TST-24 asked for per-client wire tests against a fake gateway. An audit first
corrected the finding's premise: Go, Rust, and Java already had them — bufconn,
a loopback tonic server, and InProcessServerBuilder respectively — each already
asserting the round trip, the server-observed bearer header, and the ReplayGap
sentinel. The two genuine gaps were .NET (every test substituted the transport
interface; the test project had no server package at all) and Python (stub
monkeypatching everywhere but one opt-in TLS test).
Both now serve mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxAccessGateway over a real transport —
Kestrel h2c and grpc.aio, each on an ephemeral loopback port — and drive the
ordinary public client API against it. Only the gateway's behaviour is canned;
the framing, serialization, metadata, and status codes are genuine. Four shapes
each: full round trip with every reply field asserted, the authorization header
as received by the server (including on the streaming RPC), the ReplayGap
sentinel surfaced as the client's typed signal, and a real PERMISSION_DENIED
mapping to the typed authorization error.
The .NET client was only ever compiled in CI, never tested, so the portable job
gains a dotnet test step.
Fixes a bug the new tests caught on their first run: Python's connect() built the
grpc.aio channel inside asyncio.to_thread, and a grpc.aio channel binds to the
event loop current on the constructing thread, so every non-stub connection
raised 'There is no current event loop in thread'. No mock-based test could see
it, and the test guarding the off-loop behaviour patched create_channel and so
asserted the bug. Split resolve_channel_security (blocking TOFU probe, off-loop)
from create_channel (on-loop); the guard tests now assert both halves.
Exercising TST-25 acceptance Check 6 end-to-end showed the on-failure issue
step works — it has filed an issue on every red nightly since 2026-07-17
(#126-#139) — but that every one of those issues links `http://gitea:3000`,
the runner-internal origin Gitea hands the runner. That URL is correct for
the issue-creation API call (the job container resolves `gitea` only on the
docker network and has no LAN egress to the public origin) and unreachable
for anyone clicking out of the issue.
Keep `github.server_url` for the API call; add a `PUBLIC_SERVER_URL` job env
used only for the browser-facing link in the body. Verified with a
forced-failure probe run (677) whose issue (#140) carries a public link that
returns 200.
Also records Check 6 as done in scripts/ci/README.md and corrects the
2026-07-13 tracking entry that wrote the check off as abandoned.
The nightly-windev job (cycle-2 TST-25) discharges TST-05's scheduling design:
cron 0 6 * * * runs run-windev-ci.sh live, which sets
MXGATEWAY_RUN_LIVE_MXACCESS_TESTS=1, runs WorkerLiveMxAccessSmokeTests on windev,
and opens a Gitea issue on failure. That converts 'run by memory' into 'runs
nightly, reports failures'.
The finding's other half — audit the live suite for coverage of each of the eleven
late-added command kinds — is not discharged. The audit's answer is negative for
five: the suite covers all six COM commands and none of the five control commands
(Ping/GetSessionState/GetWorkerInfo/DrainEvents/ShutdownWorker), which are exactly
the kinds the finding calls masked by FakeWorkerHarness canned replies. Recorded as
Partially done with the residual test work specified, rather than claiming closure.
Repo-side half of SEC-36. The appsettings.json plaintext was already discharged
before this branch (HEAD ships the fail-closed ${secret:ldap/mxgateway/bind}
store reference), so the residual leak was the literal value in glauth.md,
docs/GatewayTesting.md, and the historical archreview SEC-06 evidence -- all
scrubbed to <service-account-password> placeholders pointing at the source of
truth scadaproj/infra/glauth/.
- csproj: add <UserSecretsId>mxaccessgw-server</UserSecretsId> (dev channel)
- GatewayOptionsValidator: blank-password message now names both channels
(dev user-secrets, deployed MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountPassword)
- test: assert the message names both channels
- docs: GatewayConfiguration.md (three channels + rotation note), glauth.md
(placeholders + rotation-required + runbook pointer), GatewayTesting.md
- new operator runbook docs/runbooks/SEC-36-ldap-credential-rotation.md
(live rotation + NSSM staging remain operator-pending)
- tracking: SEC-36 -> Done (repo-side) in both registers + change-log
Deviation: kept the ${secret:} reference in appsettings.json rather than
deleting it (spec step 2 assumed the stale plaintext baseline); deleting it
would regress the shipped/documented/tested secret-store channel.
git grep -i for the old value is empty across all tracked files.
One cross-client conformance pass; also closes first-cycle CLI-08.
CLI-37: an MxStatusProxy entry is a failure iff `category !=
MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_OK`. The proto contract has always said so — `success` is
the raw 16-bit COM member carried verbatim for diagnostics, not a boolean — but
four clients branched on `success` alone and .NET required both, so the same
gateway reply produced opposite verdicts per language. An absent entry stays
success; a present entry with an UNSPECIFIED category is a failure, because the
worker always maps a category and an unmapped one is not proven OK.
CLI-38: a reply fails on HRESULT iff `hresult` is present and negative, so
positive COM success codes such as S_FALSE (1) pass. .NET/Go/Java used `!= 0`,
which errored on a parity-preserving S_FALSE that Python and Rust accepted.
This makes the existing ClientLibrariesDesign.md claim true rather than
rewriting the doc to describe the divergence.
Four shared fixtures pin both rules cross-client, and each language suite also
carries a table test for the two edges a fixture cannot express (absent entry,
UNSPECIFIED category). A Java test fake that built a status with a bare
`setSuccess(1)` and no category is fixed — under the category rule that reply
was never a success.
Make the authored CI pipeline execute and go green on the co-located runner (portable + java), fix the five real latent defects the first real run surfaced (codegen-check null, stale rust proto, orphan-terminator Linux path, stale java worker codegen, py3.12 event loop), provision pwsh + Gradle for the self-hosted act image, and disable the Windows jobs (act host-mode broken). TST-03 -> Done.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMXXvNuPekkkrTEyPNxEkW
Add docs/plans/2026-07-10-dashboard-session-acl-tst15.md: the fleshed-out
Phase-4 design for the deferred TST-15 finding. Resolves the crux the deferral
left open — the dashboard authenticates LDAP users (Admin/Viewer) while sessions
are API-key-owned (OwnerKeyId), two disjoint identity domains — via a session tag
sourced from the owning API key (carried in the existing ApiKeyConstraints JSON
blob, no SQLite migration). Admin-sees-all; a Viewer may SubscribeSession iff
session.Tags intersects the Viewer's granted tags (new Dashboard:GroupToTag map
-> hub-token tag claims); untagged sessions Admin-only by default. Includes the
enforcement path, task breakdown (epic Tasks 16-19), test plan incl. live-LDAP,
and rejected alternatives.
Design only — TST-15 stays Not started (no implementation). The tracker and the
60-testing-docs-gaps TST-15 section point at the design doc; the change-log also
records the TST-03 finding (zero registered runners; needs a runner co-located on
the gitea Docker network).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMXXvNuPekkkrTEyPNxEkW
Java client toolchain (homebrew openjdk@17) works on the Mac, so the remaining
Java halves of CLI-15/CLI-04 are done locally this session, not batched to windev.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMXXvNuPekkkrTEyPNxEkW
Gateway-side follow-up to the shared auth-lib expiry core (delivered via G-2):
- apikey create-key gains optional --expires — absolute ISO-8601 UTC or relative
<N>d/<N>h from now; omitted means non-expiring (opt-in, unchanged default).
Threaded ApiKeyAdminCommand -> parser -> runner into the library's
CreateKeyAsync(..., expiresUtc, ...). list-keys shows an expiry column and an
active/expired/revoked status.
- Dashboard API Keys page surfaces expiry: an Expires column (Never when unset)
and a status badge reading Expired (red) / Expiring (<=7d, amber) / Revoked /
Active. DashboardApiKeySummary.ExpiresUtc projected in DashboardSnapshotService;
StatusBadge maps the new states.
Tests: parser (absolute/relative/invalid/none) + end-to-end past-expiry rejection
through the live verifier; dashboard summary suite green. Docs: Authentication.md
(verification-flow expiry step, CLI table + examples, dashboard badge).
Closes the tracked SEC-10 polish (SEC-10 core was already Done).
Empirically verified the full ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests suite exits cleanly:
- macOS: 0 surviving testhost after a full run.
- windev (origin/main worktree): 0 new testhost and 0 new worker processes
after a full run, isolated by process StartTime.
Static audit confirms the prime-suspect fixtures already dispose deterministically
(WorkerClient cancels _stopCts + awaits its read/write/heartbeat tasks with a 5s
timeout; GatewaySession disposes the client; harness/E2E fixtures use await using).
Drop the stale 'leaves orphaned testhost processes' rationale from CLAUDE.md's
Source Update Workflow; keep filtered-run guidance as a speed guideline only.
Separately discovered (tracked in 00-tracking.md change log, NOT part of TST-08):
Windows-only temp-file-lock flakiness in ~4 full-host test classes (Sqlite
connection-pool retaining a temp .db handle; SelfSignedCertificateProvider's
fixed-name gw.pfx.tmp racing teardown) that macOS never surfaces.
- SEC-02: DashboardAuthorizationHandler restricts the loopback and
Authentication:Mode=Disabled bypasses to read-only. They now satisfy only a
Viewer-bearing requirement (AnyDashboardRole), never AdminOnly, so anonymous
localhost can view the dashboard but cannot reach API-key CRUD or session
Close/Kill at the policy layer (previously guarded only by service re-checks).
- SEC-12: DashboardSessionAdminService emits canonical AuditEvents through
IAuditWriter (actions dashboard-close-session / dashboard-kill-worker, category
SessionAdmin) on Success/Failure/Denied, mirroring the API-key audit path so
destructive session actions leave durable, queryable rows.
- SEC-20: drop the unbounded session_id tag from the exported
mxgateway.heartbeats.failed counter (per-session detail stays in the snapshot/log).
Docs updated same-change: CLAUDE.md (read-only loopback + 5-min bearer),
GatewayDashboardDesign.md (bypass scoping + session-admin audit), Metrics.md.
Server build clean; 30/30 targeted + 295/295 Dashboard/Security/App/Metrics sweep.
Adds the 2026-07-08 architecture review (00-overall + six domain reports)
and a remediation/ tree: one design+implementation doc per domain covering
every finding, plus 00-tracking.md as the master progress tracker.
- 153 findings with stable IDs (GWC/WRK/IPC/SEC/CLI/TST), each with
design rationale, implementation steps, tests, docs, and verification.
- Tracker rolls findings up by severity and P0/P1/P2 roadmap tier, records
cross-cutting clusters and per-finding status (all Not started).
- Planning docs only; no source changes.
Joseph Doherty
dohertj2