1b3928a0a2
- ManagementAuthenticator accepts Authorization: Bearer <jwt> alongside Basic on /management, the audit REST endpoints and the debug-stream hub. Tokens are validated locally (HS256 only, alg=none rejected, issuer/audience, lifetime with 30 s skew); roles and site scope inside a valid token are authoritative for its lifetime, so a bearer call costs no LDAP bind and no role re-map. - /auth/token returns expires_in + management_bearer:true, carries username, display name, roles and permitted sites, and answers 404 under DisableLogin. - CLI exchanges credentials once per process (in-memory CliTokenStore), sends Bearer, re-exchanges once on 401 then falls back to Basic; older/login-disabled servers are Basic-only; bad credentials are not retried with Basic. Debug stream uses the token via AccessTokenProvider. SCADABRIDGE_AUTH_MODE=basic opts out. - StartupValidator fails a Central boot on a JwtSigningKey under 32 UTF-8 bytes; fixed the false 'fail-fast at construction' comment. Removed the dead RefreshToken/RecordActivity/ShouldRefresh/IsIdleTimedOut members and the inert JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes; JwtExpiryMinutes now documented as the bearer lifetime (validated > 0). - RoleMapper reads through a process-wide RoleMappingCache (RoleMappingCacheSeconds, default 30 s): one refresh loads the table plus every Deployer mapping's scope rules, Invalidate() drops it (generation-guarded against in-flight refreshes). - Component-Security.md / Component-CLI.md / CLI README describe the real model (cookie claims ticket, bearer for CLI) instead of a cookie-embedded JWT.
175 lines
7.6 KiB
C#
175 lines
7.6 KiB
C#
using System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt;
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using System.Security.Claims;
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using System.Text;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
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using NSubstitute;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Ldap;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security.Auth;
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namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.ManagementService.Tests;
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/// <summary>
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/// Bearer-token branch of <see cref="ManagementAuthenticator"/> (review 2026-10-21 05/U1, 05/P1):
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/// a JWT minted by <c>/auth/token</c> authenticates the management/audit/debug surfaces without
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/// an LDAP bind, and every malformed, expired, tampered, foreign-key or unsigned token is a 401.
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/// </summary>
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public class ManagementAuthenticatorBearerTests
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{
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private const string Key = "this-is-a-test-signing-key-for-hmac-sha256-must-be-long-enough";
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private sealed class FixedClock(DateTimeOffset now) : TimeProvider
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{
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public override DateTimeOffset GetUtcNow() => now;
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}
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private static JwtTokenService Jwt(string key = Key, TimeProvider? clock = null) =>
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new(Options.Create(new SecurityOptions { JwtSigningKey = key, JwtExpiryMinutes = 15 }),
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NullLogger<JwtTokenService>.Instance, clock);
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private static (HttpContext Context, ILdapAuthService Ldap) ContextWithAuthorization(string authorization)
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{
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var ldap = Substitute.For<ILdapAuthService>();
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var services = new ServiceCollection();
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services.AddSingleton<IOptions<AuthDisableLoginOptions>>(
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Options.Create(new AuthDisableLoginOptions { DisableLogin = false }));
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services.AddSingleton<IOptions<SecurityOptions>>(
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Options.Create(new SecurityOptions { JwtSigningKey = Key, JwtExpiryMinutes = 15 }));
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services.AddLogging();
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services.AddSingleton(ldap);
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services.AddScoped<JwtTokenService>();
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var context = new DefaultHttpContext { RequestServices = services.BuildServiceProvider() };
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context.Request.Headers.Authorization = authorization;
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return (context, ldap);
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}
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/// <summary>A valid token yields its username, roles and site scope with no LDAP bind.</summary>
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/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidBearer_AuthenticatesFromClaims_WithoutLdap()
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{
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var token = Jwt().GenerateToken("Dee Ployer", "deployer", [Roles.Deployer, Roles.Viewer], ["3", "7"]);
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var (context, ldap) = ContextWithAuthorization($"Bearer {token}");
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var outcome = await ManagementAuthenticator.AuthenticateAsync(context);
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Assert.Null(outcome.Failure);
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Assert.NotNull(outcome.User);
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Assert.Equal("deployer", outcome.User!.Username);
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Assert.Equal("Dee Ployer", outcome.User.DisplayName);
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Assert.Equal(new[] { Roles.Deployer, Roles.Viewer }, outcome.User.Roles);
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Assert.Equal(new[] { "3", "7" }, outcome.User.PermittedSiteIds);
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await ldap.DidNotReceiveWithAnyArgs().AuthenticateAsync(default!, default!, default);
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}
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/// <summary>A token minted without site ids is system-wide (empty permitted set), like the Basic path.</summary>
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/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
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[Fact]
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public async Task ValidBearer_NoSiteClaims_IsSystemWide()
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{
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var token = Jwt().GenerateToken("Admin", "admin", [Roles.Administrator], null);
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var (context, _) = ContextWithAuthorization($"Bearer {token}");
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var outcome = await ManagementAuthenticator.AuthenticateAsync(context);
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Assert.NotNull(outcome.User);
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Assert.Empty(outcome.User!.PermittedSiteIds);
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}
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/// <summary>An expired token (past the 30 s skew) is rejected.</summary>
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/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
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[Fact]
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public async Task ExpiredBearer_Is401()
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{
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var issuedLongAgo = Jwt(clock: new FixedClock(DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddMinutes(-20)));
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var token = issuedLongAgo.GenerateToken("U", "u", [Roles.Administrator], null);
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var (context, _) = ContextWithAuthorization($"Bearer {token}");
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var outcome = await ManagementAuthenticator.AuthenticateAsync(context);
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Assert.Null(outcome.User);
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Assert.NotNull(outcome.Failure);
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}
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/// <summary>A token whose payload was edited (privilege escalation attempt) fails the signature check.</summary>
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/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
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[Fact]
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public async Task TamperedBearer_Is401()
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{
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var token = Jwt().GenerateToken("V", "viewer", [Roles.Viewer], null);
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var parts = token.Split('.');
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var payload = Encoding.UTF8.GetString(Base64UrlDecode(parts[1]))
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.Replace(Roles.Viewer, Roles.Administrator, StringComparison.Ordinal);
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var tampered = $"{parts[0]}.{Base64UrlEncode(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(payload))}.{parts[2]}";
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var (context, _) = ContextWithAuthorization($"Bearer {tampered}");
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var outcome = await ManagementAuthenticator.AuthenticateAsync(context);
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Assert.Null(outcome.User);
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Assert.NotNull(outcome.Failure);
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}
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/// <summary>A token signed with a different key (another environment) is rejected.</summary>
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/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
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[Fact]
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public async Task WrongKeyBearer_Is401()
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{
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var token = Jwt("a-completely-different-signing-key-for-hmac-sha256-validation")
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.GenerateToken("A", "admin", [Roles.Administrator], null);
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var (context, _) = ContextWithAuthorization($"Bearer {token}");
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var outcome = await ManagementAuthenticator.AuthenticateAsync(context);
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Assert.Null(outcome.User);
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Assert.NotNull(outcome.Failure);
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}
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/// <summary>An unsigned <c>alg=none</c> token is rejected.</summary>
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/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
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[Fact]
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public async Task UnsignedAlgNoneBearer_Is401()
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{
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var unsigned = new JwtSecurityToken(
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issuer: JwtTokenService.TokenIssuer,
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audience: JwtTokenService.TokenAudience,
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claims: [new Claim(JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType, "admin"),
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new Claim(JwtTokenService.RoleClaimType, Roles.Administrator)],
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expires: DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(10));
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var handler = new JwtSecurityTokenHandler();
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handler.OutboundClaimTypeMap.Clear();
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var token = handler.WriteToken(unsigned); // header {"alg":"none"}, empty signature
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var (context, _) = ContextWithAuthorization($"Bearer {token}");
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var outcome = await ManagementAuthenticator.AuthenticateAsync(context);
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Assert.Null(outcome.User);
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Assert.NotNull(outcome.Failure);
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}
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/// <summary>Garbage after <c>Bearer</c> is a 401, not an exception.</summary>
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/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
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[Fact]
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public async Task GarbageBearer_Is401()
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{
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var (context, _) = ContextWithAuthorization("Bearer not-a-jwt");
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var outcome = await ManagementAuthenticator.AuthenticateAsync(context);
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Assert.Null(outcome.User);
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Assert.NotNull(outcome.Failure);
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}
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private static byte[] Base64UrlDecode(string s)
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{
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var padded = s.Replace('-', '+').Replace('_', '/');
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padded = padded.PadRight(padded.Length + (4 - padded.Length % 4) % 4, '=');
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return Convert.FromBase64String(padded);
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}
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private static string Base64UrlEncode(byte[] bytes) =>
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Convert.ToBase64String(bytes).TrimEnd('=').Replace('+', '-').Replace('/', '_');
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}
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