7.3 KiB
FOCAS driver
Fanuc CNC driver for the FS 0i / 16i / 18i / 21i / 30i / 31i / 32i / 35i /
Power Mate i families. Talks to the controller via the licensed
Fwlib32.dll (Tier C, process-isolated per
docs/v2/driver-stability.md).
For range-validation and per-series capability surface see
docs/v2/focas-version-matrix.md.
Alarm history (cnc_rdalmhistry) — issue #267, plan PR F3-a
FocasAlarmProjection exposes two modes via FocasDriverOptions.AlarmProjection:
| Mode | Behaviour |
|---|---|
ActiveOnly (default) |
Subscribe / unsubscribe / acknowledge wire up so capability negotiation works, but no history poll runs. Back-compat with every pre-F3-a deployment. |
ActivePlusHistory |
On subscribe (== "on connect") and on every HistoryPollInterval tick, the projection issues cnc_rdalmhistry for the most recent HistoryDepth entries. Each previously-unseen entry fires an OnAlarmEvent with SourceTimestampUtc set from the CNC's reported timestamp — OPC UA dashboards see the real occurrence time, not the moment the projection polled. |
Config knobs
{
"AlarmProjection": {
"Mode": "ActivePlusHistory", // "ActiveOnly" (default) | "ActivePlusHistory"
"HistoryPollInterval": "00:05:00", // default 5 min
"HistoryDepth": 100 // default 100, capped at 250
}
}
Dedup key
(OccurrenceTime, AlarmNumber, AlarmType). The same triple across two
polls only emits once. The dedup set is in-memory and resets on
reconnect — first poll after reconnect re-emits everything in the ring
buffer. OPC UA clients that need exactly-once semantics dedupe client-side
on the same triple (the timestamp + type + number tuple is stable across
the boundary).
HistoryDepth cap
Capped at FocasAlarmProjectionOptions.MaxHistoryDepth = 250 so an
operator who types 10000 by accident can't blast the wire session with a
giant request. Typical FANUC ring buffers cap at ~100 entries; the default
HistoryDepth = 100 matches the most common ring-buffer size.
Wire surface
- Wire-protocol command id:
0x0F1A(seedocs/v2/implementation/focas-wire-protocol.md). - ODBALMHIS struct decoder:
Wire/FocasAlarmHistoryDecoder.cs. - Tier-C Fwlib32 backend short-circuits the packed-buffer decoder by
surfacing the FWLIB struct fields directly into
FocasAlarmHistoryEntry.
Writes (opt-in, off by default) — issue #268 (F4-a) + #269 (F4-b)
Writes ship behind multiple independent opt-ins. All default off so a freshly
deployed FOCAS driver is read-only until the deployment makes a deliberate
choice. Decision record: docs/v2/decisions.md →
"FOCAS write-path opt-in".
| Knob | Default | Effect when off |
|---|---|---|
FocasDriverOptions.Writes.Enabled (driver-level master switch) |
false |
Every entry in a WriteAsync batch short-circuits to BadNotWritable with status text writes disabled at driver level. Wire client never gets touched. |
FocasDriverOptions.Writes.AllowParameter (F4-b granular kill switch) |
false |
PARAM: writes return BadNotWritable with no wire client constructed. Defense in depth — even if Enabled = true an operator must explicitly opt into parameter writes per kind because a misdirected cnc_wrparam can put the CNC in a bad state. |
FocasDriverOptions.Writes.AllowMacro (F4-b granular kill switch) |
false |
MACRO: writes return BadNotWritable with no wire client constructed. Macro writes are the normal HMI-driven recipe / setpoint surface; gating them separately from AllowParameter lets a deployment open MACRO without exposing the heavier PARAM write surface. |
FocasTagDefinition.Writable (per-tag opt-in) |
false |
The per-tag check returns BadNotWritable for that tag even when the driver-level flags are on. |
Config shape — F4-b
{
"Writes": {
"Enabled": true,
"AllowParameter": true, // F4-b — opt into cnc_wrparam
"AllowMacro": true // F4-b — opt into cnc_wrmacro
},
"Tags": [
{ "Name": "RPM", "Address": "PARAM:1815", "DataType": "Int32",
"Writable": true, "WriteIdempotent": false },
{ "Name": "Recipe", "Address": "MACRO:500", "DataType": "Int32",
"Writable": true, "WriteIdempotent": false }
]
}
Server-layer ACL (LDAP groups)
Per the docs/v2/acl-design.md tier model, the FOCAS
driver only declares per-tag SecurityClassification; DriverNodeManager
applies the gate. The classification post-F4-b is:
| Tag kind | Classification | LDAP group required (default mapping) |
|---|---|---|
PARAM:N writable |
Configure |
WriteConfigure |
MACRO:N writable |
Operate |
WriteOperate |
| Other writable (PMC R/G/F/...) | Operate |
WriteOperate |
| Non-writable | ViewOnly |
(no write permission) |
Parameter writes need the heavier WriteConfigure group because they're
mostly emergency commissioning territory; macro writes use WriteOperate
because they're the normal HMI recipe surface. The driver-level
AllowParameter / AllowMacro kill switches sit independently of ACL — an
operator-team kill switch the deployment can flip without redeploying ACL
group memberships. See docs/security.md for the full
group/permission map.
WriteIdempotent is plumbed through Polly retry by the server-layer
CapabilityInvoker.ExecuteWriteAsync. When false (default), failed writes
are NOT auto-retried per plan decisions #44/#45 — a timeout that fires after
the CNC already accepted the write would otherwise risk a duplicate
non-idempotent action (alarm acks, M-code pulses, recipe steps). Flip
WriteIdempotent on per tag for genuinely-idempotent writes (a parameter
value that the operator simply wants forced to a target).
Status-code semantics post-F4-b
BadNotWritable— one of: driver-levelWrites.Enabled = false; per-tagWritable = false;Writes.AllowParameter = falsefor aPARAM:tag (F4-b);Writes.AllowMacro = falsefor aMACRO:tag (F4-b). Same status code, four distinct paths — operators distinguish by checking the knobs.BadUserAccessDenied— F4-b — the CNC reportedEW_PASSWD(parameter-write switch off / unlock required). F4-d will land the unlock workflow on top of this surface; today the deployment instructs the operator to flip the parameter-write switch on the CNC pendant.BadNotSupported— both opt-ins flipped on, but the wire client doesn't implement the kind being written (e.g. older transport variant). F4-a wired the generic dispatch; F4-b adds typedWriteParameterAsync/WriteMacroAsyncentry points whose default impls returnBadNotSupportedso transports compiled against a staleIFocasClientsurface still build.BadNodeIdUnknown— full-reference doesn't match any configuredFocasTagDefinition.Name.BadCommunicationError— wire failure (DLL not loaded, IPC peer dead, etc.).
CLI bypass
otopcua-focas-cli write (docs/Driver.FOCAS.Cli.md)
sets Writes.Enabled=true locally for the lifetime of one invocation
because the CLI is a per-operator tool — not a long-lived process bound to
the central config DB. The server-side flag is untouched; configure-the-
server code paths remain safer-by-default.