Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AD99zQQqpLCVm3p7xk
15 KiB
Heidenhain LSV2 live commissioning — 2026-11-11 (#829, #853)
.NET commissioning evidence for the read-only Heidenhain LSV2 driver (Driver.Heidenhain) against four
production Hermle iTNC 530 mills, through a deployed OtOpcUa server and OPC UA clients. Owner-approved scope:
read-only LSV2 only (INSPECT login with an empty password, plus the driver's default optional DNC login attempt and
its allowlisted reads), no writes to the controls, no DATA login, no controller configuration change, one
concurrent session per control, poll intervals at or above the driver defaults. Outages were simulated only by
stopping a local TCP proxy.
Setup
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Server | docker-dev rig, image otopcua-host:dev built 2026-11-11 15:45 UTC from master (newest Heidenhain commit at build time: ddc1f29e, #839) |
| Node | SITE-B, site-b-1 (OPC UA opc.tcp://localhost:4844). Its pair partner site-b-2 was stopped for the run so each control had exactly one session (a warm standby acquires too) |
| Driver | hh829, DriverType Heidenhain, seeded straight into the ConfigDb, deployed with POST /api/deployments |
| Devices | Hermle59, Hermle49, Hermle70, Hermle29, each host.docker.internal:190xx → a socat proxy on the Mac → <control>:19000 |
| Proxies | socat -x TCP-LISTEN:<port>,bind=127.0.0.1,fork,max-children=1 TCP:<control>:19000; max-children=1 caps upstream sessions at one, -x hex-dumps every byte in both directions (the wire census below is parsed from those dumps) |
| Tags | 46 per control (184 total): the 35 fixed leaves — Controller, Status, Program, Overrides, Axes, Tool, Alarms and 11 Capabilities (timers left off) — plus 11 ALARM: conditions (ALARM:*, ALARM:OTHER, ALARM:CLASS=1..9, severity 700). Tag DataTypes follow HeidenhainTagRules; AccessLevel Read. Deploy reported 184 authored, 0 skipped |
| Config, phase A (steps 1–3) | TimeoutMs 5000; Status/Custom/Slow/Alarm 15000 ms; MaxAlarms 64; Telemetry on; DNC login on (driver default); DATA off; timers off; reconnect 1000–30000 ms |
| Config, phase B (step 4) | the driver defaults: Status 1000, Custom 1000, Slow 10000, Alarm 2000 ms (about 3 minutes) |
| Clients | otopcua-cli (src/Client/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Client.CLI) and python-opcua 0.98.13 (bulk typed reads and raw Write service calls) |
Controls
Identity read through OPC UA; it matches the Java/Ignition evidence (ignitionoee/docs/recipes/evidence/heidenhain-final-0.20.3-2026-11-03).
| Control | Endpoint | Model / NC / PLC | Options |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hermle59 | 10.201.29.226:19000 | iTNC530 / 340490 04 SP10 / iC30v7.1_1 | %0000111100000111 |
| Hermle49 | 10.201.29.225:19000 | iTNC530 / 340490 03 SP10 / iC30V6.1_2SP3 | %0000111100000111 |
| Hermle70 | 10.201.22.225:19000 | iTNC530 / 606420 03 SP4 / iC22_V20.1_2SP2 | %0000111100000111 |
| Hermle29 | 10.201.22.215:19000 | iTNC530 / 606420 03 SP4 / iC22_V20.1_2SP2 | %0000111100000111 |
Step 1 — browse and read through OPC UA
The raw tree browses as ns=2;s=hh829/<Control>/<Folder>/<Leaf>, and every condition carries its Part 9 children.
Every leaf advertises AccessLevel = 1 and UserAccessLevel = 1 (CurrentRead only). Array leaves have ValueRank 1.
| Leaf group | Hermle59 | Hermle49 | Hermle70 | Hermle29 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Controller/* (4) | Good | Good | Good | Good |
| Status/ExecutionState, ProgramState | Good (1, 7) | Good (4, 7) | Good (4, 0) | Good (4, 0) |
| Program/Main, Current, Line | Good (Line 0) | Good (Line 0) | Good, running (Line 42255 and counting) | Good, running (Line 40474 and counting) |
| Overrides/* (R_RI 25) | BadUserAccessDenied | BadUserAccessDenied | BadUserAccessDenied | BadUserAccessDenied |
| Axes/Names | X Y Z C a A |
X Y Z C a A |
X Y Z C a A |
X Y Z C a A |
| Axes/Positions | Good, 6 values | Good, 6 values | Good, 6 values, moving | Good, 6 values, moving |
| Tool/* (R_RI 51) | Good (tool 0) | BadNotSupported (all 5) | Good (T49, L 138.1506, R −0.0101) | Good (T17, L 138.303, R −0.0101) |
| Alarms/* | Good, Count 0 | Good, Count 0 | Good, Count 0, then 1 (below) | Good, Count 1 |
| Capabilities | DncLogin AccessDenied, Overrides AccessDenied, DataLogin/PlcLayout Disabled, the rest Supported |
same, and Tool Unsupported |
as Hermle59 | as Hermle59 |
Per control: 32 Good + 3 BadUserAccessDenied (Hermle49: 27 Good + 3 BadUserAccessDenied + 5 BadNotSupported). This matches the LiveIntegration results and the Java evidence: R_RI 25 refused 23 (access denied) on all four, R_RI 51 refused 24 (unsupported) on Hermle49, and the DNC login refused 23 on all four. INSPECT alone serves every other selector.
Defect found — Tool Number/Index/AxisCode are published as Double
Tool/Number (node DataType Int64) and Tool/Index / Tool/AxisCode (Int32) arrive at the client as a
Double variant (49.0, 0.0, 2.0) on every control that serves R_RI 51. Other integer leaves are correct
(Program/Line Int64, Status/* and Alarms/Count Int32). Cause: HeidenhainSession.Leaf, case Lsv2Tool t,
returns a switch expression whose arms are long, int, int, double?, double?. C# gives the expression the
type double?, so the integers are converted before boxing. The Lsv2Program arm next to it avoids this with an
(object) cast. HeidenhainSessionTests.Tool_without_geometry_is_not_supported_not_zero does not catch it:
Shouldly's ShouldBe(7L) treats a boxed 7.0 as equal. otopcua-cli read also hides it, because it prints 49.
A strict client, or one that checks the variant type against the node's DataType, gets a type mismatch. Not fixed
here, per the run's read-only brief.
Step 2 — OPC UA write attempts are refused; no write frame leaves the driver
| Attempt | Principal | Result |
|---|---|---|
otopcua-cli write Controller/Model, Status/ExecutionState, Tool/Number × 4 controls |
Anonymous and a temporary API key with all permissions on SITE-B | BadNotWritable (0x803B0000), all 24 |
otopcua-cli write Overrides/Feed (all), Tool/Number (Hermle49) |
both | the CLI's pre-write read fails (BadUserAccessDenied / BadNotSupported) and nothing is sent |
| Raw Write service (python): Overrides/Feed, Tool/Number, Axes/Positions, AlarmConditions/AnyAlarm/ActiveState × 4 controls | both | BadNotWritable, all 32 |
| Part 9 Acknowledge, Hermle29 AnyAlarm | API key | Good — applied server-side only (AckedState → Acknowledged) |
| Part 9 Acknowledge, Hermle29 Class7 | Anonymous | BadUserAccessDenied (AlarmAck gate) |
Unlike the Java run, where the anonymous access check rejected every write first, a principal that holds write permission was refused here by the node's access level (BadNotWritable).
Wire census. The proxies' byte dumps, parsed frame by frame for the whole run (all sessions, both phases),
contain only A_LG INSPECT, A_LG DNC (each once per session, empty password), R_VR, R_RI 22/23/24/25/26/27/28/51.
There were no non-allowlisted commands and no R_MB, R_DP or C_* frames. In the write and acknowledge
window (17:00:45–17:02:20 UTC), each control received only its regular poll reads (R_VR, R_RI 22–28/51).
Client→control bytes for the whole run: Hermle59 12 876, Hermle49 12 746, Hermle70 13 396, Hermle29 15 526.
Step 3 — outage and recovery (Hermle59 proxy)
An OPC UA read loop sampled once a second: every value leaf of all four controls (35 each), plus each control's AnyAlarm condition Quality.
| Event (UTC) | Hermle59 | Others |
|---|---|---|
| Before the stop | 32 Good + 3 BadUserAccessDenied | unchanged |
| 17:06:02.6 proxy stopped | — | — |
| 17:06:05 (next poll, +2.4 s) | all 24 remote leaves BadNoCommunication; the 11 Capabilities leaves read CommunicationLost; AnyAlarm Quality BadNoCommunication; log: LSV2 communication lost; reconnecting with backoff, alarm list unavailable (CommunicationLost); its 11 alarm condition(s) keep their state |
unchanged, Good |
| 17:06:06–12 | reconnects back off (connection refused at 1, 2, 4… s) | unchanged |
| 17:06:15.8 proxy restarted | — | — |
| 17:06:20 reconnect (backoff) → 17:06:22 | all Good again (~6 s after the proxy came back); alarm list readable again |
unchanged |
Across 327 of 328 samples, Hermle49, Hermle70 and Hermle29 kept their exact status mix. The one exception was the
17:10:31 phase-B redeploy, which respawned the whole driver. The driver's health read Degraded with the connect
error while Hermle59 was down. Detection is bounded by the next poll of that control (Status interval + TimeoutMs).
A second, unplanned leg (below) also showed that a control unreachable at driver start retries and recovers: from
17:04:04 to 17:05:34 Hermle59's leaves were BadNoCommunication with CommunicationLost capabilities, and they were
all Good about 1 s after the reconnect at 17:05:35.
Step 4 — load at default intervals
The proxy byte dumps give these per-control figures (RTT = request → reply). The channel is one transaction at a time.
| Phase | Control | Requests/s | Bytes/s out / in | RTT median / p95 / max (ms) | Channel busy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A (all 15 s), 180 s | Hermle59 | 0.53 | 5.2 / 16.4 | 50 / 133 / 175 | — (one ~0.5 s batch per 15 s) |
| Hermle49 | 0.47 | 4.5 / 14.5 | 48 / 134 / 159 | ||
| Hermle70 | 0.53 | 5.2 / 18.5 | 47 / 135 / 170 | ||
| Hermle29 | 0.67 | 6.5 / 27.5 | 50 / 137 / 160 | (batch ≈ 0.67–0.83 s) | |
| B (defaults 1/1/10/2 s), 180 s | Hermle59 | 4.78 | 47.6 / 148.5 | 50 / 133 / 396 | 30.3 % |
| Hermle49 | 4.68 | 46.6 / 145.6 | 48 / 135 / 474 | 28.6 % | |
| Hermle70 | 4.78 | 47.6 / 176.3 | 47 / 132 / 244 | 28.1 % | |
| Hermle29 | 5.38 | 53.6 / 216.3 | 48 / 128 / 244 | 32.1 % |
Request mix at the defaults over 180 s, per control: R_RI 22/23/24/26 179 each (the 1 s status group keeps up), R_VR 18 and R_RI 51 18 (10 s slow group), and R_RI 27 108, which is 90 alarm walks (2 s) plus 18 slow-group walks. R_RI 28 also ran 108 times on Hermle29, the control with an active alarm. R_RI 25, and R_RI 51 on Hermle49, were sent once per session and then suppressed as documented. No control slowed down or refused anything new under either cadence.
Observation, not a defect: when a control carries ALARM: tags and the Alarms/* arrays, the alarm walk runs
twice — once per AlarmMs for the conditions and again in the Slow group for the arrays. The two are separate reads,
not shared. At the defaults that is about 0.1 extra R_RI 27 per second per control.
#853 — alarm class/group → Part 9 condition class
Every alarm seen during the run (about 16 minutes of walks on all four controls). None were provoked.
| Control | Wire record (S_RI 27) |
Class | Group | Number (int32 / hex) | Text | Driver's condition class |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hermle29 | 0007 0003 8100017b … |
7 Info | 3 Plc | −2130706053 / 0x8100017B |
702126 Filter wait for spindle cooling (U02) E161 |
BaseConditionClass (i=11163) |
| Hermle70 (raised 17:01:47, cleared before 17:13) | 0007 0003 8100015e … |
7 Info | 3 Plc | −2130706082 / 0x8100015E |
701550 Cabin unlocked! B301 |
BaseConditionClass (i=11163) |
| Hermle59, Hermle49 | — (R_RI 27 → T_ER 57, empty list throughout) |
- Both conditions behaved as designed.
AnyAlarmandClass7went Active, severity 700, Quality Good, with the message<number> <text> (class 7, group 3). TheOtherAlarmsand other class conditions stayed Inactive. Hermle70's alarm raised live, mid-run. - Consistent with the mapping table. Group 3 (
Plc) maps to Base. Both texts are machine-builder (Hermle) PLC messages: a 70xxxx message number and a device tag (E161,B301). That fits the RemoToolsDNC_ERROR_GROUPnumbering, where 3 = PLC. Class 7 = Info fits non-fatal status notices, and the one record captured earlier (−1 "Run test of cutout channels", class 7 / group 4) is consistent too. The live data now corroborates class 7, group 3 and group 4. - Still unobserved on hardware: classes 1–6, 8 and 9 (including 5 EmergencyStop → Safety) and groups 1, 2, 5 and 6 (the Process/System/Python rows). Confirming them would need an active alarm of those kinds, which this run did not provoke.
- Note for authors: on these controls the alarm number field is not the displayed message number. It reads as
0x81xxxxxx, which is negative as int32, and the HMI number is the leading digits of the text. ANUMBER=selector therefore has to use the negative raw value. This is documented ("filter on the raw codes"), but worth knowing.
Incidental findings (outside the Heidenhain driver)
- Operator error during the run, now recovered. When the first outage leg stopped the Hermle59 proxy,
kill $(lsof -ti tcp:19059)also matched and killed OrbStack's networking helper, which held the forwarded connection. The OrbStack VM stopped; every container restarted whenorbctl startwas run (17:03–17:04 UTC), andotopcua-dev-sql-1/otopcua-dev-traefik-1were started by hand. The outage leg was then re-run cleanly by killing only the socat processes. After this restart the OrbStack containers can no longer reach the LAN host 10.100.0.35 (the driver fixtures and opc-plc). The Mac itself, internet access and the 10.201.x VPN still work. Before 17:03 there were no such errors. This most likely needs OrbStack restarted from the app, or its macOS Local Network permission re-granted. - ConfigPublishCoordinator does not survive a ConfigDb that is unreachable at singleton start.
ConfigPublishCoordinator.PreStartqueries the DB synchronously. With SQL still starting, it threwActorInitializationException(SqlException: name not resolved), the singleton was terminated (Singleton actor [akka://otopcua/user/config-publish/config-publish] was terminated) and it never restarted. Every deploy then waited forever (ClusterSingletonProxy failed to find … [config-publish]every 30 s). Restarting central-1 moved the singleton to central-2, which recovered it. This is a real resilience defect for any host that boots before its ConfigDb. - The first deployment (
7a47a745) endedTimedOut(5/6 acks) becausesite-b-2was stopped. The later deploys setClusterNode.MaintenanceMode = 1onsite-b-2and sealed. The flag was reset to 0 afterwards.
Cleanup
The hh829 driver, its 4 devices, 36 tag groups and 184 tags were deleted, along with the temporary API key and
SITE-B NodeAcl. Deployment 6c7f859f sealed at 17:14:13, and the driver was stopped and disposed on site-b-1 at the
same moment. All four proxy sessions closed, and then the proxies were stopped. site-b-2 was restarted (standby,
no Heidenhain driver), and site-b-2 MaintenanceMode was restored to 0. Nothing on the controls was changed.
Status against the gates
- #829: browse/read, write refusal (including a write-capable principal), outage and recovery with the other
controls unaffected, bounded traffic at default intervals, and retained evidence are done on four iTNC 530
controls. Open: the Tool Number/Index/AxisCode Double-variant defect above, which should be fixed and
re-verified with a strict variant-type assertion. Still unproven as before: other control families
(TNC 320/430/640), successful
R_MB, units, timers 30–34, and DATA (not exercised under this scope). - #853: partially confirmed — class 7, groups 3 and 4 match the RemoTools numbering and map as documented (Base). Classes other than 7 (notably 5 → Safety) and groups 1/2/5/6 are not yet observed on hardware.