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lmxopcua/docs/v2/redundancy-interop-playbook.md
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Joseph Doherty e08855fb9d
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docs: source-verified deferment register + correct 17 drifted docs
Adds deferment.md — a source-verified inventory of new-driver status, all 17
open issues, in-code deferrals, open live gates and plan bookkeeping. Every
claim was checked against src/ and git, not against documentation.

Headline finding: three subsystems are authored, persisted and shipped but
never executed —
  * Node ACLs: IPermissionEvaluator/TriePermissionEvaluator have zero
    production consumers and OtOpcUaNodeManager never references them, yet
    ClusterAcls.razor authors NodeAcl rows and ConfigComposer.cs:51 ships them
    in every artifact. An authored deny rule has no effect.
  * IRediscoverable / IHostConnectivityProbe raise into the void (#518/#507);
    nothing ever writes a DriverHostStatus row.
  * DriverTypeRegistry is vestigial, so no factory passes a tier and every
    driver runs Tier A with the Tier-C protections dormant.

Also records the Calculation driver as picker-visible but unauthorable
(DriverConfigModal has no case) — the "registered but unauthorable" class
recurring after the Sql picker defect — and notes that no parity test guards
DriverConfigModal/DeviceModal, which is why it survived review.

Documentation corrections (source-verified):
  * ReadWriteOperations.md claimed "a denied read never hits the driver" via
    four types that do not exist in src/. Bannered + struck through; a security
    review reading that page would have concluded a per-node ACL gate exists.
  * CLAUDE.md: the Change Detection sentence was false (DriverHost consumes
    nothing); the mesh Phase 4 and Phase 5 live gates and the auto-down 1-vs-1
    gate had all PASSED; the ScriptedAlarmState table was already dropped.
  * driver-expansion tracking: Modbus RTU and SQL poll are merged, not
    pending — its command table would have made someone rebuild two shipped
    drivers in a fresh worktree.
  * drivers/README.md: dead DriverTypeRegistry paragraph, retired
    SystemPlatform namespace kind, missing Sql + Calculation rows, missing
    Modbus RTU-over-TCP transport.
  * TwinCAT.md/Galaxy.md promised an address-space rebuild that never happens.
  * Historian.md gained the #491 unproven-value-capture pointer.
  * IncrementalSync.md and AddressSpace.md bannered as wholesale v2-era (the
    rewrite is recorded as still owed, not done here); four v2 status docs
    bannered as historical; three wrong-name-for-a-live-type fixes.

Left deliberately untouched: the secrets NoOpSecretReplicator line, which
makes a security claim and needs the real behaviour identified rather than a
rename.
2026-07-27 17:26:20 -04:00

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# Redundancy Interop Playbook (Phase 6.3 Stream F — task #150)
> ⚠️ **Historical type names (audited 2026-07-27).** The operator *procedure* below is still the
> right one, but `RedundancyPublisherHostedService` (`:22`), `RecoveryStateManager.DwellTime` (`:67`)
> and `RedundancyCoordinator` no longer exist — redundancy state is now published by the
> cluster-scoped `RedundancyStateActor` singleton with `ServiceLevelCalculator` and
> `IRedundancyRoleView`. See `docs/Redundancy.md` (which states plainly that the old types are gone)
> and the per-cluster-mesh Phase 6/7 sections of `CLAUDE.md`. The `ServerUriArray` limitation noted
> at `:100-105` is still open (SDK object-type gated).
> **Scope**: manual validation that third-party OPC UA clients + AVEVA MXAccess
> observe our non-transparent redundancy signals (ServiceLevel, ServerUriArray,
> RedundancySupport) and fail over to the Backup node when the Primary drops.
>
> **Why manual**: the third-party clients named here are Windows-GUI binaries
> (UaExpert, Kepware QuickClient) or embedded inside AVEVA System Platform.
> Automating any of them into PR-CI is out of scope for v2. This playbook
> captures the minimal dev-box-plus-VM setup and the expected pass criteria so
> the work can be executed repeatably at v2 release readiness and after any
> Phase 6.3 follow-up change.
## Prerequisites
1. Two `OtOpcUa.Server` nodes in one `ServerCluster`:
- Declared as `NodeCount = 2`, `RedundancyMode = Hot` (or `Warm`).
- Each with a distinct `ApplicationUri` (enforced by unique index per
decision #86).
- Each node's `StaticRoutes.xml` points at the other (`ServerCluster.Node[].Host`).
2. `scripts/install/Install-Services.ps1` applied on each node so the
`RedundancyPublisherHostedService` is running.
3. At least one `DriverInstance` with a reachable simulator or PLC so both
servers have a non-empty address space to browse.
4. On the client host:
- `UaExpert` ≥ 1.7 installed
- Kepware `ClientAce QuickClient` (or equivalent) — optional, for a second
client
5. For the AVEVA leg: a `Galaxy.Host` running against an MXAccess deployment
with an external OPC UA client object pointed at the cluster (not at a
single node).
## Expected signals on a running cluster
| Node | `ServiceLevel` | `RedundancySupport` | `ServerUriArray` |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary, healthy, peer reachable | 200 | `Hot` (or `Warm`) | self + peer |
| Primary, mid-apply | 75 (`PrimaryMidApply`) | same | same |
| Primary, peer UNreachable | 150 (`PrimaryPeerDown`) | same | same |
| Backup, healthy | 100 (`Secondary`) | same | same |
| Either, dwelling in recovery | 50 (`Recovering`) | same | same |
| Either, invariant violation (two Primary, disabled-node mismatch) | 2 (`InvalidTopology`) | same | same |
(The band constants live in `ServiceLevelCalculator.Classify`.)
## Test matrix
Each row is one manual run; pass criterion in the right column.
### Block A — UA protocol signals (UaExpert)
| # | Scenario | Procedure | Pass criterion |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | ServiceLevel published | Connect UaExpert to Primary. Browse to `Server.ServerStatus.ServiceLevel`. | Value = 200 (or the expected Band byte per table above) |
| A2 | ServiceLevel updates on peer down | Connect to Primary. Stop Backup (`sc stop OtOpcUa`). Watch `ServiceLevel`. | Transitions 200 → 150 within ~2 s of peer probe timeout |
| A3 | RedundancySupport | Browse to `Server.ServerRedundancy.RedundancySupport`. | Value matches the declared `RedundancyMode` (Warm / Hot / None) |
| A4 | ServerUriArray (non-transparent upgrade) | Requires a redundancy-object-type upgrade follow-up. | When upgrade lands: `ServerUriArray` reports both ApplicationUris, self first |
| A4b | Peer URI visibility via `Server.ServerArray` (i=2254) | Configure each `OpcUaApplicationHost` with the partner's `ApplicationUri` via `OpcUaApplicationHostOptions.PeerApplicationUris`. From any client, Read NodeId `i=2254` (`Server.ServerArray`). | Returned `String[]` includes both self + peer `ApplicationUri`s. Validated by `DualEndpointTests` in `tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.IntegrationTests/` (loopback dual-host with real OPCFoundation client `Session` read). |
| A5 | Mid-apply dip | On Primary trigger a `sp_PublishGeneration` apply. | `ServiceLevel` drops to 75 for the apply duration + dwell |
### Block B — Client failover
| # | Scenario | Procedure | Pass criterion |
|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | UaExpert picks Primary by ServiceLevel | In UaExpert configure a Redundancy Group with both endpoint URLs. | Client picks the Primary URL (higher ServiceLevel) |
| B2 | UaExpert cuts over on Primary kill | Kill the Primary's `OtOpcUa` service. | Client session reconnects to Backup within UaExpert's reconnect timeout (default 5 s). Data-change monitored items resume. |
| B3 | UaExpert cuts back when Primary returns | Start the Primary service. Wait ≥ recovery dwell (see `RecoveryStateManager.DwellTime`). | `ServiceLevel` on returning Primary goes through 50 (Recovering) → 200; UaExpert may or may not switch back (client-policy dependent; both are accepted outcomes) |
| B4 | Kepware QuickClient failover | Repeat B1B3 with Kepware in place of UaExpert. | Same pass criteria; establishes we're not UaExpert-specific |
### Block C — Galaxy MXAccess failover
This block validates that an AVEVA System Platform app consuming our cluster
via MXAccess tolerates a Primary drop the same way a native OPC UA client does.
The MXAccess toolkit internally wraps the OPC UA Client and does its own
redundancy negotiation; we're asserting that negotiation honors our
`ServiceLevel` signal.
| # | Scenario | Procedure | Pass criterion |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | Galaxy binds to Primary on first connect | Bring the cluster up. Start a Galaxy `$MxAccessClient` object pointed at the cluster with both node URLs. | Galaxy reports `QUALITY = Good` + initial values from the Primary |
| C2 | Galaxy redirects on Primary drop | Stop the Primary. | Galaxy's `QUALITY` briefly goes `Uncertain`, then back to `Good`; values continue streaming from the Backup within MXAccess's `ReconnectInterval` (default 20 s) |
| C3 | Galaxy handles mid-apply dip | Trigger a generation apply on the Primary. | Galaxy continues reading — the mid-apply dip is advertisory (ServiceLevel 75), not a session drop; MXAccess should stay bound |
## Recording results
Copy the tables above into a tracking doc per run. The tracking doc shape:
```
Run date: 2026-MM-DD
Cluster: <id> Primary: <node> Backup: <node> Release: <sha>
A1: PASS evidence: UaExpert screenshot uaexpert-a1.png
A2: PASS evidence: ServiceLevel trend grafana-a2.png
```
One pass of every row is the acceptance criterion. Re-run after any Phase 6.3
follow-up ships (especially the non-transparent redundancy-type upgrade, which
flips A4 from "deferred" to "expected pass").
## Known limitations
- **A4 pending**: `Server.ServerRedundancy` on our current SDK build lands as
the base `ServerRedundancyState`, which has no `ServerUriArray` child.
`ServerRedundancyNodeWriter.ApplyServerUriArray` logs-and-skips until the
redundancy-object-type upgrade follow-up lands. Cross-reference **A4b**
peer URIs are visible today via `Server.ServerArray` (i=2254) populated by
`OpcUaApplicationHost.PopulateServerArray`.
- **Recovery dwell default**: `RecoveryStateManager.DwellTime` defaults to 60 s
in `Program.cs`. Adjust via future config knob if B3 takes too long to
observe.
- **C-block external dependency**: The `Galaxy.Host` side of the redundancy
story is largely out of our code — it's MXAccess's own client-redundancy
policy talking to our published ServiceLevel. A negative result on C1-C3
does not necessarily indicate an OtOpcUa bug; cross-check with UaExpert
(Block A / B) first.
## Automation notes (why this is a playbook, not a test)
- UaExpert and Kepware binaries are closed-source Windows GUIs; they don't
ship headless CLIs for the browse/connect/subscribe flows.
- The OPC Foundation reference SDK *can* drive every scenario, but our own
`Driver.OpcUaClient` tests already cover that client's behaviour; Block B
adds value specifically because these two clients have independent
redundancy implementations we don't control.
- For the sub-set of scenarios that *can* be automated — the self-loopback
case where our own `otopcua-cli` drives Primary + Backup — the existing
`tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.ControlPlane.Tests/RedundancyStateActorTests` +
`ServiceLevelCalculatorTests` (unit) already cover the math + data path.
The wire-level assertion that the peer URIs actually land on the
`Server.ServerArray` node (i=2254) is covered by `DualEndpointTests` in
`tests/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.IntegrationTests/`.