Two defects found in code review of the limiter rework.
Probe admission was check-then-act across two lock scopes: Check() read
"probe due" under lock(state), released it, then re-acquired to advance
NextProbeAtTicks. A burst of requests arriving together at an interval boundary
could therefore all observe the slot as due and all be admitted, handing the
verifier the very burst the interval exists to bound. The claim is now a single
critical section (TryConsumeProbe). The two layers are still claimed one at a
time — holding two per-state locks at once would need a global lock ordering to
stay deadlock-free — so a slot claimed on the composite partition is compensated
via ReleaseProbe when the aggregate then refuses, which otherwise silently spent
the partition's next slot and pushed the legitimate holder out by a full
interval.
Reset() removed whatever partition the caller resolved to, including the
address's shared fallback partition when the caller's key id had been collapsed
into it by the per-peer cap (or when the token was junk-shaped). That bucket also
carries failures contributed by other key ids from the same address, so one
successful authentication became a reset button for an in-progress spray. Reset
now clears only a partition the caller owns (effectiveKeyId == presented key id);
the shared bucket decays by window expiry instead, and the caller still recovers
through probe admission. The key's aggregate is cleared either way, as designed.
Also applied from the review: closure-free GetOrAdd overload on _partitions, and
a remarks paragraph acknowledging the best-effort O(n) eviction scan under
sustained overflow. Threading the resolved partition key from Check through to
RecordFailure/Reset was declined: Check resolves with mint:false and RecordFailure
with mint:true, and the two can legitimately differ when a concurrent caller fills
the per-peer cap in between — reusing Check's key would record into the wrong
partition and bypass the cap, which is not worth saving one string concat.
Tests (limiter suite 11 -> 14): ProbeAdmission_UnderConcurrentArrivals_
GrantsExactlyOneSlot (200 rounds x 8 barrier-released threads at the boundary),
ProbeAdmission_WhenAggregateRefuses_ReturnsTheClaimedPeerSlot, and
Reset_WithOverCapKeyId_DoesNotClearSharedFallbackPartition. The latter two were
confirmed as genuine reds against the unfixed code; the concurrency test is a
guard — it is deterministically green on the fixed structure but did not
reproduce the original nanosecond-wide window on its own.
The gRPC auth failure limiter partitioned on the key id parsed out of the
*unauthenticated* token and rejected with ResourceExhausted before VerifyAsync
ran. Key ids are not secret — they ride in every token and are listed on the
dashboard — so any network peer could send 10 garbage-secret requests per minute
and deny that key indefinitely: the legitimate holder's correct secret was
refused before it was ever checked, and the success-path Reset that would clear
the block sat behind the verification the block prevented (SEC-31). The tracked
map was also flushable — any `a_b_c`-shaped junk minted a fresh partition (the
`mxgw` literal was never compared), so ~4096 throwaway tokens evicted a blocked
entry and reset the window (SEC-32).
ApiKeyFailureLimiter moves from IsBlocked/RecordFailure/Reset(string peer) to a
partition-pair API: Check/RecordFailure/Reset(ApiKeyThrottlePartition) with an
ApiKeyThrottleDecision result. Two layers share one sliding window — a composite
(transport peer, key id) partition at ApiKeyFailureLimit, and a per-key-id
aggregate across all peers at the new ApiKeyFailureAggregateLimit (default 30)
that bounds a source-rotating sprayer. An over-limit state is now a valve rather
than a wall: one request per the new ApiKeyFailureProbeIntervalSeconds (default
5) is admitted through to the real verifier, so the correct secret always reaches
the constant-time compare and resets both layers. Guarantees preserved: guessing
stays bounded per window, and the failure path still spends no store read per
attempt.
SEC-32 rides the same change set: the interceptor validates token shape (literal
`mxgw` prefix, >= 3 non-empty `_` segments, key id <= 64 chars) before minting a
key-id partition, each transport peer may mint at most 32 of them before the
overflow collapses onto its fallback partition, and eviction prefers fully
expired windows and never drops an over-limit partition below a 2x transient
overshoot ceiling. Throttled attempts increment mxgateway.auth.throttled, tagged
stage=peer|aggregate only — /metrics is unauthenticated (open SEC-14), so no key
material may appear there.
Docs in the same commit: GatewayConfiguration limiter rows plus the two new keys,
the Authentication hot-path paragraph, the Authorization SEC-11 section, and the
limiter / SecurityOptions XML remarks (the old NAT rationale described the
defective keying). Tracking rows flipped to Done with a change-log entry.
Tests: new ApiKeyFailureLimiterTests (11) covering window pruning, composite vs
aggregate trip points, probe cadence, absolute-block mode, reset across both
layers, junk-spray eviction resistance, the per-peer cap, and expired-window
eviction preference; GatewayGrpcAuthorizationInterceptorTests gains the four
SEC-31 contract tests plus NonMxgwToken_FallsBackToTransportPeerPartition (20
total); GatewayOptionsValidatorTests covers both new keys including 0 as a
supported disable value (66 total).
Resolve all CommentChecker findings across the gateway server, worker, tests,
and .NET client (314 -> 0 real issues): add missing <returns>/<summary>/<param>
on public and test members, convert Stream/interface overrides to <inheritdoc/>,
and remove internal task/issue tracking IDs (SEC-*, IPC-*, WRK-*, GWC-*, TST-*,
Client.Dotnet-*) from shipped code documentation while preserving the design
rationale prose. Shipped comments should not carry internal bookkeeping, and
complete XML docs keep the analyzer/TreatWarningsAsErrors gate and generated API
docs clean. The 6 remaining flags are heuristic false positives (MD5, UTC-4,
capacity-1, near-1601) left intact so real documentation is not corrupted.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMXXvNuPekkkrTEyPNxEkW
Gateway-side follow-up to the shared auth-lib expiry core (delivered via G-2):
- apikey create-key gains optional --expires — absolute ISO-8601 UTC or relative
<N>d/<N>h from now; omitted means non-expiring (opt-in, unchanged default).
Threaded ApiKeyAdminCommand -> parser -> runner into the library's
CreateKeyAsync(..., expiresUtc, ...). list-keys shows an expiry column and an
active/expired/revoked status.
- Dashboard API Keys page surfaces expiry: an Expires column (Never when unset)
and a status badge reading Expired (red) / Expiring (<=7d, amber) / Revoked /
Active. DashboardApiKeySummary.ExpiresUtc projected in DashboardSnapshotService;
StatusBadge maps the new states.
Tests: parser (absolute/relative/invalid/none) + end-to-end past-expiry rejection
through the live verifier; dashboard summary suite green. Docs: Authentication.md
(verification-flow expiry step, CLI table + examples, dashboard badge).
Closes the tracked SEC-10 polish (SEC-10 core was already Done).
SEC-07: add QueryActiveAlarmsRequest -> events:read scope arm; fix two tests that
constructed StreamAlarmsRequest instead of QueryActiveAlarmsRequest.
SEC-05: shorten hub-token lifetime 30m -> 5m; document that the ?access_token= query
carriage must never be request-logged.
SEC-08: gateway-side CachingApiKeyVerifier (short TTL, keyed on a hash of the presented
secret) skips the per-call store read+last_used write; CoalescingMarkApiKeyStore bounds
last_used writes to <=1/key/min; identity constraints are cached. Invalidation is wired
at the gateway admin sites (revoke/rotate/delete); short TTL backstops out-of-process CLI.
SEC-11: fixed-window rate limit on POST /auth/login + a per-peer (key-id) failure limiter
checked before VerifyAsync; new MxGateway:Security options bound + validated.
Also fixes regressions from the SEC-01/04/06 commit (c185f62) that a narrow test filter
missed (all now covered by a full-suite checkpoint):
- Rooting check is cross-platform: accepts Windows C:\/UNC forms on Unix so the shipped
appsettings path validates on the macOS dev box, still rejecting bare filenames.
- AddGatewayConfiguration TryAdds a non-production IHostEnvironment fallback so the validator
resolves in minimal test/tooling containers; the real host + apikey CLI register the actual
environment first (TryAdd no-op there).
- Test assembly defaults ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development (ModuleInitializer) so full-host
tests exercise wiring instead of tripping the SEC-04/06 production guards.
- GatewayOptionsTests asserts the SEC-01 CommonApplicationData-derived default (platform-correct).
archreview: SEC-07/05/08/11 (P1). Verified: NonWindows build clean; full gateway suite
747 passed / 42 failed, where all 42 are the pre-existing macOS named-pipe-harness failures
(Unix-socket path limit) and 0 are validation/regression failures.
Interlocking changes across the gateway server (shared GatewaySession.cs /
SessionManager.cs), committed together:
- GWC-01 (Critical): alarm monitor now attaches as an internal
(non-counted) distributor subscriber instead of a second raw drain of the
single worker event channel; WorkerClient._events -> SingleReader with a
claimed-once guard so a future dual-consumer regression throws loudly.
- GWC-02 (High): faulted sessions are swept in CloseExpiredLeasesAsync
(IsFaultedReapable + FaultedReason); new FaultedGraceSeconds (default 0).
- GWC-03 (High): configurable MaxSparseArrayLength (default 1_000_000)
enforced before allocation.
- TST-02 (High, security): StreamEvents attach now enforces the opening key
id -> PermissionDenied on owner mismatch.
- TST-12 (Medium): CLAUDE.md retention-defaults sentence corrected.
Verified: NonWindows build clean; targeted tests 135/135 on macOS, plus
WorkerClientTests 18/18 on the Windows host.
- Server-057: extend []-suffix normalization to AddItemBulk/AddBufferedItem so bulk-added
array tags bind write-capable handles (authz check, worker bind, and registration kept
consistent); update gateway.md + client READMEs. Tests: AddItemBulk/AddBufferedItem wiring.
- Server-058: assert []-fallback-resolved bare array names are still denied when out of
read/write scope and that MaxWriteClassification is enforced on suffixed array registrations.
- Contracts-023/024/025: round-trip + field-19 descriptor pin for MxSparseArray; document
MxSparseArray in docs/Contracts.md; enumerate it in the protocol-version-3 test summary.
- Tests-040: add wiring tests for the six uncovered sparse-write arms (WriteSecured, Write2,
WriteSecured2, Write2Bulk, WriteSecuredBulk, WriteSecured2Bulk).
dotnet build + targeted tests green (184 passed).
Add a nullable string? OwnerKeyId property to GatewaySession that captures
the API key identifier (KeyId) of the authenticated caller that opened the
session. Wire it through ISessionManager.OpenSessionAsync → SessionManager
→ GatewaySession constructor. The gRPC service passes identityAccessor
.Current?.KeyId; internal callers (GatewayAlarmMonitor, DashboardLiveDataService)
pass null. Covers the positive and null cases with two new TDD-first tests.
Introduce IAuditActorAccessor seam + HttpAuditActorAccessor impl (reads ZbClaimTypes.Username
from IHttpContextAccessor; falls back to Identity.Name / ZbClaimTypes.Name; null when
unauthenticated). Register in DI via DashboardServiceCollectionExtensions.
Wire DashboardApiKeyManagementService: WriteDashboardAuditAsync now accepts the ClaimsPrincipal
user already in scope at each call site; ResolveOperatorActor extracts ZbClaimTypes.Username
(preferred) or Identity.Name. All four dashboard-* events now emit Actor = LDAP operator
username and Target = managed keyId, fixing the semantic gap where both fields held the keyId.
ConstraintEnforcer (gRPC / API-key actor) and CanonicalForwardingApiKeyAuditStore (CLI /
"system"/"cli" fallback) are unchanged.
Tests: DashboardApiKeyManagementServiceTests updated — CreateAuthorizedUser adds ZbClaimTypes.Username
("alice"), all dashboard-* audit assertions updated to Actor = "alice" / Target = "operator01";
new CreateAsync_AuthorizedUser_CanonicalAuditEventHasOperatorAsActorAndKeyIdAsTarget verifies the
canonical AuditEvent directly. New HttpAuditActorAccessorTests (4 cases: username claim, Identity.Name
fallback, unauthenticated → null, no context → null). ConstraintEnforcer tests still assert API-key/anonymous actor.
Wrap the WriteAllBytes/Move/HardenPermissions sequence in a try/catch so
that any failure best-effort deletes the hardened .tmp file (which may
already hold PFX/private-key bytes) before rethrowing. Add a test that
induces a persist failure by pointing SelfSignedCertPath inside a
regular file and asserts no .tmp is left on disk.
Drop KeyEncipherment from the self-signed cert's key-usage extension — it
is semantically wrong for ECDSA (RSA key-transport only); DigitalSignature
alone is correct for TLS 1.3 / ECDHE server certs. CertificateRequest is
unchanged (not IDisposable in .NET 10). Test now also asserts MachineName,
127.0.0.1 and IPv6 loopback are present in the SAN extension.
Adds missing <summary>/<param> XML docs across 99 server, worker, and test
files so CommentChecker reports zero issues (TreatWarningsAsErrors needs the
analyzer clean). Bundles in WIP dashboard work: NavSection extraction,
MainLayout/site.css/js styling alignment, and DashboardOptions/Auth tweaks.
Add IDashboardSessionAdminService (Admin-role gate, friendly errors,
audit logging) wrapping a new ISessionManager.KillWorkerAsync that
skips graceful shutdown and cleans up registry/metrics. Sessions,
Workers, and SessionDetails pages render Close / Kill buttons only
when CanManage; the service re-checks the role on every call so
forged clicks return Unauthenticated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Apply the ZB.MOM.WW. prefix to all gateway-side projects, folders,
.csproj/.sln contents, C# namespaces, using directives, generated proto
C# (csharp_namespace + checked-in generated files), InternalsVisibleTo
attributes, project-name string literals (LoadProject, .sln lookups,
worker exe paths, staticwebassets manifest), and the install/script/doc
references that point at any of the above. Migrate the solution from
.sln to .slnx via `dotnet sln migrate` and delete the old file.
External-runtime identifiers are intentionally NOT prefixed so external
configuration keeps working:
- GatewayMetrics.cs MeterName ("MxGateway.Server")
- DashboardAuthenticationDefaults Scheme/Policy ("MxGateway.Dashboard")
- GatewayRequestLoggingMiddleware logger category ("MxGateway.Request")
- StaRuntime thread name ("MxGateway.Worker.STA")
- appsettings.json root section "MxGateway" + env-var prefix
MxGateway__... and secret-name MxGateway:ApiKeyPepper
- C:\ProgramData\MxGateway\ data dir paths
Also fixes two tests that were not rename-related but became visible
while validating the rename:
- WorkerLiveMxAccessSmokeTests.ShutDownAsync: cancellation that the
gateway service correctly maps to RpcException(Cancelled) per gRPC
convention was being misclassified as a stream fault. Added a sibling
catch on RpcException with StatusCode.Cancelled.
- IntegrationTestEnvironment.ResolveRepositoryRoot: extracted IsRepositoryRoot
and made it accept either a .git marker OR a .sln/.slnx next to src/
so the worker-exe walker works in non-git working copies.
clients/proto/proto-inputs.json's protoRoot updated to point at
src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts/Protos.
Verified by `dotnet build` and a full `dotnet test` of the .slnx with
MXGATEWAY_RUN_LIVE_{MXACCESS,LDAP,GALAXY}_TESTS=1:
Tests: 472/472 pass
Worker.Tests: 280/280 pass (4 dev-rig [Fact(Skip=...)] skipped)
IntegrationTests: 18/18 pass
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Joseph Doherty