fix(CLI-40,CLI-41,CLI-44): exact-secret scrub, uniform malformed-reply contract, Go terminal-error mislabel

CLI-40: port the exact-secret credential scrub to Rust/Java/.NET (Go/Python
already did it). AuthenticateUser/WriteSecured(2) helpers now redact the exact
caller-supplied secret from any surfaced error, as defense-in-depth on top of the
by-construction guarantee. Rust hand-writes a redacting Debug (derived Debug would
leak the reply); Java/.NET rebuild the same exception type with the redacted
message and do not carry the secret-bearing original forward (so ToString/stack
traces stay clean too).

CLI-41: uniform malformed-reply contract for AuthenticateUser/ArchestrAUserToId/
AddBufferedItem across all five clients — typed payload, else a present int32
return_value, else a typed malformed-reply error. Fixes Go/Java silent-0, .NET
NRE, and Rust's own internal inconsistency.

CLI-44: the Go event goroutine's Recv-error path now uses a non-blocking
sendTerminalEventResult on the reserved slot, so a genuine terminal stream error
is reported as itself instead of being mislabeled ErrSlowConsumer under overflow.

Riders from the CLI-37/38 review: (a) .NET ToDiagnosticSummary and Python
_mxaccess_message surface the raw success member (diagnostics-only parity with
Rust); (b) the status-conversion fixture carries an independent wantSuccess
boolean and the Go/.NET fixture tests assert against it instead of recomputing
the formula under test.

Shared fixtures (authenticate-user.{echoed-credential,missing-payload,
return-value-only}.reply.json) + manifest + ClientBehaviorFixtures.md +
ClientLibrariesDesign.md updated in the same change. Tracking: CLI-40/41/44 -> Done.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-08-07 06:42:40 -04:00
parent d2bb32d97b
commit dc7fd16dd5
33 changed files with 1465 additions and 97 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
using Google.Protobuf;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Client.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Tests for the credential-scrub (CLI-40) and malformed-reply (CLI-41) contracts on the
/// credential and id-returning session helpers, driven from shared behavior fixtures.
/// </summary>
public sealed class MxGatewaySessionReplyContractTests
{
/// <summary>
/// CLI-40: when MXAccess echoes the submitted credential back in its failure diagnostic,
/// the surfaced exception message must scrub it to the library redaction marker.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public async Task AuthenticateUserAsync_RedactsEchoedCredentialInFailureMessage()
{
const string password = "sup3rSecretVerify9f3a2b";
FakeGatewayTransport transport = CreateTransport();
transport.AddInvokeReply(ReadReplyFixture("authenticate-user.echoed-credential.reply.json"));
await using MxGatewayClient client = CreateClient(transport);
MxGatewaySession session = await client.OpenSessionAsync();
MxAccessException exception = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<MxAccessException>(
async () => await session.AuthenticateUserAsync(12, "operator", password));
Assert.DoesNotContain(password, exception.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal);
Assert.Contains("<redacted>", exception.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal);
// ToString() is what logging frameworks emit; the secret-bearing original must not be
// chained as an inner exception where it would re-surface the credential verbatim.
Assert.DoesNotContain(password, exception.ToString(), StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
/// <summary>
/// CLI-41: an OK reply that carries neither the typed AuthenticateUser payload nor an
/// int32 return_value is a malformed reply, surfaced as a typed exception rather than an NRE.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public async Task AuthenticateUserAsync_MissingPayloadAndReturnValue_ThrowsMalformedReply()
{
FakeGatewayTransport transport = CreateTransport();
transport.AddInvokeReply(ReadReplyFixture("authenticate-user.missing-payload.reply.json"));
await using MxGatewayClient client = CreateClient(transport);
MxGatewaySession session = await client.OpenSessionAsync();
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<MxGatewayMalformedReplyException>(
async () => await session.AuthenticateUserAsync(12, "operator", "pw"));
}
/// <summary>
/// CLI-41: an OK reply that omits the typed payload but carries an int32 return_value
/// resolves to that return value.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public async Task AuthenticateUserAsync_ReturnValueOnly_ResolvesReturnValue()
{
FakeGatewayTransport transport = CreateTransport();
transport.AddInvokeReply(ReadReplyFixture("authenticate-user.return-value-only.reply.json"));
await using MxGatewayClient client = CreateClient(transport);
MxGatewaySession session = await client.OpenSessionAsync();
int userId = await session.AuthenticateUserAsync(12, "operator", "pw");
Assert.Equal(7, userId);
}
/// <summary>
/// CLI-41: the AddBufferedItem fallback shares the malformed-reply contract — an OK reply
/// with neither a typed item handle nor an int32 return_value throws the typed exception.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public async Task AddBufferedItemAsync_MissingPayloadAndReturnValue_ThrowsMalformedReply()
{
FakeGatewayTransport transport = CreateTransport();
transport.AddInvokeReply(new MxCommandReply
{
SessionId = "session-fixture",
Kind = MxCommandKind.AddBufferedItem,
ProtocolStatus = new ProtocolStatus { Code = ProtocolStatusCode.Ok },
});
await using MxGatewayClient client = CreateClient(transport);
MxGatewaySession session = await client.OpenSessionAsync();
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<MxGatewayMalformedReplyException>(
async () => await session.AddBufferedItemAsync(12, "Area001.Pump001.Speed", "runtime"));
}
private static MxGatewayClient CreateClient(FakeGatewayTransport transport)
{
return new MxGatewayClient(transport.Options, transport);
}
private static FakeGatewayTransport CreateTransport()
{
return new FakeGatewayTransport(new MxGatewayClientOptions
{
Endpoint = new Uri("http://localhost:5000"),
ApiKey = "test-api-key",
});
}
private static MxCommandReply ReadReplyFixture(string fileName)
{
DirectoryInfo directory = new(AppContext.BaseDirectory);
while (directory is not null)
{
string path = Path.Combine(
directory.FullName,
"clients",
"proto",
"fixtures",
"behavior",
"command-replies",
fileName);
if (File.Exists(path))
{
return JsonParser.Default.Parse<MxCommandReply>(File.ReadAllText(path));
}
directory = directory.Parent!;
}
throw new FileNotFoundException(fileName);
}
}
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ public sealed class MxStatusProxyExtensionsTests
MxStatusProxy status = JsonParser.Default.Parse<MxStatusProxy>(
testCase.GetProperty("status").GetRawText());
Assert.Equal(status.Category is MxStatusCategory.Ok, status.IsSuccess());
bool wantSuccess = testCase.GetProperty("wantSuccess").GetBoolean();
Assert.Equal(wantSuccess, status.IsSuccess());
Assert.Equal(
testCase.GetProperty("status").GetProperty("rawCategory").GetInt32(),
status.RawCategory);
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Client;
/// <summary>
/// Exception thrown when the gateway returns a protocol-OK reply that carries neither the
/// expected typed payload nor an int32 <c>return_value</c>, so the client cannot resolve the
/// operation result. This replaces the historical <see cref="NullReferenceException"/> that a
/// blind <c>reply.ReturnValue.Int32Value</c> fallback would throw.
/// </summary>
public sealed class MxGatewayMalformedReplyException : MxGatewayException
{
/// <summary>Initializes a new instance with the given message.</summary>
/// <param name="message">The error message describing the malformed reply.</param>
public MxGatewayMalformedReplyException(string message)
: base(message)
{
}
/// <summary>Initializes a new instance with full diagnostic context.</summary>
/// <param name="message">The error message describing the malformed reply.</param>
/// <param name="sessionId">The session ID, if available.</param>
/// <param name="correlationId">The correlation ID for tracing, if available.</param>
/// <param name="protocolStatus">The protocol status details, if available.</param>
/// <param name="hResult">The HResult code, if available.</param>
/// <param name="statuses">The MXAccess statuses, if available.</param>
/// <param name="innerException">The underlying exception, if any.</param>
public MxGatewayMalformedReplyException(
string message,
string? sessionId = null,
string? correlationId = null,
ProtocolStatus? protocolStatus = null,
int? hResult = null,
IReadOnlyList<MxStatusProxy>? statuses = null,
Exception? innerException = null)
: base(
message,
sessionId,
correlationId,
protocolStatus,
hResult,
statuses ?? [],
innerException)
{
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Client;
/// <summary>
/// Scrubs exact secret substrings out of diagnostic text before it leaves the client on an
/// exception path. MXAccess can echo a submitted credential or secured value back inside a
/// failure diagnostic (protocol message, MXSTATUS_PROXY diagnostic text, HRESULT description);
/// this helper replaces any such verbatim occurrence with <c>&lt;redacted&gt;</c> so the raw
/// request payload never reaches a caught exception's message. The marker matches the Go, Rust,
/// and Java clients.
/// </summary>
internal static class MxGatewaySecretRedaction
{
private const string Marker = "<redacted>";
/// <summary>
/// Replaces every non-null, non-empty secret in <paramref name="secrets"/> with the
/// redaction marker (ordinal comparison). Returns the message unchanged when it is null or
/// empty, or when no usable secret is supplied.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="message">The diagnostic message to scrub.</param>
/// <param name="secrets">The secret values to remove from the message.</param>
/// <returns>The scrubbed message.</returns>
internal static string Redact(string message, params string?[] secrets)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(message) || secrets is null)
{
return message;
}
string result = message;
foreach (string? secret in secrets)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(secret))
{
result = result.Replace(secret, Marker, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
}
return result;
}
/// <summary>
/// Returns an exception equivalent to <paramref name="ex"/> but with any verbatim secret
/// scrubbed from its message. When nothing changes, the original exception is returned
/// unchanged; otherwise a new exception of the same concrete runtime type is built and the
/// original reply/status context is preserved. The secret-bearing original is deliberately
/// <b>not</b> chained as the inner exception — doing so would let its unredacted message
/// re-surface through <see cref="Exception.ToString"/> (which logging frameworks call). The
/// original's own inner cause (a transport error, never the request payload) is carried
/// forward instead.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="ex">The exception to redact.</param>
/// <param name="secrets">The secret values to remove from the message.</param>
/// <returns>The redacted exception, or the original when no change was needed.</returns>
internal static MxGatewayException Redacted(MxGatewayException ex, params string?[] secrets)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(ex);
string redacted = Redact(ex.Message, secrets);
if (string.Equals(redacted, ex.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
return ex;
}
Exception? cause = ex.InnerException;
return ex switch
{
MxAccessException access => new MxAccessException(redacted, access.Reply, cause),
MxGatewaySessionException => new MxGatewaySessionException(
redacted, ex.SessionId, ex.CorrelationId, ex.ProtocolStatus, ex.HResultCode, ex.Statuses, cause),
MxGatewayWorkerException => new MxGatewayWorkerException(
redacted, ex.SessionId, ex.CorrelationId, ex.ProtocolStatus, ex.HResultCode, ex.Statuses, cause),
MxGatewayAuthenticationException => new MxGatewayAuthenticationException(
redacted, ex.SessionId, ex.CorrelationId, ex.ProtocolStatus, ex.HResultCode, ex.Statuses, cause),
MxGatewayAuthorizationException => new MxGatewayAuthorizationException(
redacted, ex.SessionId, ex.CorrelationId, ex.ProtocolStatus, ex.HResultCode, ex.Statuses, cause),
MxGatewayMalformedReplyException => new MxGatewayMalformedReplyException(
redacted, ex.SessionId, ex.CorrelationId, ex.ProtocolStatus, ex.HResultCode, ex.Statuses, cause),
MxGatewayCommandException => new MxGatewayCommandException(
redacted, ex.SessionId, ex.CorrelationId, ex.ProtocolStatus, ex.HResultCode, ex.Statuses, cause),
_ => new MxGatewayException(redacted, cause),
};
}
}
@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ public sealed class MxGatewaySession : IAsyncDisposable
cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
reply.EnsureProtocolSuccess().EnsureMxAccessSuccess();
return reply.AddBufferedItem?.ItemHandle ?? reply.ReturnValue.Int32Value;
return ResolveInt32Result(reply.AddBufferedItem?.ItemHandle, reply, "AddBufferedItem");
}
/// <summary>
@@ -1141,7 +1141,14 @@ public sealed class MxGatewaySession : IAsyncDisposable
verifierUserId,
cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
reply.EnsureProtocolSuccess().EnsureMxAccessSuccess();
try
{
reply.EnsureProtocolSuccess().EnsureMxAccessSuccess();
}
catch (MxGatewayException ex)
{
throw MxGatewaySecretRedaction.Redacted(ex, ExtractSecretString(value));
}
}
/// <summary>
@@ -1215,7 +1222,14 @@ public sealed class MxGatewaySession : IAsyncDisposable
verifierUserId,
cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
reply.EnsureProtocolSuccess().EnsureMxAccessSuccess();
try
{
reply.EnsureProtocolSuccess().EnsureMxAccessSuccess();
}
catch (MxGatewayException ex)
{
throw MxGatewaySecretRedaction.Redacted(ex, ExtractSecretString(value));
}
}
/// <summary>
@@ -1285,8 +1299,15 @@ public sealed class MxGatewaySession : IAsyncDisposable
verifyUserPassword,
cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
reply.EnsureProtocolSuccess().EnsureMxAccessSuccess();
return reply.AuthenticateUser?.UserId ?? reply.ReturnValue.Int32Value;
try
{
reply.EnsureProtocolSuccess().EnsureMxAccessSuccess();
return ResolveInt32Result(reply.AuthenticateUser?.UserId, reply, "AuthenticateUser");
}
catch (MxGatewayException ex)
{
throw MxGatewaySecretRedaction.Redacted(ex, verifyUserPassword);
}
}
/// <summary>
@@ -1337,7 +1358,7 @@ public sealed class MxGatewaySession : IAsyncDisposable
MxCommandReply reply = await ArchestraUserToIdRawAsync(serverHandle, userIdGuid, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
reply.EnsureProtocolSuccess().EnsureMxAccessSuccess();
return reply.ArchestraUserToId?.UserId ?? reply.ReturnValue.Int32Value;
return ResolveInt32Result(reply.ArchestraUserToId?.UserId, reply, "ArchestrAUserToId");
}
/// <summary>
@@ -1367,6 +1388,51 @@ public sealed class MxGatewaySession : IAsyncDisposable
cancellationToken);
}
/// <summary>
/// Resolves the int32 result of an OK command reply: the typed payload value when present,
/// otherwise an int32 <c>return_value</c> when the reply carries one. A reply that provides
/// neither is malformed and surfaces as <see cref="MxGatewayMalformedReplyException"/>
/// rather than the historical <see cref="NullReferenceException"/>.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="typedValue">The typed payload value, or <see langword="null"/> when absent.</param>
/// <param name="reply">The OK command reply.</param>
/// <param name="operation">The MXAccess operation name, for the diagnostic message.</param>
/// <returns>The resolved int32 result.</returns>
private static int ResolveInt32Result(int? typedValue, MxCommandReply reply, string operation)
{
if (typedValue.HasValue)
{
return typedValue.Value;
}
if (reply.ReturnValue is not null
&& reply.ReturnValue.KindCase == MxValue.KindOneofCase.Int32Value)
{
return reply.ReturnValue.Int32Value;
}
throw new MxGatewayMalformedReplyException(
$"{operation} returned a malformed reply: OK reply carried neither the typed payload nor an int32 return_value",
reply.SessionId,
reply.CorrelationId,
reply.ProtocolStatus,
reply.HasHresult ? reply.Hresult : null,
reply.Statuses.ToArray());
}
/// <summary>
/// Extracts the raw string form of a credential-bearing <see cref="MxValue"/> for redaction,
/// or <see langword="null"/> when the value does not carry a string.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="value">The value written by a secured write.</param>
/// <returns>The string payload, or <see langword="null"/>.</returns>
private static string? ExtractSecretString(MxValue value)
{
return value.KindCase == MxValue.KindOneofCase.StringValue
? value.StringValue
: null;
}
/// <summary>
/// Invokes an MXAccess command on this session.
/// </summary>
@@ -30,6 +30,6 @@ public static class MxStatusProxyExtensions
? "no diagnostic text"
: status.DiagnosticText;
return $"{status.Category} by {status.DetectedBy}; detail={status.Detail}; {diagnosticText}";
return $"success={status.Success}; {status.Category} by {status.DetectedBy}; detail={status.Detail}; {diagnosticText}";
}
}
+80 -9
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ import (
pb "gitea.dohertylan.com/dohertj2/mxaccessgw/clients/go/internal/generated"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"google.golang.org/grpc/test/bufconn"
)
@@ -200,6 +202,68 @@ func TestEventsSlowConsumerYieldsErrSlowConsumerBeforeClose(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestEventsFullBufferTerminalErrorKeepsRootCause(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeGatewayServer{
streamStarted: make(chan struct{}),
streamDone: make(chan struct{}),
streamEventCount: eventBufferSize,
streamTerminalErr: status.Error(codes.Internal, "boom"),
}
client, cleanup := newBufconnClient(t, fake)
defer cleanup()
session := NewSessionForID(client, "session-1")
events, err := session.EventsAfter(context.Background(), 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EventsAfter() error = %v", err)
}
<-fake.streamStarted
// Do not drain until the stream has fully ended: the server sends exactly
// eventBufferSize events (filling the data slots) and then returns a genuine
// terminal gRPC error. The client must report that error as itself, using the
// reserved slot, rather than mislabeling it as ErrSlowConsumer.
select {
case <-fake.streamDone:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("event stream did not stop after terminal error")
}
// streamDone fires when the server returns; the client's producer goroutine
// still needs a moment to drain the gRPC stream, fill all data slots, and
// enqueue the terminal result. Let it settle before draining so the buffer is
// genuinely full when the terminal error is processed (which is what makes the
// mislabel bug observable).
time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
var last EventResult
gotResult := false
for {
select {
case res, ok := <-events:
if !ok {
if !gotResult {
t.Fatal("events channel closed without yielding any result")
}
var gwErr *GatewayError
if !errors.As(last.Err, &gwErr) {
t.Fatalf("final event result err is %T, want *GatewayError", last.Err)
}
if code := status.Code(last.Err); code != codes.Internal {
t.Fatalf("final event result gRPC code = %s, want %s", code, codes.Internal)
}
if errors.Is(last.Err, ErrSlowConsumer) {
t.Fatalf("final event result err = %v, must not be mislabeled as ErrSlowConsumer", last.Err)
}
return
}
last = res
gotResult = true
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("events channel did not close after terminal error")
}
}
}
func TestEventsSurfacesReplayGapSentinelAsTypedSignal(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeGatewayServer{
streamStarted: make(chan struct{}),
@@ -694,15 +758,16 @@ func newBufconnClient(t *testing.T, fake *fakeGatewayServer) (*Client, func()) {
type fakeGatewayServer struct {
pb.UnimplementedMxAccessGatewayServer
openReply *pb.OpenSessionReply
openAuth string
streamAuth string
streamStarted chan struct{}
streamDone chan struct{}
streamEventCount int
streamReplayGap *pb.ReplayGap
invokeReply *pb.MxCommandReply
invokeRequest *pb.MxCommandRequest
openReply *pb.OpenSessionReply
openAuth string
streamAuth string
streamStarted chan struct{}
streamDone chan struct{}
streamEventCount int
streamReplayGap *pb.ReplayGap
streamTerminalErr error
invokeReply *pb.MxCommandReply
invokeRequest *pb.MxCommandRequest
}
func (s *fakeGatewayServer) OpenSession(ctx context.Context, req *pb.OpenSessionRequest) (*pb.OpenSessionReply, error) {
@@ -772,6 +837,12 @@ func (s *fakeGatewayServer) StreamEvents(req *pb.StreamEventsRequest, stream grp
return err
}
}
if s.streamTerminalErr != nil {
// Return a genuine terminal stream error immediately after sending the
// events, without waiting on the client to cancel. This exercises the
// Recv-error path while the client's result buffer is still full.
return s.streamTerminalErr
}
<-stream.Context().Done()
return io.EOF
}
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
package mxgateway
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
pb "gitea.dohertylan.com/dohertj2/mxaccessgw/clients/go/internal/generated"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson"
)
// loadCommandReplyFixture parses a shared command-reply fixture into an
// MxCommandReply so the Go client can be driven through the same wire shapes the
// other language clients exercise.
func loadCommandReplyFixture(t *testing.T, name string) *pb.MxCommandReply {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join("..", "..", "proto", "fixtures", "behavior", "command-replies", name)
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read fixture %s: %v", name, err)
}
var reply pb.MxCommandReply
if err := protojson.Unmarshal(data, &reply); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse fixture %s: %v", name, err)
}
return &reply
}
func TestAuthenticateUserMissingPayloadReturnsMalformedReplyError(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeGatewayServer{
invokeReply: loadCommandReplyFixture(t, "authenticate-user.missing-payload.reply.json"),
}
client, cleanup := newBufconnClient(t, fake)
defer cleanup()
session := NewSessionForID(client, "session-1")
_, err := session.AuthenticateUser(context.Background(), 12, "operator", "secret")
var malformed *MalformedReplyError
if !errors.As(err, &malformed) {
t.Fatalf("AuthenticateUser() error = %v (%T), want *MalformedReplyError", err, err)
}
if malformed.Op != "authenticate user" {
t.Fatalf("MalformedReplyError.Op = %q, want %q", malformed.Op, "authenticate user")
}
}
func TestAuthenticateUserReturnValueOnlyUsesInt32ReturnValue(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeGatewayServer{
invokeReply: loadCommandReplyFixture(t, "authenticate-user.return-value-only.reply.json"),
}
client, cleanup := newBufconnClient(t, fake)
defer cleanup()
session := NewSessionForID(client, "session-1")
userID, err := session.AuthenticateUser(context.Background(), 12, "operator", "secret")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("AuthenticateUser() error = %v", err)
}
if userID != 7 {
t.Fatalf("AuthenticateUser() = %d, want 7", userID)
}
}
// AddBufferedItem shares the prefer-payload / int32-return-value / malformed
// fallback code path; cover both branches for one of the siblings.
func TestAddBufferedItemFallbackHonoursReturnValueAndReportsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("return-value-only", func(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeGatewayServer{
invokeReply: loadCommandReplyFixture(t, "authenticate-user.return-value-only.reply.json"),
}
client, cleanup := newBufconnClient(t, fake)
defer cleanup()
session := NewSessionForID(client, "session-1")
itemHandle, err := session.AddBufferedItem(context.Background(), 12, "Area001.Pump001.Speed", "runtime")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("AddBufferedItem() error = %v", err)
}
if itemHandle != 7 {
t.Fatalf("AddBufferedItem() = %d, want 7", itemHandle)
}
})
t.Run("missing-payload", func(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeGatewayServer{
invokeReply: loadCommandReplyFixture(t, "authenticate-user.missing-payload.reply.json"),
}
client, cleanup := newBufconnClient(t, fake)
defer cleanup()
session := NewSessionForID(client, "session-1")
_, err := session.AddBufferedItem(context.Background(), 12, "Area001.Pump001.Speed", "runtime")
var malformed *MalformedReplyError
if !errors.As(err, &malformed) {
t.Fatalf("AddBufferedItem() error = %v (%T), want *MalformedReplyError", err, err)
}
if malformed.Op != "add buffered item" {
t.Fatalf("MalformedReplyError.Op = %q, want %q", malformed.Op, "add buffered item")
}
})
}
// TestAuthenticateUserScrubsEchoedCredentialFromError is the CLI-40 regression:
// a gateway diagnostic that echoes the raw credential back must never reach the
// caller's surfaced error text.
func TestAuthenticateUserScrubsEchoedCredentialFromError(t *testing.T) {
const credential = "sup3rSecretVerify9f3a2b"
fake := &fakeGatewayServer{
invokeReply: loadCommandReplyFixture(t, "authenticate-user.echoed-credential.reply.json"),
}
client, cleanup := newBufconnClient(t, fake)
defer cleanup()
session := NewSessionForID(client, "session-1")
_, err := session.AuthenticateUser(context.Background(), 12, "operator", credential)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("AuthenticateUser() error = nil, want an MXAccess failure")
}
message := err.Error()
if strings.Contains(message, credential) {
t.Fatalf("surfaced error leaked the credential: %q", message)
}
if !strings.Contains(message, "<redacted>") {
t.Fatalf("surfaced error missing redaction marker: %q", message)
}
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@ func TestStatusConversionFixtures(t *testing.T) {
var fixture struct {
Cases []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Status json.RawMessage `json:"status"`
ID string `json:"id"`
WantSuccess bool `json:"wantSuccess"`
Status json.RawMessage `json:"status"`
} `json:"cases"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &fixture); err != nil {
@@ -65,9 +66,8 @@ func TestStatusConversionFixtures(t *testing.T) {
if err := protojson.Unmarshal(tc.Status, &status); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse status: %v", err)
}
want := status.GetCategory() == pb.MxStatusCategory_MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_OK
if got := StatusSucceeded(&status); got != want {
t.Fatalf("StatusSucceeded() = %v, want %v", got, want)
if got := StatusSucceeded(&status); got != tc.WantSuccess {
t.Fatalf("StatusSucceeded() = %v, want %v", got, tc.WantSuccess)
}
})
}
+19
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,25 @@ func redactSecrets(err error, secrets ...string) error {
// dropping events. Match it with errors.Is.
var ErrSlowConsumer = errors.New("mxgateway: event consumer fell behind; stream terminated")
// MalformedReplyError reports an OK command reply that carried neither the
// typed payload the operation expected nor a usable int32 return_value, so the
// client cannot produce a result. It gives every affected helper one uniform,
// inspectable failure instead of silently returning a zero value.
type MalformedReplyError struct {
// Op names the operation whose reply was malformed.
Op string
// Detail explains what the reply was missing.
Detail string
}
// Error returns the formatted malformed-reply message.
func (e *MalformedReplyError) Error() string {
if e == nil {
return ""
}
return fmt.Sprintf("mxgateway: %s returned a malformed reply: %s", e.Op, e.Detail)
}
// GatewayError wraps transport-level gRPC failures.
type GatewayError struct {
// Op names the operation that failed (for example "dial" or "invoke").
+52 -14
View File
@@ -812,7 +812,13 @@ func (s *Session) AuthenticateUser(ctx context.Context, serverHandle int32, veri
if reply.GetAuthenticateUser() != nil {
return reply.GetAuthenticateUser().GetUserId(), nil
}
return reply.GetReturnValue().GetInt32Value(), nil
if x, ok := reply.GetReturnValue().GetKind().(*pb.MxValue_Int32Value); ok {
return x.Int32Value, nil
}
return 0, &MalformedReplyError{
Op: "authenticate user",
Detail: "reply carried neither an AuthenticateUser payload nor an int32 return_value",
}
}
// AuthenticateUserRaw invokes MXAccess AuthenticateUser and returns the raw
@@ -847,7 +853,13 @@ func (s *Session) ArchestrAUserToId(ctx context.Context, serverHandle int32, use
if reply.GetArchestraUserToId() != nil {
return reply.GetArchestraUserToId().GetUserId(), nil
}
return reply.GetReturnValue().GetInt32Value(), nil
if x, ok := reply.GetReturnValue().GetKind().(*pb.MxValue_Int32Value); ok {
return x.Int32Value, nil
}
return 0, &MalformedReplyError{
Op: "archestra user to id",
Detail: "reply carried neither an ArchestrAUserToId payload nor an int32 return_value",
}
}
// ArchestrAUserToIdRaw invokes MXAccess ArchestrAUserToId and returns the raw reply.
@@ -876,7 +888,13 @@ func (s *Session) AddBufferedItem(ctx context.Context, serverHandle int32, itemD
if reply.GetAddBufferedItem() != nil {
return reply.GetAddBufferedItem().GetItemHandle(), nil
}
return reply.GetReturnValue().GetInt32Value(), nil
if x, ok := reply.GetReturnValue().GetKind().(*pb.MxValue_Int32Value); ok {
return x.Int32Value, nil
}
return 0, &MalformedReplyError{
Op: "add buffered item",
Detail: "reply carried neither an AddBufferedItem payload nor an int32 return_value",
}
}
// AddBufferedItemRaw invokes MXAccess AddBufferedItem and returns the raw reply.
@@ -981,10 +999,12 @@ func stringSecrets(values ...*MxValue) []string {
// context cancellation stops Recv, or a terminal error is sent.
//
// The returned channel is buffered. If the consumer falls behind and the buffer
// overflows, the stream is terminated and a final EventResult carrying a
// GatewayError that wraps ErrSlowConsumer is delivered before the channel
// closes. Callers must match it with errors.Is(res.Err, ErrSlowConsumer) to
// distinguish a slow-consumer drop from a graceful server end. Use
// overflows with data, the stream is terminated and a final EventResult carrying
// a GatewayError that wraps ErrSlowConsumer is delivered before the channel
// closes; match it with errors.Is(res.Err, ErrSlowConsumer) to distinguish a
// slow-consumer drop from a graceful server end. A genuine stream error is
// reported as itself even under overflow — it is never relabeled as
// ErrSlowConsumer, so the underlying gRPC status stays inspectable. Use
// SubscribeEvents for a blocking, backpressured stream that never drops.
func (s *Session) Events(ctx context.Context) (<-chan EventResult, error) {
return s.EventsAfter(ctx, 0)
@@ -994,7 +1014,9 @@ func (s *Session) Events(ctx context.Context) (<-chan EventResult, error) {
//
// Like Events, the returned channel is buffered and terminates with a final
// EventResult wrapping ErrSlowConsumer (matchable via errors.Is) if the consumer
// falls behind and the buffer overflows, rather than silently closing.
// falls behind and the buffer overflows with data, rather than silently closing.
// A genuine stream error is reported as itself even under overflow, never
// relabeled as ErrSlowConsumer.
func (s *Session) EventsAfter(ctx context.Context, afterWorkerSequence uint64) (<-chan EventResult, error) {
subscription, err := s.subscribeEventsAfter(ctx, afterWorkerSequence, true)
if err != nil {
@@ -1048,12 +1070,11 @@ func (s *Session) subscribeEventsAfter(ctx context.Context, afterWorkerSequence
if err == io.EOF || status.Code(err) == codes.Canceled || streamCtx.Err() != nil {
return
}
sendEventResult(
streamCtx,
results,
EventResult{Err: &GatewayError{Op: "stream events", Err: err}},
cancelWhenResultBufferFull,
cancel)
// A genuine terminal stream error must be reported as itself, even
// when the data slots are full. Routing it through sendEventResult
// would let the overflow branch substitute ErrSlowConsumer and lose
// the real gRPC status, so send it directly on the reserved slot.
sendTerminalEventResult(results, EventResult{Err: &GatewayError{Op: "stream events", Err: err}})
return
}
}()
@@ -1072,6 +1093,23 @@ func ensureBulkSize(name string, length int) error {
return nil
}
// sendTerminalEventResult enqueues a terminal EventResult with a non-blocking
// send. The eventBufferReservedSlots reserve (beyond the eventBufferSize data
// slots) guarantees the send lands unless a terminal result was already
// enqueued; because this goroutine is the sole producer, at most one terminal
// send ever races for the reserved slot, so the select default only fires when
// the reserve is already spent — never dropping a first terminal error.
//
// Unlike sendEventResult, this bypasses the overflow branch: a genuine terminal
// stream error is reported verbatim even when the data slots are full, rather
// than being relabeled as ErrSlowConsumer.
func sendTerminalEventResult(results chan<- EventResult, result EventResult) {
select {
case results <- result:
default:
}
}
func sendEventResult(
ctx context.Context,
results chan<- EventResult,
@@ -29,4 +29,18 @@ public final class MxAccessException extends MxGatewayCommandException {
public MxAccessException(String operation, MxCommandReply reply) {
super(operation, reply == null ? null : reply.getProtocolStatus(), reply);
}
/**
* Creates a new MXAccess exception with an already-built, verbatim message.
* Used to re-surface an MXAccess failure with a redacted message while
* preserving the original protocol status and reply.
*
* @param message the exact message to surface (already formatted/redacted)
* @param protocolStatus protocol status reported by the gateway
* @param reply raw command reply containing the MXAccess failure detail
* @param cause underlying error, or {@code null}
*/
public MxAccessException(String message, ProtocolStatus protocolStatus, MxCommandReply reply, Throwable cause) {
super(message, protocolStatus, reply, cause);
}
}
@@ -25,6 +25,23 @@ public class MxGatewayCommandException extends MxGatewayException {
this.reply = reply;
}
/**
* Creates a new command exception with an already-built, verbatim message.
* Used to re-surface a failure with a redacted message while preserving the
* original protocol status and reply.
*
* @param message the exact message to surface (already formatted/redacted)
* @param protocolStatus protocol status returned by the gateway
* @param reply raw command reply, or {@code null} when none was produced
* @param cause underlying error, or {@code null}
*/
protected MxGatewayCommandException(
String message, ProtocolStatus protocolStatus, MxCommandReply reply, Throwable cause) {
super(message, cause);
this.protocolStatus = protocolStatus;
this.reply = reply;
}
/**
* Returns the gateway protocol status that triggered this exception.
*
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
package com.zb.mom.ww.mxgateway.client;
/**
* Thrown when the gateway returns a protocol-OK command reply that carries
* neither the expected typed payload nor a usable {@code return_value}.
*
* <p>A successful reply for a value-returning command (for example
* {@code AuthenticateUser}, {@code ArchestrAUserToId}, or {@code AddBufferedItem})
* must supply either the command's typed payload or an int32 {@code return_value}.
* A reply that satisfies neither is malformed, and the client surfaces this
* distinct failure rather than silently returning a default {@code 0}.
*/
public final class MxGatewayMalformedReplyException extends MxGatewayException {
/**
* Creates a new malformed-reply exception with the supplied message.
*
* @param message human-readable description of the malformed reply
*/
public MxGatewayMalformedReplyException(String message) {
super(message);
}
/**
* Creates a new malformed-reply exception with the supplied message and cause.
*
* @param message human-readable description of the malformed reply
* @param cause underlying error that triggered the failure
*/
public MxGatewayMalformedReplyException(String message, Throwable cause) {
super(message, cause);
}
}
@@ -54,4 +54,32 @@ public final class MxGatewaySecrets {
}
return String.join(" ", parts);
}
/**
* Replaces every occurrence of each supplied secret with the redaction
* marker {@code "<redacted>"}. Unlike {@link #redactCredentials(String)},
* which scrubs by pattern, this performs an exact-substring scrub of the
* caller-known secrets — used to strip a credential the gateway echoed back
* into a free-form failure message.
*
* @param message the message to scrub, may be {@code null}
* @param secrets the exact secret substrings to remove; {@code null}/empty
* entries and a {@code null} array are ignored
* @return {@code message} unchanged when it is {@code null} or no non-empty
* secret is supplied, otherwise the message with every secret occurrence
* replaced by {@code "<redacted>"}
*/
public static String redactExact(String message, String... secrets) {
if (message == null || secrets == null) {
return message;
}
String result = message;
for (String secret : secrets) {
if (secret != null && !secret.isEmpty()) {
result = result.replace(secret, "<redacted>");
}
}
return result;
}
}
@@ -782,15 +782,17 @@ public final class MxGatewaySession implements AutoCloseable {
*/
public MxCommandReply writeSecuredRaw(
int serverHandle, int itemHandle, int currentUserId, int verifierUserId, MxValue value) {
return invokeCommand(MxCommand.newBuilder()
.setKind(MxCommandKind.MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE_SECURED)
.setWriteSecured(WriteSecuredCommand.newBuilder()
.setServerHandle(serverHandle)
.setItemHandle(itemHandle)
.setCurrentUserId(currentUserId)
.setVerifierUserId(verifierUserId)
.setValue(value))
.build());
return invokeCommandRedacted(
MxCommand.newBuilder()
.setKind(MxCommandKind.MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE_SECURED)
.setWriteSecured(WriteSecuredCommand.newBuilder()
.setServerHandle(serverHandle)
.setItemHandle(itemHandle)
.setCurrentUserId(currentUserId)
.setVerifierUserId(verifierUserId)
.setValue(value))
.build(),
secretStringOf(value));
}
/**
@@ -837,16 +839,18 @@ public final class MxGatewaySession implements AutoCloseable {
int verifierUserId,
MxValue value,
MxValue timestampValue) {
return invokeCommand(MxCommand.newBuilder()
.setKind(MxCommandKind.MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE_SECURED2)
.setWriteSecured2(WriteSecured2Command.newBuilder()
.setServerHandle(serverHandle)
.setItemHandle(itemHandle)
.setCurrentUserId(currentUserId)
.setVerifierUserId(verifierUserId)
.setValue(value)
.setTimestampValue(timestampValue))
.build());
return invokeCommandRedacted(
MxCommand.newBuilder()
.setKind(MxCommandKind.MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE_SECURED2)
.setWriteSecured2(WriteSecured2Command.newBuilder()
.setServerHandle(serverHandle)
.setItemHandle(itemHandle)
.setCurrentUserId(currentUserId)
.setVerifierUserId(verifierUserId)
.setValue(value)
.setTimestampValue(timestampValue))
.build(),
secretStringOf(value));
}
/**
@@ -866,17 +870,24 @@ public final class MxGatewaySession implements AutoCloseable {
* @throws MxAccessException when MXAccess rejects the credential
*/
public int authenticateUser(int serverHandle, String verifyUser, String verifyUserPassword) {
MxCommandReply reply = invokeCommand(MxCommand.newBuilder()
.setKind(MxCommandKind.MX_COMMAND_KIND_AUTHENTICATE_USER)
.setAuthenticateUser(AuthenticateUserCommand.newBuilder()
.setServerHandle(serverHandle)
.setVerifyUser(verifyUser)
.setVerifyUserPassword(verifyUserPassword))
.build());
MxCommandReply reply = invokeCommandRedacted(
MxCommand.newBuilder()
.setKind(MxCommandKind.MX_COMMAND_KIND_AUTHENTICATE_USER)
.setAuthenticateUser(AuthenticateUserCommand.newBuilder()
.setServerHandle(serverHandle)
.setVerifyUser(verifyUser)
.setVerifyUserPassword(verifyUserPassword))
.build(),
verifyUserPassword);
if (reply.hasAuthenticateUser()) {
return reply.getAuthenticateUser().getUserId();
}
return reply.getReturnValue().getInt32Value();
if (reply.hasReturnValue() && reply.getReturnValue().getKindCase() == MxValue.KindCase.INT32_VALUE) {
return reply.getReturnValue().getInt32Value();
}
throw new MxGatewayMalformedReplyException(
"AuthenticateUser returned a malformed reply: OK reply carried neither "
+ "the typed payload nor an int32 return_value");
}
/**
@@ -899,7 +910,12 @@ public final class MxGatewaySession implements AutoCloseable {
if (reply.hasArchestraUserToId()) {
return reply.getArchestraUserToId().getUserId();
}
return reply.getReturnValue().getInt32Value();
if (reply.hasReturnValue() && reply.getReturnValue().getKindCase() == MxValue.KindCase.INT32_VALUE) {
return reply.getReturnValue().getInt32Value();
}
throw new MxGatewayMalformedReplyException(
"ArchestrAUserToId returned a malformed reply: OK reply carried neither "
+ "the typed payload nor an int32 return_value");
}
/**
@@ -925,7 +941,12 @@ public final class MxGatewaySession implements AutoCloseable {
if (reply.hasAddBufferedItem()) {
return reply.getAddBufferedItem().getItemHandle();
}
return reply.getReturnValue().getInt32Value();
if (reply.hasReturnValue() && reply.getReturnValue().getKindCase() == MxValue.KindCase.INT32_VALUE) {
return reply.getReturnValue().getInt32Value();
}
throw new MxGatewayMalformedReplyException(
"AddBufferedItem returned a malformed reply: OK reply carried neither "
+ "the typed payload nor an int32 return_value");
}
/**
@@ -1027,6 +1048,49 @@ public final class MxGatewaySession implements AutoCloseable {
.build());
}
/**
* Invokes a credential-bearing command, scrubbing any exact secret the
* gateway may have echoed back into a surfaced failure message. The secret
* lives only in the request, but a non-parity gateway or provider can copy
* it into a diagnostic; this guarantees it never survives in the exception
* text a caller might log.
*
* <p>On failure the original exception's message is scrubbed with
* {@link MxGatewaySecrets#redactExact}. If nothing changed (the common case
* where the message never carried the secret), the original exception is
* rethrown untouched. Otherwise it is re-thrown as the same concrete type
* carrying the redacted message; the secret-bearing original is not chained
* as a cause, so it cannot leak through a printed stack trace.
*/
private MxCommandReply invokeCommandRedacted(MxCommand command, String... secrets) {
try {
return invokeCommand(command);
} catch (MxGatewayException ex) {
String original = ex.getMessage();
String redacted = MxGatewaySecrets.redactExact(original, secrets);
if (redacted == null || redacted.equals(original)) {
throw ex;
}
if (ex instanceof MxAccessException mx) {
throw new MxAccessException(redacted, mx.protocolStatus(), mx.reply(), null);
}
throw new MxGatewayException(redacted);
}
}
/**
* Extracts the string payload of a secured-write value so it can be scrubbed
* from an echoed failure message. Only string-kind values carry a
* credential-shaped secret worth redacting; other kinds return {@code null}
* (ignored by {@link MxGatewaySecrets#redactExact}).
*/
private static String secretStringOf(MxValue value) {
if (value != null && value.getKindCase() == MxValue.KindCase.STRING_VALUE) {
return value.getStringValue();
}
return null;
}
private static String newCorrelationId() {
byte[] bytes = new byte[16];
RANDOM.nextBytes(bytes);
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
package com.zb.mom.ww.mxgateway.client;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
import com.google.protobuf.util.JsonFormat;
import io.grpc.ManagedChannel;
import io.grpc.Server;
import io.grpc.inprocess.InProcessChannelBuilder;
import io.grpc.inprocess.InProcessServerBuilder;
import io.grpc.stub.StreamObserver;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.time.Duration;
import java.util.UUID;
import mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxAccessGatewayGrpc;
import mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.MxCommandReply;
import mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.MxCommandRequest;
import mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.MxValue;
import mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.ProtocolStatus;
import mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.ProtocolStatusCode;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
final class MxGatewayCredentialReplyTests {
private static final String CREDENTIAL = "sup3rSecretVerify9f3a2b";
@Test
void authenticateUserRedactsEchoedCredentialFromReplyDrivenError() throws Exception {
MxCommandReply reply = loadReply("authenticate-user.echoed-credential.reply.json");
try (InProcessGateway gateway = InProcessGateway.startReturning(reply);
MxGatewayClient client = gateway.client()) {
MxGatewaySession session = MxGatewaySession.forSessionId(client, "auth-echo-session");
MxAccessException error = assertThrows(
MxAccessException.class,
() -> session.authenticateUser(12, "operator", CREDENTIAL));
assertFalse(error.getMessage().contains(CREDENTIAL),
"credential echoed by the gateway must not survive in the surfaced message");
assertTrue(error.getMessage().contains("<redacted>"),
"the echoed credential must be replaced with the redaction marker");
}
}
@Test
void authenticateUserMissingPayloadThrowsMalformedReply() throws Exception {
MxCommandReply reply = loadReply("authenticate-user.missing-payload.reply.json");
try (InProcessGateway gateway = InProcessGateway.startReturning(reply);
MxGatewayClient client = gateway.client()) {
MxGatewaySession session = MxGatewaySession.forSessionId(client, "auth-missing-session");
assertThrows(
MxGatewayMalformedReplyException.class,
() -> session.authenticateUser(3, "operator", "pw"));
}
}
@Test
void authenticateUserReturnValueOnlyReplyReturnsInt32Fallback() throws Exception {
MxCommandReply reply = loadReply("authenticate-user.return-value-only.reply.json");
try (InProcessGateway gateway = InProcessGateway.startReturning(reply);
MxGatewayClient client = gateway.client()) {
MxGatewaySession session = MxGatewaySession.forSessionId(client, "auth-return-session");
assertEquals(7, session.authenticateUser(3, "operator", "pw"));
}
}
@Test
void addBufferedItemReturnValueOnlyReplyReturnsInt32Fallback() throws Exception {
MxCommandReply reply = MxCommandReply.newBuilder()
.setProtocolStatus(ok())
.setReturnValue(MxValue.newBuilder().setInt32Value(55))
.build();
try (InProcessGateway gateway = InProcessGateway.startReturning(reply);
MxGatewayClient client = gateway.client()) {
MxGatewaySession session = MxGatewaySession.forSessionId(client, "buffered-return-session");
assertEquals(55, session.addBufferedItem(3, "Tank01.Level", "galaxy"));
}
}
@Test
void addBufferedItemMissingPayloadThrowsMalformedReply() throws Exception {
MxCommandReply reply = MxCommandReply.newBuilder().setProtocolStatus(ok()).build();
try (InProcessGateway gateway = InProcessGateway.startReturning(reply);
MxGatewayClient client = gateway.client()) {
MxGatewaySession session = MxGatewaySession.forSessionId(client, "buffered-malformed-session");
assertThrows(
MxGatewayMalformedReplyException.class,
() -> session.addBufferedItem(3, "Tank01.Level", "galaxy"));
}
}
private static ProtocolStatus ok() {
return ProtocolStatus.newBuilder()
.setCode(ProtocolStatusCode.PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_OK)
.build();
}
private static MxCommandReply loadReply(String fixture) throws Exception {
MxCommandReply.Builder builder = MxCommandReply.newBuilder();
JsonFormat.parser().merge(
Files.readString(fixtureRoot().resolve("command-replies/" + fixture)),
builder);
return builder.build();
}
private static Path fixtureRoot() {
Path current = Path.of(System.getProperty("user.dir")).toAbsolutePath();
for (Path path = current; path != null; path = path.getParent()) {
Path candidate = path.resolve("clients/proto/fixtures/behavior");
if (Files.exists(candidate)) {
return candidate;
}
candidate = path.resolve("../proto/fixtures/behavior").normalize();
if (Files.exists(candidate)) {
return candidate;
}
}
throw new IllegalStateException("could not locate behavior fixtures from " + current);
}
private record InProcessGateway(Server server, ManagedChannel channel) implements AutoCloseable {
static InProcessGateway startReturning(MxCommandReply reply) throws Exception {
String serverName = "mxgw-java-cred-" + UUID.randomUUID();
MxAccessGatewayGrpc.MxAccessGatewayImplBase service =
new MxAccessGatewayGrpc.MxAccessGatewayImplBase() {
@Override
public void invoke(
MxCommandRequest request, StreamObserver<MxCommandReply> responseObserver) {
responseObserver.onNext(reply);
responseObserver.onCompleted();
}
};
Server server = InProcessServerBuilder.forName(serverName)
.directExecutor()
.addService(service)
.build()
.start();
ManagedChannel channel = InProcessChannelBuilder.forName(serverName)
.directExecutor()
.build();
return new InProcessGateway(server, channel);
}
MxGatewayClient client() {
return new MxGatewayClient(
channel,
MxGatewayClientOptions.builder()
.endpoint("in-process")
.apiKey("")
.plaintext(true)
.callTimeout(Duration.ofSeconds(5))
.build());
}
@Override
public void close() {
channel.shutdownNow();
server.shutdownNow();
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"sessionId": "session-fixture",
"correlationId": "gateway-correlation-authenticate-echoed",
"kind": "MX_COMMAND_KIND_AUTHENTICATE_USER",
"protocolStatus": {
"code": "PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_OK",
"message": "MXAccess AuthenticateUser rejected credential 'sup3rSecretVerify9f3a2b'."
},
"hresult": -2147024891,
"statuses": [
{
"success": 0,
"category": "MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_SECURITY_ERROR",
"detectedBy": "MX_STATUS_SOURCE_RESPONDING_NMX",
"detail": 5,
"rawCategory": 8,
"rawDetectedBy": 5,
"diagnosticText": "Authentication failed for password 'sup3rSecretVerify9f3a2b'."
}
],
"diagnosticMessage": "MXAccess echoed the credential 'sup3rSecretVerify9f3a2b' back in its failure diagnostic."
}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
{
"sessionId": "session-fixture",
"correlationId": "gateway-correlation-authenticate-missing-payload",
"kind": "MX_COMMAND_KIND_AUTHENTICATE_USER",
"protocolStatus": {
"code": "PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_OK",
"message": "AuthenticateUser reached MXAccess."
},
"diagnosticMessage": "Malformed: the OK reply carried neither an AuthenticateUser payload nor a return_value."
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"sessionId": "session-fixture",
"correlationId": "gateway-correlation-authenticate-return-value-only",
"kind": "MX_COMMAND_KIND_AUTHENTICATE_USER",
"protocolStatus": {
"code": "PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_OK",
"message": "AuthenticateUser reached MXAccess."
},
"returnValue": {
"dataType": "MX_DATA_TYPE_INTEGER",
"variantType": "VT_I4",
"int32Value": 7
},
"diagnosticMessage": "Legacy worker populated only return_value; the typed AuthenticateUser payload is absent."
}
@@ -48,6 +48,27 @@
"path": "command-replies/write.hresult-e-fail.reply.json",
"expectation": "A negative HRESULT fails the reply even when every status entry reports MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_OK."
},
{
"id": "command-reply.authenticate-user.echoed-credential",
"category": "command_replies",
"messageType": "mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxCommandReply",
"path": "command-replies/authenticate-user.echoed-credential.reply.json",
"expectation": "When a gateway/MXAccess diagnostic echoes the caller's credential back, the surfaced error redacts the exact secret and never leaks the verbatim value."
},
{
"id": "command-reply.authenticate-user.missing-payload",
"category": "command_replies",
"messageType": "mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxCommandReply",
"path": "command-replies/authenticate-user.missing-payload.reply.json",
"expectation": "An OK reply with neither the typed AuthenticateUser payload nor a return_value raises a typed malformed-reply error, never a proto3 default 0 and never an NRE."
},
{
"id": "command-reply.authenticate-user.return-value-only",
"category": "command_replies",
"messageType": "mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxCommandReply",
"path": "command-replies/authenticate-user.return-value-only.reply.json",
"expectation": "An OK reply missing the typed AuthenticateUser payload but carrying an int32 return_value falls back to the return_value (legacy-worker compatibility)."
},
{
"id": "event-stream.session-ordered",
"category": "event_streams",
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
"cases": [
{
"id": "ok.responding-lmx",
"wantSuccess": true,
"status": {
"success": 1,
"category": "MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_OK",
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@
},
{
"id": "security-error.requesting-lmx",
"wantSuccess": false,
"status": {
"success": 0,
"category": "MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_SECURITY_ERROR",
@@ -27,6 +29,7 @@
},
{
"id": "raw-unknown-category",
"wantSuccess": false,
"status": {
"success": 0,
"category": "MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_UNKNOWN",
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from .generated.galaxy_repository_pb2 import (
)
from .events import ReplayGap
from .errors import (
MalformedReplyError,
MxAccessError,
MxGatewayAuthenticationError,
MxGatewayAuthorizationError,
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ __all__ = [
"GalaxyRepositoryClient",
"GatewayClient",
"LazyBrowseNode",
"MalformedReplyError",
"MxAccessError",
"MxGatewayAuthenticationError",
"MxGatewayAuthorizationError",
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ class MxAccessError(MxGatewayCommandError):
"""MXAccess HRESULT or status failure."""
class MalformedReplyError(MxGatewayError):
"""Raised when an OK reply lacks the expected typed payload and any usable return_value fallback."""
def map_rpc_error(operation: str, error: grpc.RpcError) -> MxGatewayTransportError:
"""Map a generated gRPC exception to the client exception hierarchy."""
@@ -153,8 +157,18 @@ def ensure_mxaccess_success(operation: str, reply: pb.MxCommandReply) -> pb.MxCo
def _mxaccess_message(operation: str, reply: pb.MxCommandReply) -> str:
status_text = reply.protocol_status.message or "MXAccess command failed"
hresult = reply.hresult if reply.HasField("hresult") else None
return (
message = (
f"{operation} failed: {status_text}; "
f"session={reply.session_id}; correlation={reply.correlation_id}; "
f"hresult={hresult}; statuses={len(reply.statuses)}"
)
# Append a per-status breakdown that carries the raw `success` COM member
# verbatim for diagnostic parity with the other clients. `category` remains
# the authoritative verdict; `success` is diagnostics only.
for status in reply.statuses:
category = pb.MxStatusCategory.Name(status.category)
message += (
f" [success={status.success}, category={category}, "
f"detail={status.detail}, {status.diagnostic_text}]"
)
return message
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
from collections.abc import AsyncIterator, Sequence
from .auth import redact_secret
from .errors import MxGatewayError, ensure_mxaccess_success
from .errors import MalformedReplyError, MxGatewayError, ensure_mxaccess_success
from .events import ReplayGap
from .generated import mxaccess_gateway_pb2 as pb
from .values import MxValueInput, to_mx_value
@@ -710,7 +710,15 @@ class Session:
correlation_id=correlation_id,
secrets=[verify_user_password],
)
return reply.authenticate_user.user_id
if reply.HasField("authenticate_user"):
return reply.authenticate_user.user_id
if reply.HasField("return_value") and reply.return_value.WhichOneof("kind") == "int32_value":
return reply.return_value.int32_value
raise MalformedReplyError(
"authenticate_user returned a malformed reply: OK reply carried "
"neither the typed payload nor an int32 return_value",
raw_reply=reply,
)
async def archestra_user_to_id(
self,
@@ -730,7 +738,15 @@ class Session:
),
correlation_id=correlation_id,
)
return reply.archestra_user_to_id.user_id
if reply.HasField("archestra_user_to_id"):
return reply.archestra_user_to_id.user_id
if reply.HasField("return_value") and reply.return_value.WhichOneof("kind") == "int32_value":
return reply.return_value.int32_value
raise MalformedReplyError(
"archestra_user_to_id returned a malformed reply: OK reply carried "
"neither the typed payload nor an int32 return_value",
raw_reply=reply,
)
async def add_buffered_item(
self,
@@ -752,7 +768,15 @@ class Session:
),
correlation_id=correlation_id,
)
return reply.add_buffered_item.item_handle
if reply.HasField("add_buffered_item"):
return reply.add_buffered_item.item_handle
if reply.HasField("return_value") and reply.return_value.WhichOneof("kind") == "int32_value":
return reply.return_value.int32_value
raise MalformedReplyError(
"add_buffered_item returned a malformed reply: OK reply carried "
"neither the typed payload nor an int32 return_value",
raw_reply=reply,
)
async def set_buffered_update_interval(
self,
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
"""Tests for the uniform malformed-reply contract (CLI-41) and the CLI-40
credential-redaction regression, driven through the shared fixtures.
CLI-41: an OK reply that carries neither the expected typed payload nor a usable
``return_value`` int32 fallback raises :class:`MalformedReplyError`; a legacy
reply that populates only ``return_value`` falls back to that int32.
CLI-40: an OK reply whose diagnostics echo the caller's credential must never
surface that credential in the raised error message.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from google.protobuf.json_format import ParseDict
from zb_mom_ww_mxgateway import MalformedReplyError, MxAccessError
from zb_mom_ww_mxgateway.generated import mxaccess_gateway_pb2 as pb
from test_typed_command_helpers import _session_with
FIXTURE_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "proto" / "fixtures" / "behavior"
def _load_reply(relative: str) -> pb.MxCommandReply:
path = FIXTURE_ROOT / relative
return ParseDict(json.loads(path.read_text()), pb.MxCommandReply())
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_authenticate_user_missing_payload_raises_malformed_reply() -> None:
reply = _load_reply("command-replies/authenticate-user.missing-payload.reply.json")
session, _ = await _session_with([reply])
with pytest.raises(MalformedReplyError) as captured:
await session.authenticate_user(12, "operator", "any-password")
assert captured.value.raw_reply is reply
assert "malformed reply" in str(captured.value)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_authenticate_user_return_value_only_falls_back_to_int32() -> None:
reply = _load_reply("command-replies/authenticate-user.return-value-only.reply.json")
session, _ = await _session_with([reply])
user_id = await session.authenticate_user(12, "operator", "any-password")
assert user_id == 7
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_add_buffered_item_falls_back_to_return_value_int32() -> None:
reply = pb.MxCommandReply(
session_id="session-1",
kind=pb.MX_COMMAND_KIND_ADD_BUFFERED_ITEM,
protocol_status=pb.ProtocolStatus(code=pb.PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_OK),
return_value=pb.MxValue(int32_value=99),
)
session, _ = await _session_with([reply])
item_handle = await session.add_buffered_item(12, "Object.Attribute", "ctx")
assert item_handle == 99
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_add_buffered_item_missing_payload_raises_malformed_reply() -> None:
reply = pb.MxCommandReply(
session_id="session-1",
kind=pb.MX_COMMAND_KIND_ADD_BUFFERED_ITEM,
protocol_status=pb.ProtocolStatus(code=pb.PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_OK),
)
session, _ = await _session_with([reply])
with pytest.raises(MalformedReplyError) as captured:
await session.add_buffered_item(12, "Object.Attribute", "ctx")
assert captured.value.raw_reply is reply
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_authenticate_user_echoed_credential_is_scrubbed() -> None:
credential = "sup3rSecretVerify9f3a2b"
reply = _load_reply("command-replies/authenticate-user.echoed-credential.reply.json")
session, _ = await _session_with([reply])
with pytest.raises(MxAccessError) as captured:
await session.authenticate_user(12, "operator", credential)
message = str(captured.value)
assert credential not in message
assert "[redacted]" in message
+71 -9
View File
@@ -193,17 +193,43 @@ impl std::error::Error for CommandError {}
/// The wrapper is heap-allocated inside [`Error::MxAccess`] to keep the
/// containing enum small. Callers can recover the reply with
/// [`MxAccessError::reply`] or [`MxAccessError::into_reply`]. Its `Display`
/// summarizes the `hresult` and status entries and scrubs any credential-like
/// tokens from diagnostic text before it reaches a caller.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
/// summarizes the `hresult` and status entries and scrubs credentials from the
/// rendered text before it reaches a caller: credential-*shaped* tokens
/// (`mxgw_...`, `bearer`) via a pattern scrub, plus any exact caller-supplied
/// secrets registered with [`MxAccessError::with_secrets`] — the latter catches
/// a password MXAccess echoed back verbatim even though it has no token shape.
///
/// `Debug` is hand-written (not derived) so the attached exact secrets never
/// reach `{:?}` output either: it scrubs them from the reply rendering and
/// prints only the count of attached secrets, never their values.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct MxAccessError {
reply: MxCommandReply,
/// Exact caller-supplied secrets (e.g. an `AuthenticateUser` password or a
/// `WriteSecured` string value) scrubbed from the rendered message. Empty
/// unless a helper attaches them via [`Self::with_secrets`].
secrets: Vec<String>,
}
impl MxAccessError {
/// Wrap a reply whose MXAccess-level result reported a failure.
pub fn new(reply: MxCommandReply) -> Self {
Self { reply }
Self {
reply,
secrets: Vec::new(),
}
}
/// Register exact caller-supplied secrets to scrub from the rendered
/// message, returning the updated error.
///
/// A credential MXAccess echoes back into its diagnostic text has no
/// `mxgw_`/`bearer` shape, so the pattern scrub cannot catch it. Attaching
/// the exact secret lets `Display` replace every occurrence with
/// `<redacted>`.
pub fn with_secrets(mut self, secrets: Vec<String>) -> Self {
self.secrets = secrets;
self
}
/// Borrow the underlying reply (correlation id, hresult, statuses).
@@ -217,15 +243,43 @@ impl MxAccessError {
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for MxAccessError {
fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
// Render the reply, scrub any exact caller secret from it, and never
// print the raw secrets themselves — only how many are attached.
let mut reply = format!("{:?}", self.reply);
for secret in &self.secrets {
if !secret.is_empty() {
reply = reply.replace(secret.as_str(), "<redacted>");
}
}
formatter
.debug_struct("MxAccessError")
.field("reply", &format_args!("{reply}"))
.field(
"secrets",
&format_args!("[{} redacted]", self.secrets.len()),
)
.finish()
}
}
impl std::fmt::Display for MxAccessError {
fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
use std::fmt::Write as _;
let hresult = match self.reply.hresult {
Some(value) => value.to_string(),
None => "none".to_owned(),
};
// Render the whole body first so the exact-secret scrub can sweep every
// field — including diagnostic text that already went through the
// credential-shape scrub — before any of it reaches the caller.
let mut body = String::new();
write!(
formatter,
body,
"hresult={hresult}, {} status entr{}",
self.reply.statuses.len(),
if self.reply.statuses.len() == 1 {
@@ -233,20 +287,28 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for MxAccessError {
} else {
"ies"
}
)?;
)
.expect("writing to a String is infallible");
for status in &self.reply.statuses {
let category = MxStatusCategory::try_from(status.category)
.unwrap_or(MxStatusCategory::Unspecified);
let diagnostic = redact_credentials(&status.diagnostic_text);
write!(
formatter,
body,
"; [success={}, category={category:?}, detail={}, {}]",
status.success, status.detail, diagnostic
)?;
)
.expect("writing to a String is infallible");
}
Ok(())
for secret in &self.secrets {
if !secret.is_empty() {
body = body.replace(secret.as_str(), "<redacted>");
}
}
formatter.write_str(&body)
}
}
+48 -10
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use crate::generated::mxaccess_gateway::v1::{
WriteSecured2BulkCommand, WriteSecured2BulkEntry, WriteSecured2Command,
WriteSecuredBulkCommand, WriteSecuredBulkEntry, WriteSecuredCommand,
};
use crate::value::{MxStatus, MxValue};
use crate::value::{MxStatus, MxValue, MxValueProjection};
const MAX_BULK_ITEMS: usize = 1_000;
@@ -801,6 +801,7 @@ impl Session {
verifier_user_id: i32,
value: MxValue,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let secrets = string_secret(&value);
self.invoke(
MxCommandKind::WriteSecured,
Payload::WriteSecured(WriteSecuredCommand {
@@ -811,7 +812,8 @@ impl Session {
value: Some(value.into_proto()),
}),
)
.await?;
.await
.map_err(|error| attach_secrets(error, secrets))?;
Ok(())
}
@@ -831,6 +833,7 @@ impl Session {
value: MxValue,
timestamp_value: MxValue,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let secrets = string_secret(&value);
self.invoke(
MxCommandKind::WriteSecured2,
Payload::WriteSecured2(WriteSecured2Command {
@@ -842,7 +845,8 @@ impl Session {
timestamp_value: Some(timestamp_value.into_proto()),
}),
)
.await?;
.await
.map_err(|error| attach_secrets(error, secrets))?;
Ok(())
}
@@ -882,7 +886,8 @@ impl Session {
verify_user_password: verify_user_password.to_owned(),
}),
)
.await?;
.await
.map_err(|error| attach_secrets(error, vec![verify_user_password.to_owned()]))?;
authenticate_user_id(&reply)
}
@@ -1074,18 +1079,51 @@ fn add_buffered_item_handle(reply: &MxCommandReply) -> Result<i32, Error> {
fn authenticate_user_id(reply: &MxCommandReply) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match reply.payload.as_ref() {
Some(mx_command_reply::Payload::AuthenticateUser(authenticate)) => Ok(authenticate.user_id),
_ => Err(Error::MalformedReply {
detail: "authenticate_user reply lacked an AuthenticateUser payload".to_owned(),
}),
_ => reply
.return_value
.as_ref()
.and_then(int32_reply_value)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::MalformedReply {
detail:
"authenticate_user reply lacked an AuthenticateUser payload or int32 return_value"
.to_owned(),
}),
}
}
fn archestra_user_id(reply: &MxCommandReply) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match reply.payload.as_ref() {
Some(mx_command_reply::Payload::ArchestraUserToId(archestra)) => Ok(archestra.user_id),
_ => Err(Error::MalformedReply {
detail: "archestra_user_to_id reply lacked an ArchestraUserToId payload".to_owned(),
}),
_ => reply
.return_value
.as_ref()
.and_then(int32_reply_value)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::MalformedReply {
detail:
"archestra_user_to_id reply lacked an ArchestraUserToId payload or int32 return_value"
.to_owned(),
}),
}
}
/// Extract an exact string secret from a credential-sensitive [`MxValue`] so a
/// failing `WriteSecured`/`WriteSecured2` can scrub it from the surfaced error.
/// Non-string values carry no scrubbable secret and yield an empty vector.
fn string_secret(value: &MxValue) -> Vec<String> {
match value.projection() {
MxValueProjection::String(text) if !text.is_empty() => vec![text.clone()],
_ => Vec::new(),
}
}
/// Attach caller-supplied exact secrets to an [`Error::MxAccess`] before it
/// propagates, so its `Display` scrubs any occurrence of the credential (e.g. a
/// password MXAccess echoed back verbatim). Any other error variant is returned
/// unchanged.
fn attach_secrets(error: Error, secrets: Vec<String>) -> Error {
match error {
Error::MxAccess(boxed) => Error::MxAccess(Box::new(boxed.with_secrets(secrets))),
other => other,
}
}
+106
View File
@@ -804,6 +804,93 @@ async fn authenticate_user_keeps_credentials_out_of_surfaced_errors() {
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn authenticate_user_scrubs_exact_caller_credential_echoed_in_diagnostic() {
// CLI-40: MXAccess can echo the supplied credential back inside its failure
// diagnostic (here in statuses[0].diagnostic_text). The token has no
// mxgw_/bearer shape, so the pattern scrub alone cannot catch it — the
// exact-secret scrub must replace the caller's password with <redacted>.
let credential = "sup3rSecretVerify9f3a2b";
let state = Arc::new(FakeState::default());
*state.invoke_override.lock().await = Some(InvokeOverride::CannedReply(Box::new(
command_reply_fixture("authenticate-user.echoed-credential.reply.json"),
)));
let endpoint = spawn_fake_gateway(state.clone()).await;
let client = GatewayClient::connect(ClientOptions::new(endpoint))
.await
.unwrap();
let session = client.session("session-fixture");
let error = session
.authenticate_user(7, "verifier", credential)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(error, Error::MxAccess(_)),
"OK protocol + negative hresult must route to Error::MxAccess: {error:?}"
);
let rendered = error.to_string();
assert!(
!rendered.contains(credential),
"exact caller credential leaked into the surfaced error: {rendered}"
);
assert!(
rendered.contains("<redacted>"),
"credential occurrence must be replaced with <redacted>: {rendered}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn authenticate_user_maps_missing_payload_reply_to_malformed_reply() {
// CLI-41: an OK reply with neither a typed AuthenticateUser payload nor a
// return_value is malformed.
let state = Arc::new(FakeState::default());
*state.invoke_override.lock().await = Some(InvokeOverride::CannedReply(Box::new(
command_reply_fixture("authenticate-user.missing-payload.reply.json"),
)));
let endpoint = spawn_fake_gateway(state.clone()).await;
let client = GatewayClient::connect(ClientOptions::new(endpoint))
.await
.unwrap();
let session = client.session("session-fixture");
let error = session
.authenticate_user(7, "verifier", "pw")
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(error, Error::MalformedReply { .. }),
"missing payload + missing return_value must be MalformedReply, got {error:?}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn authenticate_user_falls_back_to_return_value_when_typed_payload_absent() {
// CLI-41: an OK reply that carries only a return_value (legacy worker) must
// resolve the user id from it, mirroring add_buffered_item's fallback.
let state = Arc::new(FakeState::default());
*state.invoke_override.lock().await = Some(InvokeOverride::CannedReply(Box::new(
command_reply_fixture("authenticate-user.return-value-only.reply.json"),
)));
let endpoint = spawn_fake_gateway(state.clone()).await;
let client = GatewayClient::connect(ClientOptions::new(endpoint))
.await
.unwrap();
let session = client.session("session-fixture");
let user_id = session
.authenticate_user(7, "verifier", "pw")
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
user_id, 7,
"user id must resolve from the int32 return_value"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn stream_alarms_emits_snapshot_then_complete_then_transition_in_order() {
let state = Arc::new(FakeState::default());
@@ -955,6 +1042,11 @@ enum InvokeOverride {
/// `AuthenticateUser` rejected by MXAccess) so the client's
/// `ensure_mxaccess_success` check is exercised on the typed helper path.
MxAccessFailure,
/// Reply with a caller-supplied canned [`MxCommandReply`]. Lets a test
/// drive a helper with a shared behavior fixture (e.g. the
/// echoed-credential / missing-payload / return-value-only
/// authenticate-user replies). Boxed to keep the enum small.
CannedReply(Box<MxCommandReply>),
}
#[derive(Clone)]
@@ -1057,6 +1149,7 @@ impl MxAccessGateway for FakeGateway {
payload: None,
..MxCommandReply::default()
})),
InvokeOverride::CannedReply(reply) => Ok(Response::new(*reply)),
InvokeOverride::WriteOk => {
// Extract and capture the WriteCommand payload so the test
// can assert on server_handle, item_handle, user_id, and value.
@@ -1443,6 +1536,18 @@ fn command_reply_fixture(file_name: &str) -> MxCommandReply {
})
.collect();
// The fixtures that exercise the return_value fallback path carry a typed
// `returnValue` (VT_I4). Project it so a canned reply can drive the
// helper's payload -> return_value -> MalformedReply precedence.
let return_value = fixture.get("returnValue").and_then(|value| {
value["int32Value"].as_i64().map(|int32| MxValue {
data_type: MxDataType::Integer as i32,
variant_type: value["variantType"].as_str().unwrap_or("VT_I4").to_owned(),
kind: Some(Kind::Int32Value(int32 as i32)),
..MxValue::default()
})
});
MxCommandReply {
session_id: fixture["sessionId"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().to_owned(),
correlation_id: fixture["correlationId"]
@@ -1452,6 +1557,7 @@ fn command_reply_fixture(file_name: &str) -> MxCommandReply {
protocol_status: Some(ok_status("command ok")),
hresult: fixture["hresult"].as_i64().map(|hresult| hresult as i32),
statuses,
return_value,
..MxCommandReply::default()
}
}