- QueueFrozenReplay's verdict refuses a condition a deploy removed or replaced
since the cut (Server-object and folder), so the cut path cannot replay a
ghost or judge a replaced scripted alarm on its old folder.
- DeliverToNotifierItems resolves the #826 decision's item-independent part
(live condition, notifier check, scopes) once per hop; only the grant and
SDK role checks stay per item.
- A deferred delivery's drain starts on the pool, never inline under Lock.
- Test: a condition removed between the cut and its replay (folder + Server
object).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AD99zQQqpLCVm3p7xk
- QueueFrozenReplay re-asks each item's verdict right before each entry's gate
hold (Server-object and folder cut paths): a grant revoked between the
pre-Lock verdicts and the replay no longer lets the replay through. A denied
entry is also removed from the cut's re-sent set.
- ReportEventWithoutBlocking logs and returns on a delivery that faulted
inline instead of booking it as a deferral episode (which ran the drain and
ClearStaleRefreshCuts under the event-report gate while Lock was held).
- OnConditionReportEvent isolates failures per Server-object item.
- Tests: revocation between cut and replay (folder + Server object), throwing
hop not booked as a deferral; production-overload sampling inside Lock.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AD99zQQqpLCVm3p7xk
Condition events reaching one of our notifiers no longer go through the SDK
MonitoredNode2 channel: the walk serves the attached items itself, per item and
per event (audit guard, uncached INodeManager3 verdict, item gate/cut,
QueueEvent), as the Server-object path does. No notifier of ours defers any
more; the #838 deferral queue and the #854 cut stay as the safety net and
folder items share the cut (RefreshDirectItems, flag on and off). An event
whose walk suspends is marked deferred before it suspends.
Tests produce deferral with a notifier-stall probe instead of holding a folder
item's SDK lock (which would now block the reporter). New
FolderConditionRefreshWireTests; design note in docs/plans.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AD99zQQqpLCVm3p7xk
Review of 1622d07f:
1. Perf: every i=2253 refresh ran the whole notifier walk + permission checks +
QueueEvent under Lock. Now, with nothing deferred (the common case), the refresh is
the SDK-shaped walk off Lock (Lock only to copy the root notifiers), kept only if no
deferral episode existed at any moment of it (count 0 before and after, episode
unchanged); otherwise the cut path also runs and its later replay supersedes. The
cut path takes ACL/role verdicts off Lock, then one short Lock hold: watermark +
frozen snapshots of Retain conditions from _alarmConditions (no tree walk) + per-item
cut and "replay pending" marker; the replay is queued OFF Lock, one event per hold of
the item gate. While pending, a condition event newer than the cut marks its
condition so the older frozen entry is dropped rather than following it. A
concurrent fast-path refresh cancels a pending cut replay of the same item.
Measured, 3000 retained conditions, longest Lock wait seen by another thread during
one refresh: 1622d07f 95-106 ms idle / 102-127 ms deferring; now 0-3 ms idle /
23-32 ms deferring.
2. ACL: a retained condition omitted from the replay for want of a grant is never
withheld (RefreshCut.RetainedAtCut); only Retain=true events of a condition omitted
because it was NOT retained are.
3. One gate/cut state per item for its lifetime (ConditionalWeakTable keyed by the
item): an unsubscribe + resubscribe between refresh and drain keeps the cut.
4. Cuts carry their deferral episode; ClearStaleRefreshCuts runs when the count
returns to zero, and a stale-episode cut is inert.
5. Dispose guard for the custom refresh (ObjectDisposedException once disposing;
Dispose waits for refreshes in flight).
6. Docs: a refresh waits at most for one in-progress QueueEvent on the item.
Tests: resubscribe variants, ACL-grant-lands test, pending-replay probe test,
dispose test, 3000-condition Lock-hold measurement with a probe pinning that neither
path queues its replay under Lock; stress invariant tightened (never backwards outside a
refresh; each refresh ends on the newest delivered state) and tolerant of the SDK's own
BadRefreshInProgress overlap refusal. Each new test fails against its targeted mutation.
While a folder subscriber's SDK channel is full, a condition's later events wait in
its #838 deferral queue and reach i=2253 items only when the drain gets to them, off
Lock. A ConditionRefresh in that window replayed the current state, then the older
deferred events followed RefreshEnd (stale state, or a condition the refresh had just
dropped re-added until the newest drained).
- Condition events are reported as ConditionEventSnapshot (an InstanceStateSnapshot
carrying a report sequence, condition NodeId and Retain); events queued behind a
deferred report are marked Deferred.
- Server-object refresh (ConditionRefresh and ConditionRefresh2, flag on AND off) now
runs in RefreshServerObjectItems: watermark, "anything deferred?", the replay and its
queueing in ONE Lock hold, so the replay is exactly the state at the cut. Per item it
queues the replay and installs a RefreshCut under the item's gate.
- OnConditionReportEvent holds that gate across "superseded? -> QueueEvent" for
deferred events only. Withheld from that item alone: events at/below the cut whose
condition the replay re-sent, or Retain=true events of a condition it omitted; an
older Retain=false event of an omitted condition is still delivered. Queues, other
Server-object items and folder items are untouched; refresh never waits for a drain.
- Lock order Lock -> item gate -> SDK item lock, same as a synchronous report.
- Meter otopcua.opcua.condition_events.superseded.
- Folder items keep a documented residual (SDK channel backlog + memoised per-item
verdict leave no per-event hook).
Tests: ConditionRefreshDeferralWireTests (deterministic overload by holding the folder
item's SDK lock; 6 variants fail before the fix; probe-driven gate test fails with the
gate removed; concurrent reports/refreshes/stall stress test fails before the fix).
#838 review of 91e28e87:
1. Ghost events. The deferred report ran the SDK walk off Lock with no
liveness check, so an event waiting behind a full channel when a deploy
removed its condition still reached i=2253 subscribers after the NodeDeleted
(a ghost Retain alarm for ScadaBridge) and folder items. Delivery now walks
the SDK path itself (OnReportEvent, OnReportEventAsync, inverse notifiers,
then the Parent as BaseInstanceState does) re-checking before EVERY hop that
the condition is the live instance; OnConditionReportEvent checks the same,
which also stops a non-live scripted condition being admitted through its
old equipment folder (#808). A guard test pins that only NodeState and
BaseInstanceState define the walk. New wire test removes the condition in
the same Lock hold as a flood; the flag-off variant fails without the checks.
2. Back-pressure. Deferral is per condition (one condition's events stay
ordered; others are not held up). Overflow policy: coalesce, newest wins --
past 1024 waiting per condition or 65,536 total, the oldest not-yet-started
event is discarded (a condition event carries full state). Warning on
entering deferral (<=1/min), Information on draining, meters
otopcua.opcua.condition_events.deferred / .discarded{reason}.
3. Verified by decompiling SDK 2.0.1: the notifier list is snapshotted under the
node's own lock, MonitoredNode2.Dispose completes its writer (pending writes
fail with ChannelClosedException, swallowed), and the consumer catches
per-event exceptions -- no fix needed; documented.
4. ConditionRefresh does not flush deferrals; documented as a residual.
#844 review: DescribeCredential canonicalises the key id (trim, lowercase;
non-hex ids fold into one identity) and the username, since ConfigDbApiKeyStore
matches with SQL Server's case-insensitive, trailing-space-blind `=`.
#838(a): each notifier's SDK MonitoredNode2 drains a bounded channel (4096,
FullMode=Wait) and the synchronous NodeState.ReportEvent blocks when it is
full. Condition events are reported under Lock, and the delivery task takes
Lock on a verdict-cache miss (the SDK's own GetNodeMetadata, flag off too, and
#826's IsNotifierEventVisibleTo). A burst of >4096 events under one Lock hold
therefore deadlocked the node manager -- FolderEventFloodWireTests stalled at
exactly 4097 events with enforcement on AND off (so it predates #826).
ReportConditionEvent now goes through ReportEventWithoutBlocking:
ReportEventAsync completes inline while channels have room (unchanged normal
path); on overflow the report continues asynchronously holding no thread or
lock, and later reports queue behind it so events keep report order. The
deferred work holds only frozen snapshots and drains once Lock is released;
client delivery stays bounded by each item's queue.
#838(b): documented in docs/security.md that Part 3 ReceiveEvents applies to
the event's EventType and SourceNode (the SDK check, kept first), not to the
notifier; our decision is layered on top and non-condition events on a folder
item fail closed under enforcement. The reflection item stays open.
#844: a success cleared the whole per-client count, so a client holding a valid
key could make four guesses at another key id, sign in with its own, and repeat
forever. Failures are now charged to the (client, credential identity) pair --
IOpcUaUserAuthenticator.DescribeCredential, key:<keyId> for API keys -- and to
the client as a whole. A success clears only its own identity's count; the
per-identity threshold locks that identity; a new per-client cap
(OpcUa:CredentialLockout:MaxFailedAttemptsPerClient, default 2 x
MaxFailedAttempts) that a success never resets bounds spraying across key ids
and locks every credential. Slots are bounded on both counts; a waiter whose
identity has room is not held behind one whose identity has none.
#845: (1) store timeouts, miss-budget refusals, store/authenticator exceptions,
an unset pepper and cancellation are reported Transient
(OpcUaUserAuthResult.Unavailable) and released uncounted, so a ConfigDb stall
can no longer lock every keyed client out; the client still sees the same
opaque denial. (2) a full 4096-entry table defers its next prune until the
earliest entry could age out instead of rescanning under the lock per failure.
(3) ApplicationUri deliberately NOT added to the key: on a None channel it is a
free string, so it would let an attacker reset the count per guess --
documented. (4) wire tests: distinct client certificates on a Sign endpoint are
locked out separately; the ApplicationConfigPath branch keeps the SDK lockout
off (falsified by removing the loaded-branch disable).
A legitimate consumer opening several keyed sessions at once from one key
(e.g. a ScadaBridge site node behind one NAT IP on a None endpoint) must
never see BadUserAccessDenied for parallelism. BeginAsync now hands out at
most MaxFailedAttempts - recordedFailures verification slots per key;
further activations queue FIFO and are woken as slots free. A waiter is
refused only when the key locks out (never reaching the authenticator) or,
uncounted, after OpcUa:CredentialLockout:SlotWaitSeconds (default 10,
BadTimeout). Cancelled waiters are dequeued; pruning accounts for waiters.
The security property is unchanged: no more than MaxFailedAttempts
unverified guesses in progress-or-failed per window.
- Reserve an in-flight slot per client before authenticating (TryBegin /
Complete / Abandon under one lock); refuse once recorded failures +
in-flight attempts reach MaxFailedAttempts, so a parallel burst cannot
pass the check before its first failure is recorded.
- An expired lockout resets the count (LockoutSeconds < FailureWindowSeconds
relocked on every single failure after the first lockout).
- Validate OpcUa:CredentialLockout at host start: disabled, or both
durations > 0.
- Log the first refusal of a lockout episode at Information, the rest at
Debug.
- Document that on None endpoints the key is effectively IP-only (NAT
neighbours share a UserName count) and a null peer shares one key.
1. Orphaned subscriptions (session closed without deleting subs) have Session == null, so the public
MonitoredNode2.InvalidatePermissionCacheForSession never reached their items: a cached allow survived a
deploy, the moved alarm's events were queued and delivered on TransferSubscriptions. Each notifier's
cache is now cleared whole through the SDK's private MonitoredNode2.InvalidatePermissionCaches
(reflection, guard-tested; fallback = per-session drop + Remove/Add of session-less items).
2. The verdict is decided on the condition LIVE under the event's NodeId, not the event's own instance:
the SDK key has no instance identity, so a replaced instance's late event cached a deny its successor
inherited until the next invalidation.
3. Invalidation is skipped while enforcement is off (forced across an on/off authorizer transition) and is
one O(cache) clear per node instead of a whole-cache scan per item.
4. TagReferencingEquipment carries alarm-bearing raw tags only (TagConfigIntent.Alarm); the snapshot adopts
an OrdinalIgnoreCase set instead of copying it again.
Tests (each fails with its fix reverted): FolderEventVerdictInvalidationTests (orphan + deploy + transfer;
replaced instance's late event; ACL-off skip; SDK private-method guard), DeploymentArtifactScopePathTests
(alarm-bearing projection).
User decision: save, Test Connect, live browse and the deploy gate keep
refusing out-of-namespace credential references, but an ALREADY-DEPLOYED
driver must not fault at the upgrade restart or (Galaxy) at the next
gateway reconnect, since ReopenAsync re-resolves Gateway.ApiKeySecretRef.
- LegacyCredentialReferenceTracker (Core.Abstractions): the one, deprecated,
call-site-chosen compatibility path. Running Galaxy (InitializeAsync,
ReopenAsync, ack fallback) and OpcUaClient (session open) pass it and keep
the pre-#815 semantics (case-insensitive prefixes, Galaxy file:, OpcUaClient
literal pass-through) with a rate-limited Warning (driver/field/allowed
form, never the value) and a credential-compat:<field> diagnostics entry
(both drivers now implement IDriverDiagnostics). Browsers and probes pass
none and stay hard-fail; Heidenhain has none.
- Deploy-gate message names the migration.
- Upgrade preflight: CredentialReferencePreflightService (admin nodes, once
after ApplicationStarted, ConfigDb only, resolves nothing) logs a Warning
per Draft row / Deployed-artifact finding; the /raw banner shows them plus
Running drivers reporting warn-only use (driver-health diagnostics).
- docs/security.md: exact replacement table (incl. the old form default
env:MX_API_KEY, file:, un-namespaced secret:, casing changes), the
ReopenAsync reconnect behaviour, the warn-only window and its removal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Event items on an equipment / raw device folder were fed by the SDK's MonitoredNode2 fan-out with no ACL
decision, so after a deploy moved a scripted alarm (or dropped the reference projecting a native alarm into
an equipment) the OLD folder's subscribers kept receiving it - EventId included - until the rebuild landed,
indefinitely after a failed apply.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager re-implements INodeManager3 so ValidateEventRolePermissions (the SDK's per-event,
per-item hook; base not virtual) adds IsNotifierEventVisibleTo: live condition instance, notifier still a
legitimate notifier of it, and the #586/#808 Server-object rule (IsConditionVisibleTo over
ConditionVisibilityScopes).
- The SDK memoizes that verdict per (item, event type, SourceNode): InvalidateFolderEventVerdicts runs on the
authority/authorizer setters, RevalidateMonitoredItems (deploy + timer) and CompleteAddressSpaceApply.
- ConditionRefresh on direct items goes through RefreshDirectItems (base loop + the same decision).
- New generation field TagReferencingEquipment (RawPath -> EquipmentIds, from the artifact's
UnsTagReferences via AclScopePathResolver.ResolveTagRawPath): a native alarm's wired equipment folder only
counts (folder delivery AND Server-object scopes) while the current generation still references it.
- Secondary #808 edge: UNS variables wired UNS->Raw Organizes by AddReference are tracked and always placed
as reference variables (an Area named like its equipment's id no longer narrows them).
Tests: UnsFolderScopeWireTests (moved alarm on a folder item + ConditionRefresh + rebuild; area named like
equipment id), NativeAlarmFolderEventAclWireTests (dropped reference: folder + Server object + refresh +
restore), DeploymentArtifactScopePathTests (projection). Rig/event tests now supply tag references.
docs/security.md gains the canonical table of per-driver namespaces, the five
enforcement seams, the out-of-scope cases (appsettings ${secret:}, Sql
connectionStringRef) and the migration steps for existing configs. Galaxy,
OpcUaClient, Heidenhain, Configuration and driver-specs docs, the Galaxy
options XML docs, the drivers rule file and the docker-dev compose comment
point at it. docker-dev's env:GALAXY_MXGW_API_KEY stays valid (allowed legacy
prefix), so no rig change is needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
OPC Foundation SDK 2.0.1's SessionManager lockout refused EVERY
activation (Anonymous included, before the token is read) from a client
with 5 failed identity validations in 60 s, for 5 minutes, keyed on cert
thumbprint else peer IP. Disable it (MaxFailedAuthenticationAttempts=0
on built and loaded configs) and enforce FailedCredentialLockout in the
identity-registry adapter instead: UserName activations only, keyed on
thumbprint+peer together, same 5/60s/300s defaults, configurable via
OpcUa:CredentialLockout.
Review of af5c9744:
1. UNS reference variables (s=Area/Line/Equip/Eff) of a moved or renamed
equipment stayed readable/writable under the OLD names' grants: they now
resolve as ReferenceVariable and are authorized at their split path only
while it equals their live equipment folder's placement (live chain ==
generation chain) + one name; otherwise denied (Read and Write).
2. TryPlaceScriptedCondition now also requires the owner folder's live chain
to match the generation (AuthorizeScriptedCondition gains ownerFolderChain),
so a moved equipment's alarm/children/commands follow its folder.
3. Identifiers containing NUL are denied before the decision cache, keeping
client ids disjoint from the NUL-prefixed resolved-scope keys (a client
could otherwise poison a real folder's cached verdict for its key shard).
4. An id no live node holds is Unknown: placed at [\0unknown] so only
Cluster / Namespace-uns grants decide it (a removed opaque id can no longer
split onto a same-named narrow grant; narrow grantees get no NodeDeleted for
removed UNS folders/vtags/conditions — documented); 4-segment
reference-shaped ids keep their split.
5. A wire test drives placements from DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority.
Baseline updates: #797 owner tests (unit + wire) and Sdk2RepeatedAlarmAuthority
now install folder scopes; Sdk2HistoryAuthority's UNS alias used the RAW path
as its UNS id (never minted in production) and now carries EqA/HistoryAlias.
Each new guard was falsified (reverting it fails its test).
UNS Area/Line/Equipment folders are minted under their opaque entity ids
(s=UA-/UL-/EQ-...), virtual tags under s=EQ-.../Name and scripted conditions
(+ #629 children) under s=<ScriptedAlarmId>[/...], while every UNS grant is
planted at a NAME path. DataPlaneAuthorizer split those ids, so with
Security:Acl:Enabled a narrow (Area/Line/Equipment) grant could not Browse,
Read, subscribe or HistoryRead them, and Server-object delivery never reached
it — so a narrow key never held the EventId Ack/Confirm/AddComment need.
- The generation carries UnsFolderScopes (folderId -> path + id chain), built
by DeploymentArtifact from the same AclScopePathResolver as the grants; ids
two entity kinds share are dropped; plumbed through IDataPlaneAuthoritySink.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager.ResolveUnsAclSubject reports live facts (folder id
ancestry / scripted owner binding); attached by the Authorizer setter.
- Evaluate places the subject against the CURRENT generation before the
decision cache, which now caches the walk keyed on the resolved scope.
Folders require live chain == generation chain (a moved equipment is denied
under old and new line until the rebuild). Owned nodes (vtags, conditions,
children) get owner path + a reserved segment, so Tag grants and their
Browse transit never expose them. Conditions share TryPlaceScriptedCondition
with the #797 command gate.
- Server-object visibility of a scripted condition is decided on the
condition alone, so a moved alarm cannot reach its old owner there.
Tests: UnsFolderScopeWireTests (opaque ids, end-to-end browse -> EventId ->
Acknowledge on an Equipment grant; sibling denied; Tag-only grant; moved alarm
and moved equipment stale windows). Rig tests now install folder scopes
explicitly (ServerEventRig.FolderScopes); the #797 recreate test deliberately
asserts the moved alarm is invisible to the Cluster observer in the window.
Review of 3d1b86b4: OpcUaPublishActor installs a new authority generation
before applying its address space, and an apply that throws keeps the old one.
A scripted alarm moved from equipment A to B therefore stayed commandable with
A's grant under B's generation (briefly before the rebuild, or indefinitely
after a failed apply).
The generation now carries ScriptedAlarmOwners (ScriptedAlarmId -> EquipmentId,
decoded by ParseDataPlaneAuthority from the artifact's ScriptedAlarms rows, the
same rows the composition materialises from). AuthorizeScriptedCondition denies
unless the node manager's live binding names the same owner as the generation:
a moved alarm is denied under the old owner's, the new owner's and a Cluster
grant until the address space re-binds it; an alarm the generation no longer
deploys is denied. Install/apply order unchanged.
Tests: window (a) generation moved / binding stale => both owners and Cluster
denied, then rebuild under the new owner => new owner allowed, old denied;
window (b) apply failed after install => denied across clock and further
generations, then a successful rebuild restores the new owner only; undeployed
alarm denied; artifact decode of the owner map.
Scripted condition NodeIds are opaque ScriptedAlarmIds, so splitting them as a
topology path could never match an Equipment grant: a narrow equipment grant was
denied while a Cluster grant passed.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager binds each LIVE scripted condition instance to the
EquipmentId it was materialised under (only when it hangs under that folder);
dropped on remove / drop-recreate / equipment-subtree removal / rebuild; a
same-id re-materialise under another equipment re-parents and re-binds.
- DataPlaneAuthoritySnapshot carries EquipmentScopePaths (EquipmentId ->
[uns, Area, Line, Equipment]) decoded from the artifact by the same
AclScopePathResolver call that plants Equipment grants.
- DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeScriptedCondition re-reads key, grant and
generation per call (uncached) and evaluates at the owner path; unbound,
replaced or unplaceable owners deny under every grant. No id-split or
realm-root fallback.
- Native conditions (RawPath) and the ACL-off role gate are unchanged.
NodeIds and AlarmCommand.AlarmId are unchanged.
Sdk2OpaqueScriptedScopeBaselineTests deliberately flipped: it pinned the denial
and now pins owner-grant allow / sibling deny / cluster allow. Follow-up #808
(folder ids + Server-object event visibility for narrow UNS grants).
The docs said script authoring was Admin-gated (VirtualTags.md "Known
resource limits") and that a Designer "cannot publish" (security.md roles
table). The code admits Designer to both: Scripts, ScriptEdit, EquipmentPage
(virtual tags, scripted alarms), /api/script-analysis/* and Deployments all
carry AdminUiPolicies.ConfigEditor = RequireRole("Administrator",
"Designer"). That is a recorded decision, not drift: AdminUI-001 (98b27fc1)
loosened the analysis backend from FleetAdmin to Administrator,Designer to
match the page gate, and R2-05 converged the same pages on ConfigEditor
"with the same semantics". So the docs follow the code:
- VirtualTags.md: the primary control is ConfigEditor (Administrator or
Designer), which also gates deploy.
- security.md roles table: Designer = the whole ConfigEditor surface incl.
scripts and deploy; Administrator = Designer + the FleetAdmin-only surface
(role grants, API keys, certificate actions, manual failover) — the old
"publish, cluster/node CRUD" were ConfigEditor all along.
- 2026-06-09 Monaco plan: its FleetAdmin gate is marked superseded.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
The #733 miss budget (MissBurst / MissRefillPerSecond) was process-wide, because
the impersonation seam did not carry the client's address, so one noisy client
could drain it for everybody while the known-id set was unavailable.
- IOpcUaUserAuthenticator gains AuthenticateUserNameAsync(username, password,
IPEndPoint? remoteEndpoint, ct) (default: ignore it and delegate); the server
calls it. IApiKeyStore gains the matching FindAsync(..., IPAddress?, ...).
- The SDK (1.5.378) exposes no client address publicly. SecureChannelRemoteEndpoint
reads it from the TCP listener's private channel map by reflection (through the
protected TransportListeners, exposed by OtOpcUaSdkServer), keyed by the
session's secure channel id. Fail-soft: null => process-wide accounting only.
- BoundedApiKeyStore charges a miss to the client's own bucket (keyed by IP
address) and then to the process-wide one, which stays as the backstop. A
refusal by either takes from neither; a hit refunds both. New options
Security:ApiKeys:MissBurstPerEndpoint (10) / MissRefillPerSecondPerEndpoint (2),
0 disables; telemetry outcome endpoint_miss_budget. At most 4096 addresses are
tracked; idle buckets are pruned and an address beyond the cap is charged
process-wide only.
Tests: BoundedApiKeyStorePerEndpointTests (noisy client vs quiet one, process-wide
backstop, refund + refill, off switch, authenticator forwards the address) and
over the wire ApiKeyMissBudgetPerEndpointTests (activation hands the authenticator
the loopback endpoint; real authenticator + bounded store refuse a client's 3rd
and 4th unknown key without a store read). Each new behaviour test fails with its
fix mutated out. Host.Tests 224/0, OpcUaServer.Tests 1019/1 (the one failure is the
wall-clock NodeManagerLockTimeBenchmarkTests under suite load; passes alone).
Docs: security.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
mxaccessgw 488649c+ acknowledges by AuthenticateUser as the operator and
writing <alarm>.AckMsg, so AcknowledgeAlarmRequest now needs a real Galaxy
operator_user + operator_domain + operator_password. The OPC UA data plane is
API-key/anonymous and carries no Galaxy password, so the driver resolves the
account per ack:
1. the session's API key's Galaxy ack identity, set on AdminUI /apikeys and
held ONLY in the encrypted Secrets store
(otopcua/apikeys/<keyId>/galaxy-ack-{user,password}); a key with a user but
no password secret is refused, never silently downgraded;
2. else the driver instance's AlarmAck fallback account (DriverConfig
FallbackUser/FallbackDomain/FallbackPasswordSecretRef; secret:/${secret:}/
env:/file:/dev: only — a literal is refused);
3. else DriverOperationRefusedException: nothing is sent, never an empty
operator_user. Refusals are excluded from the resilience retry/breaker.
- Pins ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Client/Contracts 0.2.1 -> 0.3.0 (vendored into
nuget-packages/ from the Gitea feed, per the local-mxgw source mapping).
- The session ApiKeyId (not a secret) rides NativeAlarmAck ->
RouteNativeAlarmAck -> RouteAlarmAck -> AlarmAcknowledgeRequest; the password
is resolved in the driver and never travels through actor messages.
- The OPC UA principal + key id are appended to the AckMsg comment
("[OPC UA: <principal>, key <id>]") and logged, so a shared fallback
account does not lose who acknowledged.
- Password never logged: GalaxyAckCredential.ToString omits it, the
acknowledger scrubs it from every gateway message it echoes and withholds
any exception that echoes it; audit rows carry only the key id.
- AdminUI: /apikeys "Ack identity" editor (set/remove; delete-key clears it),
Galaxy driver form gains the fallback section.
- Synchronous OPC UA status for a refusal is follow-up #760 (the native ack
path is fire-and-forget after the Part 9 method returns).
Tests: request mapping (password populated), password absent from logs and
exception text (mutation-checked), key-mapped / fallback / refused paths at
resolver and driver level, breaker non-trip, key-id propagation through node
manager and DriverHostActor, AdminUI service + form round-trip.
Closes#749
The hand-rolled bearer handler is replaced by AddJwtBearer (Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer
10.0.7, pinned on the same servicing line as the other AspNetCore packages). Validation parameters come
from JwtTokenService.BuildValidationParameters, which now pins ValidAlgorithms = HS256 for both the
bearer scheme and TryValidate; MapInboundClaims is off so the minted Role/zb:username keys resolve.
/auth/token requires the cookie scheme, so a bearer can no longer mint a fresh token for itself.
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
BoundedApiKeyStore's negative cache was keyed by key id, so a flood of DISTINCT well-formed
otua_<random>_x credentials missed it every time and cost one SQL query per attempt under the
SDK's SessionManager-wide lock, no credential needed (R03:3.3).
- IApiKeyStore.ListKeyIdsAsync (default null = unsupported; ConfigDbApiKeyStore lists every
ApiKeyId): the bounded store keeps a known-id set refreshed every StoreCacheSeconds
(single-flight, failed refresh keeps the previous set) and refuses an unknown id without a store
read ({outcome=unknown_id}).
- A process-wide miss budget (token bucket, Security:ApiKeys:MissBurst=100 /
MissRefillPerSecond=20, ApiKeyStoreGuardOptions) bounds lookups that reach the store and miss
while no set is available; a hit refunds its token. Per-endpoint accounting needs the
OpcUaServer impersonation seam to carry the client address — follow-up.
- docs/security.md: the new knobs, and the known-cluster gate's documented fail-open window at
central boot (R03:4.2) plus the async PSK refresh (R03:3.4).
Refs #733
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ub9hGmYLQvn9XETzw7CMsT
- HistoryUpdate items with SourceTimestamp > now + ServerHistorian:HistoryUpdateMaxFutureSkew
(default 1 day, <=0 disables) => BadOutOfRange in the node manager (every backend, never sent);
clock injected via OtOpcUaNodeManager.Clock (host TimeProvider).
- HistoryUpdate is Primary-only: off-Primary => BadInvalidState per node, after authorization,
same IDriverPrimaryRoleSource verdict as the native-ack gate; HistoryRead ungated.
- SqlServer: base schema requirement back to v1; SupportsModifiedTrail (v>=2). On v1 with
AutoCreateSchema=false: writes/reads/events/retention work, modified reads + HistoryUpdate =>
BadHistoryOperationUnsupported with nothing sent, retention skips SampleModified, one Warning per boot.
- QuestDB integration test pinning wall-clock TTL (far-future row evicts only partitions older
than the TTL by the wall clock), with a positive control.
- Docs: Historian.md, Configuration.md, security.md, CLAUDE.md (incl. QuestDB retry duplicates,
#674.4 anonymous-readable trail with ACL off, #674.5 not implemented).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every HistoryUpdate a SQL backend applies now leaves a modification trail
(prior value, principal, Part 11 update type, modification time), and
HistoryReadRaw with IsReadModified=true serves it as HistoryModifiedData.
- Core: HistoryUpdateContext threaded into all three IHistorianDataUpdater
methods; IHistorianDataSource.ReadModifiedAsync (default NotSupported =>
BadHistoryOperationUnsupported on Gateway/Null); HistoryModified* contracts.
- SqlServer: schema v2 (002_sample_modified.sql, RequiredVersion=2, docs copy);
trail written by OUTPUT ... INTO on the same MERGE/DELETE statement, so a
failed update leaves no audit row; retention purges SampleModified per tag on
the source-time cutoff; ReadModifiedAsync keyed on (SourceTimeUtc, ModifiedId).
- QuestDB: append-only {prefix}sample_modified (TTL like samples), trail row
written BEFORE the change (orphan-on-crash, never an untracked change);
existence reads now carry the prior value; ReadModifiedAsync.
- Node manager: modified reads dispatch + page via the #669 continuation store
(HistoryContinuationState gains HistoryCursorKind + LastModifiedId), gated by
the existing HistoryRead decision; session principal / key id passed to the
updater. IsDeleteModified stays unsupported.
- Client.CLI: historyread --modified.
- Tests: node-manager dispatch/paging/cursor binding/principal threading,
over-the-wire HistoryModifiedData, shared ModifiedValueConformance on both
backends, SqlServer atomicity (forced trail failure => no change) + v1->v2
upgrade + retention trail purge.
- Docs: Historian.md (Modified-value history section, schema v2 upgrade note),
security.md, Client.CLI.md, CLAUDE.md.
#587 — a client Acknowledge/Confirm/AddComment/Shelve/Enable/Disable emitted no condition event: the SDK's
ReportStateChange is gated on AutoReportStateChanges (never set), and the engine re-projection found the node
already in the new state and was suppressed by the delta-gate. WireMethodTransitionReporting now wraps each
method's SDK handler and, on Good, reports exactly once via ReportConditionEvent, under Lock so the routed
re-projection cannot race in ahead of the SDK applying the state. Independent of the SDK's imprecise
AreEventsMonitored bookkeeping. The shelve methods' state is applied by the wrapper (the SDK never applies
it). Native conditions' Confirmed/Shelving are method-owned (NativeAlarmProjector's constants would re-report
every ack and undo every shelve). MaxTimeShelved set to int.MaxValue ms at materialise — Create() left it 0
and every TimedShelve failed BadShelvingTimeOutOfRange. Wrong "SDK auto-fires (E2)" comments fixed.
#588 — with ACL on, GeneralModelChange and AuditWriteUpdate events no longer go to Server.ReportEvent
(ungated to every i=2253 item): ReportToServerObject delivers them per item, a model change narrowed to the
Affected nodes the session may Browse (dropped when none), an audit write only with Read on its source plus
the SDK audit/encryption guard. Flag off: unchanged.
#586 review: materialise raises only the new condition's monitored unit (was a full O(N) reconcile per
condition ⇒ O(N²) deploys under Lock).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
Review of 75e559f6:
- OnConditionReportEvent now mirrors MonitoredNode2's AuditEventState guard (only while Server.Auditing,
over SignAndEncrypt / https-uabinary). Conditions report their Part 9 method audit events through
themselves, so the first cut queued AuditConditionAcknowledge (i=8944) etc. to every i=2253 item with
auditing off -- the removed folder->Server forward used to drop them.
- ReconcileAllEventsMonitoring keeps one AreEventsMonitored unit on every materialised condition while any
i=2253 item exists (called from SubscribeToAllEvents, materialise, removal, rebuild), so
ConditionState.EventsMonitored() is true on a server whose only subscribers are Server-object items.
A protected SubscribeToEvents override no-ops all-events items, which stops the SDK's AddRootNotifier
(unsubscribe: true bug) taking that unit back from conditions rebuilt under a live item.
Flag-off over-the-wire coverage: Acknowledge/AddComment with and without a folder co-subscriber (no audit
event, transitions once each), EventsMonitored on/after-rebuild/off, rebuild survival with one copy per
event, native + scripted conditions once each, refresh once per condition with RefreshStart/End; plus an
ACL-on native-vs-scripted notifier-folder decision. Falsified: removing the audit guard reds both audit
cases; removing the reconcile reds the monitored test.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
Server-object (all-events) items bypassed the ACL entirely: the SDK attached them to every root
notifier's fan-out via SubscribeToAllEvents, and a root notifier with no direct subscriber forwarded
to the core Server object, which this node manager never sees.
- SubscribeToAllEvents override records the item and attaches it to nothing.
- Each condition's own OnReportEvent (fires once per event) queues the event to each recorded item
whose session holds Subscribe on the condition (RawPath) or any notifier folder it reports through
-- the per-folder path's question; otherwise mirrors MonitoredNode2.OnReportEvent.
- The root-notifier forward to the core Server object (OnReportEvent override) is dropped.
- ConditionRefresh on an i=2253 item is filtered the same way (once per condition).
- Revalidation is implicit: every event re-asks the authorizer (per-generation cache, key expiry and
revocation re-checked per call). Inert with Security:Acl:Enabled=false.
Over-the-wire tests: no-grant vs granted (positive control), created-before-deploy, revoke/restore by
deployment, key expiry with no tick, refresh, and flag-off. Falsified: disabling the filter, or
restoring the forward, turns the enforcement tests red.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
#562: direct event (alarm) monitored items are now tracked in a second map
(_eventItems, fed by the SubscribeToEvents override) and re-authorized by
RevalidateMonitoredItems on both triggers (DataPlaneAuthorityState.Changed and
AclRevalidationTimer). A denied item is detached via the SDK's own protected
SubscribeToEvents(unsubscribe: true) - never MonitoringMode.Disabled - and
re-attached on restore; a client delete of a stood-down item is absorbed.
Over-the-wire tests: revoke -> stop (positive control on a still-granted
notifier) -> restore -> resume; clock-driven expiry via the real timer with a
control session; delete-while-stood-down is not resurrected; unexpired
negative control. Server-object (all-events) subscriptions are documented as
outside the ACL (observed over the wire).
#563: DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeKeyUsable runs the FindUsableKey probe on
the WriteOperate and AlarmAck role gates regardless of Security:Acl:Enabled,
so an expired or deployment-disabled key loses its activation-time roles on
its open session. Anonymous (no key id) is unaffected; reads/subscriptions
stay ungated with the flag off. No new flag.
Docs: docs/security.md and the CLAUDE.md API-key/ACL section.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
BoundedApiKeyStore bounded ConfigDbApiKeyStore with a
CancellationTokenSource(TimeSpan, TimeProvider) linked into the inner call. That
bounds the call only if the callee chooses to observe the token, and
Microsoft.Data.SqlClient does not while a connect/login is in flight on a
black-holed socket. The 2026-08-20 live gate paused the SQL container and watched
a keyed activation hang 42.9 s past its 2000 ms bound — the "did not answer
within 2000 ms" Warning fired only at unpause — and because this runs inside the
SDK's synchronous SessionManager-lock-holding impersonation callback, an
unrelated already-open subscription stalled 57 s behind it. That is precisely the
hazard the bound exists to prevent, and the TTL cache cannot help a miss.
BoundAsync now races the inner call against Task.Delay on the injected clock with
Task.WhenAny. Inner wins: stop the timer, await it, faults and genuine caller
cancellation propagate unchanged. Delay wins: cancel the linked token anyway (a
cooperative inner store should still stop), hand the abandoned task to
ObserveAbandoned, meter outcome=timeout, log the now-honest Warning, and throw
OperationCanceledException — the same exception the authenticator's catch-all
already maps to the standard opaque denial. Fail-closed is unchanged: nothing
here can admit.
ObserveAbandoned disposes the CTS and TOUCHES finished.Exception (the observation
itself), so a late SqlClient fault can never become an UnobservedTaskException.
Debug, not Warning — the timeout is already reported at Warning, and an outage
must not produce two lines per activation for one event.
An abandoned answer is NEVER cached: it was taken before the deadline and would
be served after it, so a key revoked or expired in the meantime could be admitted
from a lookup nobody was still waiting for. StoreTimeoutMs <= 0 still
short-circuits to the unbounded call byte-for-byte (the documented rollback).
RED BEFORE GREEN. Every pre-existing deadline test drives GatedApiKeyStore, whose
waits take the token, so a cooperative CancelAfter unblocks them and all 15
passed against the defective build — the suite could not see the gate's failure
at all. The new UncooperativeApiKeyStore ignores ct entirely and completes only
when the test releases it. Against the unmodified store the three new tests fail
3/18 with "should throw OperationCanceledException but threw TimeoutException"
under a test-side WaitAsync(2 s), so the red is a failure and not a hang — and
that exception swap IS the finding restated as an assertion.
Host.Tests 137/137.
New docs/security.md section "Mesh gRPC ingress is AllowAnonymous by design"
(archreview 03/S14): what the cookie FallbackPolicy covers, why it can block a
correctly-PSK'd call before the interceptor's verdict matters, why the
AllowAnonymous opt-out is safe (all five interceptors fail-closed), the
affected-endpoint table (fused-vs-driver-only distinction), and the two
standing guards (MeshGrpcAnonymousMetadataTests, MeshGrpcMapConventionTests)
plus the auth-stack/driver-only boundary tests.
One cross-reference line each in docs/Configuration.md (§MeshTransport,
§ConfigSource/ConfigServe) and docs/Telemetry.md, so an operator reading
about the listener ports meets the constraint where they'd look for it.
Joseph Doherty