+///         <item><see cref="GroupAttribute"/>: <c>memberOf</c> — matches AD's default. Values are full DNs
+///         (<c>CN=&lt;Group&gt;,OU=...,DC=...</c>); the authenticator strips the leading <c>CN=</c> RDN value and uses
+///         that as the lookup key in <see cref="GroupToRole"/>.</item>
+///         <item><see cref="GroupToRole"/>: maps your AD group common-names to OPC UA roles — e.g.
+///         <c>{"OPCUA-Operators" : "WriteOperate", "OPCUA-Engineers" : "WriteConfigure"}</c>.</item>
+///     </list>
+///     <para>
+///         Nested groups are <b>not</b> expanded — AD's <c>tokenGroups</c> / <c>LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN</c>
+///         membership-chain filter isn't used. Assign users directly to the role-mapped groups, or pre-flatten
+///         membership in your directory. If nested expansion becomes a requirement, it's an authenticator
+///         enhancement (not a config change).
+///     </para>
+/// </remarks>
 public sealed class LdapOptions
 {
     public bool Enabled { get; init; } = false;
@@ -23,6 +49,20 @@ public sealed class LdapOptions
     public string DisplayNameAttribute { get; init; } = "cn";
     public string GroupAttribute { get; init; } = "memberOf";
 
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     LDAP attribute used to match a login name against user entries in the directory.
+    ///     Defaults to <c>uid</c> (RFC 2307). Common overrides:
+    ///     <list type="bullet">
+    ///         <item><c>sAMAccountName</c> — Active Directory, classic NT-style login names (e.g. <c>jdoe</c>).</item>
+    ///         <item><c>userPrincipalName</c> — Active Directory, email-style (e.g. <c>jdoe@corp.example.com</c>).</item>
+    ///         <item><c>cn</c> — GLAuth + some OpenLDAP deployments where users are keyed by common-name.</item>
+    ///     </list>
+    ///     Used only when <see cref="ServiceAccountDn"/> is non-empty (search-then-bind path) —
+    ///     direct-bind fallback constructs the DN as <c>cn=&lt;name&gt;,&lt;SearchBase&gt;</c>
+    ///     regardless of this setting and is not a production-grade path against AD.
+    /// </summary>
+    public string UserNameAttribute { get; init; } = "uid";
+
     /// <summary>
     ///     LDAP group → OPC UA role. Each authenticated user gets every role whose source group
     ///     is in their membership list. Recognized role names (CLAUDE.md): <c>ReadOnly</c> (browse

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Security/LdapUserAuthenticator.cs

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ public sealed class LdapUserAuthenticator(LdapOptions options, ILogger<LdapUserA
         {
             await Task.Run(() => conn.Bind(options.ServiceAccountDn, options.ServiceAccountPassword), ct);
 
-            var filter = $"(uid={EscapeLdapFilter(username)})";
+            var filter = $"({options.UserNameAttribute}={EscapeLdapFilter(username)})";
             var results = await Task.Run(() =>
                 conn.Search(options.SearchBase, LdapConnection.ScopeSub, filter, ["dn"], false), ct);
 

src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Security/WriteAuthzPolicy.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Server-layer write-authorization policy. ACL enforcement lives here — drivers report
+///     <see cref="SecurityClassification"/> as discovery metadata only; the server decides
+///     whether a given session is allowed to write a given attribute by checking the session's
+///     roles (resolved at login via <see cref="LdapUserAuthenticator"/>) against the required
+///     role for the attribute's classification.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+///     Matches the table in <c>docs/Configuration.md</c>:
+///     <list type="bullet">
+///         <item><c>FreeAccess</c>: no role required — anonymous sessions can write (matches v1 default).</item>
+///         <item><c>Operate</c> / <c>SecuredWrite</c>: <c>WriteOperate</c> role required.</item>
+///         <item><c>Tune</c>: <c>WriteTune</c> role required.</item>
+///         <item><c>VerifiedWrite</c> / <c>Configure</c>: <c>WriteConfigure</c> role required.</item>
+///         <item><c>ViewOnly</c>: no role grants write access.</item>
+///     </list>
+///     <c>AlarmAck</c> is checked at the alarm-acknowledge path, not here.
+/// </remarks>
+public static class WriteAuthzPolicy
+{
+    public const string RoleWriteOperate = "WriteOperate";
+    public const string RoleWriteTune = "WriteTune";
+    public const string RoleWriteConfigure = "WriteConfigure";
+
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     Decide whether a session with <paramref name="userRoles"/> is allowed to write to an
+    ///     attribute with the given <paramref name="classification"/>. Returns true for
+    ///     <c>FreeAccess</c> regardless of roles (including empty / anonymous sessions) and
+    ///     false for <c>ViewOnly</c> regardless of roles. Every other classification requires
+    ///     the session to carry the mapped role — case-insensitive match.
+    /// </summary>
+    public static bool IsAllowed(SecurityClassification classification, IReadOnlyCollection<string> userRoles)
+    {
+        if (classification == SecurityClassification.FreeAccess) return true;
+        if (classification == SecurityClassification.ViewOnly) return false;
+
+        var required = RequiredRole(classification);
+        if (required is null) return false;
+
+        foreach (var r in userRoles)
+        {
+            if (string.Equals(r, required, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+                return true;
+        }
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     Required role for a classification, or null when no role grants access
+    ///     (<see cref="SecurityClassification.ViewOnly"/>) or no role is needed
+    ///     (<see cref="SecurityClassification.FreeAccess"/> — also returns null; callers use
+    ///     <see cref="IsAllowed"/> which handles the special-cases rather than branching on
+    ///     null themselves).
+    /// </summary>
+    public static string? RequiredRole(SecurityClassification classification) => classification switch
+    {
+        SecurityClassification.FreeAccess => null, // IsAllowed short-circuits
+        SecurityClassification.Operate => RoleWriteOperate,
+        SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite => RoleWriteOperate,
+        SecurityClassification.Tune => RoleWriteTune,
+        SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite => RoleWriteConfigure,
+        SecurityClassification.Configure => RoleWriteConfigure,
+        SecurityClassification.ViewOnly => null, // IsAllowed short-circuits
+        _ => null,
+    };
+}

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Tests/CertTrustServiceTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+using System.Security.Cryptography;
+using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
+using Shouldly;
+using Xunit;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Tests;
+
+[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
+public sealed class CertTrustServiceTests : IDisposable
+{
+    private readonly string _root;
+
+    public CertTrustServiceTests()
+    {
+        _root = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-cert-test-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
+        Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(_root, "rejected", "certs"));
+        Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(_root, "trusted", "certs"));
+    }
+
+    public void Dispose()
+    {
+        if (Directory.Exists(_root)) Directory.Delete(_root, recursive: true);
+    }
+
+    private CertTrustService Service() => new(
+        Options.Create(new CertTrustOptions { PkiStoreRoot = _root }),
+        NullLogger<CertTrustService>.Instance);
+
+    private X509Certificate2 WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind kind, string subject)
+    {
+        using var rsa = RSA.Create(2048);
+        var req = new CertificateRequest($"CN={subject}", rsa, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, RSASignaturePadding.Pkcs1);
+        var cert = req.CreateSelfSigned(DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(-1), DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddYears(1));
+        var dir = Path.Combine(_root, kind == CertStoreKind.Rejected ? "rejected" : "trusted", "certs");
+        var path = Path.Combine(dir, $"{subject} [{cert.Thumbprint}].der");
+        File.WriteAllBytes(path, cert.Export(X509ContentType.Cert));
+        return cert;
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ListRejected_returns_parsed_cert_info_for_each_der_in_rejected_certs_dir()
+    {
+        var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "test-client-A");
+
+        var rows = Service().ListRejected();
+
+        rows.Count.ShouldBe(1);
+        rows[0].Thumbprint.ShouldBe(c.Thumbprint);
+        rows[0].Subject.ShouldContain("test-client-A");
+        rows[0].Store.ShouldBe(CertStoreKind.Rejected);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ListTrusted_is_separate_from_rejected()
+    {
+        WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "rej");
+        WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Trusted, "trust");
+
+        var svc = Service();
+        svc.ListRejected().Count.ShouldBe(1);
+        svc.ListTrusted().Count.ShouldBe(1);
+        svc.ListRejected()[0].Subject.ShouldContain("rej");
+        svc.ListTrusted()[0].Subject.ShouldContain("trust");
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void TrustRejected_moves_file_from_rejected_to_trusted()
+    {
+        var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "promoteme");
+        var svc = Service();
+
+        svc.TrustRejected(c.Thumbprint).ShouldBeTrue();
+
+        svc.ListRejected().ShouldBeEmpty();
+        var trusted = svc.ListTrusted();
+        trusted.Count.ShouldBe(1);
+        trusted[0].Thumbprint.ShouldBe(c.Thumbprint);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void TrustRejected_returns_false_when_thumbprint_not_in_rejected()
+    {
+        var svc = Service();
+        svc.TrustRejected("00DEADBEEF00DEADBEEF00DEADBEEF00DEADBEEF").ShouldBeFalse();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void DeleteRejected_removes_the_file()
+    {
+        var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "killme");
+        var svc = Service();
+
+        svc.DeleteRejected(c.Thumbprint).ShouldBeTrue();
+        svc.ListRejected().ShouldBeEmpty();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void UntrustCert_removes_from_trusted_only()
+    {
+        var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Trusted, "revoke");
+        var svc = Service();
+
+        svc.UntrustCert(c.Thumbprint).ShouldBeTrue();
+        svc.ListTrusted().ShouldBeEmpty();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Thumbprint_match_is_case_insensitive()
+    {
+        var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "case");
+        var svc = Service();
+
+        // X509Certificate2.Thumbprint is upper-case hex; operators pasting from logs often
+        // lowercase it. IsAllowed-style case-insensitive match keeps the UX forgiving.
+        svc.TrustRejected(c.Thumbprint.ToLowerInvariant()).ShouldBeTrue();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Missing_store_directories_produce_empty_lists_not_exceptions()
+    {
+        // Fresh root with no certs subfolder — service should tolerate a pristine install.
+        var altRoot = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-cert-empty-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
+        try
+        {
+            var svc = new CertTrustService(
+                Options.Create(new CertTrustOptions { PkiStoreRoot = altRoot }),
+                NullLogger<CertTrustService>.Instance);
+            svc.ListRejected().ShouldBeEmpty();
+            svc.ListTrusted().ShouldBeEmpty();
+        }
+        finally
+        {
+            if (Directory.Exists(altRoot)) Directory.Delete(altRoot, recursive: true);
+        }
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Malformed_file_is_skipped_not_fatal()
+    {
+        // Drop junk bytes that don't parse as a cert into the rejected/certs directory. The
+        // service must skip it and still return the valid certs — one bad file can't take the
+        // whole management page offline.
+        File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(_root, "rejected", "certs", "junk.der"), "not a cert");
+        var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "valid");
+
+        var rows = Service().ListRejected();
+        rows.Count.ShouldBe(1);
+        rows[0].Thumbprint.ShouldBe(c.Thumbprint);
+    }
+}

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/DL205/DL205Profile.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.DL205;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Tag map for the AutomationDirect DL205 device class. Mirrors what the ModbusPal
+///     <c>.xmpp</c> profile in <c>ModbusPal/DL205.xmpp</c> exposes (or the real PLC, when
+///     <see cref="ModbusSimulatorFixture"/> is pointed at one).
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+///     This is the scaffold — each tag is deliberately generic so the smoke test has stable
+///     addresses to read. Device-specific quirk tests (word order, max-register, register-zero
+///     access, etc.) will land in their own test classes alongside this profile as the user
+///     validates each behavior in ModbusPal; see <c>docs/v2/modbus-test-plan.md</c> §per-device
+///     quirk catalog for the checklist.
+/// </remarks>
+public static class DL205Profile
+{
+    /// <summary>Holding register the smoke test reads. Address 100 sidesteps the DL205
+    /// register-zero quirk (pending confirmation) — see modbus-test-plan.md.</summary>
+    public const ushort SmokeHoldingRegister = 100;
+
+    /// <summary>Expected value the ModbusPal profile seeds into register 100. When running
+    /// against a real DL205 (or a ModbusPal profile where this register is writable), the smoke
+    /// test seeds this value first, then reads it back.</summary>
+    public const short SmokeHoldingValue = 1234;
+
+    public static ModbusDriverOptions BuildOptions(string host, int port) => new()
+    {
+        Host = host,
+        Port = port,
+        UnitId = 1,
+        Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2),
+        Tags =
+        [
+            new ModbusTagDefinition(
+                Name: "DL205_Smoke_HReg100",
+                Region: ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters,
+                Address: SmokeHoldingRegister,
+                DataType: ModbusDataType.Int16,
+                Writable: true),
+        ],
+        // Disable the background probe loop — integration tests drive reads explicitly and
+        // the probe would race with assertions.
+        Probe = new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
+    };
+}

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/DL205/DL205SmokeTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+using Shouldly;
+using Xunit;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.DL205;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     End-to-end smoke against the DL205 ModbusPal profile (or a real DL205 when
+///     <c>MODBUS_SIM_ENDPOINT</c> points at one). Drives the full <see cref="ModbusDriver"/>
+///     + real <see cref="ModbusTcpTransport"/> stack — no fake transport. Success proves the
+///     driver can initialize against the simulator, write a known value, and read it back
+///     with the correct status and value, which is the baseline every device-quirk test
+///     builds on.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+///     Device-specific quirk tests (word order, max-register, register-zero access, exception
+///     code translation, etc.) land as separate test classes in this directory as each quirk
+///     is validated in ModbusPal. Keep this smoke test deliberately narrow — any deviation
+///     the driver hits beyond "happy-path FC16 + FC03 round-trip" belongs in its own named
+///     test so filtering by device class (<c>--filter DisplayName~DL205</c>) surfaces the
+///     quirk-specific failure mode.
+/// </remarks>
+[Collection(ModbusSimulatorCollection.Name)]
+[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
+[Trait("Device", "DL205")]
+public sealed class DL205SmokeTests(ModbusSimulatorFixture sim)
+{
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task DL205_roundtrip_write_then_read_of_holding_register()
+    {
+        if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
+
+        var options = DL205Profile.BuildOptions(sim.Host, sim.Port);
+        await using var driver = new ModbusDriver(options, driverInstanceId: "dl205-smoke");
+        await driver.InitializeAsync(driverConfigJson: "{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
+
+        // Write first so the test is self-contained — ModbusPal's default register bank is
+        // zeroed at simulator start, and tests must not depend on prior-test state per the
+        // test-plan conventions.
+        var writeResults = await driver.WriteAsync(
+            [new(FullReference: "DL205_Smoke_HReg100", Value: (short)DL205Profile.SmokeHoldingValue)],
+            TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
+        writeResults.Count.ShouldBe(1);
+        writeResults[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u, "write must succeed against the ModbusPal DL205 profile");
+
+        var readResults = await driver.ReadAsync(
+            ["DL205_Smoke_HReg100"],
+            TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
+        readResults.Count.ShouldBe(1);
+        readResults[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
+        readResults[0].Value.ShouldBe((short)DL205Profile.SmokeHoldingValue);
+    }
+}

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/ModbusPal/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# ModbusPal simulator profiles
+
+Drop device-specific `.xmpp` profiles here. The integration tests connect to the
+endpoint in `MODBUS_SIM_ENDPOINT` (default `localhost:502`) and expect the
+simulator to already be running — tests do not launch ModbusPal themselves,
+because its Java GUI + JRE requirement is heavier than the harness is worth.
+
+## Getting started
+
+1. Download ModbusPal from SourceForge (`modbuspal.jar`).
+2. `java -jar modbuspal.jar` to launch the GUI.
+3. Load a profile from this directory (or configure one manually) and start the
+   simulator on TCP port 502.
+4. `dotnet test tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests` — tests
+   auto-skip with a clear `SkipReason` if the TCP probe at the configured
+   endpoint fails within 2 seconds.
+
+## Profile files
+
+- `DL205.xmpp` — _to be added_ — register map reflecting the AutomationDirect
+  DL205 quirks tracked in `docs/v2/modbus-test-plan.md`. The scaffolded smoke
+  test in `DL205/DL205SmokeTests.cs` needs holding register 100 writable and
+  present; a minimal ModbusPal profile with a single holding-register bank at
+  address 100 is sufficient.
+
+## Environment variables
+
+- `MODBUS_SIM_ENDPOINT` — override the simulator endpoint. Accepts `host:port`;
+  defaults to `localhost:502`. Useful when pointing the suite at a real PLC on
+  the bench.

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/ModbusSimulatorFixture.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+using System.Net.Sockets;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Reachability probe for a Modbus TCP simulator (ModbusPal or a real PLC). Parses
+///     <c>MODBUS_SIM_ENDPOINT</c> (default <c>localhost:502</c>) and TCP-connects once at
+///     fixture construction. Each test checks <see cref="SkipReason"/> and calls
+///     <c>Assert.Skip</c> when the endpoint was unreachable, so a dev box without a running
+///     simulator still passes `dotnet test` cleanly — matches the Galaxy live-smoke pattern in
+///     <c>GalaxyRepositoryLiveSmokeTests</c>.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+///     <para>
+///         Do NOT keep the probe socket open for the life of the fixture. The probe is a
+///         one-shot liveness check; tests open their own transports (the real
+///         <see cref="ModbusTcpTransport"/>) against the same endpoint. Sharing a socket
+///         across tests would serialize them on a single TCP stream.
+///     </para>
+///     <para>
+///         The fixture is a collection fixture so the reachability probe runs once per test
+///         session, not per test — checking every test would waste several seconds against a
+///         firewalled endpoint that times out each attempt.
+///     </para>
+/// </remarks>
+public sealed class ModbusSimulatorFixture : IAsyncDisposable
+{
+    private const string DefaultEndpoint = "localhost:502";
+    private const string EndpointEnvVar = "MODBUS_SIM_ENDPOINT";
+
+    public string Host { get; }
+    public int Port { get; }
+    public string? SkipReason { get; }
+
+    public ModbusSimulatorFixture()
+    {
+        var raw = Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable(EndpointEnvVar) ?? DefaultEndpoint;
+        var parts = raw.Split(':', 2);
+        Host = parts[0];
+        Port = parts.Length == 2 && int.TryParse(parts[1], out var p) ? p : 502;
+
+        try
+        {
+            using var client = new TcpClient();
+            var task = client.ConnectAsync(Host, Port);
+            if (!task.Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2)) || !client.Connected)
+            {
+                SkipReason = $"Modbus simulator at {Host}:{Port} did not accept a TCP connection within 2s. " +
+                             $"Start ModbusPal (or override {EndpointEnvVar}) and re-run.";
+            }
+        }
+        catch (Exception ex)
+        {
+            SkipReason = $"Modbus simulator at {Host}:{Port} unreachable: {ex.GetType().Name}: {ex.Message}. " +
+                         $"Start ModbusPal (or override {EndpointEnvVar}) and re-run.";
+        }
+    }
+
+    public ValueTask DisposeAsync() => ValueTask.CompletedTask;
+}
+
+[Xunit.CollectionDefinition(Name)]
+public sealed class ModbusSimulatorCollection : Xunit.ICollectionFixture<ModbusSimulatorFixture>
+{
+    public const string Name = "ModbusSimulator";
+}

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests.csproj

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk">
+
+    <PropertyGroup>
+        <TargetFramework>net10.0</TargetFramework>
+        <Nullable>enable</Nullable>
+        <ImplicitUsings>enable</ImplicitUsings>
+        <IsPackable>false</IsPackable>
+        <IsTestProject>true</IsTestProject>
+        <RootNamespace>ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests</RootNamespace>
+    </PropertyGroup>
+
+    <ItemGroup>
+        <PackageReference Include="xunit.v3" Version="1.1.0"/>
+        <PackageReference Include="Shouldly" Version="4.3.0"/>
+        <PackageReference Include="Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk" Version="17.12.0"/>
+        <PackageReference Include="xunit.runner.visualstudio" Version="3.0.2">
+            <PrivateAssets>all</PrivateAssets>
+            <IncludeAssets>runtime; build; native; contentfiles; analyzers; buildtransitive</IncludeAssets>
+        </PackageReference>
+    </ItemGroup>
+
+    <ItemGroup>
+        <ProjectReference Include="..\..\src\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.csproj"/>
+    </ItemGroup>
+
+    <ItemGroup>
+        <None Update="ModbusPal\**\*" CopyToOutputDirectory="PreserveNewest"/>
+        <None Update="DL205\**\*" CopyToOutputDirectory="PreserveNewest"/>
+    </ItemGroup>
+
+    <ItemGroup>
+        <NuGetAuditSuppress Include="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-37gx-xxp4-5rgx"/>
+        <NuGetAuditSuppress Include="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w3x6-4m5h-cxqf"/>
+    </ItemGroup>
+
+</Project>

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests/LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+using Shouldly;
+using Xunit;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Deterministic guards for Active Directory compatibility of the internal helpers
+///     <see cref="LdapUserAuthenticator"/> relies on. We can't live-bind against AD in unit
+///     tests — instead, we pin the behaviors AD depends on (DN-parsing of AD-style
+///     <c>memberOf</c> values, filter escaping with case-preserving RDN extraction) so a
+///     future refactor can't silently break the AD path while the GLAuth live-smoke stays
+///     green.
+/// </summary>
+[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
+public sealed class LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests
+{
+    [Fact]
+    public void ExtractFirstRdnValue_parses_AD_memberOf_group_name_from_CN_dn()
+    {
+        // AD's memberOf values use uppercase CN=… and full domain paths. The extractor
+        // returns the first RDN's value regardless of attribute-type case, so operators'
+        // GroupToRole keys stay readable ("OPCUA-Operators" not "CN=OPCUA-Operators,...").
+        var dn = "CN=OPCUA-Operators,OU=OPC UA Security Groups,OU=Groups,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com";
+        LdapUserAuthenticator.ExtractFirstRdnValue(dn).ShouldBe("OPCUA-Operators");
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ExtractFirstRdnValue_handles_mixed_case_and_spaces_in_group_name()
+    {
+        var dn = "CN=Domain Users,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com";
+        LdapUserAuthenticator.ExtractFirstRdnValue(dn).ShouldBe("Domain Users");
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ExtractFirstRdnValue_also_works_for_OpenLDAP_ou_style_memberOf()
+    {
+        // GLAuth + some OpenLDAP deployments expose memberOf as ou=<group>,ou=groups,...
+        // The authenticator needs one extractor that tolerates both shapes since directories
+        // in the field mix them depending on schema.
+        var dn = "ou=WriteOperate,ou=groups,dc=lmxopcua,dc=local";
+        LdapUserAuthenticator.ExtractFirstRdnValue(dn).ShouldBe("WriteOperate");
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void EscapeLdapFilter_prevents_injection_via_samaccountname_lookup()
+    {
+        // AD login names can contain characters that are meaningful to LDAP filter syntax
+        // (parens, backslashes). The authenticator builds filters as
+        // ($"({UserNameAttribute}={EscapeLdapFilter(username)})") so injection attempts must
+        // not break out of the filter. The RFC 4515 escape set is: \ → \5c, * → \2a, ( → \28,
+        // ) → \29, \0 → \00.
+        LdapUserAuthenticator.EscapeLdapFilter("admin)(cn=*")
+            .ShouldBe("admin\\29\\28cn=\\2a");
+        LdapUserAuthenticator.EscapeLdapFilter("domain\\user")
+            .ShouldBe("domain\\5cuser");
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void LdapOptions_default_UserNameAttribute_is_uid_for_rfc2307_compat()
+    {
+        // Regression guard: PR 31 introduced UserNameAttribute with a default of "uid" so
+        // existing deployments (pre-AD config) keep working. Changing the default breaks
+        // everyone's config silently; require an explicit review.
+        new LdapOptions().UserNameAttribute.ShouldBe("uid");
+    }
+}

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests/LdapUserAuthenticatorLiveTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+using System.Net.Sockets;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
+using Shouldly;
+using Xunit;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Live-service tests against the dev GLAuth instance at <c>localhost:3893</c>. Skipped
+///     when the port is unreachable so the test suite stays portable on boxes without a
+///     running directory. Closes LMX follow-up #4 — the server-side <see cref="LdapUserAuthenticator"/>
+///     is exercised end-to-end against a real LDAP server (same one the Admin process uses),
+///     not just the flow-shape unit tests from PR 19.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+///     The <c>Admin.Tests</c> project already has a live-bind test for its own
+///     <c>LdapAuthService</c>; this pair catches divergence between the two bind paths — the
+///     Server authenticator has to work even when the Server process is on a machine that
+///     doesn't have the Admin assemblies loaded, and the two share no code by design
+///     (cross-app dependency avoidance). If one side drifts past the other on LDAP filter
+///     construction, DN resolution, or memberOf parsing, these tests surface it.
+/// </remarks>
+[Trait("Category", "LiveLdap")]
+public sealed class LdapUserAuthenticatorLiveTests
+{
+    private const string GlauthHost = "localhost";
+    private const int GlauthPort = 3893;
+
+    private static bool GlauthReachable()
+    {
+        try
+        {
+            using var client = new TcpClient();
+            var task = client.ConnectAsync(GlauthHost, GlauthPort);
+            return task.Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1)) && client.Connected;
+        }
+        catch { return false; }
+    }
+
+    // GLAuth dev directory groups are named identically to the OPC UA roles
+    // (ReadOnly / WriteOperate / WriteTune / WriteConfigure / AlarmAck), so the map is an
+    // identity translation. The authenticator still exercises every step of the pipeline —
+    // bind, memberOf lookup, group-name extraction, GroupToRole lookup — against real LDAP
+    // data; the identity map just means the assertion is phrased with no surprise rename
+    // in the middle.
+    private static LdapOptions GlauthOptions() => new()
+    {
+        Enabled = true,
+        Server = GlauthHost,
+        Port = GlauthPort,
+        UseTls = false,
+        AllowInsecureLdap = true,
+        SearchBase = "dc=lmxopcua,dc=local",
+        // Search-then-bind: service account resolves the user's full DN (cn=<user> lives
+        // under ou=<primary-group>,ou=users), the authenticator binds that DN with the
+        // user's password, then stays on the service-account session for memberOf lookup.
+        // Without this path, GLAuth ACLs block the authenticated user from reading their
+        // own entry in full — a plain self-search returns zero results and the role list
+        // ends up empty.
+        ServiceAccountDn = "cn=serviceaccount,dc=lmxopcua,dc=local",
+        ServiceAccountPassword = "serviceaccount123",
+        DisplayNameAttribute = "cn",
+        GroupAttribute = "memberOf",
+        UserNameAttribute = "cn", // GLAuth keys users by cn — see LdapOptions xml-doc.
+        GroupToRole = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
+        {
+            ["ReadOnly"] = "ReadOnly",
+            ["WriteOperate"] = WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteOperate,
+            ["WriteTune"] = WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteTune,
+            ["WriteConfigure"] = WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteConfigure,
+            ["AlarmAck"] = "AlarmAck",
+        },
+    };
+
+    private static LdapUserAuthenticator NewAuthenticator() =>
+        new(GlauthOptions(), NullLogger<LdapUserAuthenticator>.Instance);
+
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task Valid_credentials_bind_and_return_success()
+    {
+        if (!GlauthReachable()) Assert.Skip("GLAuth unreachable at localhost:3893 — start the dev directory to run this test.");
+
+        var result = await NewAuthenticator().AuthenticateAsync("readonly", "readonly123", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
+
+        result.Success.ShouldBeTrue(result.Error);
+        result.DisplayName.ShouldNotBeNullOrEmpty();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task Writeop_user_gets_WriteOperate_role_from_group_mapping()
+    {
+        // Drives end-to-end: bind as writeop, memberOf lists the WriteOperate group, the
+        // authenticator surfaces WriteOperate via GroupToRole. If this test fails,
+        // WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed for an Operate-tier write would also fail
+        // (WriteOperate is the exact string the policy checks for), so the failure mode is
+        // concrete, not abstract.
+        if (!GlauthReachable()) Assert.Skip("GLAuth unreachable at localhost:3893 — start the dev directory to run this test.");
+
+        var result = await NewAuthenticator().AuthenticateAsync("writeop", "writeop123", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
+
+        result.Success.ShouldBeTrue(result.Error);
+        result.Roles.ShouldContain(WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteOperate);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task Admin_user_gets_multiple_roles_from_multiple_groups()
+    {
+        if (!GlauthReachable()) Assert.Skip("GLAuth unreachable at localhost:3893 — start the dev directory to run this test.");
+
+        // 'admin' has primarygroup=ReadOnly and othergroups=[WriteOperate, AlarmAck,
+        // WriteTune, WriteConfigure] per the GLAuth dev config — the authenticator must
+        // surface every mapped role, not just the primary group. Guards against a regression
+        // where the memberOf parsing stops after the first match or misses the primary-group
+        // fallback.
+        var result = await NewAuthenticator().AuthenticateAsync("admin", "admin123", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
+
+        result.Success.ShouldBeTrue(result.Error);
+        result.Roles.ShouldContain(WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteOperate);
+        result.Roles.ShouldContain(WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteTune);
+        result.Roles.ShouldContain(WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteConfigure);
+        result.Roles.ShouldContain("AlarmAck");
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task Wrong_password_returns_failure()
+    {
+        if (!GlauthReachable()) Assert.Skip("GLAuth unreachable at localhost:3893 — start the dev directory to run this test.");
+
+        var result = await NewAuthenticator().AuthenticateAsync("readonly", "wrong-pw", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
+
+        result.Success.ShouldBeFalse();
+        result.Error.ShouldNotBeNullOrEmpty();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task Unknown_user_returns_failure()
+    {
+        if (!GlauthReachable()) Assert.Skip("GLAuth unreachable at localhost:3893 — start the dev directory to run this test.");
+
+        var result = await NewAuthenticator().AuthenticateAsync("no-such-user-42", "whatever", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
+
+        result.Success.ShouldBeFalse();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task Empty_credentials_fail_without_touching_the_directory()
+    {
+        // Pre-flight guard — doesn't require GLAuth.
+        var result = await NewAuthenticator().AuthenticateAsync("", "", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
+        result.Success.ShouldBeFalse();
+        result.Error.ShouldContain("Credentials", Case.Insensitive);
+    }
+}

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests/WriteAuthzPolicyTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+using Shouldly;
+using Xunit;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests;
+
+[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
+public sealed class WriteAuthzPolicyTests
+{
+    // --- FreeAccess and ViewOnly special-cases ---
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void FreeAccess_allows_write_even_for_empty_role_set()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.FreeAccess, []).ShouldBeTrue();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void FreeAccess_allows_write_for_arbitrary_roles()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.FreeAccess, ["SomeOtherRole"]).ShouldBeTrue();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ViewOnly_denies_write_even_with_every_role()
+    {
+        var allRoles = new[] { "WriteOperate", "WriteTune", "WriteConfigure", "AlarmAck" };
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.ViewOnly, allRoles).ShouldBeFalse();
+    }
+
+    // --- Operate tier ---
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Operate_requires_WriteOperate_role()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeTrue();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Operate_role_match_is_case_insensitive()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["writeoperate"]).ShouldBeTrue();
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["WRITEOPERATE"]).ShouldBeTrue();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Operate_denies_empty_role_set()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, []).ShouldBeFalse();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Operate_denies_wrong_role()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["ReadOnly"]).ShouldBeFalse();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void SecuredWrite_maps_to_same_WriteOperate_requirement_as_Operate()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeTrue();
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite, ["WriteTune"]).ShouldBeFalse();
+    }
+
+    // --- Tune tier ---
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Tune_requires_WriteTune_role()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Tune, ["WriteTune"]).ShouldBeTrue();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Tune_denies_WriteOperate_only_session()
+    {
+        // Important: role roles do NOT cascade — a session with WriteOperate can't write a Tune
+        // attribute. Operators escalate by adding WriteTune to the session's roles, not by a
+        // hierarchy the policy infers on its own.
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Tune, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeFalse();
+    }
+
+    // --- Configure tier ---
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Configure_requires_WriteConfigure_role()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Configure, ["WriteConfigure"]).ShouldBeTrue();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void VerifiedWrite_maps_to_same_WriteConfigure_requirement_as_Configure()
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite, ["WriteConfigure"]).ShouldBeTrue();
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeFalse();
+    }
+
+    // --- Multi-role sessions ---
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Session_with_multiple_roles_is_allowed_when_any_matches()
+    {
+        var roles = new[] { "ReadOnly", "WriteTune", "AlarmAck" };
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Tune, roles).ShouldBeTrue();
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Session_with_only_unrelated_roles_is_denied()
+    {
+        var roles = new[] { "ReadOnly", "AlarmAck", "SomeCustomRole" };
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Configure, roles).ShouldBeFalse();
+    }
+
+    // --- Mapping table ---
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(SecurityClassification.Operate, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteOperate)]
+    [InlineData(SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteOperate)]
+    [InlineData(SecurityClassification.Tune, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteTune)]
+    [InlineData(SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteConfigure)]
+    [InlineData(SecurityClassification.Configure, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteConfigure)]
+    public void RequiredRole_returns_expected_role_for_classification(SecurityClassification c, string expected)
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.RequiredRole(c).ShouldBe(expected);
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(SecurityClassification.FreeAccess)]
+    [InlineData(SecurityClassification.ViewOnly)]
+    public void RequiredRole_returns_null_for_special_classifications(SecurityClassification c)
+    {
+        WriteAuthzPolicy.RequiredRole(c).ShouldBeNull();
+    }
+}