scadaproj/docs/plans/2026-06-02-auth-audit-normalization-phase1.md

# Phase 1 (Auth adoption) — elaborated steps + Task 1.0 findings

Companion to `2026-06-02-auth-audit-normalization.md`. Produced by the Task 1.0 read-only
exploration gate (4 parallel explorers: library surface + 3 repos). All paths verified
2026-06-02 against source.

## Cutover target — `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth` public surface

| Package | Consumer entry points |
|---|---|
| `.Abstractions` | **NB: `IGroupRoleMapper<TRole>`/`GroupRoleMapping<TRole>`/`CanonicalRole` live in namespace `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Roles`** (verified during Task 1.1). `ILdapAuthService`, `LdapOptions` (`Transport: LdapTransport{Ldaps,StartTls,None}`, `AllowInsecure`, `UserNameAttribute`, `GroupAttribute`, `ServiceAccountDn/Password`, `SearchBase`, `ConnectionTimeoutMs`, `ServerCertificateValidationCallback`), `LdapAuthResult(Succeeded,Username,DisplayName,Groups,Failure)`, `LdapAuthFailure`, `CanonicalRole{Viewer,Operator,Engineer,Designer,Deployer,Administrator}`, `IGroupRoleMapper<TRole>` (**no default impl — consumer writes it**) → `GroupRoleMapping<TRole>(Roles, Scope:object?)`, plus API-key abstractions (`IApiKeyVerifier`, `ApiKeyVerification`, `ApiKeyIdentity`, `IApiKeyStore`/`IApiKeyAdminStore`/`IApiKeyAuditStore`, `ApiKeyOptions{TokenPrefix,PepperSecretName,SqlitePath,RunMigrationsOnStartup}`) |
| `.Ldap` | `LdapAuthService(LdapOptions)` : `ILdapAuthService`. Bind-then-search, fail-closed, never throws. `LdapOptionsValidator` (TLS-or-AllowInsecure) auto-registered. |
| `.ApiKeys` | `ApiKeyVerifier(ApiKeyOptions, IApiKeyStore, IApiKeyPepperProvider, TimeProvider?)`, `ApiKeyParser.TryParse` (`<prefix>_<keyId>_<secret>`), `ApiKeySecretGenerator.NewSecret()`, default SQLite stores, `ConfigurationApiKeyPepperProvider`. **Extracted from MxGateway — near-1:1 with its pipeline.** |
| `.AspNetCore` | `ZbClaimTypes{Name,Role,DisplayName,Username,ScopeId}`, `ZbCookieDefaults.Apply(opts, requireHttps, idleTimeout)`, DI: `AddZbLdapAuth(services, config, sectionPath)`, `AddZbApiKeyAuth(services, config, sectionPath)`. |

## Per-app current state (verified) and elaborated cutover

### OtOpcUa — packages: Abstractions + Ldap + AspNetCore (no ApiKeys)

Current LDAP: `src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Security/Ldap/LdapAuthService.cs` (impl), `ILdapAuthService.cs`,
`LdapOptions.cs` (**section `Security:Ldap`**, `UseTls` bool, `Enabled`, `DevStubMode`, embedded `GroupToRole` dict),
`LdapAuthResult.cs` (already carries `Roles`). Role mapping is **config + DB**: `RoleMapper.Map` (config
`GroupToRole`) + `RoleMapper.Merge` with DB `LdapGroupRoleMappingService`/`LdapGroupRoleMapping` (system-wide rows).
Native roles `AdminRole{ConfigViewer,ConfigEditor,FleetAdmin}` (control-plane only; data-plane is a separate
`NodePermissions` bitmask). DI: two `TryAddSingleton<ILdapAuthService,LdapAuthService>` sites
(`Security/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:42` + `Host/Program.cs:106`). Cookie `ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Auth`,
single Cookie scheme (JWT inside cookie). **Second LDAP consumer:** OPC UA data-plane
`LdapOpcUaUserAuthenticator` + `OpcUaApplicationHost.HandleImpersonation` call the LDAP service too.

- **1.1 mapper:** implement `IGroupRoleMapper<AdminRole>` (or `<string>`) wrapping `RoleMapper.Map` + DB `Merge`.
- **1.2 Ldap:** replace `LdapAuthService` with `Auth.Ldap`; restructure flow to `ILdapAuthService → Groups → IGroupRoleMapper → roles → claims`; **preserve `DevStubMode` app-side** (library has no stub); wire BOTH consumers (login endpoint + OPC UA impersonation).
- **1.4 config:** `UseTls`→`Transport` enum (section already `Security:Ldap` — see Finding #1).
- **1.5 cookie/claims:** use `ZbClaimTypes` + `ZbCookieDefaults.Apply`; keep cookie name.
- **1.7 roles:** `ConfigViewer→Viewer`, `ConfigEditor→Designer`, `FleetAdmin→Administrator(+Deployer; publish⊂FleetAdmin)`. Data-plane `NodePermissions` unaffected.

### MxAccessGateway — packages: all 4 (ApiKeys **source**, cuts over first)

Current API keys (`src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Security/Authentication/`): `ApiKeyParser` (`mxgw_<id>_<secret>`),
`ApiKeySecretHasher` (HMAC-SHA256 + pepper `MxGateway:ApiKeyPepper`), `ApiKeySecretGenerator`, `ApiKeyVerifier`
(`FixedTimeEquals`), SQLite stores, `ConstraintEnforcer` + rich `ApiKeyConstraints`, gRPC
`GatewayGrpcAuthorizationInterceptor` + `GatewayScopes`. DI `AddSqliteAuthStore()`. → **near-1:1 with `Auth.ApiKeys`.**
LDAP: `Dashboard/DashboardAuthenticator.cs` (`MxGateway:Ldap`, `UseTls`), `GroupToRole` under `MxGateway:Dashboard`,
roles `Admin`/`Viewer`, cookie `MxGatewayDashboard`.

- **1.1 mapper:** `IGroupRoleMapper<string>` wrapping `DashboardAuthenticator.MapGroupsToRoles`.
- **1.2 Ldap:** replace `DashboardAuthenticator`'s LDAP internals with `Auth.Ldap` (keep dashboard claims/principal build).
- **1.3 ApiKeys:** delete the local parser/hasher/generator/verifier/stores; re-point to `Auth.ApiKeys`; **keep** `ConstraintEnforcer` + gRPC interceptor + scopes on top (constraints carried as the opaque blob). Lowest-risk ApiKeys cutover (it's the donor).
- **1.4 config:** `UseTls`→`Transport`.
- **1.5/1.7:** `ZbClaimTypes`/cookie defaults; `Viewer→Viewer`, `Admin→Administrator`.

### ScadaBridge — packages: all 4 (Ldap **source**; ApiKeys consumer)

Current LDAP (`src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security/LdapAuthService.cs`): the hardened reference (RFC-4514 DN escape,
filter escape, per-op timeout, fail-closed group lookup, username trim, service-account-bind distinction). Config is
**flat** `ScadaBridge:Security:Ldap*` in `SecurityOptions.cs` with **`LdapTransport` enum already** (`Ldaps/StartTls/None`),
`AllowInsecureLdap`, `LdapUserIdAttribute`, `LdapGroupAttribute`, validated by `SecurityOptionsValidator : OptionsValidatorBase`.
Role mapping **DB-backed** with **site-scoping**: `RoleMapper.MapGroupsToRolesAsync` → `RoleMappingResult(Roles, PermittedSiteIds, IsSystemWideDeployment)` over `LdapGroupMapping` + `SiteScopeRule` (SQL Server). Roles
`Admin/Design/Deployment/Audit/AuditReadOnly`; SoD via `OperationalAudit{Admin,Audit,AuditReadOnly}` + `AuditExport{Admin,Audit}`.
Cookie `ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Auth`; JWT-in-cookie via `JwtTokenService`.
**Inbound API keys** (`InboundAPI/ApiKeyValidator.cs`): **raw `X-API-Key`**, **deterministic** HMAC (`ApiKeyHasher`, no per-row salt, by-value lookup), `ApiKey{Name,KeyHash,IsEnabled}` in **SQL Server**, **per-method approval** via `ApiMethod.ApprovedApiKeyIds` — **architecturally different from the library's keyId/scope/SQLite model.**

- **1.1 mapper:** `IGroupRoleMapper<string>` wrapping `RoleMapper.MapGroupsToRolesAsync`, carrying `PermittedSiteIds`/`IsSystemWideDeployment` in `GroupRoleMapping.Scope`.
- **1.2 Ldap:** ScadaBridge is the donor — confirm `Auth.Ldap` behaviour-matches, then re-point `LdapAuthService` usages to the library type. Lowest-risk Ldap cutover.
- **1.3 ApiKeys:** **see Finding #3 — bigger than a token reformat; needs a scope decision.**
- **1.4 config:** nest flat `Security:Ldap*` under a sub-section + rename `LdapUserIdAttribute→UserNameAttribute`, `LdapGroupAttribute→GroupAttribute`, `LdapTransport→Transport` (+ `SecurityOptionsValidator` + appsettings). Enum already matches.
- **1.7 roles:** `Admin→Administrator`, `Design→Designer`, `Deployment→Deployer`, `Audit→Administrator` (collapse), `AuditReadOnly→Viewer` (collapse) — removes the `OperationalAudit`/`AuditExport` SoD (accepted).

## Key findings that change the plan

1. **OtOpcUa LDAP section is `Security:Ldap`, not `Authentication:Ldap`.** Both `components/auth/GAPS.md §1`
   and the auth current-state doc are wrong; the code (and the prior fix in memory) use `Security:Ldap`.
   → Task 1.4 for OtOpcUa is only `UseTls`→`Transport`, not a section move.
2. **OtOpcUa "double-singleton bug" is already mitigated.** Both registration sites use `TryAddSingleton`
   (dedupes); the `Enabled` flag is an intentional fail-closed master switch. → Not a blocking fix; verify and
   keep `Enabled`. Removes a risk the plan flagged.
3. **ScadaBridge inbound API keys are a re-architecture, not a token reformat.** The library's ApiKeys model
   (`<prefix>_<keyId>_<secret>` Bearer, keyId lookup + constant-time compare, SQLite store, scopes + opaque
   constraints) is fundamentally different from ScadaBridge's (raw `X-API-Key`, deterministic by-value HMAC
   lookup, SQL Server `ApiKey{Name,KeyHash}`, per-method approval list). Wholesale adoption means re-architecting
   inbound-API auth AND resolving a SQLite-vs-SQL-Server storage mismatch. **Needs a scope decision (Decision A).**
4. **OtOpcUa role mapping is config + DB**, not just config (`RoleMapper.Map` baseline + DB `Merge`). The
   `IGroupRoleMapper` impl must combine both. OtOpcUa also has `DevStubMode` (no library equivalent — keep app-side)
   and a **second LDAP consumer** (OPC UA data-plane impersonation) that must be re-wired too.
5. **MxGateway ApiKeys cutover is the donor path — lowest risk** (delete locals, re-point to library; keep
   `ConstraintEnforcer`/gRPC/scopes on top). Confirms the GAPS sequencing (gateway first).

## Task 1.2 (LDAP cutover) — implemented + reviewed (2026-06-02)

Commits: OtOpcUa `257caa7`, MxGateway `c3b466e`, ScadaBridge `ac34dac`. All targeted tests green.
Security review verdict: **sound, no credential-leak regression** in any repo (insecure-transport
guards fire correctly; DevStubMode cannot leak to prod; claim shapes preserved). All three returned
CHANGES-REQUESTED for fixable issues:

- **OtOpcUa** (no Critical): (I1) insecure-transport guard is login-time only — add startup
  validation gated on `Enabled` for defense-in-depth, verify prod overlays still boot; (I2) integration
  stub pre-populates `Roles` so the Groups→mapper path isn't actually exercised — fix the stub; (I3)
  document/test the zero-role fail-closed fallback.
- **MxGateway** (2 Critical): (C1) library strips group DNs to short RDN names before the
  `LdapGroupClaimType` claim → verify prior behaviour, document, drop the now-dead full-DN branch in the
  mapper, add a claim-value assertion; (C2) gateway's local `LdapOptions` is now a shadow copy (validated
  but unused at runtime) → fold to the shared type or document the drift. (I1) shared `LdapOptionsValidator`
  has **no `Enabled=false` guard** → validates even when LDAP is disabled (real for MxGateway, which can
  disable dashboard LDAP).
- **ScadaBridge** (2 Critical): (C1) `ConfigSecretsTests` still checks the OLD flat key → passes
  vacuously, no longer guards secret-in-config — repoint to nested key; (C2) `production-checklist.md`
  still lists deleted flat keys → update; (I) unsafe `(RoleMappingResult)Scope!` cast → null-guard.

**Cross-cutting decision — shared library `LdapOptionsValidator` `Enabled` guard:** the validator runs
regardless of `Enabled`, requiring Server/SearchBase/ServiceAccountDn even when LDAP is off. Correct fix =
add an `if (!Enabled) return Success` guard to the shared validator and republish `0.1.1`, re-pinning all
consumers. (Alternative: each consumer always supplies those fields. The library fix is the principled one.)

## Task 1.2/1.4 — DONE (reviewed + fixed, 2026-06-02)

Library hardened to **`0.1.1`** (`LdapOptionsValidator` skips when `Enabled=false`), republished, re-pinned in all 3 repos.
Fix commits: OtOpcUa `c4f315e` (startup insecure-transport guard gated on Enabled/DevStub + `Transport: Ldaps`
declared in the 3 prod overlays + test fidelity), MxGateway `f4dc11b` (group-claim shape documented as
non-breaking — claim read nowhere in prod; shadow `LdapOptions` kept with a drift-warning doc), ScadaBridge
`4db8c37` (secret-test repointed to nested key, prod checklist updated, `Scope` cast guarded). All targeted
suites green. **1.2 (LDAP) + 1.4 (config) complete across all 3 repos.**

Remaining Phase 1: **1.3 ApiKeys** (MxGateway donor cutover — low risk; ScadaBridge full re-architecture —
largest single item: SQLite store + Bearer format + scopes + key re-issuance), **1.5** claims/cookies,
**1.6** dev base DN, **1.7** canonical roles.

## Task 1.3 ApiKeys — MxGateway DONE; ScadaBridge pending (2026-06-02)

**Library bumped to `0.1.2`**: `Auth.ApiKeys` SQLite migrator now stamps schema version **2** (was 1) to
match the donor gateway's deployed `gateway-auth.db` — without it the gateway would fail to boot (migrator
threw on a newer on-disk version). Final schema byte-identical since v1; no key re-issuance. Republished,
re-pinned in MxGateway. (+2 migrator tests.)

**MxGateway 1.3 — DONE + APPROVED** (commit `05009d7`): deleted 28 local pipeline files, adopted
`Auth.ApiKeys 0.1.2` via `AddZbApiKeyAuth`; kept `ConstraintEnforcer`/gRPC interceptor/scopes/CLI/dashboard
on top via a `GatewayApiKeyIdentityMapper` (library identity → gateway identity-with-EffectiveConstraints).
Review: no Critical; no auth bypass, schema compat + crypto parity + gRPC status mapping verified. Non-blocking
follow-ups: (a) dashboard mutations now write two audit rows (library + `dashboard-*`) — fine, note for Phase 2
audit bridging; (b) nit: `GatewayApiKeyIdentityMapper` uses `Constraints as string` (opaque coupling) — consider
a guard/contract test.

**ScadaBridge 1.3 — PENDING**: the full inbound-API re-architecture (SQL Server → SQLite store, `X-API-Key`
→ Bearer, per-method-approval → scopes/constraints, **all inbound keys re-issued**). Largest/highest-risk
single item in the program; warrants its own focused pass (likely decomposed).

## ScadaBridge ApiKeys re-architecture — spec (FULL ADOPT, 2026-06-02)

Decision: **full adopt** the library SQLite store + scopes model. Single consistent contract all layers build to:

- **Token format**: `Authorization: Bearer sbk_<keyId>_<secret>` (prefix `sbk`). Replaces the raw `X-API-Key` header.
- **Scope model = method name.** A key's `Scopes` set = the API-method names it may call. `ApiMethod.ApprovedApiKeyIds`
  (CSV of key int IDs) is **retired**; per-method approval moves to the key's scopes. Auth check at the endpoint:
  `identity.Scopes.Contains(methodName)`.
- **Storage**: inbound keys move to the library's SQLite store (new `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore` sqlite path
  + pepper via `ApiKeyOptions.PepperSecretName`, `RunMigrationsOnStartup`). The SQL Server `ApiKey` entity is retired;
  `ApiMethod` is KEPT minus `ApprovedApiKeyIds` (EF migration drops the column). `InboundApiRepository` loses its ApiKey
  methods + `GetApprovedKeysForMethodAsync`.
- **Auth path** (`InboundAPI`): endpoint reads Bearer, calls library `IApiKeyVerifier.VerifyAsync`, then the scope check.
  PRESERVE the security invariants: 401 (missing/invalid/disabled), **403 identical message for both "method not found"
  and "not in scope"** (enumeration-safety, InboundAPI-011), constant-time compare (library does it), active-node 503 +
  body-cap 413 filters unchanged, audit actor = key DisplayName. Delete `ApiKeyValidator` hashing + `ApiKeyHasher`.
- **Management** (`ManagementActor` + CLI `security api-key` + Commons messages): drive the library `IApiKeyAdminStore` +
  `ApiKeySecretGenerator`. `create` returns `sbk_<keyId>_<secret>` once (plaintext-once preserved); methods a key may call
  = its scopes, set on create/update (e.g. `--methods a,b` or grant/revoke-method commands). `list` returns id/name/enabled
  (no secret), `update --enabled`, `delete`/revoke. Audit preserved.
- **CentralUI**: `ApiKeys.razor` (list/create/toggle/delete via admin store; show token once), `ApiKeyForm.razor` (edit the
  key's method-scopes), `ApiMethodForm.razor` (method-side "approved keys" now reads/writes key scopes across keys).
- **Breaking change**: all inbound keys re-issued (new format); clients switch `X-API-Key` → `Authorization: Bearer`.
  Needs a runbook + CHANGELOG. Re-pin ScadaBridge Auth packages to **0.1.2**.

Sub-tasks (sequential where files overlap): **(A)** storage retire + EF migration + library wiring/options;
**(B)** auth-path rewrite (Bearer + verifier + scope check); **(C)** management (ManagementActor + CLI + messages);
**(D)** CentralUI pages; **(E)** runbook/CHANGELOG + integration test sweep. A→(B,C)→D→E.
Sequencing note: doing it **additively** (add library path, switch auth, rewire mgmt/UI, retire SQL Server entity LAST)
keeps the build green at each step.

### Re-arch progress
- **A+B foundation — DONE + reviewed+fixed** (commits `a94558c`, `1fcc4f5`; re-pinned to 0.1.2). Library `AddZbApiKeyAuth`
  wired additively (`ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore`, prefix `sbk`, reuses inbound pepper); inbound endpoint now uses
  the library verifier + Bearer + `Scopes.Contains(methodName)`. Security invariants preserved: 401 generic / 403 identical
  body for not-found AND not-in-scope (enumeration-safe, pinned to a literal in tests), scope-check-before-DB (no timing
  oracle), fail-fast pepper preflight (Central), audit actor = DisplayName. Old SQL Server path still compiles (retired in E).
  163/163 InboundAPI tests green. **NOTE for E:** the library's `ApiKeySecretGenerator.NewSecret()` is `internal` — seed/create
  keys via the public `ApiKeyAdminCommands.CreateKeyAsync` seam (returns the assembled `sbk_…` token).
- **Library 0.1.3 — DONE + reviewed + PUBLISHED** (scadaproj commits `468959c` impl, `290e85c` tests; pushed to Gitea,
  ApiKeys 0.1.3 nupkg verified HTTP 200). Added `IApiKeyAdminStore.SetScopesAsync(keyId, scopes, ct)` + `SetEnabledAsync(keyId,
  enabled, whenUtc, ct)` (+ audited facade verbs `ApiKeyAdminCommands.SetScopesAsync`/`SetEnabledAsync` → eventTypes
  `set-scopes`/`enable-key`/`disable-key`). **No schema change** (`CurrentVersion` stays 2): scopes column already exists;
  `revoked_utc` doubles as the enabled flag (null = enabled), so enable/disable is a reversible toggle that preserves the
  secret (proven by test asserting `SecretHash.SequenceEqual` + unchanged `last_used_utc`). This is what lets C/D edit a key's
  method-scopes and toggle enabled WITHOUT re-issuing the token. **ScadaBridge must re-pin Auth packages 0.1.2 → 0.1.3.**
- **C (management), D (CentralUI), E (retire SQL Server ApiKey + ApiMethod.ApprovedApiKeyIds migration + runbook/CHANGELOG)
  — IN PROGRESS.** Mapping: `CreateApiKeyCommand` → `CreateKeyAsync` (keyId = `Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N")`,
  DisplayName = name, scopes = `--methods`); `ListApiKeysCommand` → `ListKeysAsync` (enabled = `RevokedUtc is null`);
  `UpdateApiKeyCommand(IsEnabled)` → `SetEnabledAsync`; new set-scopes path → `SetScopesAsync`; `DeleteApiKeyCommand` →
  revoke-then-`DeleteKeyAsync`. All management message keys switch `int ApiKeyId` → `string KeyId`.

### Discovered architecture (CentralUI Explore, 2026-06-02) — expands C/D/E
Two facts the original A–E spec missed:
1. **CentralUI bypasses the ManagementActor.** `Components/Pages/Admin/ApiKeys.razor`, `ApiKeyForm.razor`, and
   `Components/Pages/Design/ApiMethodForm.razor` call `IInboundApiRepository` (SQL Server EF) **directly** — they do NOT
   send the `CreateApiKeyCommand`/etc. management messages. So there are **two** management entry points to rewire
   (CLI→ManagementActor uses the messages; CentralUI→repository uses the entities). Decoupling: introduce one app-side
   **`IInboundApiKeyAdmin` seam** over the library `ApiKeyAdminCommands`, and route BOTH CLI and CentralUI through it
   (DRY + single audit path). The message-contract change (int→string) touches only CLI+ManagementActor; the
   entity/repository change (`ApiKey.Id`, `ApiMethod.ApprovedApiKeyIds`) touches CentralUI + TransportExport.
2. **TransportExport couples API keys + methods into config export/import** (`Components/Pages/Design/TransportExport.razor`
   + `.razor.cs`, `HashSet<int>` selections, `ExportSelection`). With keys now in the library SQLite store (per-env pepper,
   secret-once), a key can't be exported/re-imported usefully. **Decision (user, 2026-06-02): EXCLUDE inbound API keys from
   transport — export API methods only; keys are re-created + method-scopes re-granted per environment.**

CentralUI blast radius (string keyId + scopes replace int Id + ApprovedApiKeyIds CSV): `Admin/ApiKeys.razor`,
`Admin/ApiKeyForm.razor`, `Design/ApiMethodForm.razor` (approved-keys ↔ key-scopes), `Design/TransportExport.razor(.cs)`,
`Design/ExternalSystems.razor` (uses method `int` id — methods STAY int in SQL Server, so unaffected for keys),
`Dashboard.razor` (key count), test `Admin/ApiKeyFormAuditDrillinTests.cs`.

### C/D/E decomposition — 5 reviewed green sub-commits (user: "coordinated multi-commit now", 2026-06-02)
- **C1** — re-pin ScadaBridge Auth 0.1.2→0.1.3; add app-side `IInboundApiKeyAdmin` seam (string-keyId model:
  Create(name,methods)→(keyId,token) / List / SetEnabled / SetMethods / Delete[=revoke+delete] / GetMethodsForKey /
  GetKeysForMethod) over the library facade; register `ApiKeyAdminCommands` + the seam in Host **and** CentralUI DI; seam
  unit tests. **Purely additive — build green.**
- **C2** — Commons `Messages/Management/SecurityCommands.cs` contracts int→string keyId + add `Methods` + new
  `SetApiKeyMethodsCommand`; rewire ManagementActor handlers + CLI `security api-key` onto the seam; update ManagementActor
  tests. (CentralUI unaffected — it doesn't use these messages.)
- **C3** — CentralUI `ApiKeys.razor`/`ApiKeyForm.razor`/`ApiMethodForm.razor` (+ Dashboard count) off `IInboundApiRepository`-
  for-keys onto the seam; string keyId; method-scope editing replaces `ApprovedApiKeyIds`; update bUnit test. (Methods stay
  in SQL Server; just stop using the `ApprovedApiKeyIds` column — dropped in C5.)
- **C4** — TransportExport: remove API-key selection/export (methods-only); drop key `HashSet<int>` + `ExportSelection` keys;
  tests.
- **C5 (=E)** — retire SQL Server `ApiKey` entity + DbContext reg + `IInboundApiRepository` key methods +
  `GetApprovedKeysForMethodAsync`; drop `ApiMethod.ApprovedApiKeyIds`; EF migration (drop ApiKeys table + column); delete
  residual `ApiKeyValidator`/`ApiKeyHasher`; runbook + CHANGELOG (breaking: re-issue keys, `X-API-Key`→`Authorization: Bearer`);
  full build+test sweep.

#### Re-arch sub-commit progress (2026-06-02)
- **C1 — DONE + reviewed** (ScadaBridge commits `d09def2` seam+re-pin-0.1.3, `7f7ea3f` review polish). `IInboundApiKeyAdmin`
  seam (interface in Commons, `LibraryInboundApiKeyAdmin` impl in the Security project over `ApiKeyAdminCommands`), DI in
  Host (CentralUI shares that container). Spec PASS + code-review APPROVED (guard `name`, doc throws/O(n) contract).
  **Two pre-existing Host.Tests reds from the prior session's Auth work (uncaught because Host.Tests weren't run) fixed as
  part of restoring a green baseline:** (a) `7e25efa` — A+B's Central pepper preflight (`1fcc4f5`) needs a ≥16-char test
  `ApiKeyPepper`; supplied via env vars in the Central test fixtures (test-only) + 3 guard tests; Host.Tests 86 fail → 1.
  (b) `55099b1` — LDAP cutover (`ac34dac`) made component-lib `AddSecurity(IConfiguration)` violate ScadaBridge's
  `OptionsTests` arch rule; moved `AddZbLdapAuth` to the Host composition root, dropped the param (behaviour-preserving);
  Host.Tests 1 fail → **0**. Green baseline now: build 0/0, Host.Tests 228, Security.Tests 89, InboundAPI 163, CentralUI 584.
  **NOTE for Phase 2:** `AuditLog.AddAuditLog(IConfiguration)` also takes IConfiguration but is intentionally NOT in the
  `OptionsTests` scanned set — revisit during audit adoption (Task 2.5), don't silently "fix".
- **C2 — DONE + reviewed** (SB commits `6518e93` rewire, `8219b8e` review fixes). Commons messages int→string keyId
  + `Methods` + new `SetApiKeyMethodsCommand`; ManagementActor's 5 API-key handlers + CLI `security api-key` now drive
  `IInboundApiKeyAdmin`; ScadaBridge management audit preserved (actor = user.Username; secret/token never audited/logged).
  Spec PASS, code-review APPROVED after fixes: not-found now throws `ManagementCommandException` BEFORE audit (no spurious
  audit on no-op update/delete/set-methods); empty `Methods` rejected server-side (prevents unusable key on create + stealth-
  disable via `set-methods ""`); token advisory→stderr. Green: ManagementService 125, CLI 188, + Security/InboundAPI/Host/
  CentralUI unchanged. CentralUI + SQL Server `ApiKey` entity/repo untouched (C3/C5).
- **C3 — DONE + reviewed** (SB commits `107e524` rewire, `d1191fd` review fixes). CentralUI `Admin/ApiKeys.razor`,
  `Admin/ApiKeyForm.razor`, `Design/ApiMethodForm.razor`, `Dashboard.razor` onto `IInboundApiKeyAdmin`: string keyId,
  method-NAME scopes replace the `ApprovedApiKeyIds` CSV, one-time token display on create, key Name fixed-after-create
  (no rename in the lib model). The "approved keys ↔ key scopes" inversion is a pure tested helper
  `CentralUI/Services/ApiMethodKeyScopeReconciler.cs` (save method entity first, then reconcile each affected key's full
  scope set fresh; empty-last-scope revoke is blocked with a clear message, never pushes an empty set). Spec PASS,
  code-review APPROVED after fixes: seam `bool` not-found now surfaced (no silent success), partial-reconcile-failure
  guidance ("method saved, key scopes partially applied — review on API Keys page"), create validation order, concurrent-
  edit reconciler test. CentralUI.Tests 595 green; all other suites unchanged. TransportExport + SQL Server entities/repo
  untouched (C4/C5). (Also removed a stray `Name` artifact file from an accidental redirect — not committed.)
- **C4 — DONE + reviewed** (SB commits `731cfd3` rewire, `b13d7b3` review polish). TransportExport excludes inbound API
  keys (methods-only) end-to-end — UI selection, `ExportSelection`, DependencyResolver, EntitySerializer/DTOs, BundleExporter,
  manifest/summary, CLI `--api-keys`, ManagementActor `HandleExportBundle`, and the IMPORT path (BundleImporter/ArtifactDiff:
  no key creation; method overwrite PRESERVES the destination's existing `ApprovedApiKeyIds`, doesn't clobber). Method export
  drops `ApprovedApiKeyIds`. Backward-compat: legacy bundles with an `apiKeys` section still deserialize (tolerant `ApiKeys?`
  field via shared `BundleJsonOptions` + `WhenWritingNull`) and are IGNORED on import with an `ImportResult.ApiKeysIgnored`
  count + audit stamp; new exports omit the field. UI info note added. Spec PASS, code-review APPROVED (note: review I-1
  "added-unrestricted count" intentionally SKIPPED — wrong model: inbound auth is scope-based, the verifier ignores
  `ApprovedApiKeyIds`, so a new method is callable by NO key until a scope is granted). Transport.Tests 60, IntegrationTests
  34 green. SQL Server `ApiKey`/`ApiMethod` entities + repo untouched (C5).
- **C5 (=E) — DONE + reviewed** (SB commit `afa5598`). Retired SQL Server `ApiKey` entity + 7 `IInboundApiRepository` key
  methods + `ApiMethod.ApprovedApiKeyIds` + `DbSet<ApiKey>`/fluent config + residual `ApiKeyHasher`/`IApiKeyHasher`/
  `ApiKeyValidator` (+ their tests). EF migration `RetireInboundApiKeyStore` (DropTable `ApiKeys` + DropColumn
  `ApprovedApiKeyIds`; `Down` recreates both byte-faithfully; ModelSnapshot consistent). CHANGELOG.md + tracked runbook
  `docs/operations/inbound-api-key-reissue.md` (BREAKING: `X-API-Key`→`Authorization: Bearer sbk_…`, all keys re-issued;
  per-env SqlitePath + ≥16-char ApiKeyPepper). Spec PASS, code-review APPROVED: migration Down/snapshot verified, inbound
  verifier path (A+B) intact, no live consumer broke. Green: ConfigurationDatabase 241, InboundAPI 148 (was 163: removed
  validator/hasher tests), Security 89, Host 227 (was 228: removed validator DI test), ManagementService 125, CLI 188,
  CentralUI 595, Transport 60+34. (Pre-existing infra-dependent failures — IntegrationTests ×11, AuditLog ×1, needing live
  LDAP/SQL/SMTP — proven identical at baseline `b13d7b3` via git-stash; StaleTagMonitor flaky timer tests pass 13/13 isolated.)
  **Installer/secret note:** the C5 code-review flagged the (untracked, intentionally `.gitignore`d `/deploy/`) `install.ps1`
  not injecting the pepper — fixed ON DISK (the on-disk installer now takes `-ApiKeyPepper`); a subagent had force-committed
  the ignored deploy script (which embeds a real default JWT key) — that commit was RESET (`git reset --mixed`), keeping the
  edit on disk and the secret OUT of git history (branch was never pushed). The pepper requirement is documented in the
  tracked runbook.

### ✅ Task 1.3 (Adopt ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys) COMPLETE across all repos
MxGateway donor cutover + ScadaBridge full re-architecture (C1 seam → C2 mgmt/CLI → C3 CentralUI → C4 TransportExport →
C5 retire+migration+runbook), all reviewed, lib at **0.1.3**. ScadaBridge inbound API is now 100% on the shared library
(Bearer `sbk_<keyId>_<secret>`, scope = method name, per-key SQLite store + per-env pepper); the SQL Server key model is
fully retired. Remaining Phase 1: **1.5** (AspNetCore claims/cookies, 3 UIs), **1.6** (dev GLAuth base DN), **1.7**
(canonical roles, 3 repos). Then Phase 2 (audit) + Phase 3 (Actor wiring).

## Resolved decisions (2026-06-02)

- **Decision A — ScadaBridge inbound API keys depth → (a) FULL ADOPT.** Re-architect inbound-API auth to the
  library's model: `<prefix>_<keyId>_<secret>` Bearer token format, keyId lookup + constant-time compare,
  scopes/constraints, and **move inbound API keys into the library's SQLite store** (separate from the SQL Server
  config DB). This is the largest, highest-risk item in Phase 1. Implications to handle in Task 1.3:
  - New SQLite auth DB for ScadaBridge inbound keys (path via `ApiKeyOptions.SqlitePath`); migrate/retire the
    SQL Server `ApiKey{Name,KeyHash}` table + `ApiMethod.ApprovedApiKeyIds` linkage.
  - Re-model **per-method approval** as the library's scopes/constraints (or the opaque constraint blob) — the
    `ApiMethod.ApprovedApiKeyIds` set becomes per-key scope grants.
  - Switch the inbound transport from `X-API-Key` header to `Authorization: Bearer <token>` (a client-visible
    contract change — extends the already-accepted token-format change; needs the interop check + a doc/CHANGELOG note).
  - Existing raw keys cannot be migrated (deterministic-by-value hash, no keyId/secret split) → **re-issue** all
    inbound API keys; call this out in the cutover runbook.
- **Decision B — canonical role mappings → confirmed as tabled above** (OtOpcUa `ConfigViewer→Viewer`,
  `ConfigEditor→Designer`, `FleetAdmin→Administrator+Deployer`; MxGateway `Viewer/Admin`; ScadaBridge
  `Admin→Administrator`, `Design→Designer`, `Deployment→Deployer`, `Audit→Administrator`, `AuditReadOnly→Viewer`).
- **Decision C — dev escape hatches → keep app-side, unchanged.** OtOpcUa `DevStubMode` and MxGateway
  `AllowAnonymousLocalhost`/loopback bypass have no library equivalent; preserve them in each app outside the
  shared `Auth.Ldap` path.

## Phase 1 tail — decisions + current state (2026-06-02, resumed)

Task 1.0 gate read-only re-exploration confirmed the post-cutover state for 1.5/1.6/1.7 (3 parallel Explore agents):
- **None of the 3 repos reference `ZbClaimTypes`/`ZbCookieDefaults` yet.** `ZbClaimTypes.Name`/`Role` alias the framework
  URIs (`ClaimTypes.Name`/`.Role`); `DisplayName`/`Username`/`ScopeId` = new `zb:`-prefixed strings.
- Claim mints today: **OtOpcUa** `AuthEndpoints.cs` uses `ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier` + `JwtTokenService.{Username,DisplayName}ClaimType` ("Username"/"DisplayName") + `ClaimTypes.Role` (JWT-in-cookie). **MxGateway** `DashboardAuthenticator.CreatePrincipal` uses `ClaimTypes.{NameIdentifier,Name,Role}` + custom `mxgateway:ldap_group`. **ScadaBridge** `CentralUI/Auth/AuthEndpoints.cs` + `JwtTokenService` use **plain** `"DisplayName"/"Username"/"Role"/"SiteId"/"LastActivity"` strings — `"Role"`/`"SiteId"` are load-bearing in `TokenValidationParameters` + every `AuthorizationPolicies` `RequireClaim`.
- Cookie names confirmed: `ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Auth` / `MxGatewayDashboard` / `ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Auth`. All three apps already do HttpOnly+SameSite=Strict+sliding+SecurePolicy via hand-rolled `PostConfigure` (no `ZbCookieDefaults.Apply`).
- Dev base DNs today: OtOpcUa + MxGateway = `dc=lmxopcua,dc=local`; ScadaBridge = `dc=scadabridge,dc=local`.
- `CanonicalRole` is referenced **nowhere** in any repo yet (Task 1.7 is its first use).

**Decision A3 (Task 1.6 dev base DN) → `dc=zb,dc=local`** (product-neutral, matches the ZB.MOM.WW family; all 3 dev
fixtures + dev appsettings move to it — prod directories untouched). ScadaBridge GLAuth user DNs become
`cn=<user>,ou=<group>,ou=users,dc=zb,dc=local`; OtOpcUa/MxGateway leave `dc=lmxopcua`.

**Decision (Task 1.5 ScadaBridge depth) → FULL canonical incl. role/scope.** Migrate ScadaBridge's role claim to the
framework URI (`ZbClaimTypes.Role`) and the site claim to `ZbClaimTypes.ScopeId` across cookie + JWT mint +
`TokenValidationParameters` + every policy `RequireClaim` + tests (cleanest: redefine the `JwtTokenService.*ClaimType`
constants to alias `ZbClaimTypes.*` so all existing references inherit canonical values). **Treated as high-risk** for the
ScadaBridge slice (serial spec→code review, full ScadaBridge suite). OtOpcUa/MxGateway slices stay standard.

### ✅ Task 1.5 (AspNetCore claims/cookies) COMPLETE across all 3 repos (reviewed)
- **OtOpcUa** `83856b7` + review-fix `d0777ee` (spec ✅, code ✅): `.Security` adds the `Auth.AspNetCore` pkg ref; `JwtTokenService.{Username,DisplayName}ClaimType` alias `ZbClaimTypes.{Username,DisplayName}`; cookie principal emits `ZbClaimTypes.Name` (replaced `NameIdentifier` — grep-confirmed no other reader) + `ZbClaimTypes.Role`; cookie via `ZbCookieDefaults.Apply`, name kept. Issued JWT is documented as issue-only (no `AddJwtBearer` in OtOpcUa; role stays short `"Role"`; `BuildValidationParameters` pins `RoleClaimType`/`NameClaimType` for forward-compat). 35/35.
- **MxGateway** `7e1af37` (spec ✅, code ✅): `DashboardAuthenticator` emits `ZbClaimTypes.{Username,DisplayName}` + identity `nameType/roleType=ZbClaimTypes.{Name,Role}`; keeps `mxgateway:ldap_group` + `NameIdentifier` (HubTokenService reads it); cookie via `ZbCookieDefaults.Apply(requireHttps:true, idleTimeout:8h)` (8h preserved), `RequireHttpsCookie=false` dev-HTTP override kept, name kept. Dashboard 85/85; full 575/578 (3 pre-existing FakeWorker reds).
- **ScadaBridge** `a0938f7` + spelling-fix `c185a56` (high-risk; spec ✅, code ✅): `JwtTokenService.*ClaimType` constants aliased to `ZbClaimTypes.*` (`RoleClaimType`=framework URI, `SiteIdClaimType`=`ScopeId`); JWT mint `MapInboundClaims=false`+`OutboundClaimTypeMap.Clear()` (instance-isolated, reviewer-verified) and validate `MapInboundClaims=false`+pinned `RoleClaimType`/`NameClaimType` → byte-symmetric round-trip; cookie identity `roleType=RoleClaimType`; every site-scope read on `SiteIdClaimType`; cookie via `ZbCookieDefaults.Apply` (30-min idle), name kept. No `AddJwtBearer` middleware (sole JWT path = `JwtTokenService.ValidateToken`). Role VALUES unchanged. Security 93/93, CentralUI 595/595, ManagementService 125/125, Host 227/227; infra reds (Integration ×11, AuditLog ×1, flaky StaleTagMonitor) confirmed pre-existing by stash-at-HEAD. **Minor (deferred):** a stale "PostConfigure" comment word; JWT-validated principals have null `Identity.Name` (no regression, no bearer path).

### ✅ Task 1.6 (unify dev LDAP base DN → `dc=zb,dc=local`) COMPLETE across all 3 repos (reviewed, code-review-only per `small` class)
Mechanical, grep-verified substitution of each repo's dev directory base DN to the neutral `dc=zb,dc=local`; prod left untouched (no in-repo prod overlay carries the dev DN; `/deploy` is gitignored and was not touched). OU structure preserved throughout.
- **OtOpcUa** `8ba289f`: `LdapOptions.SearchBase` default, integration `docker-compose.yml` `LDAP_ROOT` + `TwoNodeClusterHarness` SearchBase/ServiceAccountDn, `AclEdit.razor` placeholder, `docs/v2/{dev-environment,phase-7-e2e-smoke}`. `grep dc=lmxopcua`→empty. Security 35, AdminUI 121, ControlPlane 29, Runtime 74 green.
- **MxGateway** `9572045`: `LdapOptions` defaults, `appsettings.json`, dashboard test group-DNs, `glauth.md` (dev DNs only — the `DC=corp,…` prod-example column left intact), `CLAUDE.md` index line. `grep dc=lmxopcua`→empty. 575/578 (3 pre-existing FakeWorker).
- **ScadaBridge** `6ae6051` (14 files): app `appsettings.Central.json`, the 4 docker/docker-env2 central-node configs, `infra/glauth/config.toml` baseDN, `infra/tools/ldap_tool.py`, 4 test fixtures, `docs/test_infra/*`. Cluster nodes use the shared `scadabridge-ldap` container backed by the now-updated `infra/glauth/config.toml` (no separate seed). `grep dc=scadabridge`→only the 2 excluded historical `docs/plans/*` records + synthetic `dc=example` left. Full non-infra suite green (Security 93, CentralUI 595, ManagementService 125, Host 227, ConfigurationDatabase 241).

## Task 1.7 (canonical roles) — inventory + decisions (2026-06-02)

Read-only role inventory (3 parallel Explore agents) found the canonical-role standardization is bigger than the plan's "~5 min/repo": it changes role string VALUES (claims + config-DB + enforcement), needs config-DB DATA migrations, and makes the ScadaBridge SoD collapse real. **EF persistence confirmed:** OtOpcUa `AdminRole` is `HasConversion<string>().HasMaxLength(32)` (stores the enum MEMBER NAME); ScadaBridge `LdapGroupMappings.Role` is free-text `nvarchar(500)` with HasData seed. Both → renaming role values requires a data migration.

**Resolved per-repo mapping (Decision B + filled gaps):**
- **MxGateway:** `Viewer→Viewer` (no-op), `Admin→Administrator`. Clean rename of `DashboardRoles.Admin` VALUE + `GroupToRole` config + `GatewayOptionsValidator` allowed-set. NO DB (dashboard roles not persisted). ⚠️ MUST NOT touch the separate gRPC `GatewayScopes.Admin = "admin"` data-plane scope.
- **OtOpcUa:** `ConfigViewer→Viewer`, `ConfigEditor→Designer`, `FleetAdmin→Administrator`, **`DriverOperator→Operator`** (plan-omitted gap). Rename `AdminRole` members + DevStub/appsettings `GroupToRole` values + every `[Authorize(Roles=)]`/`RequireRole` role string. **Config-DB data migration** on `LdapGroupRoleMappings.Role` (raw SQL UPDATE old→new; column is the same string col so it's a data, not schema, change). Data-plane `NodePermissions` bitmask UNTOUCHED. Enforcement preserved: `Designer`(←ConfigEditor) keeps the deploy access it has today (`Deployments.razor` `Roles="FleetAdmin,ConfigEditor"`→`"Administrator,Designer"`). Policy NAMES (e.g. `"DriverOperator"`/`"FleetAdmin"` policy keys) may stay as internal indirections; only the role STRINGS they check become canonical.
- **ScadaBridge (heaviest):** `Admin→Administrator`, `Design→Designer`, `Deployment→Deployer`, **`Audit→Administrator`** (collapse), **`AuditReadOnly→Viewer`** (collapse). Requires: config-DB data migration (`LdapGroupMappings.Role` UPDATE + HasData seed + ModelSnapshot); ~20 hard-coded role-string sites (ManagementActor site-scope bypass ×6 + `GetRequiredRole`, DebugStreamHub ×2, BrowseService/BindingTester, policy arrays); SoD policy rework `OperationalAuditRoles→{Administrator,Viewer}` + `AuditExportRoles→{Administrator}` so former `AuditReadOnly`(→Viewer) keeps audit-READ but still can't export; all role-asserting tests. **Real security consequence (accepted):** `Audit→Administrator` grants former audit-only users the full admin surface (create sites, manage LDAP mappings/API keys, import bundles). Site-scoping stays orthogonal (computed from `PermittedSiteIds`, Deployment-only).

**Decisions (2026-06-02):** depth = **FULL canonical (values change, incl. config-DB migrations + real SoD escalation)**; cadence = **proceed now**. Execution: MxGateway + OtOpcUa single high-risk commits each (parallel); ScadaBridge as a focused atomic change (1–2 coupled commits — the rename + seed + migration are coupled, so it does not cleanly split into 1.3-style green sub-increments). High-risk serial review (spec→code) per repo + full ScadaBridge suite.

### ✅ Task 1.7 (canonical roles) COMPLETE across all 3 repos (high-risk; spec ✅ + code ✅ each)
- **MxGateway** `04bce3ff` (spec ✅, code ✅): `DashboardRoles.Admin` value `"Admin"→"Administrator"` (Viewer unchanged) + `GroupToRole` config; validator/enforcement inherit the constant. NO DB (dashboard roles not persisted). gRPC `GatewayScopes.Admin="admin"` proven untouched. 577/580 (3 pre-existing FakeWorker).
- **OtOpcUa** `c1619d9` (spec ✅, code ✅): `AdminRole` enum members → `Viewer/Designer/Administrator`; `DriverOperator` role string → `Operator` (policy NAMES kept stable); DevStub `["Administrator"]`. **Data migration** `20260602112419_CanonicalizeAdminRoles` (`UPDATE LdapGroupRoleMapping` old→new, reverse Down, snapshot unchanged, no pending model changes). `Deployments.razor` `[Authorize(Roles="Administrator,Designer")]` (deploy access preserved). Data-plane `NodePermissions`/`NodeAcl`/evaluator untouched (proven). Security 45, Configuration 90, AdminUI 121 green. (Minor non-issues: an `ou=FleetAdmin` placeholder DN + a data-plane doc-comment — both LDAP-group/doc text, not role values.)
- **ScadaBridge** `b104760` + doc-fix `4118452` (high-risk; spec ✅, code ✅): `Roles` → canonical `{Administrator,Designer,Deployer,Viewer}` (Audit/AuditReadOnly removed); **SoD reworked** `OperationalAudit={Administrator,Viewer}`, `AuditExport={Administrator}` (Viewer reads-not-exports audit; Administrator does both + full admin). All enforcement literals moved incl. the 6 ManagementActor site-scope bypasses + DebugStreamHub + BrowseService/BindingTester. **Migration** `20260602113822_CanonicalizeRoles` (seed `UpdateData` + idempotent raw catch-all for operator rows; lossy Down documented; snapshot consistent). **Real SoD escalation** (Audit→Administrator gains full admin) documented in CHANGELOG. Full non-infra suite green (Security 93, CentralUI 595, ManagementService 125, Host 227, ConfigurationDatabase 241); infra reds pre-existing (stash-at-HEAD confirmed). `4118452` corrected stale role-name prose in NavMenu comments (comment-only; CentralUI rebuild 0/0).

## ✅ PHASE 1 COMPLETE (2026-06-02)

All of Tasks 1.0–1.7 done across OtOpcUa, MxAccessGateway, ScadaBridge — each on its local-only `feat/adopt-zb-auth` branch, **nothing pushed**. The three apps now consume `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.*` from the Gitea feed (OtOpcUa 0.1.1 Abstractions+Ldap+AspNetCore; MxGateway 0.1.2 all-four; ScadaBridge 0.1.3 all-four): shared LDAP (`Auth.Ldap`), shared API-key model (`Auth.ApiKeys`, ScadaBridge fully re-architected), `IGroupRoleMapper<TRole>` seam, nested/`Transport`-enum config, canonical `ZbClaimTypes`/`ZbCookieDefaults`, unified dev base DN `dc=zb,dc=local`, and the canonical-six role vocabulary (with ScadaBridge's accepted auditor/admin SoD collapse). Every task spec- and code-reviewed; high-risk ones via the serial chain + full-suite runs. **Phase 1 exit gate met.** Next: Phase 2 (audit component — the original ask) starting at the Task 2.0 gate, then Phase 3 (wire audit Actor from the Auth principal).