- ManagementAuthenticator accepts Authorization: Bearer <jwt> alongside Basic on
/management, the audit REST endpoints and the debug-stream hub. Tokens are
validated locally (HS256 only, alg=none rejected, issuer/audience, lifetime with
30 s skew); roles and site scope inside a valid token are authoritative for its
lifetime, so a bearer call costs no LDAP bind and no role re-map.
- /auth/token returns expires_in + management_bearer:true, carries username, display
name, roles and permitted sites, and answers 404 under DisableLogin.
- CLI exchanges credentials once per process (in-memory CliTokenStore), sends Bearer,
re-exchanges once on 401 then falls back to Basic; older/login-disabled servers are
Basic-only; bad credentials are not retried with Basic. Debug stream uses the token
via AccessTokenProvider. SCADABRIDGE_AUTH_MODE=basic opts out.
- StartupValidator fails a Central boot on a JwtSigningKey under 32 UTF-8 bytes;
fixed the false 'fail-fast at construction' comment. Removed the dead
RefreshToken/RecordActivity/ShouldRefresh/IsIdleTimedOut members and the inert
JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes; JwtExpiryMinutes now documented as the bearer lifetime
(validated > 0).
- RoleMapper reads through a process-wide RoleMappingCache (RoleMappingCacheSeconds,
default 30 s): one refresh loads the table plus every Deployer mapping's scope
rules, Invalidate() drops it (generation-guarded against in-flight refreshes).
- Component-Security.md / Component-CLI.md / CLI README describe the real model
(cookie claims ticket, bearer for CLI) instead of a cookie-embedded JWT.
Joseph Doherty
1b3928a0a2