bafbcbee7e27313561ebb485db40abb6532e64ba
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Joseph Doherty
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5d4dd17d7f |
fix(mqtt-transport): warn when a configured password is dropped for want of a username
Driver.Mqtt.Transport-002 (Low, correctness). Credentials were attached only when Username was non-empty, so a config carrying a Password and no Username connected anonymously with the secret silently discarded — the deployment reads as authenticated and is not, which is the direction an operator cannot see from the config. Warned rather than sent. MQTT 3.1.1 may not carry a password without a username, so the password-only CONNECT is not available on every protocol version this factory serves, and synthesizing one under V500 only would change the wire behaviour of deployments that connect happily today. The configured values stay authoritative; the drop just stops being silent. The secret is never formatted into the message. Tests: the warning fires and does NOT contain the password, plus the falsifying control that an ordinary anonymous config (neither credential set) stays silent — without it the fix could warn on every connect and still pass. |
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Joseph Doherty
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74b852716c |
fix(mqtt-transport): warn when the untrusted-cert hatch voids a pinned CA
Driver.Mqtt.Transport-001 (Medium, Security). allowUntrustedServerCertificate and caCertificatePath are independent settings, and when both are set the hatch wins SILENTLY: ConfigureTls installs the accept-everything validator and returns before the pin is consulted. The combination is not exotic — the hatch is what an operator turns on while standing a broker up and the pin is what they add afterwards — and the failure is silent in the direction that matters: the config reads as pinned, and nothing validates anything. Both knobs are explicit, so the flag stays authoritative (overriding it would break a deployment that genuinely wants the hatch, and refusing to build would fault a driver over a config we have been accepting). Saying so once, at the seam that resolves the conflict, is the proportionate answer. No behaviour change; the factory's optional ILogger already exists for this class of deferred diagnostic and never formats credentials. |
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Joseph Doherty
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7f2108dcf2 |
feat(mqtt): Sparkplug primary-host STATE publishing, Primary-gated (#511)
`ActAsPrimaryHost` was accepted by config and by the AdminUI form and did nothing but
log a warning. It now delivers the whole three-part contract or none of it: a retained
`ONLINE` on `spBv1.0/STATE/{hostId}`, a matching retained `OFFLINE` armed as the MQTT
Last Will, and an explicit `OFFLINE` on a clean stand-down.
**The claim is a dedicated connection, not a message.** A Will can only be registered in
the CONNECT packet — it cannot be added to a live session, changed, or withdrawn. So a
claim that is acquired and released at runtime cannot ride the long-lived ingest session.
`SparkplugPrimaryHost` opens its own connection (client id `{clientId}-spbhost`, forced
clean-session) when the node gains Primary and closes it when the node loses Primary; the
connection's lifetime *is* the claim, so every leg follows from its lifecycle. Ingest is
untouched by a role change — no dropped subscriptions, no lost birth cache, no data gap at
the Secondary->Primary transition.
**Primary-gated** (owner decision, recorded on the issue). Both pair nodes subscribe
independently, so an ungated claim means both claim the same host id — and the sharp
failure is not the two fighting over the retained STATE, it is that the SECONDARY's death
fires its Will and publishes OFFLINE while the Primary is healthy, stopping every edge node
in the group. Registering the Will only on whichever node is Primary at connect time fails
the other way: a node that later gains Primary would publish ONLINE with no Will behind it.
New seam: `IDriverPrimaryRoleSource` (`Core.Abstractions`) carrying the *data-plane* verdict
(`PrimaryGatePolicy.ShouldServiceAsPrimary`), not the alarm-drain verdict — an unknown role
with a driver peer present must deny. Registered unconditionally by `AddOtOpcUaRuntime`,
deliberately NOT alongside `IRedundancyRoleView`, which `AddAlarmHistorian` registers only
when that section is enabled: piggybacking would leave a pair with no alarm historian
falling back to "claim unconditionally". Polled on a 1s timer rather than evented — a
process singleton raising events at per-instance drivers outlives every driver it holds.
Accepted trade: a brief edge-visible OFFLINE window during failover. That is a genuine
state transition, not a glitch to hide.
Live-gated 5/5 against the Mosquitto fixture, including the Will leg — `AbandonForTests`
drops the socket with no DISCONNECT, because a clean disconnect makes the broker discard
the Will by protocol rule, so a test driven through `StopAsync` would observe the
stand-down OFFLINE and pass against an implementation that never armed a Will. Falsified:
removing the Will turns that leg and only that leg red.
Also corrects two stale claims found en route: the AdminUI form still said MQTT tags are
read-only (#508 shipped), and the driver doc still said nothing consumes `IRediscoverable`.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
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Joseph Doherty
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7f53bd96ec |
fix(mqtt): close #509, #510, #512, #513, #514
Five MQTT tracker items — four AdminUI/authoring defects plus the .Browser layering exception. No runtime driver behaviour changes. #513 payloadFormat in a Sparkplug blob. MqttTagConfigModel.ToJson wrote the key unconditionally. Sharper than the issue states: PayloadFormat is the one Plain field with a NON-NULLABLE typed backing, so the write did not preserve a retyped tag's leftover — it INVENTED "payloadFormat":"Json" in a Sparkplug tag that never had one. Now Plain-only; preserve-unknown-keys is pinned unchanged. #509 slashed Sparkplug metric names. The mapper already carried metricName verbatim; only the tag Name (a RawPath segment) tripped RawPaths.ValidateSegment, which refused the batch whole — including Node Control/Rebirth, mandatory on every Sparkplug edge node. ToRawSegment coerces the Name and leaves the address untouched. Coercion is not injective, so DescribeNameCollisions refuses a colliding set BY NAME: silently merging two metrics into one tag would be worse than the refusal it replaces. Applies to every driver, not just MQTT — the argument is about what a Name is, not about who produced it. The sanitiser is pinned against RawPaths.ValidateSegment rather than a copied charset. #510 stale rebirth affordance. _canRebirth was probed once at browse-open and sessions are reaped for idleness, so a modal left open offered an action whose token no longer resolved. Re-probed on arm AND on confirm (the reap can land between the two, and confirm is the one path that publishes to a live broker); the affordance retires with an explanation instead of vanishing or erroring. #514 rebirth on a quiet plant. The tree is birth-driven and births are never retained, so a plant that birthed before the window opened showed an empty tree — and the scope came only from a tree selection, so the one action that would fill the tree could not be armed. The session already accepted a bare {group}/{edgeNode} ("the prime rebirth target"); this adds the affordance. Edge-node scope only, not a group broadcast. The rule is extracted to SparkplugRebirthScope so it is testable — this repo has no bUnit — and is advisory: the session re-resolves and refuses before publishing. #512 .Browser -> .Driver layering. TWO extractions were needed, not the one the issue anticipated: it costed this as "the client-options builder", but the browse session decodes births itself, so moving only that would have left the reference exactly where it was. - MqttClientOptionsFactory (TLS, PEM CA-pin validator, credentials, protocol mapping) -> new leaf .Transport project. NOT .Contracts: that is deliberately transport-free and MqttClientOptions is an MQTTnet type, so .Contracts would hand MQTTnet to ControlPlane. This is the fix the .Browser csproj comment had already prescribed, against the issue's suggestion. - The Sparkplug protocol layer (SparkplugTopic/MessageType, SparkplugCodec, RebirthRequester) -> .Contracts, beside the Tahu wire schema it encodes. Still exactly one copy of the TLS/CA-pin logic; MqttBrowserLayeringTests guards the graph both ways. Measured, not assumed: Driver.Mqtt.dll, Polly.Core and Serilog are now absent from the AdminUI's output. Core.dll remains, because Driver.Sql.Browser has the SAME violation, undocumented — the old comment blamed this browser for Core and was wrong. Filed separately rather than fixed in passing. Full suite green apart from the 7 known pre-existing failures (4 AbLegacy integration, compose profiles not up; 3 Host.IntegrationTests). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |