fix(client-rust): apply TLS guard to GalaxyClient and add CLI strict flag

Extract the TLS-without-CA guard into a shared `build_tls_config` helper
in options.rs so both GatewayClient and GalaxyClient use identical logic.
GalaxyClient previously had no guard, so TLS-without-CA produced a cryptic
tonic handshake failure; it now returns the same actionable InvalidEndpoint
error. The guard message notes that a server-name override affects SNI but
does not pin trust. Add --require-certificate-validation to ConnectionArgs
in the CLI binary. Add a mirror test for GalaxyClient in tests/tls.rs.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-06-01 07:28:16 -04:00
parent 330e665f6b
commit cdfad420bb
5 changed files with 115 additions and 52 deletions
+8
View File
@@ -426,6 +426,11 @@ struct ConnectionArgs {
ca_file: Option<PathBuf>,
#[arg(long)]
server_name_override: Option<String>,
/// Verify the server certificate against the system trust roots even
/// without a pinned CA. The Rust client's default is to require a CA
/// file (see `--ca-file`); set this flag to use system roots instead.
#[arg(long)]
require_certificate_validation: bool,
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 10)]
connect_timeout_seconds: u64,
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 30)]
@@ -453,6 +458,9 @@ impl ConnectionArgs {
if let Some(server_name_override) = &self.server_name_override {
options = options.with_server_name_override(server_name_override);
}
if self.require_certificate_validation {
options = options.with_require_certificate_validation(true);
}
options
}
+3 -36
View File
@@ -6,10 +6,8 @@
//! code should prefer [`GatewayClient::open_session`] and the [`Session`]
//! handle it returns, rather than the `*_raw` methods.
use std::fs;
use tonic::codegen::InterceptedService;
use tonic::transport::{Certificate, Channel, ClientTlsConfig};
use tonic::transport::Channel;
use tonic::Request;
use crate::auth::AuthInterceptor;
@@ -21,7 +19,7 @@ use crate::generated::mxaccess_gateway::v1::{
OpenSessionReply, OpenSessionRequest, QueryActiveAlarmsRequest, StreamAlarmsRequest,
StreamEventsRequest,
};
use crate::options::ClientOptions;
use crate::options::{build_tls_config, ClientOptions};
use crate::session::Session;
/// Generated gateway client wrapped in the auth interceptor that
@@ -78,38 +76,7 @@ impl GatewayClient {
})?;
endpoint = endpoint.connect_timeout(options.connect_timeout());
if !options.plaintext() {
let mut tls = ClientTlsConfig::new();
if let Some(server_name) = options.server_name_override() {
tls = tls.domain_name(server_name.to_owned());
}
if let Some(ca_file) = options.ca_file() {
let certificate = fs::read(ca_file).map_err(|source| Error::InvalidEndpoint {
endpoint: options.endpoint().to_owned(),
detail: format!("failed to read CA file {}: {source}", ca_file.display()),
})?;
tls = tls.ca_certificate(Certificate::from_pem(certificate));
} else if !options.require_certificate_validation() {
// Lenient-default fallback (Rust pin-only exception): tonic
// 0.13's `ClientTlsConfig` builds its rustls verifier inside a
// crate-private connector and exposes no hook for a custom
// `ServerCertVerifier`, so — unlike the other clients — the
// Rust client cannot accept an arbitrary self-signed cert. Pin
// the gateway's CA instead, or opt into strict verification
// against the system trust roots. We reject here rather than
// silently verifying against system roots (which would fail a
// self-signed gateway with a confusing handshake error).
return Err(Error::InvalidEndpoint {
endpoint: options.endpoint().to_owned(),
detail: "TLS requested without a pinned CA. The Rust client cannot accept an \
arbitrary self-signed certificate (tonic 0.13 exposes no custom \
rustls verifier). Pin the gateway certificate with \
ClientOptions::with_ca_file, or call \
ClientOptions::with_require_certificate_validation(true) to verify \
against the system trust roots."
.to_owned(),
});
}
if let Some(tls) = build_tls_config(&options)? {
endpoint = endpoint.tls_config(tls)?;
}
+3 -15
View File
@@ -6,13 +6,12 @@
//! re-exported through [`crate::generated::galaxy_repository::v1`].
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::fs;
use std::sync::Arc;
use prost_types::Timestamp;
use tokio::sync::Mutex as AsyncMutex;
use tonic::codegen::InterceptedService;
use tonic::transport::{Certificate, Channel, ClientTlsConfig};
use tonic::transport::Channel;
use tonic::Request;
use crate::auth::AuthInterceptor;
@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@ use crate::generated::galaxy_repository::v1::{
DiscoverHierarchyRequest, GalaxyObject, GetLastDeployTimeRequest, TestConnectionRequest,
WatchDeployEventsRequest,
};
use crate::options::ClientOptions;
use crate::options::{build_tls_config, ClientOptions};
const DISCOVER_HIERARCHY_PAGE_SIZE: i32 = 5000;
const BROWSE_CHILDREN_PAGE_SIZE: i32 = 500;
@@ -183,18 +182,7 @@ impl GalaxyClient {
})?;
endpoint = endpoint.connect_timeout(options.connect_timeout());
if !options.plaintext() {
let mut tls = ClientTlsConfig::new();
if let Some(server_name) = options.server_name_override() {
tls = tls.domain_name(server_name.to_owned());
}
if let Some(ca_file) = options.ca_file() {
let certificate = fs::read(ca_file).map_err(|source| Error::InvalidEndpoint {
endpoint: options.endpoint().to_owned(),
detail: format!("failed to read CA file {}: {source}", ca_file.display()),
})?;
tls = tls.ca_certificate(Certificate::from_pem(certificate));
}
if let Some(tls) = build_tls_config(&options)? {
endpoint = endpoint.tls_config(tls)?;
}
+66
View File
@@ -3,10 +3,14 @@
//! chain of `with_*` setters; the `Debug` impl redacts the API key.
use std::fmt;
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::Duration;
use tonic::transport::{Certificate, ClientTlsConfig};
use crate::auth::ApiKey;
use crate::error::Error;
const DEFAULT_MAX_GRPC_MESSAGE_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
@@ -171,6 +175,68 @@ impl ClientOptions {
}
}
/// Build the [`ClientTlsConfig`] for a non-plaintext connection described by
/// `options`, applying the lenient-default guard that is the **Rust
/// pin-only exception**.
///
/// Returns `Ok(None)` when `options.plaintext()` is `true` (no TLS needed).
/// Returns `Ok(Some(tls))` when a valid TLS config can be assembled.
/// Returns `Err(Error::InvalidEndpoint)` when TLS is requested but no pinned
/// CA was provided and `require_certificate_validation` is `false`.
///
/// # Why this guard exists
///
/// `tonic` 0.13's `ClientTlsConfig` builds its rustls verifier inside a
/// crate-private connector and exposes no hook for a custom
/// `ServerCertVerifier`. The Rust client therefore cannot accept an arbitrary
/// self-signed certificate the way the other language clients do. Rather than
/// silently falling back to system-root verification (which always fails
/// against a self-signed gateway certificate), we reject the configuration
/// early with an actionable error.
pub(crate) fn build_tls_config(options: &ClientOptions) -> Result<Option<ClientTlsConfig>, Error> {
if options.plaintext() {
return Ok(None);
}
let mut tls = ClientTlsConfig::new();
if let Some(server_name) = options.server_name_override() {
tls = tls.domain_name(server_name.to_owned());
}
if let Some(ca_file) = options.ca_file() {
let certificate = fs::read(ca_file).map_err(|source| Error::InvalidEndpoint {
endpoint: options.endpoint().to_owned(),
detail: format!("failed to read CA file {}: {source}", ca_file.display()),
})?;
tls = tls.ca_certificate(Certificate::from_pem(certificate));
} else if !options.require_certificate_validation() {
// Lenient-default fallback (Rust pin-only exception): tonic
// 0.13's `ClientTlsConfig` builds its rustls verifier inside a
// crate-private connector and exposes no hook for a custom
// `ServerCertVerifier`, so — unlike the other clients — the
// Rust client cannot accept an arbitrary self-signed cert. Pin
// the gateway's CA instead, or opt into strict verification
// against the system trust roots. We reject here rather than
// silently verifying against system roots (which would fail a
// self-signed gateway with a confusing handshake error).
//
// Note: a server-name override affects SNI (the hostname sent
// in the TLS ClientHello) but does NOT pin trust. Overriding
// the server name alone does not bypass certificate validation.
return Err(Error::InvalidEndpoint {
endpoint: options.endpoint().to_owned(),
detail: "TLS requested without a pinned CA. The Rust client cannot accept an \
arbitrary self-signed certificate (tonic 0.13 exposes no custom \
rustls verifier). Pin the gateway certificate with \
ClientOptions::with_ca_file, or call \
ClientOptions::with_require_certificate_validation(true) to verify \
against the system trust roots. Note: a server-name override \
affects SNI but does not pin trust."
.to_owned(),
});
}
Ok(Some(tls))
}
impl Default for ClientOptions {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new("http://127.0.0.1:5000")
+35 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
use std::time::Duration;
use zb_mom_ww_mxgateway_client::{ClientOptions, Error, GatewayClient};
use zb_mom_ww_mxgateway_client::{ClientOptions, Error, GalaxyClient, GatewayClient};
/// Drive `connect` to its error without requiring `GatewayClient: Debug`
/// (the success arm is dropped explicitly so `unwrap_err` is unnecessary).
@@ -87,6 +87,40 @@ async fn tls_with_ca_file_is_permitted_and_proceeds_past_the_guard() {
);
}
/// Drive `GalaxyClient::connect` to its error (mirrors `connect_err` above).
async fn galaxy_connect_err(options: ClientOptions) -> Error {
match GalaxyClient::connect(options).await {
Ok(_client) => {
panic!("GalaxyClient::connect unexpectedly succeeded against a dead TLS address")
}
Err(error) => error,
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn galaxy_tls_without_ca_is_rejected_with_actionable_error_by_default() {
// GalaxyClient::connect must apply the same TLS guard as GatewayClient —
// TLS without a pinned CA (and without require_certificate_validation)
// returns a clear, actionable InvalidEndpoint error.
let options = ClientOptions::new("https://127.0.0.1:1")
.with_plaintext(false)
.with_connect_timeout(Duration::from_millis(200));
let error = galaxy_connect_err(options).await;
let Error::InvalidEndpoint { detail, .. } = error else {
panic!("expected InvalidEndpoint, got {error:?}");
};
assert!(
detail.contains("ca_file") || detail.contains("CA"),
"error should instruct the user to pass a CA file: {detail}"
);
assert!(
detail.contains("require_certificate_validation"),
"error should mention the require_certificate_validation opt-in: {detail}"
);
}
/// A throwaway self-signed CA certificate (PEM). Only needs to parse as a
/// PEM trust root so the CA-pinning path is exercised past the guard.
const SELF_SIGNED_CA_PEM: &str = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----