Render Fallback:Mode=ForceSubtag as a cyan 'Subtag monitoring (forced)'
badge, distinct from the amber failover 'degraded' badge, so an intentional
configuration isn't shown as a fault. Distinguished by the shared
AlarmProviderReasons.ForcedSubtag reason carried on the provider-status feed.
B1: add AlarmProviderSwitchCount to GatewayMetricsSnapshot so the switch total is
readable without scraping the OTEL counter.
B2: replace the free-text reason tag on mxgateway.alarms.provider_switches with a
bounded AlarmProviderSwitchReason enum (failover/failback/unknown); the human-readable
reason stays in the structured log.
The themed Blazor <LoginCard> page (Components/Pages/Login.razor, @page "/login")
registers a Razor Components endpoint that matches ALL HTTP methods. The credential
form POSTed to /login, where MapPost("/login") also matched — so every POST /login
threw Microsoft.AspNetCore.Routing.Matching.AmbiguousMatchException (HTTP 500),
breaking dashboard login for every user. It was latent because the dashboard was only
ever reached via the AllowAnonymousLocalhost bypass on the host box.
Move the credential POST to a distinct /auth/login route (mirroring ScadaBridge, which
never collided because it posts to /auth/login). GET /login stays the Blazor page; the
cookie LoginPath stays /login. Adds a registration assertion pinning DashboardLoginPost
to /auth/login as the regression guard.
Files: Login.razor (LoginCard Action), DashboardEndpointRouteBuilderExtensions (MapPost
route), GatewayApplicationTests (route assertion).
The dashboard auth cookie name was hardcoded to the constant
DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.CookieName (MxGatewayDashboard). Browser
cookies are scoped by host+path but NOT by port, so two gateway instances
sharing a hostname would clobber each other's dashboard session under the
shared name.
Add DashboardOptions.CookieName (MxGateway:Dashboard:CookieName); null/blank
keeps the canonical default. Applied in the existing dashboard cookie
PostConfigure (runs after the inline AddCookie default, so it wins). Behaviour
is unchanged when unset. Adds a Tests case for the override.
Introduce IAuditActorAccessor seam + HttpAuditActorAccessor impl (reads ZbClaimTypes.Username
from IHttpContextAccessor; falls back to Identity.Name / ZbClaimTypes.Name; null when
unauthenticated). Register in DI via DashboardServiceCollectionExtensions.
Wire DashboardApiKeyManagementService: WriteDashboardAuditAsync now accepts the ClaimsPrincipal
user already in scope at each call site; ResolveOperatorActor extracts ZbClaimTypes.Username
(preferred) or Identity.Name. All four dashboard-* events now emit Actor = LDAP operator
username and Target = managed keyId, fixing the semantic gap where both fields held the keyId.
ConstraintEnforcer (gRPC / API-key actor) and CanonicalForwardingApiKeyAuditStore (CLI /
"system"/"cli" fallback) are unchanged.
Tests: DashboardApiKeyManagementServiceTests updated — CreateAuthorizedUser adds ZbClaimTypes.Username
("alice"), all dashboard-* audit assertions updated to Actor = "alice" / Target = "operator01";
new CreateAsync_AuthorizedUser_CanonicalAuditEventHasOperatorAsActorAndKeyIdAsTarget verifies the
canonical AuditEvent directly. New HttpAuditActorAccessorTests (4 cases: username claim, Identity.Name
fallback, unauthenticated → null, no context → null). ConstraintEnforcer tests still assert API-key/anonymous actor.
Standardize the dashboard role VALUE on the canonical six: Admin→Administrator
(Viewer unchanged). Pure value rename via DashboardRoles.Admin constant +
appsettings GroupToRole; the GatewayOptionsValidator allowed-set/message track
the constant so they now require 'Administrator' or 'Viewer'. Enforcement is
unchanged — Administrator authorizes exactly what Admin did.
Dashboard roles are derived at login from LDAP groups via GroupToRole and are
never persisted to the SQLite auth store, so no DB migration/seed change.
UNTOUCHED: the separate gRPC API-key scope GatewayScopes.Admin = "admin"
(lowercase) and every "admin" scope literal — a distinct data-plane system.
- DashboardAuthenticator.CreatePrincipal: emit ZbClaimTypes.Username ("zb:username") with
the login username, ZbClaimTypes.DisplayName ("zb:displayname") with the display name,
ZbClaimTypes.Name (== ClaimTypes.Name) for Identity.Name resolution, ZbClaimTypes.Role
(== ClaimTypes.Role) for IsInRole/[Authorize]. Keep ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier for back-compat
read-sites; keep mxgateway:ldap_group unchanged (MxGateway-specific, no ZbClaimType for groups).
ClaimsIdentity built with nameType=ZbClaimTypes.Name, roleType=ZbClaimTypes.Role.
- DashboardServiceCollectionExtensions.AddGatewayDashboard: route cookie hardening through
ZbCookieDefaults.Apply(requireHttps:true, idleTimeout:8h); set cookie name/path/redirects
after Apply; PostConfigure still overrides SecurePolicy per RequireHttpsCookie setting.
- DashboardAuthenticatorTests: add AuthenticateAsync_Success_EmitsCanonicalZbClaims asserting
zb:username, zb:displayname, ZbClaimTypes.Role per role, Identity.Name, and ldap_group preserved.
Defect 1: ValidateLdap used AddIfNotPositive for Port, accepting any value
> 0 including 70000. Replaced with builder.Port() from the shared
ZB.MOM.WW.Configuration library, which enforces the 1-65535 TCP range and
emits "MxGateway:Ldap:Port must be between 1 and 65535 (was {value})".
Defect 2: AddIfInvalidPath only caught ArgumentException, NotSupportedException,
and PathTooLongException from Path.GetFullPath. On macOS/Linux a path containing
an embedded null throws IOException, which escaped the catch block and caused
Validate() to throw instead of returning a failure. Added catch (IOException).
Tests: added Validate_Fails_WhenLdapPortIsZero, Validate_Fails_WhenLdapPortExceedsMaximum,
and Validate_Succeeds_WhenLdapEnabledWithValidPort to cover the new range boundary.
Wrap the WriteAllBytes/Move/HardenPermissions sequence in a try/catch so
that any failure best-effort deletes the hardened .tmp file (which may
already hold PFX/private-key bytes) before rethrowing. Add a test that
induces a persist failure by pointing SelfSignedCertPath inside a
regular file and asserts no .tmp is left on disk.
Drop KeyEncipherment from the self-signed cert's key-usage extension — it
is semantically wrong for ECDSA (RSA key-transport only); DigitalSignature
alone is correct for TLS 1.3 / ECDHE server certs. CertificateRequest is
unchanged (not IDisposable in .NET 10). Test now also asserts MachineName,
127.0.0.1 and IPv6 loopback are present in the SAN extension.
Joseph Doherty