The remediation reviews approved every task but left a tail of small notes.
This lands the gateway-side half of them.
Hardening (behavior changes, all narrow):
- BuildFilteredWriteBulkCommand's unreachable default case failed OPEN: a
fifth bulk-write kind added upstream without a filter case here would have
shipped the DENIED entries to the worker while reporting them denied to the
caller. It now throws UnreachableException.
- SqliteCanonicalAuditStore.ListRecentAsync no longer throws on a row it
cannot date. The retention sweep deliberately preserves such rows (SQLite's
datetime() yields NULL, so the DELETE never matches), which guaranteed the
dashboard's recent-audit view would meet one eventually and lose the whole
page to it. The row is now reported at DateTimeOffset.MinValue with every
other column intact, behind an optional logger.
- The audit drain loop's finally now completes the channel writer alongside
detaching the drain, so a producer that raced past the attached check takes
the write-through branch instead of stranding its event in a buffer nobody
reads until shutdown. TryComplete is idempotent, so StopAsync is unaffected.
Tests:
- MapCommandReply ownership (Assert.Same on the inner reply), mirroring the
existing MapEvent ownership test.
- Redactor key-id length boundary at exactly 64 and 65 characters, pinning
which way it fails. Nothing validates key-id length at creation, so
docs/Diagnostics.md's "which no issued key id does" is now stated as the
heuristic it is.
- ApiKeyFailureLimiter.Reset with a PartitionResolution whose partition was
evicted between the Check and the Reset: inert, and clears nobody else's
block.
- Constraint-cache concurrency stress: the cap is enforced by the inserting
thread, so overshoot must be transient and proportional to the in-flight
inserters, and the cache must settle at or under the cap.
- ListRecentAsync against a raw-SQL undateable row.
Comment/doc accuracy:
- EventsHubViewerRegistry.ReleaseConnection records that it relies on
SignalR's default sequential per-connection dispatch
(MaximumParallelInvocationsPerClient = 1).
- A PERF(followup) note on Invoke's double session resolve and why removing it
needs a SessionManager overload.
- SessionEventDistributor: the volatile-field comment named the pump as the
lock-free reader, but the pump's single capture point is inside _replayLock;
the genuinely lock-free reader is SubscriberCount. OnSubscriberOverflow's
"cannot be observed here" now excepts the DisposeAsync abandon path. The
churn test names its ConcurrentDictionary bucket-order assumption and that a
violation surfaces as a read timeout, not a silent pass.
- The two "restores the sequential drain's behavior" claims (SessionManager,
docs/Sessions.md) were wrong: the sequential drain leaked too, because
KillWorkerAsync's entry ThrowIfCancellationRequested aborted the whole loop
on the first session for zero kills. Reworded to "fixes a leak the
sequential drain also had", with the sweep-bound/shutdown-unbound
ParallelOptions asymmetry explained.
- ISessionManager.ShutdownAsync's token doc: it degrades the drain to a kill
sweep rather than cancelling it, with the bounded overrun stated.
SessionShutdownHostedService.StopAsync records that its cancellation-logging
branch is now unreachable.
Same-commit docs rule (were missed in the prior commit):
- docs/GalaxyRepository.md: SnapshotCachePath now documents the per-OS derived
default and the GalaxyRepositoryOptionsValidator rooting/validity enforcement.
- A2-galaxyrepository-adoption-handoff.md: correct the now-inaccurate NSSM caveat
(SnapshotCachePath override is optional, not required; blank seeds a rooted host
default, no silent no-op) and repoint the option-validation item at the new
GalaxyRepositoryOptionsValidator.
SEC-34 guard confirmed and documented: TryParseKeyId's '_' split cannot truncate a
key id because both — and the only — gateway key-creation paths
(ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser.IsValidKeyId, DashboardApiKeyManagementService.ValidateKeyId)
restrict key ids to IsAsciiLetterOrDigit || '.' || '-', and key ids are never
library-generated. Added a citing comment; no behavior change.
Test consolidation: moved the three host-start SqlitePath overrides into
TestHostEnvironmentInitializer (per-process temp store, mirroring Secrets__SqlitePath)
so future host-start tests auto-cover.
SEC-33: make rooting host-meaningful and stop shipping foreign-platform literals.
- Delete IsRootedForAnyPlatform; AddIfNotRooted now uses Path.IsPathRooted (current OS).
- Promote AddIfNotRooted/AddIfInvalidPath to shared GatewayConfigPathRules so the new
Galaxy validator reuses them and the two validators cannot drift.
- Remove Authentication:SqlitePath and Galaxy:SnapshotCachePath Windows literals from
appsettings.json; the CommonApplicationData-derived code defaults take over. The
Galaxy default is seeded as a configuration value before AddZbGalaxyRepository
(SnapshotCachePath is init-only, so a PostConfigure mutation cannot compile).
- New GalaxyRepositoryOptionsValidator (ValidateOnStart) enforces a valid, host-rooted
SnapshotCachePath when PersistSnapshot is true.
- Root-cause the stray junk-named auth DB: host start eagerly builds
AuthSqliteConnectionFactory; under the non-rooted Windows literal on macOS SQLite
wrote it relative to the test bin CWD. The three real-host-start tests now pin
SqlitePath to a temp path.
SEC-34: verification cache Invalidate-vs-in-flight-repopulation race closed with a
per-key generation counter (bump-before-evict, snapshot-then-recheck). The expiry
cap (window 2) takes the documented fallback: the library verification identity
carries no ExpiresUtc, so the cache cannot cap at the key's expiry (donor-library ask).
GWC-24 rider: cap MxGateway:Events:QueueCapacity at int.MaxValue/2 so the derived
checked(2 * EventChannelCapacity) in WorkerClient cannot overflow at session creation.
SEC-35 (doc-only): note IsProduction() env-name semantics in GatewayConfiguration.md.
Docs updated same commit (GatewayConfiguration.md, Authentication.md) and tracking
registers/change-log flipped (00-tracking.md, 40-security-dashboard.md).
ReleaseProbe recognised its own reservation by comparing NextProbeAtTicks to
now + _probeIntervalTicks. RecordInto's rearm-on-trip writes that identical
expression, so a concurrent RecordFailure on the same WindowState whose `now`
lands on the claimer's tick — routine at ~1 ms clock resolution under load — was
mistaken for the caller's own claim. The release then stomped the legitimate
fresh re-arm back to the stale previousProbeAtTicks, which is already due, handing
the next arrival a free probe the re-arm had just closed.
WindowState gains a monotonic ProbeVersion bumped by every writer of
NextProbeAtTicks (TryConsumeProbe's claim and RecordInto's re-arm alike).
TryConsumeProbe returns the stamp it set as part of a ProbeClaim; ReleaseProbe
restores the previous value only while the state's version still equals that
stamp, checking and restoring in one lock(state) section and bumping the version
again on restore so no other stale release can match either.
Test: ProbeSlotRestore_DoesNotStompConcurrentRearmAtSameTick, with the clock held
still so the claim and the interleaved failure necessarily share a tick. Making it
deterministic needed a seam — the claim-to-release window is a few nanoseconds and
racing threads do not hit it (an earlier thread-based attempt passed against the
defective guard three runs out of three, and its end state was ordering-dependent
rather than correctness-dependent, so it was dropped rather than shipped as
theatre). The seam is an internal ProbeReleaseInterleaveHook, null in production,
costing one null check on the already-refused path. Verified as a genuine red
against the timestamp guard: Expected ThrottledByPeer, Actual ProbeAdmitted.
Two defects found in code review of the limiter rework.
Probe admission was check-then-act across two lock scopes: Check() read
"probe due" under lock(state), released it, then re-acquired to advance
NextProbeAtTicks. A burst of requests arriving together at an interval boundary
could therefore all observe the slot as due and all be admitted, handing the
verifier the very burst the interval exists to bound. The claim is now a single
critical section (TryConsumeProbe). The two layers are still claimed one at a
time — holding two per-state locks at once would need a global lock ordering to
stay deadlock-free — so a slot claimed on the composite partition is compensated
via ReleaseProbe when the aggregate then refuses, which otherwise silently spent
the partition's next slot and pushed the legitimate holder out by a full
interval.
Reset() removed whatever partition the caller resolved to, including the
address's shared fallback partition when the caller's key id had been collapsed
into it by the per-peer cap (or when the token was junk-shaped). That bucket also
carries failures contributed by other key ids from the same address, so one
successful authentication became a reset button for an in-progress spray. Reset
now clears only a partition the caller owns (effectiveKeyId == presented key id);
the shared bucket decays by window expiry instead, and the caller still recovers
through probe admission. The key's aggregate is cleared either way, as designed.
Also applied from the review: closure-free GetOrAdd overload on _partitions, and
a remarks paragraph acknowledging the best-effort O(n) eviction scan under
sustained overflow. Threading the resolved partition key from Check through to
RecordFailure/Reset was declined: Check resolves with mint:false and RecordFailure
with mint:true, and the two can legitimately differ when a concurrent caller fills
the per-peer cap in between — reusing Check's key would record into the wrong
partition and bypass the cap, which is not worth saving one string concat.
Tests (limiter suite 11 -> 14): ProbeAdmission_UnderConcurrentArrivals_
GrantsExactlyOneSlot (200 rounds x 8 barrier-released threads at the boundary),
ProbeAdmission_WhenAggregateRefuses_ReturnsTheClaimedPeerSlot, and
Reset_WithOverCapKeyId_DoesNotClearSharedFallbackPartition. The latter two were
confirmed as genuine reds against the unfixed code; the concurrency test is a
guard — it is deterministically green on the fixed structure but did not
reproduce the original nanosecond-wide window on its own.
The gRPC auth failure limiter partitioned on the key id parsed out of the
*unauthenticated* token and rejected with ResourceExhausted before VerifyAsync
ran. Key ids are not secret — they ride in every token and are listed on the
dashboard — so any network peer could send 10 garbage-secret requests per minute
and deny that key indefinitely: the legitimate holder's correct secret was
refused before it was ever checked, and the success-path Reset that would clear
the block sat behind the verification the block prevented (SEC-31). The tracked
map was also flushable — any `a_b_c`-shaped junk minted a fresh partition (the
`mxgw` literal was never compared), so ~4096 throwaway tokens evicted a blocked
entry and reset the window (SEC-32).
ApiKeyFailureLimiter moves from IsBlocked/RecordFailure/Reset(string peer) to a
partition-pair API: Check/RecordFailure/Reset(ApiKeyThrottlePartition) with an
ApiKeyThrottleDecision result. Two layers share one sliding window — a composite
(transport peer, key id) partition at ApiKeyFailureLimit, and a per-key-id
aggregate across all peers at the new ApiKeyFailureAggregateLimit (default 30)
that bounds a source-rotating sprayer. An over-limit state is now a valve rather
than a wall: one request per the new ApiKeyFailureProbeIntervalSeconds (default
5) is admitted through to the real verifier, so the correct secret always reaches
the constant-time compare and resets both layers. Guarantees preserved: guessing
stays bounded per window, and the failure path still spends no store read per
attempt.
SEC-32 rides the same change set: the interceptor validates token shape (literal
`mxgw` prefix, >= 3 non-empty `_` segments, key id <= 64 chars) before minting a
key-id partition, each transport peer may mint at most 32 of them before the
overflow collapses onto its fallback partition, and eviction prefers fully
expired windows and never drops an over-limit partition below a 2x transient
overshoot ceiling. Throttled attempts increment mxgateway.auth.throttled, tagged
stage=peer|aggregate only — /metrics is unauthenticated (open SEC-14), so no key
material may appear there.
Docs in the same commit: GatewayConfiguration limiter rows plus the two new keys,
the Authentication hot-path paragraph, the Authorization SEC-11 section, and the
limiter / SecurityOptions XML remarks (the old NAT rationale described the
defective keying). Tracking rows flipped to Done with a change-log entry.
Tests: new ApiKeyFailureLimiterTests (11) covering window pruning, composite vs
aggregate trip points, probe cadence, absolute-block mode, reset across both
layers, junk-spray eviction resistance, the per-peer cap, and expired-window
eviction preference; GatewayGrpcAuthorizationInterceptorTests gains the four
SEC-31 contract tests plus NonMxgwToken_FallsBackToTransportPeerPartition (20
total); GatewayOptionsValidatorTests covers both new keys including 0 as a
supported disable value (66 total).
Resolve all CommentChecker findings across the gateway server, worker, tests,
and .NET client (314 -> 0 real issues): add missing <returns>/<summary>/<param>
on public and test members, convert Stream/interface overrides to <inheritdoc/>,
and remove internal task/issue tracking IDs (SEC-*, IPC-*, WRK-*, GWC-*, TST-*,
Client.Dotnet-*) from shipped code documentation while preserving the design
rationale prose. Shipped comments should not carry internal bookkeeping, and
complete XML docs keep the analyzer/TreatWarningsAsErrors gate and generated API
docs clean. The 6 remaining flags are heuristic false positives (MD5, UTC-4,
capacity-1, near-1601) left intact so real documentation is not corrupted.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMXXvNuPekkkrTEyPNxEkW
Gateway-side follow-up to the shared auth-lib expiry core (delivered via G-2):
- apikey create-key gains optional --expires — absolute ISO-8601 UTC or relative
<N>d/<N>h from now; omitted means non-expiring (opt-in, unchanged default).
Threaded ApiKeyAdminCommand -> parser -> runner into the library's
CreateKeyAsync(..., expiresUtc, ...). list-keys shows an expiry column and an
active/expired/revoked status.
- Dashboard API Keys page surfaces expiry: an Expires column (Never when unset)
and a status badge reading Expired (red) / Expiring (<=7d, amber) / Revoked /
Active. DashboardApiKeySummary.ExpiresUtc projected in DashboardSnapshotService;
StatusBadge maps the new states.
Tests: parser (absolute/relative/invalid/none) + end-to-end past-expiry rejection
through the live verifier; dashboard summary suite green. Docs: Authentication.md
(verification-flow expiry step, CLI table + examples, dashboard badge).
Closes the tracked SEC-10 polish (SEC-10 core was already Done).
Full-host tests passed in isolation but failed 2-4/run under parallel execution on
Windows with 'the process cannot access the file ... because it is being used by
another process' (macOS never sees it — Unix deletes open files). Two shared-state
parallel collisions, discovered while verifying TST-08:
1. Self-signed cert generation. GatewayTlsBootstrapTests sets process-global
Kestrel/TLS env vars that GatewayApplication.Build reads; a parallel host-building
test inherits them mid-run and both generate a cert at the same path, racing on the
fixed-name '<path>.tmp'. Fixes:
- SelfSignedCertificateProvider: stage the PFX in a unique '<path>.<guid>.tmp' instead
of a fixed name, so concurrent/interrupted writers never collide on the temp file
(real robustness: two instances or a restart-during-write no longer clash). The
final atomic Move (last-writer-wins) still yields an equivalent cert.
- TestHostEnvironmentInitializer: default MxGateway__Tls__SelfSignedCertPath to a
per-process temp path so the suite never writes the shared ProgramData default or
fights the deployed service; first host-building test generates, the rest load it.
- GatewayTlsBootstrapTests: [Collection] with DisableParallelization so its global
env-var mutation cannot bleed into parallel tests (new GlobalEnvironmentCollection).
2. AuthStoreHealthCheckTests opened a real SQLite file; Microsoft.Data.Sqlite's
connection pool keeps the .db handle open after 'await using', so the finally
File.Delete threw. Reuse the existing TempDatabaseDirectory helper, which calls
SqliteConnection.ClearAllPools() before deleting.
Server build clean; affected classes 17/17 on macOS. Windows full-suite verified separately.
SEC-07: add QueryActiveAlarmsRequest -> events:read scope arm; fix two tests that
constructed StreamAlarmsRequest instead of QueryActiveAlarmsRequest.
SEC-05: shorten hub-token lifetime 30m -> 5m; document that the ?access_token= query
carriage must never be request-logged.
SEC-08: gateway-side CachingApiKeyVerifier (short TTL, keyed on a hash of the presented
secret) skips the per-call store read+last_used write; CoalescingMarkApiKeyStore bounds
last_used writes to <=1/key/min; identity constraints are cached. Invalidation is wired
at the gateway admin sites (revoke/rotate/delete); short TTL backstops out-of-process CLI.
SEC-11: fixed-window rate limit on POST /auth/login + a per-peer (key-id) failure limiter
checked before VerifyAsync; new MxGateway:Security options bound + validated.
Also fixes regressions from the SEC-01/04/06 commit (c185f62) that a narrow test filter
missed (all now covered by a full-suite checkpoint):
- Rooting check is cross-platform: accepts Windows C:\/UNC forms on Unix so the shipped
appsettings path validates on the macOS dev box, still rejecting bare filenames.
- AddGatewayConfiguration TryAdds a non-production IHostEnvironment fallback so the validator
resolves in minimal test/tooling containers; the real host + apikey CLI register the actual
environment first (TryAdd no-op there).
- Test assembly defaults ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development (ModuleInitializer) so full-host
tests exercise wiring instead of tripping the SEC-04/06 production guards.
- GatewayOptionsTests asserts the SEC-01 CommonApplicationData-derived default (platform-correct).
archreview: SEC-07/05/08/11 (P1). Verified: NonWindows build clean; full gateway suite
747 passed / 42 failed, where all 42 are the pre-existing macOS named-pipe-harness failures
(Unix-socket path limit) and 0 are validation/regression failures.
Introduce IAuditActorAccessor seam + HttpAuditActorAccessor impl (reads ZbClaimTypes.Username
from IHttpContextAccessor; falls back to Identity.Name / ZbClaimTypes.Name; null when
unauthenticated). Register in DI via DashboardServiceCollectionExtensions.
Wire DashboardApiKeyManagementService: WriteDashboardAuditAsync now accepts the ClaimsPrincipal
user already in scope at each call site; ResolveOperatorActor extracts ZbClaimTypes.Username
(preferred) or Identity.Name. All four dashboard-* events now emit Actor = LDAP operator
username and Target = managed keyId, fixing the semantic gap where both fields held the keyId.
ConstraintEnforcer (gRPC / API-key actor) and CanonicalForwardingApiKeyAuditStore (CLI /
"system"/"cli" fallback) are unchanged.
Tests: DashboardApiKeyManagementServiceTests updated — CreateAuthorizedUser adds ZbClaimTypes.Username
("alice"), all dashboard-* audit assertions updated to Actor = "alice" / Target = "operator01";
new CreateAsync_AuthorizedUser_CanonicalAuditEventHasOperatorAsActorAndKeyIdAsTarget verifies the
canonical AuditEvent directly. New HttpAuditActorAccessorTests (4 cases: username claim, Identity.Name
fallback, unauthenticated → null, no context → null). ConstraintEnforcer tests still assert API-key/anonymous actor.
Best-effort resolve the host FQDN via Dns.GetHostEntry and add it as a
DNS SAN when it differs (OrdinalIgnoreCase) from the short machine name
and "localhost". SocketException / ArgumentException are caught and
silently skipped so cert generation remains robust when DNS is absent.
Wrap the WriteAllBytes/Move/HardenPermissions sequence in a try/catch so
that any failure best-effort deletes the hardened .tmp file (which may
already hold PFX/private-key bytes) before rethrowing. Add a test that
induces a persist failure by pointing SelfSignedCertPath inside a
regular file and asserts no .tmp is left on disk.
Drop KeyEncipherment from the self-signed cert's key-usage extension — it
is semantically wrong for ECDSA (RSA key-transport only); DigitalSignature
alone is correct for TLS 1.3 / ECDHE server certs. CertificateRequest is
unchanged (not IDisposable in .NET 10). Test now also asserts MachineName,
127.0.0.1 and IPv6 loopback are present in the SAN extension.
Adds missing <summary>/<param> XML docs across 99 server, worker, and test
files so CommentChecker reports zero issues (TreatWarningsAsErrors needs the
analyzer clean). Bundles in WIP dashboard work: NavSection extraction,
MainLayout/site.css/js styling alignment, and DashboardOptions/Auth tweaks.
Add IApiKeyAdminStore.DeleteAsync that only deletes already-revoked
rows (active keys must be revoked first so the revoke event lands in
the audit log before the row disappears) and a matching admin-gated
DashboardApiKeyManagementService.DeleteAsync. ApiKeysPage now shows
Delete on revoked rows in place of the old "No actions" stub, and
Rotate/Revoke/Delete all route through ConfirmDialog so each
destructive action requires an explicit confirmation step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Apply the ZB.MOM.WW. prefix to all gateway-side projects, folders,
.csproj/.sln contents, C# namespaces, using directives, generated proto
C# (csharp_namespace + checked-in generated files), InternalsVisibleTo
attributes, project-name string literals (LoadProject, .sln lookups,
worker exe paths, staticwebassets manifest), and the install/script/doc
references that point at any of the above. Migrate the solution from
.sln to .slnx via `dotnet sln migrate` and delete the old file.
External-runtime identifiers are intentionally NOT prefixed so external
configuration keeps working:
- GatewayMetrics.cs MeterName ("MxGateway.Server")
- DashboardAuthenticationDefaults Scheme/Policy ("MxGateway.Dashboard")
- GatewayRequestLoggingMiddleware logger category ("MxGateway.Request")
- StaRuntime thread name ("MxGateway.Worker.STA")
- appsettings.json root section "MxGateway" + env-var prefix
MxGateway__... and secret-name MxGateway:ApiKeyPepper
- C:\ProgramData\MxGateway\ data dir paths
Also fixes two tests that were not rename-related but became visible
while validating the rename:
- WorkerLiveMxAccessSmokeTests.ShutDownAsync: cancellation that the
gateway service correctly maps to RpcException(Cancelled) per gRPC
convention was being misclassified as a stream fault. Added a sibling
catch on RpcException with StatusCode.Cancelled.
- IntegrationTestEnvironment.ResolveRepositoryRoot: extracted IsRepositoryRoot
and made it accept either a .git marker OR a .sln/.slnx next to src/
so the worker-exe walker works in non-git working copies.
clients/proto/proto-inputs.json's protoRoot updated to point at
src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts/Protos.
Verified by `dotnet build` and a full `dotnet test` of the .slnx with
MXGATEWAY_RUN_LIVE_{MXACCESS,LDAP,GALAXY}_TESTS=1:
Tests: 472/472 pass
Worker.Tests: 280/280 pass (4 dev-rig [Fact(Skip=...)] skipped)
IntegrationTests: 18/18 pass
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Joseph Doherty