Phase 1 gate step 4 failed: setting Enabled = 0 to take a node out of service
returns 422 ClusterEnabledNodeCountMismatch, because
DraftValidator.ValidateClusterTopology requires the enabled-node count to equal
ServerCluster.NodeCount. On a Warm/Hot pair — every cluster on the rig, and
every cluster in the target topology — Enabled can therefore never be the
maintenance hatch. The plan called step 4 "the check that makes step 3
acceptable to ship", so Task 3's behaviour change was not shippable as it stood:
a node down for maintenance would block every deployment to its cluster.
The two rules were each reasonable and contradictory together — the validator
reads Enabled as "part of the declared topology", Phase 1 additionally read it
as "expect an ack". Split the meanings rather than weaken either rule:
Enabled part of the declared topology (validator, untouched)
MaintenanceMode expected to participate now (coordinator + reconciler)
Rejected alternatives: counting configured rather than enabled nodes (drops the
guard against booting a pair into InvalidTopology); downgrading the rule to a
warning (weakens a deploy gate for everyone); shipping with no hatch.
Sabotage: dropping !n.MaintenanceMode from the coordinator query turns the new
test red. It also asserts both nodes remain Enabled, so the fix cannot quietly
regress to disabling the row after all.
Configuration.Tests 95/95, ControlPlane.Tests 101/101, solution builds clean.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
- docker-dev seed: AkkaPort = 4053 on all six ClusterNode rows, so a freshly
seeded rig matches a migrated one. GrpcPort left null.
- config-db-schema.md: both columns, why AkkaPort is NOT NULL/4053 and GrpcPort
is nullable, the unenforced duplication + its reconciler, and Enabled's new
second meaning as the deploy path's expected-ack set.
- Configuration.md: Cluster:Port / PublicHostname now flag that they are stored
twice, with the "update the row too" instruction and why the drift is silent.
- design doc §7: Phase 1 marked done, plus a "Phase 1 as shipped" note recording
both deviations rather than leaving the sketch reading as what happened.
- program plan: Phase 1 marked done; AdminUI node edit explicitly deferred.
- CLAUDE.md: the deploy-path behaviour change and its three consequences.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
ACL design defines NodePermissions bitmask flags covering Browse / Read / Subscribe / HistoryRead / WriteOperate / WriteTune / WriteConfigure / AlarmRead / AlarmAcknowledge / AlarmConfirm / AlarmShelve / MethodCall plus common bundles (ReadOnly / Operator / Engineer / Admin); 6-level scope hierarchy (Cluster / Namespace / UnsArea / UnsLine / Equipment / Tag) with default-deny + additive grants and Browse-implication on ancestors; per-LDAP-group grants in a new generation-versioned NodeAcl table edited via the same draft → diff → publish → rollback boundary as every other content table; per-session permission-trie evaluator with O(depth × group-count) cost cached for the lifetime of the session and rebuilt on generation-apply or LDAP group cache expiry; cluster-create workflow seeds a default ACL set matching the v1 LmxOpcUa LDAP-role-to-permission map for v1 → v2 consumer migration parity; Admin UI ACL tab with two views (by LDAP group, by scope), bulk-grant flow, and permission simulator that lets operators preview "as user X" effective permissions across the cluster's UNS tree before publishing; explicit Deny deferred to v2.1 since verbose grants suffice at v2.0 fleet sizes; only denied OPC UA operations are audit-logged (not allowed ones — would dwarf the audit log). Schema doc gains the NodeAcl table with cross-cluster invariant enforcement and same-generation FK validation; admin-ui.md gains the ACLs tab; phase-1 doc gains Task E.9 wiring this through Stream E plus a NodeAcl entry in Task B.1's DbContext list.
Dev-environment doc inventories every external resource the v2 build needs across two tiers per decision #99 — inner-loop (in-process simulators on developer machines: SQL Server local or container, GLAuth at C:\publish\glauth\, local dev Galaxy) and integration (one dedicated Windows host with Docker Desktop on WSL2 backend so TwinCAT XAR VM can run in Hyper-V alongside containerized oitc/modbus-server, plus WSL2-hosted Snap7 and ab_server, plus OPC Foundation reference server, plus FOCAS TestStub and FaultShim) — with concrete container images, ports, default dev credentials (clearly marked dev-only since production uses Integrated Security / gMSA per decision #46), bootstrap order for both tiers, network topology diagram, test data seed locations, and operational risks (TwinCAT trial expiry automation, Docker pricing, integration host SPOF mitigation, per-developer GLAuth config sync, Aveva license scoping that keeps Galaxy tests on developer machines and off the shared host).
Removes consumer cutover (ScadaBridge / Ignition / System Platform IO) from OtOpcUa v2 scope per decision #136 — owned by a separate integration / operations team, tracked in 3-year-plan handoff §"Rollout Posture" and corrections §C5; OtOpcUa team's scope ends at Phase 5. Updates implementation/overview.md phase index to drop the "6+" row and add an explicit "OUT of v2 scope" callout; updates phase-1 and phase-2 docs to reframe cutover as integration-team-owned rather than future-phase numbered.
Decisions #129–137 added: ACL model (#129), NodeAcl generation-versioned (#130), v1-compatibility seed (#131), denied-only audit logging (#132), two-tier dev environment (#133), Docker WSL2 backend for TwinCAT VM coexistence (#134), TwinCAT VM centrally managed / Galaxy on dev machines only (#135), cutover out of v2 scope (#136), dev credentials documented openly (#137).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Joseph Doherty