lmxopcua/service_info.md

# Service Update Summary

Updated service instance: `C:\publish\lmxopcua\instance1`

Update time: `2026-03-25 12:54-12:55 America/New_York`

Backup created before deploy: `C:\publish\lmxopcua\backups\20260325-125444`

Configuration preserved:
- `C:\publish\lmxopcua\instance1\appsettings.json` was not overwritten.

Deployed binary:
- `C:\publish\lmxopcua\instance1\ZB.MOM.WW.LmxOpcUa.Host.exe`
- Last write time: `2026-03-25 12:53:58`
- Size: `143360`

Windows service:
- Name: `LmxOpcUa`
- Display name: `LMX OPC UA Server`
- Account: `LocalSystem`
- Status after update: `Running`
- Process ID after restart: `29236`

Restart evidence:
- Service log file: `C:\publish\lmxopcua\instance1\logs\lmxopcua-20260325_004.log`
- Last startup line: `2026-03-25 12:55:08.619 -04:00 [INF] The LmxOpcUa service was started.`

## CLI Verification

Endpoint from deployed config:
- `opc.tcp://localhost:4840/LmxOpcUa`

CLI used:
- `C:\Users\dohertj2\Desktop\lmxopcua\tools\opcuacli-dotnet\bin\Debug\net10.0\opcuacli-dotnet.exe`

Commands run:

```powershell
opcuacli-dotnet.exe connect -u opc.tcp://localhost:4840/LmxOpcUa
opcuacli-dotnet.exe read -u opc.tcp://localhost:4840/LmxOpcUa -n 'ns=1;s=MESReceiver_001.MoveInPartNumbers'
opcuacli-dotnet.exe read -u opc.tcp://localhost:4840/LmxOpcUa -n 'ns=1;s=MESReceiver_001.MoveInPartNumbers[]'
```

Observed results:
- `connect`: succeeded, server reported as `LmxOpcUa`.
- `read ns=1;s=MESReceiver_001.MoveInPartNumbers`: succeeded with good status `0x00000000`.
- `read ns=1;s=MESReceiver_001.MoveInPartNumbers[]`: failed with `BadNodeIdUnknown` (`0x80340000`).

---

## Instance 2 (Redundant Secondary)

Deployed: `2026-03-28`

Deployment path: `C:\publish\lmxopcua\instance2`

Configuration:
- `OpcUa.Port`: `4841`
- `OpcUa.ServerName`: `LmxOpcUa2`
- `OpcUa.ApplicationUri`: `urn:localhost:LmxOpcUa:instance2`
- `Dashboard.Port`: `8082`
- `MxAccess.ClientName`: `LmxOpcUa2`
- `Redundancy.Enabled`: `true`
- `Redundancy.Mode`: `Warm`
- `Redundancy.Role`: `Secondary`
- `Redundancy.ServerUris`: `["urn:localhost:LmxOpcUa:instance1", "urn:localhost:LmxOpcUa:instance2"]`

Windows service:
- Name: `LmxOpcUa2`
- Display name: `LMX OPC UA Server (Instance 2)`
- Account: `LocalSystem`
- Endpoint: `opc.tcp://localhost:4841/LmxOpcUa`

Instance 1 redundancy update (same date):
- `OpcUa.ApplicationUri`: `urn:localhost:LmxOpcUa:instance1`
- `Redundancy.Enabled`: `true`
- `Redundancy.Mode`: `Warm`
- `Redundancy.Role`: `Primary`
- `Redundancy.ServerUris`: `["urn:localhost:LmxOpcUa:instance1", "urn:localhost:LmxOpcUa:instance2"]`

CLI verification:
```
opcuacli-dotnet.exe redundancy -u opc.tcp://localhost:4840/LmxOpcUa
  → Redundancy Mode: Warm, Service Level: 200, Application URI: urn:localhost:LmxOpcUa:instance1

opcuacli-dotnet.exe redundancy -u opc.tcp://localhost:4841/LmxOpcUa
  → Redundancy Mode: Warm, Service Level: 150, Application URI: urn:localhost:LmxOpcUa:instance2
```

Both instances report the same `ServerUriArray` and expose the same Galaxy namespace (`urn:ZB:LmxOpcUa`).

## LDAP Authentication Update

Updated: `2026-03-28`

Both instances updated to use LDAP authentication via GLAuth.

Configuration changes (both instances):
- `Authentication.AllowAnonymous`: `true` (anonymous can browse/read)
- `Authentication.AnonymousCanWrite`: `false` (anonymous writes blocked)
- `Authentication.Ldap.Enabled`: `true`
- `Authentication.Ldap.Host`: `localhost`
- `Authentication.Ldap.Port`: `3893`
- `Authentication.Ldap.BaseDN`: `dc=lmxopcua,dc=local`

LDAP server: GLAuth v2.4.0 at `C:\publish\glauth\` (Windows service: `GLAuth`)

Permission verification (instance1, port 4840):
```
anonymous read    → allowed
anonymous write   → denied  (BadUserAccessDenied)
readonly  read    → allowed
readonly  write   → denied  (BadUserAccessDenied)
readwrite write   → allowed
admin     write   → allowed
alarmack  write   → denied  (BadUserAccessDenied)
bad password      → denied  (connection rejected)
```

## Alarm Notifier Chain Update

Updated: `2026-03-28`

Both instances updated with alarm event propagation up the notifier chain.

Code changes:
- Alarm events now walk up the parent chain (`ReportEventUpNotifierChain`), reporting to every ancestor node
- `EventNotifier = SubscribeToEvents` is set on all ancestors of alarm-containing nodes (`EnableEventNotifierUpChain`)
- Removed separate `Server.ReportEvent` call (no longer needed — the walk reaches the root)

No configuration changes required — alarm tracking was already enabled (`AlarmTrackingEnabled: true`).

Verification (instance1, port 4840):
```
alarms --node TestArea --refresh:
  TestMachine_001.TestAlarm001 → visible (Severity=500, Retain=True)
  TestMachine_001.TestAlarm002 → visible (Severity=500, Retain=True)
  TestMachine_001.TestAlarm003 → visible (Severity=500, Retain=True)
  TestMachine_002.TestAlarm001 → visible (Severity=500, Retain=True)
  TestMachine_002.TestAlarm003 → visible (Severity=500, Retain=True)

alarms --node DEV --refresh:
  Same 5 alarms visible at DEV (grandparent) level
```

## Auth Consolidation Update

Updated: `2026-03-28`

Both instances updated to consolidate LDAP roles into OPC UA session roles (`RoleBasedIdentity.GrantedRoleIds`).

Code changes:
- LDAP groups now map to custom OPC UA role NodeIds in `urn:zbmom:lmxopcua:roles` namespace
- Roles stored on session identity via `GrantedRoleIds` — no username-to-role side cache
- Permission checks use `GrantedRoleIds.Contains()` instead of username extraction
- `AnonymousCanWrite` behavior is consistent regardless of LDAP state
- Galaxy namespace moved from `ns=2` to `ns=3` (roles namespace is `ns=2`)

No configuration changes required.

Verification (instance1, port 4840):
```
anonymous read      → allowed
anonymous write     → denied  (BadUserAccessDenied, AnonymousCanWrite=false)
readonly  write     → denied  (BadUserAccessDenied)
readwrite write     → allowed
admin     write     → allowed
alarmack  write     → denied  (BadUserAccessDenied)
bad password        → rejected (connection failed)
```

## Granular Write Roles Update

Updated: `2026-03-28`

Both instances updated with granular write roles replacing the single ReadWrite role.

Code changes:
- `ReadWrite` role replaced by `WriteOperate`, `WriteTune`, `WriteConfigure`
- Write permission checks now consider the Galaxy security classification of the target attribute
- `SecurityClassification` stored in `TagMetadata` for per-node lookup at write time

GLAuth changes:
- New groups: `WriteOperate` (5502), `WriteTune` (5504), `WriteConfigure` (5505)
- New users: `writeop`, `writetune`, `writeconfig`
- `admin` user added to all groups (5502, 5503, 5504, 5505)

Config changes (both instances):
- `Authentication.Ldap.ReadWriteGroup` replaced by `WriteOperateGroup`, `WriteTuneGroup`, `WriteConfigureGroup`

Verification (instance1, port 4840, Operate-classified attributes):
```
anonymous read        → allowed
anonymous write       → denied  (AnonymousCanWrite=false)
readonly  write       → denied  (no write role)
writeop   write       → allowed (WriteOperate matches Operate classification)
writetune write       → denied  (WriteTune doesn't match Operate)
writeconfig write     → denied  (WriteConfigure doesn't match Operate)
admin     write       → allowed (has all write roles)
```

## Historian SDK Migration

Updated: `2026-04-06`

Both instances updated to use the Wonderware Historian SDK (`aahClientManaged.dll`) instead of direct SQL queries for historical data access.

Code changes:
- `HistorianDataSource` rewritten from `SqlConnection`/`SqlDataReader` to `ArchestrA.HistorianAccess` SDK
- Persistent connection with lazy connect and auto-reconnect on failure
- `HistorianConfiguration.ConnectionString` replaced with `ServerName`, `IntegratedSecurity`, `UserName`, `Password`, `Port`
- `HistorianDataSource` now implements `IDisposable`, disposed on service shutdown
- `ConfigurationValidator` validates Historian SDK settings at startup

SDK DLLs deployed to both instances:
- `aahClientManaged.dll` (primary SDK, v2.0.0.0)
- `aahClient.dll`, `aahClientCommon.dll` (dependencies)
- `Historian.CBE.dll`, `Historian.DPAPI.dll`, `ArchestrA.CloudHistorian.Contract.dll`

Configuration changes (both instances):
- `Historian.ConnectionString` removed
- `Historian.ServerName`: `"localhost"`
- `Historian.IntegratedSecurity`: `true`
- `Historian.Port`: `32568`
- `Historian.Enabled`: `true` (unchanged)

Verification (instance1 startup log):
```
Historian.Enabled=true, ServerName=localhost, IntegratedSecurity=true, Port=32568
Historian.CommandTimeoutSeconds=30, MaxValuesPerRead=10000
=== Configuration Valid ===
LmxOpcUa service started successfully
```

## HistoryServerCapabilities and Continuation Points

Updated: `2026-04-06`

Both instances updated with OPC UA Part 11 spec compliance improvements.

Code changes:
- `HistoryServerCapabilities` node populated under `ServerCapabilities` with all boolean capability properties
- `AggregateFunctions` folder populated with references to 7 supported aggregate functions
- `HistoryContinuationPointManager` added — stores remaining data when results exceed `NumValuesPerNode`
- `HistoryReadRawModified` and `HistoryReadProcessed` now return `ContinuationPoint` in `HistoryReadResult` for partial reads
- Follow-up requests with `ContinuationPoint` resume from stored state; invalid/expired points return `BadContinuationPointInvalid`

No configuration changes required.

Verification (instance1 startup log):
```
HistoryServerCapabilities configured with 7 aggregate functions
LmxOpcUa service started successfully
```

## Remaining Historian Gaps Fix

Updated: `2026-04-06`

Both instances updated with remaining OPC UA Part 11 spec compliance fixes.

Code changes:
- **Gap 4**: `HistoryReadRawModified` returns `BadHistoryOperationUnsupported` when `IsReadModified=true`
- **Gap 5**: `HistoryReadAtTime` override added with `ReadAtTimeAsync` using SDK `HistorianRetrievalMode.Interpolated`
- **Gap 8**: `HistoricalDataConfigurationState` child nodes added to historized variables (`Stepped=false`, `Definition="Wonderware Historian"`)
- **Gap 10**: `ReturnBounds` parameter handled — boundary `DataValue` entries with `BadBoundNotFound` inserted at StartTime/EndTime
- **Gap 11**: `StandardDeviation` aggregate added to client enum, mapper, CLI (aliases: `stddev`/`stdev`), and UI dropdown

No configuration changes required.

## Historical Event Access

Updated: `2026-04-06`

Both instances updated with OPC UA historical event access (Gap 7).

Code changes:
- `HistorianDataSource.ReadEventsAsync` queries Historian event store via separate `HistorianConnectionType.Event` connection
- `LmxNodeManager.HistoryReadEvents` override maps `HistorianEvent` records to OPC UA `HistoryEventFieldList` entries
- `AccessHistoryEventsCapability` set to `true` when `AlarmTrackingEnabled` is true
- Event fields: EventId, EventType, SourceNode, SourceName, Time, ReceiveTime, Message, Severity

No configuration changes required. All historian gaps (1-11) are now resolved.

## Data Access Gaps Fix

Updated: `2026-04-06`

Both instances updated with OPC UA DA spec compliance fixes.

Code changes:
- `ConfigureServerCapabilities()` populates `ServerCapabilities` node: `ServerProfileArray`, `LocaleIdArray`, `MinSupportedSampleRate`, continuation point limits, array/string limits, and 12 `OperationLimits` values
- `Server_ServerDiagnostics_EnabledFlag` set to `true` — SDK auto-tracks session/subscription counts
- `OnModifyMonitoredItemsComplete` override logs monitored item modifications

No configuration changes required. All DA gaps (1-8) resolved.

## Alarms & Conditions Gaps Fix

Updated: `2026-04-06`

Both instances updated with OPC UA Part 9 alarm spec compliance fixes.

Code changes:
- Wired `OnConfirm`, `OnAddComment`, `OnEnableDisable`, `OnShelve`, `OnTimedUnshelve` handlers on each `AlarmConditionState`
- Shelving: `SetShelvingState()` manages `TimedShelve`, `OneShotShelve`, `Unshelve` state machine
- `ReportAlarmEvent` now populates `LocalTime` (timezone offset + DST) and `Quality` event fields
- Flaky `Monitor_ProbeDataChange_PreventsStaleReconnect` test fixed (increased stale threshold from 2s to 5s)

No configuration changes required. All A&C gaps (1-10) resolved.

## Security Gaps Fix

Updated: `2026-04-06`

Both instances updated with OPC UA Part 2/4/7 security spec compliance fixes.

Code changes:
- `SecurityProfileResolver`: Added 4 modern AES profiles (`Aes128_Sha256_RsaOaep-Sign/SignAndEncrypt`, `Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss-Sign/SignAndEncrypt`)
- `OnImpersonateUser`: Added `X509IdentityToken` handling with CN extraction and role assignment
- `BuildUserTokenPolicies`: Advertises `UserTokenType.Certificate` when non-None security profiles are configured
- `OnCertificateValidation`: Enhanced logging with certificate thumbprint, subject, and expiry
- Authentication audit logging: `AUDIT:` prefixed log entries for success/failure with session ID and roles

No configuration changes required. All security gaps (1-10) resolved.

## Notes

The service deployment and restart succeeded. The live CLI checks confirm the endpoint is reachable and that the array node identifier has changed to the bracketless form. The array value on the live service still prints as blank even though the status is good, so if this environment should have populated `MoveInPartNumbers`, the runtime data path still needs follow-up investigation.