122940c0e4
Two latent apply-path hazards from the ScadaBridge adversarial architecture review. Neither has a live trigger in any current consumer — ScadaBridge's ten replicated tables carry no foreign keys at all (verified against the running rig's site-localdb.db) and OtOpcUa's LocalDb tables carry none either — but both are the kind that surface as silent divergence rather than as an error, so they are closed before a consumer's schema grows into them. Wire-compatible: no proto change, no lib_schema_version bump, no on-disk schema change. No consumer code change. - RegisterReplicated now refuses a table that is the PARENT of a foreign key with a row-mutating ON DELETE action (CASCADE / SET NULL / SET DEFAULT), naming the offending child column and action. The apply path writes remote rows with INSERT OR REPLACE, whose PK-conflict resolution DELETES the existing row first; connections run PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON, so that implicit delete fires the child's ON DELETE action while the capture guard is raised. The child rows would change on the applying node only, produce no oplog entry, and diverge the pair with nothing able to detect it — LWW compares only rows it was told about. RESTRICT / NO ACTION stay allowed: they abort the statement instead of mutating rows behind capture's back, which the apply path already handles as per-entry poison. The check inspects every foreign key in the database and runs at registration; SQLite cannot add a foreign key to an existing table, so a child table created later is caught at the next startup's registration, not at the DDL. Documented on ILocalDb.RegisterReplicated and in the README's limitations list. - An entry's row write and its ledger write are now atomic with each other. They are two statements and SQLite aborts only the failing one, so a statement-level fault between them — the case the per-entry poison catch exists for — committed a half-applied entry: a tombstone whose table row was gone while __localdb_row_version still called it live (SnapshotStreamer can only warn and skip that, so the peer never learns the row died), or an upsert whose new row carried the OLD version and therefore lost the next comparison it should have won. The pair now runs inside a per-entry SAVEPOINT, rolled back (and released, so nothing nests) before dead-lettering, leaving both writes or neither while the rest of the batch proceeds and commits. Every new test was run against the unfixed code first and fails there with exactly the divergence shape described: the tombstone case reads back null instead of the live row, the upsert case reads back the remote row against an unchanged ledger, and the registration cases throw nothing. Suite: 213/213 green, build 0 warnings / 0 errors.
399 lines
28 KiB
Markdown
399 lines
28 KiB
Markdown
# ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb
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An embedded **SQLite local cache** with **optional bidirectional async 2-node
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replication over gRPC**, for the ZB.MOM.WW SCADA / OT family. It gives an application a
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fast, crash-safe local store that can optionally keep a second node in sync
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asynchronously — local writes **never** block on the peer, and a node that never enables
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replication is simply a fast local DB.
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Change capture uses SQLite triggers writing a single HLC-stamped oplog inside the
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consumer's own write transaction (crash-consistent, non-bypassable). Convergence is
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last-writer-wins over a hybrid logical clock. All timestamps are UTC.
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## Packages (all `0.3.3`)
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| Package | Contents |
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| `ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb` | Embedded DB host: `ILocalDb` SQL surface (`ExecuteAsync` / `QueryAsync` / transactions), `RegisterReplicated(table[, baselineExistingRows])` (PK + BLOB + foreign-key validation, trigger install, oplog schema), `DeregisterReplicated(table)` (trigger removal + oplog/ledger prune), `HybridLogicalClock`, `AddZbLocalDb()` DI. |
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| `ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb.Contracts` | `localdb_sync.v1` proto + generated gRPC types (packable; a future peer could be non-.NET). |
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| `ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb.Replication` | gRPC sync engine: passive `LocalDbSyncService`, initiating `SyncBackgroundService`, `MaintenanceBackgroundService`, LWW apply, watermark acks + pruning, snapshot resync, `ISyncStatus`, `LocalDbMetrics`, `AddZbLocalDbReplication()` / `MapZbLocalDbSync()`. |
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> Status: **published to the Gitea feed; adopted by ScadaBridge (Phases 1+2) and OtOpcUa (Phase 1).**
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>
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> - `0.3.3` (2026-08-20) — two latent apply-path hazards from the ScadaBridge adversarial
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> architecture review (P4-7). Neither had a live trigger in any current consumer; both are the
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> kind that surface as silent divergence, not as an error. Wire-compatible: no proto change, no
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> `lib_schema_version` bump, no on-disk schema change.
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> - **A replicated table may no longer be the parent of a row-mutating `ON DELETE` foreign key.**
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> The apply path writes remote rows with `INSERT OR REPLACE`, and REPLACE resolves a PK conflict
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> by DELETING the existing row first. Connections run `PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON`, so that implicit
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> delete fires the child's `ON DELETE CASCADE` / `SET NULL` / `SET DEFAULT` — while the capture
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> guard is raised. The child rows change on the applying node ONLY, produce no oplog entry, and
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> the pair diverges with nothing able to detect it (LWW compares only rows it was told about).
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> `RegisterReplicated` now inspects every foreign key in the database and refuses such a table
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> with a `LocalDbRegistrationException` naming the offending child column and action.
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> `RESTRICT` / `NO ACTION` remain fine — they abort the statement instead of mutating rows
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> behind capture's back, which the apply path already handles as per-entry poison. Checked at
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> registration; SQLite cannot add a foreign key to an existing table, so a child table created
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> later is caught at the next startup's registration rather than at the DDL.
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> - **An entry's row write and its ledger write are now atomic with each other.** They are two
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> statements, and SQLite aborts only the failing one — so a statement-level fault between them
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> (the case the per-entry poison catch exists for) committed a half-applied entry: a tombstone
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> whose table row was gone while `__localdb_row_version` still called it live, which the snapshot
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> streamer can only warn about and skip, so the peer never learned the row died; or an upsert
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> whose new row carried the OLD version and therefore lost the next comparison it should have
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> won. The pair is wrapped in a per-entry `SAVEPOINT` that is rolled back before dead-lettering,
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> so a poison entry leaves both writes or neither and the rest of the batch is untouched.
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> - `0.3.2` (2026-08-19) — two Medium findings from the ScadaBridge adversarial architecture review
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> (P4-1, P4-3). Wire-compatible with every earlier peer: no proto change, no `lib_schema_version`
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> bump, no on-disk schema change — the keepalive is transport-level and the rest is local policy.
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> - **A live session now ends itself when a cap prune eats deltas it has not sent.** The pump reads
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> `seq > sentThruSeq`, which resumes SILENTLY above a pruned hole; the peer acks the later seqs
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> and the pair is durably divergent for the whole life of that session. `needs_snapshot` (set in
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> the prune's own transaction) only heals a RECONNECT, and nothing forced one — so on a stable
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> LAN with a slow-but-alive peer the divergence was unbounded. Every pump iteration now compares
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> the oplog horizon (`MIN(seq)`, one b-tree seek) against its sent watermark and throws
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> `LocalDbOplogGapException` when deltas it still owes are gone. The horizon, not the flag,
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> because the flag is also raised for reasons that do not invalidate the running session.
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> - **The sync stream has HTTP/2 keepalive, and the server's single-stream guard is newest-wins.**
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> Neither end ever timed out on silence (a converged pair is legitimately quiet), so a hard crash
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> or partition of the dialling node left the passive node's handler parked in `MoveNext` on a
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> half-open stream — holding the guard, reporting itself connected, and rejecting the rebooted
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> peer's reconnects with `AlreadyExists`, indefinitely on an idle pair. The initiator now dials
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> with `KeepAlivePingDelay` / `KeepAlivePingTimeout` (new options, 60s/20s, `Always` policy so
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> idle connections ping too), and a fresh authenticated `Sync` cancels the incumbent and waits
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> for it to unwind before starting — the guard serializes sessions, it was never a fence, and an
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> authenticated same-key dialler is by definition the peer. An incumbent that will not yield
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> within the takeover timeout still gets `AlreadyExists`, because two live sessions over one
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> database is worse than a refused dial.
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> - `0.3.1` (2026-08-18) — a faulting session flushes its control lane before cancelling its writer,
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> so a locally-detected handshake mismatch actually reaches the peer instead of leaving it to
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> reconnect-loop against a generic disconnect.
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> - `0.3.0` (2026-08-15) — **the snapshot-resync flag is per-table.** On-disk bookkeeping schema
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> goes to **v3** (new `__localdb_snapshot_state`, upgraded in place on open); wire-compatible with
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> `0.1.x`/`0.2.x` peers, and `lib_schema_version` deliberately stays `1` because it is compared
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> fail-closed for equality.
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> - **`RegisterReplicated(table, baselineExistingRows: true)` now flags a resync for THAT TABLE.**
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> Through `0.2.x` the flag was one bit for the whole database, so baselining one table
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> re-streamed every registered table in full — and on a pair enabling replication late, both
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> nodes did that to each other at once. A snapshot now streams only the flagged tables.
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> - **The database-wide flag survives, unchanged, for the cases that genuinely need it**: an oplog
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> cap prune or an impossible peer ack loses deltas for the oplog as a whole, so nothing short of
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> every table is sound. What moved is only where a *baseline* records its debt.
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> - **Additive wire extension, negotiated by capability, not by version.** `Handshake` gains
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> `supports_partial_snapshot`; `SnapshotBegin` gains a `tables` scope where **empty means "all
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> tables"** — which is precisely what a pre-`0.3.0` sender emits and what a pre-`0.3.0` receiver
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> assumes. A peer that does not advertise the capability is served a **full** snapshot, because a
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> scoped one would make it advance `last_applied_remote_seq` past deltas it never received.
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> - **A partial snapshot moves no watermark on either side.** The receiver keeps
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> `last_applied_remote_seq` (it is one number for the whole peer oplog, and the untouched tables'
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> deltas still sit below the snapshot's as-of); the sender keeps pumping from where it was. The
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> overlap re-delivers rows the snapshot already carried, which LWW absorbs.
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> - **Snapshot debt now clears on acknowledgement, not on enqueue** (new `SnapshotAck`, exchanged
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> only between `0.3.0` peers). A crash part-way through a snapshot re-streams the same scope on
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> reconnect instead of losing it. Against a pre-`0.3.0` peer the `0.2.x` clear-on-enqueue
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> behaviour is kept — there is no ack to wait for.
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> - `0.2.1` (2026-08-14) — two adversarial-review findings against `0.2.0`. Wire-compatible with
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> `0.1.x`/`0.2.0` peers; no proto change, no `lib_schema_version` bump, no on-disk schema change.
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> - **`DeregisterReplicated` no longer leaves the HLC without a crash anchor.** Clock recovery on
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> open is `MAX(hlc_high_water, oplog HLCs, ledger HLCs, last_seen_hlc)`, and `hlc_high_water` was
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> written only by graceful disposal — while deregistration deletes the table's oplog AND ledger
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> rows. A crash after a deregister boot could therefore recover the clock below stamps the peer
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> already holds, and LWW discards those as older. The current clock is now flushed inside the
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> deregistration transaction, before the prune (and the flush is MAX-guarded, so it can never
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> regress the anchor).
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> - **The sync inbox is bounded (64 messages) instead of unbounded**, so inbound memory is capped
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> at roughly `64 x MaxBatchBytes` rather than "whatever the peer sends" — the bad case being a
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> mutual full snapshot of a large dataset, buffered whole on both nodes at once. A full inbox now
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> stops draining the gRPC stream, which closes the peer's flow-control window.
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> - **A snapshot this node owes is streamed alongside a running receive loop**, not from inside the
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> handshake. That is what makes bounding safe: previously neither side drained its inbox while
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> sending, so a mutual snapshot converged only because the inbox was unbounded. Interleaving was
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> already safe (snapshot rows and deltas both merge through LWW, the watermark write is
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> MAX-guarded) — only the ordering changed.
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> - **Documented the cost of late baselining**: the snapshot flag is per-database, so baselining
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> one table re-streams every registered table, in both directions on a late-enabled pair. Trim
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> high-volume tables (event logs) before turning replication on late.
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> - `0.2.0` (2026-08-14) — performance + lifecycle work from the ScadaBridge architectural review.
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> All of it is wire-compatible with `0.1.x` peers (no proto change, no `lib_schema_version` bump);
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> the on-disk bookkeeping schema goes to **v2** and is upgraded in place on open.
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> - **`DeregisterReplicated(table)`** — drops a table's capture triggers and prunes its oplog and
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> row-version rows. A node that does not replicate should not be paying for capture on every
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> write, and until now there was no way to stop once a file had been registered. Idempotent, and
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> usable on triggers left behind by an earlier build.
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> - **`RegisterReplicated(table, baselineExistingRows: true)`** — closes the late-opt-in hole: rows
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> that predate registration were invisible to the peer forever, because the snapshot streamer
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> pages from the row-version ledger and CDC never wrote them there. Opting in seeds the ledger at
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> an LWW-safe floor (HLC `0`, this node's id) and flags a snapshot resync so they actually
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> travel. Default is still off — the documented CDC contract is unchanged unless you ask.
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> - **O(1) backlog depth** — `MAX(seq) - MAX(last_acked_seq, MIN(seq) - 1)` replaces a
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> `COUNT(*)` over the whole unacked backlog that ran once a minute AND on every metrics scrape
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> (measured 58 VM steps vs 100,020 on a 50k backlog).
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> - **Byte-budget batching** — `MaxBatchBytes` (default 2 MB) bounds delta and snapshot messages by
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> summed serialized size, with `MaxBatchSize` demoted to a secondary row cap. Consumers no longer
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> have to tune the row count against their widest row to stay under the gRPC message limit.
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> Inbound delta batches and acks already queued are coalesced into one transaction / one ack.
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> - **`LwwApplier` prepares once per statement** instead of three SQL parses per applied row.
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> - **Dropped `__localdb_oplog_hlc`** — an index no query ever used, costing a b-tree insert inside
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> every captured consumer write. Existing files lose it on the next open.
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> - `0.1.3` (2026-07-21) — fixes the other half of the rebuilt-peer story: a rebuilt peer's OWN
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> writes were silently dropped. `last_applied_remote_seq` is a watermark in the *peer's* seq
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> space, and a rebuilt peer numbers from 1 again — so the healthy node advertised the old peer's
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> watermark, the rebuilt node started its pump above it, and its first N writes were never sent.
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> Now the watermark is reset when the peer's node id changes, and a peer claiming to have applied
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> more of our stream than we ever produced is treated as evidence that *we* were rebuilt (pump
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> restarts from the beginning; LWW makes re-sending harmless). Found on the OtOpcUa docker-dev rig
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> — it only became reachable once `0.1.2` made back-fill work.
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> - `0.1.2` (2026-07-21) — fixes snapshot resync for a **wiped peer**: a converged pair prunes its
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> oplog to empty on ack, and the handshake read an empty oplog as "no gap possible", so a peer
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> that came back with an empty database and a zero watermark was never snapshotted. The gap is
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> now measured against `last_acked_seq` when the oplog is empty.
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> - `0.1.1` (2026-07-20) — creates the parent directory of `LocalDb:Path` (a missing directory was
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> a hard boot failure, `SQLite Error 14`).
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## Quickstart
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### Local-only (no replication)
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```csharp
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builder.Services.AddZbLocalDb(builder.Configuration, db =>
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{
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// onReady: create your own tables, then opt them into (future) replication.
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db.ExecuteAsync(
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"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS widget (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT, qty INTEGER)")
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.GetAwaiter().GetResult();
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db.RegisterReplicated("widget"); // PK required; installs capture triggers
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});
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// Consume ILocalDb anywhere:
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await db.ExecuteAsync("INSERT INTO widget (id, name, qty) VALUES (@id, @n, @q)",
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new { id = 1, n = "bolt", q = 42 });
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var rows = await db.QueryAsync("SELECT name, qty FROM widget",
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r => (Name: r.GetString(0), Qty: r.GetInt32(1)));
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```
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`AddZbLocalDb` is first-registration-wins: a second call is a no-op. `RegisterReplicated`
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installs capture triggers even without the replication package present — you can register
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tables now and turn on sync later.
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### Replicated (2 nodes)
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Every node registers the passive side (so either can accept a stream) and the initiator
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(idle unless a `PeerAddress` is set). Configure exactly **one** side with the peer's
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address; the other stays passive.
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```csharp
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// Both nodes:
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builder.Services.AddZbLocalDb(builder.Configuration, db => { /* create + RegisterReplicated */ });
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builder.Services.AddGrpc();
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builder.Services.AddZbLocalDbReplication(builder.Configuration); // passive host + initiator + maintenance
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var app = builder.Build();
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app.MapZbLocalDbSync(); // passive gRPC endpoint — host must have AddGrpc()
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app.Run();
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```
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```jsonc
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// Node A — the INITIATOR: dials node B
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"LocalDb": {
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"Path": "nodeA.db",
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"Replication": { "PeerAddress": "https://nodeB:5001", "ApiKey": "…" }
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}
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// Node B — PASSIVE: no PeerAddress, its SyncBackgroundService idles and only serves the endpoint
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"LocalDb": { "Path": "nodeB.db", "Replication": { } }
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```
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Both directions flow on the single bidirectional stream the initiator opens; the passive
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node still pushes its own deltas back. Only one side needs `PeerAddress`.
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## Configuration
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### `LocalDb` section (`LocalDbOptions`)
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| Key | Default | Meaning |
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| `Path` | `""` (required) | Filesystem path to the SQLite database file. |
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| `BusyTimeoutMs` | `5000` | SQLite `busy_timeout` pragma, in milliseconds. |
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| `Synchronous` | `"NORMAL"` | SQLite `synchronous` pragma (`OFF` / `NORMAL` / `FULL`). |
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### `LocalDb:Replication` section (`ReplicationOptions`)
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| Key | Default | Meaning |
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| `PeerAddress` | `""` | gRPC address to dial. Empty ⇒ passive (initiator idles). |
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| `ApiKey` | `null` | Bearer token the initiator presents on its channel; `null` ⇒ no key header. |
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| `FlushInterval` | `250 ms` | How often the change pump flushes pending oplog deltas. |
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| `MaxBatchBytes` | `2 MB` | **Primary** batch cap: summed serialized bytes per outbound delta/snapshot message. Sized under the 4 MB gRPC default; a single row above the budget is still sent, alone. |
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| `MaxBatchSize` | `500` | **Secondary** row-count cap per outbound batch (also the snapshot DB page size). |
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| `MaxOplogRows` | `1_000_000` | Backlog ceiling; exceeding it flags a snapshot resync and prunes oldest rows. |
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| `MaxOplogAge` | `7 days` | Age ceiling; an unpruned entry older than this flags a snapshot resync. |
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| `TombstoneRetention` | `7 days` | How long deleted-row tombstones are kept before pruning. |
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| `ReconnectBackoffMax` | `60 s` | Upper bound on exponential reconnect backoff (validator caps ≤ 1 day). |
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| `MaintenanceInterval` | `60 s` | How often maintenance enforces caps + prunes expired tombstones. |
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| `MaxHlcDriftAhead` | `5 min` | Max tolerated HLC drift where the peer's clock runs ahead of ours. |
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| `FailClosedOnDrift` | `false` | When true, an over-drift entry is dead-lettered instead of applied. |
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All options are validated at startup (`ZB.MOM.WW.Configuration` validators).
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## How it works
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- **Capture** — three AFTER triggers per registered table write each change into one
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shared, HLC-stamped `__localdb_oplog` plus a `__localdb_row_version` ledger, in the
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consumer's own transaction. A DB-scoped `__localdb_applying` guard makes replicated
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applies skip re-capture.
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- **Convergence** — last-writer-wins: compare incoming HLC, then `node_id` ordinal as the
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tie-break; the strict-greater winner is applied, the loser discarded (but still acked).
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- **Streaming** — one long-lived bidirectional gRPC stream. The initiator dials; both
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sides push oplog batches above the peer's watermark and ack the applied watermark back,
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which drives pruning. Outbound uses a single writer fed by two lanes (an unbounded
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control lane for handshake/acks that always preempts a bounded data lane for
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delta/snapshot batches), so receiving never blocks on the ability to ack.
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- **Resync** — when a peer's watermark falls below the pruned oplog horizon, it is sent a
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full snapshot of the registered tables (streamed, keyset-paged) and deltas resume above
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the snapshot's as-of seq. When instead a single table was *baselined*, only that table is
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streamed and **no watermark moves on either side** — a partial snapshot speaks for nothing
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outside its own tables, so the deltas it overlaps are still pumped and merged by LWW.
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**Each node decides from its OWN state** whether it owes the peer a snapshot, and a peer
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that does not advertise `supports_partial_snapshot` is sent a full one. The snapshot is
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streamed *after* the handshake, alongside a running receive loop, so a node sending one
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still applies what the peer sends it — a mutual snapshot exchanges under flow control
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instead of being buffered whole in memory. Between `0.3.0` peers the sender's flags are
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cleared by the receiver's `SnapshotAck`, so a crash mid-snapshot re-streams it.
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- **Maintenance** — a background service on **both** roles enforces the oplog row/age caps
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and prunes expired tombstones every `MaintenanceInterval`.
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## Semantics worth knowing
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- **PK-column updates** are captured as delete-of-old-PK + insert-of-new — a tombstone on
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the old key plus a fresh insert (full delete+insert support).
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- **Upserts** (`INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE`) are fully supported (the row-version
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trigger uses an explicit `ON CONFLICT` clause so it is not rewritten by the outer
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statement's conflict algorithm).
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- **Clock-drift guard** — warn-once per session when a peer entry's HLC physical time is
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more than `MaxHlcDriftAhead` ahead. With `FailClosedOnDrift`, each over-drift entry is
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dead-lettered; otherwise it is applied (the HLC merge absorbs the skew). The **session
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never dies from drift** — no livelock on reconnect.
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- **Writes never block on the peer**; local commit is independent of replication.
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- **All timestamps are UTC** (HLC physical component is UTC Unix milliseconds).
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## Limitations (honest list)
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- **Exactly two nodes.** No mesh / N-node topologies.
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- **LWW only.** No per-table pluggable conflict resolvers.
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- **BLOB columns are rejected at registration** (a column declared `BLOB` fails
|
|
`RegisterReplicated`, because `json_object` cannot capture it). A *typeless* column can
|
|
still hold a BLOB value at runtime, which then surfaces as a write-time error, not a
|
|
registration error.
|
|
- **A replicated table may not be the parent of a row-mutating `ON DELETE` foreign key**
|
|
(`CASCADE` / `SET NULL` / `SET DEFAULT` from any other table, or from itself). Applying a
|
|
remote row uses `INSERT OR REPLACE`, whose implicit delete fires that action with change
|
|
capture suppressed — the child rows would change on the applying node only and never
|
|
replicate, diverging the pair undetectably. `RegisterReplicated` refuses such a table
|
|
(`0.3.3`); use `ON DELETE NO ACTION`/`RESTRICT` and delete children explicitly, or leave
|
|
the parent unreplicated. The check runs at registration and reads the whole database's
|
|
foreign keys, so a child table created *after* registration is caught at the next startup,
|
|
not at the moment of the `CREATE TABLE`.
|
|
- **CDC semantics** — rows that existed **before** `RegisterReplicated` are not captured
|
|
and are not snapshotted; only changes after registration are replicated. **Opt out with
|
|
`RegisterReplicated(table, baselineExistingRows: true)`**, which seeds the row-version
|
|
ledger for existing rows at the baseline floor (HLC `0`) and flags a snapshot resync
|
|
**for that table** so they reach the peer. The floor is below every genuine stamp, so a baselined row loses
|
|
every comparison against a real remote write and wins only where the peer has no version
|
|
of that key at all. Two nodes that baseline the same key both hold HLC `0` and resolve by
|
|
the node-id tie-break — convergent, but arbitrary as to which content survives.
|
|
- **A snapshot still ships whole tables.** The flag is per-table as of `0.3.0`, so baselining
|
|
one table streams that table and no other — but *that* table travels in full, and two
|
|
cases still stream **everything**: an oplog cap prune / impossible peer ack (delta
|
|
continuity is lost for the oplog as a whole), and any peer older than `0.3.0` (which
|
|
cannot be told a snapshot is partial). So **purge or trim high-volume tables such as event
|
|
logs before baselining them**, and expect one slow first sync. Bounded either way (batch
|
|
budget out, bounded inbox in).
|
|
- **REAL ±Infinity** is carried in SQLite's JSON dialect on the wire (fine for the
|
|
SQLite↔SQLite peers this library targets).
|
|
- `AddZbLocalDb` / `AddZbLocalDbReplication` are **first-registration-wins** (idempotent).
|
|
- **Inbound buffering is bounded, not zero.** The duplex inbox holds up to 64 messages, so
|
|
peak inbound memory is roughly `64 x MaxBatchBytes` (~128 MB at the 2 MB default, far
|
|
less in practice — messages are only that large when the sender has that much backlog).
|
|
Lower `MaxBatchBytes` to lower the ceiling. Beyond the bound the stream stops being
|
|
drained and the peer is slowed by flow control.
|
|
|
|
## Observability
|
|
|
|
Metrics publish under the single meter **`ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb.Replication`** (all instruments
|
|
null-guarded — replication runs identically whether or not metrics are collected):
|
|
|
|
| Instrument | Kind | Notes |
|
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
| `localdb.oplog.depth` | ObservableGauge | Unacked oplog backlog (polled cheaply at scrape time). |
|
|
| `localdb.sync.lag.seconds` | ObservableGauge | Seconds since the last successful sync (no measurement when never synced). |
|
|
| `localdb.sync.applied` | Counter | Rows applied from inbound **delta** batches. |
|
|
| `localdb.sync.conflicts_discarded` | Counter | Inbound rows that lost LWW. |
|
|
| `localdb.sync.dead_lettered` | Counter | Poison / over-drift rows routed to the dead-letter table. |
|
|
| `localdb.sync.reconnects` | Counter | Reconnect attempts (initiator). |
|
|
| `localdb.sync.snapshots` | Counter | Snapshots, tagged `direction=sent`/`received` (one increment per snapshot). |
|
|
|
|
**Counter split to note:** rows merged from a **snapshot** are *not* counted under
|
|
`localdb.sync.applied`; a completed snapshot instead increments `localdb.sync.snapshots`
|
|
once (with its `direction` tag). Only delta-batch rows increment `localdb.sync.applied`.
|
|
|
|
`ISyncStatus` (registered singleton) surfaces live state for dashboards / health:
|
|
`Connected` (true while **any** session is active — a node can run both roles at once),
|
|
`PeerNodeId`, `LastSyncUtc`, `OplogBacklog` (**nullable** — null means unknown because no
|
|
provider is wired or the poll threw, so a DB failure never reads as "0 backlog"), and
|
|
`ConnectionAttempts`.
|
|
|
|
## Ops notes
|
|
|
|
- When the oplog row/age caps are exceeded, maintenance prunes to the ceiling and flags the
|
|
**database-wide** `needs_snapshot` (disk safety over delta continuity); the peer then gets a
|
|
full snapshot. Per-table debt lives separately in `__localdb_snapshot_state` and is what
|
|
baselining writes.
|
|
- **Upgrading a pair to `0.3.0`** needs no coordination: the two nodes negotiate scoped snapshots
|
|
by capability, so a `0.3.0` node paired with a `0.2.x` one simply keeps sending full snapshots
|
|
until both are upgraded. Rolling the file forward is one-way — a `0.2.x` build reopening a v3
|
|
file leaves `__localdb_snapshot_state` in place and ignores it, so any per-table debt recorded
|
|
by `0.3.0` is invisible to it (roll forward again, or re-baseline).
|
|
- **Turning a table off** — `DeregisterReplicated(table)` drops its capture triggers and prunes
|
|
its oplog + ledger rows. It must be applied **symmetrically**: the handshake compares
|
|
registered-table digests fail-closed, so a node that drops a table its peer still
|
|
replicates stops syncing with a schema-mismatch error. Deregister on both nodes, or on
|
|
neither. Re-enabling later should pass `baselineExistingRows: true`, or the rows that
|
|
accumulated while capture was off stay invisible to the peer — but trim high-volume
|
|
tables first (see Limitations: baselining flags a full, all-tables snapshot). The HLC's
|
|
durable anchor is flushed in the same transaction, so a crash after a deregister boot
|
|
cannot bring the clock back below stamps peers already hold.
|
|
- **On-disk schema upgrades** are applied in place when the file is opened, in one
|
|
transaction, and every step is safe to re-run. `schema_version` in `__localdb_meta` is
|
|
local-file state only — it is NOT the wire `lib_schema_version`, so a pair mid-upgrade
|
|
keeps syncing.
|
|
- The **`__localdb_dead_letter`** table holds poison rows (bad JSON, null-row non-tombstone
|
|
entries) and over-drift rejects (when `FailClosedOnDrift`). Inspect it to diagnose
|
|
rejects.
|
|
- **Peer auth**: `ApiKey` is sent by the initiator as a static `Authorization: Bearer …`
|
|
header on its channel. The library's passive service does **not** itself verify the key
|
|
— the passive host enforces whatever gRPC auth the host application configures (e.g.
|
|
`ZB.MOM.WW.Auth`). Configure host-side authorization to actually gate inbound streams.
|
|
|
|
## Testing
|
|
|
|
199 tests, all offline / no live dependencies — unit (HLC ordering + restart
|
|
persistence, deregistration's HLC anchor surviving an ungraceful reopen, trigger SQL
|
|
generation, LWW decision table, watermark/pruning, digest computation, schema-version
|
|
upgrade, deregistration idempotency, baseline-floor LWW safety, O(1) depth vs a seeded
|
|
backlog, byte-budget chunking, bounded-inbox backpressure under a slow reader), integration
|
|
over two real SQLite DBs on an in-memory (and real) gRPC pipe (bidirectional convergence,
|
|
delete/update races, offline-accumulate → reconnect, prune → snapshot resync, mutual
|
|
snapshot over a capacity-1 transport, single-table baseline streaming only that table,
|
|
mixed-version interop where a peer without `supports_partial_snapshot` gets a full one,
|
|
snapshot debt surviving until the peer's `SnapshotAck`), plus seeded randomized property tests (random interleaved op sequences → both DBs identical after quiesce).
|
|
Family conventions apply (`TreatWarningsAsErrors`).
|
|
|
|
Build / test from this directory:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
dotnet build ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb.slnx
|
|
dotnet test ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb.slnx
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
See the design doc: [`docs/plans/2026-07-17-localdb-design.md`](../docs/plans/2026-07-17-localdb-design.md).
|