a6c41617196b50132a62f9735401aa8558fe38a4
11 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Joseph Doherty
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75c1897522 |
fix(localdb): snapshot as_of_seq floors at last_acked_seq so a rebuilt peer's watermark is lifted — ends the full-snapshot-on-every-reconnect loop (0.3.4, ScadaBridge register row 106)
SnapshotStreamer.SendAsync stamped as_of_seq = MAX(seq), which reads 0 once ack-pruning has emptied a converged sender's oplog. A receiver whose watermark genuinely is 0 (a rebuilt node — ScadaBridge's site-a-a since its 2026-08-15 rebuild) was healed by the snapshot but never lifted by it (the receiver's watermark update is correctly MAX-guarded), so the 0.1.2 empty-oplog horizon rule saw 0 < last_acked_seq as a gap on every subsequent handshake and re-streamed the whole database on every reconnect until the sender wrote again. Observed live: the same 127k-row full snapshot on two consecutive restarts of the pair. Fix: as_of_seq = max(MAX(seq), last_acked_seq). Every delta pruned below last_acked_seq is already folded into the rows the snapshot carries, so that is the floor it may claim; the receiver's MAX guard then lifts the watermark and the next handshake finds no gap. Sender-side only; wire-compatible; no schema change. Test WipedPeer_SnapshotLiftsItsWatermark_SoTheNextReconnectSendsNoSecondSnapshot fails on the unfixed code exactly as the rig does (watermark 0, expected 3) and passes with the fix: the second episode exchanges only a delta, and a capturing logger on the snapshot streamer proves no snapshot was sent. Suite 216/216 on 8 of 9 runs; one unnamed single-test failure on the first run did not recur in eight further runs and could not be attributed. |
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Joseph Doherty
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122940c0e4 |
fix(localdb): refuse cascading-FK parents at registration; make an entry's row+ledger writes atomic (0.3.3, ScadaBridge arch-review P4-7)
Two latent apply-path hazards from the ScadaBridge adversarial architecture review. Neither has a live trigger in any current consumer — ScadaBridge's ten replicated tables carry no foreign keys at all (verified against the running rig's site-localdb.db) and OtOpcUa's LocalDb tables carry none either — but both are the kind that surface as silent divergence rather than as an error, so they are closed before a consumer's schema grows into them. Wire-compatible: no proto change, no lib_schema_version bump, no on-disk schema change. No consumer code change. - RegisterReplicated now refuses a table that is the PARENT of a foreign key with a row-mutating ON DELETE action (CASCADE / SET NULL / SET DEFAULT), naming the offending child column and action. The apply path writes remote rows with INSERT OR REPLACE, whose PK-conflict resolution DELETES the existing row first; connections run PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON, so that implicit delete fires the child's ON DELETE action while the capture guard is raised. The child rows would change on the applying node only, produce no oplog entry, and diverge the pair with nothing able to detect it — LWW compares only rows it was told about. RESTRICT / NO ACTION stay allowed: they abort the statement instead of mutating rows behind capture's back, which the apply path already handles as per-entry poison. The check inspects every foreign key in the database and runs at registration; SQLite cannot add a foreign key to an existing table, so a child table created later is caught at the next startup's registration, not at the DDL. Documented on ILocalDb.RegisterReplicated and in the README's limitations list. - An entry's row write and its ledger write are now atomic with each other. They are two statements and SQLite aborts only the failing one, so a statement-level fault between them — the case the per-entry poison catch exists for — committed a half-applied entry: a tombstone whose table row was gone while __localdb_row_version still called it live (SnapshotStreamer can only warn and skip that, so the peer never learns the row died), or an upsert whose new row carried the OLD version and therefore lost the next comparison it should have won. The pair now runs inside a per-entry SAVEPOINT, rolled back (and released, so nothing nests) before dead-lettering, leaving both writes or neither while the rest of the batch proceeds and commits. Every new test was run against the unfixed code first and fails there with exactly the divergence shape described: the tombstone case reads back null instead of the live row, the upsert case reads back the remote row against an unchanged ledger, and the registration cases throw nothing. Suite: 213/213 green, build 0 warnings / 0 errors. |
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Joseph Doherty
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f62b017cc7 | fix(localdb): fault live sync session on cap-prune; keepalive + newest-wins sync guard (0.3.2, ScadaBridge arch-review P4-1 + P4-3) | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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cea3930b94 |
feat(localdb): per-table needs_snapshot (0.3.0, on-disk schema v3)
Baselining one table used to set a single per-DATABASE needs_snapshot bit, and a snapshot streams every registered table in full — so opting one table into replication late re-sent all of them, in both directions at once on a pair enabling replication late. On a database holding a high-volume table (an event log at its retention cap) that is the largest transfer this library performs. 0.2.1 documented the cost and deferred the fix as needing an on-disk change. Schema v3 adds __localdb_snapshot_state (table_name PK, needs_snapshot), created by the shared DDL with IF NOT EXISTS so an older file gains it on open; the v2->v3 transition is a version stamp only. RegisterReplicated(..., baselineExistingRows: true) now flags that table alone. The database-wide flag survives unchanged for the paths that genuinely reach every table — a cap prune or an impossible peer ack loses delta continuity for the oplog as a whole. DeregisterReplicated drops a table's pending flag with its ledger rows, since nothing would ever stream (and so clear) it afterwards. Wire compatibility is additive and negotiated by CAPABILITY, not version: lib_schema_version stays 1 because ValidateHandshake compares it fail-closed for equality, so bumping it would stop 0.1.x/0.2.x pairs syncing outright. Handshake gains supports_partial_snapshot (field 5) and SnapshotBegin gains a tables scope (field 2) where EMPTY means all tables — precisely what a pre-0.3.0 sender emits and what a pre-0.3.0 receiver assumes. A peer that does not advertise the capability is served a full snapshot: a scoped one would make it advance last_applied_remote_seq to the snapshot's as-of and silently discard every delta below it for the tables left out. For the same reason a partial snapshot moves no watermark on either side. The receiver keeps last_applied_remote_seq (carrying only the HLC across, which is MAX-guarded), and the sender keeps _sentThruSeq, so the deltas the snapshot overlaps are still pumped and merged by LWW. Crash safety: snapshot debt now clears on the receiver's new SnapshotAck rather than on enqueue, so an ungraceful exit part-way through re-streams the same scope on reconnect. The ack rides the unbounded CONTROL lane like DeltaAck, so it composes with 0.2.1's bounded 64-message inbox and its out-of-handshake snapshot. Against a pre-0.3.0 peer the 0.2.x clear-on-enqueue behaviour is kept — there is no ack to wait for — with the handshake's horizon gap check as the net. Tests 199/199 (was 188): single-table baseline streams only that table, mixed- version interop (peer without the capability gets a full snapshot), debt standing until SnapshotAck, partial snapshot not advancing the receiver's watermark, no SnapshotAck emitted to an old peer, end-to-end over two real databases, plus v2->v3 upgrade and per-table flag isolation. README, ILocalDb remarks (which named this as the follow-up) and the umbrella CLAUDE.md index updated. |
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Joseph Doherty
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522cfbfda6 |
fix(localdb): flush the HLC anchor on deregister, bound the sync inbox (0.2.1)
Two adversarial-review findings against 0.2.0. Wire-compatible with 0.1.x/0.2.0 peers: no proto change, no lib_schema_version bump, no on-disk schema change. F4 — DeregisterReplicated destroyed the HLC clock's only durable crash anchor. Clock recovery on open is MAX(hlc_high_water, MAX(oplog.hlc), MAX(row_version.hlc), last_seen_hlc); hlc_high_water is written only by Dispose, and deregistration deletes the table's rows from BOTH ledgers. On a file whose registered tables have all been deregistered, an ungraceful exit (crash, SIGKILL, power loss) therefore left nothing above zero to recover from: the reopened clock restarts from wall-clock time and can re-issue stamps below HLCs peers already hold, which LWW discards as older. The current clock is now flushed inside the deregistration transaction, before the prune, as a separate command so it cannot inflate the "did anything change?" answer. FlushHlcHighWater takes an optional transaction (SQLite rejects a command with no transaction on a connection that has one) and is now MAX-guarded — every writer of that column is flushing a monotonic clock, so a lower value can only be stale. F3 — the sync inbox was Channel.CreateUnbounded, making inbound memory a function of what the PEER sends. The bad case is not hypothetical: a snapshot streams every row of every registered table, needs_snapshot is per-database, and both sides of a pair that enables replication late baseline unconditionally — so a mutual full snapshot of a large dataset (an event log near its storage cap) was buffered whole, in memory, on both nodes at once. The inbox is now bounded at 64 messages with wait-mode backpressure, so the ceiling is ~64 x MaxBatchBytes — a configured number rather than a peer-controlled one — and a full inbox stops draining the gRPC stream, which closes the peer's flow-control window. The pump writes with WriteAsync, not TryWrite: on a full bounded channel TryWrite drops the message, and every inbound message is protocol state. Bounding alone would have deadlocked the very case it was aimed at. The snapshot a node owes was streamed from INSIDE the handshake, before the receive loop existed, so neither side drained its inbox while sending; a mutual snapshot converged only because the inbox was unbounded. The snapshot now runs as the first phase of the outbound task, started alongside the receive loop, so the inbox is drained for the whole life of the session. Interleaving needed no new safety: snapshot rows and deltas both merge through LWW and the snapshot's watermark write is MAX-guarded. Ordering within the outbound lane is preserved (the pump still starts only after the snapshot, from its as-of seq). Per-table needs_snapshot (the finding's optional third part) is NOT done: the flag lives in __localdb_peer_state and narrowing it needs an on-disk schema change, which this fix deliberately avoids. Documented as a follow-up, and the cost is now written down where it is decided — RegisterReplicated(baselineExistingRows) remarks and the README both say that baselining one table re-streams every registered table in both directions, and that high-volume tables should be trimmed before enabling replication late. 188/188 tests pass (was 184). New coverage: the deregistered clock anchor surviving an ungraceful reopen (a second instance over the same file with no Dispose — fails without the flush, recovering at 0), the flush not counting as work done, bounded-inbox backpressure under a slow reader (the pump stalls at the bound and loses nothing, proven by contiguous in-order delivery), and a mutual snapshot over a capacity-1 transport converging — that last one deadlocks and times out against the old handshake-phase snapshot ordering. Version 0.2.1. |
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Joseph Doherty
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9377fa1678 |
perf(localdb): dereg API, O(1) backlog depth, byte-budget batching, prepare-once apply (0.2.0)
WP3.3 of the ScadaBridge architectural-review remediation. Six changes, all wire-compatible with 0.1.x peers — no proto change, no lib_schema_version bump. The on-disk bookkeeping schema goes to v2 and is upgraded in place when a file is opened. DeregisterReplicated(table). There was no way to stop capturing once a file had been registered, so a node that does not replicate kept paying three triggers inside every write transaction, appending to an oplog nothing would ever drain. Drops the triggers and prunes the table's oplog + row-version rows in one transaction; idempotent, and deliberately usable on a table this process never registered, since stale triggers left by an EARLIER build are the primary case. Deregistration must be symmetric across a pair, and already is enforced: the handshake compares registered-table digests fail-closed, so a node that drops a table its peer still replicates stops syncing loudly rather than diverging. RegisterReplicated(table, baselineExistingRows: true). Closes the late-opt-in hole: the snapshot streamer pages from __localdb_row_version, which only triggers populate, so a node that started replicating LATE never sent its pre-existing rows — silently, forever. Seeding alone would not have fixed it, because a node whose oplog starts at seq 1 presents no gap at the handshake and is told it needs no snapshot; the seed therefore also flags needs_snapshot, and the existing resync machinery carries the rows. The floor is HLC 0 stamped with this node's id: every genuine HLC is a UTC millisecond shifted left 16 bits and so is strictly greater, which makes a baselined row lose every comparison against a real remote write and win only where the peer has no version of that key at all. Two nodes baselining the same key both hold 0 and resolve by the node-id tie-break — convergent, and nothing better is available for two rows of unordered antiquity. Opt-in, so the documented CDC contract is unchanged unless asked. Pruning the ledger on deregister is safe precisely because re-registration can re-baseline; the two APIs are a pair. O(1) backlog depth. GetOplogDepth ran COUNT(*) over the entire unacked backlog, once a minute from maintenance AND on every metrics scrape — a full scan of a million rows exactly when a node is already behind. Now MAX(seq) - MAX(last_acked_seq, MIN(seq) - 1), floored at 0: three b-tree seeks, measured at 58 VM steps against 100,020 for the count on a 50k backlog. Exact, because seq is AUTOINCREMENT and every prune path removes a prefix (ack pruning by watermark, the row cap by count, the age cap by an HLC cutoff that rises with seq). The MIN clamp is what keeps it exact after a cap prune has moved the horizon above a stalled watermark — without it the caps would re-flag on every tick forever. Byte-budget batching. MaxBatchSize was the only cap on an outbound message, which made it a proxy for a byte budget that consumers had to tune against their widest row: ScadaBridge pinned it to 16 because 70 KB config_json times the 500 default is ~35 MB against a 4 MB gRPC limit. MaxBatchBytes (default 2 MB) now bounds delta and snapshot messages by summed serialized size, with the row count demoted to a secondary cap. A row larger than the budget is sent alone rather than stalling the stream on it. Since more, smaller messages would otherwise mean more apply transactions and more acks, inbound delta batches and acks ALREADY queued are coalesced — one transaction and one ack per burst, bounded by the sender's own caps, and a no-op under a trickle. LwwApplier prepares each statement once. It went through the generic transaction façade, which builds a fresh SqliteCommand per call: three SQL parses per applied row, on the path that drains a reconnect backlog. Statements are now held for the batch and rebound. Dropped __localdb_oplog_hlc. It indexed (table_name, pk_json, hlc), which no query has ever used — every oplog access path is by seq or a full hlc-predicate delete — while costing a b-tree insert inside every captured consumer write. 184/184 tests pass (was 149). New coverage: schema upgrade drops the index and preserves identity/watermarks/data, deregistration idempotency and trigger absence and cross-process cleanup, baseline seeding at the floor with LWW safety proved through the real applier, depth asserted equal to the counting query across every prune scenario plus a constant-time assertion over a 200k backlog, byte-budget chunking including the one-giant-row edge on both the delta and snapshot paths, prepare-once statement counting, and coalescing that must not swallow the message that ends its run. Version 0.2.0. |
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Joseph Doherty
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3b7489a7b0 |
fix(localdb): a rebuilt peer's own writes were silently dropped
The other half of the rebuilt-peer story, and only reachable once 0.1.2 made back-fill work: with the wiped node repopulated and writing again, its writes never reached its peer. last_applied_remote_seq is a watermark in the PEER's seq space, and a rebuilt peer is a new database whose oplog numbers from 1. Two things then went wrong, and both had to be fixed — the first alone leaves data stuck: - The healthy node kept advertising the OLD peer's watermark, and the sending side seeds its pump from exactly that number, so the rebuilt node skipped its entire oplog. The watermark (and the observed peer clock) is now reset when the peer's node id changes. last_acked_seq is deliberately NOT reset: it describes our own oplog's pruned horizon and is what tells a rebuilt peer it needs a snapshot — clearing it would turn 0.1.2's back-fill back off. - A peer claiming to have applied more of our stream than we have ever produced can only be remembering a previous incarnation of us. That claim is now rejected in favour of starting from the beginning; LWW makes the re-send harmless. This mirrors the clamp RecordPeerAckAsync already applies to acks. Found on the OtOpcUa docker-dev rig, where the healthy node held watermark 10 while the rebuilt peer's oplog was seqs 1-3 and its last_acked stayed 0 — the peer never accepted a single one. Covered by a test that converges with one peer, replaces it with a fresh database, and requires a write on the new peer to arrive: RED before this fix, green after. 149/149 pass. Version 0.1.3. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW |
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Joseph Doherty
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cad3bcb6bf |
fix(localdb): snapshot a wiped peer whose deltas were already acked and pruned
A converged pair prunes its oplog on ack, so "no oplog rows at all" is the steady state of a healthy pair — not an anomaly. ComputeSnapshotRequiredAsync measured the peer's gap against the oldest surviving oplog row and treated an empty oplog as "no gap possible", which made that steady state the one state from which a wiped peer could never be healed: it reconnected with an empty database and a zero watermark, was told it needed no snapshot, and stayed empty indefinitely. With an empty oplog the oldest seq we could still stream is one past last_acked_seq — ack-pruning is the only thing that empties the oplog without also flagging needs_snapshot, and it deletes exactly seq <= last_acked_seq. Measuring the gap against that heals the wiped peer and leaves every other case identical: a converged peer's watermark equals last_acked_seq (no snapshot), and a pair that has never written anything has both at zero. Found by the OtOpcUa LocalDb Phase 1 live gate (check 4), which recorded it as a documented limitation. Covered by a test that reproduces the live-gate scenario through the real session stack: RED before this fix (the wiped side never converges, 15 s timeout), green after. 148/148 pass. Version 0.1.2. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW |
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Joseph Doherty
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3dd7aa40ff |
docs: publish LocalDb 0.1.0 to the feed + reconcile component status against verified state
Publishes the three ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb packages to the Gitea feed (restore-verified from a scratch consumer) and adds the build/push.sh the other shared libs already have. The status prose across CLAUDE.md, README.md and components/*/GAPS.md had drifted from reality, so it was re-derived from the feed listing and the actual PackageReferences + registration calls on each consumer's default branch rather than from prior claims. Five claims were false: Health "not yet adopted" (all four apps wire MapZbHealth), GalaxyRepository's mxaccessgw adoption "a follow-on" (its Server wires AddZbGalaxyRepository), Configuration "not yet pushed", Secrets G-8 "not yet committed", and Theme pinned at 0.2.0 (all four are on 0.3.1). Every doc also said "three apps" while HistorianGateway is a fourth consumer of seven libs, and all eight libraries' test counts were stale (re-ran each suite; all green). Surfaces one previously unrecorded gap: Secrets source is at 0.1.3 with KEK rotation committed, but the feed tops out at 0.1.2, so no app can consume rotation until it is published. Health and observability divergence tables are labelled historical, not re-verified — the libraries are proven wired, but per-app probe coverage vs spec was not re-walked. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts |
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Joseph Doherty
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ac6bcde159 |
docs(localdb): README + scadaproj index row + design-doc deltas; pack-verified 3 nupkgs @ 0.1.0
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts |
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Joseph Doherty
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61e5564c26 |
feat(localdb): scaffold ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb (core/contracts/replication + tests)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts |