9789b01acd
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AD5mc2BnaaAfY3hqqQ
981 lines
66 KiB
Markdown
981 lines
66 KiB
Markdown
# NAM AD LDAP cutover — DEV vd03, then QA vq03/vq04 (DEV + QA EXECUTED 2026-11-19 on the interim account)
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> **Status lives in Gitea.** Execution is tracked by
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> [scadaproj#6](https://gitea.dohertylan.com/dohertj2/scadaproj/issues/6). The dedicated, shared LDAP-lookup service
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> account is [scadaproj#58](https://gitea.dohertylan.com/dohertj2/scadaproj/issues/58), a QA prerequisite (§5, D1). This
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> file is the design and runbook. It **supersedes** [`2026-08-13-vd03-nam-ldap-cutover.md`](2026-08-13-vd03-nam-ldap-cutover.md)
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> (§10 lists what changed). The independent review of 2026-11-15 is applied (§11).
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**Written 2026-11-15. Status: PLAN ONLY. Nothing here has been executed.**
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**EXECUTED ON DEV 2026-11-19** (§0): all four apps on vd03 log in against NAM AD. Record:
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[`docs/deploy/2026-11-19-vd03-nam-ldap/`](../deploy/2026-11-19-vd03-nam-ldap/README.md). The DC-failover checks
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(§7.6 step 5, A2) are dropped by owner instruction. New QA prerequisite from DEV: OtOpcUa's `RequireHttpsCookie`
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on a plain-HTTP AdminUI (record, finding 1). **QA plan: §0Q** (written 2026-11-19, not executed; QA hold stands).
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**Updated 2026-11-19:** §0 is the **DEV vd03 execution plan using the groups and accounts that exist today**, so
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it does not wait for scadaproj#58, the D3 automation account or the D6 deploy group. QA keeps the full
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prerequisites in §5–§7, and the QA deploy hold still stands.
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---
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## 0. DEV vd03 now, with today's groups and accounts (2026-11-19)
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### 0.1 What the directory holds today
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Re-enumerated 2026-11-19 from the Mac (`ldapsearch` over LDAPS to nam1, bound as `svc_igntadmin`; that bind is
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the D1 interim's single verification bind).
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- **Groups:** 41 `UG_WW_*`, the 39 from 08-12 plus `UG_WW_PAR_CVD_Oper` and `UG_WW_PAR_CVD_Super`. Neither is a
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platform group, so neither is mapped. **There is still no `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_*` group.**
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- **Names:** the DEV platform names are exactly as in §4. Copy them with this case.
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| DEV group | Members (2026-11-19) |
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|---|---|
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| `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_DEV` (7) | chamalas, millerh5, benjamd2, marting4, dohertj2, oswaltk, Luis Bastidas |
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| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_DEV` (6) | chamalas, millerh5, benjamd2, marting4, dohertj2, Luis Bastidas |
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| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_DEV` (2) | benjamd2, oswaltk |
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| `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_DEV` (7) | **the same 7 people as `APP_ADMIN_DEV`** |
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| `UG_WW_CITRIX_DEV` (6) | never mapped; culverj holds only this group, so they get no role on DEV |
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**Accounts used on DEV (no new accounts):**
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| Use | Account | Groups and resulting roles | Credential |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| LDAP lookup (D1 interim) | `svc_igntadmin@nam.zimmer.com` | No `UG_WW_*` group, so it **cannot sign in** to any app, which is correct for a lookup account | Mac Keychain, service `btdb-manager/ldap`. Seeded into each store as `nam-ldap-svc-password` |
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| Positive login and automation (D3 option b) | `dohertj2` | `APP_ADMIN_DEV` + `APP_IDE_DEV` + `HIST_ADMIN_DEV`. Gets Administrator everywhere, plus Designer in OtOpcUa and ScadaBridge, plus Deployer in ScadaBridge (§0.2) | Mac Keychain (`NAM\dohertj2`) |
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| Negative control: zero roles | `adm_dohertj2` | 3 groups, none `UG_WW_*`. The library passes it (`memberOf` is non-empty), the app maps no role, and §3.2 must refuse it | Mac Keychain (`NAM\adm_dohertj2`) |
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| Negative control: bad credentials | a bogus user/password | — | — |
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**Viewer is not exercised live on DEV.** Only benjamd2 and oswaltk hold `APP_IDE_RO_DEV`, and both also hold
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`APP_ADMIN_DEV`. The Viewer mapping is checked by reading the effective config back (A4). A real Viewer-only
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login waits for QA or for a volunteer.
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### 0.2 Deviations from the full plan (DEV only)
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| Full plan | DEV now | Why it's acceptable | Ends when |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| D1: dedicated account from scadaproj#58 | `svc_igntadmin` | The interim §5 already allows on DEV. **Tell the Ignition team before §0.4 step 3**: a wrong secret here locks *their* admin account (2 bad binds per login, §1.3) | scadaproj#58 is delivered; swap it in during the soak (§7) |
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| D3: a NAM automation account | `dohertj2` (option b) | It holds every DEV role the scripts need | The D3 account exists |
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| D6: `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_DEV` → Deployer | **`UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_DEV` → `Deployer`, in ScadaBridge only** | Still one group, one role per app (§3.1): ScadaBridge maps `HIST_ADMIN` to nothing else. Its members are identical to `APP_ADMIN_DEV`, so the effect is "DEV admins can deploy", the SoD collapse already accepted for this directory (`ldap_setup.md`). It is a DEV-only row | D6's group exists: add `APP_DEPLOY_DEV` → Deployer, then delete the `HIST_ADMIN_DEV` row |
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| D4: `zimmer-rootca` in `LocalMachine\Root` | Phase 0 checks it. vd03 is domain-joined, so the root is expected to be there via GPO [I]. If it isn't, run DEV with `AllowInsecure=true` and record it | DEV only, short-lived (D4 b) | The root is installed |
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| D7: membership confirmed per person | Done for DEV by §0.1 | — | — |
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**Unchanged:** the standards (§3), the LDAP block (§6, with `ServiceAccountDn: svc_igntadmin@nam.zimmer.com`),
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the restart rules, the §7.6 verification and stop rule, and the rollback (§7.7).
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### 0.3 Builds on vd03
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| App | On vd03 (2026-11-19) | Carries | Action |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| HistorianGateway | `f84af29` | #136 (case-insensitive `GroupToRole`, mapper fault refused) | none |
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| MxAccessGateway | `e74918cc` | already refuses zero roles | none |
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| OtOpcUa | `cdf433a35` | #913 (§2): options passthrough, zero-role refusal, library logger | none |
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| ScadaBridge | **`061432c8`** | **neither #144 nor #145** | **Deploy `main` `2e0ce81e`** (§0.4 step 1) |
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ScadaBridge `061432c8..2e0ce81e` is 11 commits: #144, #145 and the #116 `leader-auto-down` default (already
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drilled on vd03, 2026-11-15). **No migration** and no wire change. Use the procedure in
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`docs/deployment/deployment-records/2026-11-15-wonder-app-vd03-061432c8.md` (single central + site; take a
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DB backup first). With login still off, the dev user holds every role, so #144/#145 have no visible effect
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until step 6.
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### 0.4 Order of work on vd03
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All remote steps stay inside the `winrm` deploy scope (§7). One app at a time; each one passes §7.6 before the next.
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1. **ScadaBridge binary deploy `2e0ce81e`.** Verify with the deploy's normal checks: health, the site connected,
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the CLI works as the login-off dev user.
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2. **Phase 0 on vd03 (§7.0), reduced:** DC reach on 636 from vd03; the `zimmer-rootca` check (decides D4);
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back up every app's config and env; record OtOpcUa `Security__Auth__DisableLogin` (expected `true`), mxgw's
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environment name, its `ServerCertificateThumbprintSha256` and base `GwAdmin`/`GwReader`; each app's secrets
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store and KEK source; the OtOpcUa `LdapGroupRoleMapping` rows. Builds per §0.3. The service-account bind was
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done 2026-11-19 (§0.1), so don't repeat it.
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3. **Seed `nam-ldap-svc-password`** in each store (§7.1): HG, mxgw and ScadaBridge Central through their
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`/admin/secrets` pages (login is still off on all three), and OtOpcUa's store with the `secret` CLI or its
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page. Verify each read-back value with **one** LdapProbe bind as `svc_igntadmin`.
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4. **HistorianGateway (the canary), §7.2.** §6 + §4.1 DEV mapping, `Dashboard:DisableLogin=false`. Run §7.6 fully,
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including the nam1→nam2 failover check.
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5. **MxAccessGateway, §7.3.** §6 + §4.2 DEV mapping; delete the base `GwAdmin`/`GwReader`; remove any GLAuth pin;
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`DisableLogin=false`.
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6. **ScadaBridge, §7.4.**
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- a. **While login is still off**, add the role mappings with the CLI (`--url` the vd03 central):
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`UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_DEV`→Administrator, `UG_WW_APP_IDE_DEV`→Designer, `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_DEV`→Viewer,
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**`UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_DEV`→Deployer (DEV interim, §0.2)**. The §4.4 SQL fallback works too: put the
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`HIST_ADMIN_DEV` row in its `@t`.
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- b. Write `ScadaBridge:Security:Ldap` (§6). Remove **both** `DisableLogin` and `AllowOutsideDevelopment`.
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- c. Restart the central. Re-point scripts (`apply.sh`, drill and deploy packs) at `dohertj2`, and confirm
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`/auth/token` and the CLI (HTTP Basic) work with it.
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- d. Extra §7.6 check: `adm_dohertj2` is refused at `/auth/login`, at `/auth/token` **and** on the
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management/CLI path (#145).
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7. **OtOpcUa AdminUI, §7.5.** §6 as `Security__Ldap__*` with `FallbackServers__0` (the #913 build honours it),
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the §4.3 DEV `GroupToRole`, then `Security__Auth__DisableLogin=false`. Restart the single node. §7.6 plus
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acceptance A2 (nam1 blocked → login through nam2, with the library's `sticky preference moved` line).
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`adm_dohertj2` is refused at `/auth/login` and `/auth/token`.
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8. **Record** the run as `docs/deploy/2026-11-<dd>-vd03-nam-ldap-cutover.md` in scadaproj, plus a line in each
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app's deployment notes. The mxgw notes must say "delete `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` from the base file on every
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redeploy". Tick the DEV items on scadaproj#6.
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**Stop rule (§7.6 rule 6) for this run:** the account is Ignition's, so stop at the **first** `service-bind`
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warning, not the second. Ask IT for the account's lockout state before any retry.
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**Soak:** a few working days of real logins on DEV.
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---
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## 0Q. QA vq03/vq04, with today's groups and accounts (plan 2026-11-19; EXECUTED 2026-11-19)
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**Executed 2026-11-19 15:29–16:10 EST:** all four apps on both boxes on the DEV builds and NAM AD; record
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[`docs/deploy/2026-11-19-qa-nam-ldap/`](../deploy/2026-11-19-qa-nam-ldap/README.md). Optional step 8 (oswaltk) not run.
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**Owner decisions (2026-11-19):**
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1. QA binds as **`svc_igntadmin`** as well (interim). This supersedes A6 and the §7 note "QA never runs on
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`svc_igntadmin`". Both tiers move to the scadaproj#58 account together when it arrives: re-seed
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`nam-ldap-svc-password` in every store, then a rolling restart per app.
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2. **QA gets exactly the builds DEV runs.**
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3. **One window:** each app's code deploy and its LDAP change share one restart.
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**Gate:** the owner lifts the QA hold and names the window. **Tell the Ignition team before the window:** QA adds
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8 more stores that reference their admin account.
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### 0Q.1 What QA holds today
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Read-only checks on 2026-11-19 (directory as in §0.1; QA config files over SMB; health and redirects over HTTP).
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| DEV-proven groups | QA members (2026-11-19) |
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|---|---|
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| `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_QA` (6) | chamalas, millerh5, benjamd2, marting4, dohertj2, Luis Bastidas |
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| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_QA` (6) | the same 6 |
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| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_QA` (1) | oswaltk (**Viewer only**, so a live Viewer test is possible with them) |
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| `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_QA` (6) | **the same 6 as `APP_ADMIN_QA`**, so the §0.2 Deployer interim carries over |
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| `UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_QA` (0) | empty; mapped per §4 anyway (grants nobody anything) |
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**Every app already has login ON on both boxes, against the box-local GLAuth, over plain HTTP.** Anonymous `GET /`
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returns 302 → `/login` on `:5220`, `:5130`, `:8085` and `:9000`. So QA is a **directory swap**, not a "turn login on". The
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GLAuth `multi-role` automation identity stops working at the cutover; the D3 interim is `dohertj2`, as on DEV.
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| App | QA build now | → target (= DEV) | Where its LDAP config lives (QA) | Notes |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| HistorianGateway (per box) | `6365f34` | `f84af29` (#136) | **NSSM env** `Ldap__*`, `Dashboard__GroupToRole__SCADA-*` [I] | `app\appsettings.json` has `Dashboard:RequireHttpsCookie=true`, yet login runs over HTTP. Phase 0 reads whether the env overrides it (finding 1 below) |
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| MxAccessGateway (per box) | `76a71bc8` | `e74918cc` | `app\appsettings.json`: GLAuth `localhost:3893`, `dc=zb,dc=local`, `${secret:ldap/mxgateway/bind}`, **base `GwAdmin`/`GwReader`** | Phase 0 records the environment name and any overlay. Delete `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` from the base file (§4.2) |
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| ScadaBridge (pair) | `061432c8` | `2e0ce81e` (#144/#145) | `app\appsettings.Central.json` (GLAuth `127.0.0.1:3893`, `dc=scadabridge`) + Central env password | **`Secrets:Store:Provider=SqlServer`**: one shared store, so seed once. `RequireHttpsCookie=false` already. The two Centrals' files differ (known per-node JWT/idle drift): edit each file, never copy one over the other |
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| OtOpcUa (Warm pair) | `76e73e7d` | `cdf433a3` (#913; 83 commits, **no migration**) | service env [I] | Warm redundancy (`Mode=Warm`); Phase 0 records which node is Primary. Needs the cookie decision (finding 1) |
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Secrets master keys: the shipped files say `Source=Environment` (`ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY`) for HG, mxgw and OtOpcUa. The
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service env may override that. The seed script reads each service's own env, so it never assumes.
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### 0Q.2 Findings carried from DEV
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1. **Plain-HTTP cookies.** OtOpcUa's auth cookie is `Secure` by default, so its AdminUI login loops over HTTP. On DEV
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the fix was `Security__Cookie__RequireHttpsCookie=false`. QA OtOpcUa login works today over HTTP, so Phase 0 checks
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whether QA already sets that. If not, set it in the cutover (same value as DEV). Check HG `Dashboard:RequireHttpsCookie`
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the same way.
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2. **Secrets CLI.** The boxes' CLI (0.6.2) takes a value only on argv. Use the 0.6.6 build from DEV (stdin; no store
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schema or envelope change), copied to `E:\ApiInstall\_tools\secret-0.6.6\` on each box.
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3. **Do not** add firewall rules or run DC-failover drills (owner, 2026-11-19).
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4. Logs: the apps' own files may be empty. Verification reads the box OTel collector export
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(`E:\ApiInstall\OtelCollector\data\logs.jsonl`) over SMB.
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### 0Q.3 Mappings (QA suffix)
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As §4, plus the Deployer interim:
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| Group | OtOpcUa | ScadaBridge | MxAccessGateway | HistorianGateway |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_QA` | Administrator | Administrator | Administrator | Administrator |
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| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_QA` | Designer | Designer | Viewer | — |
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| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_QA` | Viewer | Viewer | Viewer | Viewer |
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| `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_QA` | Viewer | **Deployer (interim)** | — | Administrator |
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| `UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_QA` | — | Viewer | — | Viewer |
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Remove every GLAuth mapping: HG `SCADA-*` env entries and mxgw `GwAdmin`/`GwReader`. The ScadaBridge `SCADA-*` seed rows
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stay; they grant nothing in NAM.
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### 0Q.4 The window
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All remote steps are `winrm` deploy scope on vq03/vq04, one app at a time, in the canary order. **Stop at the first
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`service-bind` warning** (§0.4 stop rule). Each app's code deploy and LDAP change share one restart.
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0. **Before the window (from the Mac, no remote exec):**
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- stage the four builds (same artifacts as DEV, re-hashed) and the 0.6.6 Secrets CLI over SMB;
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- **add the ScadaBridge role rows with the CLI** while QA still logs in through GLAuth. Log in as `multi-role`,
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with `--url` pointing at the **active** central. This path is audited and invalidates the cache, unlike the SQL path DEV
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had to use. Add the five rows from §0Q.3; they grant nothing until the cutover.
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1. **Phase 0 per box** (`preflight.ps1` from the DEV record, retargeted to the QA layout `E:\ApiInstall\<App>\app`
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and the service names):
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- DC reach on 636 and `zimmer-rootca` trust;
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- back up every service key and every `appsettings*.json` to `E:\ApiInstall\_ldapcut-<ts>\`;
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- record each app's LDAP/login/cookie env, mxgw's environment name, OtOpcUa `Secrets:Replication:Enabled`, the
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OtOpcUa Primary/Standby and ServiceLevels, and the `LdapGroupRoleMapping` overlay rows;
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- read each app's secrets provider and master-key source from its service env.
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2. **Seed `nam-ldap-svc-password`** (`seed-secret.ps1`, generalised to read each service's own `Secrets__*` and
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master-key env):
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- HG and mxgw: per box;
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- OtOpcUa: per box, or once if replication is on;
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- ScadaBridge: **once**, into the shared SQL store, using the active Central's provider settings.
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Read back each value and compare its hash against the Keychain value. The value file is ACL'd and deleted.
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3. **HistorianGateway**, vq03 then vq04 (independent single nodes; this is the canary):
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- deploy `f84af29` with HG's own procedure (`HistorianGateway/docs/deploy/2026-11-19-vd03-f84af29/` retargeted to
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QA);
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- before the start, rewrite the NSSM env: `Ldap__*` → §6, `Dashboard__GroupToRole__*` → §0Q.3, and the cookie per
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finding 1.
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Verify on each box: bogus refused, `dohertj2` → Administrator, no `system-side` lines. Then the next box.
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4. **MxAccessGateway**, vq03 then vq04:
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- deploy `e74918cc` with mxgw's procedure. It will replace `app\appsettings.json`, so apply the edit to the **new**
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file before the start: §6 block, QA `GroupToRole`, delete `GwAdmin`/`GwReader`, no GLAuth pin;
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- mind the nssm `START_PENDING` abort in the repo upgrade script (memory note: use the try/catch fix as on vd03).
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Verify per box as in step 3.
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5. **ScadaBridge pair**: deploy `2e0ce81e` with the QA pair procedure (`deploy-prep/2026-11-15-143/qa.tmpl.ps1` actions
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minus `migrate`):
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- stop both Sites, then both Centrals, so the pair goes down together;
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- swap the binaries and edit **each** Central's `appsettings.Central.json`: §6 block, drop any `Auth` block;
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- remove `ScadaBridge__Security__Ldap__ServiceAccountPassword` from **both** Central envs;
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- start the Centrals (vq03 first), then the Sites.
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Verify:
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- `dohertj2` gets Administrator+Designer+Deployer at `/auth/login`, at `/auth/token` and on the CLI against the
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active central;
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- bogus refused;
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- LocalDb sync connected; Z28062–Z28069 at their Good baseline; `WarmCanary` connected; one active per pair.
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6. **OtOpcUa Warm pair**: deploy `cdf433a3` with OtOpcUa's QA procedure (the 2026-11-13 `76e73e7d` pack: stop-both /
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start-both for a binary upgrade, worker isolation `-Reapply`/`-Verify`).
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- **Before the start**, add to **both** nodes' env: the 18 `Security__Ldap__*` entries from the DEV record (QA suffix
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in `GroupToRole`), `Security__Auth__DisableLogin` left `false`, and the cookie per finding 1.
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- Verify:
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- ServiceLevel 250 on the Primary, 90 on the Standby (Warm), and the Standby canary reads `BadOutOfService`;
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- LocalDb sync connected; the script-runner canary Good;
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- `dohertj2` → Viewer+Designer+Administrator via cookie and `/auth/token`; bogus refused;
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- the ScadaBridge `WarmCanary` reconnects.
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7. **Re-point QA automation** from `multi-role` to `dohertj2`: the qa pack scripts, drills, `apply.sh`.
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8. **Optional:** oswaltk's Viewer-only login (the only Viewer-only member).
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9. **Record** in `docs/deploy/2026-11-<dd>-qa-nam-ldap/`, plus a deploy record in each repo.
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**Outages:** HG and mxgw a few seconds per box. The ScadaBridge pair stops together (about 2–3 min of site data path on
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the 11-15 run). The OtOpcUa pair stops together (about 37 s on 11-13). That is the price of one window: every restart is
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also a binary upgrade, and the pairs can't roll those.
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**Rollback:** per app, restore the `_ldapcut-<ts>` keys and files. Binaries roll back with each repo's own procedure
|
||
(no app here has a schema change). Keep the ScadaBridge `UG_WW_*` rows. The box-local GLAuth stays running until the
|
||
soak ends.
|
||
|
||
**Goal:** move the login of the four auth-bearing apps off their current setup (disabled login, or a GLAuth
|
||
test directory) and onto the Zimmer NAM Active Directory: DEV first, a soak, then the QA pair.
|
||
- The service-account password lives as a `${secret:}` reference in each app's encrypted Secrets store, never
|
||
in config.
|
||
- Every app maps AD groups to its roles from one canonical matrix, [`ldap_mapping.md`](../../ldap_mapping.md),
|
||
under two family rules (§3):
|
||
- **one AD group grants exactly one role per app;**
|
||
- **a user whose groups map to no role cannot sign in** (cookie or token).
|
||
|
||
**In scope:** HistorianGateway (dashboard), MxAccessGateway (dashboard), ScadaBridge (Central UI + CLI),
|
||
OtOpcUa (AdminUI).
|
||
|
||
**Out of scope:**
|
||
- **Overview:** no login by design.
|
||
- **The machine-to-machine surfaces stay API-key based:** OtOpcUa's OPC UA data plane, the mxgw and HG gRPC
|
||
APIs, and ScadaBridge's inbound API. They can still be *disrupted* by the restarts here (§7.0).
|
||
- **ignitionoee:** on hold (`ldap_mapping.md` §6).
|
||
|
||
**Evidence key:** **[V]** = verified in source or a file, with the citation; **[I]** = inferred, to be confirmed
|
||
in Phase 0. Source paths are relative to each repo.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 1. Current state (2026-11-15)
|
||
|
||
### 1.1 Builds and the Auth library
|
||
|
||
The 2026-08-13 plan's "redeploy to Auth 0.2.1" phase is **obsolete**:
|
||
|
||
| App | Deployed on DEV and QA | Auth pin [V] |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| OtOpcUa | `76e73e7d` | **0.4.1** (`Directory.Packages.props:238-240`) |
|
||
| ScadaBridge | `061432c8` | **0.5.0** (ScadaBridge#46) |
|
||
| MxAccessGateway | `76a71bc8` | **0.4.1** |
|
||
| HistorianGateway | `6365f34` | **0.4.1** |
|
||
|
||
Domain-root `SearchBase` (≥ 0.2.1), `FallbackServers` (≥ 0.2.0 in the library, but **dropped by OtOpcUa**,
|
||
§2) and `BindMode` with the empty-password guard (≥ 0.4.1) are all available.
|
||
|
||
**Before the cutover:**
|
||
- **OtOpcUa (§2)** and **ScadaBridge (§2A)** need code changes and a deploy.
|
||
- **HistorianGateway (§2B)** gets an optional hardening change.
|
||
|
||
### 1.2 Login state per app and tier
|
||
|
||
| App | DEV vd03 | QA vq03/vq04 |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| **HistorianGateway** | **Login OFF**: `Dashboard:DisableLogin=true` in `appsettings.Production.json`. LDAP points at the shared GLAuth `10.100.0.35:3893`, plain [V, file]. | **Login ON** against the box-local GLAuth. Config is in the **NSSM env** (`Ldap__*`, GroupToRole `SCADA-Admins`/`SCADA-Designers`) [I]. KEK at `C:\ProgramData\ZB\kek\historiangw.kek` [V, 11-13 evidence]. |
|
||
| **MxAccessGateway** | **Login OFF**: `MxGateway:Dashboard:DisableLogin=true` [V, file]. LDAP `127.0.0.1:3893`, `dc=scadalink,dc=local`. The deployed build **refuses** `DisableLogin=true` under `Production` (`GatewayOptionsValidator.cs:484-488`), so vd03 mxgw is **not** running as Production [V by inference from it booting]; Phase 0 records the environment name. | **Login ON**: `localhost:3893`, `dc=zb,dc=local`, `${secret:ldap/mxgateway/bind}` [V, file]. ⚠ `deployment.md` says the box-local GLAuth is `dc=scadabridge,dc=local` [I]. |
|
||
| **ScadaBridge** | **Login OFF**: `ScadaBridge:Security:Auth:DisableLogin=true` + `AllowOutsideDevelopment=true` [V, file]. With login off, the management/CLI path authenticates every caller as the all-roles dev user (`ManagementService/ManagementAuthenticator.cs:63-71`: `"multi-role"`, `Roles.All`) [V]. LDAP `localhost:3893`. | **Login ON**, box-local GLAuth `127.0.0.1:3893` [V]. Every CLI, deploy and drill script logs in as GLAuth `multi-role`. |
|
||
| **OtOpcUa** (AdminUI) | Code defaults (`Enabled=true`, `Server=localhost`, `Port=3893`, `SearchBase=dc=zb,dc=local`, `ServiceAccountDn=""`), plus files holding `Transport=Ldaps` and `DevStubMode=false`; no `Security__Ldap__*` in the env [V, 11-13 record]. `Security__Auth__DisableLogin` is in the env, **value unknown**. | Unknown; Phase 0 reads it. |
|
||
|
||
### 1.3 Directory facts
|
||
|
||
**Still valid, from `ldap_setup.md`:**
|
||
- **DCs:** `uswap-vdc-nam1.nam.zimmer.com` (`10.201.216.2`) and `uswap-vdc-nam2.nam.zimmer.com` (`10.201.138.78`).
|
||
- **Transports:** LDAPS 636, StartTLS and plain 389 all work.
|
||
- **TLS:** the certs are RSA-1024, chain `leaf ← zimmer-issueca1 ← zimmer-rootca`. The only chain error is
|
||
`UntrustedRoot`, so installing the root is sufficient. Windows accepts the 1024-bit key.
|
||
- **Directory shape:** `SearchBase` `DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com`; login attribute `sAMAccountName`; `memberOf`
|
||
collapses to bare CNs.
|
||
- **Reachability:** from the Mac, nam1/nam2 on 389 and 636 are open (2026-11-15). Not proven from the boxes.
|
||
|
||
**Login names.** In `BindMode=ServiceAccount` (this plan), `AcceptDomainQualifiedNames` has **no effect**: it
|
||
applies only in User mode (`ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap/LdapAuthService.cs:156-161`) [V]. So `NAM\jdoe` and
|
||
`jdoe@nam.zimmer.com` return *user not found*. **Users must type their bare sAMAccountName.** Put that on the
|
||
login-page notice.
|
||
|
||
**Lockout (AD policy: 5 failed binds per 15 min, per account) [V, `LdapAuthService.cs`]:**
|
||
|
||
| Failure | Bad binds | Effect |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| **Wrong *user* password** | **1**, on one DC (`:164-168`, `:428-436`) | Final (`BadCredentials`); no walk to the next DC. Locks only that user, after 5 tries. |
|
||
| **Wrong *service-account* password** | **2 per login attempt**: system-side, so it walks to the next DC (`:173-174`, `:408-415`) | Locks the **shared** account. |
|
||
|
||
The shared account is one account for all four apps and both tiers (D1). A mistyped secret in any of the ~7
|
||
stores can therefore lock out login everywhere within a few attempts.
|
||
|
||
ScadaBridge's background group refresh also binds as this account. Its throttle is 5 per 5 min
|
||
(`ScadaBridge Security/SecurityOptions.cs:132-145`) [V], looser than AD's 5 per 15 min. **Mitigations:**
|
||
- D1 asks IT for a no-lockout (or very high threshold) policy on the account.
|
||
- §7.1 verifies every store's value before that app restarts.
|
||
- §7 does one canary app first.
|
||
- §7.6 has a stop rule.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 2. Phase A — OtOpcUa code fix (prerequisite for the OtOpcUa cutover)
|
||
|
||
One OtOpcUa change, one issue, one deploy. It fixes five things.
|
||
|
||
### 2.1 Defects [V]
|
||
|
||
1. **Options dropped.** `LdapOptions.ToLibraryOptions()` (`src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Security/Ldap/LdapOptions.cs:111`)
|
||
copies 12 fields into the library's `LdapOptions` (`ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions/Ldap/LdapContracts.cs:21`).
|
||
- **Dropped:** `FallbackServers` (0.2.0), `BindMode`, `UserBindTemplate` and `AcceptDomainQualifiedNames`
|
||
(0.4.0). The config keys are ignored without error, so the AdminUI has **no DC failover**.
|
||
- **Not config-bound, by design:** `ServerCertificateValidationCallback`, which is code-only.
|
||
2. **Zero-role sign-in (review B1).** `Security/Endpoints/AuthEndpoints.cs:124-158` signs in with an **empty**
|
||
role set when the mapper returns no roles, **and** when the mapper throws: it catches the exception, logs a
|
||
warning and continues with the baseline roles, which are empty on the real path.
|
||
- The fallback policy and `AdminUiPolicies.AuthenticatedRead` (`Security/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:192,217`)
|
||
only require an authenticated user, and 18 AdminUI pages use `AuthenticatedRead`.
|
||
- No policy requires `Viewer`; it is only a default in `RoleGrants.razor:126`.
|
||
- With a domain-root `SearchBase`, **any NAM user with any group would get AdminUI read access**, and
|
||
`/auth/token` would mint them a token.
|
||
3. **No library logger (review M1).** `OtOpcUaLdapAuthService.cs:48` builds `LibLdapAuthService` with no
|
||
logger, and the library logs only via `_logger?.`. So the failover log line
|
||
(`sticky preference moved`) and the stage diagnostics (`failed system-side at …`) **never appear** in
|
||
OtOpcUa, and §7.6's checks can't be done.
|
||
4. **No validation of the new options (review B2).** OtOpcUa **never runs the library's
|
||
`LdapOptionsValidator`**: it constructs the library service directly (`OtOpcUaLdapAuthService.cs:48`). That
|
||
answers the old open question.
|
||
- Calling the library validator would **stop OtOpcUa booting on DEV and QA**. It requires
|
||
`ServiceAccountDn` in ServiceAccount mode (`ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap/LdapOptionsValidator.cs:81-87`), DEV runs on
|
||
code defaults (`Enabled=true`, `ServiceAccountDn=""`), and OtOpcUa validates LDAP on every node
|
||
(`Host/Program.cs:190-195`).
|
||
5. **Stale docs.** The OtOpcUa validator comment (`Host/Configuration/LdapOptionsValidator.cs:12-14`) describes a
|
||
"direct-bind path" that doesn't exist. The `LdapOptions` doc says the default server is `10.100.0.35`; the
|
||
code says `localhost`.
|
||
|
||
### 2.2 The fix
|
||
|
||
1. **Add the four properties** with the library's defaults and pass them through `ToLibraryOptions()`:
|
||
- `List<string> FallbackServers = []` → `IReadOnlyList<string>`
|
||
- `LdapBindMode BindMode = ServiceAccount`
|
||
- `string UserBindTemplate = ""`
|
||
- `bool AcceptDomainQualifiedNames = true`
|
||
2. **Refuse a zero-role login (the family standard, §3.2).** In `/auth/login` **and** `/auth/token`:
|
||
- if the mapped role set is empty, refuse exactly like bad credentials (HTTP 401 / the login page's
|
||
"invalid or not authorized"), with no cookie and no token;
|
||
- if the mapper **throws**, also **refuse** (fail closed), log the exception, and do not sign in.
|
||
- **This reverses the current code comment's intent and the test
|
||
`Login_when_role_mapper_throws_signs_in_with_no_role_claims`**
|
||
(`tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Security.Tests/AuthEndpointsIntegrationTests.cs:402`). Rewrite that test to
|
||
assert refusal.
|
||
- Add tests: empty mapping refused (cookie + token); mapper throws refused (cookie + token); one mapped role
|
||
signs in.
|
||
- **DevStub is unaffected:** it grants `Administrator`.
|
||
3. **Inject the logger:** pass `ILogger<ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap.LdapAuthService>` from DI into the
|
||
`LibLdapAuthService` constructor at `OtOpcUaLdapAuthService.cs:48`. Add a test that a failover writes the
|
||
library's `sticky preference moved` line.
|
||
4. **Validation, OtOpcUa's own validator only.** In `Host/Configuration/LdapOptionsValidator.cs`, port **only**:
|
||
- the library's `FallbackServers` rule (each entry parses as `host[:port]`);
|
||
- the `BindMode=User` → `UserBindTemplate` contains `{0}` exactly once rule.
|
||
|
||
**Do not** port the `ServiceAccountDn`-required rule.
|
||
|
||
**Add a test that boots the validator with today's DEV-shaped config** (`Enabled=true`, `Server=localhost`,
|
||
`ServiceAccountDn=""`, `Transport=Ldaps`) and asserts it **passes**.
|
||
5. **Completeness guard.** Add a unit test that reflects over the library `LdapOptions`' public settable
|
||
properties.
|
||
- For each one, set a non-default value on OtOpcUa's options, call `ToLibraryOptions()`, and assert the value
|
||
arrived. Compare `IReadOnlyList` values **by content**.
|
||
- Check **both directions:** every library property is mapped or allow-listed, and no allow-list entry is
|
||
stale.
|
||
- Allow-list: `ServerCertificateValidationCallback`.
|
||
- Mutation check: delete one assignment and the test must fail.
|
||
6. **Binding test:** `Security:Ldap:FallbackServers:0` reaches the library options, in JSON and as the env var
|
||
`Security__Ldap__FallbackServers__0`.
|
||
7. **Docs:**
|
||
- `docs/Configuration.md` `Security:Ldap`: the new keys, a NAM two-DC example, the zero-role refusal, and
|
||
"type the bare sAMAccountName".
|
||
- Fix the two stale comments from §2.1 item 5.
|
||
8. **Acceptance A1 (offline):** an AdminUI login against the redundant GLAuth pair (`infra/glauth-redundant/`,
|
||
`:3893` + `FallbackServers ["…:3894"]`).
|
||
- Stop the primary: login still succeeds and the log shows `sticky preference moved to …:3894`.
|
||
- A GLAuth user in no mapped group is refused.
|
||
|
||
### 2.3 Issue text for `lmxopcua` (not filed by this plan)
|
||
|
||
> **Title:** AdminUI LDAP: drops `FallbackServers`/`BindMode`/…, signs in users with no mapped role, and the library logs nothing
|
||
>
|
||
> **Labels:** `type:bug`, `priority:p1`, `area:auth`, `cross-repo`
|
||
>
|
||
> **Body:**
|
||
> 1. `LdapOptions.ToLibraryOptions()` (`Security/Ldap/LdapOptions.cs:111`) drops `FallbackServers`, `BindMode`,
|
||
> `UserBindTemplate` and `AcceptDomainQualifiedNames`, so there is no AD DC failover.
|
||
> 2. `AuthEndpoints.cs:124-158` signs in with an empty role set, including when the mapper throws, and
|
||
> `AuthenticatedRead` admits any authenticated user. Once the search base is a whole AD domain, any directory
|
||
> user gets AdminUI read access and a token. The fix refuses empty roles at `/auth/login` and `/auth/token`,
|
||
> and refuses when the mapper throws. This reverses `Login_when_role_mapper_throws_signs_in_with_no_role_claims`.
|
||
> 3. `OtOpcUaLdapAuthService.cs:48` passes no logger to the library, so failover and stage logs are missing.
|
||
> Inject `ILogger<LdapAuthService>`.
|
||
> 4. Validate the new options in OtOpcUa's own validator: the fallback parse rule and the BindMode/UserBindTemplate
|
||
> rules only. **Not** `ServiceAccountDn`, because DEV boots on code defaults with an empty DN.
|
||
> 5. A two-way reflection completeness test, a binding test, docs, and fixes to the stale comments.
|
||
>
|
||
> **Acceptance:** failover on the redundant GLAuth pair, a zero-role user refused (cookie + token), and a
|
||
> DEV-shaped config boots. Plan: `scadaproj/docs/plans/2026-11-15-nam-ldap-cutover.md` §2.
|
||
|
||
### 2.4 Ship it
|
||
|
||
Merge to `master` and deploy with OtOpcUa's own procedure (`docs/deploy/`, most recently
|
||
`2026-11-13-vd03-qa-to-76e73e7d.md`): DEV, then QA.
|
||
|
||
- **No LDAP config change** goes out with this deploy.
|
||
- **The zero-role refusal does change behaviour on QA:** it is live against the box-local GLAuth today, so any
|
||
GLAuth user without a mapped group loses AdminUI read access. Phase 0 checks that the `multi-role` user maps.
|
||
- **Gate:** §7.5 (the OtOpcUa cutover) does not start until the deployed build contains this fix.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 2A. Phase A2 — ScadaBridge zero-role refusal (prerequisite for the ScadaBridge cutover)
|
||
|
||
**Defect [V, review B1]:**
|
||
- `CentralUI/Auth/AuthEndpoints.cs:59-115` signs in (cookie) and issues a bearer at `/auth/token` (`:125`) even
|
||
when `RoleMapper` returns no roles.
|
||
- `Dashboard.razor:2` and `Monitoring/Health.razor:2` are bare `[Authorize]`, so any directory user could read
|
||
them.
|
||
|
||
**Fix:**
|
||
1. In `/auth/login` and `/auth/token`, an empty mapped role set returns the bad-credentials response, with no
|
||
cookie and no token.
|
||
2. Apply the same rule to the mid-session group refresh (`DirectoryGroupRefresher`). A session whose roles drop
|
||
to zero is already ended by that refresh (`:141-142`); keep that behaviour and test it.
|
||
3. **Tests:** zero roles refused (login + token); one role signs in; a refresh to zero ends the session.
|
||
4. **Docs:** the `Component-Security` / CentralUI auth section.
|
||
5. **Leave the bare `[Authorize]` pages** as they are; they are safe once a login requires a role. Add a
|
||
static test that every page is either policy-gated or relies on that rule.
|
||
|
||
**Issue text for `ScadaBridge` (not filed):**
|
||
|
||
> **Title:** Central UI / `/auth/token` sign in users whose AD groups map to no role
|
||
>
|
||
> **Labels:** `type:bug`, `priority:p1`, `area:auth`, `cross-repo`
|
||
>
|
||
> **Body:** `CentralUI/Auth/AuthEndpoints.cs:59-115` signs in and mints a bearer with an empty role set. With a
|
||
> domain-wide NAM search base, any AD user reaches `Dashboard` and `Monitoring/Health` (bare `[Authorize]`). The
|
||
> family standard (scadaproj NAM cutover plan §3.2) refuses login when no role is mapped. Fix login and token,
|
||
> keep the refresh's end-on-zero, and add tests.
|
||
>
|
||
> **Acceptance:** a zero-role user is refused at both endpoints. Plan: `docs/plans/2026-11-15-nam-ldap-cutover.md` §2A.
|
||
|
||
**Ship:** a ScadaBridge build containing the fix, deployed DEV then QA before §7.4. This is a binary deploy, so
|
||
it follows the QA pair rules: stop both centrals and start them together.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 2B. Phase A3 — HistorianGateway case-insensitive group match (optional hardening)
|
||
|
||
**Defect [review M5]:** `Dashboard/DashboardOptions.cs:44-45` declares `IReadOnlyDictionary<string,string>`
|
||
with an `OrdinalIgnoreCase` default. The configuration binder **replaces** it with a new case-**sensitive**
|
||
`Dictionary`. The reviewer proved this with an offline binder test; the XML doc says "compared
|
||
case-insensitively", which is wrong once it's bound. AD group names are mixed case, so a key whose case differs
|
||
from the `memberOf` CN never matches.
|
||
|
||
**Fix:** declare `Dictionary<string,string>` with `StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase`, so the binder fills the
|
||
existing instance, as mxgw and OtOpcUa do. Add a binder test with a mixed-case key.
|
||
|
||
**Until it ships (and in any case),** §4 copies each group name **exactly** as LdapProbe prints it.
|
||
|
||
**Issue text for `historiangw` (not filed):**
|
||
|
||
> **Title:** `Dashboard:GroupToRole` is case-sensitive after binding (docs say case-insensitive)
|
||
>
|
||
> **Labels:** `type:bug`, `priority:p3`, `area:auth`
|
||
>
|
||
> **Body:** the `IReadOnlyDictionary` default with `OrdinalIgnoreCase` is replaced by the binder's default
|
||
> `Dictionary`. Make the property a `Dictionary` with `OrdinalIgnoreCase` and add a binder test with a mixed-case
|
||
> key. Found by the NAM cutover review (scadaproj plan §2B).
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 3. The family standards (DECIDED 2026-11-15)
|
||
|
||
### 3.1 One AD group grants exactly one role per app
|
||
|
||
A user's roles in an app are the union of the roles of every mapped group they belong to. No app maps one group
|
||
to two roles. Each deployment maps only its own `_DEV`/`_QA`/`_PROD` suffix.
|
||
|
||
**Why:**
|
||
1. Every schema already enforces or implies it, so no code change is needed:
|
||
|
||
| App | Mapping shape [V] |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| OtOpcUa | `Dictionary<string,string> GroupToRole` (`Security/Ldap/LdapOptions.cs:84`), unioned with the DB overlay `LdapGroupRoleMapping` (`OtOpcUaGroupRoleMapper.cs`). The overlay's only unique index is `(LdapGroup, ClusterId)`, filtered, so two system-wide rows per group are possible; **the rule forbids them** and Phase 0 checks. |
|
||
| ScadaBridge | table **`LdapGroupMappings`**, with `HasIndex(LdapGroupName).IsUnique()` (`ConfigurationDatabase/Configurations/SecurityConfiguration.cs:26`). `RoleMapper` unions roles across different groups (`Security/RoleMapper.cs:48-60`). |
|
||
| MxAccessGateway | `Dictionary<string,string>` (`Configuration/DashboardOptions.cs:69`). The validator allows only `Administrator`/`Viewer` (`GatewayOptionsValidator.cs:506-517`). |
|
||
| HistorianGateway | `IReadOnlyDictionary<string,string>` (`Dashboard/DashboardOptions.cs:44`). Case-sensitive in practice (§2B). |
|
||
|
||
2. Grants stay readable in AD, where IT owns membership.
|
||
3. It removes a silent failure: the old two-row ScadaBridge insert hits the unique index.
|
||
|
||
**Rejected:** several roles per group. It would need a ScadaBridge migration and matching changes in the other
|
||
apps. It stays a future option.
|
||
|
||
### 3.2 No role, no login (added by review B1)
|
||
|
||
**Every app refuses sign-in, both cookie and token, when the user's groups map to no role.** That includes the
|
||
case where the role lookup fails.
|
||
|
||
| App | Before the fixes [V] | Change (status 2026-11-17: merged, **not deployed**) |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| MxAccessGateway | refuses (`Dashboard/DashboardAuthenticator.cs:66-70`) | none |
|
||
| HistorianGateway | refused zero roles; a throwing mapper escaped as a 500 | historiangw#136, `f84af29`: case-insensitive `GroupToRole`, a mapper fault is refused like a bad password, both logged at Warning (`Dashboard/DashboardAuthenticator.cs`, the `MapAsync` catch and the `roles.Count == 0` branch) |
|
||
| OtOpcUa | signed in with no roles, even when the mapper threw | **§2 (Phase A)**: lmxopcua#913, `cdf433a35` |
|
||
| ScadaBridge | signed in with no roles: cookie, `/auth/token`, management HTTP Basic/Bearer | **§2A (Phase A2)**: #144 `d48e1667` (cookie, token, session refresh) + #145 `2e0ce81e` (management/CLI, audit, debug stream) |
|
||
|
||
**Consequence for the matrix:** read access now **requires** a mapped group. In OtOpcUa, `Viewer` is not checked
|
||
by any policy (pages use `AuthenticatedRead`), so a **Viewer cell means "holds a role, so may sign in and read"**.
|
||
That is why `APP_IDE_RO_<T>` → `Viewer` stays, and why `HIST_ADMIN_<T>` → `Viewer` in OtOpcUa is meaningful.
|
||
|
||
### 3.3 Consequence for ScadaBridge `Deployer`
|
||
|
||
`APP_IDE` → `Designer` only. In ScadaBridge, `Administrator` does not imply `Deployer`: each policy requires its
|
||
own role (`Security/AuthorizationPolicies.cs:190-202`). No existing group means "deploy", so:
|
||
- a **new AD group `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_{DEV,QA}`** (D6) maps to `Deployer`;
|
||
- until it exists on a tier, **the ScadaBridge cutover does not run there**, because nobody could deploy.
|
||
|
||
The other apps have no `Deployer` role; OtOpcUa deploy is `ConfigEditor` = Administrator/Designer,
|
||
`AdminUiPolicies.cs:18`.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 4. The tier mappings (generated from `ldap_mapping.md` §4.1)
|
||
|
||
These are platform groups only. Plant-floor, site and batch groups are not in this cutover (D5), and `CITRIX_*`
|
||
is never mapped. **Copy each group name exactly as LdapProbe prints it** (§2B; D7). The names below are as
|
||
observed on 2026-08-12.
|
||
|
||
| Group (`<T>` = `DEV` or `QA`) | OtOpcUa | ScadaBridge | MxAccessGateway | HistorianGateway |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_<T>` | Administrator | Administrator | Administrator | Administrator |
|
||
| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_<T>` | Designer | Designer | Viewer | — |
|
||
| `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_<T>` *(new, D6; only once it exists)* | — | Deployer | — | — |
|
||
| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_<T>` | Viewer | Viewer | Viewer | Viewer |
|
||
| `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_<T>` | Viewer | — | — | Administrator |
|
||
| `UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_QA` *(QA only; empty as of 08-12)* | — | Viewer | — | Viewer |
|
||
|
||
### 4.1 HistorianGateway (DEV: `appsettings.Production.json`; QA: NSSM env)
|
||
|
||
```jsonc
|
||
"Ldap": { /* §6 */ },
|
||
"Dashboard": {
|
||
"DisableLogin": false,
|
||
"GroupToRole": { "UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_DEV": "Administrator", "UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_DEV": "Administrator", "UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_DEV": "Viewer" }
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
On QA, remove every `Dashboard__GroupToRole__SCADA-*` entry first, then set:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_QA=Administrator
|
||
Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_QA=Administrator
|
||
Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_QA=Viewer
|
||
Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_QA=Viewer
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### 4.2 MxAccessGateway (the overlay file for the box's environment name; Phase 0 records it)
|
||
|
||
The **base `appsettings.json` ships `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` mappings** (`:86-89`) [V], and dictionaries **merge**
|
||
across overlays. So the overlay alone can't remove them, and they can't be neutralised either, because the
|
||
validator accepts only `Administrator`/`Viewer` as a value. **Delete the two entries from the box's base
|
||
`appsettings.json`** (backed up). A redeploy restores the base file, so the mxgw deploy notes must carry the
|
||
deletion forward.
|
||
|
||
Then set:
|
||
|
||
```jsonc
|
||
"MxGateway": {
|
||
"Ldap": { /* §6 */ },
|
||
"Dashboard": {
|
||
"DisableLogin": false,
|
||
"GroupToRole": { "UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_DEV": "Administrator", "UG_WW_APP_IDE_DEV": "Viewer", "UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_DEV": "Viewer" }
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
On QA, use the `_QA` suffix and delete `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` the same way. **Acceptance A4 reads the *effective*
|
||
config** (§8), not just the edited file.
|
||
|
||
### 4.3 OtOpcUa (service env, both tiers)
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
Security__Ldap__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_<T>=Administrator
|
||
Security__Ldap__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_IDE_<T>=Designer
|
||
Security__Ldap__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_<T>=Viewer
|
||
Security__Ldap__GroupToRole__UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_<T>=Viewer
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- **DB overlay:** the RoleGrants page / `LdapGroupRoleMapping` must hold **no** rows for these groups, or only the
|
||
same role.
|
||
- `DriverOperator` also honours the role `Operator` (`ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:201-202`); nothing maps to
|
||
it here.
|
||
|
||
### 4.4 ScadaBridge (central database)
|
||
|
||
**Preferred: the management surface**, so the change is audited by the ManagementActor and the 30 s
|
||
cross-central role-mapping cache is invalidated.
|
||
- Use the CLI `security` role-mapping commands: `scadabridge security --help` lists them. Run them on the target
|
||
tier with an explicit `--url`, **while DEV login is still off** (the dev user holds every role).
|
||
- On QA, run them as the current GLAuth admin before the cutover.
|
||
- The Central UI's role-mapping page is equivalent.
|
||
|
||
Add one mapping per group:
|
||
- `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_<T>` → `Administrator`
|
||
- `UG_WW_APP_IDE_<T>` → `Designer`
|
||
- `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_<T>` → `Viewer`
|
||
- `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_<T>` → `Deployer`, **only if that group exists (D6)**
|
||
- QA only: `UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_QA` → `Viewer`
|
||
|
||
**Fallback: direct SQL** (idempotent; refuses to change a conflicting row). It bypasses the audit and the cache
|
||
invalidation, so record it in the deployment record and **wait 30 s (or restart Central) before testing**.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
SET XACT_ABORT ON;
|
||
BEGIN TRAN;
|
||
DECLARE @t TABLE (LdapGroupName nvarchar(500) NOT NULL, Role nvarchar(100) NOT NULL);
|
||
INSERT @t VALUES (N'UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_DEV', N'Administrator'), (N'UG_WW_APP_IDE_DEV', N'Designer'), (N'UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_DEV', N'Viewer');
|
||
-- Only if D6's group exists: INSERT @t VALUES (N'UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_DEV', N'Deployer');
|
||
-- QA: _QA suffix, plus (N'UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_QA', N'Viewer').
|
||
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM dbo.LdapGroupMappings m JOIN @t t ON t.LdapGroupName = m.LdapGroupName WHERE m.Role <> t.Role)
|
||
THROW 50001, 'LdapGroupMappings maps one of these groups to a different role; resolve by hand.', 1;
|
||
INSERT dbo.LdapGroupMappings (LdapGroupName, Role)
|
||
SELECT t.LdapGroupName, t.Role FROM @t t
|
||
WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM dbo.LdapGroupMappings m WHERE m.LdapGroupName = t.LdapGroupName);
|
||
COMMIT;
|
||
SELECT Id, LdapGroupName, Role FROM dbo.LdapGroupMappings ORDER BY Id;
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**Names [V]:**
|
||
- Table `LdapGroupMappings`.
|
||
- Columns `LdapGroupName` `nvarchar(500)` and `Role` `nvarchar(100)` (`SecurityConfiguration.cs:16-24`).
|
||
- Role values are the `Security/Roles.cs:45-56` constants.
|
||
|
||
The `SCADA-*` seed rows (Ids 1–5) name GLAuth groups that don't exist in NAM, so they grant nothing; leave them.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 5. Decisions (owner or IT): settle before the cutover (§7)
|
||
|
||
| # | Decision | Options | Recommendation |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| D1 | **Service account** (owner request: one dedicated LDAP-lookup account shared by the four services, **scadaproj#58**) | **Target:** the dedicated account from scadaproj#58, shared across all four apps; one account for DEV and QA unless IT prefers one per tier. **Interim (DEV only):** `svc_igntadmin@nam.zimmer.com`, **only with the Ignition team's agreement**. It is their admin account, and their rotations or lockouts would hit us. | **Target from scadaproj#58, a QA prerequisite.** **Add to the scadaproj#58 ask: a no-lockout policy (or a very high threshold) on the account**, because it is shared by four apps and two tiers and a wrong secret costs 2 bad binds per login (§1.3). `BindMode=ServiceAccount` everywhere. Rotation = re-seed `nam-ldap-svc-password` in every store **and restart each app**, since values resolve only at startup (§7.1). |
|
||
| D2 | **Turn login on where DEV is deliberately open** (HG; mxgw = mxaccessgw#231 item 3; ScadaBridge) | Turn it on / leave DEV open | **Turn it on.** DEV is where problems should surface. |
|
||
| D3 | **Automation identity** (CLI, deploy and drill scripts). **QA:** today GLAuth `multi-role`. **DEV:** today the login-off dev user (`ManagementAuthenticator.cs:63-71`), which stops working the moment DEV ScadaBridge login turns on. The same applies to OtOpcUa scripts if DEV `Security__Auth__DisableLogin=true` (Phase 0). | (a) A NAM *user-type* identity per tier in `APP_ADMIN_<T>` + `APP_IDE_<T>` + `APP_DEPLOY_<T>`, password in the Mac Keychain. The scadaproj#58 account is lookup-only and should not double as a login unless IT agrees. (b) An interim DEV identity (a named admin's account) for DEV only. | **(a). A precondition of the DEV ScadaBridge step** (or (b) as a DEV interim) **and of the QA ScadaBridge step.** Also of the OtOpcUa step if Phase 0 finds DEV OtOpcUa login off. |
|
||
| D4 | **TLS trust** | (a) Install `zimmer-rootca` in `LocalMachine\Root`, `AllowInsecure=false`. (b) `AllowInsecure=true`: **accepts any certificate** (`ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap/Internal/NovellLdapConnection.cs:41-46`), so an active man-in-the-middle can read the service-account **and every user's** password. (c) Pin: in OtOpcUa, HG and ScadaBridge this is code-only (`ServerCertificateValidationCallback`), but **mxgw has a config-bound strict pin**, `MxGateway:Ldap:ServerCertificateThumbprintSha256` (`LdapServerCertificatePin.cs:9-21`). | **(a).** (b) is DEV only and short-lived, if at all. For mxgw: **remove any GLAuth pin** left in config (§7.3), and optionally pin the NAM DC leaf thumbprints. The certs expire 2027-03, so a pin must be renewed. |
|
||
| D5 | **Plant-floor and site groups** | now / later | **Later** (`ldap_mapping.md` §6). |
|
||
| D6 | **New group `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_{DEV,QA}`** (ScadaBridge `Deployer`) | ticket it / the rejected multi-role code (§3.1) | **Ticket it. Blocks the ScadaBridge step on each tier.** |
|
||
| D7 | **Group membership and exact names** | — | **Per person:** `dotnet run --project tools/LdapProbe -- --insecure --svc '<svc account UPN>' -u <sAMAccountName>` (service-account path; prompts for the service password). Or, as the person, `--insecure --self-bind -u <sAMAccountName>` (binds as them; `--svc` is ignored). **Families:** `-g 'UG_WW_*'`. Missing people get a ServiceNow membership request, not a wider mapping. Copy group names exactly (§2B). |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 6. The LDAP block (each app's section)
|
||
|
||
The sections are: HG `Ldap`, mxgw `MxGateway:Ldap`, ScadaBridge `ScadaBridge:Security:Ldap`
|
||
(`Security/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:24`), OtOpcUa `Security:Ldap`.
|
||
|
||
```jsonc
|
||
{
|
||
"Enabled": true,
|
||
"Server": "uswap-vdc-nam1.nam.zimmer.com",
|
||
"Port": 636,
|
||
"Transport": "Ldaps",
|
||
"AllowInsecure": false, // D4
|
||
"FallbackServers": [ "uswap-vdc-nam2.nam.zimmer.com:636" ], // OtOpcUa: only with the §2 build
|
||
"SearchBase": "DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com",
|
||
"ServiceAccountDn": "<svc account UPN from scadaproj#58>", // D1; DEV interim: svc_igntadmin@nam.zimmer.com (Ignition agreement)
|
||
"ServiceAccountPassword": "${secret:nam-ldap-svc-password}",
|
||
"UserNameAttribute": "sAMAccountName",
|
||
"DisplayNameAttribute": "name",
|
||
"GroupAttribute": "memberOf",
|
||
"BindMode": "ServiceAccount"
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
mxgw only: no `ServerCertificateThumbprintSha256` unless D4 chooses to pin the NAM DCs.
|
||
|
||
The env form follows the usual pattern, e.g. `Ldap__FallbackServers__0=uswap-vdc-nam2.nam.zimmer.com:636`.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 7. Runbook
|
||
|
||
**Order:**
|
||
1. **DEV:** HistorianGateway (**the canary**, §7.6 rule 6) → MxAccessGateway → ScadaBridge (after §2A, D3, D6)
|
||
→ OtOpcUa (after §2).
|
||
2. A soak of a few working days with real logins.
|
||
3. **QA in the same order.** QA also needs **scadaproj#58** (QA never runs on `svc_igntadmin`). If DEV used the
|
||
interim account, switch DEV to the scadaproj#58 account during the soak, so that QA repeats a configuration
|
||
already proven on DEV.
|
||
|
||
**One app at a time:** edit, restart, verify, then the next.
|
||
|
||
**Remote execution only within the `winrm` deploy scope:** preflight, backup, edit, restart, verify, rollback.
|
||
Files go over SMB and SQL runs from the Mac. servecli is retired.
|
||
|
||
**Restart rules (review M4).** This is a **config-only** change: the same binary, no migration, no wire change.
|
||
So restarts are **rolling, standby first**:
|
||
|
||
| Pair | How | Why |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| **OtOpcUa QA pair** | Restart the standby (ServiceLevel 240/90), confirm it is healthy and back at its level, then the primary. The primary's restart is a failover; ScadaBridge's OPC UA client follows ServiceLevel, as WarmCanary showed. | The stop-both/start-both rule in OtOpcUa's records is for binary/schema upgrades. Config-only allows rolling [I: confirm against OtOpcUa's deploy notes in Phase 0]. **A bad LDAP key stops a node booting**, which is why the standby goes first. |
|
||
| **ScadaBridge QA centrals** | Standby central first, confirm it rejoins (one active, `/health/active`), then the active one, which gives a takeover of about 8–11 s. **Sites are not restarted.** | Central LDAP config only. The LocalDb stop-together rule applies to the *site* pairs' sync, which this change doesn't touch. The stop-together rule for binaries (§2A) does not apply. |
|
||
| **Single nodes** (DEV; HG/mxgw on each QA box) | One restart each. | — |
|
||
|
||
A pair restarted together **is** an outage of its data plane (OPC UA or the site data path). Don't do it for this
|
||
change.
|
||
|
||
### 7.0 Phase 0 — preflight (read-only; deploy scope; per box vd03, vq03, vq04)
|
||
|
||
1. **DC reachability:** `Test-NetConnection` to nam1 and nam2 on 636 and 389.
|
||
2. **TLS:** check the chain to nam1:636 (`SslStream`, or `certutil -verify`) and whether `zimmer-rootca` is in
|
||
`LocalMachine\Root`. This settles D4.
|
||
3. **Service-account bind, once** from the Mac:
|
||
`LDAPTLS_REQCERT=never ldapsearch -H ldaps://uswap-vdc-nam1.nam.zimmer.com:636 -x -D '<svc account UPN>' -W -b "DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com" -s base dn`
|
||
4. **Current config per app, kept for rollback:**
|
||
- hash the appsettings;
|
||
- export the NSSM/service env;
|
||
- list every `Ldap__*`, `*__Ldap__*`, `*DisableLogin*`, `*__GroupToRole__*` entry;
|
||
- record **OtOpcUa's `Security__Auth__DisableLogin`** on all three boxes;
|
||
- record **mxgw's environment name** (it decides the overlay file; vd03 can't be Production while
|
||
`DisableLogin=true`);
|
||
- record **mxgw's `ServerCertificateThumbprintSha256`** (a leftover GLAuth pin blocks NAM);
|
||
- record **mxgw's base `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` entries**.
|
||
5. **QA mxgw `dc=zb` vs `dc=scadabridge`:** does a test login work today? This decides the rollback target.
|
||
6. **Secrets per app:**
|
||
- the store path, master-key source and KEK location for the §7.1 fallback. The family default is
|
||
`MasterKey:Source=Environment` / `ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY`; file-based KEKs exist on some boxes. Record which
|
||
each app uses; don't assume.
|
||
- **ScadaBridge Central `Secrets:Store:Provider`.** QA is the shared SQL store (2026-11-13 QA pack §1); DEV is
|
||
[I] `Sqlite`.
|
||
- **OtOpcUa `Secrets:Replication:Enabled`** (`Host/Configuration/SecretsRegistration.cs:21`). If it's on, the
|
||
QA pair shares the secret through Akka replication, and "one store per box" becomes "seed once".
|
||
- HG KEK health on vd03 (historiangw#134).
|
||
7. **OtOpcUa DB overlay:** the `LdapGroupRoleMapping` rows (§4.3).
|
||
8. **Builds:**
|
||
- the deployed OtOpcUa build contains §2 (required before **§7.5**);
|
||
- the deployed ScadaBridge build contains §2A (before §7.4);
|
||
- on QA, the GLAuth `multi-role` user still maps to a role after §2/§2A (§2.4).
|
||
|
||
### 7.1 Seed and verify the secret (before any config change)
|
||
|
||
- **Name:** `nam-ldap-svc-password`, the same in every store.
|
||
- Values resolve **only at startup**, so a rotation is re-seed every store plus restart every app (§7 restart
|
||
rules).
|
||
- An **unresolved** `${secret:}` throws `SecretNotFoundException` at boot (`SecretReferenceExpander.cs:74-77`),
|
||
so the app won't start.
|
||
- **Preferred:** each app's `/admin/secrets` page. It writes through the app's own provider, which is correct for
|
||
ScadaBridge's shared SQL store and for a replicated OtOpcUa store.
|
||
- DEV HG, mxgw and ScadaBridge are still login-off at this point. On QA, use the current GLAuth admin.
|
||
- **Fallback:** the `secret` CLI, with the store and master-key settings **from Phase 0 step 6**, per app:
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$env:Secrets__SqlitePath = "<that app's store, Phase 0>"
|
||
$env:Secrets__MasterKey__Source = "<Environment|File, Phase 0>" # family default: Environment (ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY)
|
||
$env:Secrets__MasterKey__FilePath = "<kek, only if File>"
|
||
secret.exe set nam-ldap-svc-password # prompts; never pass the value as an argument
|
||
```
|
||
- **Stores:**
|
||
- HG and mxgw: per box.
|
||
- OtOpcUa: per box, or once if replication is on.
|
||
- ScadaBridge: **once per tier through Central**. The site does no LDAP.
|
||
- **Verify the VALUE before the app's restart (review M2):** read it back (`get`) and bind with it once using
|
||
LdapProbe (`--svc '<svc account UPN>'`, pasting the read-back value). One good bind proves the stored secret.
|
||
A wrong secret found here costs 1–2 bad binds, instead of 2 per user login after the restart.
|
||
|
||
### 7.2 HistorianGateway (DEV: file; QA: NSSM env). The canary.
|
||
|
||
1. Back up the file or env.
|
||
2. Write §6 and §4.1. On DEV, set `DisableLogin` to `false`. On QA, replace the `Ldap__*` entries and remove the
|
||
`SCADA-*` `GroupToRole` entries.
|
||
3. Restart `ZbHistorianGateway`. Run §7.6 **fully, including the failover check**, before touching any other app.
|
||
|
||
### 7.3 MxAccessGateway (the file for its environment name)
|
||
|
||
1. Back up the base and overlay files.
|
||
2. Write `MxGateway:Ldap` (§6) and `GroupToRole` (§4.2), and delete the base `GwAdmin`/`GwReader`.
|
||
3. **Remove the `ServerCertificateThumbprintSha256` pin**, or replace it with the NAM DC leaf thumbprints (D4).
|
||
4. On DEV, set `DisableLogin` to `false` (D2, mxaccessgw#231 item 3). If that makes the box eligible to run as
|
||
Production, record the environment name. Don't change it in this step.
|
||
5. Leave the API-key store under `data\` and the pepper env alone.
|
||
6. Restart, then run §7.6.
|
||
|
||
### 7.4 ScadaBridge (Central only)
|
||
|
||
**Preconditions:**
|
||
- §2A deployed;
|
||
- D6: `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_<T>` exists, has members, and is mapped;
|
||
- D3: the automation identity works. On DEV it is needed **before** login turns on, because the dev-user path
|
||
ends then.
|
||
|
||
1. Back up `appsettings.Central.json` and the env.
|
||
2. Add the role mappings (§4.4, CLI preferred).
|
||
3. Write `ScadaBridge:Security:Ldap` (§6).
|
||
4. On DEV, **remove BOTH** `ScadaBridge:Security:Auth:DisableLogin` and `AllowOutsideDevelopment`. Removing only
|
||
the second while `DisableLogin=true` makes `DisableLoginGuard` crash-loop the service.
|
||
5. On QA, replace the GLAuth values.
|
||
6. Restart: DEV, the single central. QA, rolling, standby central first (§7 restart rules).
|
||
7. Re-point every script that used `multi-role` (or relied on login-off) at the D3 identity: `apply.sh`, the
|
||
drill and deploy packs. Confirm `/auth/token` works with it.
|
||
|
||
### 7.5 OtOpcUa AdminUI (service env; only after §2 is deployed)
|
||
|
||
1. Back up the env.
|
||
2. Add §6 as `Security__Ldap__*` and the §4.3 `GroupToRole`. Keep the files' `Transport`/`DevStubMode`.
|
||
3. If `Security__Auth__DisableLogin=true`, set it to `false`, and if scripts relied on it, have D3 in place first.
|
||
4. Restart: DEV, the single node. QA, **rolling, standby first** (§7 restart rules). Watch ServiceLevel and the
|
||
ScadaBridge `WarmCanary` connection across the primary's restart.
|
||
5. **Existing sessions:** AdminUI cookies and bearer tokens issued under GLAuth stay valid after the switch until
|
||
they expire. Either:
|
||
- invalidate them (restart both nodes, if the cookie and data-protection keys are per process [I], or rotate
|
||
the signing or data-protection key); or
|
||
- record their remaining lifetime and accept it.
|
||
|
||
ScadaBridge needs no such step: its group refresh ends sessions whose roles change
|
||
(`DirectoryGroupRefresher.cs:141-142`).
|
||
|
||
### 7.6 Verify (each app, right after its restart)
|
||
|
||
1. **Negative control first:** a bogus user and password. Expect a clean "invalid / not authorized" and **no**
|
||
`failed system-side` warning.
|
||
- A `service-bind`-stage warning means the stored service secret is wrong. **Stop: every further attempt costs
|
||
the shared account 2 bad binds.**
|
||
- A `connect`-stage warning means network or TLS.
|
||
- (An unresolved `${secret:}` never gets this far; the app fails at boot with `SecretNotFoundException`.)
|
||
- (OtOpcUa logs these lines only with the §2 logger fix.)
|
||
2. **One real login per mapped role:** Administrator, Designer, Viewer, and Deployer for ScadaBridge. The UI shows
|
||
exactly that role, and the user typed a **bare sAMAccountName** (§1.3).
|
||
3. **A user whose groups map to no role is refused**, on the login page **and** at the token endpoint where one
|
||
exists (OtOpcUa and ScadaBridge `/auth/token`). This is the §3.2 standard: in OtOpcUa and ScadaBridge it holds
|
||
only with the §2/§2A builds; mxgw and HG already refuse.
|
||
4. **`${secret:}` proof:** no `*ServiceAccountPassword` sits in env, and the stored value was bind-verified
|
||
(§7.1).
|
||
5. **Failover:**
|
||
- On HG (the canary), once per tier: block nam1:636 briefly. Login still works and the log shows `sticky
|
||
preference moved`; then restore.
|
||
- **OtOpcUa** gets its own nam1→nam2 check (acceptance A2).
|
||
6. **Stop rule (review M2):** stop the cutover on **2 failed logins attributable to the service account, across
|
||
all apps, within 15 minutes.** Count `service-bind` warnings, not user typos. Diagnose before any retry; ask IT
|
||
to check the account's lockout state.
|
||
|
||
### 7.7 Rollback (per app)
|
||
|
||
- Restore the backed-up files or env and restart. On QA, use the same rolling order: standby first.
|
||
- mxgw: also restore its base `appsettings.json` (the `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` entries) and any pin.
|
||
- **Point the scripts back at `multi-role`** (QA), or back at login-off (DEV ScadaBridge).
|
||
- If the shared account got locked, **IT clears the lockout.** Until then, every NAM-backed app is down for login;
|
||
roll those apps back to GLAuth or login-off first.
|
||
- The seeded secrets are inert once nothing references them. The ScadaBridge `UG_WW_*` mapping rows grant nothing
|
||
while login is off or on GLAuth.
|
||
- **Keep** the §2/§2A/§2B builds. The zero-role refusal is the family standard and stands on its own.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 8. Acceptance
|
||
|
||
- **A1:** the §2 offline tests pass:
|
||
- failover on the redundant GLAuth pair with the library's log line;
|
||
- zero-role refusal (cookie + token, including the mapper-throws case);
|
||
- a DEV-shaped config boots;
|
||
- the reflection guard fails under its mutation.
|
||
- The §2A tests pass too.
|
||
- **A2:** on each tier, the OtOpcUa AdminUI login survives nam1 being blocked, through nam2.
|
||
- **A3:** every §7.6 check passes for each tier and app.
|
||
- **A4:** no app maps any group to two roles, and no stale GLAuth mapping remains. Check the **effective**
|
||
config: env plus all overlays plus base, including mxgw's `GwAdmin`/`GwReader`, and the ScadaBridge table.
|
||
- **A5:** automation runs on the D3 identity. Nothing uses `multi-role`, or relies on login-off, on a cut-over
|
||
app.
|
||
- **A6:** QA (and DEV after the soak) binds as the scadaproj#58 account and never as `svc_igntadmin`.
|
||
|
||
## 9. Open questions
|
||
|
||
1. ~~Does OtOpcUa run the library's validator?~~ **Answered: no** (§2.1 item 4). The validation is ported
|
||
selectively (§2.2 item 4).
|
||
2. Does QA mxgw login work today (`dc=zb` vs `dc=scadabridge`)? Phase 0 step 5.
|
||
3. What is the HG KEK state on vd03? (historiangw#134)
|
||
4. Is OtOpcUa's AdminUI cookie or data-protection key per process or shared? That decides the §7.5 step 5 method
|
||
[I].
|
||
5. Does OtOpcUa's deploy procedure allow a rolling restart for config-only changes? Confirm against its records
|
||
(§7 restart rules).
|
||
6. Do the `UG_WW_*` memberships and exact names still match 2026-08-12? D7 re-enumerates.
|
||
7. ignitionoee: still on hold.
|
||
|
||
## 10. Corrections from the 2026-08-13 plan
|
||
|
||
| 08-13 plan said | Fact (2026-11-15) |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| Phase 1: redeploy to Auth 0.2.1 | Every build already runs 0.4.1 (ScadaBridge 0.5.0). Phase deleted. |
|
||
| Preflight over servecli `:2222` | servecli is retired; the winrm deploy scope plus SMB plus SQL replace it. |
|
||
| mxgw on vd03 has LDAP login on | `DisableLogin=true` (and so it isn't running as Production). |
|
||
| One target block for all four apps | OtOpcUa drops `FallbackServers` and three more options, and logs nothing. Fixed in §2. |
|
||
| A zero-group user is denied in every app | **Only mxgw and HG refuse.** OtOpcUa and ScadaBridge sign in with no roles. Fixed in §2/§2A; the standard is §3.2. |
|
||
| ScadaBridge `INSERT INTO LdapGroupMapping`, two rows for `APP_IDE` | The table is `LdapGroupMappings`, unique `LdapGroupName`. One-group-one-role plus the new D6 group; CLI preferred over SQL. |
|
||
| `ldap_mapping.md`: ScadaBridge can grant two roles per group | It can't. Rewritten as the canonical matrix. |
|
||
| Seed the ScadaBridge central and site stores with the CLI | Seed once through Central `/admin/secrets`; the site does no LDAP. |
|
||
| Stop after 2 failures; every failed login costs both DCs | A wrong *user* password costs 1 bind. A wrong *service* secret costs 2 per login and locks the shared account. New stop rule, a no-lockout ask and value verification. |
|
||
| Service account `svc_igntadmin` now, dedicated "later" | Target: scadaproj#58, a QA prerequisite; `svc_igntadmin` is a DEV interim only, with Ignition's agreement. |
|
||
| OtOpcUa before ScadaBridge | OtOpcUa last, after its fix. |
|
||
| (silent) automation | DEV and QA automation lose their identity on cutover. D3 is a precondition. |
|
||
| (silent) restarts | Rolling, standby first, for config-only changes. Restarting a pair together is a data-plane outage. |
|
||
|
||
## 11. Review 2026-11-15: findings and disposition
|
||
|
||
| # | Finding | Disposition |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| B1 | OtOpcUa and ScadaBridge sign in users with zero mapped roles (OtOpcUa even when the mapper throws); `AuthenticatedRead`/bare `[Authorize]` then grant read access to any AD user | **Applied.** New standard §3.2; OtOpcUa fix §2.2 item 2 (refuses on throw too, reversing `Login_when_role_mapper_throws_signs_in_with_no_role_claims`); ScadaBridge Phase A2 §2A with issue text and a deploy; Viewer semantics §3.2; §7.6 step 3 and `ldap_mapping.md` §1 rewritten. |
|
||
| B2 | Calling the library validator would stop OtOpcUa booting on DEV/QA (`ServiceAccountDn` required) | **Applied.** §2.2 item 4 ports only the `FallbackServers` and BindMode/UserBindTemplate rules, with a DEV-shaped boot test. Open question 1 answered (§2.1 item 4). |
|
||
| M1 | No logger passed to the library service | **Applied.** §2.2 item 3. |
|
||
| M2 | Lockout on the shared account; §1.3 had it backwards | **Applied.** §1.3 table; D1 no-lockout ask; §7.1 value verification; HG as canary; §7.6 rule 6 stop rule. |
|
||
| M3 | DEV automation breaks when DEV login turns on | **Applied.** D3 covers DEV (dev-user path, `ManagementAuthenticator.cs:63-71`); a precondition in §7.4/§7.5. |
|
||
| M4 | "Data plane unaffected" was misleading; pairs restarted together are an outage | **Applied.** §7 restart rules: rolling, standby first, for config-only changes. The OtOpcUa rolling allowance is [I] pending Phase 0 / open question 5. |
|
||
| M5 | HG group match is case-sensitive after binding | **Applied.** §2B (optional Phase A3) with issue text; exact names from LdapProbe in §4 and D7. |
|
||
| M6 | mxgw config-bound certificate pin | **Applied.** Phase 0 step 4; §7.3 step 3; D4 corrected. |
|
||
| m | §2.4 / §7.0 cross-references | **Applied** (→ §7.5). |
|
||
| m | Unresolved `${secret:}` fails at boot | **Applied** (§7.1, §7.6). |
|
||
| m | Rotation needs restarts | **Applied** (D1, §7.1). |
|
||
| m | `AcceptDomainQualifiedNames` only applies in User mode | **Applied** (§1.3; users type the bare sAMAccountName). |
|
||
| m | D7 command was wrong | **Applied** (`-u` with `--svc`, or `--self-bind -u`). |
|
||
| m | Secrets CLI hardcoded `File` | **Applied** (Phase 0 step 6 supplies the values; default noted). |
|
||
| m | OtOpcUa secret replication | **Applied** (Phase 0 step 6; §7.1 stores). |
|
||
| m | mxgw vd03 can't be Production with `DisableLogin` | **Applied** (§1.2; Phase 0 step 4; §7.3 step 4). |
|
||
| m | mxgw base `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` merge | **Applied** (§4.2 delete from base; A4 checks the effective config). |
|
||
| m | Existing OtOpcUa sessions survive cutover | **Applied** (§7.5 step 5; ScadaBridge self-ends via refresh). |
|
||
| m | Rollback gaps | **Applied** (§7.7: scripts, AD lockout, rolling on QA). |
|
||
| m | `AllowInsecure` accepts any certificate | **Applied** (D4(b)). |
|
||
| m | Stale OtOpcUa validator comment | **Applied** (§2.1 item 5, §2.2 item 7). |
|
||
| m | ScadaBridge SQL bypasses audit and cache | **Applied** (§4.4: CLI/UI preferred; SQL fallback with a 30 s wait). |
|
||
| n | `LdapOptions` doc default `10.100.0.35` vs code `localhost` | **Applied** (§2.1 item 5). |
|
||
| n | Reflection test: compare lists by content, both directions | **Applied** (§2.2 item 5). |
|
||
| n | §4.4 DEPLOY row conditional | **Applied.** |
|