When a replicated site pair cold-starts together, the node that wins the
Deployment Manager singleton loads its own (stale) store, and the peer's
rows arrive by LocalDb sync about a second later. The boot load has already
run and the startup reconcile rightly reports no gap (the rows are in the
store by the time it asks central), so only the instance sweep starts those
instances - at its plain 60 s cadence. Reproduced on the primary rig: boot
load without the instance at 05:03:16, sweep start at 05:04:16.
The env2 drill read this as "never started" because the operator
redeployed at +49 s, before the first sweep tick at +60 s.
Fix: when boot-time Instance Actor creation finishes, the singleton runs
one sweep at once, then sweeps every InstanceSweepSettleIntervalSeconds
(default 5) for InstanceSweepSettleWindowSeconds (default 120), then falls
back to InstanceSweepIntervalSeconds. Startup never waits for the peer, so
a site whose peer is down for good still starts alone from its own store.
LocalDb 0.3.7 exposes no "snapshot applied" signal, so the fix rides the
arrival-path-agnostic sweep with all its existing guards.
Tests: PostBootSettleSweepTests (4) + validator theory. The two positive
tests fail with the fix disabled; the window-close test fails when the
settle timer is never cancelled.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
Unreplicated, the site-x survivor came up empty (by design: no LocalDb peer);
replicated, kill and freeze each lost only the 26-30 s takeover window, every
buffered message was delivered once, and the 4 duplicate ticks came from the
frozen victim's 6 s zombie window. Central kill: 0 gap.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
Read-only export of DEV vd03 and QA vq03 (2026-11-12): the only
Children["DelmiaRecv"] user is CvdReactor.ProcessRecipeDownload (script 4,
identical on both envs; DEV 3 / QA 9 instances), and the only ScriptAlarm
.Severity reader is DEV TestMesMachine.AlarmStatus (script 42, SBTEST01/02).
QA has no #131 work.
Adds the original (rollback) and fixed bodies, a guarded check/apply/rollback
script that re-sends every script field, and the apply plan: #52 any time,
#131 with or after the dd4f1c2a binary. The old #131 body still compiles on
main but returns banded values; the fixed body is what fails to compile on the
deployed binaries. Rig evidence for both gates is in the README.
Refs #52#131
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Client and the test-only .Server move
1.5.378.182 -> 2.0.1, the version OtOpcUa master runs (lmxopcua#782; #799
and #801 closed). Transitive Core/Core.Types/Types/Configuration/
Security.Certificates resolve to 2.0.1.
API breaks fixed in the DCL adapter:
- Built-in types are immutable structs (Variant, DataValue, NodeId,
LocalizedText, StatusCode, ArrayOf<T>). New OpcUaValueBoundary restores
the SDK 1.5 CLR shapes for every read, subscription and alarm-event
value (byte[], UTC DateTime with no-timestamp = MinValue, Guid,
detached arrays) and builds write variants with SDK 1.5's
new Variant(object) semantics (byte[] = ByteString scalar).
- StatusCodes members are no longer constants: switches/patterns over
them (verify-outcome mapping, connection-level classification,
BadResourceUnavailable) match by value.
- CertificateIdentifier no longer caches a certificate and the
CertificateValidator/CertificateValidation event is gone: the
configuration's CertificateManager owns trust lists and the loaded
application certificate and is disposed with the session; auto-accept
and the verify probe's capture-and-reject use AcceptError.
- new UserIdentity(X509Certificate2) is gone: X509 user identities use
X509IdentityTokenHandler with an on-demand PFX provider (still fails
fast on a missing file/key).
- DefaultSessionFactory takes the telemetry context; collections are
ArrayOf<T>; EventFilter select clauses and ContentFilter operands are
built immutably.
UserName identity (lmxopcua#880): SDK 2's default handler sends a
password over 64 bytes - every 65-character OtOpcUa API key - as an
RsaEncryptedSecret that SDK 1.5 servers reject with BadIdentityTokenInvalid
and SDK 2 servers accept only within a 5-minute clock window (#873). The
DCL now always uses LegacyRsaUserNameIdentityTokenHandler (ported from
OtOpcUa be28aa44), i.e. exactly what it sent on SDK 1.5, so it logs in to
both server generations during a mixed rollout.
Tests: the in-process secured test server is ported to SDK 2 and can
admit an API key; new tests cover the handler (mutation-checked: 5 of 7
fail with the SDK default handler), the value boundary, and a 65-char key
end to end over None/Sign/SignAndEncrypt with a wrong key reaching the
key check (BadIdentityTokenRejected).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
A node frozen past failure detection + StableAfter, or both sides of a partition
that heals after each downed the other, used to stay a second active node until an
operator restarted one: the peer quarantines the removed UID and Akka.Cluster
1.5.62 never acts on ThisActorSystemQuarantinedEvent.
ShutOutRestart (child of the LeaderAutoDown downing actor; opt-out via
ScadaBridge:Cluster:LeaderAutoDown:RestartWhenShutOut, default on for
leader-auto-down only) watches two signals:
- S1 ThisActorSystemQuarantinedEvent: the peer quarantined this node. If the peer
is still a live member here, only this side can be shut out -> restart now.
- S2 AssociationErrorEvent 'has a UID that has been quarantined': the peer still
runs the incarnation this node removed. A healed partition yields only S2, on
both sides. Wait ShutOutGrace (60s) for a frozen peer to restart itself, then
tiebreak.
Tiebreak: the higher address (Akka Member.AddressOrdering) restarts, the lower
stays and restarts only if still split one grace later. Removed peers are probed
(Identify, 5s -> 60s back-off) since nothing else contacts them after mutual
removal. Restart = Cluster.Down(self) -> existing self-down path.
The Host now exits 75 after an unplanned ActorSystem termination (and sets it on
the Windows service before it reports stopped): SCM recovery with failureflag 1
only restarts a service that stops with a non-zero code, and the watchdog used
to exit 0. Shipped default strategy stays auto-down.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
Auth 0.5.0 (all five packages) adds the passwordless ILdapGroupLookup. A new
singleton DirectoryGroupRefresher asks it for a session's current groups once
the new zb:lastgrouprefresh anchor (stamped at login) is older than
ScadaBridge:Security:LdapGroupRefresh:IntervalMinutes (default 15, Enabled
default true, CacheSeconds 60 per-node answer reuse). CookieSessionValidator
replaces the stored groups and re-maps roles; this reaches HTTP and live
circuits (once per interval, independent of the 10 s circuit refresh).
Failure policy: directory unavailable keeps the stored groups (warn, all paths
incl. fail-closed mutation checks); user not found / disabled / ambiguous /
no groups ends the session. Inert under BindMode=User (NotSupported),
LDAP disabled, or DisableLogin.
Auth 0.4.4 ApiKeyFailure.StoreUnavailable now answers 503 SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
on the inbound API instead of a misleading 401.
Docs: Component-Security.md, components/Security.md, Component-Host.md,
register row 23 closed.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
Ran every #116 gate on the local docker rig (main 2d2e9f35), with an auto-down baseline
on the same build:
- active kill: takeover 29s central / 26s site-a; standby kill: downed 29s / 26s, 0 blips;
- boot logs: no deprecation warning, [leader-auto-down] started/unreachable/DOWNING lines;
- partition past the window: accepted dual-active, restart of one side recovers;
- cold start of both pairs together: one cluster each; site-a S&F drains on the survivor.
Extra: docker pause of the active node leaves a permanent second active after unpause on
BOTH strategies (Akka.Cluster ignores ThisActorSystemQuarantinedEvent) — filed as #132.
- docker/docker-compose.leader-auto-down.yml: opt-in overlay (env override) for the central
and site-a pairs; shipped default stays auto-down.
- docker/failover-drill.sh: DRILL_PAIR (central|site-a|site-b|site-c), DRILL_ACTION
(kill|pause), sidecar probes for unpublished site health, strict rejoin + dual-active check.
- docs/plans/2026-11-12-leader-auto-down-rig-drill.md (+ raw logs), docker/README.md.
Refs #116, #106, #132
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
Switch ScadaBridge from its own LoggerConfigurationFactory to AddZbSerilog
(ZB.MOM.WW.Telemetry(.Serilog) 0.1.0 -> 0.2.0) using the two 0.2.0 hooks:
- MinimumLevelGovernor: ScadaBridge:Logging:MinimumLevel, applied after
ReadFrom.Configuration so it outranks Serilog:MinimumLevel (never null, so the
floor never defers to the Serilog key; Override:* namespace entries still apply;
the one-shot conflict / unparseable-value warnings are unchanged).
- ConfigureLogger: the standby active-node exclusion filter (register row 71),
the configured node identity (the shared bootstrap stamps NodeHostname from
the machine name and skips empty values; an overwriting enricher keeps the
configured ScadaBridge:Node values verbatim), Enrich.FromLogContext and the
ExecutionLogCaptureSink.
ScadaBridgeLogging runs AddZbSerilog on a small pre-host builder and Program
installs the result as the static Log.Logger; both web hosts keep UseSerilog()
over it. One logger and one file-sink handle per process, usable before the
host is built (startup banner, warnings, pre-host Fatal), by SerilogAkkaLogger,
and after the host is disposed (shutdown line, unexpected-termination Fatal) —
AddZbSerilog's own DI registration would leave Log.Logger alone and have the
host dispose the logger.
LoggerConfigurationFactory is deleted (nothing else used it). Tests: existing
logging/standby/sink tests now run through the new pipeline, plus
ScadaBridgeLoggingParityTests (level precedence, Override:* still applies,
one-shot warning, configured identity incl. NodeHostname != MachineName and empty
SiteId, exact property set of a plain line, trace_id/span_id). Mutation-checked:
governor deferring, filter removed, identity enricher removed, FromLogContext
removed, capture sink removed each fail tests.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
AlarmConditionState.Severity mixed two conventions: OPC UA rows carried Part 9
Severity (higher = more severe) while MxGateway native alarms and computed
alarms carried a raw AVEVA-style priority (1 = most urgent). Every consumer
ranks higher as worse, so Worst Severity, the severity filter/sort and the
site event-log Error threshold picked the LEAST urgent MxGateway/computed
alarms.
- AlarmPriorityBands: the OtOpcUa GalaxyAlarmPriority table (lmxopcua#887,
b61f3e05), value for value: 1-250 -> 1000, 251-500 -> 750, 501-750 -> 500,
751-999 -> 250; <= 0 clamps to Critical, > 999 to Low.
- MxGatewayAlarmMapper bands the gateway severity (= AVEVA priority);
AlarmConditionStateFactory.ForComputed bands PriorityLevel. OPC UA unchanged.
- AlarmConditionState gains trailing Priority (int?): the raw source number,
exactly the pre-#129 Severity. AlarmStateChanged.Priority and the wire
AlarmStateUpdate.priority keep that meaning (no proto change); central derives
Severity by kind (SeverityFromPriority), so an older site decodes correctly.
- ScriptAlarm gains trailing Priority. The native MES 900-999 band and the MES
API Severity/MinSeverity/MaxSeverity key off Priority; rig seed scripts moved
from a.Severity to a.Priority, so MES output is unchanged.
- AlarmActor raise logs Error when the banded severity >= 700 (same threshold
as NativeAlarmActor): priority 1-500 Error, 501+ Warning (was raw >= 700).
- NativeAlarmActor upgrades pre-#129 native_alarm_state rows on rehydrate.
- Debug snapshot decode restores Condition.Priority from the row's priority.
- Docs: Commons, DCL, SiteRuntime, Communication, CentralUI, InboundAPI,
HighLevelReqs, MES alarm-status plan, CLAUDE.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
Pins ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb, .Replication and .Contracts at 0.3.7 (published
2026-11-12). Wire-compatible; no config or code change needed.
- 0.3.6 (scadaproj#36): the library sync service enforces
LocalDb:Replication:ApiKey itself. LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor is kept for
its refuse-every-stream-when-blank rule; its doc comment is updated. The
rig's site-a pair already carries one identical key on both nodes.
- 0.3.7 (scadaproj#16): a tombstone is held until the peer has it, so a
node offline past TombstoneRetention no longer resurrects deleted rows.
The survivor's ledger (sf_messages / site_events deletes) grows for the
length of the outage; optional TombstoneHardCap bounds it.
Deploy notes added to the topology + installation guides, the S&F
requirement and CLAUDE.md: stop/start the pair together, same ApiKey on
both nodes, ledger growth while a peer is down.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
`dotnet ef migrations script --idempotent` puts each migration in ONE batch
behind IF NOT EXISTS guards, and SQL Server compiles the whole batch before any
guard runs. AddAuditLogHashChain adds ChainSeq and then creates two filtered
indexes whose WHERE clause references it in the same batch, so the script
failed with Msg 207 "Invalid column name 'ChainSeq'" on any DB at migration
<= 60 (the 2026-11-11 vd03 deploy hand-inserted GO separators instead).
- AddAuditLogHashChain: the two CREATE INDEX statements go through EXEC(N'...')
so they compile at execution time. Same indexes, same snapshot; Migrate() /
database update unaffected; DBs that already ran the migration never run it
again. The column-level GRANT compiles fine (checked at execution).
- Audit of 58-64: no other migration hits the pattern (the idempotent script
from 57 now runs clean end to end; AddConfigGraphRowVersions' plain CREATE
INDEX on a new column is not compile-checked).
- docs/plans/sql/AddAuditLogHashChain.sql: same EXEC wrap. It, and
PrefixSearchIndexes.sql / AddConfigGraphRowVersions.sql, also carried a
stray UTF-8 BOM after the prepended header comment that made sqlcmd fail
with Msg 102 on line 1 of the batch; removed.
- New IdempotentMigrationScriptTests: migrates the fixture DB to 57, runs the
generated idempotent script batch by batch, asserts every migration applied,
then re-runs it as a no-op. Fails with Msg 207 without the migration fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
#122: the Notification Outbox KPI snapshots ORed every status in one
aggregation, which scanned the clustered index once the table held ~1 M
Parked rows (0.7-2.6 s; Health dashboard up to 5 s). Each snapshot now runs
three status-equality legs that seek their own index (~0.12 s); a cold Health
load on the rig is 0.12-0.52 s.
#123: site_events event_type/severity indexes are now composites with
timestamp, so a filtered page is read in order and stops at the limit
(severity=Error over 1 GB: 2,287 -> 15 ms cold, 115 -> 1.6 ms warm). Costs
454 -> 530 B/row, ~14 % fewer rows under the same cap. The schema apply drops
the old indexes in place; the cap size model samples timestamp three times
and re-scores inside its band with unchanged constants.
#124: the set-based AuditLog insert's NOT EXISTS probe scanned the EventId
index and concurrent writers deadlocked on S/IX page locks. WITH (FORCESEEK):
4 writers 775 rows/s + 76 deadlocks in 30 s -> 5,214 rows/s + 0. New
concurrent-writer regression test fails 4/4 without the hint.
New ResidualBench tool (eventlog, flatten, audit, audit-contention) and
docker/measure-ui-responsiveness.sh. All four residuals pass; results in
docs/plans/2026-11-10-wp4-residual-scope-results.md. Findings filed as
#122, #123 and #124 (fixed in the following commit).
vd03 is the DEV box (vd = DEV, vq03/vq04 = QA). Historical docs called it prod/production.
Only vd03-referential uses are changed; generic 'production' wording (production HOCON,
production code paths, ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Production, real-world production guidance)
is unchanged. One verbatim git commit message quoted in PLAN-07 is left as recorded.
Sign/SignAndEncrypt sessions failed before activation with "ApplicationCertificate
for the security profile ... cannot be found" (BadConfigurationError): both
RealOpcUaClient.ConnectAsync and the verify probe built an empty CertificateIdentifier.
- New OpcUaApplicationIdentity builds the client ApplicationConfiguration for both
paths. Secured modes load the application certificate from a configurable own
store (subject + ApplicationUri), auto-creating a self-signed RSA-2048 cert only
when none exists. A persisted cert is reused across reconnect/restart and never
silently rotated: one that no longer validates (e.g. ApplicationUri mismatch)
fails closed. First-time creation is serialised per own store and logged at
Warning with the thumbprint. None mode is unchanged and never touches the store.
- New OpcUaGlobalOptions: ApplicationUri, ApplicationCertificateSubject,
OwnCertificateStorePath, AutoCreateApplicationCertificate,
ApplicationCertificateLifetimeMonths (validated).
- Owned resources: the private-key cert is disposed on disconnect, failed connect
and at probe end; sessions are now disposed after close, and a reconnect on the
same instance closes the previous session first.
- CertStoreActor wrote trusted server certs to the store ROOT, which the SDK never
reads (it uses {store}/certs), so an operator Trust never affected validation and
SDK-rejected certs never listed. It now uses certs/ and migrates legacy root files
on start.
- Rig: all site nodes (docker/, docker-env2/) put the four PKI stores on the
persistent /app/data volume with a pinned ApplicationUri.
- Tests: in-process strict-trust StandardServer (test-only Opc.Ua.Server 1.5.378.106)
exercising the real adapter through ConnectAsync and VerifyEndpointAsync for Sign
and SignAndEncrypt: allow + read + reconnect + restart on one identity, deny when
the client doesn't trust the server (BadCertificateUntrusted), deny when the server
doesn't trust the client (BadSecurityChecksFailed), None untouched, concurrent
provisioning creates one cert, URI mismatch fails without rotating, auto-create off.
Against the pre-fix client these tests fail with the exact #121 error.
#120: Akka ILoggingAdapter lines used to bypass Serilog and go to stdout only.
- BuildHocon sets akka.loggers = [Host.Actors.SerilogAkkaLogger] and keeps akka.loglevel = INFO,
so Akka Debug chatter is still filtered at the adapter. The INFO+ lines that used to reach
stdout now go through the Serilog pipeline instead, with no extra volume.
- Lines reach the file sinks with the node enrichers. SourceContext is the logging class's full
name, AkkaSource is the actor path, Akka's own timestamp is kept, and format arguments become
structured properties.
- The Akka logger actor writes on its own thread, after the logging actor's LogContext is gone.
To keep the ExecutionId, the two DCL actors log through ExecutionAwareLogging.GetLogger(Context),
which records ExecutionLogContext.Current (a new AsyncLocal mirror of the pushed id) in an
ExecutionTaggedLogMessage. The logger actor pushes that id again while it writes the line.
#56 remainder (coordinator decision: no replicated schema change):
- The host pipeline gains ExecutionLogCaptureSink.
- While a run is traced, its step logger registers its ExecutionId: the site ScriptLogger from the
launcher (plus each inline CallShared child id), and the central InboundScriptLogger from the
executor.
- Each tagged line becomes a ScriptLog row with LogSource "node" and the new
ScriptTraceExtra.LogCategory.
- The rows count against the existing MaxLogLinesPerRun cap, are clipped at 2 000 chars, ride the
low-priority collector lane and pass the same redactor. Untraced runs cost one volatile read.
- Lines are never copied twice. The step loggers' own forwards run inside
ExecutionLogCapture.Suppress(), and the sink suppresses itself while it calls a target. The
registration is declared inside the launcher's and executor's try, so it ends before the catch
blocks log the outcome, and FlushDropped closes it.
- FlowGraphBuilder lists node lines in FlowGraph.NodeLogs and never folds them onto a step.
- The Flow Debugger shows them in a Node log card (FlowNodeLogPanel): grouped per execution under
its run step, with an All | Warn + filter. Live and Replay both read the same rows, so site
scope and role rules apply unchanged.
- CLI --show-logs prints them as a trailing block.
Tests: Commons ExecutionLogCaptureTests, ExecutionLogContext.Current, FlowGraphBuilder node lines.
SiteRuntime NodeLogCaptureTests covers cross-actor capture via the launcher, untraced runs
capturing nothing, no double capture of script and runtime lines or of the launcher failure line,
the shared cap, collector redaction, shared-script child ids and FlushDropped closing capture.
InboundNodeLogCaptureTests covers the central path. DCL ExecutionAwareLoggingTests covers the
DataConnectionActor write-path Debug line being tagged and an uncorrelated line not being tagged.
Host SerilogAkkaLoggerTests covers mapping, the ExecutionId crossing the logger hop, HOCON,
ActorSystem boot and the Akka line reaching a traced run's step log end to end. Host
LoggerConfigurationTests checks that the sink is wired. bUnit FlowNodeLogPanelTests and a CLI
projection test cover the UI and CLI. Every new assertion was mutation-proven.
Docs: step-logs design section 12, Component-SiteRuntime, CentralUI, InboundAPI, Host, CLI README,
CLAUDE.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
LogContext is an AsyncLocal and does not cross an Akka message hop, so the run's id now rides the
message: Commons.Observability.IExecutionCorrelated (explicit interface member, no wire change) on
SetStaticAttributeCommand, AttributeValueChanged (not for an inferred writer), ScriptCallRequest and
the four RouteTo*Requests, plus a new additive SourceExecutionId on GetAttributeRequest,
WaitForAttributeRequest, WriteAttributeBatchRequest, WriteTagRequest and WriteTagBatchRequest.
ScriptRuntimeContext stamps its id on the requests it sends, the Instance Actor hands it on to the
DCL, and the Instance, Script, Alarm, Deployment Manager and both DCL actors re-push it per message in
AroundReceive (ExecutionLogContext.PushFor: one type test when the message names no execution). The
inbound executor pushes the request's ExecutionId for the method execution.
Tests (TestKit): Instance Actor line carries the message's id, no leak from the sender's ambient
context, scope ends with the message, per-write ids inside a batched SetAttributes, ids forwarded on
DCL writes, ScriptRuntimeContext stamps; DCL adapter lines on single/batch writes carry the id;
inbound executor lines carry the request id; Commons mapping + no serialized member. Each mutation-
proved. Still open on #56: a queryable per-execution sink and a Flow Debugger section. The DCL
actors' own Akka _log lines bypass Serilog (filed #120).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Bundles did not record that a template was a derived slot template, so the
importer re-created every slot as a BASE template named after the slot.
- Export: TemplateDto gains an additive, null-omitted `Derivation`
(owner path + base path by stable names); a derived template carries only
its own rows (overrides/additions, not inherited placeholders). The closure
pulls in each derived template's base/owner; base orders first.
schemaVersion 1.1 -> 1.2, bundleFormatVersion stays 1.
- Import: base templates go through the ordinary passes; derived templates are
ordered topologically (DerivedTemplatePlan; cycle / duplicate / malformed =
preview Blocker + SemanticValidationException before anything is staged),
their owner and base resolved by path (#100 root rule), and the slot is
created with TemplateService.AddCompositionAsync, synced in place when it
already exists with the same base, or deleted+recomposed when the base
differs; own rows applied as overrides, then ResyncInheritedMembersAsync.
Missing owner/base fails that record (BundleImportDerivedTemplateUnresolved
audit + ImportResult warning), never creating a base in its place.
- Preview/diff: derived rows are keyed by qualified name and compared against
the target slot at the same owner path (own rows + base), so an unchanged
slot is Identical and a same-named base template is never matched.
- Pre-#118 bundles import exactly as before (new fixture
pre-118-derived-plaintext.scadabundle, written by a13aabc7). The field is in
content, pinned by the signed manifest's contentHash.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Every downing decision of LeaderAutoDowningProvider is now logged under a
[leader-auto-down] prefix: start-up snapshot (leader, window, already-unreachable),
unreachable observed + its window (Warning), skipped because already Down/Exiting,
pending Down cancelled on reachable-again/removed, timed out on a non-leader and kept
pending, leadership gained/lost, and DOWNING (Warning) before Cluster.Down. Akka's own
AutoDown logged only the final Down. Decision semantics are unchanged.
New real two-node scenarios (IntegrationTests/Cluster/LeaderAutoDownScenarioTests),
built from production BuildHocon with self-first seeds:
- both nodes cold-start together -> one cluster, nobody downed past FD + window;
- lone cold start with the peer dead (the down-if-alone cold-recreate shape) stays Up,
then the peer cold-starts and joins;
- flapping peer via Akka's trttl throttler Blackhole: unreachable shorter than the
window, repeated past it in total -> never downed; positive control asserts the cuts
really produced unreachability;
- partition held past the window -> each side downs the other, both stay Up and
leader (the accepted dual-active trade);
- switch off: auto-down loads AutoDowning, keep-oldest loads SplitBrainResolverProvider,
only leader-auto-down loads the in-repo provider.
Unit: flapping never downs; a flapping member that finally stays unreachable is downed
exactly once a full window after its LAST unreachable; each decision log line.
Mutation-proved: no timer cancel on reachable -> flap-then-stay unit fails; reachable
ignored -> both unit flapping tests, the cancel-log test and the real-cluster flapping
test fail; DOWNING log dropped -> log test fails; provider never downs -> partition
test fails; auto-down miswired to the new provider -> switch-off theory fails.
Docker failover drill not run (it would rebuild the shared scadabridge:latest image
and reuse the shared rig volumes while another agent works in the repo); filed as
deploy gate ScadaBridge#116. Default remains auto-down.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
TemplateLibrary.GetIdByNameAsync was first-row-wins, so a derived slot template
could shadow a same-named base. Now: exact name, base first, derived-only name
only when unique, otherwise unresolved (composition audit says ambiguous).
Tracked-template indexes are base-first too.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
When the run reset the response flag via SetAttribute before the six-argument
handshake, wait for that reset to echo (shared timeout) before writing batch +
trigger, so the previous run's cached CompleteFlag can't satisfy it. Covers the
unported DB-owned MES/receiver scripts. Pending reset consumed per handshake.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
OtOpcUa's out-of-process script runner publishes 0x80040000 with a null value.
- OpcUaDataConnection: logs entry/recovery once per tag, names the symbolic
status in read errors; never a disconnect (not in the reconnect status set).
- InstanceActor: a Bad update with no value is a quality-only transition
(keep value, quality Bad, stream publish, no script/alarm/waiter re-eval),
matching the connection-drop rule. Bad with a value is unchanged.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
#113: AuditLogPartitionMaintenance (monthly SPLIT RANGE) and the
backfill-source-node endpoint now use the AuditLog:MaintenanceConnectionString
login when set (unset = unchanged). Migration AuditMaintenanceGrants gives
scadabridge_audit_purger ALTER ANY DATASPACE and column-level UPDATE (SourceNode).
#114: archive cleanup deletes the writer's own *.tmp files and manifest-less
data files older than 24 h inside {Directory}/{YYYY} (DeletedOrphan, dry-run aware).
#115: head-export failures bump scadabridge.audit.chain_head_export.failures and
Degrade the /health/ready entry audit-chain-head-export (failing or stale > 2 intervals).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Owner decisions recorded: the archive destination stays a directory/UNC
(no object-storage client; share + permissions named at enablement),
parquet-tools-only reading (no re-import), unsigned like the chain (#107).
AuditLog:Archive:RetentionDays (default 0 = never delete; else must exceed
AuditLog:RetentionDays, counted from the archived month's end) and
DeleteSupersededStaleArchives (default true) run after every purge tick.
A retried purge's stale Archived archive is deleted only when a later,
verifying, Purged archive of the same partition provably holds every row:
same prior anchor and the stale chain-end hash at its chain-end sequence
(row or tombstone), every unchained row present by EventId; otherwise it is
reported KeptStale. A sole copy left at Archived is never touched. Deletion
removes only the archive name's own three files in its folder, manifest
first, never a manifest-supplied path. `audit archive cleanup [--dry-run]`
= CleanupAuditArchives (Administrator).
AuditLogArchiveCleanupTests (MSSQL) cover retried purge, kept stale copy,
sole copy, retention and the path guard; each safety rule mutation-checked.
Follow-ups filed: #113, #114, #115.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Item 1 (owner decision: no signing). AuditLog:HashChain:HeadExport (default
off): both centrals periodically read every month's chain head (LastSeq,
LastHash, purge anchor, chained rows, tombstones; one snapshot under the
chain lock SHARED) and append the changed heads to a sink the DB login cannot
write - File (append-only JSONL per node per day, local or UNC) or Syslog
(RFC 5424 over UDP / TCP octet counting). `audit verify-heads --path` reads
those records back (file or syslog-collector lines) and the new
VerifyAuditChainHeads command checks each against the database: Matches /
Extended / Purged, or Mismatch / Regressed / MissingHead / MissingLink /
CountMismatch (exit 3). AuditChainHeadStoreTests forges a chain with the
production hasher: verify-chain says Intact, verify-heads says Mismatch.
Item 3. AuditLog:MaintenanceConnectionString (${secret:}-capable, unset =
today's single login) runs the chain job, chain verify / head export, the
partition switch-out + archive and the per-channel purge on
AuditMaintenanceContext (keyed audit-maintenance repository/archive, purge
actor prefers them). AuditMaintenanceLoginTests runs the hardened setup on
SQL Server: writer (datareader/datawriter/audit_writer) ingests and is
refused chaining and deleting; the chainer+purger login does the full cycle.
Two-login grants documented in Component-AuditLog.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Variant B2 of the #78 benchmark: migration FlipAuditLogClusteredKey drops the
twelve non-clustered indexes, re-adds PK_AuditLog as (OccurredAtUtc, EventId)
on ps_AuditLog_Month, adds the aligned unique UX_AuditLog_EventId_Occurred
(EventId, OccurredAtUtc) for the idempotency probe, and rebuilds the twelve
indexes unchanged. Guarded (re-runnable) Up, inverse-rebuild Down; production
scripts docs/plans/sql/FlipAuditLogClusteredKey{,.rollback}.sql.
The partition-switch purge staging table now reads the live clustered key
order from sys.index_columns, so it switches either shape (old binaries
hard-code the old order: ship with the binaries, both centrals stopped).
Evidence: 300k rows, page 1 90,532 -> 34 logical reads (ordered backward
clustered scan under Top), keyset page 90,532 -> 46, probe 14 -> 14;
FlipAuditLogClusteredKeyMigrationTests pins indexes, grants, Down/Up, the
staging key (mutation: hard-coded old key fails SWITCH) and the read ratio.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Owner decisions on #110: one signing key per environment; TrustedKeys stay hand-edited;
Signing:ProductionBoundary (new, default off) logs a startup warning and reports a Degraded
bundle-signing-policy /health/ready entry while RequireSignedBundles is off; the private key
is read via ${secret:} (proved end to end, never logged); cluster pull decided not to be
built; differential deletions stay deferred. Adds docs/operations/bundle-signing-runbook.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Owner decision (b), 2026-11-09. PendingUpdatesEvaluator re-flattened every
deployed instance on each cache-TTL expiry even when nothing had changed.
- Migration AddConfigGraphRowVersions: a non-concurrency rowversion column
+ index on the 18 configuration tables the evaluation reads (Templates +
5 member tables, Instances + 4 override/binding tables, DataConnections,
DeployedConfigSnapshots, Sites, SharedScripts, ExternalSystemDefinitions,
ExternalSystemMethods, DatabaseConnectionDefinitions). SQL Server only in
the model; SQLite test contexts are untouched. Script:
docs/plans/sql/AddConfigGraphRowVersions.sql. Joins the coordinated
central-pair migration window (#107 item 4).
- IConfigGraphWatermarkReader / ConfigGraphWatermarkReader: ONE query of
MAX(RowVersion) + COUNT_BIG(*) per table (count catches deletes, which
raise no rowversion). rowversion is engine-bumped for any writer, so a
peer central node's edit moves it — not the per-process watermark MG-3
removed.
- The secret store (outside the DB) gets its own stamp: SHA-256 over
ListAsync(includeDeleted: true) metadata.
- Evaluator re-serves the last CLEAN snapshot while watermark + secret
stamp are unchanged; every PendingUpdatesFullEvaluationEvery'th (default
10, validated >= 1, 1 = off) is full regardless — the safety net for a
same-KEK re-wrap or an input table missing from the set. Always full when
the token is unavailable/unreadable, after an evaluation that could not
compute a site's artifact hash, on Re-check, and after a deploy completion.
It only re-serves a real earlier answer, never manufactures one.
Tests: SQL Server (real migrated DB) — token stable without writes, moves
for a peer-connection INSERT/UPDATE and a non-max DELETE, moves for a local
EF write, a detached Update still saves (not a concurrency token), and a
guard that every table the evaluator's repository reads touch is covered.
Evaluator — reuse without flatten (re-served answer still shows the stale
instance), watermark move, 4 secret changes, every-Nth, 5 no-token modes,
unclean evaluation not reused, cache Re-check and deploy completion force
full. Mutation-proven: token compare, clean check, cache force flag, row
count, and an uncovered read each turn tests red.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Owner decision (b), 2026-11-09. An inbound API method has no site
affinity, so the F2 route-time scope only bounded routed SITE traffic;
the method's central-side effects (Database.*, ExternalSystem,
notifications) still ran for a scoped Deployer. FlowDebugRunner now
refuses FlowDebugRunMethodCommand for a site-scoped caller (site ids,
not Administrator) before the script executes, audits the refusal as a
failed InboundRequest under the operator's name, and raises
SiteScopeViolationException -> ManagementUnauthorized, so the Central
UI and the CLI (same /management command) share the gate.
The page disables the "Inbound API method" entry for scoped Deployers
with the reason (tooltip + inline note), starts them on script entry,
and ignores ?methodId= / a stored method choice. Replay and the
instance-scoped script / value-change Live runs are unchanged. The
route-time scope is kept as defence in depth.
Tests: scoped refused (in- and out-of-scope routing; script never runs,
refusal audited), unscoped/Administrator allowed, scoped Replay allowed,
scoped in-scope value-change Live still runs; bUnit for the disabled
entry, the drill-in, and the unscoped control. Mutation-proven (gate
and UI flag reverted -> 4 red).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Evaluated against the current pages and their data sources. The notification
outbox is central-owned, offset-paged and has its own status lifecycle. Site
calls are site-owned and keyset-paged, with a different lifecycle and a
Retry/Discard that relays to the owning site. A union grid would need a
two-cursor merge, a status filter that does not line up, and buttons that hide
different semantics. The revisit trigger (operator confusion reports) has not
fired.
Recommends against building it now. If confusion is reported, start with
cross-links and a combined "stuck items" Health card.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Neither feature is specified well enough to build safely, so this records the
open questions, the options and a recommendation instead of code.
- Pull: the existing CLI can already orchestrate export from one cluster and
import into another with per-cluster auth and audit. A server-side pull
needs decisions on the machine credential, source-side authorisation,
network direction and passphrase handling. Recommendation: orchestrate it
with the CLI and RequireSignedBundles; write no code now.
- Differential: imports already auto-skip Identical rows, so a full bundle
applies only what changed. The baseline, deletions and target drift are
undefined. Recommendation: keep YAGNI; if it is ever needed, use
per-entry content hashes plus --since, and never tombstones.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Exports can now carry a detached ECDSA P-256 signature over the exact
manifest.json bytes in a new optional manifest.sig zip entry. The manifest
already pins the content hash, so a verified signature covers the whole
bundle, including the plaintext source environment the confirm step relies
on. Off by default (ScadaBridge:Transport:Signing): with the defaults,
exports are unsigned and imports accept signed and unsigned bundles.
- The bundle format does not change: bundleFormatVersion stays 1,
manifest.json and the AES-GCM associated data are untouched, and older
importers open entries by name and ignore manifest.sig. Three entries fit
within the default MaxBundleEntryCount of 4.
- Import policy runs after the content-hash check and before any passphrase
work. A signature that fails to verify against a trusted key is always
refused. RequireSignedBundles additionally refuses unsigned bundles and
bundles signed by an untrusted key. A refusal is BundleSignatureException
(Commons), shown on the UI upload step and on CLI preview/import.
- The signature status, key id and signer are recorded on BundleSession and
shown in the import wizard. They are also returned on PreviewBundleResult
and recorded on the BundleImported audit row. BundleExported records
Signed/SigningKeyId.
- Key material is pluggable. IBundleSigningKeySource and IBundleTrustStore
are TryAdd'd; the defaults read Signing:PrivateKey (meant to be a
${secret:} reference) and Signing:TrustedKeys. Key ids are SPKI
fingerprints. Startup validation rejects unparseable or non-P-256 keys.
- Compatibility proof: the checked-in fixtures pre-signing-plaintext and
pre-signing-encrypted were exported by origin/main 3ff463b6, before this
change, and are imported end to end with signing off and with signing
configured.
The design leaves key-per-env vs per-org, trust distribution and rotation,
and the production default for RequireSignedBundles open. These are listed
in Component-Transport.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Component-AuditLog Retention & Purge describes the archive: directory and
layout, the three files, consistency with the hash chain (SHARED read,
guarded switch, anchor = archived chain end), fail-closed purge, retention
interplay (per-channel overrides are not archived, their tombstones are),
verify/read, and the AuditLog:Archive configuration. alog.md §13.6/§15.2/§16,
CLAUDE.md, HighLevelReqs AL-12, Component-CLI, Component-ManagementService,
docs/components/{CLI,ManagementService}.md and the CLI README drop the
"deferred / 501" wording and document `audit archive list|verify` and the
parquet export.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Per-hop current state with code evidence (browser/Traefik/Kestrel, CLI,
central<->site gRPC + PSK, LocalDb sync, Akka remoting, OPC UA /
MxGateway), the recommended mode per hop (Kestrel HTTPS + ALPN, gRPC over
TLS with validation and the PSK retained, Akka DotNetty SSL with a cert
per node and mutual auth), certificate issuance/storage/rotation, rig and
wonder impact, a staged rollout, rollback, a test plan and 13 open owner
decisions. Findings: the central ASPNETCORE_URLS re-bind drops the
scheme (an https URL binds plaintext); Akka.NET has no secure-cookie, so
mTLS is the only remoting authentication. Component-ClusterInfrastructure
documents the new RemotingTls option.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Adds LeaderAutoDowningProvider (Host/Actors), a line-for-line port of Akka.NET
1.5.62 AutoDowning/AutoDown/AutoDownBase read from the decompiled assembly: the
leader among the reachable members downs a peer unreachable for StableAfter; a
non-leader records it as pending and downs it on becoming leader; reachable-again
or removed members are forgotten; Down/Exiting members are skipped. Its window is
carried under scadabridge.cluster.leader-auto-down.unreachable-after, so no
deprecated auto-down-unreachable-after key is emitted and Akka's boot-time
"keep-majority will be used instead" warning goes away. DownRemovalMargin reads
akka.cluster.down-removal-margin exactly as AutoDowning does (default off).
New SplitBrainResolverStrategy value "leader-auto-down", wired through BuildHocon
and ClusterOptionsValidator. The default stays "auto-down"; auto-down and
keep-oldest HOCON is byte-identical to before. Placed in Host, not
ClusterInfrastructure, per the Code Placement rule (ClusterInfrastructure stays
Akka-free).
Tests: HOCON + validator units; LeaderAutoDownTests ports Akka's AutoDownSpec
cases (leader-only, pending-on-leader-change, losing leadership, reachable again,
removed, Down/Exiting skipped, single Down per member); LeaderAutoDownFailoverTests
clones SbrFailoverTests' oldest-crash and younger-crash cases on a real two-node
cluster plus a test that Akka actually loaded the provider and its downing actor.
Mutation-checked: a provider that never calls Cluster.Down fails both failover
tests; never-downs, leader-check-dropped, reachable-ignored and pending-not-flushed
mutations each fail the unit tests.
Remaining gate before switching the default: the docker failover drill
(DRILL_MODE=active and standby mode) on leader-auto-down.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Component-AuditLog Security & Tamper-Evidence describes the per-month chain,
the chaining job and its lock, both purge paths (checkpoint anchor,
tombstones), pre-existing rows, verification and what an unsigned chain does
not prove. alog.md §11.4/§16, CLAUDE.md, HighLevelReqs AL-11/12,
Component-CLI, Component-ManagementService, docs/components/CLI.md and the
CLI README drop the "no-op placeholder" wording.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Audit roadmap T1 (alog.md §11.4): one chain per UTC calendar month of
OccurredAtUtc. Each chained row carries ChainSeq (gap-free within its month)
and RowHash = SHA-256(prev.RowHash || canonical(row)); the v1 canonical form
(AuditChainHasher) is pinned by a known-answer vector computed independently.
- Migration AddAuditLogHashChain: nullable ChainSeq/RowHash on dbo.AuditLog
(metadata-only add), AuditLogChainHead (per-month chain end + partition-purge
checkpoint anchor), AuditLogChainTombstone, two partition-aligned filtered
indexes, scadabridge_audit_chainer role with a column-level UPDATE grant.
Production script docs/plans/sql/AddAuditLogHashChain.sql.
- AuditLogHashChain chains unchained rows oldest month first under an
exclusive sp_getapplock (zero timeout, so a dual-active central pair still
yields one chain), with an optimistic head check and a ChainSeq IS NULL
row-count check that roll a pass back instead of leaving a gap. The ingest
path is untouched.
- Purges keep the chain verifiable: the partition switch records the month's
checkpoint anchor and drops its tombstones; the per-channel DELETE writes a
tombstone per chained row in the same transaction (OUTPUT INTO). Both, and
the SourceNode backfill, hold the chain lock; the backfill skips chained
rows. The switch staging table gains the two new columns.
- AuditChainVerifier reports the first break (partition, ChainSeq, EventId,
kind) for edited, deleted, reordered rows and tail truncation.
- AuditLogHashChainService (central, default OFF via AuditLog:HashChain).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
(a) Inbound API compile state (#75) is per central node: a recompile cleared the
known-bad record only on the node that answered, and the peer kept refusing the
unchanged script with SCRIPT_COMPILE_FAILED (the per-request revision check only
notices a changed script). Create / update / delete (ManagementActor post-commit),
RecompileApiMethod, and API methods written by a Transport bundle import now publish
InboundApiMethodInvalidated on the central cache-invalidation topic (#100 item 3).
The new InboundApiCacheInvalidationHandler drops that method's compiled handler,
known-bad record and cached ApiMethod row on the peer, which compiles the current
text on its next request.
(b) docs/components/InboundAPI.md no longer claims a direct DB edit stays stale
until restart: the per-request revision check picks it up once the node's cached
row expires (ApiMethodCacheTtl, 5 s). Component-InboundAPI, Component-Host and the
#85 cache audit describe the peer invalidation.
(c) Decision: the import's locked-override warnings keep EXACT (ordinal) name
matching, because FlatteningService matches override names ordinally. An override
differing from a locked member only by case never reaches that member's lock check
(the flattener drops it as unresolved), so a "targets a LOCKED member" warning for it
would be false. The comparer is now named (LockedOverrideNameComparer) and documented,
and pinned by tests on both sides (flattener + import).
Tests: the peer's known-bad record is cleared by a recompile (and validate leaves it
alone); create/update/delete and the import publish the invalidation; the handler
drops only the named method; composition root registers the handler; case-only
override gets no lock warning; the flattener matches override names exactly.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
The #96 site-psk-invalidation topic was the first cross-node invalidation broadcast.
It is generalised into ONE central DistributedPubSub topic, central-cache-invalidation,
carrying typed messages (Commons ICentralCacheInvalidation: SitePskInvalidated,
RoleMappingsInvalidated, ExternalDefinitionsInvalidated, InboundApiMethodInvalidated)
in an envelope stamped with the publisher's process-unique origin id.
- Host: CentralCacheInvalidationBus (ICentralCacheInvalidationPublisher, no-op until
the mediator is set, never throws) and CentralCacheInvalidationSubscriber, which
skips its own node's envelopes and hands the peer's to every registered
ICentralCacheInvalidationHandler (a failing handler does not stop the rest).
Replaces SitePskInvalidationSubscriber.
- Migration of #96: SitePskRotationInvalidator publishes through the bus and is the
PSK handler; SitePskInvalidated keeps its type name and is also published bare on
site-psk-invalidation, which the subscriber still listens to, so a mixed-version
central pair keeps exchanging PSK invalidations. Remove after one release.
- Audit D1: RoleMappingCache is a handler; ManagementActor's post-commit role-mapping
invalidation also publishes RoleMappingsInvalidated, so a revocation is immediate on
the peer instead of after RoleMappingCacheSeconds.
- Audit D3 / #83 (peer half): ExternalDefinitionLookupCache is a handler; the 9
ManagementActor handlers and the Transport bundle importer publish
ExternalDefinitionsInvalidated after commit. (#83's local import half was already in.)
TTLs remain the fallback for a lost broadcast or a direct SQL edit. Tests: bus and
subscriber unit tests (origin filter, legacy topic), peer-node tests through the real
caches in ManagementService.Tests, importer publish, composition root, and a real
two-node cluster from the production HOCON (CentralCacheInvalidationTwoNodeTests)
proving every message type crosses with the production serializer. Docs: Host,
Communication, Security, ManagementService, ESG, and the #85 cache audit.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
The bulk SetInstanceNativeAlarmSourceOverridesCommand handler always wrote the
entry's IsMesReportableOverride, so a CLI import of a legacy 4-column CSV (no
MesReportable column) reset every imported source's MES override to inherit. The
Central UI avoided it only by looking up the stored flag client-side.
NativeAlarmSourceOverrideEntry gains an additive trailing KeepStoredMesReportable
flag: when set, the server leaves an existing row's MES override untouched (a new
row inherits) and ignores IsMesReportableOverride; unset keeps the old meaning
(null = clear to inherit), so older senders are unaffected. The CLI and the Central
UI now build their entries through one rule (ToOverrideEntry on each row type):
no MesReportable column => KeepStoredMesReportable. CLI README and
Component-CentralUI updated.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Deployments free-text search and the config-audit EntityName filter no longer
emit LIKE '%term%' by default. Prefix (LIKE 'term%') is the default; substring
is an explicit opt-in (DeploymentSearchMode.Contains / entityNameContains)
always bounded by a DeployedAt/Timestamp window (explicit, else 30 days).
Migration PrefixSearchIndexes adds DeployedBy, RevisionHash and EntityName
indexes. Deployments page gains a 'Match anywhere' checkbox.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
The data plane answers a broken inbound method with the generic "Script
compilation failed for this method"; the Roslyn diagnostic reached only the
central log, and the known-bad cache could not be observed or reset per method.
- InboundScriptExecutor keeps the diagnostics with each known-bad record and
exposes GetCompileState(name, currentScript): IsCompiled / IsKnownBad /
LastCompileError, judged against the current script text (a record for older
text is reported as not compiled yet).
- Management: ValidateApiMethodCommand (compile the stored script, return
ApiMethodCompileResult, register nothing, cache untouched) and
RecompileApiMethodCommand (CompileAndRegister without re-sending the entity,
drops the node's ApiMethodCache row, audited "Recompile"). Both Designer, like
UpdateApiMethod; dispatched through the shared ApiMethodCompileOperations.
GetApiMethod keeps the entity fields top-level and adds isCompiled,
isKnownBad, lastCompileError and compileStateNode. Compile state is per
central node and every result names the node.
- CLI: api-method validate --id, api-method recompile --id.
- Central UI: the API-method edit page shows the saved script's compile state
and last error, with Validate and Recompile actions (same operations, same
Designer gate, fresh DI scope).
- RequiredRoleMatrixTests entries; ManagementSurfaceParityTests covers the new
CLI leaves; ApiMethodCompileDiagnosticsTests + an executor CompileState test.
- Docs: CLI README, Component-CLI/ManagementService/InboundAPI, components/*.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Joseph Doherty