docs(security): document the GroupToRole data-plane role requirement
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@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ LDAP is configured under the `Security:Ldap` section (bound to `LdapOptions`, `s
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}
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```
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`GroupToRole` maps LDAP group names → Admin roles (case-insensitive); a user gets every role whose source group is in their membership. The values are the canonical control-plane role strings (`Viewer` / `Designer` / `Administrator`, plus the appsettings-only `Operator` for the `DriverOperator` policy). `UserNameAttribute: "sAMAccountName"` is the critical AD override — the GLAuth dev default is `cn`, which is not how AD users are looked up; use `userPrincipalName` instead if operators log in with `user@corp.example.com` form. `LdapOptionsValidator` (`src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host/Configuration/LdapOptionsValidator.cs`) fails startup when `Transport = None` and `AllowInsecure = false` on a real-LDAP (non-DevStub) config.
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`GroupToRole` maps LDAP group names → roles (case-insensitive); a user gets every role whose source group is in their membership. The values are the canonical control-plane role strings (`Viewer` / `Designer` / `Administrator`, plus the appsettings-only `Operator` for the `DriverOperator` policy); the same map also supplies data-plane role strings (`ReadOnly`, `WriteOperate`, `WriteTune`, `WriteConfigure`, `AlarmAcknowledge`) — see [Role grant source (data-plane)](#role-grant-source-data-plane) below. `UserNameAttribute: "sAMAccountName"` is the critical AD override — the GLAuth dev default is `cn`, which is not how AD users are looked up; use `userPrincipalName` instead if operators log in with `user@corp.example.com` form. `LdapOptionsValidator` (`src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host/Configuration/LdapOptionsValidator.cs`) fails startup when `Transport = None` and `AllowInsecure = false` on a real-LDAP (non-DevStub) config.
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---
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@@ -242,6 +242,29 @@ Key properties:
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See [`docs/v2/acl-design.md`](v2/acl-design.md) for the complete design: trie invalidation, flag semantics, per-path override rules, and the reasoning behind additive-only (no Deny).
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### Role grant source (data-plane)
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Data-plane roles come from `Security:Ldap:GroupToRole` (appsettings), **not** from the Config-DB
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`LdapGroupRoleMapping` table. That table's `Role` column is the `AdminRole` enum
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(`Administrator`/`Designer`/`Viewer`) and supplies **control-plane** roles only — it cannot emit the
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data-plane role strings the OPC UA gates read (`ReadOnly`, `WriteOperate`, `WriteTune`,
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`WriteConfigure`, `AlarmAcknowledge`). A deployment therefore **must** map its data-plane LDAP groups
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to those role strings via `GroupToRole`, e.g.:
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```json
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"GroupToRole": {
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"ot-operators": "WriteOperate",
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"ot-tuners": "WriteTune",
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"ot-engineers": "WriteConfigure",
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"ot-alarm-ack": "AlarmAcknowledge",
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"ot-readonly": "ReadOnly"
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}
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```
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If this mapping is absent the data-plane evaluator is strictly default-deny: inbound operator writes
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and OPC UA Part-9 alarm acknowledgement all return `BadUserAccessDenied` even for users who
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authenticate successfully. (The same requirement gates the pre-existing scripted-alarm ack path.)
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---
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## Control-Plane Authorization
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