Joseph Doherty
f9f1b8fcee
Gate record: docs/plans/2026-07-20-localdb-phase2-live-gate.md. Checks 1, 2, 5, 6 pass. Checks 3 and 4 are NOT satisfied — the defect they were meant to confirm turned out to be the opposite of what the plan assumed. Three defects crash-looped every driver node before check 1 could even run: 1. An empty ServerHistorian:ApiKey kills the host. ServerHistorianOptions- Validator exists to turn exactly that class of failure into a named OptionsValidationException, but its documented fail tier explicitly excluded ApiKey on the reasoning that a keyless client "degrades — the gateway rejects calls". It does not: the client validates its own options at construction, so the process dies during Akka startup and never makes a call. 2. UseTls disagreeing with the endpoint scheme kills the host too, in both directions (both messages confirmed in the shipped client assembly). Moving an endpoint from https to http without clearing UseTls is an ordinary migration slip. 3. Plaintext h2c was UNREACHABLE. HistorianGatewayClientAdapter forwarded the TLS-only options unconditionally, and AllowUntrustedServerCertificate defaults to false, so it always sent RequireCertificateValidation=true — which the client rejects outright when UseTls=false. Every http:// deployment crashed, though the scheme is documented as the supported way to select h2c, and the only workaround was to assert a certificate posture for a connection that has no certificate. The fourth was the blocker, and it is Phase 2's own: 4. The drain gate deferred to a Primary that cannot deliver. Redundancy roles are elected CLUSTER-WIDE; the alarm queue is PAIR-LOCAL. On the rig the elected driver Primary is central-1 — it carries the driver Akka role, replicates nobody's LocalDb and does not even run the alarm historian — so every driver node logged "Historian drain suspended", including the two site-b nodes that have no peer at all. Nothing drained anywhere, where before Phase 2 it drained fine. The cost is not a duplicate; it is the buffer growing to the capacity wall and evicting the audit trail it exists to protect. Fixed in three layers: a separate ShouldDrainAlarmHistory policy (unknown role drains; the two gates now deliberately disagree, and a test pins that); peer- host matching in DriverHostActor so a node stands down only for a Primary holding its rows; and AddAlarmHistorian short-circuiting the gate when replication is unconfigured — testing BOTH Replication:PeerAddress and SyncListenPort, since only the dialing half sets the former while both halves share the queue. Every one of these follows from the asymmetry: a false allow costs a duplicate row, which at-least-once delivery already accepts and payload-hash ids collapse; a false deny loses data silently. A third vacuous test, caught by the same delete-the-guard discipline: the role-view tests stayed green with the guard removed, because AwaitAssert polls until an assertion passes and the assertion was "reads open" — which is the SEEDED value, satisfied at the first poll before the actor processed anything. They now assert the sequence of published values through a recording view; the control then goes red for exactly the cases that matter. Migration evidence: 11 legacy rows across two deliberately overlapping files converged to exactly 9 identical rows on both nodes, proving D-6's payload-hash identity on real nodes rather than in a fixture. Open design fork, recorded in the gate doc rather than decided here: a pair cannot currently identify its own Primary, so both halves drain. Safe in every topology — nothing loses data — but the gate's de-duplication benefit is unrealised until roles are scoped per pair. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.IntegrationTests
Two-node Akka cluster integration tests on top of TwoNodeClusterHarness.
Default mode (no infra required)
dotnet test tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.IntegrationTests
Uses Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory for ConfigDb and a stub ILdapAuthService that
accepts any username when the password is valid-password. Each harness instance creates a
unique in-memory database scoped to its lifetime. This is the mode CI runs by default.
Real-infra mode (SQL Server + OpenLDAP)
When you need to exercise EF behaviors that diverge between providers (index uniqueness,
RowVersion concurrency, JSON columns, migration application) or a real LDAP bind, bring up
the bundled compose stack and set the env-var switches:
docker compose -f tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.IntegrationTests/docker-compose.yml up -d
export OTOPCUA_HARNESS_USE_SQL=1
export OTOPCUA_HARNESS_USE_LDAP=1
dotnet test tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.IntegrationTests
docker compose -f tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.IntegrationTests/docker-compose.yml down -v
SQL Server mode (OTOPCUA_HARNESS_USE_SQL=1)
- Container:
mcr.microsoft.com/mssql/server:2022-latestonlocalhost:14331 - Each
TwoNodeClusterHarness.StartAsync()creates a unique databaseOtOpcUa_Harness_{guid}viaDatabase.EnsureCreatedAsync()and drops it onDisposeAsync()(best-effort). - Port
14331chosen to avoid colliding with thedocker-dev/fleet (which uses14330).
LDAP mode (OTOPCUA_HARNESS_USE_LDAP=1)
- Container:
bitnami/openldap:2.6onlocalhost:3894 - Users
alice/alice123andbob/bob123, all underou=FleetAdmin. - Port
3894chosen to avoid colliding with thedocker-dev/fleet (which uses3893).
Local-dev caveat
This dev VM (DESKTOP-6JL3KKO) does not run Docker locally. Real-infra mode runs on the
shared Linux Docker host (10.100.0.35) per docs/v2/dev-environment.md, or in CI on Linux.