ClusterRoleInfo resolved the leader address through Cluster.State.Members, which is
published asynchronously; a miss stored null permanently, so RoleLeader(role) stayed null
(flaky test timed out under load: 6/10 failing with CPU contention, 0/20 after). Only the
address is ever read, so store it directly. Adds a deterministic unit test (fails without
the fix) and InternalsVisibleTo for the Cluster.Tests project.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
options.Roles is unconditionally overwritten by AddOtOpcUaCluster's PostConfigure to equal
EffectiveRoles.Gossiped (T2's own structural-identity fix), so comparing options.Roles against
Gossiped could never observe a divergence — an overlay setting Cluster:Roles was silently
ignored, not fail-start. The validator now injects IConfiguration and re-reads the raw
Cluster:Roles section LIVE (reflecting any overlay applied after EffectiveRoles was first
resolved), normalized through EffectiveRoles.Resolve for reuse of its own validation.
AddOtOpcUaCluster now TryAddSingleton(configuration) so a bare ServiceCollection test harness
(not just WebApplicationBuilder) can supply IConfiguration to the validator.
Both guard tests rewritten to go through the real AddOtOpcUaCluster + PostConfigure pipeline
over a live ConfigurationManager, simulating an overlay as a second provider added AFTER
EffectiveRoles was resolved off the same object — exactly Program.cs's own sequencing. Confirmed
red beforehand: the "changes" test failed to throw against the pre-fix validator.
With Security:Acl:Enabled=true, a session holding any grant narrower than
Cluster could not browse the served address space at all — confirmed by the
live gate.
Mechanism. Both realm trees hang under ONE anchor folder minted in
CreateAddressSpace: NodeId("OtOpcUa", <raw ns>). ResolveParentFolder parents
every top-level raw folder AND every top-level UNS area under it, and the
Browse override throws BadUserAccessDenied for the WHOLE call when its source
node is denied. DataPlaneAuthorizer.BuildScope split that identifier like a
path, producing {Kind: Raw, Segments: ["OtOpcUa"]} — but trie grant paths are
["raw", <RawPath segments…>] and "OtOpcUa" is never a path segment, so
PermissionTrie.HasBrowseTransit failed at the realm-child lookup and
CollectMatches yielded only Cluster-scoped grants. Deny, at the front door.
The trie already handled a zero-segment scope as "the realm root, itself an
ancestor of everything granted in that realm" (PermissionTrie.cs:101-118) —
no production path had ever produced that scope. This wires it up.
- V3NodeIds.SharedRootFolderId names the anchor identity; CreateAddressSpace
now mints the NodeId/BrowseName/DisplayName from it (behaviour-identical,
makes the coupling explicit).
- BuildScope maps that identifier (realm-qualified to Raw — in the UNS
namespace s=OtOpcUa is an ordinary Area) onto the zero-segment Raw scope.
- Evaluate adds a second-realm OR-leg for Browse on the anchor only: it fronts
both trees, so a principal whose only Browse grant lives in the UNS tree
still enters through this raw node. Browse only; transit confers navigation,
never read/write/subscribe.
- No trie, evaluator or builder change. No reordering above the decision cache
— key revocation is still re-checked before the lookup — and the cache key
is unchanged (the combined verdict caches under the anchor's own
identifier/realm; a generation advance clears it).
Falsifications actually run (implement-then-revert-the-line, plus one
genuine red-first):
- DataPlaneAuthorizerTests: the 7 new facts were written BEFORE the fix and 4
went red (the 3 deny-only ones passed vacuously, as a deny-only test must).
- Deleting the UNS OR-leg reddens exactly one fact,
The_shared_root_folder_is_browsable_on_a_uns_only_browse_grant (26/27 pass).
- Dropping the realm qualification from IsSharedRootFolder reddens exactly
A_uns_area_named_like_the_anchor_gets_no_anchor_semantics. Its first draft
did NOT catch this — a raw-only grant is refused either way; the
discriminating grant had to be an unrelated UNS one, whose own transit marks
the zero-segment UNS scope the un-qualified mapping would land on.
- Disabling the BuildScope anchor branch reddens the new end-to-end fact
NodeManagerStage6EnforcementTests.The_shared_root_folder_is_browsable_on_a_narrow_grant_and_still_filters
(real booted server, real Browse dispatch: BadUserAccessDenied on the whole
call), which also pins that the reference filter still withholds the
non-granted sibling.
- Core PermissionTrieBrowseTransitTests gains 3 characterization facts pinning
the previously-dead realm-root branch (transit true for the granting realm's
root, false for the other realm's, false without the Browse bit). These were
green on arrival — the trie was always correct; nothing called it.
Tests: Core 351 -> 354 passed; OpcUaServer 482 -> 490 passed. Build clean.
TagConfigJson.ClassifyEnumText classified via Enum.TryParse(text, ignoreCase: true),
which accepts a numeric STRING for any enum: "1" returns the member at that ordinal
and an out-of-range "99" parses just as happily. Every driver contract's strict enum
read inherits that, so a Sql tag authored "type":"99" was ACCEPTED, carried
(DriverDataType)99, and SqlPollReader.TryCoerce fell through its switch to the String
arm — a stringified cell published Good under a type nothing can map.
Refuse a digit- or sign-leading spelling before the parse (judged on the TRIMMED text,
because Enum.TryParse trims), and require Enum.IsDefined — which covers what the
leading-character check cannot, since TryParse also ORs a comma-separated list for a
non-[Flags] enum. Mirrors RawBrowseCommitMapper.ParseNativeType and
MTConnectTagDefinitionFactory.TryParseDataType, which already guard their own parses.
Three AdminUI restatements of the same rule now ask ClassifyEnumText instead of
Enum.TryParse (TagConfigJson.GetEnum, SqlTagConfigModel.ReadEnumStrict,
MqttTagConfigModel.DescribeInvalidEnum/GetEnumNullable) — leaving them would have opened
the #549 direction the moment the runtime tightened: a blob the modal accepts and the
driver skips.
RED first: 10 failing in Core.Abstractions.Tests, 4 in Driver.Sql.Tests, and 10 of the
11 new fleet-wide parity cases (re-confirmed by reverting the Core fix).
The connect path was the one capability call the resilience pipeline never
saw, so a driver that could not connect contributed zero breaker input and
the /hosts resilience panel read 'All targets healthy' against a dead
endpoint. InitializeAsync now routes through the invoker as
DriverCapability.Initialize, keyed on the driver-instance id.
- No pipeline retry: the actor's RetryConnect timer is the retry loop
(parser forces retryCount overrides to 0, same funnel as write-shaped).
- Breaker threshold 2, not the Read-sized 5: the breaker samples 30 s and
the reconnect timer fires every 10 s, so at most three attempts fit one
window — threshold 5 could never open. Pinned by its own test.
- An open breaker fast-fails into the same InitializeFailed path as a real
connect failure; the 15 s break window costs at most one extra tick.
The best-effort teardown ShutdownAsync stays unwrapped.
- Companion fix: DriverCapabilityInvokerFactory.Create now invalidates the
instance's tracker snapshots with its pipelines — a respawn during an
outage discarded the only breaker whose OnClosed could clear the OPEN
flag, stranding a false 'Breaker OPEN' chip forever.
Live gate PASSED on docker-dev (image symbol-verified per container):
rtu-gate against dead 10.100.0.35:5021 opened its Initialize breaker on
both centrals with the red 'BREAKER OPEN' chip on /hosts; a socat
5021→5020 forwarder recovered it (both breakers closed within 1 s, panel
back to 'All targets healthy'); healthy MAIN-modbus recorded zero breaker
events. Full suite 50/50 green. Evidence:
docs/plans/2026-08-07-adminui-followups-and-live-gates.md §7.
MeshGrpcBoundaryTests replaces the MeshClusterClientBoundaryTests deleted in step 1. Three
self-seeded single-member clusters sharing the ActorSystem name, joined ONLY by gRPC, driving
the REAL CentralCommunicationActor -> MeshGrpcCommandDialer -> Kestrel h2c ->
MeshCommandAuthInterceptor -> NodeCommandGrpcService -> NodeCommunicationActor -> EventStream:
1. No_cross_mesh_Akka_association_forms_between_central_and_either_site — the program's own
point, kept as a test rather than a live-gate note: each cluster stays single-member and
none ever holds another's address as a member.
2. One_dispatch_through_central_reaches_a_node_in_every_cluster_mesh — the fan, with each
site holding its OWN per-cluster PSK, so a dial that selected the wrong cluster's key
would be refused at the far side.
3. Falsifiability_control_a_dial_carrying_the_wrong_cluster_key_delivers_nothing — without
it, (2) cannot distinguish "the gRPC boundary carried it" from "something else in the
process did". The same node then accepts the right key, so the silence is the auth gate
and not a dead endpoint.
All three run fully offline — no Docker fixture — and pass.
Comment sweep across every remaining clusterclient|receptionist hit in src/ and tests/:
the program label becomes "mesh gRPC command plane", and every comment that described the
deleted transport as live now describes what actually runs (Dps = pair-local default,
Grpc = cross-mesh). mesh_transport.proto's header/service comments are reworded; no message,
field or enum is touched — the contract is locked. MeshCommActorPathTests is reshaped rather
than retired: the two paths still exist and still matter, but what a mismatch costs is now a
misleading Unavailable from the gRPC ingress rather than a silently dropped receptionist send.
The only surviving mentions of the old names are the ones that must survive: the fail-closed
rules that name "ClusterClient" as a retired value refused at boot, their tests, and this
test class's own account of what it replaces.
MeshTransportOptions.ModeClusterClient is gone. MeshTransportOptionsValidator accepts Dps or
Grpc and nothing else, so a node left carrying the string "ClusterClient" is now REFUSED at
boot naming MeshTransport:Mode and both remaining values — deliberately fail-closed rather
than falling back to Dps, which on a split-topology node would deliver nothing at all. A new
fact pins exactly that.
SplitTopologyTransportValidator tightens from an allow-list of two to Grpc only, as its own
comment said it would once ClusterClient was deleted. Dps on a cluster-role node stays
refused; the rule is still an explicit allow-list, so a typo'd mode fails too.
Tests: the two ClusterClient-mode facts in MeshTransportOptionsValidatorTests are deleted
(their Dps siblings already assert the same rule for the one remaining non-Grpc mode), the
SplitTopology fixtures move to Grpc, and the three-mode Theories in
ControlPlaneStarterOrderTests / CentralCommunicationActorTests become two-mode.
The property, the four validator rules that graded it (empty / non-akka.tcp / actor-path
suffix / one-bad-among-good) and all twelve docker-compose entries (6 nodes x 2) are gone.
The compose comment blocks that explained "/system/receptionist is appended at construction
time" and the client's contact rotation go with them, and the surrounding prose now
describes the Grpc command plane it actually runs.
CentralGrpcEndpoints' doc no longer says it "replaces" the Akka contact points — there is
nothing left to replace — and ContactRefreshSeconds' failure message names the node
dispatch set rather than the ClusterClient contact points.
`rg CentralContactPoints src tests docker-dev` is now empty.
akka.extensions loses ClusterClientReceptionistExtensionProvider and the whole
akka.cluster.client block (buffer-size / reconnect-timeout / receptionist.role) goes with
it. The DistributedPubSub extension and the maximum-frame-size / log-frame-size-exceeding
canary both stay — DPS is the pair-local transport and the frame canary guards every
remoting message, neither of which the cross-mesh deletion touches.
MeshTransportHoconTests drops its three ClusterClientSettings/ClusterReceptionistSettings
asserts and keeps the frame-size pin and the DPS-extension pin, renamed since it no longer
has a receptionist to survive alongside.
Two review items from Task 1B.1, both diagnostic:
1. CentralCommandGrpcService's "actor not ready" Warning omitted the peer and
the correlation id while the decode-failure Warning six lines above carried
both. These are the only two ways an ack fails to reach the coordinator, and
an operator has to correlate either against the node's own log. Decoding has
already succeeded on this path, so the DECODED correlation id is free.
2. A fused driver,admin,cluster-MAIN node under Mode=Grpc owes BOTH validator
surfaces at once (driver keys AND ConfigServe:GrpcListenPort). The two blocks
are independent `if`s; chained as `else if` a fused central node would be
graded on one surface only and boot with nowhere for any ack to land. Pinned
from both sides plus the fully-configured pass.
Found on the docker-dev live gate, not in tests. Two drivers that faulted
during initialise (rtu-gate, opcua1) each rendered "0 tags" on /hosts against
two authored tags apiece, because a ledger that had never committed returned
SkippedTagReport.Empty.
A zero report is a positive claim -- "this driver skipped nothing" -- and
making it on behalf of a driver that never got as far as looking is exactly
the quiet inaccuracy #541 exists to remove. GetSkippedTags() and
SkippedTagLedger.Snapshot() now return null until the first committed build,
so the column renders the same em-dash it already used for a driver that
cannot report at all. Both are 'no answer'; neither is 'nothing skipped'.
Knock-on: a FOCAS driver whose only init threw now reports null rather than a
zero report, which is strictly more honest than the assertion the test
originally made.
A driver builds its RawPath -> definition table at init and tolerates a
per-tag miss: an unmappable TagConfig, an unparseable address, a
capability-matrix rejection. That tolerance is right -- one bad tag must not
take down the other few thousand. What was missing is any statement of the
fact afterwards. A skip is not an error and happens before any read, so the
driver stays Healthy, errors/5 min stays 0, Last error stays empty, and Last
read advances live off the tags that did map. On the wonder Makino in #540
that reading held while focas-z-34184 ignored 20 of its 22 tags.
New optional capability ISkippedTagReporter, backed by a shared
SkippedTagLedger so the reset/commit/cap rules are one implementation rather
than one per driver. The report -- authored count, exact skipped count, and a
capped sample of RawPath + reason -- rides DriverHealthChanged to a new Tags
column on /hosts, over the Phase 5 telemetry stream. No table: a driver-only
node has no ConfigDb to write to, the lesson from #521.
The issue named eight drivers. It is twelve -- every driver in
DriverTypeNames.All has an authored-tag skip path. Calculation (no scriptId),
MTConnect (no readable DataItem id), Galaxy (no attributeRef) and OpcUaClient
(no nodeId) were unlisted, and OpcUaClient's was the quietest of the twelve:
NamespaceMap drops such an entry with a bare `continue` and not even a log
line. SkippedTagReporterFleetTests pins the invariant reflectively over every
IDriver in src/Drivers/, so a thirteenth cannot re-introduce the silence.
Sql drops a tag at TWO points and its report is the union of both: a blob
that does not map, AND an identifier the 8.1 catalog gate rejects against the
live catalog. The second is what schema drift produces -- a renamed column, a
dropped view -- months after a deployment sealed green, and reporting only
the first would have that driver claim "0 skipped" while polling half its
tags, which is worse than reporting nothing because the column would then be
actively reassuring.
Deliberately additive to driver state, never a change of it. Latching
non-Healthy for a config problem would satisfy both halves of the #527
comms-loss conjunction -- 90 s without a successful read AND non-Healthy --
and a driver whose tags were ALL skipped has no successful reads by
construction, so it would reconnect-loop forever against a healthy device.
Three details that are load-bearing rather than incidental:
- The skip digest is part of the publish fingerprint. A skipped tag leaves
every other fingerprint component identical to a clean driver's, so without
it PublishHealthSnapshot's dedup swallows exactly the publish carrying the
signal -- the trap that already bit the rediscovery and host-status
channels. The digest covers the sample, not just the counts: a redeploy
that fixes one tag and breaks another leaves both counts unchanged.
- The count is exact; only the sample is capped, and the tooltip says so when
it is showing fewer than it counted. A truncated list that looked complete
would have an operator fix twenty tags and believe the job done.
- The ledger stages and commits, so an init that throws part-way leaves the
previous report standing. A partial snapshot would read as "we now skip
fewer tags", the opposite of the truth.
The proto field needs no companion presence flag, unlike host_statuses: a
singular message field carries real presence in proto3, and a has_ flag would
collide with protoc's generated HasSkippedTags.
Verified red-first three ways: dropping SkippedTagDigest from the fingerprint
fails the two dedup tests, removing the seam from one driver fails the fleet
guard, and dropping the catalog-gate leg fails the Sql union test. Full
solution builds with zero new warnings against 4e22f024.
A browse-committed AB CIP / TwinCAT / FOCAS tag bound with its model's DEFAULT
data type, not the one the device reported. A browsed REAL committed as
`{"tagPath":"Pump_1_Speed","dataType":"DInt"}` — and those three drivers decode
the wire bytes by that field, not by the raw row's OPC UA DataType — so the tag
read four bytes of a float through an integer decoder and published a plausible
wrong number with no error raised anywhere. FOCAS was missed when #536 was filed.
The type is CARRIED, not derived. Reverse-mapping the leaf's driver-agnostic
DriverDataType looks like the smaller fix and is wrong: SInt/Int/DInt/USInt/UInt
all collapse into Int32 on the way out of the driver, so that version would bind
a 16-bit INT as a 32-bit DINT while appearing to fix the REAL. Drivers now state
their own type name on DriverAttributeInfo.NativeDataType, which reaches the
picker as AttributeInfo.AddressFields["dataType"] and the commit mapper from
there. A leaf that states nothing keeps the model default — the pre-#536
behaviour, kept deliberately as the fallback rather than a guess.
Numeric strings are refused before parsing: Enum.TryParse accepts "9" for any
enum and Enum.IsDefined then confirms it, so an unguarded parse would bind a tag
to a type nobody named. A test caught this in the first version of the guard.
--- and the other half, which the fixture was hiding ---
Test Connect on a device with NO authored tags — every AB CIP device at the
moment an operator first presses the button — reported "CIP handshake failed"
against a healthy controller. That was written down as a fixture limitation
("ab_server doesn't implement @raw_cpu_type"). Both halves of that were wrong:
* @raw_cpu_type is not a libplctag special tag at all (only @raw, @tags and
@udt/ are), so it goes out as an ordinary symbolic name that no controller
defines, and the controller's "tag does not exist" IS the successful answer.
* ab_server answered an unresolvable tag path with CIP 0x03 where a Logix
controller answers 0x04 — ErrorBadParam vs ErrorNotFound, which the probe
classifies oppositely. Fixed in vendored patch 0002.
* With the fixture then telling the truth, the real defect surfaced:
AbCipDriverProbe.IsReachableException matched the native C status spellings
("STATUS_NOT_FOUND"), but libplctag.NET throws with the MANAGED enum name
("ErrorNotFound"). Those substrings can never match, so the reachable
classification could not fire on the exception path — which is the path every
no-authored-tags probe takes. This was failing on real hardware too, not just
against the sim. It now recovers the Status and defers to IsReachableStatus,
so there is one classification rather than two that can drift.
Rejected: switching the fallback to @tags. libplctag builds a tag-listing tag
with NO network I/O, so it reports OK against any TCP listener — measured green
against a Mosquitto broker.
Verification: full solution suite green. Falsification runs confirm exactly the
intended tests go red — 9 for the type carry, 3 (the reachable statuses only) for
the probe classification. Live on docker-dev: browse-committed TestString/
Motor_Run/TestSINT now store String/Bool/SInt, alongside last session's
Pump_1_Speed still holding the wrong DInt. TestSINT is the falsifier — its row
DataType is Int32, identical to TestDINT's, so no reverse map could have produced
"SInt".
Known consequence: pre-existing browse-committed tags keep their wrong dataType;
the fix applies to new commits only.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Completes data-plane enforcement behind Security:Acl:Enabled. Read (every
attribute, not just Value), Browse, TranslateBrowsePath, CreateMonitoredItems,
SubscribeToEvents and SetMonitoringMode now consult scoped NodeAcl grants.
With the flag off nothing changes.
Four things went beyond the stage as written, each because leaving it out
would have made the feature look like it worked:
- Browse needed ancestor visibility. The trie inherits downward, and a client
reaches a deep node by browsing the nodes above it, so without this every
grant narrower than the cluster was authored, shipped and unreachable. It is
a separate non-inheriting marker, NOT a synthesized Browse grant on each
ancestor: the additive downward walk would carry such a grant from Plant onto
Plant/Siemens/dev9 and every other sibling subtree. Pinned by a test that
goes through the evaluator — probing the trie helper directly passes against
the broken design, because a sibling is absent from the trie either way.
- Revocation had to reach LIVE subscriptions. Every other operation re-asks per
request; a subscription is authorized once and then streams, and streaming is
how machine consumers actually read this server — so stopping only the
re-asking operations would have made revocation close to cosmetic.
IDataPlaneAuthoritySource gained a Changed event.
A denied item is queued BadUserAccessDenied and then DETACHED from its
MonitoredNode2 fan-out, not set MonitoringMode.Disabled. Disabling discards
the item's queued notifications, so the client is silenced without ever being
told why. The over-the-wire test caught this; the unit-level path reports the
item as stood down either way. Detaching is also reversible, so a restored
grant resumes the feed with no client action.
- The decision cache holds the grant WALK, not the decision. Grants and the
trie are fixed for a generation; a key's ExpiresUtc passes with the clock, so
caching the whole decision would let an expired key keep working until the
next deploy — the stage-5 open-session hole in a subtler form.
- TranslateBrowsePath is gated, without which browse filtering is decorative: a
client refused a browse asks TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds for the same path.
Found en route: UserAuthorizationState's staleness ceiling couples two clocks.
MembershipResolvedUtc is stamped from DataPlaneAuthorizer's TimeProvider while
IsStale is evaluated against TriePermissionEvaluator's; they are the same
instance in production and diverge the moment anything injects a test clock, at
which point the evaluator denies EVERYTHING with a verdict indistinguishable
from "no grant matched". Stage 5's claim that these predicates cannot fire was
accidentally true; they are now disabled explicitly.
Also fixed: ContinuationPoint.NodeToBrowse is the manager HANDLE, not a
NodeState. The declared type is object, so the wrong cast compiled cleanly and
silently yielded null — skipping the browse source gate entirely.
Falsified: disabling the transit marking reddens exactly the three tests that
assert transit works; implementing transit as an ancestor grant reddens the
sibling-leak test; skipping the fan-out detach reddens the revocation test.
Full solution suite green.
The stage 8 live gate has NOT run yet.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
`Security:Acl:Enabled` (default false) makes scoped `NodeAcl` grants decide
data-plane authorization at the three seams that have one, and gives HistoryRead
a check it never had. Read, Browse and Subscribe stay ungated — stage 6.
The ACL decision REPLACES the server-wide role check rather than chaining with
it. Chained, a grant would have to confer the role as well as pass the scope
check, and only Cluster-scoped grants confer a role — so every narrow grant
would have stayed inert and the flag would have looked inert too. The
load-bearing test is an ALLOW: a session carrying no roles at all writing
successfully on the strength of its grant. A deny-only test passes against a
build where the ACL is never consulted, because the role gate denies too.
Found en route: the principal never reached the session. The authenticator
passed it as OpcUaUserAuthResult.DisplayName, but RoleCarryingUserIdentity
derives DisplayName from the presented token — for a key-bearing client that is
the static username `apikey`, identical fleet-wide. So the trie's matching key
was dropped at the identity boundary, and the audit ClientUserId on a rejected
write recorded `apikey` for every consuming system. Principal and ApiKeyId are
now carried explicitly.
Beyond the stage as sketched:
- Revocation reaches an OPEN session. Every decision re-checks the
authenticating key against the current snapshot; without it a key revoked by a
deployment kept its authority until the client chose to reconnect, which for a
machine-to-machine consumer can be indefinitely.
- UserAuthorizationState is built per CALL, not per session. The per-session
shape exists so an LDAP session can re-resolve membership that changed out of
band; nothing can change out of band under API keys, so the generation stamp is
the whole invalidation signal and a per-call record picks it up for free.
IsStale/NeedsRefresh therefore cannot fire here and are documented as vestigial.
- The trie is built inside DataPlaneAuthorityState.Apply, under the same
generation as the snapshot, rather than by a second wiring at the publish
actor. An uninstalled trie denies everything — indistinguishable from working
enforcement. Deleting the install turns 13 of the 22 new tests red.
- The deploy log reports what the BUILD dropped instead of re-deriving it. The
old count agreed with the builder on one of its four drop reasons; a rule with
a blank ScopeId, a retired scope kind, or a path not starting at a realm
vanished with the log reading zero.
Both IApiKeyStore implementations widened to the full grant set. The narrowing
was redundant — ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper applies the same filter itself — and
became a trap once scope was enforced. Pinned by asserting the roles are
unchanged, with the two grants carrying different flags so it cannot pass by
accident.
Falsified by mutation: enforcement never engaging, the write seam ignoring the
ACL, the realm dropped from the scope, the revocation check removed, and the
trie never installed each turn the intended tests red and no others.
Full solution suite green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Two independent defects surfaced in review of #520 stage 3.
#532 — Cluster:Roles had no OTOPCUA_ROLES fallback, despite two doc sites
promising one. A node configured only through the env var — which drives ALL of
Program.cs's conditional wiring, so it reads as the authoritative knob — bound an
empty Roles array and joined the cluster carrying no Akka roles at all. It ran,
served, and logged nothing wrong, while central reported "no driver-role nodes
are Up" and every deployment to it timed out. Not hypothetical: the field fix on
wonder-app-vd03 was to hand-add Cluster__Roles__0/1 to a Windows service's
registry environment. Anyone reading the code to diagnose that box would have
concluded from the XML doc that the fallback was already applied.
AddOtOpcUaCluster now post-configures AkkaClusterOptions through the shared
RoleParser.ResolveEffectiveRoles, so BuildClusterOptions (Akka's own member
roles), ClusterRoleInfo, the ControlPlane singleton scope and
ConfigDbApiKeyStore's ClusterId all see one answer. Two sibling validators
(ConfigSource, Telemetry) read Cluster:Roles directly and were exempting the
exact node they exist for — an env-only driver-only node has no ConfigDb and
could sit on ConfigSource:Mode=Direct unchallenged. They resolve the same way now.
Also collapsed the four open-coded `Roles.FirstOrDefault(IsClusterRole)` +
ClusterIdFromRole copies into RoleParser.ClusterIdFromRoles. They had drifted:
three classified the cluster role ordinally, so a verbatim-bound `Cluster-SITE-A`
yielded a null ClusterId — and a null ClusterId applies NO cluster filter, which
made #528's cross-cluster over-grant guard fail OPEN. IsClusterRole is now
case-insensitive; the ClusterId suffix keeps its authored spelling, because
normalizing it would silently rename the Akka role of a running deployment.
#533 — three string-identity rules in one authorization path. AclScopeRef used
default (ordinal) equality while the trie builder filtered ClusterId and hashed
principals OrdinalIgnoreCase; the deploy gate's cross-cluster check was ordinal
too, which was the worse half — it could reject a whole deploy over a ClusterId
case difference the runtime would have accepted. It only worked because resolver
and builder were handed the same NodeAcl instances.
The rule is now stated once, on AclScopeRef, and applied throughout:
identifiers (ScopeId, ClusterId, Principal) compare OrdinalIgnoreCase; path
segments compare Ordinal. AclScopePathResolver re-keys its own maps rather than
documenting a comparer contract for callers, so the two independent producers —
EF at the gate, artifact JSON on the node — cannot diverge from the outside.
PermissionTrieNode.Children stays Ordinal: those are browse names, and Speed /
speed are two nodes that can coexist under one device.
Split PermissionTrieBuildDiagnosticReason.RetiredScopeKind out of
UnresolvedScope. A legacy FolderSegment row and a typo'd id had the same message
and different remedies.
Falsified: five mutations, each reddening only its own guard — remove the
PostConfigure (3 tests), revert IsClusterRole to ordinal (3), revert AclScopeRef
equality (1), revert the resolver's map comparer (6), revert the gate's
comparisons (2), remove the FolderSegment short-circuit (1).
Test isolation: OTOPCUA_ROLES is process-global and xUnit runs classes in
parallel, so the three validator suites that now resolve effective roles share a
non-parallel collection. Without it, cases passing no roles would intermittently
observe another class's env var.
Full solution build clean; full suite green apart from two pre-existing failures
confirmed identical on 3a6b2a1d (PrimaryGateFailoverTests, and
DriverProbeRegistrationTests expecting 10 probe types where 12 now register)
plus the AbLegacy integration suite, which needs a docker fixture.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Makes the /raw device tree addressable by an ACL rule, and builds the
scope-path producer PermissionTrieBuilder has accepted since it was written
but which had no caller anywhere.
The plan for this stage said "add NodeHierarchyKind.Raw, whose path is the
RawPath segments Folder/Driver/Device/TagGroup/Tag". That shape is wrong.
RawFolder.ParentRawFolderId and TagGroup.ParentTagGroupId are both
self-referencing, so folders and tag groups each nest without bound and a real
RawPath is folder…/Driver/Device/group…/Tag. NodeScope was fixed-arity and
PermissionTrie.CollectMatches was five hardcoded steps, so the scope model
could not address a real raw tree at all. NodeScope is now {ClusterId, Kind,
Segments} and the walk is a segment loop. The trie STRUCTURE was already
variable-depth (NodeAclPath.Segments is a list, Children is a recursive
dictionary), so only the walker and the scope record had to change.
Four decisions worth keeping:
- The namespace level became the realm. Level 1 gated on NodeScope.NamespaceId,
but v3 has no Namespace entity — the snapshot was retired when the address
space went dual-namespace, and the identifier appears nowhere in production
outside NodeScope. So the level could only ever fail to match, which silently
made every sub-cluster grant unreachable while cluster grants kept working.
It is now a realm token derived from the scope's Kind, not carried on it, so
the walk and the producer cannot disagree about its spelling.
- Provenance comes from the granting row's own ScopeKind, recorded on TrieGrant
at build time. Depth-derived provenance could not name a raw level at all,
since the depth of "Device" varies with folder nesting.
- The trie comparer moved from OrdinalIgnoreCase to Ordinal. Raw sibling-name
uniqueness is ordinal, so Speed and speed can both exist under one device and
a grant on either would have matched both.
- The null-scopePaths "deterministic test mode" is deleted. It planted
unresolvable rows at a direct child of the trie root, a position the walker
cannot reach, so the grant looked placed and could never match — and every
test using that mode proved nothing about production placement. scopePaths is
now required, and a row that does not resolve is dropped with a diagnostic.
A scope resolves to a LIST of paths: a raw tag projected into N equipments is
reachable at N+1 NodeIds and a write through any of them lands on the same
driver reference, so a Tag-scoped grant covering only the raw node would be
bypassable through a UNS one. The lookup is keyed on (ScopeKind, ScopeId), not
ScopeId alone — ScopeId has no FK and no type discriminator, so an id collision
across entity types would hand a grant the wrong node's paths.
Also closed here, all found by review rather than asked for:
- NodeAcl rows had no deploy-time validation of any kind and were not reachable
from DraftValidator at all (DraftSnapshot carried no NodeAcls). They are now
gated for dangling ids, cross-cluster scopes, blank/contradictory ScopeId, the
retired FolderSegment kind, and undefined ordinals.
- ConfigDbApiKeyStore conferred roles from Cluster-scoped grants authored in ANY
cluster, because it filtered on scope kind with no ClusterId predicate while
ArtifactApiKeyStore read an already-cluster-filtered snapshot. On a fused
admin+driver node that was a cross-cluster over-grant. Its doc comment claimed
the two stores matched.
- The two AdminUI ACL banners still said enforcement was LDAP-group -> role
mapping, which stages 1/2 made false in both directions.
- The /apikeys page was never classified in PageAuthorizationGuardTests, so that
test has been red since the key-minting commit merged — I did not run
AdminUI.Tests before merging stage 4.
Falsified rather than assumed: 8 mutations against the trie tests, 5 against the
deploy gate (including one proving a cross-cluster row is not silently
mis-diagnosed as unresolved), a staged red->green for the over-grant regression,
and the realm gate, the comparer and the malformed-path guard each broken
individually to confirm only their own tests go red.
Node ACLs are still not ENFORCED — nothing constructs a NodeScope or calls the
evaluator yet. That is stages 5 and 6; this stage makes the model able to
express what those will enforce.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
A driver-only node has had no ConfigDb since per-cluster mesh Phase 4, so it
registered NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator and denied every UserName token. Its keys
now ride the deployment artifact instead.
- ConfigComposer snapshots ApiKeys alongside the NodeAcls it already carried.
Only the peppered HMAC ships, never a secret, and the pepper is node config
that is deliberately not in the artifact.
- DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority decodes both node-side. Grants are
scoped to the node's own cluster; keys are not, because ApiKey carries no
ClusterId — a key is a fleet-wide credential and the ACL rows are what bind it.
- OpcUaPublishActor installs them on DataPlaneAuthorityState on every apply,
BEFORE its plan.IsEmpty early-return: an artifact that only revokes a key
produces an empty address-space plan, so feeding after that return would leave
the revoked key working until an unrelated structural change redeployed.
- ArtifactApiKeyStore serves them to session activation; a node with a ConfigDb
keeps ConfigDbApiKeyStore, whose per-request read is what makes revocation
immediate there.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager gains DataPlaneAuthority — the cluster identity blocker #4
named. NodeScope.ClusterId is required and the evaluator fails closed on a
mismatch, so until now no scope it built could have evaluated. Nothing reads it
until stages 5/6.
The generation is a node-local COUNTER driven by the RevisionHash, not derived
from its bits. PermissionTrieCache treats the highest GenerationId as current, so
a generation taken from hash bytes would install a lower number about half the
time and the cache would go on serving the previous deployment's ACLs, silently.
Sessions are not stamped with it yet — that belongs with the first seam that
reads a UserAuthorizationState, in stage 5, rather than being built now and
consulted by nothing.
Live-gated on docker-dev against site-a-1 (driver-only, no ConfigDb): key
authenticates, wrong secret denied, both halves of the revocation asymmetry
observed, and a SITE-A grant confirmed not to reach site-b-1. Key minted with an
independent Python HMAC so the verifier was checked against something other than
itself. Rig left clean.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Pulled forward from stage 7 because without it the feature is unusable and
un-live-gateable: there was no way to create a key short of hand-inserting a row
and computing an HMAC by hand.
The minting logic is an IApiKeyAdminService in Core.Authorization, NOT logic in
the Razor page — this repo has no bUnit, so anything only a page can reach is
untestable, and minting credentials is not where that belongs. The page is a thin
shell over it.
Moved to Core.Authorization so both ends can reach them: ApiKeyOptions (was in
Host) and OpcUaPrincipals (was in OpcUaServer.Security). The OPC UA server
resolves principals; the AdminUI must refuse to mint a key claiming a reserved
one. OpcUaServer already gained a Core reference in stage 1b, so no new edge —
AdminUI gains one.
ApiKeyOptions is now bound UNCONDITIONALLY rather than in the driver branch: a
driver node needs the pepper to VERIFY keys and an admin node needs it to MINT
them, and getting that wrong on either side is a silent authentication failure
rather than a startup error.
Validation rules, all covered: the reserved 'anonymous' principal is refused
case-insensitively (so "ANONYMOUS" cannot slip past into a distinct principal
that the evaluator would then match case-INsensitively against anonymous's
grants); blank name/principal; a principal longer than the column, rejected
rather than truncated, because silent truncation yields a key that authenticates
and is granted nothing with no visible cause; a past expiry. Generation runs
BEFORE the DbContext is opened so an unconfigured pepper surfaces as a clear
error instead of a stored row whose hash nothing can verify.
The page shows the plaintext ONCE and says so; it is held in component state and
written nowhere else, because the server keeps only a hash. Revocation is flagged
in the UI as taking effect only after the next deployment — driver-only nodes
have no ConfigDb, so keys ride the artifact.
FleetAdmin-only (Administrator), not ConfigEditor: this mints credentials.
Core.Tests 68 green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Stage 1b. Still no enforcement wired — this adds the credential model the
identity cutover (stage 2) will read.
ApiKey holds one principal per key, deliberately. The reason to separate keys
from principals is so many keys share a grant set and rotating a key never
touches an ACL row, and that holds with one principal per key since nothing stops
two keys naming the same principal. A key belonging to several principals at once
buys little and costs a join table. UserAuthorizationState.Principals stays a
list, so adding it later needs no ACL-side change.
ApiKeySecret is the security-critical half and is pure, so it is tested on its
own: otua_<keyId>_<secret>, peppered HMAC-SHA256, FixedTimeEquals. Notes why a
plain HMAC rather than an iterated KDF (the secret is 32 bytes of CSPRNG, and the
call runs inline on session activation, which the SDK serializes server-wide
behind its SessionManager event lock), and fails closed on an unset pepper rather
than hashing under an empty key.
Found and fixed a bug in my own first draft: the key id was url-safe base64,
whose alphabet maps '/' to '_' — the very character TryParse splits on. Roughly
one key in five would have had its id truncated at a random position, an
intermittent auth failure reproducing only for SOME keys. The id is hex now, and
the guard is falsified: reverting the alphabet reds both
The_generated_key_id_never_contains_the_separator and, as a bonus signal,
Two_generated_keys_never_collide, because truncated ids collide.
ApiKeyId is NOT NULL, unlike the nullable NodeAclId precedent whose filtered
unique index would admit two NULL ids. Fine for a config row, not for a
credentials lookup key.
OpcUaServer.csproj now references Core. Until now it did not, so
IPermissionEvaluator was literally uncallable from the node manager — the place
enforcement has to happen. No new transitive package surface.
Schema doc updated for both, and its NodeAcl block flagged for pre-existing drift
(it still documents the GenerationId column v3 dropped) without fixing it here.
Core 247, OpcUaServer 364, Configuration 128 — all green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Joseph Doherty