e08855fb9d
Adds deferment.md — a source-verified inventory of new-driver status, all 17
open issues, in-code deferrals, open live gates and plan bookkeeping. Every
claim was checked against src/ and git, not against documentation.
Headline finding: three subsystems are authored, persisted and shipped but
never executed —
* Node ACLs: IPermissionEvaluator/TriePermissionEvaluator have zero
production consumers and OtOpcUaNodeManager never references them, yet
ClusterAcls.razor authors NodeAcl rows and ConfigComposer.cs:51 ships them
in every artifact. An authored deny rule has no effect.
* IRediscoverable / IHostConnectivityProbe raise into the void (#518/#507);
nothing ever writes a DriverHostStatus row.
* DriverTypeRegistry is vestigial, so no factory passes a tier and every
driver runs Tier A with the Tier-C protections dormant.
Also records the Calculation driver as picker-visible but unauthorable
(DriverConfigModal has no case) — the "registered but unauthorable" class
recurring after the Sql picker defect — and notes that no parity test guards
DriverConfigModal/DeviceModal, which is why it survived review.
Documentation corrections (source-verified):
* ReadWriteOperations.md claimed "a denied read never hits the driver" via
four types that do not exist in src/. Bannered + struck through; a security
review reading that page would have concluded a per-node ACL gate exists.
* CLAUDE.md: the Change Detection sentence was false (DriverHost consumes
nothing); the mesh Phase 4 and Phase 5 live gates and the auto-down 1-vs-1
gate had all PASSED; the ScriptedAlarmState table was already dropped.
* driver-expansion tracking: Modbus RTU and SQL poll are merged, not
pending — its command table would have made someone rebuild two shipped
drivers in a fresh worktree.
* drivers/README.md: dead DriverTypeRegistry paragraph, retired
SystemPlatform namespace kind, missing Sql + Calculation rows, missing
Modbus RTU-over-TCP transport.
* TwinCAT.md/Galaxy.md promised an address-space rebuild that never happens.
* Historian.md gained the #491 unproven-value-capture pointer.
* IncrementalSync.md and AddressSpace.md bannered as wholesale v2-era (the
rewrite is recorded as still owed, not done here); four v2 status docs
bannered as historical; three wrong-name-for-a-live-type fixes.
Left deliberately untouched: the secrets NoOpSecretReplicator line, which
makes a security claim and needs the real behaviour identified rather than a
rename.
140 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
140 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
# Redundancy Interop Playbook (Phase 6.3 Stream F — task #150)
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> ⚠️ **Historical type names (audited 2026-07-27).** The operator *procedure* below is still the
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> right one, but `RedundancyPublisherHostedService` (`:22`), `RecoveryStateManager.DwellTime` (`:67`)
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> and `RedundancyCoordinator` no longer exist — redundancy state is now published by the
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> cluster-scoped `RedundancyStateActor` singleton with `ServiceLevelCalculator` and
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> `IRedundancyRoleView`. See `docs/Redundancy.md` (which states plainly that the old types are gone)
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> and the per-cluster-mesh Phase 6/7 sections of `CLAUDE.md`. The `ServerUriArray` limitation noted
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> at `:100-105` is still open (SDK object-type gated).
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> **Scope**: manual validation that third-party OPC UA clients + AVEVA MXAccess
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> observe our non-transparent redundancy signals (ServiceLevel, ServerUriArray,
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> RedundancySupport) and fail over to the Backup node when the Primary drops.
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>
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> **Why manual**: the third-party clients named here are Windows-GUI binaries
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> (UaExpert, Kepware QuickClient) or embedded inside AVEVA System Platform.
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> Automating any of them into PR-CI is out of scope for v2. This playbook
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> captures the minimal dev-box-plus-VM setup and the expected pass criteria so
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> the work can be executed repeatably at v2 release readiness and after any
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> Phase 6.3 follow-up change.
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## Prerequisites
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1. Two `OtOpcUa.Server` nodes in one `ServerCluster`:
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- Declared as `NodeCount = 2`, `RedundancyMode = Hot` (or `Warm`).
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- Each with a distinct `ApplicationUri` (enforced by unique index per
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decision #86).
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- Each node's `StaticRoutes.xml` points at the other (`ServerCluster.Node[].Host`).
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2. `scripts/install/Install-Services.ps1` applied on each node so the
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`RedundancyPublisherHostedService` is running.
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3. At least one `DriverInstance` with a reachable simulator or PLC so both
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servers have a non-empty address space to browse.
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4. On the client host:
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- `UaExpert` ≥ 1.7 installed
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- Kepware `ClientAce QuickClient` (or equivalent) — optional, for a second
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client
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5. For the AVEVA leg: a `Galaxy.Host` running against an MXAccess deployment
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with an external OPC UA client object pointed at the cluster (not at a
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single node).
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## Expected signals on a running cluster
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| Node | `ServiceLevel` | `RedundancySupport` | `ServerUriArray` |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Primary, healthy, peer reachable | 200 | `Hot` (or `Warm`) | self + peer |
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| Primary, mid-apply | 75 (`PrimaryMidApply`) | same | same |
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| Primary, peer UNreachable | 150 (`PrimaryPeerDown`) | same | same |
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| Backup, healthy | 100 (`Secondary`) | same | same |
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| Either, dwelling in recovery | 50 (`Recovering`) | same | same |
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| Either, invariant violation (two Primary, disabled-node mismatch) | 2 (`InvalidTopology`) | same | same |
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(The band constants live in `ServiceLevelCalculator.Classify`.)
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## Test matrix
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Each row is one manual run; pass criterion in the right column.
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### Block A — UA protocol signals (UaExpert)
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| # | Scenario | Procedure | Pass criterion |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| A1 | ServiceLevel published | Connect UaExpert to Primary. Browse to `Server.ServerStatus.ServiceLevel`. | Value = 200 (or the expected Band byte per table above) |
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| A2 | ServiceLevel updates on peer down | Connect to Primary. Stop Backup (`sc stop OtOpcUa`). Watch `ServiceLevel`. | Transitions 200 → 150 within ~2 s of peer probe timeout |
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| A3 | RedundancySupport | Browse to `Server.ServerRedundancy.RedundancySupport`. | Value matches the declared `RedundancyMode` (Warm / Hot / None) |
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| A4 | ServerUriArray (non-transparent upgrade) | Requires a redundancy-object-type upgrade follow-up. | When upgrade lands: `ServerUriArray` reports both ApplicationUris, self first |
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| A4b | Peer URI visibility via `Server.ServerArray` (i=2254) | Configure each `OpcUaApplicationHost` with the partner's `ApplicationUri` via `OpcUaApplicationHostOptions.PeerApplicationUris`. From any client, Read NodeId `i=2254` (`Server.ServerArray`). | Returned `String[]` includes both self + peer `ApplicationUri`s. Validated by `DualEndpointTests` in `tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.IntegrationTests/` (loopback dual-host with real OPCFoundation client `Session` read). |
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| A5 | Mid-apply dip | On Primary trigger a `sp_PublishGeneration` apply. | `ServiceLevel` drops to 75 for the apply duration + dwell |
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### Block B — Client failover
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| # | Scenario | Procedure | Pass criterion |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| B1 | UaExpert picks Primary by ServiceLevel | In UaExpert configure a Redundancy Group with both endpoint URLs. | Client picks the Primary URL (higher ServiceLevel) |
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| B2 | UaExpert cuts over on Primary kill | Kill the Primary's `OtOpcUa` service. | Client session reconnects to Backup within UaExpert's reconnect timeout (default 5 s). Data-change monitored items resume. |
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| B3 | UaExpert cuts back when Primary returns | Start the Primary service. Wait ≥ recovery dwell (see `RecoveryStateManager.DwellTime`). | `ServiceLevel` on returning Primary goes through 50 (Recovering) → 200; UaExpert may or may not switch back (client-policy dependent; both are accepted outcomes) |
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| B4 | Kepware QuickClient failover | Repeat B1–B3 with Kepware in place of UaExpert. | Same pass criteria; establishes we're not UaExpert-specific |
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### Block C — Galaxy MXAccess failover
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This block validates that an AVEVA System Platform app consuming our cluster
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via MXAccess tolerates a Primary drop the same way a native OPC UA client does.
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The MXAccess toolkit internally wraps the OPC UA Client and does its own
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redundancy negotiation; we're asserting that negotiation honors our
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`ServiceLevel` signal.
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| # | Scenario | Procedure | Pass criterion |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| C1 | Galaxy binds to Primary on first connect | Bring the cluster up. Start a Galaxy `$MxAccessClient` object pointed at the cluster with both node URLs. | Galaxy reports `QUALITY = Good` + initial values from the Primary |
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| C2 | Galaxy redirects on Primary drop | Stop the Primary. | Galaxy's `QUALITY` briefly goes `Uncertain`, then back to `Good`; values continue streaming from the Backup within MXAccess's `ReconnectInterval` (default 20 s) |
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| C3 | Galaxy handles mid-apply dip | Trigger a generation apply on the Primary. | Galaxy continues reading — the mid-apply dip is advertisory (ServiceLevel 75), not a session drop; MXAccess should stay bound |
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## Recording results
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Copy the tables above into a tracking doc per run. The tracking doc shape:
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```
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Run date: 2026-MM-DD
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Cluster: <id> Primary: <node> Backup: <node> Release: <sha>
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A1: PASS evidence: UaExpert screenshot uaexpert-a1.png
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A2: PASS evidence: ServiceLevel trend grafana-a2.png
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…
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```
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One pass of every row is the acceptance criterion. Re-run after any Phase 6.3
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follow-up ships (especially the non-transparent redundancy-type upgrade, which
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flips A4 from "deferred" to "expected pass").
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## Known limitations
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- **A4 pending**: `Server.ServerRedundancy` on our current SDK build lands as
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the base `ServerRedundancyState`, which has no `ServerUriArray` child.
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`ServerRedundancyNodeWriter.ApplyServerUriArray` logs-and-skips until the
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redundancy-object-type upgrade follow-up lands. Cross-reference **A4b** —
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peer URIs are visible today via `Server.ServerArray` (i=2254) populated by
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`OpcUaApplicationHost.PopulateServerArray`.
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- **Recovery dwell default**: `RecoveryStateManager.DwellTime` defaults to 60 s
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in `Program.cs`. Adjust via future config knob if B3 takes too long to
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observe.
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- **C-block external dependency**: The `Galaxy.Host` side of the redundancy
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story is largely out of our code — it's MXAccess's own client-redundancy
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policy talking to our published ServiceLevel. A negative result on C1-C3
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does not necessarily indicate an OtOpcUa bug; cross-check with UaExpert
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(Block A / B) first.
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## Automation notes (why this is a playbook, not a test)
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- UaExpert and Kepware binaries are closed-source Windows GUIs; they don't
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ship headless CLIs for the browse/connect/subscribe flows.
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- The OPC Foundation reference SDK *can* drive every scenario, but our own
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`Driver.OpcUaClient` tests already cover that client's behaviour; Block B
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adds value specifically because these two clients have independent
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redundancy implementations we don't control.
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- For the sub-set of scenarios that *can* be automated — the self-loopback
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case where our own `otopcua-cli` drives Primary + Backup — the existing
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`tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.ControlPlane.Tests/RedundancyStateActorTests` +
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`ServiceLevelCalculatorTests` (unit) already cover the math + data path.
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The wire-level assertion that the peer URIs actually land on the
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`Server.ServerArray` node (i=2254) is covered by `DualEndpointTests` in
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`tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.IntegrationTests/`.
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