scadaproj/ZB.MOM.WW.Auth/CLAUDE.md

# ZB.MOM.WW.Auth

Shared login / identity / API-key library for the **ZB.MOM.WW SCADA family** (4 packages + `ApiKeys.SqlServer`; consumed by OtOpcUa, ScadaBridge, MxAccessGateway, HistorianGateway). Build/test from this directory: `dotnet test` (the `ApiKeys.SqlServer` live suite is gated on `AUTH_SQLSERVER_CONNSTR`). Component spec + gaps: `../components/auth/`.

## Index history (migrated from the scadaproj root CLAUDE.md)

> Moved verbatim out of the scadaproj root `CLAUDE.md` on 2026-09-03 so it loads only when needed. **This file is now the authoritative place for this history — append new entries here and keep the root index row short.**

### Component-table row as it read in the index

| Component | Status | Goal | Design | Implementation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Auth (login / identity / authz) | Adopted (**feed carries `0.3.0` as of 2026-09-02 — five packages, the new one being `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys.SqlServer`; ALL FOUR apps pin `0.3.0` as of 2026-09-03**: OtOpcUa `master @ b8b4c18f`, ScadaBridge `main @ e45c4af9` (the `inbound-api-key-shared-store` work, merged), MxAccessGateway `main @ 4f931e4`, HistorianGateway `main @ d8d890c` — each built + tested with no new failures versus its pre-bump baseline, all PUSHED to origin. The preceding `0.2.1` pins landed 2026-08-13 (OtOpcUa `08e33fc7`, ScadaBridge `d28824d9`, MxAccessGateway `1cb14d2`, HistorianGateway `e42ff31`). **`0.2.0` (2026-08-10) adds LDAP backup-DC sticky failover**, **`0.2.1` (2026-08-12) fixes a defect that broke AD logins outright** — an AD continuation referral escaped `NovellLdapConnection.Search`, so any `SearchBase` at a domain root failed every login as `ServiceAccountBindFailed` against a perfectly healthy directory. Live-proven against `DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com`; the app-level exposure is closed by the pin bumps. **`FallbackServers` is live-gated** via the local redundant GLAuth pair ([`infra/glauth-redundant/`](infra/glauth-redundant/), primary :3893 + backup :3894 on the dev Mac): HistorianGateway dashboard drill PASS 2026-08-13 (failover, stickiness, walk-back). | Shared `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth` lib | [`components/auth/`](components/auth/) | [`ZB.MOM.WW.Auth/`](ZB.MOM.WW.Auth/) |

### Narrative

The auth component is fully populated: a normalized [`spec`](components/auth/spec/SPEC.md), a
proposed [`shared-contract`](components/auth/shared-contract/ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.md), three
[`current-state`](components/auth/current-state/) docs, and an adoption [`GAPS`](components/auth/GAPS.md)
backlog. Common ground = LDAP/GLAuth identity + peppered-HMAC API keys; left per-project =
the authz vocabularies (OPC-UA permissions / gRPC scopes / roles + site-scoping).

The shared library is **built and lives in this repo** at [`ZB.MOM.WW.Auth/`](ZB.MOM.WW.Auth/)
(a plain directory of this repo — no nested `.git`, verified 2026-08-07; .NET 10; 4 packages — `Abstractions`, `Ldap`, `ApiKeys`, `AspNetCore`;
250 tests passing + 2 skipped (verified 2026-08-10 at `0.2.0`; was 215+1 at `0.1.5`); feed carries `0.1.0`–`0.2.0`). The implementation plan is at
[`docs/plans/2026-06-01-zb-mom-ww-auth-shared-library.md`](docs/plans/2026-06-01-zb-mom-ww-auth-shared-library.md).
**Adopted across all three apps on 2026-06-02** (auth GAPS #1–#8) on each repo's `feat/adopt-zb-auth` branch —
committed + reviewed, then **fast-forward-merged into the repo's local default (main/master) and PUSHED to origin
(gitea) on 2026-06-03** (in sync; the `feat/*` branches kept locally as history). Cutover: shared `Auth.Ldap`,
`Auth.ApiKeys` (ScadaBridge inbound fully re-architected to the keyId/Bearer model), `IGroupRoleMapper<TRole>` seam,
`Transport`-enum config, canonical `ZbClaimTypes`/`ZbCookieDefaults`, unified dev base DN `dc=zb,dc=local`, and the
canonical-six role vocabulary (with ScadaBridge's accepted auditor/admin SoD collapse). Consumer pins: **all four apps pin `0.3.0` as of 2026-09-03** (commits listed in the table row above, all pushed to origin); all four pinned `0.2.1` from 2026-08-13 before that. Prior history — all four pinned `0.1.5` (verified 2026-08-07): MxGateway via `e107019` 2026-07-18 (earlier bumped `0.1.2`→`0.1.4` 2026-07-09 for the G-2 API-key-expiry verifier enforcement — commit `197731a`; also required implementing the 0.1.3 `IApiKeyAdminStore.SetScopes/SetEnabled` members on a test fake), ScadaBridge `50d79ed1` + HistorianGateway `df211ee` 2026-07-18, OtOpcUa `1adaa2fc` 2026-07-20 (PR #484, family alignment from `0.1.1`). Per-repo detail in [`components/auth/GAPS.md`](components/auth/GAPS.md) +
`docs/plans/2026-06-02-auth-audit-normalization*.md`.
Build/test from `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth/`: `dotnet test` (the `ApiKeys.SqlServer` live suite is gated on `AUTH_SQLSERVER_CONNSTR`, skipped otherwise). Consumer matrix: OtOpcUa → Abstractions+Ldap+AspNetCore;
MxAccessGateway & HistorianGateway → the original four; ScadaBridge → those four **plus `ApiKeys.SqlServer`** (ApiKeys not used by OtOpcUa).
**`0.1.4` (2026-07-09, archreview G-2):** optional `ApiKeyRecord.ExpiresUtc` (nullable = never-expires), `ApiKeyFailure.KeyExpired`, `ApiKeyVerifier` expiry enforcement (inclusive, injected clock), a `CreateKeyAsync(expiresUtc)` overload, and a SQLite **schema v3** additive `expires_utc` column (idempotent `ALTER`; donor v2 DBs upgrade in place, no key invalidated). **All four Auth pkgs published to the Gitea feed at `0.1.4`** (2026-07-09). **HistorianGateway adopted the expiry surface at `0.1.4`** — `apikey create --expires` + dashboard Expires column (Task-10 done). **`0.1.5` (2026-07-18)** is `0.1.4` plus the `SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.12` transitive security pin (GHSA-2m69-gcr7-jv3q), no API change; all four apps now pin it (see consumer pins above). **`0.2.0` (2026-08-10) — LDAP backup-DC sticky failover** (plan `docs/plans/2026-08-10-ldap-backup-dc-failover.md`, design `…-design.md`; **4 pkgs published to the feed, restore-verified**; family `Directory.Build.props` now `0.2.0`): one additive `LdapOptions.FallbackServers` list (`"host"` or `"host:port"`, empty default = failover off, single-endpoint behaviour byte-unchanged) makes `LdapAuthService` walk an ordered endpoint list (primary + fallbacks) on **system-side failures only** — connect/TLS, service-account bind, or search. A user-side answer from a healthy directory (`Success`/`UserNotFound`/`AmbiguousUser`/`BadCredentials`/`GroupLookupFailed`) is **final and never retried elsewhere** (re-asking a second DC about a rejected password would multiply one bad-password event into several against the account lockout policy). Endpoint preference is **sticky** — the last endpoint that gave *any* authoritative answer (success **or** a user-side failure) is tried first next time — so a primary outage costs its connect timeout once, not per login; an exhausted walk leaves the preference untouched. Fail-closed contract preserved per-endpoint; boot validation rejects a malformed `FallbackServers` entry naming the field; optional `ILogger<LdapAuthService>` emits a Warning per failed hop (endpoint + stage, no secrets) and an Information on sticky change; wired via `AddZbLdapAuth` (`GetService`, so logging is optional). Motivation: the ZB production directory is NAM AD with two DCs. Unit suite covers the walk/stickiness (14 tests) + env-gated live GLAuth failover test (`ZB_LDAP_IT=1`). **No `Abstractions` contract change beyond the new option; no `LdapAuthFailure` enum change.** App adoption (pin bump to `0.2.0` + authoring `FallbackServers`) is a follow-up.
**`0.2.1` (2026-08-12) — AD continuation referrals no longer fail the search** (**4 pkgs published to the feed, restore-verified**; the assembly restored *from the feed* carries the fix and `0.2.0` does not — checked as a positive control, not by trusting the push). Active Directory answers **any search based at a domain root** with continuation references (to `CN=Configuration`, `DC=ForestDnsZones`, …). With referral following disabled — the default, and what we want, since chasing one would re-bind somewhere we never authenticated — Novell surfaces each by throwing `LdapReferralException` from `Next()`. That escaped `NovellLdapConnection.Search`, and `LdapAuthService` maps a failed search to `ServiceAccountBindFailed`, so **every login against `SearchBase = DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com` failed system-side on both DCs while the directory, the credentials and the service account were all healthy** — ~546 ms, identical on each endpoint, so failover could not help either. Found by the new `tools/LdapProbe` (below) and live-proven fixed against the ZB NAM domain root. The search loop now skips referrals (`ReadEntries(ILdapSearchResults)`, extracted so it is unit-testable through the Novell seam without a live directory) and continues; a 1000-referral cap guards a client that throws without advancing, since that would spin forever inside a fail-closed auth path. **Non-referral faults still propagate** — swallowing those would turn "the directory is broken" into "no such user", which is the wrong answer to give about someone's credentials. 7 new tests (`NovellSearchReferralTests`), **6 verified red against the pre-fix code**, the seventh being the non-referral control that must stay green; suite 257 pass / 2 skip / 0 fail. **No `Abstractions` change; no config change.** **Consumer impact: an app on `0.1.5` cannot authenticate against an AD domain root at all**, so the pin bump is a functional fix, not housekeeping. **Closed 2026-08-13: all four apps adopted `0.2.1`** (see the table row for commits), and `FallbackServers` was live-gated the same day against the redundant local GLAuth pair (`infra/glauth-redundant/`).

**`0.3.0` (2026-09-02) — `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys.SqlServer`, a SQL Server provider for the API-key store** (design `ScadaBridge/docs/plans/2026-09-02-inbound-api-key-shared-store-design.md`; **5 pkgs published to the feed**, `ApiKeys.SqlServer` search-verified from the ScadaBridge checkout; family `Directory.Build.props` now `0.3.0`). Motivation: `Auth.ApiKeys`' SQLite store is a per-node file, so on a two-node active/standby host (ScadaBridge central) a key minted on one node exists only there and a failover 401s every inbound caller (ScadaBridge deferred-work row 108). The new package implements `IApiKeyStore`/`IApiKeyAdminStore`/`IApiKeyAuditStore` over `Microsoft.Data.SqlClient` in a `zbauth` schema (v1: `schema_version`, `api_keys`, `api_key_audit`; all timestamps `DATETIMEOFFSET(7)`, tick-exact) with a concurrent-boot-safe migrator (Serializable tx, retry on 1205/2714/1913/2627 with **jittered** backoff — the Secrets replicator's flat `100*attempt` backoff exhausted five retries about once per sixty 8-way boots in the port's soak test, so the same latent defect is an open follow-up there) and a `SqliteApiKeyStoreImporter` that copies an existing SQLite file into the schema insert-where-absent (idempotent, so both nodes of a pair can import their own file and the result is the union). Wiring: `services.AddZbApiKeyAuthSqlServer(config, apiKeySection, sqlServerSection)` registers the SQL Server stores + migrator **before** delegating to `AddZbApiKeyAuth`, whose `TryAdd*` registrations then yield (same displacement mechanism as Secrets 0.5.0). One `Abstractions` addition, additive: `IApiKeyStoreMigrator`, which `SqliteAuthStoreMigrator` now implements and `ApiKeyAdminCommands` accepts via a new ctor (old `SqliteAuthStoreMigrator` ctor retained — the three `0.2.1` consumers compile unchanged). Store semantics are pinned to the SQLite contract tests re-run live (mark-used skips revoked keys, delete only removes revoked keys, rotate clears last-used/revoked, list newest-first). 92 tests in the new project, 351 across the solution, 0 failed. A DBA-run copy of the DDL ships at `docs/sql/zbauth-schema.sql`.

**`tools/LdapProbe`** (`ldapprobe`, not packable, outside the Auth solution) is the diagnostic that found the above: it drives the **real** `LdapAuthService` so its verdict is what the four apps produce, then separately queries the directory for what the library cannot report — full group DNs, **nested** groups via `LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN`, the **primary group** (which AD omits from `memberOf`, so it can never be a role group), group type (security vs distribution), decoded `userAccountControl`, referral counts, and the TLS chain with key sizes. `--list-groups '<pat>'` enumerates every group in the directory matching a pattern, which a membership dump structurally cannot do. Findings recorded in [`ldap_setup.md`](ldap_setup.md), including the **`UG_WW_*` Wonderware group convention (39 groups)** that partly overturns that doc's earlier "no group→role convention exists" claim — it was true of Ignition, false of the domain.