The summary list still described the pre-#520 world: NodeAcl/PermissionTrie
'built and unit-tested but never wired', reads/browse/subscribe/HistoryRead
carrying no authorization at all, and UserName tokens authenticated by LDAP
bind. The body had been updated by #520 stages 5-7 but the summary, the
Anonymous auth-table row, the LDAP bind-flow paragraph (still routing the OPC
UA UserName path through the deleted LdapOpcUaUserAuthenticator), the
'sourced from Security:Ldap:GroupToRole' role-source section, and the
'Dispatch gate (no such gate exists)' section all contradicted it — a reader
who stopped at any of them got the pre-#520 answer.
All now state the flag-gated reality: with Security:Acl:Enabled false (the
default) the only enforcement is the two coarse server-wide role gates and
reads are ungated; with it true, scoped NodeAcl grants decide every
data-plane operation via DataPlaneAuthorizer -> TriePermissionEvaluator.
Data-plane roles derive from cluster-scoped NodeAcl grants
(ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper); GroupToRole and LdapGroupRoleMapping feed AdminUI
login only. The acl-design.md pointer no longer calls the design 'unshipped
work'.
Closes#547.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
OtOpcUa runs five internal gRPC planes between its own processes, all of
them cleartext HTTP/2 (h2c) with a shared-bearer interceptor: the live
telemetry stream, config-serve artifact fetch, LocalDb pair sync, mesh
commands and mesh deploy acks. The bearer therefore crosses the wire in
the clear on every one of them. That was true and undocumented; the two
mesh planes are command surfaces, so it is worth saying out loud rather
than leaving to be rediscovered per plane.
docs/security.md gains "Internal gRPC planes (h2c) — accepted cleartext
posture" under Transport Security (whose existing content is entirely
about the OPC UA endpoint). It carries a five-row table — service name,
listener config key, credential config key, interceptor — the honest
read-vs-write breakdown per plane, and the decision itself.
Decision (issue #545, option 1): risk ACCEPTED 2026-08-06, once, for all
five planes together, on the trusted-link assumption every plane already
makes (VPN / dedicated WAN). Per-cluster PSKs already bound blast radius
on the two command planes — a captured SITE-A key cannot drive SITE-B —
and production keys arrive as ${secret:...} references that must never be
reused across clusters. Recorded future work: a UseTls/scheme option,
which if built must cover all five planes together, since a mixed posture
is harder to reason about than either uniform answer.
docs/Configuration.md's MeshTransport section gains one cross-reference
paragraph pointing at the new subsection.
Docs only — no code, no behaviour change. Every service name, config key,
interceptor name and shared-listener claim was verified against the
source; ports 4056/4055 are phrased as the docker-dev rig's values of
Telemetry:GrpcListenPort / ConfigServe:GrpcListenPort, not as hardcoded
ports.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
The last stage of #520. Enforcement landed in stages 5-6; this closes the
authoring end, where a grant could be saved, deployed and sealed green while
resolving to nothing.
Scope kind and scope target are now chosen TOGETHER from a picker over the
cluster's raw and UNS trees (AclScopePickerModal -> AclScopeTree, backed by
IAclScopeService). They were previously an unrelated dropdown and a free-text
box, so "RawDevice + a TagId" was a well-formed row. Because the trees are
rooted at the grant's own cluster and each node supplies its own kind,
NodeAclScopeCrossCluster, NodeAclScopeIdUnexpected, NodeAclScopeIdMissing and
NodeAclScopeKindRetired all become unauthorable by construction.
CheckScopeAsync mirrors DraftValidator.ValidateNodeAclScopes rule for rule and
blocks the save when a scope resolves to nothing - re-checked on submit, not
trusted from form load, because a row whose entity was deleted since is exactly
where the operator never touches the picker. The list page marks such rows
unresolved with the reason. The principal field suggests known principals and
reports how many live keys reach the one typed; reaching nobody warns rather
than blocks, since authoring ahead of minting is legitimate.
Deliberate departures from the plan line, all recorded in the design doc:
- The banners are reshaped, not removed. "Not enforced" stopped being true at
stage 6, but enforcement is still a per-node flag the AdminUI cannot see, so
a narrow grant really does confer nothing on a default-configured node.
- A Cluster row produces a NULL ScopeId. The deploy gate rejects one that
carries an id, so filling in the cluster id would author undeployable rows.
- AclScopeTree is a new component rather than a third mode on RawTree, which
already carries the /raw editing tree and the equipment reference picker.
- UNS tags are not offered: a UNS signal is a UnsTagReference, and a Tag grant
already covers the raw node and every UNS projection of it.
Also fixed: the ACL editor had a DataAnnotationsValidator and no
ValidationSummary, so an invalid NodeAclId made Create a silent no-op.
Tests: 30 in AdminUI.Tests/Acls, falsified with six production mutations -
each turned exactly the intended tests red and no others.
Live gate PASSED on docker-dev, 11 legs; both central containers asserted on
the same image by container id. The pair that matters is legs 8 and 11: the
page and the deploy gate reject the same row with the same reason. Legs 5 and
9 are the positive controls - without them the gate passes against a page that
refuses everything. Not covered: UNS-realm scope selection (SITE-A has no UNS
areas). Rig restored to zero ACL rows.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
site-a-1 (driver-only, no ConfigDb) with Security:Acl:Enabled=true; central-1
on the same artifact as the A/B control. 11 legs.
The two that only a live rig could settle, as a transcript:
13:49:39 SiteAOnly = 53 (0x00000000) streaming ~1/s
13:49:40 SiteAOnly = (0x801F0000) revoking deploy lands; client TOLD
… 25 seconds of silence, ~25 updates that never arrived …
13:50:05 SiteAOnly = 157 (0x00000000) restoring deploy; feed resumes
53 -> 157 across the gap: the device counter ran throughout, so delivery
stopped, not the source. The 0x801F0000 frame is exactly what the
MonitoringMode.Disabled implementation would have swallowed.
Also recorded: the leg that distinguishes working enforcement from a trie that
denies everything is resolvedScopes=1 in the install log, not any denial.
Stated plainly as NOT covered: a UNS-realm grant (the rig's SITE-A has no UNS
equipment) and alarm-command scoping (no alarms there). Both covered offline,
neither seen live.
Two rig facts worth keeping: :9200 round-robins central-1/central-2, and a
stale central-2 rejected the deploy outright because its image predated the
stage-3 scope kinds — image parity must be asserted per container, not assumed
from one build. And SITEA-modbus had an empty DriverConfig, so it ran as a stub
serving nothing; until that was fixed every read returned
BadWaitingForInitialData and no allow leg could be told from a denial.
Rig left as found.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Completes data-plane enforcement behind Security:Acl:Enabled. Read (every
attribute, not just Value), Browse, TranslateBrowsePath, CreateMonitoredItems,
SubscribeToEvents and SetMonitoringMode now consult scoped NodeAcl grants.
With the flag off nothing changes.
Four things went beyond the stage as written, each because leaving it out
would have made the feature look like it worked:
- Browse needed ancestor visibility. The trie inherits downward, and a client
reaches a deep node by browsing the nodes above it, so without this every
grant narrower than the cluster was authored, shipped and unreachable. It is
a separate non-inheriting marker, NOT a synthesized Browse grant on each
ancestor: the additive downward walk would carry such a grant from Plant onto
Plant/Siemens/dev9 and every other sibling subtree. Pinned by a test that
goes through the evaluator — probing the trie helper directly passes against
the broken design, because a sibling is absent from the trie either way.
- Revocation had to reach LIVE subscriptions. Every other operation re-asks per
request; a subscription is authorized once and then streams, and streaming is
how machine consumers actually read this server — so stopping only the
re-asking operations would have made revocation close to cosmetic.
IDataPlaneAuthoritySource gained a Changed event.
A denied item is queued BadUserAccessDenied and then DETACHED from its
MonitoredNode2 fan-out, not set MonitoringMode.Disabled. Disabling discards
the item's queued notifications, so the client is silenced without ever being
told why. The over-the-wire test caught this; the unit-level path reports the
item as stood down either way. Detaching is also reversible, so a restored
grant resumes the feed with no client action.
- The decision cache holds the grant WALK, not the decision. Grants and the
trie are fixed for a generation; a key's ExpiresUtc passes with the clock, so
caching the whole decision would let an expired key keep working until the
next deploy — the stage-5 open-session hole in a subtler form.
- TranslateBrowsePath is gated, without which browse filtering is decorative: a
client refused a browse asks TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds for the same path.
Found en route: UserAuthorizationState's staleness ceiling couples two clocks.
MembershipResolvedUtc is stamped from DataPlaneAuthorizer's TimeProvider while
IsStale is evaluated against TriePermissionEvaluator's; they are the same
instance in production and diverge the moment anything injects a test clock, at
which point the evaluator denies EVERYTHING with a verdict indistinguishable
from "no grant matched". Stage 5's claim that these predicates cannot fire was
accidentally true; they are now disabled explicitly.
Also fixed: ContinuationPoint.NodeToBrowse is the manager HANDLE, not a
NodeState. The declared type is object, so the wrong cast compiled cleanly and
silently yielded null — skipping the browse source gate entirely.
Falsified: disabling the transit marking reddens exactly the three tests that
assert transit works; implementing transit as an ancestor grant reddens the
sibling-leak test; skipping the fan-out detach reddens the revocation test.
Full solution suite green.
The stage 8 live gate has NOT run yet.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
`Security:Acl:Enabled` (default false) makes scoped `NodeAcl` grants decide
data-plane authorization at the three seams that have one, and gives HistoryRead
a check it never had. Read, Browse and Subscribe stay ungated — stage 6.
The ACL decision REPLACES the server-wide role check rather than chaining with
it. Chained, a grant would have to confer the role as well as pass the scope
check, and only Cluster-scoped grants confer a role — so every narrow grant
would have stayed inert and the flag would have looked inert too. The
load-bearing test is an ALLOW: a session carrying no roles at all writing
successfully on the strength of its grant. A deny-only test passes against a
build where the ACL is never consulted, because the role gate denies too.
Found en route: the principal never reached the session. The authenticator
passed it as OpcUaUserAuthResult.DisplayName, but RoleCarryingUserIdentity
derives DisplayName from the presented token — for a key-bearing client that is
the static username `apikey`, identical fleet-wide. So the trie's matching key
was dropped at the identity boundary, and the audit ClientUserId on a rejected
write recorded `apikey` for every consuming system. Principal and ApiKeyId are
now carried explicitly.
Beyond the stage as sketched:
- Revocation reaches an OPEN session. Every decision re-checks the
authenticating key against the current snapshot; without it a key revoked by a
deployment kept its authority until the client chose to reconnect, which for a
machine-to-machine consumer can be indefinitely.
- UserAuthorizationState is built per CALL, not per session. The per-session
shape exists so an LDAP session can re-resolve membership that changed out of
band; nothing can change out of band under API keys, so the generation stamp is
the whole invalidation signal and a per-call record picks it up for free.
IsStale/NeedsRefresh therefore cannot fire here and are documented as vestigial.
- The trie is built inside DataPlaneAuthorityState.Apply, under the same
generation as the snapshot, rather than by a second wiring at the publish
actor. An uninstalled trie denies everything — indistinguishable from working
enforcement. Deleting the install turns 13 of the 22 new tests red.
- The deploy log reports what the BUILD dropped instead of re-deriving it. The
old count agreed with the builder on one of its four drop reasons; a rule with
a blank ScopeId, a retired scope kind, or a path not starting at a realm
vanished with the log reading zero.
Both IApiKeyStore implementations widened to the full grant set. The narrowing
was redundant — ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper applies the same filter itself — and
became a trap once scope was enforced. Pinned by asserting the roles are
unchanged, with the two grants carrying different flags so it cannot pass by
accident.
Falsified by mutation: enforcement never engaging, the write seam ignoring the
ACL, the realm dropped from the scope, the revocation check removed, and the
trie never installed each turn the intended tests red and no others.
Full solution suite green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Two independent defects surfaced in review of #520 stage 3.
#532 — Cluster:Roles had no OTOPCUA_ROLES fallback, despite two doc sites
promising one. A node configured only through the env var — which drives ALL of
Program.cs's conditional wiring, so it reads as the authoritative knob — bound an
empty Roles array and joined the cluster carrying no Akka roles at all. It ran,
served, and logged nothing wrong, while central reported "no driver-role nodes
are Up" and every deployment to it timed out. Not hypothetical: the field fix on
wonder-app-vd03 was to hand-add Cluster__Roles__0/1 to a Windows service's
registry environment. Anyone reading the code to diagnose that box would have
concluded from the XML doc that the fallback was already applied.
AddOtOpcUaCluster now post-configures AkkaClusterOptions through the shared
RoleParser.ResolveEffectiveRoles, so BuildClusterOptions (Akka's own member
roles), ClusterRoleInfo, the ControlPlane singleton scope and
ConfigDbApiKeyStore's ClusterId all see one answer. Two sibling validators
(ConfigSource, Telemetry) read Cluster:Roles directly and were exempting the
exact node they exist for — an env-only driver-only node has no ConfigDb and
could sit on ConfigSource:Mode=Direct unchallenged. They resolve the same way now.
Also collapsed the four open-coded `Roles.FirstOrDefault(IsClusterRole)` +
ClusterIdFromRole copies into RoleParser.ClusterIdFromRoles. They had drifted:
three classified the cluster role ordinally, so a verbatim-bound `Cluster-SITE-A`
yielded a null ClusterId — and a null ClusterId applies NO cluster filter, which
made #528's cross-cluster over-grant guard fail OPEN. IsClusterRole is now
case-insensitive; the ClusterId suffix keeps its authored spelling, because
normalizing it would silently rename the Akka role of a running deployment.
#533 — three string-identity rules in one authorization path. AclScopeRef used
default (ordinal) equality while the trie builder filtered ClusterId and hashed
principals OrdinalIgnoreCase; the deploy gate's cross-cluster check was ordinal
too, which was the worse half — it could reject a whole deploy over a ClusterId
case difference the runtime would have accepted. It only worked because resolver
and builder were handed the same NodeAcl instances.
The rule is now stated once, on AclScopeRef, and applied throughout:
identifiers (ScopeId, ClusterId, Principal) compare OrdinalIgnoreCase; path
segments compare Ordinal. AclScopePathResolver re-keys its own maps rather than
documenting a comparer contract for callers, so the two independent producers —
EF at the gate, artifact JSON on the node — cannot diverge from the outside.
PermissionTrieNode.Children stays Ordinal: those are browse names, and Speed /
speed are two nodes that can coexist under one device.
Split PermissionTrieBuildDiagnosticReason.RetiredScopeKind out of
UnresolvedScope. A legacy FolderSegment row and a typo'd id had the same message
and different remedies.
Falsified: five mutations, each reddening only its own guard — remove the
PostConfigure (3 tests), revert IsClusterRole to ordinal (3), revert AclScopeRef
equality (1), revert the resolver's map comparer (6), revert the gate's
comparisons (2), remove the FolderSegment short-circuit (1).
Test isolation: OTOPCUA_ROLES is process-global and xUnit runs classes in
parallel, so the three validator suites that now resolve effective roles share a
non-parallel collection. Without it, cases passing no roles would intermittently
observe another class's env var.
Full solution build clean; full suite green apart from two pre-existing failures
confirmed identical on 3a6b2a1d (PrimaryGateFailoverTests, and
DriverProbeRegistrationTests expecting 10 probe types where 12 now register)
plus the AbLegacy integration suite, which needs a docker fixture.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
A driver-only node has had no ConfigDb since per-cluster mesh Phase 4, so it
registered NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator and denied every UserName token. Its keys
now ride the deployment artifact instead.
- ConfigComposer snapshots ApiKeys alongside the NodeAcls it already carried.
Only the peppered HMAC ships, never a secret, and the pepper is node config
that is deliberately not in the artifact.
- DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority decodes both node-side. Grants are
scoped to the node's own cluster; keys are not, because ApiKey carries no
ClusterId — a key is a fleet-wide credential and the ACL rows are what bind it.
- OpcUaPublishActor installs them on DataPlaneAuthorityState on every apply,
BEFORE its plan.IsEmpty early-return: an artifact that only revokes a key
produces an empty address-space plan, so feeding after that return would leave
the revoked key working until an unrelated structural change redeployed.
- ArtifactApiKeyStore serves them to session activation; a node with a ConfigDb
keeps ConfigDbApiKeyStore, whose per-request read is what makes revocation
immediate there.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager gains DataPlaneAuthority — the cluster identity blocker #4
named. NodeScope.ClusterId is required and the evaluator fails closed on a
mismatch, so until now no scope it built could have evaluated. Nothing reads it
until stages 5/6.
The generation is a node-local COUNTER driven by the RevisionHash, not derived
from its bits. PermissionTrieCache treats the highest GenerationId as current, so
a generation taken from hash bytes would install a lower number about half the
time and the cache would go on serving the previous deployment's ACLs, silently.
Sessions are not stamped with it yet — that belongs with the first seam that
reads a UserAuthorizationState, in stage 5, rather than being built now and
consulted by nothing.
Live-gated on docker-dev against site-a-1 (driver-only, no ConfigDb): key
authenticates, wrong secret denied, both halves of the revocation asymmetry
observed, and a SITE-A grant confirmed not to reach site-b-1. Key minted with an
independent Python HMAC so the verifier was checked against something other than
itself. Rig left clean.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Anonymous sessions used to short-circuit in HandleImpersonation — "let the SDK's
default validation stand" — so they always connected and always carried no roles.
Now admission and authority are separated:
admission -> OpcUa:AllowAnonymous, the HOST's decision (it owns token policies)
authority -> the authenticator, resolving the reserved principal "anonymous"
through the SAME grant path a key's principal goes through
So anonymous can be granted WRITE, not merely tolerated as read-only, and it
arrives at the downstream gates as the same RoleCarryingUserIdentity a key
produces — which is the real payoff: no gate carries an anonymous-shaped branch,
so there is no bypass path to get wrong.
AllowAnonymous defaults to TRUE on purpose. Defaulting it false would silently
deny every client without a key the moment this deploys, including ScadaBridge's
Data Connection Layer in another repo. Making keys mandatory is a rollout
decision, not an upgrade side effect. When false, the Anonymous token policy is
withheld so a client is refused at DISCOVERY rather than only at activation, and
activation is rejected independently in case a client attempts a token type the
endpoint never advertised.
Two fail-closed choices, both falsified:
- A failure to read anonymous's grants DENIES rather than admitting with no
roles. Admitting is the pre-#520 behaviour, and defaulting to it exactly when
the server cannot determine what anonymous may do stops being harmless once
reads are gated. Making it admit reds Anonymous_denies_when_grants_cannot_be_read.
- A key may not authenticate as the reserved "anonymous" principal, or a
credentialled client silently inherits whatever anonymous was granted.
AuthenticateAnonymousAsync is a DEFAULT interface implementation returning
admit-with-no-roles, i.e. exactly the pre-#520 behaviour, so
NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator and every test double keep working rather than being
forced to reimplement it — important because driver-only nodes run the Null one
and would otherwise black out. Note a default interface method is only reachable
through the interface-typed reference, which is how OpcUaApplicationHost holds it.
An existing test asserted the old fall-through and correctly went red; it is
rewritten to pin the new contract rather than deleted, with the reason recorded.
OpcUaServer 366, Host 42 green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Stage 2b. LdapOpcUaUserAuthenticator was left registered nowhere by stage 2a;
this removes it, its three test files, and the config surface that existed only
to serve it.
Deleted: LdapOpcUaUserAuthenticator, LdapOpcUaUserAuthenticatorTests,
LdapAuthResilienceTests, LdapGlauthOutageLiveTests (19 tests).
Also removed four Security:Ldap keys — AuthTimeoutMs,
MaxConcurrentAuthentications, OutageFailureThreshold, OutageCooldownSeconds —
plus their validator rules and binding/validator test coverage. Verified first
that the ONLY consumers were the deleted class and the validator rules asserting
them; none appear in any checked-in appsettings. Leaving them would have created
exactly the dead-config surface #521/#524/#525 were filed to clear up.
Worth stating why that resilience machinery does not need relocating rather than
just deleting. It existed because the OPC UA SDK raises impersonation
SYNCHRONOUSLY under a SessionManager-wide event lock, so a hung LDAP bind there
serialized every session activation server-wide — Anonymous and X509 included.
Key verification is one indexed lookup plus one HMAC with no network I/O, so the
hazard the wall-clock bound, concurrency cap and outage circuit guarded against
no longer exists on that path. LDAP now runs only on AdminUI login, an ordinary
async request path where a slow directory affects the one request making it.
ConnectionTimeoutMs is RETAINED: it is projected into the shared library and is
not authenticator-specific.
Docs corrected rather than left to rot:
- CLAUDE.md's "LDAP Authentication" section described the deleted file as the
data-plane authenticator. Rewritten, including a warning not to "restore" it on
seeing the LDAP wiring that AdminUI legitimately still needs.
- infra/README §5b (the GLAuth outage live gate) marked RETIRED with the reason,
rather than silently dropped — the harness GLAuth is still used by
OTOPCUA_HARNESS_USE_LDAP=1 and is unaffected.
- docs/security.md's five-key resilience table cut to the one surviving key, and
a new API-key identity section added.
Historical archreview/ records are left as-is; they are dated accounts.
Host.IntegrationTests 211 tests (was 230, i.e. exactly the 19 removed) with the
same 3 pre-existing failures verified against clean master. Host 37, Security 89.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
deferment.md §8.1 asked for a decision: wire IPermissionEvaluator into the node
manager, or say plainly that ACLs are not enforced. Decision: the latter. The
evaluator stays in the tree; #520 tracks the wire-up.
Verifying the claim turned up four things worse than the audit recorded:
- docs/security.md, not ReadWriteOperations.md, was the highest-risk doc. It
claimed an anonymous session is "default-denie[d] any node a session has no
ACL grant for". The opposite holds: anonymous can Browse/Read/Subscribe/
HistoryRead the entire address space, and is refused writes and alarm acks
only because it carries no roles.
- Three of five documented data-plane role strings do nothing.
OpcUaDataPlaneRoles declares exactly WriteOperate and AlarmAck; ReadOnly,
WriteTune and WriteConfigure are compared against nowhere in src/. The doc
called all five "exact, case-insensitive, and code-true".
- ReadWriteOperations.md was fiction beyond the ACL claims. OnReadValue has
zero occurrences in src/ — the documented read path did not exist. Reads
never reach a driver: the node manager is push-model and the SDK serves a
Read from the cached pushed value. WriteAuthzPolicy, _sourceByFullRef,
_writeIdempotentByFullRef and IRoleBearer are likewise zero-hit, and
CapabilityInvoker is not referenced by the OpcUaServer project at all. This
file is rewritten rather than bannered.
- v2-release-readiness.md claimed a whole enforcement layer shipped —
FilterBrowseReferences, GateCallMethodRequests, MapCallOperation,
AuthorizationBootstrap, Node:Authorization:* keys. None exist. Whatever
landed on the v2 branch did not survive into the shipped tree.
The UI change is the operative one: ClusterAcls.razor and AclEdit.razor now
warn that a grant is saved and shipped in every deployment artifact but never
evaluated, so an operator cannot author a deny rule believing it works.
deferment.md gains a §9 execution log tracking §8 remediation.
OtOpcUa is Akka-clustered and AddZbSecrets is registered unconditionally, so every
node (admin, driver, fused) resolves secrets and needs the SAME KEK + same store rows.
Ship G-5 as a production-posture runbook rather than hardcoding Source=File + shared
paths into the committed role-overlay appsettings (which dev + TwoNodeClusterHarness
also consume — that would break every dev/CI boot). Base appsettings stays on
Source=Environment. Documents the interim File-KEK + shared-SQLite posture and the
G-7 hand-off (ConfigDb-backed ISecretStore mirroring the existing DP
PersistKeysToDbContext<OtOpcUaConfigDbContext> key-ring sharing). Cross-linked from
docs/security.md. Mirrors the ScadaBridge G-5 resolution.
OtOpcUa commits no plaintext secrets — the only secret-shaped committed value is
ServerHistorian:ApiKey='' (empty, disabled by default). Because the pre-host expander
is fail-closed AND section-agnostic, hard-committing a ${secret:} token would break
every dev/CI/integration boot for zero at-rest benefit. Instead document the token
delivery convention for all five config secrets (jwt/ldap/deploy/configdb/historian)
in docs/security.md and note the token option in the ServerHistorian comments.
Mechanism proven live: unseeded token boot fails with SecretNotFoundException at
pre-host expansion; seeded token resolves and boot proceeds. Behavior-neutral
(comment + doc only).
The gate reads the literal role string OpcUaDataPlaneRoles.AlarmAck = "AlarmAck"
(OtOpcUaNodeManager.cs:643), but the Role-grant-source section told operators to map
their alarm-ack group to "AlarmAcknowledge" (the PermissionFlags ACL bit, a different
vocabulary) — which silently never satisfies the ack gate. Fix the three role-string
occurrences + add a code-true note; generalize the scripted-alarm note to native alarms.
A thin gateway over the admin-operations cluster singleton so CI/scripts can trigger a
deployment without the Blazor button. Forwards to the same IAdminOperationsClient.
StartDeploymentAsync; mounted on admin-role nodes. Auth is a fixed-time X-Api-Key check
against Security:DeployApiKey (orthogonal to the cookie-only web auth); AllowAnonymous so the
auth fallback doesn't 401 it, self-disabling (503) until the key is set. Outcome->status:
202/200/409/422. Unit tests for the key check + outcome mapping; HTTP E2E (real auth + real
deploy via the 2-node harness). Documented in docs/security.md.
STRUCTURAL (links-report.md):
- Repointed missing src/.../Security/Ldap/LdapAuthService.cs -> the real
OtOpcUaLdapAuthService.cs (Ldap/OtOpcUaLdapAuthService.cs implements
ILdapAuthService). Class was reorganized as a wrapper over shared
ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap. check_links now clean for docs/security.md.
CODE-REALITY — transport profiles (OpcUaApplicationHost.cs:15-23,59-64,374-409):
- Only THREE profiles exist: None, Basic256Sha256Sign,
Basic256Sha256SignAndEncrypt (NO hyphens, NO underscores). Removed the four
fabricated Aes128/Aes256 rows. Config binds by enum-member name; hyphenated
form does NOT bind. Documented this + the empty-list fallback to None.
- Config section is OpcUa (not OpcUaServer); key is the LIST
EnabledSecurityProfiles (not singular SecurityProfile). Program.cs:120 binds
'OpcUa'; Certificates.razor:80 reads OpcUa:PkiStoreRoot.
- No SecurityProfileResolver class exists — stated so explicitly.
CODE-REALITY — LDAP (LdapOptions.cs:21, OtOpcUaLdapAuthService.cs):
- Section is Security:Ldap (LdapOptions.SectionName), not OpcUaServer:Ldap.
- Authenticator is OtOpcUaLdapAuthService (wrapper) + LdapOpcUaUserAuthenticator
(IOpcUaUserAuthenticator.AuthenticateUserNameAsync), not bespoke
LdapUserAuthenticator/IUserAuthenticator.
- UseTls bool -> Transport enum (Ldaps/StartTls/None); AllowInsecureLdap ->
AllowInsecure. Added Enabled master switch + DevStubMode.
- Group->role mapping is downstream via IGroupRoleMapper<string>
(OtOpcUaGroupRoleMapper), NOT in the auth service. ILdapGroupsBearer and
DenyAllUserAuthenticator do not exist (fallback is NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator).
- GroupToRole values corrected to canonical roles (Viewer/Designer/
Administrator/Operator).
CODE-REALITY — ACL trie (TriePermissionEvaluator.cs, PermissionTrieCache.cs,
NodeScope.cs, NodePermissions.cs):
- NodePermissions backing type is int (not uint); lives in Configuration/Enums.
- Authorize(UserAuthorizationState, OpcUaOperation, NodeScope) returns
AuthorizationDecision.
- Evaluator is strictly fail-CLOSED. Removed the fabricated
'fail-open-during-transition' + Authorization:StrictMode key (no StrictMode
anywhere in source).
- Cache: generation-sealed Install/Invalidate/Prune. AclChangeNotifier does
NOT exist — removed.
- Added the SystemPlatform (Galaxy) scope hierarchy variant.
CODE-REALITY — control plane (AdminRole.cs, ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:
113-131):
- AdminRole members are Viewer/Designer/Administrator (Task 1.7 rename from
ConfigViewer/ConfigEditor/FleetAdmin). DriverOperator/FleetAdmin are POLICY
names; DriverOperator requires roles Operator|Administrator.
CODE-REALITY — analyzer (UnwrappedCapabilityCallAnalyzer.cs:99-103,
AnalyzerReleases.Shipped.md):
- Confirmed category OtOpcUa.Resilience + severity Warning (already correct).
Corrected 'Five tests' (suite has 26 cases) and AlarmSurfaceInvoker
wrapper-home wording.
OTHER FIXES:
- v2 header: removed false AddJwtBearer/IPostConfigureOptions<JwtBearerOptions>
claim — auth is Cookie-only; JWT is mint-only via /auth/token for external
consumers (JwtTokenService.cs:25-48).
- Certificates.razor is a read-only viewer; removed fabricated
CertTrustService/CertTrustOptions promote claim.
- Audit: writer is AuditWriterActor (not AuditLogService); softened the
unverifiable server-side 'AUDIT:' Serilog-prefix claim.
- RestartDriver / ReconnectDriver messages + AdminOperationsActor
handlers (broadcast via driver-control DPS topic; audited via
ConfigEdits).
- DriverHostActor subscribes to driver-control; locates the
matching child DriverInstanceActor and stops+respawns it
(Restart) or sends it a ForceReconnect internal message
(Reconnect — re-enters Reconnecting state without full stop).
DriverInstanceSpec constructor call uses named args to handle
the full 6-parameter signature.
- New DriverOperator authorization policy mapped to DriverOperator
or FleetAdmin role; documented in docs/security.md. Map LDAP
group via GroupToRole (e.g. "ot-driver-operator": "DriverOperator").
- DriverStatusPanel renders Reconnect + Restart buttons when the
user holds the DriverOperator policy (hidden otherwise). Restart
requires an in-page Razor confirm block (no JS confirm, keeps
SignalR event loop unblocked). Both buttons show a spinner and
are disabled during in-flight; result chip auto-clears after 8s.
Username sourced from AuthenticationStateProvider.
Reconnect resolves to "ForceReconnect" (re-enter Reconnecting,
not full stop+respawn) — transport drops and retries while actor
and in-memory state are preserved. All DriverInstanceActor states
handle ForceReconnect safely (no-op when already in transition).
- Redundancy.md: full rewrite — Akka-leader-driven ServiceLevel replaces
operator-managed RedundancyRole. Documents the 5-tier ServiceLevelCalculator,
RedundancyStateActor cluster singleton, and the DPS data flow.
- ServiceHosting.md: full rewrite — single fused OtOpcUa.Host binary with
OTOPCUA_ROLES env gating. Documents the conditional DI graph and the new
health endpoints (/health/ready, /health/active, /healthz).
- security.md: v2 banner at top covering path/project renames + new JWT bearer
+ DataProtection persisted to ConfigDb. Body unchanged because the 4-concern
security model is unchanged in v2; full per-section rewrite waits for F15
(Admin pages migration) since security.md references many pages that move.
- README.md: platform overview updated to v2 (fused Host + role gating).
Rewrite src/ and tests/ project paths in docs, CLAUDE.md, README.md, and
test-fixture READMEs to the new module-folder layout (Core/Server/Drivers/
Client/Tooling). References to retired v1 projects (Galaxy.Host/Proxy/Shared,
the legacy monolithic test projects) are left untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Five operational docs rewritten for v2 (multi-process, multi-driver, Config-DB authoritative):
- docs/Configuration.md — replaced appsettings-only story with the two-layer model.
appsettings.json is bootstrap only (Node identity, Config DB connection string,
transport security, LDAP bind, logging). Authoritative config (clusters, namespaces,
UNS, equipment, tags, driver instances, ACLs, role grants, poll groups) lives in
the Config DB accessed via OtOpcUaConfigDbContext and edited through the Admin UI
draft/publish workflow. Added v1-to-v2 migration index so operators can locate where
each old section moved. Cross-links to docs/v2/config-db-schema.md + docs/v2/admin-ui.md.
- docs/Redundancy.md — Phase 6.3 rewrite. Named every class under
src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Redundancy/: RedundancyCoordinator, RedundancyTopology,
ApplyLeaseRegistry (publish fencing), PeerReachabilityTracker, RecoveryStateManager,
ServiceLevelCalculator (pure function), RedundancyStatePublisher. Documented the
full 11-band ServiceLevel matrix (Maintenance=0 through AuthoritativePrimary=255)
from ServiceLevelCalculator.cs and the per-ClusterNode fields (RedundancyRole,
ServiceLevelBase, ApplicationUri). Covered metrics
(otopcua.redundancy.role_transition counter + primary/secondary/stale_count gauges
on meter ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Redundancy) and SignalR RoleChanged push from
FleetStatusPoller to RedundancyTab.razor.
- docs/security.md — preserved the transport-security section (still accurate) and
added Phase 6.2 authorization. Four concerns now documented in one place:
(1) transport security profiles, (2) OPC UA auth via LdapUserAuthenticator
(note: task spec called this LdapAuthenticationProvider — actual class name is
LdapUserAuthenticator in Server/Security/), (3) data-plane authorization via
NodeAcl + PermissionTrie + AuthorizationGate — additive-only model per decision
#129, ClusterId → Namespace → UnsArea → UnsLine → Equipment → Tag hierarchy,
NodePermissions bundle, PermissionProbeService in Admin for "probe this permission",
(4) control-plane authorization via LdapGroupRoleMapping + AdminRole
(ConfigViewer / ConfigEditor / FleetAdmin, CanEdit / CanPublish policies) —
deliberately independent of data-plane ACLs per decision #150. Documented the
OTOPCUA0001 Roslyn analyzer (UnwrappedCapabilityCallAnalyzer) as the compile-time
guard ensuring every driver-capability async call is wrapped by CapabilityInvoker.
- docs/ServiceHosting.md — three-process rewrite: OtOpcUa Server (net10 x64,
BackgroundService + AddWindowsService, hosts OPC UA endpoint + all non-Galaxy
drivers), OtOpcUa Admin (net10 x64, Blazor Server + SignalR + /metrics via
OpenTelemetry Prometheus exporter), OtOpcUa Galaxy.Host (.NET Framework 4.8 x86,
NSSM-wrapped, env-variable driven, STA thread + MXAccess COM). Pipe ACL
denies-Admins detail + non-elevated shell requirement captured from feedback memory.
Divergence from CLAUDE.md: task spec said "TopShelf is still the service-installer
wrapper per CLAUDE.md note" but no csproj in the repo references TopShelf — decision
#30 replaced it with the generic host's AddWindowsService wrapper (per the doc
comment on OpcUaServerService). Reflected the actual state + flagged this divergence
here so someone can update CLAUDE.md separately.
- docs/StatusDashboard.md — replaced the full v1 reference (dashboard endpoints,
health check rules, StatusData DTO, etc.) with a short "superseded by Admin UI"
pointer that preserves git-blame continuity + avoids broken links from other docs
that reference it.
Class references verified by reading:
src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Redundancy/{RedundancyCoordinator, ServiceLevelCalculator,
ApplyLeaseRegistry, RedundancyStatePublisher}.cs
src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/Authorization/{PermissionTrie, PermissionTrieBuilder,
PermissionTrieCache, TriePermissionEvaluator, AuthorizationGate}.cs
src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Security/{AuthorizationGate, LdapUserAuthenticator}.cs
src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin/{Program.cs, Services/AdminRoles.cs,
Services/RedundancyMetrics.cs, Hubs/FleetStatusPoller.cs}
src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Program.cs + appsettings.json
src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Galaxy.Host/{Program.cs, Ipc/PipeServer.cs}
src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration/Entities/{ClusterNode, NodeAcl,
LdapGroupRoleMapping}.cs
src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Analyzers/UnwrappedCapabilityCallAnalyzer.cs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Active Directory compatibility. LdapOptions xml-doc expanded with a cheat-sheet covering Server (DC FQDN), Port 389 vs 636, UseTls=true under AD LDAP-signing enforcement, dedicated read-only service account DN, sAMAccountName vs userPrincipalName vs cn trade-offs, memberOf DN shape (CN=Group,OU=...,DC=... with the CN= RDN stripped to become the GroupToRole key), and the explicit 'nested groups NOT expanded' call-out (LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN / tokenGroups is a future authenticator enhancement, not a config change). docs/security.md §'Active Directory configuration' adds a complete appsettings.json snippet with realistic AD group names (OPCUA-Operators → WriteOperate, OPCUA-Engineers → WriteConfigure, OPCUA-AlarmAck → AlarmAck, OPCUA-Tuners → WriteTune), LDAPS port 636, TLS on, insecure-LDAP off, and operator-facing notes on each field. LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests (5 unit guards): ExtractFirstRdnValue parses AD-style 'CN=OPCUA-Operators,OU=...,DC=...' DNs correctly (case-preserving — operators' GroupToRole keys stay readable); also handles mixed case and spaces in group names ('Domain Users'); also works against the OpenLDAP ou=<group>,ou=groups shape (GLAuth) so one extractor tolerates both memberOf formats common in the field; EscapeLdapFilter escapes the RFC 4515 injection set (\, *, (, ), \0) so a malicious login like 'admin)(cn=*' can't break out of the filter; default UserNameAttribute regression guard.
Test posture — Server.Tests Unit: 43 pass / 0 fail (38 prior + 5 new AD-compat guards). Server.Tests LiveLdap category: 6 pass / 0 fail against running GLAuth (would skip cleanly without). Server build clean, 0 errors, 0 warnings.
Deferred: the session-identity end-to-end check (drive a full OPC UA UserName session, then read a 'whoami' node to verify the role landed on RoleBasedIdentity). That needs a test-only address-space node and is scoped for a separate PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Renames all 11 projects (5 src + 6 tests), the .slnx solution file, all source-file namespaces, all axaml namespace references, and all v1 documentation references in CLAUDE.md and docs/*.md (excluding docs/v2/ which is already in OtOpcUa form). Also updates the TopShelf service registration name from "LmxOpcUa" to "OtOpcUa" per Phase 0 Task 0.6.
Preserves runtime identifiers per Phase 0 Out-of-Scope rules to avoid breaking v1/v2 client trust during coexistence: OPC UA `ApplicationUri` defaults (`urn:{GalaxyName}:LmxOpcUa`), server `EndpointPath` (`/LmxOpcUa`), `ServerName` default (feeds cert subject CN), `MxAccessConfiguration.ClientName` default (defensive — stays "LmxOpcUa" for MxAccess audit-trail consistency), client OPC UA identifiers (`ApplicationName = "LmxOpcUaClient"`, `ApplicationUri = "urn:localhost:LmxOpcUaClient"`, cert directory `%LocalAppData%\LmxOpcUaClient\pki\`), and the `LmxOpcUaServer` class name (class rename out of Phase 0 scope per Task 0.5 sed pattern; happens in Phase 1 alongside `LmxNodeManager → GenericDriverNodeManager` Core extraction). 23 LmxOpcUa references retained, all enumerated and justified in `docs/v2/implementation/exit-gate-phase-0.md`.
Build clean: 0 errors, 30 warnings (lower than baseline 167). Tests at strict improvement over baseline: 821 passing / 1 failing vs baseline 820 / 2 (one flaky pre-existing failure passed this run; the other still fails — both pre-existing and unrelated to the rename). `Client.UI.Tests`, `Historian.Aveva.Tests`, `Client.Shared.Tests`, `IntegrationTests` all match baseline exactly. Exit gate compliance results recorded in `docs/v2/implementation/exit-gate-phase-0.md` with all 7 checks PASS or DEFERRED-to-PR-review (#7 service install verification needs Windows service permissions on the reviewer's box).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add ServerCapabilities/OperationLimits node, enable diagnostics, add OnModifyMonitoredItemsComplete
override for DA compliance. Wire shelving, enable/disable, confirm, and addcomment handlers on
alarm conditions with LocalTime/Quality event fields for Part 9 compliance. Add Aes128/Aes256
security profiles, X.509 certificate authentication, and AUDIT-prefixed auth logging. Fix flaky
probe monitor test. Update docs for all changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The standalone CLI tool is superseded by src/ZB.MOM.WW.LmxOpcUa.Client.CLI
which uses the shared IOpcUaClientService abstraction. Renames CliTool.md to
Client.CLI.md and updates README, CLAUDE.md, Security, and Redundancy docs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Map LDAP groups to custom OPC UA role NodeIds on RoleBasedIdentity.GrantedRoleIds
during authentication, replacing the username-to-role side cache. Split ReadWrite
into WriteOperate/WriteTune/WriteConfigure so write access is gated per Galaxy
security classification. AnonymousCanWrite now behaves consistently regardless
of LDAP state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove ConfigUserAuthenticationProvider and Users property — LDAP is the only auth mechanism
- Fix historian quality mapping to use existing QualityMapper (OPC DA quality bytes, not custom mapping)
- Add AppRoles constants, unify HasWritePermission/HasAlarmAckPermission into shared HasRole helper
- Hoist write permission check out of per-item loop, eliminate redundant _ldapRolesEnabled field
- Update docs (Configuration.md, Security.md, OpcUaServer.md, HistoricalDataAccess.md)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace static user list with GLAuth LDAP authentication. Group
membership (ReadOnly, ReadWrite, AlarmAck) maps to granular OPC UA
permissions for write and alarm-ack operations. Anonymous can still
browse and read but not write.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds Security section to appsettings.json with configurable OPC UA
transport profiles (None, Basic256Sha256-Sign, Basic256Sha256-SignAndEncrypt),
certificate policy settings, and a configurable BindAddress for the
OPC UA endpoint. Defaults preserve backward compatibility.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Joseph Doherty