N1: a refusal of the DWORD-addressed request permanently settled the layout
as per-element, so a tag deployed before the online edit that creates its
BOOL array later read DWORD n and published byte 0 as Good. The native runtime
now keeps an explicit layout (Unsettled / Packed / PerElement) that ONLY a
reply type changes: 0xD3 settles packed (Bits[n/32], bit n%32), 0xC1 settles
per-element (Bits[n]). Refusals and comms faults leave it unsettled, so the
next read asks again. A reply whose type disagrees with the addressing it was
asked under is discarded and re-read once under the shown layout (it would be
some other element), also when an online edit re-types a settled array. A
scalar BOOL answered 0xD3 with no element bit, or not settled packed, is
refused BadTypeMismatch instead of decoding byte 0.
m1: the write-owned Degraded marker is set together with the CAS that installs
it, under one lock, so concurrent failing writes cannot leave it naming a
different instance (a good write then clears it); a refusal-only read batch
still keeps it write-owned.
m2/m3/m5: documented (breaker accounting of a superseded init; libplctag
throw-only NotImplemented assumption; the TypeMismatch write status word is
libplctag-only).
m4: test for a write on an unsettled layout (settles by a read first).
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
I1: the U11 Bits[n] -> Bits[n/32] rewrite was unconditional. The native
runtime now keeps the original element path until the first reply settles the
layout: 0xD3 confirms DWORD addressing (bit n%32); any other reply type (e.g.
a 0xC1 per-element BOOL array) or a refusal of the DWORD index falls back to
Bits[n] and re-reads, and a write settles the layout by a read first, so it can
never decode or write element n/32 of an element-addressed array.
I2: libplctag ErrorNoMatch/ErrorBadDevice no longer fold into NotFound (they
now read as BadConnection: comms, Degraded, LastSuccessfulRead preserved).
ErrorNotImplemented - and the native runtime's own pre-send refusals - raise
AbCipLocalRefusalException: BadNotSupported, no health, LastSuccessfulRead NOT
advanced, no backoff record, not reachable for the probe or Test Connect.
M1: the bit RMW's parent read/write status words follow the health contract
(refusal: per-tag Bad + Warning; comms: evict the parent + Degraded).
M2: device Unsupported read refusals return Refused (advance
LastSuccessfulRead); device write refusals call RecordWriteAnswered (not the
pre-send native type gate).
M3: a good write clears a Degraded a write comms fault recorded (a read-side
Degraded is still left for the read path).
M4: a superseded init throws AbCipInitializationSupersededException (not an
OCE); ShutdownAsync stamps Unknown only if no newer init published meanwhile.
M5: the sync-Dispose timing assert is 2 s against a 4 s probe read; the
unencodable-array test asserts health.
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Integration cases (both transports, skipped when the fixture is unreachable):
- H10: a typo'd probe tag leaves the host Running and a cold data tag created
after many probe ticks still reads Good;
- H1/L4: a missing tag reads BadNodeIdUnknown every poll beside a Good sibling,
the driver stays Healthy and LastSuccessfulRead advances even when only the
refused tag is read;
- U10 (AB_SERVER_ALLOW_WRITES=1): an int[16] written to TestArray (DINT[16])
reads back element for element through a fresh driver; a 15-element write is
BadOutOfRange.
Not run here: the 10.100.0.35:44818 fixture was down during this lane (Wave 4).
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
F10 follow-through: removing IDisposable outright broke a synchronous
drv.Dispose() call site outside this lane (Runtime.Tests
AbCipAlmaNativeAlarmEndToEndTests). The sync Dispose() is back, but it starts
the same teardown as DisposeAsync and returns instead of parking the caller on
DisposeAsync().AsTask().GetAwaiter().GetResult(); a background fault is
logged. The runtime still takes the IAsyncDisposable path (preferred, never
both).
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
L4 evidence over the real native runtime and a fake CIP target: a renamed tag
that is the device's only lease holder is created once and Forward-Opened once
across five polls, with no Forward Close, every poll BadNodeIdUnknown and the
driver Healthy.
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
P11: AbCipUdtReadPlanner called AbCipUdtMemberLayout.TryBuild(parent.Members)
for every member reference on every poll - O(members^2) per parent per tick,
a dictionary allocation each time. GetOrBuild caches the layout (including a
"not groupable" verdict) in a ConditionalWeakTable keyed by the member list's
identity, which is immutable for the life of the tag table; a re-init's new
lists replace the entries and the old ones are collected with them.
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
U10 (user decision: implement array encode now): config, the AdminUI and
discovery all advertised array tags Operate-writable, but both runtimes encoded
a scalar - an int[] threw InvalidCastException (BadTypeMismatch AND Degraded),
a scalar wrote element 0 natively, and libplctag re-sent its whole last-read
buffer with element 0 patched (stale elements 1..n-1).
- AbCipArrayCodec encodes count elements little-endian at the element width,
CONVERTING each element (ScadaBridge writes int[] to INT arrays; overflow is
BadOutOfRange, unconvertible BadTypeMismatch, both before anything is sent).
- The driver checks the shape before any runtime exists: not a list ->
BadTypeMismatch, length != elementCount -> BadOutOfRange, BOOL/STRING/
structure element types -> BadNotSupported; and, before sending, a controller
buffer that is not width x count -> BadTypeMismatch. Refusals warn once and
write no health.
- Native: ONE Write Tag of count elements with the controller's type code (the
client fragments a large one); libplctag: the codec's bytes copied into the
elem_count-sized buffer, refused TooSmall if it does not fit.
- IAbCipTagRuntime.EncodeArray (default: NotSupportedException).
Real-controller proof is a hardware userGate (see the lane report recipe).
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
U11: a scalar BOOL authored over Bits[n] requested element n and decoded
"any of bits 0-7 of the reply set", so Bits[n] read Good with the subscript
ignored. A Logix BOOL array is stored as DWORDs (0xD3) and its element segment
addresses them, so the native runtime now requests DWORD n / 32 and decodes bit
n % 32 when the controller answers 0xD3 (a plain BOOL reply still decodes its
byte). libplctag exposes no type code and so cannot say which DWORD it read: a
4-byte reply for such a tag is refused BadNotSupported (warned once) instead of
publishing a wrong value as Good. Real-controller proof is a hardware gate.
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
H19: Format/InvalidCast/Overflow on a client value never touched the wire but
latched Degraded; a good write set Healthy and so undid a Degraded the poll
loop had just recorded for other tags (the batch read path is worst-wins for
exactly this reason).
- The three conversion failures map to BadTypeMismatch/BadOutOfRange with a
once-per-tag Warning and no health write (AbLegacy's rule).
- A good write (scalar or bit RMW) advances LastSuccessfulRead only - the
device answered - and leaves the state alone.
- A write comms fault (thrown, or a non-refusal status word, which used to
write no health at all) is Degraded with LastSuccessfulRead preserved and
never downgrades Faulted.
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
H17: the .n read-modify-write hard-coded a DINT parent. On an INT or SINT host
(both legal in Logix, and reads of Flags.3 there already worked) the DINT
decode of a 2-byte buffer threw OutOfBounds, the generic catch evicted the BIT
tag's (non-existent) runtime and reported BadCommunicationError + Degraded.
The parent width now comes from the parent read's size (1 SINT / 2 INT /
4 DINT / 8 LINT; unknown keeps the DINT assumption). Narrow hosts use unsigned
arithmetic so a set top bit encodes without overflow; a bit past the host's
width is BadOutOfRange and a non-integer width BadTypeMismatch, both refused
before anything is written, warned once, no health write. A transport failure
in the RMW now evicts the parent runtime it actually used. Native end-to-end:
an INT host is written as ONE INT (type 0xC3, 2 bytes).
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
P8: on the native transport the bounded-parallel read window is also the cap
on services per Multiple Service Packet (the device's shared scheduler packs
whatever is queued, within the connection's request/reply byte budget), so the
default 8 cost a 1000-tag controller ~125 round trips per poll instead of ~10.
The effective window (AbCipDriver.ReadWindow) is now max(64, option) when the
native tag factory serves reads; libplctag and injected factories keep the
option exactly. Option doc + AdminUI help text updated (Razor: Wave 4 live
check).
P7 addendum: a work item now takes its window slot only after its runtime
exists. A cold create queues on its device's single-flight connect gate, and
holding a slot there let one dead device's backoff-expiry attempt occupy the
whole window for a full Timeout, stalling every other device's reads.
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Found by the H13 stress test (200 re-inits under a concurrent reader): a read
that resolved the device just before the table swap could cold-create a
runtime into the retired state after its teardown had disposed it (leaked
native handle / lease), and could hit a per-tag SemaphoreSlim the teardown had
disposed, which the generic catch reported as a comms fault (Degraded).
- DeviceState.Retire marks the state retired before disposing handles; each
handle is removed-then-disposed exactly once. A creator re-checks the flag
after its TryAdd (fenced, Dekker-paired with Retire) and disposes the orphan.
- A failure on a retired device is the teardown's doing: BadCommunicationError
for that one call, no evict, no health signal.
- Per-tag/RMW gates are no longer disposed (async-only waits hold no handle),
matching the ConnectGate rationale.
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
H10: the probe loop recorded EVERY exception - including the controller
answering NotFound for a typo'd or download-deleted Probe.ProbeTagPath - as a
Forward-Open failure. At a 5 s tick against a 30 s backoff cap ShouldAttempt
was never true again, so every cold or evicted data tag on a reachable device
read BadCommunicationError indefinitely and the host showed Stopped.
The probe now decides the backoff verdict and the host state separately:
- a device refusal (thrown or as a status word) is backoff success + host
Running + one Warning per device naming the probe tag; an initialised probe
runtime is kept so its lease is not re-opened every tick;
- a malformed probe tag name (AbCipTagConfigurationException) never reached
the device: no backoff signal, no host transition, one Warning;
- a genuine transport failure is unchanged (backoff failure, host Stopped).
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Re-review 1: HandleDispatch's terminal guard and its AwaitingApplyAcks flip read the row separately, so a
lost-dispatch closure committed between them was silently reopened. The flip now carries the RowVersion the
guard read; a change in between is a concurrency conflict (nothing seeded, nothing published, coordinator
reset). Pinned on real SQL Server with a closure injected between the two reads (fails without the fix).
AdminOps' apply deadline and the coordinator's now both read DeployTimings.ApplyDeadline, passed explicitly
to both singletons. Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols(.OpenIdConnect) pinned to 8.11.0 and referenced
directly by the Security project, so the whole IdentityModel family resolves 8.11.0 (fresh restore clean
of NU190x/NU1605).
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
H1/L4: one classification (AbCipRefusals.IsDeviceRefusal) of the statuses
that prove the controller answered - NotFound, OutOfBounds, NotAllowed,
TooLarge, TooSmall, TypeMismatch, Unsupported - shared by the data path, the
Test-Connect probe (IsReachableStatus widened) and the native runtime.
- A refused read/write (thrown or as a status word) is per-tag Bad with a
once-per-tag Warning, keeps the runtime (no evict, so no lease/Forward-Open
churn for a sole lease holder), writes no Degraded and, since the device
answered, advances LastSuccessfulRead without touching the state.
- A refused cold create records the backoff as reachable, so siblings are no
longer throttled for up to 30 s by one Arr[999].
- The native runtime completes InitializeAsync on any refusal (it used to on
TypeMismatch/Unsupported only) and reports it on every later read.
- A refused READ of NotAllowed reads BadNotReadable, not BadNotWritable.
- Test Connect names the refusal ("probe tag refused: OutOfBounds").
0x1C/0x20/0xFF-0x2104 still fold into BadReply inside Driver.Ab.Transport
(Lane K follow-up); they remain comms faults until mapped there.
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
H13: _devices/_devicesByRoutingKey are published by reference swap under a
lifecycle lock and never mutated after publish, so the retained poll engine,
discovery and the actor's GetHostStatuses pull never read a table mid-Clear.
Every retire (init's own release, shutdown, dispose) takes the table it
replaces, so ShutdownAsync racing DisposeAsync tears each state down once, and
a generation check makes an InitializeAsync overtaken by a shutdown publish
nothing (it throws OperationCanceledException) instead of resurrecting probe
loops behind the shutdown. Probe join is one bounded 5 s wait independent of
the caller token.
H21: _health is volatile and read-modify-write updates go through a CAS.
F10: the sync Dispose() (sync-over-async) is removed; DisposeAsync is the
complete, idempotent teardown the runtime calls after ShutdownAsync.
Refs #737
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Ruling refinement on I1. Only timeouts are strikes, so a never-returning
while(true), which times out once and is then only refused, was never
quarantined, and that defeated E1. A refusal now quarantines immediately
when the orphan it was refused behind has been executing for longer than
ScriptingOptions.StuckOrphanQuarantineFactor x the script's timeout
(default 10, so 20 s at the 2 s default; 0 or less disables it). It uses
the same quarantine path: one Error, otopcua.script.quarantined with
reason=stuck, Bad, lifted on source change or redeploy. A young orphan
(a short overrun) is still a plain refusal.
The guard stamps the run's start (Stopwatch timestamp) when the pool
picks it up and clears it when the run really finishes.
Tests: the 30-trigger while(true) regression (paced) now ends
quarantined with reason "stuck", still with exactly one orphan and a
healthy sibling. Positive control: a 2x overrun is refused, not
quarantined, and evaluates again once the orphan completes. A factor of
0 disables the rule. Docs (ScriptEditor "Runtime safety", VirtualTags)
and the seam remarks are updated.
Refs #734
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
BoundedApiKeyStore kept the set (volatile) and its DateTimeOffset stamp (non-volatile, 16 bytes) in separate
fields, so a reader could pair a new set with an old stamp or read a torn stamp; they are now one immutable
snapshot behind a volatile reference. An inner store that cannot list ids now switches the set off with a
per-instance flag instead of writing KnownIdSet = false into the shared ApiKeyStoreGuardOptions.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
RefreshAsync now tells "the store answered: no such secret" (revocation - drop the refreshed key AND the
lazily cached one) apart from "the read failed" (keep the previous key). Store reads fan out through
Parallel.ForEachAsync capped at MaxConcurrentRefreshReads = 8 instead of one read per cluster at once.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
The one-snapshot refactor re-sorted every collection in memory with an ordinal comparer, while the old
composer's SQL ORDER BY used the database's case-insensitive collation; mixed-case keys therefore re-hashed
an unchanged configuration (spurious drift fleet-wide, a "new" revision on a no-op redeploy). The snapshot
factory now reads every composed table ORDER BY its natural key server-side and Compose serialises in the
order given. Pinned byte-for-byte against a verbatim replica of the old composer on the real SQL Server.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
GalaxyTelemetryTests (ActivityListener) and GatewayGalaxyDataWriterFailClosedTests
(MeterListener, filtered only by meter and instrument name) observe every Galaxy span or
measurement in the process. They now run in a collection with parallelization disabled
(F-FU6), because a parallel driver test, or its background probe seed, polluted their counts.
The stream-cancel assertion in GalaxyDriverShutdownTests goes back to a bounded wait: the
instantaneous IsCompleted check introduced in round 1 was racy.
Refs #735
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Review fix round 2 for lane F:
- N1: the init platform seed no longer runs inline under the init token. Galaxy's Tier-A
Initialize budget is 5 s, and a cold gateway DiscoverHierarchy can spend all of it, so the
OperationCanceledException rethrow failed init, opened the Initialize breaker and cost a full
rebuild per retry. InitializeAsync now only resolves the platform source (no network) and
queues a background seed tied to a per-runtime CTS that the teardown cancels. A result that
lands after its runtime was torn down is discarded.
- N2: the seed worker serves the runtime that is live when each pass STARTS, so a request made
under a new runtime while a stale pass is in flight always gets a pass of its own.
- N3: SubscribeAsync and the subscribe-once read capture the runtime generation before
SubscribeBulk and register only if it is unchanged, atomically with the teardown's registry
Clear (_registryGate). On a mismatch they release the handles and fail the call. Re-subscribe
Rebind uses the same gate, and the production rebuild clears the registry unconditionally.
- PerPlatformProbeWatcher re-checks its stop after the SubscribeBulk await, atomically with
the record and publish. A pass that straddles StopAsync releases the handles it acquired
instead of writing the probe entry back into a cleared registry.
Refs #735
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
I7: a Dispatching row committed after the coordinator's PreStart whose Tell never arrived had no owner and
refused every later deploy. The in-flight check (now fully off the admin singleton's thread, serialised by the
actor-local compose flag alone) closes a Dispatching row with zero NodeDeploymentState rows that is past the
apply deadline as TimedOut (optimistic on RowVersion) and proceeds.
HandleDispatch ignores a dispatch for a Sealed/PartiallyFailed/TimedOut row, so a late or duplicated dispatch
cannot flip it back. Coordinator status/reason writes attach a key+RowVersion stub instead of loading the
multi-MB ArtifactBlob; proven on the real SQL Server (blob untouched, seal lands).
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
SQL Server's DbUpdateException for one duplicate names every entry in the statement batch, so detaching
ex.Entries dropped the whole flush. On a row-level rejection the writer now asks the database which of the
batch's EventIds it already holds, drops exactly those, re-saves the rest, and falls back to row-by-row only
if a non-duplicate row is still refused. Fresh context + entities per attempt. Pinned against the real
central SQL Server (new SqlServerTestDatabase harness) and a faithful whole-batch interceptor.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
- ScriptLogRateLimiter.LimitPerWindow. The ScriptLogTopicSink and
VirtualTagActor summaries now print the configured limit, not
DefaultLimitPerWindow. Tests assert "limit N/window" for a non-default
N.
- CalculationDriver.Dispose cancels, then takes _evalGate (bounded 2 s)
and disposes the gate and _evalCts. The pump and timer ticks enter the
gate through TryEnterEvalGateAsync, which stops cleanly once the
driver is disposed. Test: Dispose with a 6 s runaway run in flight
returns promptly, disposes both, and a late trigger is harmless.
- ScriptedAlarmEngine captures _shutdownToken once and disposes
_shutdownCts in Dispose when every drained task has completed. A task
stuck past the grace leaves the CTS to the GC. Lifecycle tests assert
the disposal.
- DraftValidator: CalculationNoEffectiveTrigger is skipped for a
change-triggered tag whose scriptId does not resolve. That case is
already CalculationScriptMissing or CalculationScriptNotFound, and
there are no reads to count. Both existing tests now assert the
absence (red before the change).
- docs/VirtualTags.md: System.Threading is denied as a whole namespace,
with an allow-list; the type list is now accurate (Unsafe,
RuntimeHelpers, and the ForbiddenMembers on System.Type); the resource
limits section covers the run guard and the allocation budget.
docs/ScriptEditor.md: accurate deny-list and a new "Runtime safety"
section covering timeout, refusal, quarantine after 3 timeouts,
allocation budget, lifting, and rate-limit summaries that appear only
on the source's next entry after a burst then quiet.
Refs #734
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
The window used to count every terminal row, so 50+ failed deploys pushed the last good artifact out of it.
Now the newest KeepSealed (>= 1) Sealed rows keep their blob, failed rows are prunable unless referenced in
the ReferencedDays window. Pinned: 60 TimedOut + 1 old Sealed -> Sealed retained, 60 TimedOut emptied.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
The fixture wedged EVERY write on one shared token-ignoring release gate, so
the later same-tag write was also hung, and the 300 ms pessimistic bound
abandoned it while the test was still polling before ReleaseWrites(). Its
reason was "write did not complete within" (the bound), not "queued for" (the
queue budget), and it had already entered the driver, so the tag had been
released. The release path is correct. Only the first write now hangs, and
later writes complete at once.
The abandon reason formatted the bound with TotalSeconds:F0, which printed a
300 ms bound as "0s". It now uses milliseconds, and the test asserts it.
Refs #731
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Coordinator ruling (I6): until ServiceLevel consumes IOpcUaEndpointState (F-C1), the probe must not sit on
the Active tier of a fused node, because Traefik routes the AdminUI on /health/active. Driver-only nodes keep
it on Ready + Active; admin-only nodes do not register it. Pinned per role.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
ServerAuthenticationStateProvider throws InvalidOperationException from GetAuthenticationStateAsync in any
scope where no circuit set its state (minimal-API requests, hosted-service scopes). The accessor now treats
that as "no circuit identity" and falls back to the HTTP principal. Pinned with the real provider on both
sides (unset -> HTTP fallback; set -> circuit principal wins).
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
The hand-rolled bearer handler is replaced by AddJwtBearer (Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer
10.0.7, pinned on the same servicing line as the other AspNetCore packages). Validation parameters come
from JwtTokenService.BuildValidationParameters, which now pins ValidAlgorithms = HS256 for both the
bearer scheme and TryValidate; MapInboundClaims is off so the minted Role/zb:username keys resolve.
/auth/token requires the cookie scheme, so a bearer can no longer mint a fresh token for itself.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
DependencyMuxActor retained the last value of every ref ever registered,
and never removed the entries. The continuous-historization recorder
registers every historized ref, so on a historizing node the map grew
with the historized address space and never shrank. The class remark
claimed a bound that did not hold.
- Retain only refs that at least one subscriber registered with
ReplayRetained: true names (VT actors, the Calculation mux adapter, the
scripted-alarm host). A non-opting subscriber is still delivered to but
retains nothing.
- When a ref's last replay-opting subscriber leaves, its value is kept
for a grace (default 2 min, Props(retentionGrace)) so a restart
(old adapter gone, new one not yet registered) still replays. A
periodic sweep then drops it along with the entry. Entries with no
subscriber and nothing retained are removed.
- New SourceRemoved(DriverInstanceId) evicts the values a removed driver
produced, so its last Good is never replayed. The mux records the
publishing driver per retained ref. No production sender exists yet:
DriverHostActor is outside this lane (follow-up).
- Remark rewritten. Tests: retention bounded to replay-opting refs,
release after grace (with an in-grace replay as the positive control),
SourceRemoved eviction, and the restart-replay scenario still green.
Refs #734
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
The writer concurrency fake parks on its release signal (the 300 ms delay could release the
gate early on a starved pool), the supervisor test's cross-thread hold flag is Volatile, and
the EffectiveTimeout doc now states the 1 s floor the code and tests implement.
Refs #735
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Review fix round 1 for lane F:
- The ScanState probe watcher is seeded at InitializeAsync from a platform-only
DiscoverHierarchy query (IGalaxyPlatformSource / GatewayGalaxyPlatformSource over the owned
repository client) and re-seeded on every deploy-watcher rediscovery. The runtime never
calls DiscoverAsync on a live driver, so per-platform host status was unreachable in
production. A failed fetch logs a Warning and never fails init; re-seeds coalesce so a
deploy during an in-flight pass still gets a pass that starts after it.
- EnsureEventPumpStarted refuses while the runtime is stopping, BEFORE reusing the live pump
(that pump belongs to the dying subscriber), and the production rebuild disposes any stale
pump before wiring the new subscriber.
- TeardownRuntimeAsync closes the MX session under the caller's token linked with a 5 s
SessionCloseDeadline, so a blackholed gateway cannot hold DriverInstanceActor.PostStop for 30 s.
- A runtime generation counter, bumped by every teardown, is re-checked before each Rebind
in ResubscribeAllAsync, so a replay-gap re-snapshot that straddles a teardown cannot
resurrect handles into the cleared registry.
Refs #735
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
The SDK's DisposeAsync closes with no token, i.e. under the 30 s DefaultCallTimeout, so a
blackholed gateway parked the driver's teardown for the whole of it. CloseAsync(ct) runs the
close under the caller's token, drops the channel on a cancelled/failed close (the gateway
reaps the session on its idle lease) and leaves the session re-openable. A close followed by
the final dispose closes the gateway session once.
Refs #735
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
- I1 ScriptRunGuard: a run refused because the previous one is still
executing is a Bad publish plus otopcua.script.run_refused, and no longer
a quarantine strike. Only a timeout (and an allocation breach) counts;
a refusal neither adds to nor resets the timeout streak; a completed run
(value or throw) resets it. On a 1 Hz trigger with a 2 s budget a single
4 s overrun is one timeout plus two refusals and must not quarantine.
Tests updated across the guard, the alarm engine, the Calculation
evaluator and the VT evaluator, plus
Refusals_neither_count_toward_nor_reset_the_timeout_streak.
- I3 ScriptedAlarmEngine: the quality bucket is tracked only after the
predicate completes (or in the inputs-not-ready path), so the tracked
bucket is the last one annotated. A refused or quarantined predicate
used to re-track the input bucket Good before the attempt and then flip
it Bad, emitting QualityChanged on every push. The run-guard tests now
count emissions (exactly 1 across N pushes, refused and quarantined
cases), with a healthy sibling's dispatch count as the positive control
that every push was processed. Both were red before the fix.
Refs #734
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
- RunWriteAsync wraps the invoker call in WaitAsync(writeTimeout) (Props,
default 10 s = 2x the 5 s write cap): a token-ignoring hung write now
answers BadTimeout, releases its slot and tag, and its orphan outcome
is observed and discarded - later writes to that tag reach the device.
- WriteCompleted carries the launching incarnation (from the process-wide
generation source); a late completion from a previous incarnation after
a supervision restart is ignored instead of freeing the new
incarnation's slot/tag.
- Test: a hung token-ignoring tag-a write is abandoned and a later tag-a
write reaches the device while the abandoned one is still inside it.
Refs #731
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
- GatewayHistorianDataSource.ReadRawWindowAsync keeps the cap + 1 probe budget
(budgetCap) separate from the client's cap: a strict-ceiling or crowding
refusal now reports Limit = the server cap that applied and advises setting
NumValuesPerNode at or below it (it said "lower NumValuesPerNode" with
Limit = cap + 1 to a client that sent 0).
- Fuzz: the oracle-source over-cap assertion was vacuous (cap 0 never counts);
it now checks no reverse window reached the forward-only shape. Class docs
name the post-floor cap set (3 ... 1000) and distinguish NumValuesPerNode
1 / 2 from the smallest server cap.
- HistoryPaging.IsFullPage doc says it judges the REQUEST cap (page + ties +
lookahead), which is finite under any limit; AdvertiseMaxReturnDataValues
swallows any exception (returns false for the caller to log), as its doc
promised.
Refs #736
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
BoundedApiKeyStore's negative cache was keyed by key id, so a flood of DISTINCT well-formed
otua_<random>_x credentials missed it every time and cost one SQL query per attempt under the
SDK's SessionManager-wide lock, no credential needed (R03:3.3).
- IApiKeyStore.ListKeyIdsAsync (default null = unsupported; ConfigDbApiKeyStore lists every
ApiKeyId): the bounded store keeps a known-id set refreshed every StoreCacheSeconds
(single-flight, failed refresh keeps the previous set) and refuses an unknown id without a store
read ({outcome=unknown_id}).
- A process-wide miss budget (token bucket, Security:ApiKeys:MissBurst=100 /
MissRefillPerSecond=20, ApiKeyStoreGuardOptions) bounds lookups that reach the store and miss
while no set is available; a hit refunds its token. Per-endpoint accounting needs the
OpcUaServer impersonation seam to carry the client address — follow-up.
- docs/security.md: the new knobs, and the known-cluster gate's documented fail-open window at
central boot (R03:4.2) plus the async PSK refresh (R03:3.4).
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
- Writes: a second write to a tag already inside the driver waits in the
queue behind it (_tagsInFlight) while other tags still run under the
cap of 4; queued writes are stamped and failed BadTimeout at dequeue
once older than the 8 s host Ask budget (Props queuedWriteBudget)
instead of being written late.
- Initialise attempts are bounded pessimistically (initializeTimeout,
default 30 s = 2x Tier C) on top of the invoker's token-only timeout:
an overrun is logged as abandoned, reported InitializeFailed so the
retry loop continues, and its late result is dropped by generation.
Generations come from a process-wide Interlocked counter so a prior
incarnation's late result cannot collide (F6).
- PostStop shares one shutdownTimeout budget across shutdown + dispose.
- TelemetryDialSupervisor cancels the establishment deadline on
StreamStopped; FleetDiagnosticsClient builds the ActorSelection inside
the try (a malformed node degrades to "unavailable"); the diagnostics
page labels the column "Last health publish".
- Tests: same-tag serialisation with a distinct-tag positive control;
stale queued write BadTimeout; token-ignoring hung init -> later
attempt connects; stopwatch assertion demoted to a ceiling.
Refs #731
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
Joseph Doherty