Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Joseph Doherty 88e0977ae6 fix(s7): bound async wire ops with a wall-clock deadline (R2-01 read leg)
v2-ci / build (pull_request) Successful in 5m5s
v2-ci / unit-tests (pull_request) Failing after 13m50s
The R2-01 live gate (S7_1500ConnectTimeoutOutageTests, docker-pause blackhole)
surfaced a real gap the offline fakes couldn't: S7.Net's ReadTimeout/WriteTimeout
map to the TcpClient's ReceiveTimeout/SendTimeout, which govern only SYNCHRONOUS
socket calls — the async read/write paths S7.Net uses ignore them. On an
established-but-frozen peer (frozen PLC / firewall DROP / cable pulled mid-flow,
TCP session still open) a read blocked until the OS TCP stack gave up (minutes),
silently wedging the poll loop: no Bad tick, no reconnect. STAB-14 fixed only the
CONNECT leg (EnsureConnectedAsync CancelAfter); this is its READ-leg sibling.

- New S7OperationDeadline: bounds every data-plane wire op with a wall-clock
  ceiling (= _options.Timeout), surfacing an overrun as TimeoutException. Applied
  in S7PlcAdapter to Read/ReadBytes/Write/WriteBytes/ReadStatus. OpenAsync is left
  to EnsureConnectedAsync's own CancelAfter (not double-bounded).
- IsS7ConnectionFatal now classifies TimeoutException fatal → handle marked dead →
  next EnsureConnectedAsync reopens (connect-timeout fix takes over from there).
- Tests: 5 S7OperationDeadline unit tests (deadline / token-honouring / caller-
  cancel-passthrough / resultless), 1 driver-reaction test (read TimeoutException
  → reopen). Driver.S7.Tests 260/260.
- Live gate S7_1500ConnectTimeoutOutageTests now GREEN against the real snap7 sim
  (8s: baseline Good -> pause blackhole -> Bad tick -> unpause -> recovered Good).
2026-07-15 07:11:42 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 8999c722a0 fix(r2-01): probe failures mark the handle dead under the gate so the next tick reopens (STAB-15b, task 9) 2026-07-13 10:03:36 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 33044061c3 fix(r2-01): cancellation observed mid-PDU marks the connection dead before propagating (STAB-15a, task 8) 2026-07-13 10:01:20 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 8aed9ac365 fix(r2-01): RED framing-fault classification Theory T5 (STAB-15a, task 6) 2026-07-13 09:57:08 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 7813304199 fix(r2-01): RED poll-loop-survival T2 + caller-cancel pinning T4 (task 2) 2026-07-13 09:51:57 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 9dedb7936b fix(r2-01): RED connect-timeout regression tests T1+T3 (task 1) 2026-07-13 09:50:07 -04:00
Joseph Doherty fcdcf0e2fb fix(r2-01): extend reconnect fakes with token-honouring hang + probe-fault modes (task 0) 2026-07-13 09:48:42 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 25c0c6f68f fix(s7): add lazy reconnect path (archreview STAB-1 / Critical 3)
The S7 Plc was opened once in InitializeAsync and never re-opened: a transient
PLC reboot / network blip permanently killed the driver until redeploy. Introduce
an IS7Plc / IS7PlcFactory seam (mirrors TwinCAT's ITwinCATClientFactory) and a lazy
EnsureConnectedAsync that disposes a dead handle and re-opens a fresh connection on
the next data call. Reads/writes mark the handle dead on a connection-fatal fault
(socket drop / ErrorCode.ConnectionError) but NOT on a data-address error; the probe
loop routes through EnsureConnectedAsync as a backstop.

The seam also closes the S7 TEST-1 gap — the reconnect state machine is now unit-
testable without a live PLC (S7.Net.Plc is sealed with no in-process fake).

Verification:
- 4 deterministic unit guards (fatal→reopen, data-error→no-reopen, raw socket→reopen,
  reopen-fail→degrade-then-recover); full S7 unit suite 234/234 green.
- LIVE end-to-end proof against real python-snap7 (S7_1500ReconnectTests, double-gated
  on sim reachability + S7_RECONNECT_BOUNCE_CMD): bounced the container, driver observed
  the outage and resumed Good reads with NO redeploy. Baseline smoke 3/3 still green.
2026-07-08 17:04:46 -04:00