c4a92f424af1ae0d440557c86e44a47bd628ca7c
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Joseph Doherty
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f8d5b0fdbb |
Phase 6.2 Stream C follow-up — wire AuthorizationGate into DriverNodeManager Read / Write / HistoryRead dispatch
Closes the Phase 6.2 security gap the v2 release-readiness dashboard flagged: the evaluator + trie + gate shipped as code in PRs #84-88 but no dispatch path called them. This PR threads the gate end-to-end from OpcUaApplicationHost → OtOpcUaServer → DriverNodeManager and calls it on every Read / Write / 4 HistoryRead paths. Server.Security additions: - NodeScopeResolver — maps driver fullRef → Core.Authorization NodeScope. Phase 1 shape: populates ClusterId + TagId; leaves NamespaceId / UnsArea / UnsLine / Equipment null. The cluster-level ACL cascade covers this configuration (decision #129 additive grants). Finer-grained scope resolution (joining against the live Configuration DB for UnsArea / UnsLine path) lands as Stream C.12 follow-up. - WriteAuthzPolicy.ToOpcUaOperation — maps SecurityClassification → the OpcUaOperation the gate evaluator consults (Operate/SecuredWrite → WriteOperate; Tune → WriteTune; Configure/VerifiedWrite → WriteConfigure). DriverNodeManager wiring: - Ctor gains optional AuthorizationGate + NodeScopeResolver; both null means the pre-Phase-6.2 dispatch runs unchanged (backwards-compat for every integration test that constructs DriverNodeManager directly). - OnReadValue: ahead of the invoker call, builds NodeScope + calls gate.IsAllowed(identity, Read, scope). Denied reads return BadUserAccessDenied without hitting the driver. - OnWriteValue: preserves the existing WriteAuthzPolicy check (classification vs session roles) + adds an additive gate check using WriteAuthzPolicy.ToOpcUaOperation(classification) to pick the right WriteOperate/Tune/Configure surface. Lax mode falls through for identities without LDAP groups. - Four HistoryRead paths (Raw / Processed / AtTime / Events): gate check runs per-node before the invoker. Events path tolerates fullRef=null (event-history queries can target a notifier / driver-root; those are cluster-wide reads that need a different scope shape — deferred). - New WriteAccessDenied helper surfaces BadUserAccessDenied in the OpcHistoryReadResult slot + errors list, matching the shape of the existing WriteUnsupported / WriteInternalError helpers. OtOpcUaServer + OpcUaApplicationHost: gate + resolver thread through as optional constructor parameters (same pattern as DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder in Phase 6.1). Null defaults keep the existing 3 OpcUaApplicationHost integration tests constructing without them unchanged. Tests (5 new in NodeScopeResolverTests): - Resolve populates ClusterId + TagId + Equipment Kind. - Resolve leaves finer path null per Phase 1 shape (doc'd as follow-up). - Empty fullReference throws. - Empty clusterId throws at ctor. - Resolver is stateless across calls. The existing 9 AuthorizationGate tests (shipped in PR #86) continue to cover the gate's allow/deny semantics under strict + lax mode. Full solution dotnet test: 1164 passing (was 1159, +5). Pre-existing Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged. Existing OpcUaApplicationHost + HealthEndpointsHost + driver integration tests continue to pass because the gate defaults to null → no enforcement, and the lax-mode fallback returns true for identities without LDAP groups (the anonymous test path). Production deployments flip the gate on by constructing it via OpcUaApplicationHost's new authzGate parameter + setting `Authorization:StrictMode = true` once ACL data is populated. Flipping the switch post-seed turns the evaluator + trie from scaffolded code into actual enforcement. This closes release blocker #1 listed in docs/v2/v2-release-readiness.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Joseph Doherty
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6b04a85f86 |
Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization gating by role. Per the user's ACL-at-server-layer directive (saved as feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md in memory), write authorization is enforced in DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue and never delegated to the driver or to driver-specific auth (the v1 Galaxy-provided security path is explicitly not part of v2 — drivers report SecurityClassification as discovery metadata only). New WriteAuthzPolicy static class in Server/Security/ maps SecurityClassification → required role per the table documented in docs/Configuration.md: FreeAccess = no role required (anonymous sessions can write), Operate + SecuredWrite = WriteOperate, Tune = WriteTune, VerifiedWrite + Configure = WriteConfigure, ViewOnly = deny regardless of roles. Role matching is case-insensitive and role requirements do NOT cascade — a session with WriteConfigure can write Configure attributes but needs WriteOperate separately to write Operate attributes; this is deliberate so escalation is an explicit LDAP group assignment, not a hierarchy the policy silently grants. DriverNodeManager gains a _securityByFullRef Dictionary populated during Variable() registration (parallel to the existing _variablesByFullRef) so OnWriteValue can look up the classification in O(1) on the hot path. OnWriteValue casts the session's context.UserIdentity to the new IRoleBearer interface (implemented by OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity from PR 19) — empty Roles collection when the session is anonymous; the same WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed check then either short-circuits true (FreeAccess), false (ViewOnly), or walks the roles list looking for the required one. On deny, OnWriteValue logs 'Write denied for {FullRef}: classification=X userRoles=[...]' at Information level (readable trail for operator complaints) and returns BadUserAccessDenied without touching IWritable.WriteAsync — drivers never see a request we'd have refused. IRoleBearer kept as a minimal server-side interface rather than reusing some abstraction from Core.Abstractions because the concept is OPC-UA-session-scoped and doesn't generalize (the driver side has no notion of a user session). Tests — WriteAuthzPolicyTests (17 new cases): FreeAccess allows write with empty role set + arbitrary roles; ViewOnly denies write even with every role; Operate requires WriteOperate; role match is case-insensitive; Operate denies empty role set + wrong role; SecuredWrite shares Operate's requirement; Tune requires WriteTune; Tune denies WriteOperate-only (asserts roles don't cascade — this is the test that catches a future regression where someone 'helpfully' adds a role-escalation table); Configure requires WriteConfigure; VerifiedWrite shares Configure's requirement; multi-role session allowed when any role matches; unrelated roles denied; RequiredRole theory covering all 5 classified-and-mapped rows + null for FreeAccess/ViewOnly special cases. lmx-followups.md follow-up #2 marked DONE with a back-reference to this PR and the memory note. Full Server.Tests Unit suite: 38 pass / 0 fail (17 new WriteAuthz + 14 SecurityConfiguration from PR 19 + 2 NodeBootstrap + 5 others). Server.Tests Integration (Category=Integration) 2 pass — existing PR 17 anonymous-endpoint smoke tests stay green since the read path doesn't hit OnWriteValue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |