Files

224 lines
8.9 KiB
C#

using Microsoft.Data.Sqlite;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Cli.Interactive;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Crypto;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.MasterKey;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Rotation;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Sqlite;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Tests.Cli.Interactive;
/// <summary>
/// Exercises <see cref="KekDoctor"/> against the REAL SQLite store and REAL AES-256-GCM cipher — the
/// lockout-triage path an operator runs to learn, per row, which KEK it is wrapped under and whether
/// the session KEK actually opens it, then remedies via a guided rewrap-all. KEK-A and KEK-B are two
/// distinct 32-byte <see cref="LiteralMasterKeyProvider"/> keys (distinct derived <c>kek_id</c>s).
/// </summary>
public sealed class KekDoctorTests : IAsyncLifetime, IDisposable
{
private readonly string _dbPath =
Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"zb-secrets-doctor-{Guid.NewGuid():N}.db");
private readonly SecretsSqliteConnectionFactory _factory;
private readonly SqliteSecretStore _store;
// Two distinct 32-byte keys → two distinct derived kek_ids (KEK-A / KEK-B).
private readonly LiteralMasterKeyProvider _kekA =
new(Convert.ToBase64String(FillKey(0xA1)));
private readonly LiteralMasterKeyProvider _kekB =
new(Convert.ToBase64String(FillKey(0xB2)));
public KekDoctorTests()
{
_factory = new SecretsSqliteConnectionFactory(_dbPath);
_store = new SqliteSecretStore(_factory);
}
public async Task InitializeAsync() =>
await new SqliteSecretsStoreMigrator(_factory).MigrateAsync(CancellationToken.None);
public Task DisposeAsync() => Task.CompletedTask;
private static byte[] FillKey(byte b)
{
byte[] key = new byte[32];
Array.Fill(key, b);
return key;
}
// A live session over the shared store, keyed by the supplied provider.
private SecretsSession Session(IMasterKeyProvider kek) => new()
{
Target = new TargetConfigReader().Manual(_dbPath, new MasterKeyOptions()),
Store = _store,
Migrator = new SqliteSecretsStoreMigrator(_factory),
MasterKey = kek,
Cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(kek),
StoreKind = "sqlite",
};
// A degraded session: no KEK, no cipher (metadata-only).
private SecretsSession DegradedSession() => new()
{
Target = new TargetConfigReader().Manual(_dbPath, new MasterKeyOptions()),
Store = _store,
Migrator = new SqliteSecretsStoreMigrator(_factory),
MasterKey = null,
Cipher = null,
StoreKind = "sqlite",
};
private async Task SeedAsync(string name, string value, IMasterKeyProvider kek)
{
var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(kek);
StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName(name), value, SecretContentType.Text);
await _store.UpsertAsync(row, CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Diagnose_reports_ok_rows_under_session_kek()
{
await SeedAsync("sql/a", "value-a", _kekA);
await SeedAsync("ldap/b", "value-b", _kekA);
KekDoctorReport report = await new KekDoctor().DiagnoseAsync(Session(_kekA), CancellationToken.None);
Assert.True(report.Healthy);
Assert.Equal(_kekA.KekId, report.SessionKekId);
Assert.Equal(2, report.Rows.Count);
Assert.Equal(2, report.Total); // no rows vanished → Total equals Rows.Count.
Assert.All(report.Rows, r => Assert.Equal(RowKekStatus.Ok, r.Status));
// Rows ordered by name: "ldap/b" precedes "sql/a".
Assert.Equal(["ldap/b", "sql/a"], report.Rows.Select(r => r.SecretName));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Diagnose_verdict_reads_fresh_row_kek_not_stale_metadata()
{
// Seed under A; a first diagnosis on session A reports Ok.
await SeedAsync("sql/a", "value-a", _kekA);
KekDoctorReport first = await new KekDoctor().DiagnoseAsync(Session(_kekA), CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal(RowKekStatus.Ok, Assert.Single(first.Rows).Status);
// Re-seal the SAME row under B (simulates a concurrent re-wrap/re-set moving its KEK). A second
// diagnosis on session A must classify from the FRESH row.KekId (B) → WrongKek surfacing B's id,
// never a false Corrupt from probing a row the session cannot open.
await SeedAsync("sql/a", "value-a", _kekB);
KekDoctorReport second = await new KekDoctor().DiagnoseAsync(Session(_kekA), CancellationToken.None);
KekDiagnosis row = Assert.Single(second.Rows);
Assert.Equal(RowKekStatus.WrongKek, row.Status);
Assert.Equal(_kekB.KekId, row.RowKekId);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Diagnose_reports_wrong_kek_rows_with_their_kekid()
{
// Rows sealed under A; the session runs on B → the operator must learn A is the KEK to hunt.
await SeedAsync("sql/a", "value-a", _kekA);
KekDoctorReport report = await new KekDoctor().DiagnoseAsync(Session(_kekB), CancellationToken.None);
Assert.False(report.Healthy);
Assert.Equal(_kekB.KekId, report.SessionKekId);
KekDiagnosis row = Assert.Single(report.Rows);
Assert.Equal(RowKekStatus.WrongKek, row.Status);
Assert.Equal(_kekA.KekId, row.RowKekId);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Diagnose_reports_corrupt_row_when_kekid_matches_but_unwrap_fails()
{
await SeedAsync("sql/a", "value-a", _kekA);
// Tamper one byte of the DEK wrap tag: kek_id still matches the session KEK, but the unwrap
// (and therefore the decrypt probe) now fails closed. UpsertAsync bumps revision — irrelevant.
StoredSecret row = (await _store.GetAsync(new SecretName("sql/a"), CancellationToken.None))!;
byte[] tag = (byte[])row.WrapTag.Clone();
tag[0] ^= 0xFF;
await _store.UpsertAsync(row with { WrapTag = tag }, CancellationToken.None);
KekDoctorReport report = await new KekDoctor().DiagnoseAsync(Session(_kekA), CancellationToken.None);
Assert.False(report.Healthy);
KekDiagnosis diag = Assert.Single(report.Rows);
Assert.Equal(RowKekStatus.Corrupt, diag.Status);
Assert.Equal(_kekA.KekId, diag.RowKekId);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Diagnose_includes_tombstoned_rows()
{
await SeedAsync("sql/live", "live", _kekA);
await SeedAsync("sql/dead", "dead", _kekA);
await _store.DeleteAsync(new SecretName("sql/dead"), "carol", CancellationToken.None);
KekDoctorReport report = await new KekDoctor().DiagnoseAsync(Session(_kekA), CancellationToken.None);
// A tombstoned row still appears — it blocks rewrap-all (it carries a KEK-wrapped DEK).
Assert.Equal(2, report.Rows.Count);
Assert.Contains(report.Rows, r => r.SecretName == "sql/dead");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Diagnose_throws_on_degraded_session()
{
InvalidOperationException ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(
() => new KekDoctor().DiagnoseAsync(DegradedSession(), CancellationToken.None));
Assert.Contains("key", ex.Message, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public async Task RewrapAll_throws_on_degraded_session()
{
InvalidOperationException ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(
() => new KekDoctor().RewrapAllAsync(DegradedSession(), _kekA, CancellationToken.None));
Assert.Contains("key", ex.Message, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public async Task RewrapAll_moves_wrong_kek_rows_onto_session_kek()
{
await SeedAsync("sql/a", "value-a", _kekA);
await SeedAsync("sql/b", "value-b", _kekA);
// Session runs on B; rows are on A → rewrap A onto the session KEK (B).
SecretsSession session = Session(_kekB);
RewrapReport report = await new KekDoctor().RewrapAllAsync(session, _kekA, CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal(2, report.Total);
Assert.Equal(2, report.Rewrapped);
Assert.Equal(0, report.AlreadyCurrent);
// Rows now decrypt under the session KEK (B), and the doctor re-diagnoses healthy.
var cipherB = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(_kekB);
StoredSecret a = (await _store.GetAsync(new SecretName("sql/a"), CancellationToken.None))!;
Assert.Equal(_kekB.KekId, a.KekId);
Assert.Equal("value-a", cipherB.Decrypt(a));
KekDoctorReport after = await new KekDoctor().DiagnoseAsync(session, CancellationToken.None);
Assert.True(after.Healthy);
}
public void Dispose()
{
SqliteConnection.ClearAllPools();
foreach (string path in new[] { _dbPath, _dbPath + "-wal", _dbPath + "-shm" })
{
try
{
if (File.Exists(path))
{
File.Delete(path);
}
}
catch (IOException)
{
// Best-effort temp cleanup.
}
}
}
}