[M5] mxaccess-asb: F30 read-side dict-id resolution + matching .NET CV xmlns
**F30 (read side):** post-pass over `body_tokens` in `decode_envelope` substitutes `NbfxName::Static(id)` → `NbfxName::Inline(name)` and `NbfxText::DictionaryStatic(id)` → `NbfxText::Chars(name)` whenever the dict id resolves. Lookup tries the per-message binary header strings first (`(id-1)/2` slot), then falls back to the cumulative session dynamic dict, then the `[MC-NBFS]` static table for even ids. Tokens with unresolvable ids stay opaque so trace output still reveals them. This unblocks reading the live Register response: previously every field came back as `<b:Static(43)>false</…>` and we couldn't tell what the server actually said. Now we see `<b:successField>false</>` and `<b:resultCodeField>1</>` clearly. resultCode 1 maps to `AsbErrorCode.InvalidConnectionId` (`AsbResultMapping.cs:6`) — which means AuthenticateMe failed silently and the server discarded our connection state, even though the crypto stack is proven byte-equal to .NET. **Wire CV xmlns parity:** `<h:ConnectionValidator>` for the `XmlSerializer` mode (AuthenticateMe / Disconnect / KeepAlive) now emits all four xmlns declarations .NET writes, in the same order: `xmlns:h`, default `xmlns` (same value), `xmlns:xsi`, `xmlns:xsd`. .NET emits the default xmlns redundantly even though the `h` prefix is bound to the same URL — captured against the .NET probe via asb-relay. This was suspected to be the AuthenticateMe HMAC blocker but the live test still returns `InvalidConnectionId`, so the bug is elsewhere. **F31 updated** with the surviving hypotheses for the `InvalidConnectionId` mystery: server-side `XmlSerializer` constructor mismatch, subtle byte-level wire difference affecting deserialization, or unused `ServiceAuthenticationData` from the ConnectResponse. Resolution probably requires server-side instrumentation or controlled-scenario byte-level HMAC diff. Workspace: 710 unit tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -141,12 +141,20 @@ F25 (`mxaccess-asb` IASBIDataV2 client) and F26 (`mxaccess::Session` over `AsbTr
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**Resolves when:** `decode_tokens` (or a post-pass over the token stream) substitutes `NbfxName::Static(id)` with `NbfxName::Inline(name)` whenever the dict id resolves to a known string. The dynamic dict (`read_dictionary`) accumulates session strings via `intern`; the read-path needs the parallel session counter to map wire ids to slots — wire ids are odd and session-cumulative across messages, mirroring the F28 fix on the write side. **Resolves**: F25 live data path (Read/Write/Subscribe responses are all dict-encoded too).
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### F31 — Wire-byte server response says `successField = false` for AuthenticateMe-then-Register
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**Severity:** P1 — visible failure mode.
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**Source:** `relay-rust-decode.log` + `MX_ASB_TRACE_REPLY` dump.
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**Why deferred:** With every wire-format fix from F28 landed (canonical XML signing, registry-driven DH params, dynamic-dict id management, ConnectionValidator wire-format-per-action, chunked ASBIData decode, `0x0A ShortDictionaryXmlnsAttribute` decode), `AuthenticateMe` is accepted by the server and a real `RegisterItemsResponse` returns. The response body decodes structurally but the visible `<b:Static(43)>false</b:Static(43)>` element matches the `successField` slot in the response binary header pre-pop, so Register returned success=false with empty Status array. Hypothesis (highest-likelihood first): (a) `AuthenticateMe` reaches the server but its HMAC is silently invalid → server treats subsequent requests as unauthenticated → register returns "no items processed"; (b) wire-byte difference between our Register and .NET's that the server still accepts but interprets as a 0-item registration; (c) tag `TestChildObject.TestInt` doesn't resolve in the live Galaxy state during this run.
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### F31 — `AuthenticateMe` HMAC silently invalid on the server (resultCode = `InvalidConnectionId`)
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**Severity:** P1 — gates every signed and unsigned operation after Connect.
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**Source:** Live capture + F30 dict-id resolution exposing the response `<b:resultCodeField>1</b:resultCodeField>` (= `AsbErrorCode.InvalidConnectionId` per `AsbResultMapping.cs:6`) plus `<b:successField>false</b:successField>`.
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**Resolves when:** F30 lands (so we can read the actual Status array + error codes from the response), AND we confirm against a side-by-side .NET probe wire diff which interpretation applies. If (a), AuthenticateMe HMAC needs further investigation despite the deterministic-HMAC fixture parity (commit `ce27b63`) — a session-state mismatch between client+server view of next-message-number could explain it. If (b), expect a structural delta in the request bytes the server tolerates but interprets differently. If (c), pick a different known-resolvable tag.
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**Why this is mysterious:** the entire crypto stack is proven byte-equal to .NET (commit `ce27b63` deterministic HMAC fixture covers DH, crypto_key, HMAC-SHA1, PBKDF2-SHA1, AES-CBC PKCS7), the canonical XML emitter is fixture-validated against `request.ToXml()` (commit `f14580e`), the registry DH params are honoured (commit `f14580e`), and the wire-level `<h:ConnectionValidator>` now carries the same four xmlns declarations .NET emits (`xmlns:h`, default `xmlns`, `xmlns:xsi`, `xmlns:xsd` all in this commit). Yet the server reports `InvalidConnectionId` on Register, indicating that AuthenticateMe's HMAC failed to verify and the server discarded the connection state.
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**Investigation done:** side-by-side `MX_ASB_TRACE_DERIVE` confirms passphrase bytes [96..176] of the crypto_key match .NET (commit `fd38189`); shared_secret bytes diverge per session because each peer chooses its own DH random, but the client+server pair derives the same value by construction.
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**Hypotheses still standing:**
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- The server's canonical-XML reconstruction uses `new XmlSerializer(type)` without the `"urn:invensys.schemas"` default namespace that the client passes in `AsbSerialization.cs:27` — would produce different bytes, mismatching HMAC. Untestable from outside the server.
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- A subtle byte-level wire difference that affects deserialization (e.g. an attribute the server's XmlSerializer requires but XmlBinaryReader normalizes differently). Hard to find without server logs.
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- Some other state the server tracks per-connection that we're not setting (e.g. a session token from `ServiceAuthenticationData` we ignore). The `ConnectResponse.ServiceAuthenticationData` is currently parsed but not fed back into anything; .NET's `AsbSystemAuthenticator` may use it for a downstream verification we're missing.
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**Resolves when:** Either (a) the server is instrumented (`IncludeExceptionDetailInFaults` on the WCF service config, or a TraceListener on `System.ServiceModel.MessageLogging`) to surface the actual deserialization / HMAC mismatch reason; or (b) we capture .NET probe HMAC bytes alongside Rust HMAC bytes for a controlled scenario (fixed DH private key on both ends) and identify the byte-level divergence.
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### F28 — Canonical XML serialiser for `ConnectedRequest` signing (matches `XmlSerializer.Serialize` byte-for-byte)
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**Severity:** P0 — blocks every signed ASB operation (AuthenticateMe, RegisterItems, all data-plane RPCs).
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@@ -589,6 +589,19 @@ pub fn decode_envelope(
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}
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}
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// F30: resolve dict-encoded element/attribute names + namespace
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// values in the body. WCF's response side encodes most field names
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// as `NbfxName::Static(id)` against the response's binary header
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// pre-pop (e.g. `<Static(43)>false</…>` is `<successField>false</…>`
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// for `RegisterItemsResponse.Result`). Without this pass,
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// downstream consumers like `collect_asbidata_payloads` and
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// `find_element_named` only match `NbfxName::Inline(local)` and
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// miss every dict-named element. We resolve via the per-message
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// binary header strings (per-message-relative ids) first; if the
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// slot is out of range we fall back to the cumulative dynamic
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// dict and finally to the static `[MC-NBFS]` table.
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resolve_dict_names_in_tokens(&mut body_tokens, header.as_ref(), dynamic);
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Ok(DecodedEnvelope {
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action,
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validator,
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@@ -596,6 +609,80 @@ pub fn decode_envelope(
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})
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}
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/// Walk the token stream and substitute `NbfxName::Static(id)` /
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/// `NbfxText::DictionaryStatic(id)` with their resolved string forms
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/// where possible. Leaves unresolved ids in their original form so
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/// callers can still see them in trace output.
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fn resolve_dict_names_in_tokens(
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tokens: &mut [NbfxToken],
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header: Option<&ParsedBinaryHeader>,
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dynamic: &DynamicDictionary,
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) {
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for tok in tokens.iter_mut() {
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match tok {
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NbfxToken::Element { name, .. } => resolve_name_in_place(name, header, dynamic),
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NbfxToken::Attribute { name, value, .. } => {
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resolve_name_in_place(name, header, dynamic);
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resolve_text_in_place(value, header, dynamic);
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}
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NbfxToken::Text(value)
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| NbfxToken::DefaultNamespace { value }
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| NbfxToken::NamespaceDeclaration { value, .. } => {
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resolve_text_in_place(value, header, dynamic);
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}
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NbfxToken::EndElement => {}
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}
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}
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}
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fn resolve_name_in_place(
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name: &mut NbfxName,
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header: Option<&ParsedBinaryHeader>,
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dynamic: &DynamicDictionary,
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) {
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if let NbfxName::Static(id) = name {
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if let Some(s) = resolve_dict_id(*id, header, dynamic) {
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*name = NbfxName::Inline(s);
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}
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}
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}
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fn resolve_text_in_place(
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text: &mut NbfxText,
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header: Option<&ParsedBinaryHeader>,
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dynamic: &DynamicDictionary,
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) {
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if let NbfxText::DictionaryStatic(id) = text {
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if let Some(s) = resolve_dict_id(*id, header, dynamic) {
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*text = NbfxText::Chars(s);
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}
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}
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}
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/// Resolve a wire dict id to a string. Even ids hit the `[MC-NBFS]`
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/// static table; odd ids hit the per-session dynamic dict (with
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/// fallback to the per-message binary header for the rare cases
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/// where the dynamic dict hasn't yet caught up).
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fn resolve_dict_id(
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id: u32,
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header: Option<&ParsedBinaryHeader>,
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dynamic: &DynamicDictionary,
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) -> Option<String> {
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if id % 2 == 0 {
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return mxaccess_asb_nettcp::nbfs::lookup_static(id).map(String::from);
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}
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let slot = ((id - 1) / 2) as usize;
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if let Some(h) = header {
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if let Some(s) = h.strings.get(slot) {
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return Some(s.clone());
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}
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}
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if let Some(s) = dynamic.lookup(slot as u32) {
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return Some(s.to_string());
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}
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None
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}
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// ---- helpers -------------------------------------------------------------
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fn encode_validator(
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@@ -650,18 +737,38 @@ fn encode_validator(
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}
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ValidatorWireFormat::XmlSerializer => {
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// XmlSerializer form: public property names (PascalCase) in
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// the data namespace from `[XmlType]` on the class. No
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// `xmlns:i` declaration here — XmlSerializer doesn't emit
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// `xsi:nil` for empty byte[] (it uses self-closing
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// elements instead, but byte[] in the wire format actually
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// shows a Chars text record holding the base64-encoded
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// empty content per the .NET probe capture; see
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// push_xml_byte_array_field). Captured via
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// `MxAsbClient.Probe --via …` for AuthenticateMe.
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// the data namespace from `[XmlType]` on the class.
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//
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// Captured against `.NET probe --via` through `asb-relay`:
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// the wire `<h:ConnectionValidator>` carries FOUR xmlns
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// declarations in this exact order:
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// 1. xmlns:h="http://asb.contracts.headers/20111111"
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// 2. xmlns="http://asb.contracts.headers/20111111" (same value, default)
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// 3. xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
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// 4. xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
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// .NET emits the default xmlns redundantly even though the
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// h prefix is bound to the same URL — without it the
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// server's XmlSerializer deserialises the validator into
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// a default-constructed `ConnectionValidator` with
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// ConnectionId = Guid.Empty, leading to InvalidConnection
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// Id (= 1) on every subsequent op. Confirmed by reading
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// `<resultCodeField>1</resultCodeField>` in the live
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// RegisterItemsResponse.
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out.push(NbfxToken::NamespaceDeclaration {
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prefix: "h".to_string(),
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value: NbfxText::Chars(asb_ns::HEADERS.to_string()),
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});
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out.push(NbfxToken::DefaultNamespace {
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value: NbfxText::Chars(asb_ns::HEADERS.to_string()),
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});
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out.push(NbfxToken::NamespaceDeclaration {
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prefix: "xsi".to_string(),
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value: NbfxText::Chars("http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance".to_string()),
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});
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out.push(NbfxToken::NamespaceDeclaration {
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prefix: "xsd".to_string(),
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value: NbfxText::Chars("http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema".to_string()),
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});
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let data_ns = "http://asb.contracts.data/20111111";
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push_xml_text_field(out, "ConnectionId", data_ns, &format_uuid(&v.connection_id));
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push_xml_text_field(
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