Review of af5c9744:
1. UNS reference variables (s=Area/Line/Equip/Eff) of a moved or renamed
equipment stayed readable/writable under the OLD names' grants: they now
resolve as ReferenceVariable and are authorized at their split path only
while it equals their live equipment folder's placement (live chain ==
generation chain) + one name; otherwise denied (Read and Write).
2. TryPlaceScriptedCondition now also requires the owner folder's live chain
to match the generation (AuthorizeScriptedCondition gains ownerFolderChain),
so a moved equipment's alarm/children/commands follow its folder.
3. Identifiers containing NUL are denied before the decision cache, keeping
client ids disjoint from the NUL-prefixed resolved-scope keys (a client
could otherwise poison a real folder's cached verdict for its key shard).
4. An id no live node holds is Unknown: placed at [\0unknown] so only
Cluster / Namespace-uns grants decide it (a removed opaque id can no longer
split onto a same-named narrow grant; narrow grantees get no NodeDeleted for
removed UNS folders/vtags/conditions — documented); 4-segment
reference-shaped ids keep their split.
5. A wire test drives placements from DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority.
Baseline updates: #797 owner tests (unit + wire) and Sdk2RepeatedAlarmAuthority
now install folder scopes; Sdk2HistoryAuthority's UNS alias used the RAW path
as its UNS id (never minted in production) and now carries EqA/HistoryAlias.
Each new guard was falsified (reverting it fails its test).
UNS Area/Line/Equipment folders are minted under their opaque entity ids
(s=UA-/UL-/EQ-...), virtual tags under s=EQ-.../Name and scripted conditions
(+ #629 children) under s=<ScriptedAlarmId>[/...], while every UNS grant is
planted at a NAME path. DataPlaneAuthorizer split those ids, so with
Security:Acl:Enabled a narrow (Area/Line/Equipment) grant could not Browse,
Read, subscribe or HistoryRead them, and Server-object delivery never reached
it — so a narrow key never held the EventId Ack/Confirm/AddComment need.
- The generation carries UnsFolderScopes (folderId -> path + id chain), built
by DeploymentArtifact from the same AclScopePathResolver as the grants; ids
two entity kinds share are dropped; plumbed through IDataPlaneAuthoritySink.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager.ResolveUnsAclSubject reports live facts (folder id
ancestry / scripted owner binding); attached by the Authorizer setter.
- Evaluate places the subject against the CURRENT generation before the
decision cache, which now caches the walk keyed on the resolved scope.
Folders require live chain == generation chain (a moved equipment is denied
under old and new line until the rebuild). Owned nodes (vtags, conditions,
children) get owner path + a reserved segment, so Tag grants and their
Browse transit never expose them. Conditions share TryPlaceScriptedCondition
with the #797 command gate.
- Server-object visibility of a scripted condition is decided on the
condition alone, so a moved alarm cannot reach its old owner there.
Tests: UnsFolderScopeWireTests (opaque ids, end-to-end browse -> EventId ->
Acknowledge on an Equipment grant; sibling denied; Tag-only grant; moved alarm
and moved equipment stale windows). Rig tests now install folder scopes
explicitly (ServerEventRig.FolderScopes); the #797 recreate test deliberately
asserts the moved alarm is invisible to the Cluster observer in the window.
QualityMixConformance (SqlServer + QuestDB): tag Q mixes Good/Uncertain/Bad
regions across eight 10 s intervals (two all-Uncertain - Mantis 0006166 0%/0% -
one through an Uncertain bound, plus Uncertain bounds from a sloped non-Good end
and from a hold into an outage); tag QP has data starting and ending inside
intervals. PercentGood/PercentBad are asserted against hand-derived Part 13
DurationGood/DurationBad, the oracle is checked against the same hand values,
and Count/Average/TimeAverage(2)/Total(2)/Start/End/Delta/Interpolative are
compared with the #796 oracle forward, reverse and truncated.
Teeth: with SdkAggregateOracle.Run answering PercentGood from the baseline
(Uncertain as Good), 8 tests fail per backend; all pass with the fixed oracle.
Records a new SDK divergence: with an Uncertain first sample the baseline
TimeAverage/Total integrate the pre-data span as a ramp from 0; ours covers
only the data (Part 13) - pinned by hand.
docs/drivers/OpcUaClient.md, docs/plans/2026-05-28-driver-browsers-design.md and
docs/Client.CLI.md: one OpcUaEndpointUrlRewriter for driver, AdminUI browser and
Client CLI/UI; configured host+port win, advertised path kept for opc.tcp; policy/mode
selection and certificate validation unchanged; NAT test recipe against the #813 fixture.
Review of 3d1b86b4: OpcUaPublishActor installs a new authority generation
before applying its address space, and an apply that throws keeps the old one.
A scripted alarm moved from equipment A to B therefore stayed commandable with
A's grant under B's generation (briefly before the rebuild, or indefinitely
after a failed apply).
The generation now carries ScriptedAlarmOwners (ScriptedAlarmId -> EquipmentId,
decoded by ParseDataPlaneAuthority from the artifact's ScriptedAlarms rows, the
same rows the composition materialises from). AuthorizeScriptedCondition denies
unless the node manager's live binding names the same owner as the generation:
a moved alarm is denied under the old owner's, the new owner's and a Cluster
grant until the address space re-binds it; an alarm the generation no longer
deploys is denied. Install/apply order unchanged.
Tests: window (a) generation moved / binding stale => both owners and Cluster
denied, then rebuild under the new owner => new owner allowed, old denied;
window (b) apply failed after install => denied across clock and further
generations, then a successful rebuild restores the new owner only; undeployed
alarm denied; artifact decode of the owner map.
Scripted condition NodeIds are opaque ScriptedAlarmIds, so splitting them as a
topology path could never match an Equipment grant: a narrow equipment grant was
denied while a Cluster grant passed.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager binds each LIVE scripted condition instance to the
EquipmentId it was materialised under (only when it hangs under that folder);
dropped on remove / drop-recreate / equipment-subtree removal / rebuild; a
same-id re-materialise under another equipment re-parents and re-binds.
- DataPlaneAuthoritySnapshot carries EquipmentScopePaths (EquipmentId ->
[uns, Area, Line, Equipment]) decoded from the artifact by the same
AclScopePathResolver call that plants Equipment grants.
- DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeScriptedCondition re-reads key, grant and
generation per call (uncached) and evaluates at the owner path; unbound,
replaced or unplaceable owners deny under every grant. No id-split or
realm-root fallback.
- Native conditions (RawPath) and the ACL-off role gate are unchanged.
NodeIds and AlarmCommand.AlarmId are unchanged.
Sdk2OpaqueScriptedScopeBaselineTests deliberately flipped: it pinned the denial
and now pins owner-grant allow / sibling deny / cluster allow. Follow-up #808
(folder ids + Server-object event visibility for narrow UNS grants).
Owner decisions §14 #5/#6 as built (design §12.5):
- Scripting:Worker:Identity (default unset, Windows only, fail-closed validation): each worker
starts under a restricted token derived from the host's. Every privilege but SeChangeNotify is
removed; the restricting SIDs are NT SERVICE\OtOpcUaScriptWorker's SID + Everyone + Users +
RESTRICTED; the token and default DACLs are host + SYSTEM + identity + RESTRICTED. The worker
is created suspended, put in its Job Object before it runs, inherits only its stdio pipes, gets
an ACL'd work dir as TEMP, and runs with DOTNET_EnableDiagnostics=0. The identity is granted on
the host's window station and desktop, because USER32 init made coreclr.dll fail with
ERROR_DLL_INIT_FAILED on windev. The logon SID is not used because the host's process DACL
gives it PROCESS_VM_READ.
- The worker pipe on Windows always has an explicit protected DACL: host account + identity
only. There is no owner ACE, so an elevated host's Administrators gets no access.
- The worker treats access denied on its parent-pid poll as alive; the Job Object covers that case.
- scripts/install/Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 + ScriptWorkerIsolation.psm1 are idempotent
and support -WhatIf, -Uninstall and -PlanOnly. They create the disabled anchor service, the
PeCacheDir ACL (protected, no Users, key and markers host-only, pe\ Modify for the identity),
read+execute on script-worker\, a ReadData deny on the install root, the outbound firewall
block on the worker exe, and optionally the host-service env.
- Tests: the dry-run harness scripts/install/tests/Test-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 (46
assertions, mutation-checked); ScriptWorkerIdentityTests; WorkerIsolationTests, which cover
the pipe ACL, token access and a real restricted worker running a script, all green on windev.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
ForbiddenTypeAnalyzer now denies System.AppContext, System.Console, GCSettings, ProfileOptimization,
EncodingProvider/CodePagesEncodingProvider, TypeDescriptor and CryptoConfig as types, and the ambient
CultureInfo.{DefaultThreadCurrentCulture,DefaultThreadCurrentUICulture,CurrentCulture,CurrentUICulture}
and TimeZoneInfo.ClearCachedData members (member deny-list now covers properties and member-access reads).
Shadow-mode tests diverge via culture-sensitive string.Compare (worker is InvariantGlobalization) instead of
AppContext.BaseDirectory, with a premise test. Mutation-proved: 21 new cases fail with the analyzer reverted.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Shadow on central-1/2 with all three seams: zero mismatches on ordinary VTs / Calc / alarms, counted mismatches on
exactly the divergent (value) and decimal (unsupported_type) scripts, kill -9 of the shadow workers left every
published value Good. OutOfProcess with ScriptedAlarm listed: alarms raise and clear, a runaway predicate is killed
twice and quarantined (BadInternalError) with its siblings Active and Good, kill -9 under an in-flight predicate
freezes it Active + BadResourceUnavailable and it re-evaluates in isolation. Answers A-7 (Modbus UInt16 boxes as
ushort) and A-8 (a decimal VT publishes BadNotSupported in process). Rig restored to revision e221b179.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
- ShadowScriptRunner (Core.Scripting): IScriptShadow.Mirror copies the inputs and queues the shadow run on the
pool; compares value (structural), CLR type, status and failure class (compile / budget / threw+message /
unsupported_type); runner-fault shadow outcomes (Unavailable, worker busy) are not compared. Bounded:
Scripting:Shadow:MaxInFlight (256) and one per script; drops counted (behind | key_busy).
- Metrics otopcua.script.shadow.{compared,mismatch{script},dropped,inflight}; one rate-limited Warning per
script and reason with a diff summary (Scripting:Shadow:MismatchLogsPerMinute, re-armed at the seam's deploy).
- The VirtualTag, Calculation and scripted-alarm seams recognise the shadow and keep their in-process path
byte-for-byte (no coalescer, one-at-a-time pump, in-process engine), mirroring after each compiled run.
- ScriptRunnerSelection builds the shadow over an OutOfProcessScriptRunner whose lines carry
ScriptRunnerRole=Shadow; Status() is null under Shadow so readiness never sees the shadow pool; the
script-runner health entry stays Healthy and reports the shadow counters as data.
- docker-dev/docker-compose.script-runner-shadow.yml; docs/VirtualTags.md "Shadow mode".
- Tests: comparison table, per-script metric + once-per-reason log, rate limit, hung/blocking/throwing shadow
never reaches the caller, MaxInFlight drop accounting, input copy; real-worker divergent + unsupported-type
scripts counted against exactly those scripts, a worker-only runaway killed/quarantined there with every
published value intact, alarm transitions identical to in process across a kill -9 of the shadow worker.
Mutation-proved (16 mutants, 15 red; the one survivor added an assertion).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
- IScriptRunner.RunBatch: one EvalBatch frame per worker for every evaluation ready to run; per-item, streamed results.
The default (InProcessScriptRunner) is RunAsync per item. Used by the Calculation pump (dequeue all, split at a
repeated tag, publish in dequeue order), the VirtualTag seam (ScriptBatchCoalescer, no timer) and the scripted-alarm
engine (whole dirty set). In process the pump and the engine stay one at a time, unchanged.
- Exact per-item deadlines: the worker hands work to an idle evaluation thread or defers it (EvalResults
deferred_eval_ids); the host stops that run's clock and restarts T then G when it starts (started_eval_ids). A run
queued behind a runaway is neither timed out nor struck and is a victim, not the culprit, at the kill.
- Scripted-alarm seam behind Scripting:Runner:Seams; unset Seams now means VirtualTag + Calculation, so alarms run out of
process only when listed. Load still compiles each predicate (to PE bytes only) so a broken one fails the load; passes
batch and apply in the serial order under the gate. Script faults freeze the condition BadInternalError; runner faults
freeze it BadResourceUnavailable and re-evaluate on recovery; a dead worker never clears an alarm. IScriptRunnerProvider
carries the runner to DriverHostActor.
- Perf harness: batch throughput (RunBatch vs RunAsync x n) and alarm-pass latency (in process / batched / serial);
design §12.3 records macOS + windev. On windev the serial out-of-process alarm pass misses 250 ms from ~500 alarms;
batched p99 <= 53 ms at 1,000.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Proven broken first: VirtualTagToVirtualTagFlowTests (real mux + host + Roslyn
evaluator) failed on master - VT A evaluated, VT B reading A by its key never did.
VT outputs only reached their OPC UA node; the mux carried driver values only.
- VirtualTagHostActor also sends each real result (not re-asserts) and a disabled
tag's BadOutOfService to the mux as VirtualTagOutput, keyed by the VT's UNS
NodeId identifier {EquipmentId}/{Name}. Publish path unchanged (single source).
- DependencyMuxActor pins VT outputs (retained with no subscriber, no grace,
immune to SourceRemoved) and replays them; VirtualTagOutputsRemoved releases
keys that leave the deployed set.
- DraftValidator: blocking VirtualTagDependencyCycle (A->B->A, self-read, loops
through Calculation tags, {{equip}} refs resolved); disabled VTs are not nodes.
EquipReferenceUnresolved names the key form when {{equip}}/<name> is a VT.
- Runtime backstop: the host re-detects VT cycles per apply and does not route
outputs of tags on one.
- AdminUI ScriptTagCatalog lists VTs by key (the bare leaf name never resolved).
- docs/VirtualTags.md documents the routing, key, retention and cycle rules.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Revises 963b0d66, which dropped a disabled VirtualTag from the runtime plan so a
bound client got BadNodeIdUnknown. Now the plan carries Enabled (part of value
equality): AddressSpaceComposer.Compose and DeploymentArtifact.BuildEquipmentVirtualTagPlans
keep the row with Enabled=false (byte-parity), the applier materialises the node as
normal, and VirtualTagHostActor spawns no VirtualTagActor for it but publishes
BadOutOfService (new OpcUaStatus constant) with a null value stamped at deploy, on
every apply. Enabled flips are node-irrelevant to the change classifier; enabled->disabled
stops the child, disabled->enabled resumes evaluation. Validator exemption and name
uniqueness unchanged. Scripted alarms keep their not-materialised convention.
Tests updated; new wire test DisabledVirtualTagWireTests. docs/VirtualTags.md updated.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
Joseph Doherty