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Author SHA1 Message Date
Joseph Doherty
d5fa1f450e Phase 3 PR 29 — Account/session page expanding the minimal sidebar role display into a dedicated /account route. Shows the authenticated operator's identity (username from ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier, display name from ClaimTypes.Name), their Admin roles as badges (from ClaimTypes.Role), the raw LDAP groups that mapped to those roles (from the 'ldap_group' claim added by Login.razor at sign-in), and a capability table listing each Admin capability with its required role and a Yes/No badge showing whether this session has it. Capability list mirrors the Program.cs authorization policies + each page's [Authorize] attribute so operators can self-service check whether their session has access without trial-and-error navigation — capabilities covered: view clusters + fleet status (all roles), edit configuration drafts (ConfigEditor or FleetAdmin per CanEdit policy), publish generations (FleetAdmin per CanPublish policy), manage certificate trust (FleetAdmin per PR 28 Certificates page attribute), manage external-ID reservations (ConfigEditor or FleetAdmin per Reservations page attribute).
Sidebar's 'Signed in as' line now wraps the display name in a link to /account so the existing sidebar-compact view becomes the entry point for the fuller page — keeps the sign-out button where it was for muscle memory, just adds the detail page one click away. Page is gated with [Authorize] (any authenticated admin) rather than a specific role — the capability table deliberately works for every signed-in user so they can see what they DON'T have access to, which helps them file the right ticket with their LDAP admin instead of getting a plain Access Denied when navigating blindly.
Capability → required-role table is defined as a private readonly record list in the page rather than pulled from a service because it's a UI-presentation concern, not runtime policy state — the runtime policy IS Program.cs's AddAuthorizationBuilder + each page's [Authorize] attribute, and this table just mirrors it for operator readability. Comment on the list reminds future-me to extend it when a new policy or [Authorize] page lands. No behavior change if roles are empty, but the page surfaces a hint ('Sign-in would have been blocked, so if you're seeing this, the session claim is likely stale') that nudges the operator toward signing out + back in.
No new tests added — the page is pure display over claims; its only logic is the 'has-capability' Any-overlap check which is exactly what ASP.NET's [Authorize(Roles=...)] does in-framework, and duplicating that in a unit test would test the framework rather than our code. Admin.Tests Unit stays 23 pass / 0 fail. Admin build clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:43:35 -04:00
6fdaee3a71 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page' (#27) from phase-3-pr28-cert-trust into v2 2026-04-18 14:42:52 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
ed88835d34 Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page. New /certificates route (FleetAdmin-only) surfaces the OPC UA server's PKI store rejected + trusted certs and gives operators Trust / Delete / Revoke actions so rejected client certs can be promoted without touching disk. CertTrustService reads $PkiStoreRoot/{rejected,trusted}/certs/*.der files directly via X509CertificateLoader — no Opc.Ua dependency in the Admin project, which keeps the Admin host runnable on a machine that doesn't have the full Server install locally (only needs the shared PKI directory reachable; typical deployment has Admin + Server side-by-side on the same box and PkiStoreRoot defaults match so a plain-vanilla install needs no override). CertTrustOptions bound from the Admin's 'CertTrust:PkiStoreRoot' section, default %ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki (matches OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot default). Trust action moves the .der from rejected/certs/ to trusted/certs/ via File.Move(overwrite:true) — idempotent, tolerates a concurrent operator doing the same move. Delete wipes the file. Revoke removes from trusted/certs/ (Opc.Ua re-reads the Directory store on each new client handshake, so no explicit reload signal is needed; operators retry the rejected connection after trusting). Thumbprint matching is case-insensitive because X509Certificate2.Thumbprint is upper-case hex but operators copy-paste from logs that sometimes lowercase it. Malformed files in the store are logged + skipped — a single bad .der can't take the whole management page offline. Missing store directories produce empty lists rather than exceptions so a pristine install (Server never run yet, no rejected/trusted dirs yet) doesn't crash the page.
Razor page layout: two tables (Rejected / Trusted) with Subject / Issuer / Thumbprint / Valid-window / Actions columns, status banner after each action with success or warning kind ('file missing' = another admin handled it), FleetAdmin-only via [Authorize(Roles=AdminRoles.FleetAdmin)]. Each action invokes LogActionAsync which Serilog-logs the authenticated admin user + thumbprint + action for an audit trail — DB-level ConfigAuditLog persistence is deferred because its schema is cluster-scoped and cert actions are cluster-agnostic; Serilog + CertTrustService's filesystem-op info logs give the forensic trail in the meantime. Sidebar link added to MainLayout between Reservations and the future Account page.
Tests — CertTrustServiceTests (9 new unit cases): ListRejected parses Subject + Thumbprint + store kind from a self-signed test cert written into rejected/certs/; rejected and trusted stores are kept separate; TrustRejected moves the file and the Rejected list is empty afterwards; TrustRejected with a thumbprint not in rejected returns false without touching trusted; DeleteRejected removes the file; UntrustCert removes from trusted only; thumbprint match is case-insensitive (operator UX); missing store directories produce empty lists instead of throwing DirectoryNotFoundException (pristine-install tolerance); a junk .der in the store is logged + skipped and the valid certs still surface (one bad file doesn't break the page). Full Admin.Tests Unit suite: 23 pass / 0 fail (14 prior + 9 new). Full Admin build clean — 0 errors, 0 warnings.
lmx-followups.md #3 marked DONE with a cross-reference to this PR and a note that flipping AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates to false as the production default is a deployment-config follow-up, not a code gap — the Admin UI is now ready to be the trust gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:37:55 -04:00
5389d4d22d Phase 3 PR 27 � Fleet status dashboard page (#26) 2026-04-18 14:07:16 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
b5f8661e98 Phase 3 PR 27 — Fleet status dashboard page. New /fleet route shows per-node apply state (ClusterNodeGenerationState joined with ClusterNode for the ClusterId) in a sortable table with summary cards for Total / Applied / Stale / Failed node counts. Stale detection: LastSeenAt older than 30s triggers a table-warning row class + yellow count card. Failed rows get table-danger + red card. Badge classes per LastAppliedStatus: Applied=bg-success, Failed=bg-danger, Applying=bg-info, unknown=bg-secondary. Timestamps rendered as relative-age strings ('42s ago', '15m ago', '3h ago', then absolute date for >24h). Error column is truncated to 320px with the full message in a tooltip so the table stays readable on wide fleets. Initial data load on OnInitializedAsync; auto-refresh every 5s via a Timer that calls InvokeAsync(RefreshAsync) — matches the FleetStatusPoller's 5s cadence so the dashboard sees the most recent state without polling ahead of the broadcaster. A Refresh button also kicks a manual reload; _refreshing gate prevents double-runs when the timer fires during an in-flight query. IServiceScopeFactory (matches FleetStatusPoller's pattern) creates a fresh DI scope per refresh so the per-page DbContext can't race the timer with the render thread; no new DI registrations needed. Live SignalR hub push is deliberately deferred to a follow-up PR — the existing FleetStatusHub + NodeStateChangedMessage already works for external JavaScript clients; wiring an in-process Blazor Server consumer adds HubConnectionBuilder plumbing that's worth its own focused change. Sidebar link added to MainLayout between Overview and Clusters. Full Admin.Tests Unit suite 14 pass / 0 fail — unchanged, no tests regressed. Full Admin build clean (0 errors, 0 warnings). Closes the 'no per-driver dashboard' gap from lmx-followups item #7 at the fleet level; per-host (platform/engine/Modbus PLC) granularity still needs a dedicated page that consumes IHostConnectivityProbe.GetHostStatuses from the Server process — that's the live-SignalR follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 13:12:31 -04:00
4058b88784 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization by role' (#25) from phase-3-pr26-server-write-authz into v2 2026-04-18 13:04:35 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
6b04a85f86 Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization gating by role. Per the user's ACL-at-server-layer directive (saved as feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md in memory), write authorization is enforced in DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue and never delegated to the driver or to driver-specific auth (the v1 Galaxy-provided security path is explicitly not part of v2 — drivers report SecurityClassification as discovery metadata only). New WriteAuthzPolicy static class in Server/Security/ maps SecurityClassification → required role per the table documented in docs/Configuration.md: FreeAccess = no role required (anonymous sessions can write), Operate + SecuredWrite = WriteOperate, Tune = WriteTune, VerifiedWrite + Configure = WriteConfigure, ViewOnly = deny regardless of roles. Role matching is case-insensitive and role requirements do NOT cascade — a session with WriteConfigure can write Configure attributes but needs WriteOperate separately to write Operate attributes; this is deliberate so escalation is an explicit LDAP group assignment, not a hierarchy the policy silently grants. DriverNodeManager gains a _securityByFullRef Dictionary populated during Variable() registration (parallel to the existing _variablesByFullRef) so OnWriteValue can look up the classification in O(1) on the hot path. OnWriteValue casts the session's context.UserIdentity to the new IRoleBearer interface (implemented by OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity from PR 19) — empty Roles collection when the session is anonymous; the same WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed check then either short-circuits true (FreeAccess), false (ViewOnly), or walks the roles list looking for the required one. On deny, OnWriteValue logs 'Write denied for {FullRef}: classification=X userRoles=[...]' at Information level (readable trail for operator complaints) and returns BadUserAccessDenied without touching IWritable.WriteAsync — drivers never see a request we'd have refused. IRoleBearer kept as a minimal server-side interface rather than reusing some abstraction from Core.Abstractions because the concept is OPC-UA-session-scoped and doesn't generalize (the driver side has no notion of a user session). Tests — WriteAuthzPolicyTests (17 new cases): FreeAccess allows write with empty role set + arbitrary roles; ViewOnly denies write even with every role; Operate requires WriteOperate; role match is case-insensitive; Operate denies empty role set + wrong role; SecuredWrite shares Operate's requirement; Tune requires WriteTune; Tune denies WriteOperate-only (asserts roles don't cascade — this is the test that catches a future regression where someone 'helpfully' adds a role-escalation table); Configure requires WriteConfigure; VerifiedWrite shares Configure's requirement; multi-role session allowed when any role matches; unrelated roles denied; RequiredRole theory covering all 5 classified-and-mapped rows + null for FreeAccess/ViewOnly special cases. lmx-followups.md follow-up #2 marked DONE with a back-reference to this PR and the memory note. Full Server.Tests Unit suite: 38 pass / 0 fail (17 new WriteAuthz + 14 SecurityConfiguration from PR 19 + 2 NodeBootstrap + 5 others). Server.Tests Integration (Category=Integration) 2 pass — existing PR 17 anonymous-endpoint smoke tests stay green since the read path doesn't hit OnWriteValue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 13:01:01 -04:00
cd8691280a Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 25 — Modbus test plan + DL205 quirk catalog' (#24) from phase-3-pr25-modbus-test-plan into v2 2026-04-18 12:49:19 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
77d09bf64e Phase 3 PR 25 — modbus-test-plan.md: integration-test playbook with per-device quirk catalog. ModbusPal is the chosen simulator; AutomationDirect DL205 is the first target device class with 6 pending quirks to document and cover with named tests (word order for 32-bit values, register-zero access policy, coil addressing base, maximum registers per FC03, response framing under sustained load, exception code on protected-bit coil write). Each quirk placeholder has a proposed test name so the user's validation work translates directly into integration tests. Test conventions section codifies the named-per-quirk pattern, skip-when-unreachable guard, real ModbusTcpTransport usage, and inter-test isolation. Sets up the harness-and-catalog structure future device families (Allen-Bradley Micrologix, Siemens S7-1200 Modbus gateway, Schneider M340, whatever the user hits) will slot into — same per-device catalog shape, cross-device patterns section for recurring quirks that can get promoted into driver defaults. Next concrete PRs proposed: PR 26 for the integration test project scaffold + DL205 profile + fixture with skip-guard + one smoke test, PR 27+ for the individual confirmed quirks one-per-PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:45:21 -04:00
163c821e74 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 24 — Modbus PLC data type extensions' (#23) from phase-3-pr24-modbus-types into v2 2026-04-18 12:32:55 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
eea31dcc4e Phase 3 PR 24 — Modbus PLC data type extensions. Extends ModbusDataType beyond the textbook Int16/UInt16/Int32/UInt32/Float32 set with Int64/UInt64/Float64 (4-register types), BitInRegister (single bit within a holding register, BitIndex 0-15 LSB-first), and String (ASCII packed 2 chars per register with StringLength-driven sizing). Adds ModbusByteOrder enum on ModbusTagDefinition covering the two word-orderings that matter in the real PLC population: BigEndian (ABCD — Modbus TCP standard, Schneider PLCs that follow it strictly) and WordSwap (CDAB — Siemens S7 family, several Allen-Bradley series, some Modicon families). NormalizeWordOrder helper reverses word pairs in-place for 32-bit values and reverses all four words for 64-bit values (keeps bytes big-endian within each register, which is universal; swaps only the word positions). Internal codec surface switched from (bytes, ModbusDataType) pairs to (bytes, ModbusTagDefinition) because the tag carries the ByteOrder + BitIndex + StringLength context the codec needs; RegisterCount similarly takes the tag so strings can compute ceil(StringLength/2). DriverDataType mapping in MapDataType extended to cover the new logical types — Int64/UInt64 widen to Int32 (PR 25 follow-up: extend DriverDataType enum with Int64 to avoid precision loss), Float64 maps to DriverDataType.Float64, String maps to DriverDataType.String, BitInRegister surfaces as Boolean, all other mappings preserved. BitInRegister writes throw a deliberate InvalidOperationException with a 'read-modify-write' hint — to atomically flip a single bit the driver needs to FC03 the register, OR/AND in the bit, then FC06 it back; that's a separate PR because the bit-modify atomicity story needs a per-register mutex and optional compare-and-write semantics. Everything else (decoder paths for both byte orders, Int64/UInt64/Float64 encode + decode, bit-index extraction across both register halves, String nul-truncation on decode, String nul-padding on encode) ships here. Tests (21 new ModbusDataTypeTests): RegisterCount_returns_correct_register_count_per_type theory (10 rows covering every numeric type); RegisterCount_for_String_rounds_up_to_register_pair theory (5 rows including the 0-char edge case that returns 0 registers); Int32_BigEndian_decodes_ABCD_layout + Int32_WordSwap_decodes_CDAB_layout + Float32_WordSwap_encode_decode_roundtrips (covers the two most-common 32-bit orderings); Int64_BigEndian_roundtrips + UInt64_WordSwap_reverses_four_words (word-swap on 64-bit reverses the four-word layout explicitly, with the test computing the expected wire shape by hand rather than trusting the implementation) + Float64_roundtrips_under_word_swap (3.14159265358979 survives the round-trip with 1e-12 tolerance); BitInRegister_extracts_bit_at_index theory (6 rows including LSB, MSB, and arbitrary bits in a multi-bit mask); BitInRegister_write_is_not_supported_in_PR24 (asserts the exception message steers the reader to the 'read-modify-write' follow-up); String_decodes_ASCII_packed_two_chars_per_register (decodes 'HELLO!' from 3 packed registers with the 'HELLO!'u8 test-only UTF-8 literal which happens to equal the ASCII bytes for this ASCII input); String_decode_truncates_at_first_nul ('Hi' padded with nuls reads back as 'Hi'); String_encode_nul_pads_remaining_bytes (short input writes remaining bytes as 0). Full solution: 0 errors, 217 unit + integration tests pass (22 + 30 new Modbus = 52 Modbus total, 165 pre-existing). ModbusDriver capability footprint now matches the most common industrial PLC workloads — Siemens S7 + Allen-Bradley + Modicon all supported via ByteOrder config without driver forks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:27:12 -04:00
8a692d4ba8 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 23 — Modbus IHostConnectivityProbe' (#22) from phase-3-pr23-modbus-probe into v2 2026-04-18 12:23:04 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
268b12edec Phase 3 PR 23 — Modbus IHostConnectivityProbe. ModbusDriver now implements 6 of 8 capability interfaces (adds IHostConnectivityProbe alongside IDriver + ITagDiscovery + IReadable + IWritable + ISubscribable from the earlier PRs). Background probe loop kicks off in InitializeAsync when ModbusProbeOptions.Enabled is true, sends a cheap FC03 read-1-register at ProbeAddress (default 0) every Interval (default 5s) with a per-tick Timeout (default 2s), and tracks the single Modbus endpoint's state in the HostState machine. Initial state = Unknown; first successful probe transitions to Running; any transport/timeout failure transitions to Stopped; recovery transitions back to Running. OnHostStatusChanged fires exactly on transitions (not on repeat successes — prevents event-spam on a healthy connection). HostName format is 'host:port' so the Admin UI can display the endpoint uniformly with Galaxy platforms/engines in the fleet status dashboard. GetHostStatuses returns a single-item list with the current state + last-change timestamp (Modbus driver talks to exactly one endpoint per instance — operators spin up multiple driver instances for multi-PLC deployments). ShutdownAsync cancels the probe CTS before tearing down the transport so the loop can't log a spurious Stopped after intentional shutdown (OperationCanceledException caught separately from the 'real' transport errors). ModbusDriverOptions extended with ModbusProbeOptions sub-record (Enabled default true, Interval 5s, Timeout 2s, ProbeAddress ushort for PLCs that have register-0 policies; most PLCs tolerate an FC03 at 0 but some industrial gateways lock it). Tests (7 new ModbusProbeTests): Initial_state_is_Unknown_before_first_probe_tick (probe disabled, state stays Unknown, HostName formatted); First_successful_probe_transitions_to_Running (enabled, waits for probe count + event queue, asserts Unknown → Running with correct OldState/NewState); Transport_failure_transitions_to_Stopped (flip fake.Reachable = false mid-run, wait for state diff); Recovery_transitions_Stopped_back_to_Running (up → down → up, asserts ≥ 3 transitions); Repeated_successful_probes_do_not_generate_duplicate_Running_events (several hundred ms of stable probes, count stays at 1); Disabled_probe_stays_Unknown_and_fires_no_events (safety guard when operator wants to disable probing); Shutdown_stops_the_probe_loop (probe count captured at shutdown, delay 400ms, assert ≤ 1 extra to tolerate the narrow race where an in-flight tick completes after shutdown — the contract is 'no new ticks scheduled' not 'instantaneous freeze'). FlappyTransport fake exposes a volatile Reachable flag so tests can toggle the PLC availability mid-run, + ProbeCount counter so tests can assert the loop actually issued requests. WaitForStateAsync helper polls GetHostStatuses up to a deadline; tolerates scheduler jitter on slow CI runners. Full solution: 0 errors, 202 unit + integration tests pass (22 Modbus + 180 pre-existing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:12:00 -04:00
edce1be742 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 22 — Modbus ISubscribable via polling overlay' (#21) from phase-3-pr22-modbus-subscribe into v2 2026-04-18 12:07:51 -04:00
19 changed files with 1803 additions and 60 deletions

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@@ -27,33 +27,36 @@ only exposes `ReadRawAsync` + `ReadProcessedAsync`.
- Integration test: OPC UA client calls `HistoryReadAtTime` / `HistoryReadEvents`,
value flows through IPC to the Host's `HistorianDataSource`, back to the client.
## 2. Write-gating by role
## 2. Write-gating by role — **DONE (PR 26)**
**Status**: `RoleBasedIdentity.Roles` populated on the session (PR 19) but
`DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue` doesn't consult it.
Landed in PR 26. `WriteAuthzPolicy` in `Server/Security/` maps
`SecurityClassification` → required role (`FreeAccess` → no role required,
`Operate`/`SecuredWrite``WriteOperate`, `Tune``WriteTune`,
`Configure`/`VerifiedWrite``WriteConfigure`, `ViewOnly` → deny regardless).
`DriverNodeManager` caches the classification per variable during discovery and
checks the session's roles (via `IRoleBearer`) in `OnWriteValue` before calling
`IWritable.WriteAsync`. Roles do not cascade — a session with `WriteOperate`
can't write a `Tune` attribute unless it also carries `WriteTune`.
CLAUDE.md defines the role set: `ReadOnly` / `WriteOperate` / `WriteTune` /
`WriteConfigure` / `AlarmAck`. Each `DriverAttributeInfo.SecurityClassification`
maps to a required role for writes.
See `feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md` in memory for the architectural directive
that authz stays at the server layer and never delegates to driver-specific auth.
**To do**:
- Add a `RoleRequirements` table: `SecurityClassification` → required role.
- `OnWriteValue` reads `context.UserIdentity` → cast to `RoleBasedIdentity`
→ check role membership before calling `IWritable.WriteAsync`. Return
`BadUserAccessDenied` on miss.
- Unit test against a fake `ISystemContext` with varying role sets.
## 3. Admin UI client-cert trust management — **DONE (PR 28)**
## 3. Admin UI client-cert trust management
PR 28 shipped `/certificates` in the Admin UI. `CertTrustService` reads the OPC
UA server's PKI store root (`OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot` — default
`%ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki`) and lists rejected + trusted certs by parsing the
`.der` files directly, so it has no `Opc.Ua` dependency and runs on any
Admin host that can reach the shared PKI directory.
**Status**: Server side auto-accepts untrusted client certs when the
`AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` option is true (dev default).
Production deployments want operator-controlled trust via the Admin UI.
Operator actions: Trust (moves `rejected/certs/*.der``trusted/certs/*.der`),
Delete rejected, Revoke trust. The OPC UA stack re-reads the trusted store on
each new client handshake, so no explicit reload signal is needed —
operators retry the rejected client's connection after trusting.
**To do**:
- Surface the server's rejected-certificate store in the Admin UI.
- Page to move certs between `rejected` / `trusted`.
- Flip `AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` to false once Admin UI is the
trust gate.
Deferred: flipping `AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` to `false` as the
deployment default. That's a production-hardening config change, not a code
gap — the Admin UI is now ready to be the trust gate.
## 4. Live-LDAP integration test

103
docs/v2/modbus-test-plan.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
# Modbus driver — test plan + device-quirk catalog
The Modbus TCP driver unit tests (PRs 2124) cover the protocol surface against an
in-memory fake transport. They validate the codec, state machine, and function-code
routing against a textbook Modbus server. That's necessary but not sufficient: real PLC
populations disagree with the spec in small, device-specific ways, and a driver that
passes textbook tests can still misbehave against actual equipment.
This doc is the harness-and-quirks playbook. It's what gets wired up in the
`tests/Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests` project when we ship that (PR 26 candidate).
## Harness
**Chosen simulator: ModbusPal** (Java, scriptable). Rationale:
- Scriptable enough to mimic device-specific behaviors (non-standard register
layouts, custom exception codes, intentional response delays).
- Runs locally, no CI dependency. Tests skip when `localhost:502` (or the configured
simulator endpoint) isn't reachable.
- Free + long-maintained — physical PLC bench is unavailable in most dev
environments, and renting cloud PLCs isn't worth the per-test cost.
**Setup pattern** (not yet codified in a script — will land alongside the integration
test project):
1. Install ModbusPal, load the per-device `.xmpp` profile from
`tests/Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests/ModbusPal/` (TBD directory).
2. Start the simulator listening on `localhost:502` (or override via
`MODBUS_SIM_ENDPOINT` env var).
3. `dotnet test` the integration project — tests auto-skip when the endpoint is
unreachable, so forgetting to start the simulator doesn't wedge CI.
## Per-device quirk catalog
### AutomationDirect DL205
First known target device. Quirks to document and cover with named tests (to be
filled in when user validates each behavior in ModbusPal with a DL205 profile):
- **Word order for 32-bit values**: _pending_ — confirm whether DL205 uses ABCD
(Modbus TCP standard) or CDAB (Siemens-style word-swap) for Int32/UInt32/Float32.
Test name: `DL205_Float32_word_order_is_CDAB` (or `ABCD`, whichever proves out).
- **Register-zero access**: _pending_ — some DL205 configurations reject FC03 at
register 0 with exception code 02 (illegal data address). If confirmed, the
integration test suite verifies `ModbusProbeOptions.ProbeAddress` default of 0
triggers the rejection and operators must override; test name:
`DL205_FC03_at_register_0_returns_IllegalDataAddress`.
- **Coil addressing base**: _pending_ — DL205 documentation sometimes uses 1-based
coil addresses; verify the driver's zero-based addressing matches the physical
PLC without an off-by-one adjustment.
- **Maximum registers per FC03**: _pending_ — Modbus spec caps at 125; some DL205
models enforce a lower limit (e.g., 64). Test name:
`DL205_FC03_beyond_max_registers_returns_IllegalDataValue`.
- **Response framing under sustained load**: _pending_ — the driver's
single-flight semaphore assumes the server pairs requests/responses by
transaction id; at least one DL205 firmware revision is reported to drop the
TxId under load. If reproduced in ModbusPal we add a retry + log-and-continue
path to `ModbusTcpTransport`.
- **Exception code on coil write to a protected bit**: _pending_ — some DL205
setups protect internal coils; the driver should surface the PLC's exception
PDU as `BadNotWritable` rather than `BadInternalError`.
_User action item_: as each quirk is validated in ModbusPal, replace the _pending_
marker with the confirmed behavior and file a named test in the integration suite.
### Future devices
One section per device class, same shape as DL205. Quirks that apply across
multiple devices (e.g., "all AB PLCs use CDAB") can be noted in the cross-device
patterns section below once we have enough data points.
## Cross-device patterns
Once multiple device catalogs accumulate, quirks that recur across two or more
vendors get promoted into driver defaults or opt-in options:
- _(empty — filled in as catalogs grow)_
## Test conventions
- **One named test per quirk.** `DL205_word_order_is_CDAB_for_Float32` is easier to
diagnose on failure than a generic `Float32_roundtrip`. The `DL205_` prefix makes
filtering by device class trivial (`--filter "DisplayName~DL205"`).
- **Skip with a clear SkipReason.** Follow the pattern from
`GalaxyRepositoryLiveSmokeTests`: check reachability in the fixture, capture
a `SkipReason` string, and have each test call `Assert.Skip(SkipReason)` when
it's set. Don't throw — skipped tests read cleanly in CI logs.
- **Use the real `ModbusTcpTransport`.** Integration tests exercise the wire
protocol end-to-end. The in-memory `FakeTransport` from the unit test suite is
deliberately not used here — its value is speed + determinism, which doesn't
help reproduce device-specific issues.
- **Don't depend on ModbusPal state between tests.** Each test resets the
simulator's register bank or uses a unique address range. Avoid relying on
"previous test left value at register 10" setups that flake when tests run in
parallel or re-order.
## Next concrete PRs
- **PR 26 — Integration test project + DL205 profile scaffold**: creates
`tests/Driver.Modbus.IntegrationTests`, imports the ModbusPal profile (or
generates it from JSON), adds the fixture with skip-when-unreachable, plus
one smoke test that reads a register. No DL205-specific assertions yet — that
waits for the user to validate each quirk.
- **PR 27+**: one PR per confirmed DL205 quirk, landing the named test + any
driver-side adjustment (e.g., retry on dropped TxId) needed to pass it.

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@@ -5,15 +5,17 @@
<h5 class="mb-4">OtOpcUa Admin</h5>
<ul class="nav flex-column">
<li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/">Overview</a></li>
<li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/fleet">Fleet status</a></li>
<li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/clusters">Clusters</a></li>
<li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/reservations">Reservations</a></li>
<li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/certificates">Certificates</a></li>
</ul>
<div class="mt-5">
<AuthorizeView>
<Authorized>
<div class="small text-light">
Signed in as <strong>@context.User.Identity?.Name</strong>
Signed in as <a class="text-light" href="/account"><strong>@context.User.Identity?.Name</strong></a>
</div>
<div class="small text-muted">
@string.Join(", ", context.User.Claims.Where(c => c.Type.EndsWith("/role")).Select(c => c.Value))

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@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
@page "/account"
@attribute [Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization.Authorize]
@using System.Security.Claims
@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services
<h1 class="mb-4">My account</h1>
<AuthorizeView>
<Authorized>
@{
var username = context.User.FindFirst(ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier)?.Value ?? "—";
var displayName = context.User.Identity?.Name ?? "—";
var roles = context.User.Claims
.Where(c => c.Type == ClaimTypes.Role).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
var ldapGroups = context.User.Claims
.Where(c => c.Type == "ldap_group").Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
}
<div class="row g-4">
<div class="col-md-6">
<div class="card">
<div class="card-body">
<h5 class="card-title">Identity</h5>
<dl class="row mb-0">
<dt class="col-sm-4">Username</dt><dd class="col-sm-8"><code>@username</code></dd>
<dt class="col-sm-4">Display name</dt><dd class="col-sm-8">@displayName</dd>
</dl>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-6">
<div class="card">
<div class="card-body">
<h5 class="card-title">Admin roles</h5>
@if (roles.Count == 0)
{
<p class="text-muted mb-0">No Admin roles mapped — sign-in would have been blocked, so if you're seeing this, the session claim is likely stale.</p>
}
else
{
<div class="mb-2">
@foreach (var r in roles)
{
<span class="badge bg-primary me-1">@r</span>
}
</div>
<small class="text-muted">LDAP groups: @(ldapGroups.Count == 0 ? "(none surfaced)" : string.Join(", ", ldapGroups))</small>
}
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-12">
<div class="card">
<div class="card-body">
<h5 class="card-title">Capabilities</h5>
<p class="text-muted small">
Each Admin role grants a fixed capability set per <code>admin-ui.md</code> §Admin Roles.
Pages below reflect what this session can access; the route's <code>[Authorize]</code> guard
is the ground truth — this table mirrors it for readability.
</p>
<table class="table table-sm align-middle mb-0">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Required role(s)</th>
<th class="text-end">You have it?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
@foreach (var cap in Capabilities)
{
var has = cap.RequiredRoles.Any(r => roles.Contains(r, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
<tr>
<td>@cap.Name<br /><small class="text-muted">@cap.Description</small></td>
<td>@string.Join(" or ", cap.RequiredRoles)</td>
<td class="text-end">
@if (has)
{
<span class="badge bg-success">Yes</span>
}
else
{
<span class="badge bg-secondary">No</span>
}
</td>
</tr>
}
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="mt-4">
<form method="post" action="/auth/logout">
<button class="btn btn-outline-danger" type="submit">Sign out</button>
</form>
</div>
</Authorized>
</AuthorizeView>
@code {
private sealed record Capability(string Name, string Description, string[] RequiredRoles);
// Kept in sync with Program.cs authorization policies + each page's [Authorize] attribute.
// When a new page or policy is added, extend this list so operators can self-service check
// whether their session has access without trial-and-error navigation.
private static readonly IReadOnlyList<Capability> Capabilities =
[
new("View clusters + fleet status",
"Read-only access to the cluster list, fleet dashboard, and generation history.",
[AdminRoles.ConfigViewer, AdminRoles.ConfigEditor, AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
new("Edit configuration drafts",
"Create and edit draft generations, manage namespace bindings and node ACLs. CanEdit policy.",
[AdminRoles.ConfigEditor, AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
new("Publish generations",
"Promote a draft to Published — triggers node roll-out. CanPublish policy.",
[AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
new("Manage certificate trust",
"Trust rejected client certs + revoke trust. FleetAdmin-only because the trust decision gates OPC UA client access.",
[AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
new("Manage external-ID reservations",
"Reserve / release external IDs that map into Galaxy contained names.",
[AdminRoles.ConfigEditor, AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
];
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
@page "/certificates"
@attribute [Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization.Authorize(Roles = AdminRoles.FleetAdmin)]
@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services
@inject CertTrustService Certs
@inject AuthenticationStateProvider AuthState
@inject ILogger<Certificates> Log
<h1 class="mb-4">Certificate trust</h1>
<div class="alert alert-info small mb-4">
PKI store root <code>@Certs.PkiStoreRoot</code>. Trusting a rejected cert moves the file into the trusted store — the OPC UA server picks up the change on the next client handshake, so operators should retry the rejected client's connection after trusting.
</div>
@if (_status is not null)
{
<div class="alert alert-@_statusKind alert-dismissible">
@_status
<button type="button" class="btn-close" @onclick="ClearStatus"></button>
</div>
}
<h2 class="h4">Rejected (@_rejected.Count)</h2>
@if (_rejected.Count == 0)
{
<p class="text-muted">No rejected certificates. Clients that fail to handshake with an untrusted cert land here.</p>
}
else
{
<table class="table table-sm align-middle">
<thead><tr><th>Subject</th><th>Issuer</th><th>Thumbprint</th><th>Valid</th><th class="text-end">Actions</th></tr></thead>
<tbody>
@foreach (var c in _rejected)
{
<tr>
<td>@c.Subject</td>
<td>@c.Issuer</td>
<td><code class="small">@c.Thumbprint</code></td>
<td class="small">@c.NotBefore.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd") → @c.NotAfter.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd")</td>
<td class="text-end">
<button class="btn btn-sm btn-success me-1" @onclick="() => TrustAsync(c)">Trust</button>
<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-danger" @onclick="() => DeleteRejectedAsync(c)">Delete</button>
</td>
</tr>
}
</tbody>
</table>
}
<h2 class="h4 mt-5">Trusted (@_trusted.Count)</h2>
@if (_trusted.Count == 0)
{
<p class="text-muted">No client certs have been explicitly trusted. The server's own application cert lives in <code>own/</code> and is not listed here.</p>
}
else
{
<table class="table table-sm align-middle">
<thead><tr><th>Subject</th><th>Issuer</th><th>Thumbprint</th><th>Valid</th><th class="text-end">Actions</th></tr></thead>
<tbody>
@foreach (var c in _trusted)
{
<tr>
<td>@c.Subject</td>
<td>@c.Issuer</td>
<td><code class="small">@c.Thumbprint</code></td>
<td class="small">@c.NotBefore.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd") → @c.NotAfter.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd")</td>
<td class="text-end">
<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-danger" @onclick="() => UntrustAsync(c)">Revoke</button>
</td>
</tr>
}
</tbody>
</table>
}
@code {
private IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> _rejected = [];
private IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> _trusted = [];
private string? _status;
private string _statusKind = "success";
protected override void OnInitialized() => Reload();
private void Reload()
{
_rejected = Certs.ListRejected();
_trusted = Certs.ListTrusted();
}
private async Task TrustAsync(CertInfo c)
{
if (Certs.TrustRejected(c.Thumbprint))
{
await LogActionAsync("cert.trust", c);
Set($"Trusted cert {c.Subject} ({Short(c.Thumbprint)}).", "success");
}
else
{
Set($"Could not trust {Short(c.Thumbprint)} — file missing; another admin may have already handled it.", "warning");
}
Reload();
}
private async Task DeleteRejectedAsync(CertInfo c)
{
if (Certs.DeleteRejected(c.Thumbprint))
{
await LogActionAsync("cert.delete.rejected", c);
Set($"Deleted rejected cert {c.Subject} ({Short(c.Thumbprint)}).", "success");
}
else
{
Set($"Could not delete {Short(c.Thumbprint)} — file missing.", "warning");
}
Reload();
}
private async Task UntrustAsync(CertInfo c)
{
if (Certs.UntrustCert(c.Thumbprint))
{
await LogActionAsync("cert.untrust", c);
Set($"Revoked trust for {c.Subject} ({Short(c.Thumbprint)}).", "success");
}
else
{
Set($"Could not revoke {Short(c.Thumbprint)} — file missing.", "warning");
}
Reload();
}
private async Task LogActionAsync(string action, CertInfo c)
{
// Cert trust changes are operator-initiated and security-sensitive — Serilog captures the
// user + thumbprint trail. CertTrustService also logs at Information on each filesystem
// move/delete; this line ties the action to the authenticated admin user so the two logs
// correlate. DB-level ConfigAuditLog persistence is deferred — its schema is
// cluster-scoped and cert actions are cluster-agnostic.
var state = await AuthState.GetAuthenticationStateAsync();
var user = state.User.Identity?.Name ?? "(anonymous)";
Log.LogInformation("Admin cert action: user={User} action={Action} thumbprint={Thumbprint} subject={Subject}",
user, action, c.Thumbprint, c.Subject);
}
private void Set(string message, string kind)
{
_status = message;
_statusKind = kind;
}
private void ClearStatus() => _status = null;
private static string Short(string thumbprint) =>
thumbprint.Length > 12 ? thumbprint[..12] + "…" : thumbprint;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
@page "/fleet"
@using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore
@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration
@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Entities
@inject IServiceScopeFactory ScopeFactory
@implements IDisposable
<h1 class="mb-4">Fleet status</h1>
<div class="d-flex align-items-center mb-3 gap-2">
<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-primary" @onclick="RefreshAsync" disabled="@_refreshing">
@if (_refreshing) { <span class="spinner-border spinner-border-sm me-1" /> }
Refresh
</button>
<span class="text-muted small">
Auto-refresh every @RefreshIntervalSeconds s. Last updated: @(_lastRefreshUtc?.ToString("HH:mm:ss 'UTC'") ?? "—")
</span>
</div>
@if (_rows is null)
{
<p>Loading…</p>
}
else if (_rows.Count == 0)
{
<div class="alert alert-info">
No node state recorded yet. Nodes publish their state to the central DB on each poll; if
this list is empty, either no nodes have been registered or the poller hasn't run yet.
</div>
}
else
{
<div class="row g-3 mb-4">
<div class="col-md-3">
<div class="card"><div class="card-body">
<h6 class="text-muted mb-1">Nodes</h6>
<div class="fs-3">@_rows.Count</div>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3">
<div class="card border-success"><div class="card-body">
<h6 class="text-muted mb-1">Applied</h6>
<div class="fs-3 text-success">@_rows.Count(r => r.Status == "Applied")</div>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3">
<div class="card border-warning"><div class="card-body">
<h6 class="text-muted mb-1">Stale</h6>
<div class="fs-3 text-warning">@_rows.Count(r => IsStale(r))</div>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3">
<div class="card border-danger"><div class="card-body">
<h6 class="text-muted mb-1">Failed</h6>
<div class="fs-3 text-danger">@_rows.Count(r => r.Status == "Failed")</div>
</div></div>
</div>
</div>
<table class="table table-hover align-middle">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Last applied</th>
<th>Last seen</th>
<th>Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
@foreach (var r in _rows)
{
<tr class="@RowClass(r)">
<td><code>@r.NodeId</code></td>
<td>@r.ClusterId</td>
<td>@(r.GenerationId?.ToString() ?? "—")</td>
<td>
<span class="badge @StatusBadge(r.Status)">@(r.Status ?? "—")</span>
</td>
<td>@FormatAge(r.AppliedAt)</td>
<td class="@(IsStale(r) ? "text-warning" : "")">@FormatAge(r.SeenAt)</td>
<td class="text-truncate" style="max-width: 320px;" title="@r.Error">@r.Error</td>
</tr>
}
</tbody>
</table>
}
@code {
// Refresh cadence. 5s matches FleetStatusPoller's poll interval — the dashboard always sees
// the most recent published state without polling ahead of the broadcaster.
private const int RefreshIntervalSeconds = 5;
private List<FleetNodeRow>? _rows;
private bool _refreshing;
private DateTime? _lastRefreshUtc;
private Timer? _timer;
protected override async Task OnInitializedAsync()
{
await RefreshAsync();
_timer = new Timer(async _ => await InvokeAsync(RefreshAsync),
state: null,
dueTime: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(RefreshIntervalSeconds),
period: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(RefreshIntervalSeconds));
}
private async Task RefreshAsync()
{
if (_refreshing) return;
_refreshing = true;
try
{
using var scope = ScopeFactory.CreateScope();
var db = scope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<OtOpcUaConfigDbContext>();
var rows = await db.ClusterNodeGenerationStates.AsNoTracking()
.Join(db.ClusterNodes.AsNoTracking(), s => s.NodeId, n => n.NodeId, (s, n) => new FleetNodeRow(
s.NodeId, n.ClusterId, s.CurrentGenerationId,
s.LastAppliedStatus != null ? s.LastAppliedStatus.ToString() : null,
s.LastAppliedError, s.LastAppliedAt, s.LastSeenAt))
.OrderBy(r => r.ClusterId)
.ThenBy(r => r.NodeId)
.ToListAsync();
_rows = rows;
_lastRefreshUtc = DateTime.UtcNow;
}
finally
{
_refreshing = false;
StateHasChanged();
}
}
private static bool IsStale(FleetNodeRow r)
{
if (r.SeenAt is null) return true;
return (DateTime.UtcNow - r.SeenAt.Value) > TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
}
private static string RowClass(FleetNodeRow r) => r.Status switch
{
"Failed" => "table-danger",
_ when IsStale(r) => "table-warning",
_ => "",
};
private static string StatusBadge(string? status) => status switch
{
"Applied" => "bg-success",
"Failed" => "bg-danger",
"Applying" => "bg-info",
_ => "bg-secondary",
};
private static string FormatAge(DateTime? t)
{
if (t is null) return "—";
var age = DateTime.UtcNow - t.Value;
if (age.TotalSeconds < 60) return $"{(int)age.TotalSeconds}s ago";
if (age.TotalMinutes < 60) return $"{(int)age.TotalMinutes}m ago";
if (age.TotalHours < 24) return $"{(int)age.TotalHours}h ago";
return t.Value.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm 'UTC'");
}
public void Dispose() => _timer?.Dispose();
internal sealed record FleetNodeRow(
string NodeId, string ClusterId, long? GenerationId,
string? Status, string? Error, DateTime? AppliedAt, DateTime? SeenAt);
}

View File

@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ builder.Services.AddScoped<ReservationService>();
builder.Services.AddScoped<DraftValidationService>();
builder.Services.AddScoped<AuditLogService>();
// Cert-trust management — reads the OPC UA server's PKI store root so rejected client certs
// can be promoted to trusted via the Admin UI. Singleton: no per-request state, just
// filesystem operations.
builder.Services.Configure<CertTrustOptions>(builder.Configuration.GetSection(CertTrustOptions.SectionName));
builder.Services.AddSingleton<CertTrustService>();
// LDAP auth — parity with ScadaLink's LdapAuthService (decision #102).
builder.Services.Configure<LdapOptions>(
builder.Configuration.GetSection("Authentication:Ldap"));

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services;
/// <summary>
/// Points the Admin UI at the OPC UA Server's PKI store root so
/// <see cref="CertTrustService"/> can list and move certs between the
/// <c>rejected/</c> and <c>trusted/</c> directories the server maintains. Must match the
/// <c>OpcUaServer:PkiStoreRoot</c> the Server process is configured with.
/// </summary>
public sealed class CertTrustOptions
{
public const string SectionName = "CertTrust";
/// <summary>
/// Absolute path to the PKI root. Defaults to
/// <c>%ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki</c> — matches <c>OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot</c>'s
/// default so a standard side-by-side install needs no override.
/// </summary>
public string PkiStoreRoot { get; init; } =
Path.Combine(
Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData),
"OtOpcUa", "pki");
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services;
/// <summary>
/// Metadata for a certificate file found in one of the OPC UA server's PKI stores. The
/// <see cref="FilePath"/> is the absolute path of the DER/CRT file the stack created when it
/// rejected the cert (for <see cref="CertStoreKind.Rejected"/>) or when an operator trusted
/// it (for <see cref="CertStoreKind.Trusted"/>).
/// </summary>
public sealed record CertInfo(
string Thumbprint,
string Subject,
string Issuer,
DateTime NotBefore,
DateTime NotAfter,
string FilePath,
CertStoreKind Store);
public enum CertStoreKind
{
Rejected,
Trusted,
}
/// <summary>
/// Filesystem-backed view over the OPC UA server's PKI store. The Opc.Ua stack uses a
/// Directory-typed store — each cert is a <c>.der</c> file under <c>{root}/{store}/certs/</c>
/// with a filename derived from subject + thumbprint. This service exposes operators for the
/// Admin UI: list rejected, list trusted, trust a rejected cert (move to trusted), remove a
/// rejected cert (delete), untrust a previously trusted cert (delete from trusted).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The Admin process is separate from the Server process; this service deliberately has no
/// Opc.Ua dependency — it works on the on-disk layout directly so it can run on the Admin
/// host even when the Server isn't installed locally, as long as the PKI root is reachable
/// (typical deployment has Admin + Server side-by-side on the same machine).
///
/// Trust/untrust requires the Server to re-read its trust list. The Opc.Ua stack re-reads
/// the Directory store on each new incoming connection, so there's no explicit signal
/// needed — the next client handshake picks up the change. Operators should retry the
/// rejected client's connection after trusting.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class CertTrustService
{
private readonly CertTrustOptions _options;
private readonly ILogger<CertTrustService> _logger;
public CertTrustService(IOptions<CertTrustOptions> options, ILogger<CertTrustService> logger)
{
_options = options.Value;
_logger = logger;
}
public string PkiStoreRoot => _options.PkiStoreRoot;
public IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> ListRejected() => ListStore(CertStoreKind.Rejected);
public IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> ListTrusted() => ListStore(CertStoreKind.Trusted);
/// <summary>
/// Move the cert with <paramref name="thumbprint"/> from the rejected store to the
/// trusted store. No-op returns false if the rejected file doesn't exist (already moved
/// by another operator, or thumbprint mismatch). Overwrites an existing trusted copy
/// silently — idempotent.
/// </summary>
public bool TrustRejected(string thumbprint)
{
var cert = FindInStore(CertStoreKind.Rejected, thumbprint);
if (cert is null) return false;
var trustedDir = CertsDir(CertStoreKind.Trusted);
Directory.CreateDirectory(trustedDir);
var destPath = Path.Combine(trustedDir, Path.GetFileName(cert.FilePath));
File.Move(cert.FilePath, destPath, overwrite: true);
_logger.LogInformation("Trusted cert {Thumbprint} (subject={Subject}) — moved {From} → {To}",
cert.Thumbprint, cert.Subject, cert.FilePath, destPath);
return true;
}
public bool DeleteRejected(string thumbprint) => DeleteFromStore(CertStoreKind.Rejected, thumbprint);
public bool UntrustCert(string thumbprint) => DeleteFromStore(CertStoreKind.Trusted, thumbprint);
private bool DeleteFromStore(CertStoreKind store, string thumbprint)
{
var cert = FindInStore(store, thumbprint);
if (cert is null) return false;
File.Delete(cert.FilePath);
_logger.LogInformation("Deleted cert {Thumbprint} (subject={Subject}) from {Store} store",
cert.Thumbprint, cert.Subject, store);
return true;
}
private CertInfo? FindInStore(CertStoreKind store, string thumbprint) =>
ListStore(store).FirstOrDefault(c =>
string.Equals(c.Thumbprint, thumbprint, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
private IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> ListStore(CertStoreKind store)
{
var dir = CertsDir(store);
if (!Directory.Exists(dir)) return [];
var results = new List<CertInfo>();
foreach (var path in Directory.EnumerateFiles(dir))
{
// Skip CRL sidecars + private-key files — trust operations only concern public certs.
var ext = Path.GetExtension(path);
if (!ext.Equals(".der", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
!ext.Equals(".crt", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
!ext.Equals(".cer", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
continue;
}
try
{
var cert = X509CertificateLoader.LoadCertificateFromFile(path);
results.Add(new CertInfo(
cert.Thumbprint, cert.Subject, cert.Issuer,
cert.NotBefore.ToUniversalTime(), cert.NotAfter.ToUniversalTime(),
path, store));
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
// A malformed file in the store shouldn't take down the page. Surface it in logs
// but skip — operators see the other certs and can clean the bad file manually.
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "Failed to parse cert at {Path} — skipping", path);
}
}
return results;
}
private string CertsDir(CertStoreKind store) =>
Path.Combine(_options.PkiStoreRoot, store == CertStoreKind.Rejected ? "rejected" : "trusted", "certs");
}

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus;
/// </remarks>
public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId,
Func<ModbusDriverOptions, IModbusTransport>? transportFactory = null)
: IDriver, ITagDiscovery, IReadable, IWritable, ISubscribable, IDisposable, IAsyncDisposable
: IDriver, ITagDiscovery, IReadable, IWritable, ISubscribable, IHostConnectivityProbe, IDisposable, IAsyncDisposable
{
// Active polling subscriptions. Each subscription owns a background Task that polls the
// tags at its configured interval, diffs against _lastKnownValues, and fires OnDataChange
@@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
private long _nextSubscriptionId;
public event EventHandler<DataChangeEventArgs>? OnDataChange;
public event EventHandler<HostStatusChangedEventArgs>? OnHostStatusChanged;
// Single-host probe state — Modbus driver talks to exactly one endpoint so the "hosts"
// collection has at most one entry. HostName is the Host:Port string so the Admin UI can
// display the PLC endpoint uniformly with Galaxy platforms/engines.
private readonly object _probeLock = new();
private HostState _hostState = HostState.Unknown;
private DateTime _hostStateChangedUtc = DateTime.UtcNow;
private CancellationTokenSource? _probeCts;
private readonly ModbusDriverOptions _options = options;
private readonly Func<ModbusDriverOptions, IModbusTransport> _transportFactory =
transportFactory ?? (o => new ModbusTcpTransport(o.Host, o.Port, o.Timeout));
@@ -46,6 +55,15 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
await _transport.ConnectAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
foreach (var t in _options.Tags) _tagsByName[t.Name] = t;
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Healthy, DateTime.UtcNow, null);
// PR 23: kick off the probe loop once the transport is up. Initial state stays
// Unknown until the first probe tick succeeds — avoids broadcasting a premature
// Running transition before any register round-trip has happened.
if (_options.Probe.Enabled)
{
_probeCts = new CancellationTokenSource();
_ = Task.Run(() => ProbeLoopAsync(_probeCts.Token), _probeCts.Token);
}
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
@@ -62,6 +80,10 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
public async Task ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
try { _probeCts?.Cancel(); } catch { }
_probeCts?.Dispose();
_probeCts = null;
foreach (var state in _subscriptions.Values)
{
try { state.Cts.Cancel(); } catch { }
@@ -147,14 +169,14 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
case ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters:
case ModbusRegion.InputRegisters:
{
var quantity = RegisterCount(tag.DataType);
var quantity = RegisterCount(tag);
var fc = tag.Region == ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters ? (byte)0x03 : (byte)0x04;
var pdu = new byte[] { fc, (byte)(tag.Address >> 8), (byte)(tag.Address & 0xFF),
(byte)(quantity >> 8), (byte)(quantity & 0xFF) };
var resp = await transport.SendAsync(_options.UnitId, pdu, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
// resp = [fc][byte-count][data...]
var data = new ReadOnlySpan<byte>(resp, 2, resp[1]);
return DecodeRegister(data, tag.DataType);
return DecodeRegister(data, tag);
}
default:
throw new InvalidOperationException($"Unknown region {tag.Region}");
@@ -208,7 +230,7 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
}
case ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters:
{
var bytes = EncodeRegister(value, tag.DataType);
var bytes = EncodeRegister(value, tag);
if (bytes.Length == 2)
{
var pdu = new byte[] { 0x06, (byte)(tag.Address >> 8), (byte)(tag.Address & 0xFF),
@@ -313,75 +335,235 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriver(ModbusDriverOptions options, string driverInsta
public string DiagnosticId => $"modbus-sub-{Id}";
}
// ---- IHostConnectivityProbe ----
public IReadOnlyList<HostConnectivityStatus> GetHostStatuses()
{
lock (_probeLock)
return [new HostConnectivityStatus(HostName, _hostState, _hostStateChangedUtc)];
}
/// <summary>
/// Host identifier surfaced to <c>IHostConnectivityProbe.GetHostStatuses</c> and the Admin UI.
/// Formatted as <c>host:port</c> so multiple Modbus drivers in the same server disambiguate
/// by endpoint without needing the driver-instance-id in the Admin dashboard.
/// </summary>
public string HostName => $"{_options.Host}:{_options.Port}";
private async Task ProbeLoopAsync(CancellationToken ct)
{
var transport = _transport; // captured reference; disposal tears the loop down via ct
while (!ct.IsCancellationRequested)
{
var success = false;
try
{
using var probeCts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(ct);
probeCts.CancelAfter(_options.Probe.Timeout);
var pdu = new byte[] { 0x03,
(byte)(_options.Probe.ProbeAddress >> 8),
(byte)(_options.Probe.ProbeAddress & 0xFF), 0x00, 0x01 };
_ = await transport!.SendAsync(_options.UnitId, pdu, probeCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
success = true;
}
catch (OperationCanceledException) when (ct.IsCancellationRequested)
{
return;
}
catch
{
// transport / timeout / exception PDU — treated as Stopped below
}
TransitionTo(success ? HostState.Running : HostState.Stopped);
try { await Task.Delay(_options.Probe.Interval, ct).ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch (OperationCanceledException) { return; }
}
}
private void TransitionTo(HostState newState)
{
HostState old;
lock (_probeLock)
{
old = _hostState;
if (old == newState) return;
_hostState = newState;
_hostStateChangedUtc = DateTime.UtcNow;
}
OnHostStatusChanged?.Invoke(this, new HostStatusChangedEventArgs(HostName, old, newState));
}
// ---- codec ----
internal static ushort RegisterCount(ModbusDataType t) => t switch
/// <summary>
/// How many 16-bit registers a given tag occupies. Accounts for multi-register logical
/// types (Int32/Float32 = 2 regs, Int64/Float64 = 4 regs) and for strings (rounded up
/// from 2 chars per register).
/// </summary>
internal static ushort RegisterCount(ModbusTagDefinition tag) => tag.DataType switch
{
ModbusDataType.Int16 or ModbusDataType.UInt16 => 1,
ModbusDataType.Int16 or ModbusDataType.UInt16 or ModbusDataType.BitInRegister => 1,
ModbusDataType.Int32 or ModbusDataType.UInt32 or ModbusDataType.Float32 => 2,
_ => throw new InvalidOperationException($"Non-register data type {t}"),
ModbusDataType.Int64 or ModbusDataType.UInt64 or ModbusDataType.Float64 => 4,
ModbusDataType.String => (ushort)((tag.StringLength + 1) / 2), // 2 chars per register
_ => throw new InvalidOperationException($"Non-register data type {tag.DataType}"),
};
internal static object DecodeRegister(ReadOnlySpan<byte> data, ModbusDataType t) => t switch
/// <summary>
/// Word-swap the input into the big-endian layout the decoders expect. For 2-register
/// types this reverses the two words; for 4-register types it reverses the four words
/// (PLC stored [hi-mid, low-mid, hi-high, low-high] → memory [hi-high, low-high, hi-mid, low-mid]).
/// </summary>
private static byte[] NormalizeWordOrder(ReadOnlySpan<byte> data, ModbusByteOrder order)
{
ModbusDataType.Int16 => BinaryPrimitives.ReadInt16BigEndian(data),
ModbusDataType.UInt16 => BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(data),
ModbusDataType.Int32 => BinaryPrimitives.ReadInt32BigEndian(data),
ModbusDataType.UInt32 => BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32BigEndian(data),
ModbusDataType.Float32 => BinaryPrimitives.ReadSingleBigEndian(data),
_ => throw new InvalidOperationException($"Non-register data type {t}"),
};
if (order == ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian) return data.ToArray();
var result = new byte[data.Length];
for (var word = 0; word < data.Length / 2; word++)
{
var srcWord = data.Length / 2 - 1 - word;
result[word * 2] = data[srcWord * 2];
result[word * 2 + 1] = data[srcWord * 2 + 1];
}
return result;
}
internal static byte[] EncodeRegister(object? value, ModbusDataType t)
internal static object DecodeRegister(ReadOnlySpan<byte> data, ModbusTagDefinition tag)
{
switch (t)
switch (tag.DataType)
{
case ModbusDataType.Int16: return BinaryPrimitives.ReadInt16BigEndian(data);
case ModbusDataType.UInt16: return BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(data);
case ModbusDataType.BitInRegister:
{
var raw = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(data);
return (raw & (1 << tag.BitIndex)) != 0;
}
case ModbusDataType.Int32:
{
var b = NormalizeWordOrder(data, tag.ByteOrder);
return BinaryPrimitives.ReadInt32BigEndian(b);
}
case ModbusDataType.UInt32:
{
var b = NormalizeWordOrder(data, tag.ByteOrder);
return BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32BigEndian(b);
}
case ModbusDataType.Float32:
{
var b = NormalizeWordOrder(data, tag.ByteOrder);
return BinaryPrimitives.ReadSingleBigEndian(b);
}
case ModbusDataType.Int64:
{
var b = NormalizeWordOrder(data, tag.ByteOrder);
return BinaryPrimitives.ReadInt64BigEndian(b);
}
case ModbusDataType.UInt64:
{
var b = NormalizeWordOrder(data, tag.ByteOrder);
return BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt64BigEndian(b);
}
case ModbusDataType.Float64:
{
var b = NormalizeWordOrder(data, tag.ByteOrder);
return BinaryPrimitives.ReadDoubleBigEndian(b);
}
case ModbusDataType.String:
{
// ASCII, 2 chars per register, packed high byte = first char.
// Respect the caller's StringLength (truncate nul-padded regions).
var chars = new char[tag.StringLength];
for (var i = 0; i < tag.StringLength; i++)
{
var b = data[i];
if (b == 0) { return new string(chars, 0, i); }
chars[i] = (char)b;
}
return new string(chars);
}
default:
throw new InvalidOperationException($"Non-register data type {tag.DataType}");
}
}
internal static byte[] EncodeRegister(object? value, ModbusTagDefinition tag)
{
switch (tag.DataType)
{
case ModbusDataType.Int16:
{
var v = Convert.ToInt16(value);
var b = new byte[2];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteInt16BigEndian(b, v);
return b;
var b = new byte[2]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteInt16BigEndian(b, v); return b;
}
case ModbusDataType.UInt16:
{
var v = Convert.ToUInt16(value);
var b = new byte[2];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(b, v);
return b;
var b = new byte[2]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(b, v); return b;
}
case ModbusDataType.Int32:
{
var v = Convert.ToInt32(value);
var b = new byte[4];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteInt32BigEndian(b, v);
return b;
var b = new byte[4]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteInt32BigEndian(b, v);
return NormalizeWordOrder(b, tag.ByteOrder);
}
case ModbusDataType.UInt32:
{
var v = Convert.ToUInt32(value);
var b = new byte[4];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(b, v);
return b;
var b = new byte[4]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(b, v);
return NormalizeWordOrder(b, tag.ByteOrder);
}
case ModbusDataType.Float32:
{
var v = Convert.ToSingle(value);
var b = new byte[4];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteSingleBigEndian(b, v);
var b = new byte[4]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteSingleBigEndian(b, v);
return NormalizeWordOrder(b, tag.ByteOrder);
}
case ModbusDataType.Int64:
{
var v = Convert.ToInt64(value);
var b = new byte[8]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteInt64BigEndian(b, v);
return NormalizeWordOrder(b, tag.ByteOrder);
}
case ModbusDataType.UInt64:
{
var v = Convert.ToUInt64(value);
var b = new byte[8]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt64BigEndian(b, v);
return NormalizeWordOrder(b, tag.ByteOrder);
}
case ModbusDataType.Float64:
{
var v = Convert.ToDouble(value);
var b = new byte[8]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteDoubleBigEndian(b, v);
return NormalizeWordOrder(b, tag.ByteOrder);
}
case ModbusDataType.String:
{
var s = Convert.ToString(value) ?? string.Empty;
var regs = (tag.StringLength + 1) / 2;
var b = new byte[regs * 2];
for (var i = 0; i < tag.StringLength && i < s.Length; i++) b[i] = (byte)s[i];
// remaining bytes stay 0 — nul-padded per PLC convention
return b;
}
case ModbusDataType.BitInRegister:
throw new InvalidOperationException(
"BitInRegister writes require a read-modify-write; not supported in PR 24 (separate follow-up).");
default:
throw new InvalidOperationException($"Non-register data type {t}");
throw new InvalidOperationException($"Non-register data type {tag.DataType}");
}
}
private static DriverDataType MapDataType(ModbusDataType t) => t switch
{
ModbusDataType.Bool => DriverDataType.Boolean,
ModbusDataType.Bool or ModbusDataType.BitInRegister => DriverDataType.Boolean,
ModbusDataType.Int16 or ModbusDataType.Int32 => DriverDataType.Int32,
ModbusDataType.UInt16 or ModbusDataType.UInt32 => DriverDataType.Int32,
ModbusDataType.Int64 or ModbusDataType.UInt64 => DriverDataType.Int32, // widening to Int32 loses precision; PR 25 adds Int64 to DriverDataType
ModbusDataType.Float32 => DriverDataType.Float32,
ModbusDataType.Float64 => DriverDataType.Float64,
ModbusDataType.String => DriverDataType.String,
_ => DriverDataType.Int32,
};

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus;
/// <summary>
@@ -14,11 +16,31 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriverOptions
/// <summary>Pre-declared tag map. Modbus has no discovery protocol — the driver returns exactly these.</summary>
public IReadOnlyList<ModbusTagDefinition> Tags { get; init; } = [];
/// <summary>
/// Background connectivity-probe settings. When <see cref="ModbusProbeOptions.Enabled"/>
/// is true the driver runs a tick loop that issues a cheap FC03 at register 0 every
/// <see cref="ModbusProbeOptions.Interval"/> and raises <c>OnHostStatusChanged</c> on
/// Running ↔ Stopped transitions. The Admin UI / OPC UA clients see the state through
/// <see cref="IHostConnectivityProbe"/>.
/// </summary>
public ModbusProbeOptions Probe { get; init; } = new();
}
public sealed class ModbusProbeOptions
{
public bool Enabled { get; init; } = true;
public TimeSpan Interval { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5);
public TimeSpan Timeout { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2);
/// <summary>Register to read for the probe. Zero is usually safe; override for PLCs that lock register 0.</summary>
public ushort ProbeAddress { get; init; } = 0;
}
/// <summary>
/// One Modbus-backed OPC UA variable. Address is zero-based (Modbus spec numbering, not
/// the documentation's 1-based coil/register conventions).
/// the documentation's 1-based coil/register conventions). Multi-register types
/// (Int32/UInt32/Float32 = 2 regs; Int64/UInt64/Float64 = 4 regs) respect the
/// <see cref="ByteOrder"/> field — real-world PLCs disagree on word ordering.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="Name">
/// Tag name, used for both the OPC UA browse name and the driver's full reference. Must be
@@ -26,14 +48,50 @@ public sealed class ModbusDriverOptions
/// </param>
/// <param name="Region">Coils / DiscreteInputs / InputRegisters / HoldingRegisters.</param>
/// <param name="Address">Zero-based address within the region.</param>
/// <param name="DataType">Logical data type. Int16/UInt16 = single register; Int32/UInt32/Float32 = two registers big-endian.</param>
/// <param name="DataType">
/// Logical data type. See <see cref="ModbusDataType"/> for the register count each encodes.
/// </param>
/// <param name="Writable">When true and Region supports writes (Coils / HoldingRegisters), IWritable routes writes here.</param>
/// <param name="ByteOrder">Word ordering for multi-register types. Ignored for Bool / Int16 / UInt16 / BitInRegister / String.</param>
/// <param name="BitIndex">For <c>DataType = BitInRegister</c>: which bit of the holding register (0-15, LSB-first).</param>
/// <param name="StringLength">For <c>DataType = String</c>: number of ASCII characters (2 per register, rounded up).</param>
public sealed record ModbusTagDefinition(
string Name,
ModbusRegion Region,
ushort Address,
ModbusDataType DataType,
bool Writable = true);
bool Writable = true,
ModbusByteOrder ByteOrder = ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian,
byte BitIndex = 0,
ushort StringLength = 0);
public enum ModbusRegion { Coils, DiscreteInputs, InputRegisters, HoldingRegisters }
public enum ModbusDataType { Bool, Int16, UInt16, Int32, UInt32, Float32 }
public enum ModbusDataType
{
Bool,
Int16,
UInt16,
Int32,
UInt32,
Int64,
UInt64,
Float32,
Float64,
/// <summary>Single bit within a holding register. <see cref="ModbusTagDefinition.BitIndex"/> selects 0-15 LSB-first.</summary>
BitInRegister,
/// <summary>ASCII string packed 2 chars per register, <see cref="ModbusTagDefinition.StringLength"/> characters long.</summary>
String,
}
/// <summary>
/// Word ordering for multi-register types. Modbus TCP standard is <see cref="BigEndian"/>
/// (ABCD for 32-bit: high word at the lower address). Many PLCs — Siemens S7, several
/// Allen-Bradley series, some Modicon families — use <see cref="WordSwap"/> (CDAB), which
/// keeps bytes big-endian within each register but reverses the word pair(s).
/// </summary>
public enum ModbusByteOrder
{
BigEndian,
WordSwap,
}

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Opc.Ua;
using Opc.Ua.Server;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
using DriverWriteRequest = ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions.WriteRequest;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.OpcUa;
@@ -35,6 +36,12 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
private FolderState? _driverRoot;
private readonly Dictionary<string, BaseDataVariableState> _variablesByFullRef = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
// PR 26: SecurityClassification per variable, populated during Variable() registration.
// OnWriteValue looks up the classification here to gate the write by the session's roles.
// Drivers never enforce authz themselves — the classification is discovery-time metadata
// only (feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md).
private readonly Dictionary<string, SecurityClassification> _securityByFullRef = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
// Active building folder — set per Folder() call so Variable() lands under the right parent.
// A stack would support nested folders; we use a single current folder because IAddressSpaceBuilder
// returns a child builder per Folder call and the caller threads nesting through those references.
@@ -122,6 +129,7 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
_currentFolder.AddChild(v);
AddPredefinedNode(SystemContext, v);
_variablesByFullRef[attributeInfo.FullName] = v;
_securityByFullRef[attributeInfo.FullName] = attributeInfo.SecurityClass;
v.OnReadValue = OnReadValue;
v.OnWriteValue = OnWriteValue;
@@ -337,6 +345,22 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
var fullRef = node.NodeId.Identifier as string;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(fullRef)) return StatusCodes.BadNodeIdUnknown;
// PR 26: server-layer write authorization. Look up the attribute's classification
// (populated during Variable() in Discover) and check the session's roles against the
// policy table. Drivers don't participate in this decision — IWritable.WriteAsync
// never sees a request we'd have refused here.
if (_securityByFullRef.TryGetValue(fullRef!, out var classification))
{
var roles = context.UserIdentity is IRoleBearer rb ? rb.Roles : [];
if (!WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(classification, roles))
{
_logger.LogInformation(
"Write denied for {FullRef}: classification={Classification} userRoles=[{Roles}]",
fullRef, classification, string.Join(",", roles));
return new ServiceResult(StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied);
}
}
try
{
var results = _writable.WriteAsync(

View File

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaServer : StandardServer
/// managers can gate writes by role via <c>session.Identity</c>. Anonymous identity still
/// uses the stack's default.
/// </summary>
private sealed class RoleBasedIdentity : UserIdentity
private sealed class RoleBasedIdentity : UserIdentity, IRoleBearer
{
public IReadOnlyList<string> Roles { get; }
public string? Display { get; }

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
/// <summary>
/// Minimal interface a <see cref="Opc.Ua.IUserIdentity"/> implementation can expose so
/// <see cref="ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.OpcUa.DriverNodeManager"/> can read the session's
/// resolved roles without a hard dependency on any specific identity subtype. Implemented
/// by <c>OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity</c>; tests implement it with stub identities to
/// drive the authz policy under different role sets.
/// </summary>
public interface IRoleBearer
{
IReadOnlyList<string> Roles { get; }
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
/// <summary>
/// Server-layer write-authorization policy. ACL enforcement lives here — drivers report
/// <see cref="SecurityClassification"/> as discovery metadata only; the server decides
/// whether a given session is allowed to write a given attribute by checking the session's
/// roles (resolved at login via <see cref="LdapUserAuthenticator"/>) against the required
/// role for the attribute's classification.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Matches the table in <c>docs/Configuration.md</c>:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><c>FreeAccess</c>: no role required — anonymous sessions can write (matches v1 default).</item>
/// <item><c>Operate</c> / <c>SecuredWrite</c>: <c>WriteOperate</c> role required.</item>
/// <item><c>Tune</c>: <c>WriteTune</c> role required.</item>
/// <item><c>VerifiedWrite</c> / <c>Configure</c>: <c>WriteConfigure</c> role required.</item>
/// <item><c>ViewOnly</c>: no role grants write access.</item>
/// </list>
/// <c>AlarmAck</c> is checked at the alarm-acknowledge path, not here.
/// </remarks>
public static class WriteAuthzPolicy
{
public const string RoleWriteOperate = "WriteOperate";
public const string RoleWriteTune = "WriteTune";
public const string RoleWriteConfigure = "WriteConfigure";
/// <summary>
/// Decide whether a session with <paramref name="userRoles"/> is allowed to write to an
/// attribute with the given <paramref name="classification"/>. Returns true for
/// <c>FreeAccess</c> regardless of roles (including empty / anonymous sessions) and
/// false for <c>ViewOnly</c> regardless of roles. Every other classification requires
/// the session to carry the mapped role — case-insensitive match.
/// </summary>
public static bool IsAllowed(SecurityClassification classification, IReadOnlyCollection<string> userRoles)
{
if (classification == SecurityClassification.FreeAccess) return true;
if (classification == SecurityClassification.ViewOnly) return false;
var required = RequiredRole(classification);
if (required is null) return false;
foreach (var r in userRoles)
{
if (string.Equals(r, required, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
return true;
}
return false;
}
/// <summary>
/// Required role for a classification, or null when no role grants access
/// (<see cref="SecurityClassification.ViewOnly"/>) or no role is needed
/// (<see cref="SecurityClassification.FreeAccess"/> — also returns null; callers use
/// <see cref="IsAllowed"/> which handles the special-cases rather than branching on
/// null themselves).
/// </summary>
public static string? RequiredRole(SecurityClassification classification) => classification switch
{
SecurityClassification.FreeAccess => null, // IsAllowed short-circuits
SecurityClassification.Operate => RoleWriteOperate,
SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite => RoleWriteOperate,
SecurityClassification.Tune => RoleWriteTune,
SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite => RoleWriteConfigure,
SecurityClassification.Configure => RoleWriteConfigure,
SecurityClassification.ViewOnly => null, // IsAllowed short-circuits
_ => null,
};
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class CertTrustServiceTests : IDisposable
{
private readonly string _root;
public CertTrustServiceTests()
{
_root = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-cert-test-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(_root, "rejected", "certs"));
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(_root, "trusted", "certs"));
}
public void Dispose()
{
if (Directory.Exists(_root)) Directory.Delete(_root, recursive: true);
}
private CertTrustService Service() => new(
Options.Create(new CertTrustOptions { PkiStoreRoot = _root }),
NullLogger<CertTrustService>.Instance);
private X509Certificate2 WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind kind, string subject)
{
using var rsa = RSA.Create(2048);
var req = new CertificateRequest($"CN={subject}", rsa, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, RSASignaturePadding.Pkcs1);
var cert = req.CreateSelfSigned(DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(-1), DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddYears(1));
var dir = Path.Combine(_root, kind == CertStoreKind.Rejected ? "rejected" : "trusted", "certs");
var path = Path.Combine(dir, $"{subject} [{cert.Thumbprint}].der");
File.WriteAllBytes(path, cert.Export(X509ContentType.Cert));
return cert;
}
[Fact]
public void ListRejected_returns_parsed_cert_info_for_each_der_in_rejected_certs_dir()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "test-client-A");
var rows = Service().ListRejected();
rows.Count.ShouldBe(1);
rows[0].Thumbprint.ShouldBe(c.Thumbprint);
rows[0].Subject.ShouldContain("test-client-A");
rows[0].Store.ShouldBe(CertStoreKind.Rejected);
}
[Fact]
public void ListTrusted_is_separate_from_rejected()
{
WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "rej");
WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Trusted, "trust");
var svc = Service();
svc.ListRejected().Count.ShouldBe(1);
svc.ListTrusted().Count.ShouldBe(1);
svc.ListRejected()[0].Subject.ShouldContain("rej");
svc.ListTrusted()[0].Subject.ShouldContain("trust");
}
[Fact]
public void TrustRejected_moves_file_from_rejected_to_trusted()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "promoteme");
var svc = Service();
svc.TrustRejected(c.Thumbprint).ShouldBeTrue();
svc.ListRejected().ShouldBeEmpty();
var trusted = svc.ListTrusted();
trusted.Count.ShouldBe(1);
trusted[0].Thumbprint.ShouldBe(c.Thumbprint);
}
[Fact]
public void TrustRejected_returns_false_when_thumbprint_not_in_rejected()
{
var svc = Service();
svc.TrustRejected("00DEADBEEF00DEADBEEF00DEADBEEF00DEADBEEF").ShouldBeFalse();
}
[Fact]
public void DeleteRejected_removes_the_file()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "killme");
var svc = Service();
svc.DeleteRejected(c.Thumbprint).ShouldBeTrue();
svc.ListRejected().ShouldBeEmpty();
}
[Fact]
public void UntrustCert_removes_from_trusted_only()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Trusted, "revoke");
var svc = Service();
svc.UntrustCert(c.Thumbprint).ShouldBeTrue();
svc.ListTrusted().ShouldBeEmpty();
}
[Fact]
public void Thumbprint_match_is_case_insensitive()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "case");
var svc = Service();
// X509Certificate2.Thumbprint is upper-case hex; operators pasting from logs often
// lowercase it. IsAllowed-style case-insensitive match keeps the UX forgiving.
svc.TrustRejected(c.Thumbprint.ToLowerInvariant()).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Missing_store_directories_produce_empty_lists_not_exceptions()
{
// Fresh root with no certs subfolder — service should tolerate a pristine install.
var altRoot = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-cert-empty-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
try
{
var svc = new CertTrustService(
Options.Create(new CertTrustOptions { PkiStoreRoot = altRoot }),
NullLogger<CertTrustService>.Instance);
svc.ListRejected().ShouldBeEmpty();
svc.ListTrusted().ShouldBeEmpty();
}
finally
{
if (Directory.Exists(altRoot)) Directory.Delete(altRoot, recursive: true);
}
}
[Fact]
public void Malformed_file_is_skipped_not_fatal()
{
// Drop junk bytes that don't parse as a cert into the rejected/certs directory. The
// service must skip it and still return the valid certs — one bad file can't take the
// whole management page offline.
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(_root, "rejected", "certs", "junk.der"), "not a cert");
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "valid");
var rows = Service().ListRejected();
rows.Count.ShouldBe(1);
rows[0].Thumbprint.ShouldBe(c.Thumbprint);
}
}

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using System.Buffers.Binary;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class ModbusDataTypeTests
{
/// <summary>
/// Register-count lookup is per-tag now (strings need StringLength; Int64/Float64 need 4).
/// </summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData(ModbusDataType.BitInRegister, 1)]
[InlineData(ModbusDataType.Int16, 1)]
[InlineData(ModbusDataType.UInt16, 1)]
[InlineData(ModbusDataType.Int32, 2)]
[InlineData(ModbusDataType.UInt32, 2)]
[InlineData(ModbusDataType.Float32, 2)]
[InlineData(ModbusDataType.Int64, 4)]
[InlineData(ModbusDataType.UInt64, 4)]
[InlineData(ModbusDataType.Float64, 4)]
public void RegisterCount_returns_correct_register_count_per_type(ModbusDataType t, int expected)
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, t);
ModbusDriver.RegisterCount(tag).ShouldBe((ushort)expected);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(0, 1)] // 0 chars → still 1 byte / 1 register (pathological but well-defined: length 0 is 0 bytes)
[InlineData(1, 1)]
[InlineData(2, 1)]
[InlineData(3, 2)]
[InlineData(10, 5)]
public void RegisterCount_for_String_rounds_up_to_register_pair(ushort chars, int expectedRegs)
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.String, StringLength: chars);
// 0-char is encoded as 0 regs; the test case expects 1 for lengths 1-2, 2 for 3-4, etc.
if (chars == 0) ModbusDriver.RegisterCount(tag).ShouldBe((ushort)0);
else ModbusDriver.RegisterCount(tag).ShouldBe((ushort)expectedRegs);
}
// --- Int32 / UInt32 / Float32 with byte-order variants ---
[Fact]
public void Int32_BigEndian_decodes_ABCD_layout()
{
// Value 0x12345678 → bytes [0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78] as PLC wrote them.
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Int32,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.BigEndian);
var bytes = new byte[] { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78 };
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(bytes, tag).ShouldBe(0x12345678);
}
[Fact]
public void Int32_WordSwap_decodes_CDAB_layout()
{
// Siemens/AB PLC stored 0x12345678 as register[0] = 0x5678, register[1] = 0x1234.
// Wire bytes are [0x56, 0x78, 0x12, 0x34]; with ByteOrder=WordSwap we get 0x12345678 back.
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Int32,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap);
var bytes = new byte[] { 0x56, 0x78, 0x12, 0x34 };
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(bytes, tag).ShouldBe(0x12345678);
}
[Fact]
public void Float32_WordSwap_encode_decode_roundtrips()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Float32,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap);
var wire = ModbusDriver.EncodeRegister(25.5f, tag);
wire.Length.ShouldBe(4);
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(wire, tag).ShouldBe(25.5f);
}
// --- Int64 / UInt64 / Float64 ---
[Fact]
public void Int64_BigEndian_roundtrips()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Int64);
var wire = ModbusDriver.EncodeRegister(0x0123456789ABCDEFL, tag);
wire.Length.ShouldBe(8);
BinaryPrimitives.ReadInt64BigEndian(wire).ShouldBe(0x0123456789ABCDEFL);
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(wire, tag).ShouldBe(0x0123456789ABCDEFL);
}
[Fact]
public void UInt64_WordSwap_reverses_four_words()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.UInt64,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap);
var value = 0xAABBCCDDEEFF0011UL;
var wireBE = new byte[8];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt64BigEndian(wireBE, value);
// Word-swap layout: [word3, word2, word1, word0] where each word keeps its bytes big-endian.
var wireWS = new byte[] { wireBE[6], wireBE[7], wireBE[4], wireBE[5], wireBE[2], wireBE[3], wireBE[0], wireBE[1] };
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(wireWS, tag).ShouldBe(value);
var roundtrip = ModbusDriver.EncodeRegister(value, tag);
roundtrip.ShouldBe(wireWS);
}
[Fact]
public void Float64_roundtrips_under_word_swap()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.Float64,
ByteOrder: ModbusByteOrder.WordSwap);
var wire = ModbusDriver.EncodeRegister(3.14159265358979d, tag);
wire.Length.ShouldBe(8);
((double)ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(wire, tag)!).ShouldBe(3.14159265358979d, tolerance: 1e-12);
}
// --- BitInRegister ---
[Theory]
[InlineData(0b0000_0000_0000_0001, 0, true)]
[InlineData(0b0000_0000_0000_0001, 1, false)]
[InlineData(0b1000_0000_0000_0000, 15, true)]
[InlineData(0b0100_0000_0100_0000, 6, true)]
[InlineData(0b0100_0000_0100_0000, 14, true)]
[InlineData(0b0100_0000_0100_0000, 7, false)]
public void BitInRegister_extracts_bit_at_index(ushort raw, byte bitIndex, bool expected)
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.BitInRegister,
BitIndex: bitIndex);
var bytes = new byte[] { (byte)(raw >> 8), (byte)(raw & 0xFF) };
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(bytes, tag).ShouldBe(expected);
}
[Fact]
public void BitInRegister_write_is_not_supported_in_PR24()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.BitInRegister,
BitIndex: 5);
Should.Throw<InvalidOperationException>(() => ModbusDriver.EncodeRegister(true, tag))
.Message.ShouldContain("read-modify-write");
}
// --- String ---
[Fact]
public void String_decodes_ASCII_packed_two_chars_per_register()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.String,
StringLength: 6);
// "HELLO!" = 0x48 0x45 0x4C 0x4C 0x4F 0x21 across 3 registers.
var bytes = "HELLO!"u8.ToArray();
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(bytes, tag).ShouldBe("HELLO!");
}
[Fact]
public void String_decode_truncates_at_first_nul()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.String,
StringLength: 10);
var bytes = new byte[] { 0x48, 0x69, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
ModbusDriver.DecodeRegister(bytes, tag).ShouldBe("Hi");
}
[Fact]
public void String_encode_nul_pads_remaining_bytes()
{
var tag = new ModbusTagDefinition("T", ModbusRegion.HoldingRegisters, 0, ModbusDataType.String,
StringLength: 8);
var wire = ModbusDriver.EncodeRegister("Hi", tag);
wire.Length.ShouldBe(8);
wire[0].ShouldBe((byte)'H');
wire[1].ShouldBe((byte)'i');
for (var i = 2; i < 8; i++) wire[i].ShouldBe((byte)0);
}
}

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using System.Collections.Concurrent;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Modbus.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class ModbusProbeTests
{
/// <summary>
/// Transport fake the probe tests flip between "responding" and "unreachable" to
/// exercise the state machine. Calls to SendAsync with FC=0x03 count as probe traffic
/// (the driver's probe loop issues exactly that shape).
/// </summary>
private sealed class FlappyTransport : IModbusTransport
{
public volatile bool Reachable = true;
public int ProbeCount;
public Task ConnectAsync(CancellationToken ct) => Task.CompletedTask;
public Task<byte[]> SendAsync(byte unitId, byte[] pdu, CancellationToken ct)
{
if (pdu[0] == 0x03) Interlocked.Increment(ref ProbeCount);
if (!Reachable)
return Task.FromException<byte[]>(new IOException("transport unreachable"));
// Happy path — return a valid FC03 response for 1 register at addr.
if (pdu[0] == 0x03)
{
var qty = (ushort)((pdu[3] << 8) | pdu[4]);
var resp = new byte[2 + qty * 2];
resp[0] = 0x03;
resp[1] = (byte)(qty * 2);
return Task.FromResult(resp);
}
return Task.FromException<byte[]>(new NotSupportedException());
}
public ValueTask DisposeAsync() => ValueTask.CompletedTask;
}
private static (ModbusDriver drv, FlappyTransport fake) NewDriver(ModbusProbeOptions probe)
{
var fake = new FlappyTransport();
var opts = new ModbusDriverOptions { Host = "fake", Port = 502, Probe = probe };
return (new ModbusDriver(opts, "modbus-1", _ => fake), fake);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Initial_state_is_Unknown_before_first_probe_tick()
{
var (drv, _) = NewDriver(new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false });
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
var statuses = drv.GetHostStatuses();
statuses.Count.ShouldBe(1);
statuses[0].State.ShouldBe(HostState.Unknown);
statuses[0].HostName.ShouldBe("fake:502");
}
[Fact]
public async Task First_successful_probe_transitions_to_Running()
{
var (drv, fake) = NewDriver(new ModbusProbeOptions
{
Enabled = true,
Interval = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(150),
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1),
});
var transitions = new ConcurrentQueue<HostStatusChangedEventArgs>();
drv.OnHostStatusChanged += (_, e) => transitions.Enqueue(e);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
// Wait for the first probe to complete.
var deadline = DateTime.UtcNow + TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2);
while (fake.ProbeCount == 0 && DateTime.UtcNow < deadline) await Task.Delay(25);
// Then wait for the event to actually arrive.
deadline = DateTime.UtcNow + TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1);
while (transitions.Count == 0 && DateTime.UtcNow < deadline) await Task.Delay(25);
transitions.Count.ShouldBeGreaterThanOrEqualTo(1);
transitions.TryDequeue(out var t).ShouldBeTrue();
t!.OldState.ShouldBe(HostState.Unknown);
t.NewState.ShouldBe(HostState.Running);
drv.GetHostStatuses()[0].State.ShouldBe(HostState.Running);
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Transport_failure_transitions_to_Stopped()
{
var (drv, fake) = NewDriver(new ModbusProbeOptions
{
Enabled = true,
Interval = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(150),
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1),
});
var transitions = new ConcurrentQueue<HostStatusChangedEventArgs>();
drv.OnHostStatusChanged += (_, e) => transitions.Enqueue(e);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
await WaitForStateAsync(drv, HostState.Running, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
fake.Reachable = false;
await WaitForStateAsync(drv, HostState.Stopped, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
transitions.Select(t => t.NewState).ShouldContain(HostState.Stopped);
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Recovery_transitions_Stopped_back_to_Running()
{
var (drv, fake) = NewDriver(new ModbusProbeOptions
{
Enabled = true,
Interval = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(150),
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1),
});
var transitions = new ConcurrentQueue<HostStatusChangedEventArgs>();
drv.OnHostStatusChanged += (_, e) => transitions.Enqueue(e);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
await WaitForStateAsync(drv, HostState.Running, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
fake.Reachable = false;
await WaitForStateAsync(drv, HostState.Stopped, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
fake.Reachable = true;
await WaitForStateAsync(drv, HostState.Running, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
// We expect at minimum: Unknown→Running, Running→Stopped, Stopped→Running.
transitions.Count.ShouldBeGreaterThanOrEqualTo(3);
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Repeated_successful_probes_do_not_generate_duplicate_Running_events()
{
var (drv, _) = NewDriver(new ModbusProbeOptions
{
Enabled = true,
Interval = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(100),
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1),
});
var transitions = new ConcurrentQueue<HostStatusChangedEventArgs>();
drv.OnHostStatusChanged += (_, e) => transitions.Enqueue(e);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
await WaitForStateAsync(drv, HostState.Running, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
await Task.Delay(500); // several more probe ticks, all successful — state shouldn't thrash
transitions.Count.ShouldBe(1); // only the initial Unknown→Running
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Disabled_probe_stays_Unknown_and_fires_no_events()
{
var (drv, _) = NewDriver(new ModbusProbeOptions { Enabled = false });
var transitions = new ConcurrentQueue<HostStatusChangedEventArgs>();
drv.OnHostStatusChanged += (_, e) => transitions.Enqueue(e);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
await Task.Delay(300);
transitions.Count.ShouldBe(0);
drv.GetHostStatuses()[0].State.ShouldBe(HostState.Unknown);
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Shutdown_stops_the_probe_loop()
{
var (drv, fake) = NewDriver(new ModbusProbeOptions
{
Enabled = true,
Interval = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(100),
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1),
});
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
await WaitForStateAsync(drv, HostState.Running, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
var before = fake.ProbeCount;
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
await Task.Delay(400);
// A handful of in-flight ticks may complete after shutdown in a narrow race; the
// contract is that the loop stops scheduling new ones. Tolerate ≤1 extra.
(fake.ProbeCount - before).ShouldBeLessThanOrEqualTo(1);
}
private static async Task WaitForStateAsync(ModbusDriver drv, HostState expected, TimeSpan timeout)
{
var deadline = DateTime.UtcNow + timeout;
while (DateTime.UtcNow < deadline)
{
if (drv.GetHostStatuses()[0].State == expected) return;
await Task.Delay(25);
}
}
}

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using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class WriteAuthzPolicyTests
{
// --- FreeAccess and ViewOnly special-cases ---
[Fact]
public void FreeAccess_allows_write_even_for_empty_role_set()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.FreeAccess, []).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void FreeAccess_allows_write_for_arbitrary_roles()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.FreeAccess, ["SomeOtherRole"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void ViewOnly_denies_write_even_with_every_role()
{
var allRoles = new[] { "WriteOperate", "WriteTune", "WriteConfigure", "AlarmAck" };
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.ViewOnly, allRoles).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Operate tier ---
[Fact]
public void Operate_requires_WriteOperate_role()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Operate_role_match_is_case_insensitive()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["writeoperate"]).ShouldBeTrue();
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["WRITEOPERATE"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Operate_denies_empty_role_set()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, []).ShouldBeFalse();
}
[Fact]
public void Operate_denies_wrong_role()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["ReadOnly"]).ShouldBeFalse();
}
[Fact]
public void SecuredWrite_maps_to_same_WriteOperate_requirement_as_Operate()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeTrue();
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite, ["WriteTune"]).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Tune tier ---
[Fact]
public void Tune_requires_WriteTune_role()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Tune, ["WriteTune"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Tune_denies_WriteOperate_only_session()
{
// Important: role roles do NOT cascade — a session with WriteOperate can't write a Tune
// attribute. Operators escalate by adding WriteTune to the session's roles, not by a
// hierarchy the policy infers on its own.
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Tune, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Configure tier ---
[Fact]
public void Configure_requires_WriteConfigure_role()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Configure, ["WriteConfigure"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void VerifiedWrite_maps_to_same_WriteConfigure_requirement_as_Configure()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite, ["WriteConfigure"]).ShouldBeTrue();
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Multi-role sessions ---
[Fact]
public void Session_with_multiple_roles_is_allowed_when_any_matches()
{
var roles = new[] { "ReadOnly", "WriteTune", "AlarmAck" };
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Tune, roles).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Session_with_only_unrelated_roles_is_denied()
{
var roles = new[] { "ReadOnly", "AlarmAck", "SomeCustomRole" };
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Configure, roles).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Mapping table ---
[Theory]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.Operate, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteOperate)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteOperate)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.Tune, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteTune)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteConfigure)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.Configure, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteConfigure)]
public void RequiredRole_returns_expected_role_for_classification(SecurityClassification c, string expected)
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.RequiredRole(c).ShouldBe(expected);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.FreeAccess)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.ViewOnly)]
public void RequiredRole_returns_null_for_special_classifications(SecurityClassification c)
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.RequiredRole(c).ShouldBeNull();
}
}