Joseph Doherty
b009507e10
Record the OtOpcUa live wonder gate (item 2). A throwaway harness drove OtOpcUa's real GalaxyDriverBrowser (secret: ApiKeySecretRef resolved via ISecretResolver) against the real production MxGateway: dummy secret: ref -> MxGatewayAuthenticationException, real metadata:read key -> CONNECTED + browsed the real Galaxy root (10 nodes). Temp key minted via the dashboard, then revoked (functionally proven) + deleted; no prod key touched; harness + scratch stores destroyed. All four apps now G-2..G-6 done + live-proven.
126 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
126 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
# Secrets — GAPS (adoption backlog)
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The delta between each project's [`current-state`](current-state/) and the
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[`SPEC`](spec/SPEC.md), as prioritized work. The library itself is **built + published +
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reference-consumer-proven**; everything here is per-app adoption of an existing lib (not lib
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construction).
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## Execution status (2026-07-16)
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- **mxaccessgw — G-4 + G-5 + G-6 DONE.** Executed via the plan below (8 tasks, subagent-driven,
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classification-driven reviews), **merged + pushed to `origin/main` (mxaccessgw @ `e088dfa`)**.
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Offline: 0-warning build, full suite 781 pass / 44 pre-existing worker-COM (0 non-worker),
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behavioral claim-type authz test, no Data-Protection disturbance. Box-verified on windev
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(real .NET 10.0.8): fail-closed on unseeded `${secret:}` (`SecretNotFoundException`, refuses
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to start) + CLI seed/`get` decrypt round-trip + **zero plaintext in the SQLite store at rest**.
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(`/admin/secrets` interactive reveal not re-proven on this box — same shared `.Ui` component
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already live-proven via HistorianGateway; box gateway runs LDAP-disabled/anonymous so a real
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LDAP-via-secret login wasn't exercised there.) Two review-caught fixes folded in: the LDAP
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password change's test/doc blast radius (validator-helper + host-test-bootstrap + doc truth),
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and the live-LDAP integration suite now honors the `MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountPassword`
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env override. **G-4/G-5/G-6 below are the remaining OtOpcUa + ScadaBridge scope.**
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- **ScadaBridge — G-3 + G-4 + G-5 + G-6 DONE.** Executed via the plan below (10 tasks, subagent-driven,
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classification-driven reviews), **FF-merged + pushed to `origin/main` (ScadaBridge @ `128f1596`)**.
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Offline: 0-warning build, all suites green (Host 279, DCL 235 incl. 5 G-3 resolver tests, Security 181,
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CentralUI 925, InboundAPI 269, SiteRuntime 522/523 [1 pre-existing ScriptActor timing-flake, passes
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isolated + branch touched no SiteRuntime src], Commons/ConfigDb/ManagementService/Communication/ClusterInfra
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all green). **G-3 LIVE-PROVEN vs the REAL production MxGateway gateway** (`wonder-app-vd03.zmr.zimmer.com:5120`):
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a throwaway harness drove the real `MxGatewayDataConnection` through the DI factory + `AddZbSecrets` with a
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`secret:`-ref `ApiKey` → **dummy key `Unauthenticated`** (proves the resolved value is transmitted, not
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fail-closed first) → **real read-scoped key → `Connected` + browsed the real Galaxy root (10 nodes)**. Temp
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key created via the gateway dashboard, then **revoked + deleted + functionally confirmed dead**. Notable
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deltas from the plan: T3 registers `AddZbSecrets` on **both** the Central branch (UI) and
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`SiteServiceRegistration` (DCL adapter) — the plan assumed one container; T6 claim-type resolved **MATCH**
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(`ZbClaimTypes.Role == ClaimTypes.Role`, adversarially verified) → `AddSecretsAuthorization()` used directly;
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T8 (G-5) shipped as a **docs-only** production-posture runbook (`docs/operations/2026-07-16-secrets-clustered-master-key.md`)
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because hardcoding `Source=File` + `/shared` paths would break the Central-boot Host.Tests + local dev (the
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pre-host expander migrates the store unconditionally every Central boot). One review-flagged non-blocking
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follow-up: a pre-existing xUnit env-mutation CI-flake that T4 amplifies (single `[Collection]` / disable
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parallelization for Host.Tests).
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- **OtOpcUa — G-2 + G-4 + G-5 + G-6 DONE (the LAST app — all three now adopted).** Executed 2026-07-16 via the plan below (10 tasks, 2 slices, subagent-driven, classification-driven reviews), **FF-merged + pushed to `origin/master` (lmxopcua @ `872cf7e3`, `ec6598ce..872cf7e3`)**. Clean build (0 errors). The full offline suite caught **one real regression** — `AddOtOpcUaDriverFactories`' registration now resolves `ISecretResolver` (Galaxy/OpcUaClient secret: refs), so two `ResilienceInvokerFactoryRegistrationTests` that built a minimal container threw `No service for ISecretResolver`; fixed test-only by registering a stub resolver (production always has it via the unconditional `AddZbSecrets`, and `GetRequiredService` correctly fails-fast for a genuinely misconfigured host). Touched-area suites green (Galaxy 338, OpcUaClient 142, AdminUI 662); remaining non-passes are unrelated (flaky Akka/Roslyn timing tests pass in isolation; the environmental `AbCip_Green_AgainstSim` sim-fixture test — zero AbCip code touched). **Three deliberate deviations from the plan's literal text** (verified corrections, same class as the CPM miss the plan itself caught): (1) **G-4 does NOT commit a `${secret:}` token into the default appsettings** — the expander is fail-closed AND section-agnostic and the only committed secret-shaped value is `ServerHistorian:ApiKey=""` (empty, disabled-by-default), so a committed token would break every dev/CI/`TwoNodeClusterHarness` boot for zero at-rest benefit; instead documented the token-delivery convention (`docs/security.md`) + updated the ServerHistorian comments, and proved fail-closed live (unseeded → `SecretNotFoundException` at pre-host expansion; seeded → resolves). (2) **G-5 shipped docs-only** (`docs/operations/2026-07-16-secrets-clustered-master-key.md`) — hardcoding `Source=File`+shared paths into the committed role-overlay appsettings (also consumed by dev + integration) would break those boots; base stays `Source=Environment`. Mirrors the ScadaBridge G-5 resolution. (3) **Task 8 resolves in the factory/driver only, NOT the probe** — the v3 `OpcUaClientDriverProbe` is unauthenticated `GetEndpoints`-only and never reads `Password`/`UserCertificatePassword`, so probe resolution would be dead code. Layer-B resolution mirrors Galaxy: the sync driver-registry factory means resolution happens lazily at the driver's async session-open (`GalaxyDriver.BuildClientOptionsAsync` / `OpcUaClientDriver.InitializeAsync`), threaded via ctor + `DriverFactoryBootstrap` (real resolver from DI; `NullSecretResolver` null-object backs test/parse paths only, fail-closed on `secret:`). `OpcUaClientDriverOptions` was converted `sealed class` → `sealed record` for the `with`-expression (no positional params → identical JSON; verified no reference-equality/dict-key/ToString-log usages → no leak/behavior change). AdminUI G-2c is structurally leak-proof: `DriverConfig` persists as an opaque JSON string via `RawTreeService`, which has NO resolver dependency. **Live wonder gate PROVEN 2026-07-16 (VPN up):** a throwaway harness drove OtOpcUa's real `GalaxyDriverBrowser` (resolves the `secret:` `ApiKeySecretRef` via `ISecretResolver` → `GalaxySecretRef.ResolveApiKeyAsync` → connects) against the REAL production MxGateway `wonder-app-vd03:5120`. **Dummy `secret:` ref → `MxGatewayAuthenticationException` (proves the resolved value is transmitted, not fail-closed-first); real `metadata:read` key → CONNECTED + browsed the real Galaxy root (10 nodes: ControlSystem/EUR/KPI_CNC/NAM/_TestArea/MESReceiver…).** Temp key minted via the gateway dashboard, then **revoked (functionally proven — the same key that browsed 10 nodes then returned Unauthenticated) + deleted** (row gone; no prod key touched; the dashboard key-list is stale-cached so revoke/delete were verified FUNCTIONALLY, not by the list UI). Harness + scratch stores destroyed. **All of G-2/G-4/G-5/G-6 now DONE + live-proven across all three apps + mxaccessgw.**
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**Plan re-verified 2026-07-16 against `origin/master` @ `ec6598ce`** (the merged **v3.0 dual-namespace** rewrite, PR #472). The v3.0 rewrite did NOT touch the driver-secret flow, so the approach held; the plan was corrected for: OtOpcUa **is** on Central Package Management (was mis-stated as inline-versioned), `OpcUaClientDriverOptions` lives in `…Driver.OpcUaClient.Contracts` + `GalaxyDriverBrowser` in `…Driver.Galaxy.Browser`, and `DriverHostActor.cs` line shifts (1704/1756/1790 → 1766/1818/1852). Program.cs / Security / AdminUI anchors survived essentially unchanged.
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## Design + implementation plans (2026-07-16)
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G-2 … G-6 are now planned. Shared design + three per-repo executable plans (task-metadata'd,
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code-verified anchors, co-located `.tasks.json`):
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- [`docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-design.md`](../../docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-design.md)
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— shared design: library API, the two resolution layers (pre-host `${secret:}` config
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expander vs runtime `ISecretResolver`), wiring template, master-key/clustering fork.
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- [`docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-otopcua.md`](../../docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-otopcua.md)
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— **G-2 + G-4 + G-5 + G-6** (10 tasks, 2 slices; Layer-A config + Layer-B driver secrets).
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- [`docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-scadabridge.md`](../../docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-scadabridge.md)
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— **G-3 + G-4 + G-5 + G-6** (10 tasks; incl. claim-type verification + committed-plaintext cleanup).
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- [`docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-mxaccessgw.md`](../../docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-mxaccessgw.md)
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— **G-4 + G-5 + G-6** (8 tasks; single-box, no Layer B).
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G-7/G-8 remain design-only/deferred (below).
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## Cross-cutting observations
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- **No app has `${secret:}` resolution today.** All three assemble config with the stock
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`AddJsonFile`+`AddEnvironmentVariables` chain and read secrets verbatim. Two already lean
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on the *pattern* the expander formalizes: ScadaBridge's non-functional `${SCADABRIDGE_*}`
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placeholders (whole-key env override) and OtOpcUa's driver-level `GalaxySecretRef`
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(`env:`/`file:`/`dev:`/literal). These are the natural first swaps.
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- **The common high-value gap is plaintext credentials in appsettings/env:** LDAP
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service-account passwords (all three), SQL connection-string passwords (OtOpcUa ConfigDb,
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ScadaBridge ConfigDb + MachineDataDb), JWT/HS256 signing keys (OtOpcUa, ScadaBridge), and
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API-key peppers (all three, runtime-supplied but plaintext).
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- **Secrets already stored in a DB in plaintext are the sharpest edge:** OtOpcUa's OpcUaClient
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`Password`/`UserCertificatePassword` and the `dev:`/literal Galaxy API key live cleartext in
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the central config DB; ScadaBridge's MxGateway per-endpoint `ApiKey` lives plaintext in the
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ConfigDb `DataConnections` JSON. These leak at rest to anyone with DB read.
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- **Existing at-rest crypto is Data Protection, and only ScadaBridge applies it to secrets**
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(4 encrypted ConfigDb columns via `EncryptedStringConverter`). OtOpcUa/mxaccessgw use Data
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Protection only for cookies/tokens. None use DPAPI or `ProtectKeysWith*`; key rings are
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unencrypted-at-rest. `ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets` adds envelope encryption with a KEK held **outside**
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the store — a stronger boundary than "the DB is the only protection."
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- **Peppered-HMAC API-key stores stay bespoke** (mxaccessgw + ScadaBridge): they are hashed,
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not reversibly stored — already correct. Secrets only takes over the *pepper value* supply.
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## Backlog (prioritized)
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### G-1 — HistorianGateway reference consumer ✅ DONE
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Adopted + live-proven 2026-07-16 (historian password via `${secret:}`, authenticated read
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against the real wonder historian). This is the wiring template for the three apps.
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### G-2 — OtOpcUa: cleartext-in-DB driver secrets (highest value)
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Add a `secret:` arm to `GalaxySecretRef` (its own comment anticipates this) and to the
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OpcUaClient driver options, resolving through `ISecretResolver` — retire the `dev:`/literal
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and plaintext `Password`/`UserCertificatePassword` DB paths.
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### G-3 — ScadaBridge: MxGateway `ApiKey` plaintext-in-ConfigDb
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Resolve via `ISecretResolver` or extend the existing `EncryptedStringConverter` to that JSON
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column.
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### G-4 — Pre-host `${secret:}` for plaintext config secrets (all three)
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LDAP passwords, SQL connstr passwords, JWT signing keys, deploy API key (OtOpcUa),
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peppers — swap to `${secret:…}` tokens, expander running **before** each app's existing
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validator (`ConfigPreflight` / `Ldap`+`OpcUa` validators / `GatewayOptionsValidator`).
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Delete committed dev plaintext and the loose `*_login.txt` files (ScadaBridge).
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### G-5 — Master-key provider per deployment
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Env (`ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY`) for containers; DPAPI for the Windows boxes; **File (shared
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mounted key)** for clustered pairs (hard requirement — same KEK on every node).
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### G-6 — Mount `/admin/secrets` UI (all three)
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Add the RCL page to each dashboard (OtOpcUa AdminUI, MxGateway Server, ScadaBridge CentralUI)
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and map each app's admin role onto `secrets:manage` / `secrets:reveal`.
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### G-7 — Clustered replication (ScadaBridge, OtOpcUa) — build `ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Akka`
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Deferred until G-2…G-6 land for a clustered app. Options per SPEC: shared SQL-Server
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`ISecretStore` (simplest — mirrors the shared Data-Protection key ring) **or** the Akka
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replicator (LWW, anti-entropy resync, tombstones). Requires a shared KEK.
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### G-8 — KEK-rotation runbook + `RewrapAll`
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The `RewrapAll(oldKek, newKek)` admin primitive + an operator runbook. Deferred (design-only
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in this cut).
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## Out of scope (this component)
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- Akka remoting authentication/TLS (ScadaBridge plain TCP remoting) — a separate hardening
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concern, not secret storage.
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- SQL-Server `ISecretStore` provider construction (seam supports it; build with G-7).
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