Driver.Mqtt.Transport-002 (Low, correctness). Credentials were attached only
when Username was non-empty, so a config carrying a Password and no Username
connected anonymously with the secret silently discarded — the deployment reads
as authenticated and is not, which is the direction an operator cannot see from
the config.
Warned rather than sent. MQTT 3.1.1 may not carry a password without a
username, so the password-only CONNECT is not available on every protocol
version this factory serves, and synthesizing one under V500 only would change
the wire behaviour of deployments that connect happily today. The configured
values stay authoritative; the drop just stops being silent. The secret is
never formatted into the message.
Tests: the warning fires and does NOT contain the password, plus the falsifying
control that an ordinary anonymous config (neither credential set) stays silent
— without it the fix could warn on every connect and still pass.
Five MQTT tracker items — four AdminUI/authoring defects plus the .Browser
layering exception. No runtime driver behaviour changes.
#513 payloadFormat in a Sparkplug blob. MqttTagConfigModel.ToJson wrote the key
unconditionally. Sharper than the issue states: PayloadFormat is the one Plain
field with a NON-NULLABLE typed backing, so the write did not preserve a retyped
tag's leftover — it INVENTED "payloadFormat":"Json" in a Sparkplug tag that never
had one. Now Plain-only; preserve-unknown-keys is pinned unchanged.
#509 slashed Sparkplug metric names. The mapper already carried metricName
verbatim; only the tag Name (a RawPath segment) tripped RawPaths.ValidateSegment,
which refused the batch whole — including Node Control/Rebirth, mandatory on
every Sparkplug edge node. ToRawSegment coerces the Name and leaves the address
untouched. Coercion is not injective, so DescribeNameCollisions refuses a
colliding set BY NAME: silently merging two metrics into one tag would be worse
than the refusal it replaces. Applies to every driver, not just MQTT — the
argument is about what a Name is, not about who produced it. The sanitiser is
pinned against RawPaths.ValidateSegment rather than a copied charset.
#510 stale rebirth affordance. _canRebirth was probed once at browse-open and
sessions are reaped for idleness, so a modal left open offered an action whose
token no longer resolved. Re-probed on arm AND on confirm (the reap can land
between the two, and confirm is the one path that publishes to a live broker);
the affordance retires with an explanation instead of vanishing or erroring.
#514 rebirth on a quiet plant. The tree is birth-driven and births are never
retained, so a plant that birthed before the window opened showed an empty tree —
and the scope came only from a tree selection, so the one action that would fill
the tree could not be armed. The session already accepted a bare {group}/{edgeNode}
("the prime rebirth target"); this adds the affordance. Edge-node scope only, not
a group broadcast. The rule is extracted to SparkplugRebirthScope so it is
testable — this repo has no bUnit — and is advisory: the session re-resolves and
refuses before publishing.
#512 .Browser -> .Driver layering. TWO extractions were needed, not the one the
issue anticipated: it costed this as "the client-options builder", but the browse
session decodes births itself, so moving only that would have left the reference
exactly where it was.
- MqttClientOptionsFactory (TLS, PEM CA-pin validator, credentials, protocol
mapping) -> new leaf .Transport project. NOT .Contracts: that is deliberately
transport-free and MqttClientOptions is an MQTTnet type, so .Contracts would
hand MQTTnet to ControlPlane. This is the fix the .Browser csproj comment had
already prescribed, against the issue's suggestion.
- The Sparkplug protocol layer (SparkplugTopic/MessageType, SparkplugCodec,
RebirthRequester) -> .Contracts, beside the Tahu wire schema it encodes.
Still exactly one copy of the TLS/CA-pin logic; MqttBrowserLayeringTests guards
the graph both ways.
Measured, not assumed: Driver.Mqtt.dll, Polly.Core and Serilog are now absent
from the AdminUI's output. Core.dll remains, because Driver.Sql.Browser has the
SAME violation, undocumented — the old comment blamed this browser for Core and
was wrong. Filed separately rather than fixed in passing.
Full suite green apart from the 7 known pre-existing failures (4 AbLegacy
integration, compose profiles not up; 3 Host.IntegrationTests).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
MQTTnet 5 does not throw on an unsuccessful CONNACK — it returns the reason in
MqttClientConnectResult.ResultCode and v5 removed v4's ThrowOnNonSuccessfulConnectResponse,
so ConnectCoreAsync's unconditional SetState(Connected) sealed a wrong-password deployment
green: DriverState.Healthy / HostState.Running on a session that never authenticated.
Caught by the Task-13 Mosquitto fixture; 240 offline tests missed it.
ConnectCoreAsync now inspects the CONNACK and raises MqttConnectRejectedException.
Credentials/identity/protocol/Last-Will refusals are unrecoverable and set Faulted, which
stops the reconnect supervisor; transient refusals (ServerUnavailable, ServerBusy,
QuotaExceeded, UseAnotherServer, ConnectionRateExceeded, and anything unrecognised) stay
Reconnecting under backoff. MqttDriverProbe now shares the rejection wording, so the
AdminUI Test-connect button and the running driver can no longer disagree.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
Closes the connect-vs-connect defect: MQTTnet throws (and raises no DisconnectedAsync)
on a connect-while-connected, so a caller's ConnectAsync and the reconnect supervisor
corrupted each other in both directions. Both paths now check first; when the supervisor
finds the session already restored it stands down WITHOUT firing Reconnected.
Reconnected becomes Func<CancellationToken, Task>, fed from the lifetime token and capped
at ConnectTimeoutSeconds, so a hung re-subscribe can no longer park the supervisor.
Connected is published only after the re-subscribe succeeds; a supervisor that dies now
reports Faulted instead of Reconnecting forever.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
Review follow-ups on MqttConnection (Task 3):
- Every certificate test asserted rejection, so the accept branch was
unreachable-by-regression. Adds a leaf genuinely issued by the pinned CA and
asserts acceptance.
- ValidateAgainstPinnedCa never seeded ChainPolicy.ExtraStore from the incoming
chain, so a leaf behind an intermediate delivered during the handshake failed
despite a legitimate path to the pinned root. Seeds from both the incoming
chain's elements and its ExtraStore; CustomRootTrust still means only the
pinned roots may terminate the chain.
- A DisposeAsync racing an in-flight connect escaped as an unclassified
exception; it now folds into ObjectDisposedException.
- Promotes the single-caller concurrency invariant into the type remarks, with
the accurate blast radius (a leaked live connection, not a benign throw).
Serialising the lifecycle remains Task 4's job.
- X509Chain.Build can throw; an exception escaping a TLS validation callback is
an opaque handshake crash, so it is caught and refused.
- Adds a connect-retry test (Task 4's reconnect loop reuses the instance) and a
disposed-then-connect test.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
Joseph Doherty