lmxopcua/docs/v2/implementation/phase-6-2-authorization-runtime.md

# Phase 6.2 — Authorization Runtime (ACL + LDAP grants)

> **Status**: **SHIPPED (core)** 2026-04-19 — Streams A, B, C (foundation), D (data layer) merged to `v2` across PRs #84-87. Final exit-gate PR #88 turns the compliance stub into real checks (all pass, 2 deferred surfaces tracked).
>
> Deferred follow-ups (tracked separately):
> - Stream C dispatch wiring on the 11 OPC UA operation surfaces (task #143).
> - Stream D Admin UI — RoleGrantsTab, AclsTab Probe-this-permission, SignalR invalidation, draft-diff ACL section + visual-compliance reviewer signoff (task #144).
>
> Baseline pre-Phase-6.2: 1042 solution tests → post-Phase-6.2 core: 1097 passing (+55 net). One pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged.
>
> **Branch**: `v2/phase-6-2-authorization-runtime`
> **Estimated duration**: 2.5 weeks
> **Predecessor**: Phase 6.1 (Resilience & Observability) — reuses the Polly pipeline for ACL-cache refresh retries
> **Successor**: Phase 6.3 (Redundancy)

## Phase Objective

Wire ACL enforcement on every OPC UA Read / Write / Subscribe / Call path + LDAP group → admin role grants that the v2 plan specified but never ran. End-state: a user's effective permissions resolve through a per-session permission-trie over the 6-level `Cluster / Namespace / UnsArea / UnsLine / Equipment / Tag` hierarchy, cached per session, invalidated on generation-apply + LDAP group expiry.

Closes these gaps:

1. **Data-path ACL enforcement** — `NodeAcl` table + `NodePermissions` flags shipped; `NodeAclService.cs` present as a CRUD surface; no code consults ACLs at `Read`/`Write` time. OPC UA server answers everything to everyone.
2. **`LdapGroupRoleMapping` for cluster-scoped admin grants** — decision #105 shipped as the *design*; admin roles are hardcoded (`FleetAdmin` / `ConfigEditor` / `ReadOnly`) with no cluster-scoping and no LDAP-to-grant table. Decision #105 explicitly lifts this from v2.1 into v2.0.
3. **Explicit Deny pathway** — deferred to v2.1 (decision #129 note). Phase 6.2 ships *grants only*; `Deny` stays out.
4. **Admin UI ACL grant editor** — `AclsTab.razor` exists but edits the now-unused `NodeAcl` table; needs to wire to the runtime evaluator + the new `LdapGroupRoleMapping` table.

## Scope — What Changes

**Architectural separation** (critical for correctness): `LdapGroupRoleMapping` is **control-plane only** — it maps LDAP groups to Admin UI roles (`FleetAdmin` / `ConfigEditor` / `ReadOnly`) and cluster scopes for Admin access. **It is NOT consulted by the OPC UA data-path evaluator.** The data-path evaluator reads `NodeAcl` rows joined directly against the session's **resolved LDAP group memberships**. The two concerns share zero runtime code path.

| Concern | Change |
|---------|--------|
| `Configuration` project | New entity `LdapGroupRoleMapping { Id, LdapGroup, Role, ClusterId? (nullable = system-wide), IsSystemWide, GeneratedAtUtc }`. **Consumed only by Admin UI role routing.** Migration. Admin CRUD. |
| `Core` → new `Core.Authorization` sub-namespace | `IPermissionEvaluator.Authorize(IEnumerable<Claim> identity, OpcUaOperation op, NodeId nodeId) → AuthorizationDecision`. `op` covers every OPC UA surface: Browse, Read, Write, HistoryRead, HistoryUpdate, CreateMonitoredItems, TransferSubscriptions, Call, Acknowledge, Confirm, Shelve. Result is tri-state (internal model distinguishes `Allow` / `NotGranted` / `Denied` + carries matched-grant provenance). Phase 6.2 only produces `Allow` + `NotGranted`; v2.1 Deny lands without API break. |
| `PermissionTrieBuilder` | Builds trie from `NodeAcl` rows joined against **resolved LDAP group memberships**, keyed on 6-level scope hierarchy for Equipment namespaces. **SystemPlatform namespaces (Galaxy)** use a `FolderSegment` scope level between Namespace and Tag, populated from `Tag.FolderPath` segments, so folder subtree authorization works on Galaxy trees the same way UNS works on Equipment trees. Trie node carries `ScopeKind` enum. |
| `PermissionTrieCache` + freshness | One trie per `(ClusterId, GenerationId)`. Invalidated on `sp_PublishGeneration` via in-process event bus AND generation-ID check on hot path — every authz call looks up `CurrentGenerationId` (Polly-wrapped, sub-second cache); a Backup that cached a stale generation detects the mismatch + forces re-load. **Redundancy-safe**. |
| `UserAuthorizationState` freshness | Cached per session BUT bounded by `MembershipFreshnessInterval` (default **15 min**). Past that, the next hot-path authz call re-resolves LDAP group memberships via `LdapGroupService`. Failure to re-resolve (LDAP unreachable) → **fail-closed**: evaluator returns `NotGranted` for every call until memberships refresh successfully. Decoupled from Phase 6.1's availability-oriented 24h cache. |
| `AuthCacheMaxStaleness` | Separate from Phase 6.1's `UsingStaleConfig` window. Default 5 min — beyond that, authz fails closed regardless of Phase 6.1 cache warmth. |
| OPC UA server dispatch — all enforcement surfaces | `DriverNodeManager` wires evaluator on: **Browse + TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds** (ancestors implicitly visible if any descendant has a grant; denied ancestors filter from results), **Read** (per-attribute StatusCode `BadUserAccessDenied` in mixed-authorization batches; batch never poisons), **Write** (uses `NodePermissions.WriteOperate/Tune/Configure` based on driver `SecurityClassification`), **HistoryRead** (uses `NodePermissions.HistoryRead` — **distinct** flag, not Read), **HistoryUpdate** (`NodePermissions.HistoryUpdate`), **CreateMonitoredItems** (per-`MonitoredItemCreateResult` denial), **TransferSubscriptions** (re-evaluates items on transfer), **Call** (`NodePermissions.MethodCall`), **Acknowledge/Confirm/Shelve** (per-alarm flags). |
| Subscription re-authorization | Each `MonitoredItem` is stamped with `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` at create time. On every Publish, items with a stamp mismatching the session's current `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` get re-evaluated; revoked items drop to `BadUserAccessDenied` within one publish cycle. Unchanged items stay fast-path. |
| `LdapAuthService` | On cookie-auth success: resolves LDAP group memberships; loads matching `LdapGroupRoleMapping` rows → role claims + cluster-scope claims (control plane); stores `UserAuthorizationState.LdapGroups` on the session for the data-plane evaluator. |
| `ValidatedNodeAclAuthoringService` | Replaces CRUD-only `NodeAclService` for authoring. Validates (LDAP group exists, scope exists in current or target draft, grant shape is valid, no duplicate `(LdapGroup, Scope)` pair). Admin UI writes only through it. |
| Admin UI `AclsTab.razor` | Writes via `ValidatedNodeAclAuthoringService`. Adds Probe-This-Permission row that runs the real evaluator against a chosen `(LDAP group, node, operation)` and shows `Allow` / `NotGranted` + matched-grant provenance. |
| Admin UI new tab `RoleGrantsTab.razor` | CRUD over `LdapGroupRoleMapping`. Per-cluster + system-wide grants. FleetAdmin only. **Documentation explicit** that this only affects Admin UI access, not OPC UA data plane. |
| Audit log | Every Grant/Revoke/Publish on `LdapGroupRoleMapping` or `NodeAcl` writes an `AuditLog` row with old/new state + user. |

## Scope — What Does NOT Change

| Item | Reason |
|------|--------|
| OPC UA authn | Already done (PR 19 LDAP user identity + Basic256Sha256 profile). Phase 6.2 is authorization only. |
| Explicit `Deny` grants | Decision #129 note explicitly defers to v2.1. Default-deny + additive grants only. |
| Driver-side `SecurityClassification` metadata | Drivers keep reporting `Operate` / `ViewOnly` / etc. — the evaluator uses them as *part* of the decision but doesn't replace them. |
| Galaxy namespace (SystemPlatform kind) | UNS levels don't apply; evaluator treats Galaxy nodes as `Cluster → Namespace → Tag` (skip UnsArea/UnsLine/Equipment). |

## Entry Gate Checklist

- [ ] Phase 6.1 merged (reuse `Core.Resilience` Polly pipeline for the ACL cache-refresh retries)
- [ ] `acl-design.md` re-read in full
- [ ] Decision log #105, #129, corrections-doc B1 re-skimmed
- [ ] Existing `NodeAcl` + `NodePermissions` flag enum audited; confirm bitmask flags match `acl-design.md` table
- [ ] Existing `LdapAuthService` group-resolution code path traced end-to-end — confirm it already queries group memberships (we only need the caller to consume the result)
- [ ] Test DB scenarios catalogued: two clusters, three LDAP groups per cluster, mixed grant shapes; captured as seed-data fixtures

## Task Breakdown

### Stream A — `LdapGroupRoleMapping` table + migration (3 days)

1. **A.1** Entity + EF Core migration. Columns per §Scope table. Unique constraint on `(LdapGroup, ClusterId)` with null-tolerant comparer for the system-wide case. Index on `LdapGroup` for the hot-path lookup on auth.
2. **A.2** `ILdapGroupRoleMappingService` CRUD. Wrap in the Phase 6.1 Polly pipeline (timeout → retry → fallback-to-cache).
3. **A.3** Seed-data migration: preserve the current hardcoded `FleetAdmin` / `ConfigEditor` / `ReadOnly` mappings by seeding rows for the existing LDAP groups the dev box uses (`cn=fleet-admin,…`, `cn=config-editor,…`, `cn=read-only,…`). Op no-op migration for existing deployments.

### Stream B — Permission-trie evaluator (1 week)

1. **B.1** `IPermissionEvaluator.Authorize(IEnumerable<Claim> identity, NodeId nodeId, NodePermissions needed)` — returns `bool`. Phase 6.2 returns only `true` / `false`; v2.1 can widen to `Allow`/`Deny`/`Indeterminate` if Deny lands.
2. **B.2** `PermissionTrieBuilder` builds the trie from `NodeAcl` + `LdapGroupRoleMapping` joined to the current generation's `UnsArea` + `UnsLine` + `Equipment` + `Tag` tables. One trie per `(ClusterId, GenerationId)` so rollback doesn't smear permissions across generations.
3. **B.3** Trie node structure: `{ Level: enum, ScopeId: Guid, AllowedPermissions: NodePermissions, ChildrenByLevel: Dictionary<Guid, TrieNode> }`. Evaluation walks from Cluster → Namespace → UnsArea → UnsLine → Equipment → Tag, ORing allowed permissions at each level. Additive semantics: a grant at Cluster level cascades to every descendant tag.
4. **B.4** `PermissionTrieCache` service scoped as singleton; exposes `GetTrieAsync(ClusterId, ct)` that returns the current-generation trie. Invalidated on `sp_PublishGeneration` via an in-process event bus; also on TTL expiry (24 h safety net).
5. **B.5** Per-session cached evaluator: OPC UA Session authentication produces `UserAuthorizationState { ClusterId, LdapGroups[], Trie }`; cached on the session until session close or generation-apply.
6. **B.6** Unit tests: trie-walk theory covering (a) Cluster-level grant cascades to tags, (b) Equipment-level grant doesn't leak to sibling Equipment, (c) multi-group union, (d) no-grant → deny, (e) Galaxy nodes skip UnsArea/UnsLine levels.

### Stream C — OPC UA server dispatch wiring (6 days, widened)

1. **C.1** `DriverNodeManager.Read` — evaluator consulted per `ReadValueId` with `OpcUaOperation.Read`. Denied attributes get `BadUserAccessDenied` per-item; batch never poisons. Integration test covers mixed-authorization batch (3 authorized + 2 denied → 3 Good values + 2 Bad StatusCodes, request completes).
2. **C.2** `DriverNodeManager.Write` — evaluator chooses `NodePermissions.WriteOperate` / `WriteTune` / `WriteConfigure` based on the driver-reported `SecurityClassification`.
3. **C.3** `DriverNodeManager.HistoryRead` — **uses `NodePermissions.HistoryRead`**, which is a **distinct flag** from Read. Test: user with Read but not HistoryRead can read live values but gets `BadUserAccessDenied` on `HistoryRead`.
4. **C.4** `DriverNodeManager.HistoryUpdate` — uses `NodePermissions.HistoryUpdate`.
5. **C.5** `DriverNodeManager.CreateMonitoredItems` — per-`MonitoredItemCreateResult` denial in mixed-authorization batch; partial success path per OPC UA Part 4. Each created item stamped `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)`.
6. **C.6** `DriverNodeManager.TransferSubscriptions` — on reconnect, re-evaluate every transferred `MonitoredItem` against the session's current auth state. Stale-stamp items drop to `BadUserAccessDenied`.
7. **C.7** **Browse + TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds** — evaluator called with `OpcUaOperation.Browse`. Ancestor visibility implied when any descendant has a grant (per `acl-design.md` §Browse). Denied ancestors filter from browse results — the UA browser sees a hierarchy truncated at the denied ancestor rather than an inconsistent child-without-parent view.
8. **C.8** `DriverNodeManager.Call` — `NodePermissions.MethodCall`.
9. **C.9** Alarm actions (Acknowledge / Confirm / Shelve) — per-alarm `NodePermissions.AlarmAck` / `AlarmConfirm` / `AlarmShelve`.
10. **C.10** Publish path — for each `MonitoredItem` with a mismatched `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` stamp, re-evaluate. Unchanged items stay fast-path; changes happen at next publish cycle.
11. **C.11** Integration tests: three-user seed with different memberships; matrix covers every operation in §Scope. Mixed-batch tests for Read + CreateMonitoredItems.

### Stream D — Admin UI refresh (4 days)

1. **D.1** `RoleGrantsTab.razor` — FleetAdmin-gated CRUD on `LdapGroupRoleMapping`. Per-cluster dropdown + system-wide checkbox. Validation: LDAP group must exist in the dev LDAP (GLAuth) before saving — best-effort probe with graceful degradation.
2. **D.2** `AclsTab.razor` rewrites its edit path to write through the new `NodeAclService`. Adds a "Probe this permission" row: choose `(LDAP group, node, action)` → shows Allow / Deny + the reason (which grant matched).
3. **D.3** Draft-generation diff viewer now includes an ACL section: "X grants added, Y grants removed, Z grants changed."
4. **D.4** SignalR notification: `PermissionTrieCache` invalidation on `sp_PublishGeneration` pushes to Admin UI so operators see "this clusters permissions were just updated" within 2 s.

## Compliance Checks (run at exit gate)

- [ ] **Control/data-plane separation**: `LdapGroupRoleMapping` consumed only by Admin UI; the data-path evaluator has zero references to it. Enforced via a project-reference audit (Admin project references the mapping service; `Core.Authorization` does not).
- [ ] **Every operation wired**: Browse, Read, Write, HistoryRead, HistoryUpdate, CreateMonitoredItems, TransferSubscriptions, Call, Acknowledge, Confirm, Shelve all consult the evaluator. Integration test matrix covers every operation × allow/deny.
- [ ] **HistoryRead uses its own flag**: test "user with Read + no HistoryRead gets `BadUserAccessDenied` on HistoryRead".
- [ ] **Mixed-batch semantics**: Read of 5 nodes (3 allowed + 2 denied) returns 3 Good + 2 `BadUserAccessDenied` per-`ReadValueId`; CreateMonitoredItems equivalent.
- [ ] **Browse ancestor visibility**: user with a grant only on a deep equipment node can browse the path to it (ancestors implied); denied ancestors filter from browse results otherwise.
- [ ] **Galaxy FolderSegment coverage**: a grant on a Galaxy folder subtree cascades to its tags; sibling folders are unaffected. Trie test covers this.
- [ ] **Subscription re-authorization**: integration test — create item, revoke grant via draft+publish, next publish cycle the item returns `BadUserAccessDenied` (not silently still-notifying).
- [ ] **Membership freshness**: test — 15 min MembershipFreshnessInterval elapses on a long-lived session + LDAP now unreachable → authz fails closed on the next request until LDAP recovers.
- [ ] **Auth cache fail-closed**: test — Phase 6.1 cache serves stale config for 6 min; authz evaluator refuses all calls after 5 min regardless.
- [ ] **Trie invariants**: `PermissionTrieBuilder` is idempotent (build twice with identical inputs → equal tries).
- [ ] **Additive grants + cluster isolation**: cluster-grant cascades; cross-cluster leakage impossible.
- [ ] **Redundancy-safe invalidation**: integration test — two nodes, a publish on one, authorize a request on the other before in-process event propagates → generation-mismatch forces re-load, no stale decision.
- [ ] **Authoring validation**: `AclsTab` cannot save a `(LdapGroup, Scope)` pair that already exists in the draft; operator sees the validation error pre-save.
- [ ] **AuthorizationDecision shape stability**: API surface exposes `Allow` + `NotGranted` only; `Denied` variant exists in the type but is never produced; v2.1 can add Deny without API break.
- [ ] No regression in driver test counts.

## Risks and Mitigations

| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|------|:----------:|:------:|------------|
| ACL evaluator latency on per-read hot path | Medium | High | Trie lookup is O(depth) = O(6); session-cached UserAuthorizationState avoids per-Read trie rebuild; benchmark in Stream B.6 |
| Trie cache stale after a rollback | Medium | High | `sp_PublishGeneration` + `sp_RollbackGeneration` both emit the invalidation event; trie keyed on `(ClusterId, GenerationId)` so rollback fetches the prior trie cleanly |
| `BadUserAccessDenied` returns expose sensitive browse-name metadata | Low | Medium | Server returns only the status code + NodeId; no message leak per OPC UA Part 4 §7.34 guidance |
| LdapGroupRoleMapping migration breaks existing deployments | Low | High | Seed-migration preserves the hardcoded groups' effective grants verbatim; smoke test exercises the post-migration fleet admin login |
| Deny semantics accidentally ship (would break `acl-design.md` defer) | Low | Medium | `IPermissionEvaluator.Authorize` returns `bool` (not tri-state) through Phase 6.2; widening to `Allow`/`Deny`/`Indeterminate` is a v2.1 ticket |

## Completion Checklist

- [ ] Stream A: `LdapGroupRoleMapping` entity + migration + CRUD + seed
- [ ] Stream B: evaluator + trie builder + cache + per-session state + unit tests
- [ ] Stream C: OPC UA dispatch wiring on Read/Write/HistoryRead/Subscribe/Alarm paths
- [ ] Stream D: Admin UI `RoleGrantsTab` + `AclsTab` refresh + SignalR invalidation
- [ ] `phase-6-2-compliance.ps1` exits 0; exit-gate doc recorded

## Adversarial Review — 2026-04-19 (Codex, thread `019da48d-0d2b-7171-aed2-fc05f1f39ca3`)

1. **Crit · ACCEPT** — Trie must not conflate `LdapGroupRoleMapping` (control-plane admin claims per decision #105) with data-plane ACLs (decision #129). **Change**: `LdapGroupRoleMapping` is consumed only by the Admin UI role router. Data-plane trie reads `NodeAcl` rows joined against the session's **resolved LDAP groups**, never admin roles. Stream B.2 updated.
2. **Crit · ACCEPT** — Cached `UserAuthorizationState` survives LDAP group changes because memberships only refresh at cookie-auth. Change: add `MembershipFreshnessInterval` (default 15 min); past that, next hot-path authz call forces group re-resolution (fail-closed if LDAP unreachable). Session-close-wins on config-rollback.
3. **High · ACCEPT** — Node-local invalidation doesn't extend across redundant pair. **Change**: trie keyed on `(ClusterId, GenerationId)`; hot-path authz looks up `CurrentGenerationId` from the shared config DB (Polly-wrapped + sub-second cache). A Backup that read stale generation gets a mismatched trie → forces re-load. Implementation note added to Stream B.4.
4. **High · ACCEPT** — Browse enforcement missing. **Change**: new Stream C.7 (`Browse + TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds` enforcement). Ancestor visibility implied when any descendant has a grant; denied ancestors filter from browse results per `acl-design.md` §Browse.
5. **High · ACCEPT** — `HistoryRead` should use `NodePermissions.HistoryRead` bit, not `Read`. **Change**: Stream C.3 revised; separate unit test asserts `Read+no-HistoryRead` denies HistoryRead while allowing current-value reads.
6. **High · ACCEPT** — Galaxy shallow-path (Cluster→Namespace→Tag) loses folder hierarchy authorization. **Change**: SystemPlatform namespaces use a `FolderSegment` scope-level between Namespace and Tag, populated from `Tag.FolderPath`; UNS-kind namespaces keep the 6-level hierarchy. Trie supports both via `ScopeKind` on each node.
7. **High · ACCEPT** — Subscription re-authorization policy unresolved between create-time-only (fast, wrong on revoke) and per-publish (slow). **Change**: stamp each `MonitoredItem` with `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)`; re-evaluate on Publish only when either version changed. Revoked items drop to `BadUserAccessDenied` within one publish cycle.
8. **Med · ACCEPT** — Mixed-authorization batch `Read` / `CreateMonitoredItems` service-result semantics underspecified. **Change**: Stream C.6 explicitly tests per-`ReadValueId` + per-`MonitoredItemCreateResult` denial in mixed batches; batch never collapses to a coarse failure.
9. **Med · ACCEPT** — Missing surfaces: `Method.Call`, `HistoryUpdate`, event filter on subscriptions, subscription-transfer on reconnect, alarm-ack. **Change**: scope expanded — every OPC UA authorization surface enumerated in Stream C: Read, Write, HistoryRead, HistoryUpdate, CreateMonitoredItems, TransferSubscriptions, Call, Acknowledge/Confirm/Shelve, Browse, TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds.
10. **Med · ACCEPT** — `bool` evaluator bakes in grant-only semantics; collides with v2.1 Deny. **Change**: internal model uses `AuthorizationDecision { Allow | NotGranted | Denied, IReadOnlyList<MatchedGrant> Provenance }`. Phase 6.2 maps `Denied` → never produced; UI + audit log use the full record so v2.1 Deny lands without API break.
11. **Med · ACCEPT** — 6.1 cache fallback is availability-oriented; applying it to auth is correctness-dangerous. **Change**: auth-specific staleness budget `AuthCacheMaxStaleness` (default 5 min, not 24 h). Past that, hot-path evaluator fails closed on cached reads; all authorization calls return `NotGranted` until fresh data lands. Documented in risks + compliance.
12. **Low · ACCEPT** — Existing `NodeAclService` is raw CRUD. **Change**: new `ValidatedNodeAclAuthoringService` enforces scope-uniqueness + draft/publish invariants + rejects invalid (LDAP group, scope) pairs; Admin UI writes through it only. Stream D.2 adjusted.