aad7583b7981d52089063028f72bfd5cab1c8d4d
325 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Joseph Doherty
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9cf400f1e8 | perf(drivers): fixed-rate poll pacing with overrun counter; non-blocking unsubscribe | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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7320586512 | fix(historian): incremental batch-append bookkeeping; genuine group-commit durability pin | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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140bf0c131 | perf(adminui): pooled DbContext factory; role-grants reads per-call, not per-circuit | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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5df793e79a | perf(alarms): dirty-set coalescing — one evaluation per alarm per drain, latest values win | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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6ff64ca067 | perf(historian): group-commit batch append on the historization outbox | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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6bf1fb3754 | fix(opcuaserver): chunked, per-item-isolated WriteValues with typed partial-failure outcome | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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8ef02506f7 | fix(runtime): harden batch forwarding — detach pins, malformed-raise guard, struct items | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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f81cbabd2d | test(core): pin batch-after-per-tag ordering; relocate batch tests beside the engine suite | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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adebad711f | feat(core): PollGroupEngine optional per-cycle batch callback | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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bb3ccf264b | feat(commons): batched WriteValues on the address-space sink | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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1320f3fa08 | perf(runtime): raise opcua pinned dispatcher throughput 1 -> 100 | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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b857df8a12 | feat(core): add IBatchSubscribable batch data-change contract | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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8d4ca5489a |
fix(tagconfig): a numerically-spelled enum names no member — reject it fleet-wide (Driver.Sql.Contracts-002)
TagConfigJson.ClassifyEnumText classified via Enum.TryParse(text, ignoreCase: true), which accepts a numeric STRING for any enum: "1" returns the member at that ordinal and an out-of-range "99" parses just as happily. Every driver contract's strict enum read inherits that, so a Sql tag authored "type":"99" was ACCEPTED, carried (DriverDataType)99, and SqlPollReader.TryCoerce fell through its switch to the String arm — a stringified cell published Good under a type nothing can map. Refuse a digit- or sign-leading spelling before the parse (judged on the TRIMMED text, because Enum.TryParse trims), and require Enum.IsDefined — which covers what the leading-character check cannot, since TryParse also ORs a comma-separated list for a non-[Flags] enum. Mirrors RawBrowseCommitMapper.ParseNativeType and MTConnectTagDefinitionFactory.TryParseDataType, which already guard their own parses. Three AdminUI restatements of the same rule now ask ClassifyEnumText instead of Enum.TryParse (TagConfigJson.GetEnum, SqlTagConfigModel.ReadEnumStrict, MqttTagConfigModel.DescribeInvalidEnum/GetEnumNullable) — leaving them would have opened the #549 direction the moment the runtime tightened: a blob the modal accepts and the driver skips. RED first: 10 failing in Core.Abstractions.Tests, 4 in Driver.Sql.Tests, and 10 of the 11 new fleet-wide parity cases (re-confirmed by reverting the Core fix). |
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Joseph Doherty
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a3c0ec037f |
fix(adminui): authoring must not accept a TagConfig enum the runtime rejects (#549)
MTConnectTagConfigModel read `dataType` with TagConfigJson.GetEnum, which falls
back to String on ANY unrecognised value. A misspelled name ("Strng") from a
hand-authored blob, a CSV import or the API was therefore accepted at authoring
and silently rewritten, while the driver's strict parse rejected it and the tag
died with BadNodeIdUnknown. Found by the G-7 parity tests' falsifiability
control, which had to use the digits-only shape to have a case that failed.
The rule is not restated in the AdminUI. MTConnectTagDefinitionFactory exposes
its parse as `IsAcceptedDataTypeName`, documented as the one authority the
driver, the deploy gate and the authoring model all consult; the model's
Validate() asks it about the raw value the blob carries. The old digits-only
message is NOT retained as a special case: the runtime draws no distinction
between a bare number and a typo — one predicate, one Inspect warning — so a
second message here would be a second statement of a rule this model does not
own. The raw value is captured as the JSON TOKEN, because the runtime
deserialises the key into a `string?` DTO field and an unquoted number throws
there too.
The survey found the same asymmetry at six more editors, contrary to the
assumption that those runtimes silently default: R2-11 Phase C moved every
driver's TagConfig enum read to TagConfigJson.TryReadEnumStrict, which REJECTS
the tag on a present-but-invalid string, while the editors kept loading them
with a silent fallback. Modbus (region/dataType/byteOrder), S7, AbCip, AbLegacy,
TwinCAT and FOCAS now check their enums in Validate() through the runtime's own
TagConfigJson.DescribeInvalidEnumText — added alongside a public
ClassifyEnumText that TryReadEnum now delegates to, so the JSON-token door and
the string door reach one implementation. Mqtt and Sql already carried
equivalent strict checks and are untouched.
Care taken NOT to become stricter than the runtime: a present-but-non-string
token stays accepted for those six (TryReadEnum calls it absent), as does an
absent key, each pinned by a test.
Also adds a direct ProjectReference to Core.Abstractions from the AdminUI — the
save gate now leans on a type it was consuming only transitively.
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Joseph Doherty
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dac7e1885d |
feat(resilience): route IDriver.InitializeAsync through the capability invoker (R2-10 T10 closed)
The connect path was the one capability call the resilience pipeline never saw, so a driver that could not connect contributed zero breaker input and the /hosts resilience panel read 'All targets healthy' against a dead endpoint. InitializeAsync now routes through the invoker as DriverCapability.Initialize, keyed on the driver-instance id. - No pipeline retry: the actor's RetryConnect timer is the retry loop (parser forces retryCount overrides to 0, same funnel as write-shaped). - Breaker threshold 2, not the Read-sized 5: the breaker samples 30 s and the reconnect timer fires every 10 s, so at most three attempts fit one window — threshold 5 could never open. Pinned by its own test. - An open breaker fast-fails into the same InitializeFailed path as a real connect failure; the 15 s break window costs at most one extra tick. The best-effort teardown ShutdownAsync stays unwrapped. - Companion fix: DriverCapabilityInvokerFactory.Create now invalidates the instance's tracker snapshots with its pipelines — a respawn during an outage discarded the only breaker whose OnClosed could clear the OPEN flag, stranding a false 'Breaker OPEN' chip forever. Live gate PASSED on docker-dev (image symbol-verified per container): rtu-gate against dead 10.100.0.35:5021 opened its Initialize breaker on both centrals with the red 'BREAKER OPEN' chip on /hosts; a socat 5021→5020 forwarder recovered it (both breakers closed within 1 s, panel back to 'All targets healthy'); healthy MAIN-modbus recorded zero breaker events. Full suite 50/50 green. Evidence: docs/plans/2026-08-07-adminui-followups-and-live-gates.md §7. |
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Joseph Doherty
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f1c188114b |
refactor(fleet): #542 delete the dead fleet-status chain (broadcaster, SignalR bridge, hub, messages)
#542 filed FleetStatusBroadcaster as blind to site nodes since the Phase 6 per-cluster mesh split: it derives "the fleet" from central's own Akka gossip ring, which after the split is just central's own pair. Scoping the cross-mesh rewrite found the deeper truth — the whole chain is dead end to end, so this deletes it rather than reviving it. - Zero consumers. FleetStatusBroadcaster published FleetStatusChanged on the DPS "fleet-status" topic; FleetStatusSignalRBridge forwarded it to FleetStatusHub ("/hubs/fleet-status"); nothing anywhere connected. The AdminUI bans self-connecting HubConnections, no browser JS subscribes, and /fleet (Fleet.razor) reads NodeDeploymentState from the ConfigDb plus IClusterRoleInfo on a 5 s poll instead. - Its second input never existed. DriverHostStatusHeartbeat had no production sender — only the broadcaster's own test told it — so CurrentRevision was always null and the 30 s staleness -> Degraded flip could never fire. - Post-Phase-6 DPS is pair-local, so even the central-only view it did produce was an accident of topology rather than a design. The fleet visibility that actually works is unchanged and already cross-mesh-correct: /fleet over NodeDeploymentState, and the four Phase 5 per-node telemetry dials. Precedent for deleting inert machinery rather than activating it: #522 (driver stability tiers), #507 (discovered-node injection), #525 (GetMemoryFootprint). Deleted: FleetStatusBroadcaster (+ its nested DriverHostStatusHeartbeat), its admin singleton registration and FleetStatusBroadcasterKey, FleetStatusSignalRBridge and its key, FleetStatusHub and its route mapping, and the FleetStatusChanged / FleetNodeStatus / FleetNodeHealth messages. Both Fleet/ directories survive — ControlPlane keeps ClusterNodeAddressReconciler, Commons keeps GetDiagnostics. Docs swept where they claimed a fleet-status channel exists (Telemetry.md's Phase 5 non-migrated channels, Configuration.md, CLAUDE.md); completed-program plan docs under docs/plans and docs/v2 are left as the historical record they are. Build 0 errors, 868 warnings — byte-identical to master's rebuild baseline. ControlPlane.Tests 231/231, AdminUI.Tests 1109/1109. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1 |
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Joseph Doherty
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cd7135570c |
refactor(mesh): collapse MeshPaths to local actor names — no longer a wire contract (review follow-up)
MeshPaths.CentralCommunication / .NodeCommunication (the "/user/..." full-path constants) had
ZERO production consumers after the ClusterClient deletion: both gRPC services resolve their
comm actor through ActorRegistry by typed key, never by ActorSelection over a path. Only the
path-probe test still read them, while the class doc went on calling them "the wire contract
of the central↔node boundary" — a claim that stopped being true the moment nothing addressed
an actor across a process boundary by name.
- The two full-path constants are deleted; the two Name constants remain.
- MeshPaths' doc now says what it is (the local actor-naming convention the registry-keyed
services are spawned under) and records what it stopped being, so the next reader does not
re-derive a contract from the file's history.
- MeshCommActorPathTests composes "/user/" + Name itself — the absolute path is that test's
own addressing detail now, not something the product declares. Renamed
Both_mesh_comm_actors_exist_at_their_contract_paths ->
..._are_spawned_under_their_declared_names, because what it still pins is that the two
registration sites actually ran on a real booted node; a rename is now a compile error, so
"contract" was the wrong word for what would break.
- NodeCommunicationActor's summary no longer cross-references the deleted constant or calls
the name an address. CentralCommunicationActor was checked and makes no such claim.
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Joseph Doherty
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4d2dfb5b50 |
test(mesh): step 7 — replace the boundary test with MeshGrpcBoundaryTests and sweep the comments
MeshGrpcBoundaryTests replaces the MeshClusterClientBoundaryTests deleted in step 1. Three
self-seeded single-member clusters sharing the ActorSystem name, joined ONLY by gRPC, driving
the REAL CentralCommunicationActor -> MeshGrpcCommandDialer -> Kestrel h2c ->
MeshCommandAuthInterceptor -> NodeCommandGrpcService -> NodeCommunicationActor -> EventStream:
1. No_cross_mesh_Akka_association_forms_between_central_and_either_site — the program's own
point, kept as a test rather than a live-gate note: each cluster stays single-member and
none ever holds another's address as a member.
2. One_dispatch_through_central_reaches_a_node_in_every_cluster_mesh — the fan, with each
site holding its OWN per-cluster PSK, so a dial that selected the wrong cluster's key
would be refused at the far side.
3. Falsifiability_control_a_dial_carrying_the_wrong_cluster_key_delivers_nothing — without
it, (2) cannot distinguish "the gRPC boundary carried it" from "something else in the
process did". The same node then accepts the right key, so the silence is the auth gate
and not a dead endpoint.
All three run fully offline — no Docker fixture — and pass.
Comment sweep across every remaining clusterclient|receptionist hit in src/ and tests/:
the program label becomes "mesh gRPC command plane", and every comment that described the
deleted transport as live now describes what actually runs (Dps = pair-local default,
Grpc = cross-mesh). mesh_transport.proto's header/service comments are reworded; no message,
field or enum is touched — the contract is locked. MeshCommActorPathTests is reshaped rather
than retired: the two paths still exist and still matter, but what a mismatch costs is now a
misleading Unavailable from the gRPC ingress rather than a silently dropped receptionist send.
The only surviving mentions of the old names are the ones that must survive: the fail-closed
rules that name "ClusterClient" as a retired value refused at boot, their tests, and this
test class's own account of what it replaces.
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Joseph Doherty
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af3b0c3146 |
refactor(mesh): step 6 — delete the ClusterClient mode value; split topology now requires Grpc
MeshTransportOptions.ModeClusterClient is gone. MeshTransportOptionsValidator accepts Dps or Grpc and nothing else, so a node left carrying the string "ClusterClient" is now REFUSED at boot naming MeshTransport:Mode and both remaining values — deliberately fail-closed rather than falling back to Dps, which on a split-topology node would deliver nothing at all. A new fact pins exactly that. SplitTopologyTransportValidator tightens from an allow-list of two to Grpc only, as its own comment said it would once ClusterClient was deleted. Dps on a cluster-role node stays refused; the rule is still an explicit allow-list, so a typo'd mode fails too. Tests: the two ClusterClient-mode facts in MeshTransportOptionsValidatorTests are deleted (their Dps siblings already assert the same rule for the one remaining non-Grpc mode), the SplitTopology fixtures move to Grpc, and the three-mode Theories in ControlPlaneStarterOrderTests / CentralCommunicationActorTests become two-mode. |
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Joseph Doherty
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85ca86e955 |
refactor(mesh): step 5 — delete MeshTransport:CentralContactPoints, its rules and its compose entries
The property, the four validator rules that graded it (empty / non-akka.tcp / actor-path suffix / one-bad-among-good) and all twelve docker-compose entries (6 nodes x 2) are gone. The compose comment blocks that explained "/system/receptionist is appended at construction time" and the client's contact rotation go with them, and the surrounding prose now describes the Grpc command plane it actually runs. CentralGrpcEndpoints' doc no longer says it "replaces" the Akka contact points — there is nothing left to replace — and ContactRefreshSeconds' failure message names the node dispatch set rather than the ClusterClient contact points. `rg CentralContactPoints src tests docker-dev` is now empty. |
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Joseph Doherty
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d67a7e5d0b |
refactor(mesh): step 4 — drop the receptionist extension and akka.cluster.client from akka.conf
akka.extensions loses ClusterClientReceptionistExtensionProvider and the whole akka.cluster.client block (buffer-size / reconnect-timeout / receptionist.role) goes with it. The DistributedPubSub extension and the maximum-frame-size / log-frame-size-exceeding canary both stay — DPS is the pair-local transport and the frame canary guards every remoting message, neither of which the cross-mesh deletion touches. MeshTransportHoconTests drops its three ClusterClientSettings/ClusterReceptionistSettings asserts and keeps the frame-size pin and the DPS-extension pin, renamed since it no longer has a receptionist to survive alongside. |
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Joseph Doherty
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7e7df337cc | feat(mesh): CentralCommandService on the ConfigServe listener | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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545413a835 | feat(mesh): DTO mapper with round-trip goldens | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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09db9e47de | chore(mesh): Batch A review close-out — fusion-invariant note on DispatchTimeoutSeconds, tracking updates | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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aa21f61fa0 | feat(mesh): Grpc mode value + validation | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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c0ccfa27fb | feat(mesh): mesh_transport.v1 proto contract | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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dd900f970a |
fix(hosts): a driver that never built a tag table reports NO ANSWER, not zero skips
Found on the docker-dev live gate, not in tests. Two drivers that faulted during initialise (rtu-gate, opcua1) each rendered "0 tags" on /hosts against two authored tags apiece, because a ledger that had never committed returned SkippedTagReport.Empty. A zero report is a positive claim -- "this driver skipped nothing" -- and making it on behalf of a driver that never got as far as looking is exactly the quiet inaccuracy #541 exists to remove. GetSkippedTags() and SkippedTagLedger.Snapshot() now return null until the first committed build, so the column renders the same em-dash it already used for a driver that cannot report at all. Both are 'no answer'; neither is 'nothing skipped'. Knock-on: a FOCAS driver whose only init threw now reports null rather than a zero report, which is strictly more honest than the assertion the test originally made. |
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Joseph Doherty
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39db75083d |
feat(drivers): every driver reports the authored tags it skipped (Gitea #541)
A driver builds its RawPath -> definition table at init and tolerates a
per-tag miss: an unmappable TagConfig, an unparseable address, a
capability-matrix rejection. That tolerance is right -- one bad tag must not
take down the other few thousand. What was missing is any statement of the
fact afterwards. A skip is not an error and happens before any read, so the
driver stays Healthy, errors/5 min stays 0, Last error stays empty, and Last
read advances live off the tags that did map. On the wonder Makino in #540
that reading held while focas-z-34184 ignored 20 of its 22 tags.
New optional capability ISkippedTagReporter, backed by a shared
SkippedTagLedger so the reset/commit/cap rules are one implementation rather
than one per driver. The report -- authored count, exact skipped count, and a
capped sample of RawPath + reason -- rides DriverHealthChanged to a new Tags
column on /hosts, over the Phase 5 telemetry stream. No table: a driver-only
node has no ConfigDb to write to, the lesson from #521.
The issue named eight drivers. It is twelve -- every driver in
DriverTypeNames.All has an authored-tag skip path. Calculation (no scriptId),
MTConnect (no readable DataItem id), Galaxy (no attributeRef) and OpcUaClient
(no nodeId) were unlisted, and OpcUaClient's was the quietest of the twelve:
NamespaceMap drops such an entry with a bare `continue` and not even a log
line. SkippedTagReporterFleetTests pins the invariant reflectively over every
IDriver in src/Drivers/, so a thirteenth cannot re-introduce the silence.
Sql drops a tag at TWO points and its report is the union of both: a blob
that does not map, AND an identifier the 8.1 catalog gate rejects against the
live catalog. The second is what schema drift produces -- a renamed column, a
dropped view -- months after a deployment sealed green, and reporting only
the first would have that driver claim "0 skipped" while polling half its
tags, which is worse than reporting nothing because the column would then be
actively reassuring.
Deliberately additive to driver state, never a change of it. Latching
non-Healthy for a config problem would satisfy both halves of the #527
comms-loss conjunction -- 90 s without a successful read AND non-Healthy --
and a driver whose tags were ALL skipped has no successful reads by
construction, so it would reconnect-loop forever against a healthy device.
Three details that are load-bearing rather than incidental:
- The skip digest is part of the publish fingerprint. A skipped tag leaves
every other fingerprint component identical to a clean driver's, so without
it PublishHealthSnapshot's dedup swallows exactly the publish carrying the
signal -- the trap that already bit the rediscovery and host-status
channels. The digest covers the sample, not just the counts: a redeploy
that fixes one tag and breaks another leaves both counts unchanged.
- The count is exact; only the sample is capped, and the tooltip says so when
it is showing fewer than it counted. A truncated list that looked complete
would have an operator fix twenty tags and believe the job done.
- The ledger stages and commits, so an init that throws part-way leaves the
previous report standing. A partial snapshot would read as "we now skip
fewer tags", the opposite of the truth.
The proto field needs no companion presence flag, unlike host_statuses: a
singular message field carries real presence in proto3, and a has_ flag would
collide with protoc's generated HasSkippedTags.
Verified red-first three ways: dropping SkippedTagDigest from the fingerprint
fails the two dedup tests, removing the seam from one driver fails the fleet
guard, and dropping the catalog-gate leg fails the Sql union test. Full
solution builds with zero new warnings against
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Joseph Doherty
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f13a89dbc3 | docs(mtconnect): final-review nits — two stale read-only comments; task statuses | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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6b3da93151 |
fix(browse): commit the browsed data type, and fix the probe classification the fixture was hiding (#536)
A browse-committed AB CIP / TwinCAT / FOCAS tag bound with its model's DEFAULT
data type, not the one the device reported. A browsed REAL committed as
`{"tagPath":"Pump_1_Speed","dataType":"DInt"}` — and those three drivers decode
the wire bytes by that field, not by the raw row's OPC UA DataType — so the tag
read four bytes of a float through an integer decoder and published a plausible
wrong number with no error raised anywhere. FOCAS was missed when #536 was filed.
The type is CARRIED, not derived. Reverse-mapping the leaf's driver-agnostic
DriverDataType looks like the smaller fix and is wrong: SInt/Int/DInt/USInt/UInt
all collapse into Int32 on the way out of the driver, so that version would bind
a 16-bit INT as a 32-bit DINT while appearing to fix the REAL. Drivers now state
their own type name on DriverAttributeInfo.NativeDataType, which reaches the
picker as AttributeInfo.AddressFields["dataType"] and the commit mapper from
there. A leaf that states nothing keeps the model default — the pre-#536
behaviour, kept deliberately as the fallback rather than a guess.
Numeric strings are refused before parsing: Enum.TryParse accepts "9" for any
enum and Enum.IsDefined then confirms it, so an unguarded parse would bind a tag
to a type nobody named. A test caught this in the first version of the guard.
--- and the other half, which the fixture was hiding ---
Test Connect on a device with NO authored tags — every AB CIP device at the
moment an operator first presses the button — reported "CIP handshake failed"
against a healthy controller. That was written down as a fixture limitation
("ab_server doesn't implement @raw_cpu_type"). Both halves of that were wrong:
* @raw_cpu_type is not a libplctag special tag at all (only @raw, @tags and
@udt/ are), so it goes out as an ordinary symbolic name that no controller
defines, and the controller's "tag does not exist" IS the successful answer.
* ab_server answered an unresolvable tag path with CIP 0x03 where a Logix
controller answers 0x04 — ErrorBadParam vs ErrorNotFound, which the probe
classifies oppositely. Fixed in vendored patch 0002.
* With the fixture then telling the truth, the real defect surfaced:
AbCipDriverProbe.IsReachableException matched the native C status spellings
("STATUS_NOT_FOUND"), but libplctag.NET throws with the MANAGED enum name
("ErrorNotFound"). Those substrings can never match, so the reachable
classification could not fire on the exception path — which is the path every
no-authored-tags probe takes. This was failing on real hardware too, not just
against the sim. It now recovers the Status and defers to IsReachableStatus,
so there is one classification rather than two that can drift.
Rejected: switching the fallback to @tags. libplctag builds a tag-listing tag
with NO network I/O, so it reports OK against any TCP listener — measured green
against a Mosquitto broker.
Verification: full solution suite green. Falsification runs confirm exactly the
intended tests go red — 9 for the type carry, 3 (the reachable statuses only) for
the probe classification. Live on docker-dev: browse-committed TestString/
Motor_Run/TestSINT now store String/Bool/SInt, alongside last session's
Pump_1_Speed still holding the wrong DInt. TestSINT is the falsifier — its row
DataType is Int32, identical to TestDINT's, so no reverse map could have produced
"SInt".
Known consequence: pre-existing browse-committed tags keep their wrong dataType;
the fix applies to new commits only.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
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Joseph Doherty
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1a1dbc3f00 |
fix(uns): enforce the UNS segment rule on every authoring path (#535)
An area or line could be named "Packaging" or "Line 1", save cleanly, and then fail the NEXT deployment with UnsSegmentInvalid. Because a deployment snapshots the whole database, one badly-named area blocked EVERY cluster's deploy - and whoever hit that was usually not whoever typed the name. Only the equipment form carried the rule; the deploy gate held its own private copy. The rule now lives once, on Configuration.Validation.UnsSegment, and both ends call it. DraftValidator no longer restates it. Enforced in UnsTreeService, not just on the forms: - Create/Update Area, Line and Equipment reject an invalid name before touching the row. - The CSV import reports a bad name as an ERROR, not a skip - a skip means "you already have this row", which would tell the operator the equipment exists when it does not. Good rows in the same batch still insert. A form attribute could never have covered the import, and with no bUnit in this repo a rule only a form enforces is also a rule no test can reach. The forms keep an attribute for the immediate message, but it now references the shared pattern rather than restating it - a second copy is how these drifted apart. One behaviour change beyond the fix: UnsSegment.AttributePattern admits "_default", which the equipment form's hand-written literal rejected. The form was stricter than the gate it was mirroring, so a _default row was uneditable through the AdminUI. Tests: 41, falsified with three production mutations - dropping the CreateArea guard reds exactly the CreateArea rejections, turning the import error back into a skip reds only the import test, and narrowing AttributePattern reds only the attribute/IsValid agreement. Every rejection is paired with a name that must still be accepted, or a guard that refused everything would pass. Live-verified on docker-dev: the area modal now refuses "Packaging" in place with the rule spelled out, "packaging-b" saves, and a CSV import of two rows reports Inserted 1 / Skipped 0 / Errors 1 naming the offending row - the path no form attribute reaches. Rig cleaned up and a further deployment sealed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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00aa486677 |
feat(security): enforce node ACLs on read, browse and subscribe (#520 stage 6)
Completes data-plane enforcement behind Security:Acl:Enabled. Read (every attribute, not just Value), Browse, TranslateBrowsePath, CreateMonitoredItems, SubscribeToEvents and SetMonitoringMode now consult scoped NodeAcl grants. With the flag off nothing changes. Four things went beyond the stage as written, each because leaving it out would have made the feature look like it worked: - Browse needed ancestor visibility. The trie inherits downward, and a client reaches a deep node by browsing the nodes above it, so without this every grant narrower than the cluster was authored, shipped and unreachable. It is a separate non-inheriting marker, NOT a synthesized Browse grant on each ancestor: the additive downward walk would carry such a grant from Plant onto Plant/Siemens/dev9 and every other sibling subtree. Pinned by a test that goes through the evaluator — probing the trie helper directly passes against the broken design, because a sibling is absent from the trie either way. - Revocation had to reach LIVE subscriptions. Every other operation re-asks per request; a subscription is authorized once and then streams, and streaming is how machine consumers actually read this server — so stopping only the re-asking operations would have made revocation close to cosmetic. IDataPlaneAuthoritySource gained a Changed event. A denied item is queued BadUserAccessDenied and then DETACHED from its MonitoredNode2 fan-out, not set MonitoringMode.Disabled. Disabling discards the item's queued notifications, so the client is silenced without ever being told why. The over-the-wire test caught this; the unit-level path reports the item as stood down either way. Detaching is also reversible, so a restored grant resumes the feed with no client action. - The decision cache holds the grant WALK, not the decision. Grants and the trie are fixed for a generation; a key's ExpiresUtc passes with the clock, so caching the whole decision would let an expired key keep working until the next deploy — the stage-5 open-session hole in a subtler form. - TranslateBrowsePath is gated, without which browse filtering is decorative: a client refused a browse asks TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds for the same path. Found en route: UserAuthorizationState's staleness ceiling couples two clocks. MembershipResolvedUtc is stamped from DataPlaneAuthorizer's TimeProvider while IsStale is evaluated against TriePermissionEvaluator's; they are the same instance in production and diverge the moment anything injects a test clock, at which point the evaluator denies EVERYTHING with a verdict indistinguishable from "no grant matched". Stage 5's claim that these predicates cannot fire was accidentally true; they are now disabled explicitly. Also fixed: ContinuationPoint.NodeToBrowse is the manager HANDLE, not a NodeState. The declared type is object, so the wrong cast compiled cleanly and silently yielded null — skipping the browse source gate entirely. Falsified: disabling the transit marking reddens exactly the three tests that assert transit works; implementing transit as an ancestor grant reddens the sibling-leak test; skipping the fan-out detach reddens the revocation test. Full solution suite green. The stage 8 live gate has NOT run yet. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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f692f6afe4 |
feat(security): enforce node ACLs on write, alarms and HistoryRead (#520 stage 5)
`Security:Acl:Enabled` (default false) makes scoped `NodeAcl` grants decide data-plane authorization at the three seams that have one, and gives HistoryRead a check it never had. Read, Browse and Subscribe stay ungated — stage 6. The ACL decision REPLACES the server-wide role check rather than chaining with it. Chained, a grant would have to confer the role as well as pass the scope check, and only Cluster-scoped grants confer a role — so every narrow grant would have stayed inert and the flag would have looked inert too. The load-bearing test is an ALLOW: a session carrying no roles at all writing successfully on the strength of its grant. A deny-only test passes against a build where the ACL is never consulted, because the role gate denies too. Found en route: the principal never reached the session. The authenticator passed it as OpcUaUserAuthResult.DisplayName, but RoleCarryingUserIdentity derives DisplayName from the presented token — for a key-bearing client that is the static username `apikey`, identical fleet-wide. So the trie's matching key was dropped at the identity boundary, and the audit ClientUserId on a rejected write recorded `apikey` for every consuming system. Principal and ApiKeyId are now carried explicitly. Beyond the stage as sketched: - Revocation reaches an OPEN session. Every decision re-checks the authenticating key against the current snapshot; without it a key revoked by a deployment kept its authority until the client chose to reconnect, which for a machine-to-machine consumer can be indefinitely. - UserAuthorizationState is built per CALL, not per session. The per-session shape exists so an LDAP session can re-resolve membership that changed out of band; nothing can change out of band under API keys, so the generation stamp is the whole invalidation signal and a per-call record picks it up for free. IsStale/NeedsRefresh therefore cannot fire here and are documented as vestigial. - The trie is built inside DataPlaneAuthorityState.Apply, under the same generation as the snapshot, rather than by a second wiring at the publish actor. An uninstalled trie denies everything — indistinguishable from working enforcement. Deleting the install turns 13 of the 22 new tests red. - The deploy log reports what the BUILD dropped instead of re-deriving it. The old count agreed with the builder on one of its four drop reasons; a rule with a blank ScopeId, a retired scope kind, or a path not starting at a realm vanished with the log reading zero. Both IApiKeyStore implementations widened to the full grant set. The narrowing was redundant — ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper applies the same filter itself — and became a trap once scope was enforced. Pinned by asserting the roles are unchanged, with the two grants carrying different flags so it cannot pass by accident. Falsified by mutation: enforcement never engaging, the write seam ignoring the ACL, the realm dropped from the scope, the revocation check removed, and the trie never installed each turn the intended tests red and no others. Full solution suite green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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06c56d7719 |
fix(cluster,acl): OTOPCUA_ROLES fallback + one string-identity rule (#532, #533)
Two independent defects surfaced in review of #520 stage 3.
#532 — Cluster:Roles had no OTOPCUA_ROLES fallback, despite two doc sites
promising one. A node configured only through the env var — which drives ALL of
Program.cs's conditional wiring, so it reads as the authoritative knob — bound an
empty Roles array and joined the cluster carrying no Akka roles at all. It ran,
served, and logged nothing wrong, while central reported "no driver-role nodes
are Up" and every deployment to it timed out. Not hypothetical: the field fix on
wonder-app-vd03 was to hand-add Cluster__Roles__0/1 to a Windows service's
registry environment. Anyone reading the code to diagnose that box would have
concluded from the XML doc that the fallback was already applied.
AddOtOpcUaCluster now post-configures AkkaClusterOptions through the shared
RoleParser.ResolveEffectiveRoles, so BuildClusterOptions (Akka's own member
roles), ClusterRoleInfo, the ControlPlane singleton scope and
ConfigDbApiKeyStore's ClusterId all see one answer. Two sibling validators
(ConfigSource, Telemetry) read Cluster:Roles directly and were exempting the
exact node they exist for — an env-only driver-only node has no ConfigDb and
could sit on ConfigSource:Mode=Direct unchallenged. They resolve the same way now.
Also collapsed the four open-coded `Roles.FirstOrDefault(IsClusterRole)` +
ClusterIdFromRole copies into RoleParser.ClusterIdFromRoles. They had drifted:
three classified the cluster role ordinally, so a verbatim-bound `Cluster-SITE-A`
yielded a null ClusterId — and a null ClusterId applies NO cluster filter, which
made #528's cross-cluster over-grant guard fail OPEN. IsClusterRole is now
case-insensitive; the ClusterId suffix keeps its authored spelling, because
normalizing it would silently rename the Akka role of a running deployment.
#533 — three string-identity rules in one authorization path. AclScopeRef used
default (ordinal) equality while the trie builder filtered ClusterId and hashed
principals OrdinalIgnoreCase; the deploy gate's cross-cluster check was ordinal
too, which was the worse half — it could reject a whole deploy over a ClusterId
case difference the runtime would have accepted. It only worked because resolver
and builder were handed the same NodeAcl instances.
The rule is now stated once, on AclScopeRef, and applied throughout:
identifiers (ScopeId, ClusterId, Principal) compare OrdinalIgnoreCase; path
segments compare Ordinal. AclScopePathResolver re-keys its own maps rather than
documenting a comparer contract for callers, so the two independent producers —
EF at the gate, artifact JSON on the node — cannot diverge from the outside.
PermissionTrieNode.Children stays Ordinal: those are browse names, and Speed /
speed are two nodes that can coexist under one device.
Split PermissionTrieBuildDiagnosticReason.RetiredScopeKind out of
UnresolvedScope. A legacy FolderSegment row and a typo'd id had the same message
and different remedies.
Falsified: five mutations, each reddening only its own guard — remove the
PostConfigure (3 tests), revert IsClusterRole to ordinal (3), revert AclScopeRef
equality (1), revert the resolver's map comparer (6), revert the gate's
comparisons (2), remove the FolderSegment short-circuit (1).
Test isolation: OTOPCUA_ROLES is process-global and xUnit runs classes in
parallel, so the three validator suites that now resolve effective roles share a
non-parallel collection. Without it, cases passing no roles would intermittently
observe another class's env var.
Full solution build clean; full suite green apart from two pre-existing failures
confirmed identical on
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Joseph Doherty
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3a6b2a1daf |
feat(acl): variable-depth scope model + the scopePaths producer (#520 stage 3)
Makes the /raw device tree addressable by an ACL rule, and builds the
scope-path producer PermissionTrieBuilder has accepted since it was written
but which had no caller anywhere.
The plan for this stage said "add NodeHierarchyKind.Raw, whose path is the
RawPath segments Folder/Driver/Device/TagGroup/Tag". That shape is wrong.
RawFolder.ParentRawFolderId and TagGroup.ParentTagGroupId are both
self-referencing, so folders and tag groups each nest without bound and a real
RawPath is folder…/Driver/Device/group…/Tag. NodeScope was fixed-arity and
PermissionTrie.CollectMatches was five hardcoded steps, so the scope model
could not address a real raw tree at all. NodeScope is now {ClusterId, Kind,
Segments} and the walk is a segment loop. The trie STRUCTURE was already
variable-depth (NodeAclPath.Segments is a list, Children is a recursive
dictionary), so only the walker and the scope record had to change.
Four decisions worth keeping:
- The namespace level became the realm. Level 1 gated on NodeScope.NamespaceId,
but v3 has no Namespace entity — the snapshot was retired when the address
space went dual-namespace, and the identifier appears nowhere in production
outside NodeScope. So the level could only ever fail to match, which silently
made every sub-cluster grant unreachable while cluster grants kept working.
It is now a realm token derived from the scope's Kind, not carried on it, so
the walk and the producer cannot disagree about its spelling.
- Provenance comes from the granting row's own ScopeKind, recorded on TrieGrant
at build time. Depth-derived provenance could not name a raw level at all,
since the depth of "Device" varies with folder nesting.
- The trie comparer moved from OrdinalIgnoreCase to Ordinal. Raw sibling-name
uniqueness is ordinal, so Speed and speed can both exist under one device and
a grant on either would have matched both.
- The null-scopePaths "deterministic test mode" is deleted. It planted
unresolvable rows at a direct child of the trie root, a position the walker
cannot reach, so the grant looked placed and could never match — and every
test using that mode proved nothing about production placement. scopePaths is
now required, and a row that does not resolve is dropped with a diagnostic.
A scope resolves to a LIST of paths: a raw tag projected into N equipments is
reachable at N+1 NodeIds and a write through any of them lands on the same
driver reference, so a Tag-scoped grant covering only the raw node would be
bypassable through a UNS one. The lookup is keyed on (ScopeKind, ScopeId), not
ScopeId alone — ScopeId has no FK and no type discriminator, so an id collision
across entity types would hand a grant the wrong node's paths.
Also closed here, all found by review rather than asked for:
- NodeAcl rows had no deploy-time validation of any kind and were not reachable
from DraftValidator at all (DraftSnapshot carried no NodeAcls). They are now
gated for dangling ids, cross-cluster scopes, blank/contradictory ScopeId, the
retired FolderSegment kind, and undefined ordinals.
- ConfigDbApiKeyStore conferred roles from Cluster-scoped grants authored in ANY
cluster, because it filtered on scope kind with no ClusterId predicate while
ArtifactApiKeyStore read an already-cluster-filtered snapshot. On a fused
admin+driver node that was a cross-cluster over-grant. Its doc comment claimed
the two stores matched.
- The two AdminUI ACL banners still said enforcement was LDAP-group -> role
mapping, which stages 1/2 made false in both directions.
- The /apikeys page was never classified in PageAuthorizationGuardTests, so that
test has been red since the key-minting commit merged — I did not run
AdminUI.Tests before merging stage 4.
Falsified rather than assumed: 8 mutations against the trie tests, 5 against the
deploy gate (including one proving a cross-cluster row is not silently
mis-diagnosed as unresolved), a staged red->green for the over-grant regression,
and the realm gate, the comparer and the malformed-path guard each broken
individually to confirm only their own tests go red.
Node ACLs are still not ENFORCED — nothing constructs a NodeScope or calls the
evaluator yet. That is stages 5 and 6; this stage makes the model able to
express what those will enforce.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
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Joseph Doherty
|
a438ac1640 |
feat(acl): keys + ACLs reach driver-only nodes via the artifact (#520 stage 4)
A driver-only node has had no ConfigDb since per-cluster mesh Phase 4, so it registered NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator and denied every UserName token. Its keys now ride the deployment artifact instead. - ConfigComposer snapshots ApiKeys alongside the NodeAcls it already carried. Only the peppered HMAC ships, never a secret, and the pepper is node config that is deliberately not in the artifact. - DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority decodes both node-side. Grants are scoped to the node's own cluster; keys are not, because ApiKey carries no ClusterId — a key is a fleet-wide credential and the ACL rows are what bind it. - OpcUaPublishActor installs them on DataPlaneAuthorityState on every apply, BEFORE its plan.IsEmpty early-return: an artifact that only revokes a key produces an empty address-space plan, so feeding after that return would leave the revoked key working until an unrelated structural change redeployed. - ArtifactApiKeyStore serves them to session activation; a node with a ConfigDb keeps ConfigDbApiKeyStore, whose per-request read is what makes revocation immediate there. - OtOpcUaNodeManager gains DataPlaneAuthority — the cluster identity blocker #4 named. NodeScope.ClusterId is required and the evaluator fails closed on a mismatch, so until now no scope it built could have evaluated. Nothing reads it until stages 5/6. The generation is a node-local COUNTER driven by the RevisionHash, not derived from its bits. PermissionTrieCache treats the highest GenerationId as current, so a generation taken from hash bytes would install a lower number about half the time and the cache would go on serving the previous deployment's ACLs, silently. Sessions are not stamped with it yet — that belongs with the first seam that reads a UserAuthorizationState, in stage 5, rather than being built now and consulted by nothing. Live-gated on docker-dev against site-a-1 (driver-only, no ConfigDb): key authenticates, wrong secret denied, both halves of the revocation asymmetry observed, and a SITE-A grant confirmed not to reach site-b-1. Key minted with an independent Python HMAC so the verifier was checked against something other than itself. Rig left clean. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
|
087a969ee6 |
feat(acl): API key minting — AdminUI page + admin service (#520)
Pulled forward from stage 7 because without it the feature is unusable and un-live-gateable: there was no way to create a key short of hand-inserting a row and computing an HMAC by hand. The minting logic is an IApiKeyAdminService in Core.Authorization, NOT logic in the Razor page — this repo has no bUnit, so anything only a page can reach is untestable, and minting credentials is not where that belongs. The page is a thin shell over it. Moved to Core.Authorization so both ends can reach them: ApiKeyOptions (was in Host) and OpcUaPrincipals (was in OpcUaServer.Security). The OPC UA server resolves principals; the AdminUI must refuse to mint a key claiming a reserved one. OpcUaServer already gained a Core reference in stage 1b, so no new edge — AdminUI gains one. ApiKeyOptions is now bound UNCONDITIONALLY rather than in the driver branch: a driver node needs the pepper to VERIFY keys and an admin node needs it to MINT them, and getting that wrong on either side is a silent authentication failure rather than a startup error. Validation rules, all covered: the reserved 'anonymous' principal is refused case-insensitively (so "ANONYMOUS" cannot slip past into a distinct principal that the evaluator would then match case-INsensitively against anonymous's grants); blank name/principal; a principal longer than the column, rejected rather than truncated, because silent truncation yields a key that authenticates and is granted nothing with no visible cause; a past expiry. Generation runs BEFORE the DbContext is opened so an unconfigured pepper surfaces as a clear error instead of a stored row whose hash nothing can verify. The page shows the plaintext ONCE and says so; it is held in component state and written nowhere else, because the server keeps only a hash. Revocation is flagged in the UI as taking effect only after the next deployment — driver-only nodes have no ConfigDb, so keys ride the artifact. FleetAdmin-only (Administrator), not ConfigEditor: this mints credentials. Core.Tests 68 green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
|
f88eb49bd1 |
feat(acl): ApiKey entity + key format, and put Core on the server's graph (#520)
Stage 1b. Still no enforcement wired — this adds the credential model the identity cutover (stage 2) will read. ApiKey holds one principal per key, deliberately. The reason to separate keys from principals is so many keys share a grant set and rotating a key never touches an ACL row, and that holds with one principal per key since nothing stops two keys naming the same principal. A key belonging to several principals at once buys little and costs a join table. UserAuthorizationState.Principals stays a list, so adding it later needs no ACL-side change. ApiKeySecret is the security-critical half and is pure, so it is tested on its own: otua_<keyId>_<secret>, peppered HMAC-SHA256, FixedTimeEquals. Notes why a plain HMAC rather than an iterated KDF (the secret is 32 bytes of CSPRNG, and the call runs inline on session activation, which the SDK serializes server-wide behind its SessionManager event lock), and fails closed on an unset pepper rather than hashing under an empty key. Found and fixed a bug in my own first draft: the key id was url-safe base64, whose alphabet maps '/' to '_' — the very character TryParse splits on. Roughly one key in five would have had its id truncated at a random position, an intermittent auth failure reproducing only for SOME keys. The id is hex now, and the guard is falsified: reverting the alphabet reds both The_generated_key_id_never_contains_the_separator and, as a bonus signal, Two_generated_keys_never_collide, because truncated ids collide. ApiKeyId is NOT NULL, unlike the nullable NodeAclId precedent whose filtered unique index would admit two NULL ids. Fine for a config row, not for a credentials lookup key. OpcUaServer.csproj now references Core. Until now it did not, so IPermissionEvaluator was literally uncallable from the node manager — the place enforcement has to happen. No new transitive package surface. Schema doc updated for both, and its NodeAcl block flagged for pre-existing drift (it still documents the GenerationId column v3 dropped) without fixing it here. Core 247, OpcUaServer 364, Configuration 128 — all green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
|
4d376f727f |
refactor(acl): NodeAcl.LdapGroup -> Principal, with the proc that reads it (#520)
Stage 1a of the API-key ACL design. Behaviour-neutral: the trie walker already matched an opaque string, so only what produces that string changes. No enforcement is wired by this commit and none of the two live role gates move. Renamed through the ACL model: NodeAcl.Principal, TrieGrant.Principal, MatchedGrant.Principal, AuthorizationDecision.Principal, UserAuthorizationState.Principals, and PermissionTrie.CollectMatches's parameter. LdapGroupRoleMapping is a DIFFERENT entity that also has an LdapGroup column and is deliberately untouched — it backs AdminUI login, which keeps LDAP. The migration is the interesting part. EF scaffolds RenameColumn/RenameIndex, so rows survive — but it cannot know that dbo.sp_ComputeGenerationDiff checksums NodeAcl.LdapGroup. That proc is created in V3Initial.StoredProcedures and never redefined since, and SQL Server does not validate a procedure body when a column is renamed out from under it: the object keeps reporting healthy and fails at CALL time with Invalid column name, silently breaking config-drift detection. Verified against the live dev DB that the deployed proc really does reference the column. The migration therefore re-emits the proc, as one parameterised template shared by Up and Down so the two cannot drift. Prose that describes what is enforced TODAY (fleet-wide LDAP group -> role) is left alone, because it is still accurate until stage 2 lands. UserAuthorizationState's refresh machinery is retained unchanged but now carries a note that it is LDAP-shaped and largely vestigial here: an API-key principal set cannot change out of band, since keys and ACL rows both ride the deployment artifact, so the generation stamp rather than the freshness timer is the real invalidation signal. 41 authorization tests pass; solution builds clean. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
|
c81cef39f5 |
feat(alarms): bridge driver comms-loss into scripted-alarm input quality (#481)
Layer 4 of the condition-Quality chain (#477 -> #478). #478 gave a scripted condition the worst quality of its input tags, but only for inputs whose driver PUBLISHES a Bad data change. A poll driver whose device goes unreachable publishes nothing — it raises ConnectivityChanged(false) and goes silent — so the engine held its last Good value, WorstInputStatus stayed Good, and worse, AreInputsReady stayed true, so the predicate went on evaluating a stale value after the source had died. `DriverHostActor.FanCommsLossToDependencyMux` pushes a synthetic BadNoCommunication with a null value into the dependency mux for every value ref the disconnected driver owns. The issue asked for a driver -> all-tag-refs map to be built for this. It already exists: `_nodeIdByDriverRef`, keyed (DriverInstanceId, RawPath) and rebuilt from the composition on every apply. Alarm-bearing tags live in the separate `_alarmNodeIdByDriverRef` and are deliberately excluded — a native condition is not a mux value and takes the Part 9 quality path instead. Nothing is pushed on reconnect, deliberately: publishing Good would assert a value quality this actor has not observed. Recovery rides the driver's own republish, and the mechanism was verified rather than assumed — the Connected -> Reconnecting edge calls DetachSubscription, which nulls the subscription handle, so the reconnect's ResubscribeDesired builds a FRESH subscription whose PollGroupEngine initial push runs with forceRaise: true. Without that detach the poll engine would compare against its retained LastValues, see an unchanged value, raise nothing, and strand these refs Bad forever — the value-dedup trap that bit the v3 Batch 4 virtual-tag reassert. Closes #478 Finding 3, which the above depends on. WorstInputStatus skipped every input whose VALUE was null as "no data yet" — and Bad-with-no-value is exactly the shape a comms-lost driver produces, so the skip was hiding the case that matters most; without this half the fan-out above would be silently inert. The upstream source now stamps a never-pushed path BadWaitingForInitialData — the honest Part 4 code for that state — and the engine skips that specific code rather than every null value. Deleting the null-skip outright is the obvious fix and is wrong in the other direction: it makes every not-yet-published input drag its condition Bad at deploy, flooding the quality path with load-time annotations, which is what the skip existed to prevent. Both mistakes are pinned by a test pair that goes red under the opposite error, and both were falsified by reverting the production code: old null-skip restored -> A_pushed_Bad_carrying_no_value RED null-skip deleted outright -> An_input_that_was_never_pushed RED fan-out call removed -> the three DriverHostActor tests RED (1 of 7) The never-pushed test was vacuous on first writing and is worth recording: the quality bucket only emits on CHANGE, so the load-time evaluation is the one that flashes Bad, and subscribing to OnEvent after LoadAsync made the assertion unfalsifiable — it passed against the broken behaviour. It now subscribes first. `FakeUpstream.ReadTag` returned 0x80340000 (BadNotConnected) for an unset path, a different Bad code from production's placeholder. Harmless while any Bad behaved alike; load-bearing now, so it is aligned and pinned by a reflection guard asserting the engine's private constant agrees with what the production source stamps. Behaviour change to weigh, flagged in the issue and confirmed: virtual tags computed from a comms-lost input now go Bad too. That follows from using the shared mux and reads as correct, but it is broader than scripted alarms. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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b815446940 |
refactor(drivers): delete GetMemoryFootprint / FlushOptionalCachesAsync (#525)
Both `IDriver` members had no production call site. Their only consumer was `MemoryTracking`, deleted with the driver-tier recycle machinery in #522, and `GetMemoryFootprint`'s doc-comment claimed "polled every 30s by Core" — which had not been true since v3, even before #522 removed the poller. Owner decision on #525 was (a) delete rather than (b) build the process-wide watchdog that would consume them. The driver-side implementations are in git history and were mostly reusable; what was always missing is the trigger, and a member nobody calls is how the misleading doc-comment survived this long. Removed from `IDriver`, all 12 driver implementations, and every test stub — plus the support code that existed only to feed them, which is the part a member-only deletion would have left behind as dead weight: - MTConnect's three per-entry byte-weight constants, its cached `ProbeModelDataItemCount`, and `CountDataItems` — a full device-tree walk run on every cache fill to populate a number with no remaining reader. - OpcUaClient's `_discoveredNodeCount` field and the discovery-pass write to it. - MQTT's `ApproxBytesPerAuthoredTag`. Two behavioural notes, neither a change in what the software does: - `AbCipTemplateCache` now has no production reset path. Its only caller was AB CIP's flush, which itself had no caller — so nothing changes except how visible the fact is. Recorded on the type, along with the correction that its comment's claim about a device `ReinitializeAsync` also flushing it was never true. A UDT redefined on a live controller keeps its stale shape until the driver instance is rebuilt. - MTConnect's `/probe` cache is still dropped, by `InvalidateProbeModel()` on an Agent restart. That is now `internal` rather than `private` so the tests which used the flush purely to empty the cache drive the real path instead — they now cover a case that actually occurs in production. Several unrelated doc comments cited `FlushOptionalCachesAsync` as the canonical CAS example and are repointed to it. Tests: the ones that existed only to assert on the removed members are deleted (3 OpcUaClient, 3 Galaxy, 2 MQTT, 1 MTConnect, 1 AbCip). Worth noting one was vacuous — `FlushOptionalCachesAsync_resets_footprint_counter` asserted a footprint of 0 before the flush and 0 after with no discovery in between, so it would have passed against a flush that did nothing at all. Full suite green except 7 failures verified identical on master before and after (4 AbLegacy integration with the compose profile down, 3 Host.IntegrationTests), checked by name rather than assumed. Docs corrected where they described this as live: `DriverLifecycle.md` (which carried the #525 placeholder), `drivers/AbCip.md`, `drivers/AbLegacy.md`, and `v2/driver-stability.md` — whose "polls this every 30 s" + per-driver `DriverConfig` memory budget were never built as written and are now banner-ed as design intent rather than description. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
|
7f2108dcf2 |
feat(mqtt): Sparkplug primary-host STATE publishing, Primary-gated (#511)
`ActAsPrimaryHost` was accepted by config and by the AdminUI form and did nothing but
log a warning. It now delivers the whole three-part contract or none of it: a retained
`ONLINE` on `spBv1.0/STATE/{hostId}`, a matching retained `OFFLINE` armed as the MQTT
Last Will, and an explicit `OFFLINE` on a clean stand-down.
**The claim is a dedicated connection, not a message.** A Will can only be registered in
the CONNECT packet — it cannot be added to a live session, changed, or withdrawn. So a
claim that is acquired and released at runtime cannot ride the long-lived ingest session.
`SparkplugPrimaryHost` opens its own connection (client id `{clientId}-spbhost`, forced
clean-session) when the node gains Primary and closes it when the node loses Primary; the
connection's lifetime *is* the claim, so every leg follows from its lifecycle. Ingest is
untouched by a role change — no dropped subscriptions, no lost birth cache, no data gap at
the Secondary->Primary transition.
**Primary-gated** (owner decision, recorded on the issue). Both pair nodes subscribe
independently, so an ungated claim means both claim the same host id — and the sharp
failure is not the two fighting over the retained STATE, it is that the SECONDARY's death
fires its Will and publishes OFFLINE while the Primary is healthy, stopping every edge node
in the group. Registering the Will only on whichever node is Primary at connect time fails
the other way: a node that later gains Primary would publish ONLINE with no Will behind it.
New seam: `IDriverPrimaryRoleSource` (`Core.Abstractions`) carrying the *data-plane* verdict
(`PrimaryGatePolicy.ShouldServiceAsPrimary`), not the alarm-drain verdict — an unknown role
with a driver peer present must deny. Registered unconditionally by `AddOtOpcUaRuntime`,
deliberately NOT alongside `IRedundancyRoleView`, which `AddAlarmHistorian` registers only
when that section is enabled: piggybacking would leave a pair with no alarm historian
falling back to "claim unconditionally". Polled on a 1s timer rather than evented — a
process singleton raising events at per-instance drivers outlives every driver it holds.
Accepted trade: a brief edge-visible OFFLINE window during failover. That is a genuine
state transition, not a glitch to hide.
Live-gated 5/5 against the Mosquitto fixture, including the Will leg — `AbandonForTests`
drops the socket with no DISCONNECT, because a clean disconnect makes the broker discard
the Will by protocol rule, so a test driven through `StopAsync` would observe the
stand-down OFFLINE and pass against an implementation that never armed a Will. Falsified:
removing the Will turns that leg and only that leg red.
Also corrects two stale claims found en route: the AdminUI form still said MQTT tags are
read-only (#508 shipped), and the driver doc still said nothing consumes `IRediscoverable`.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
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Joseph Doherty
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2d20aeb779 |
fix(opcua,drivers): carry driver status sub-codes to clients (#519) + health-write ordering (#517)
#519 — a driver's OPC UA status code now reaches a client with its sub-code intact. DriverInstanceActor projected the driver's uint onto a 3-state Good/Uncertain/Bad enum and OtOpcUaNodeManager re-expanded Bad to a bare 0x80000000, so BadNoCommunication, BadTypeMismatch and BadNotSupported were indistinguishable on the wire and every driver's status constants (incl. the 16 #497 had just corrected) were diagnostic in logs only. Resolved by option (b): the raw uint rides AttributeValuePublished -> AttributeValueUpdate -> IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink.WriteValue, OpcUaQuality is deleted, and severity classification is a helper (OpcUaStatus.IsGood/IsUncertain/IsBad). The surface was wider than the issue costed (41 files, not "the sink and 3 implementations"): OpcUaQuality had non-driver producers with no uint to carry. Each got its natural code — BadInternalError for a failed virtual-tag script, BadNoCommunication for driver comms loss — and ScriptedAlarmHostActor's pair of mutually-inverse uint<->enum mappers is deleted, having round-tripped a code the engine already held. AddressSpaceApplier's removal writes deliberately keep the generic Bad: not losing a code the driver had is this issue; inventing one for the deploy path is a separate call. Behaviour change: WriteAlarmQuality fires its Part 9 event on a status-code change rather than a severity-bucket change. While the annotation was 3-state those were the same predicate; now a move between two Bad reasons changes what a subscriber reads. New SDK-free named constants live on Commons.OpcUa.OpcUaStatus, and StatusCodeParityTests is widened to cover them — that guard is reflection-driven, so it can only see a named constant, never an inline literal. #517 — the symptom is real but the issue named the wrong path and its fix was unsafe. ShutdownAsync cannot race: DriverInstanceActor calls it from PostStop, after the mailbox drains. (Core/Hosting/DriverHost, the one class with a concurrent GetHealth, has no production call site.) InitializeAsync can: it runs on a fire-and-forget Task.Run, and MTConnectDriver writes Healthy then starts loops that can throw into a catch which disposes the client before writing Faulted. Moving the write earlier, as suggested, inverts the terminal state — teardown drains in-flight loops that write health as they unwind, so a late loop could leave Healthy at rest with every connection closed. The fix is a bracket (conservative before, terminal after), applied to MTConnect's init-failure path only; shutdown keeps its single trailing write, and the rule plus the reachability table are documented on IDriver.ShutdownAsync. CalculationDriver.GetHealth returned a hard-coded Healthy that consulted nothing — Healthy before initialize, after shutdown and after dispose. Now derived from _running. Its test, named Health_is_always_Connected, asserted the defect and is replaced. Every new guard was falsified by breaking the production code and watching it go red. The two sub-code tests each assert two different Bad codes, since a single-code assertion could pass against a hard-coded constant under the old projection. Pre-existing failures, verified unchanged on a stashed tree and not chased: 4 in Driver.AbLegacy.IntegrationTests (slc500/micrologix/plc5 fixtures not up) and 3 in Host.IntegrationTests. Closes #517 Closes #519 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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d979ac69eb |
refactor(config): drop the dead DriverInstanceResilienceStatus table (#524)
The sibling of #521's DriverHostStatus, dead for exactly the same reason. Before this change the only reference in the entire repo was the DriverInstanceResilienceStatuses DbSet declaration: no writer, no reader, and the table empty on every deployment. Its entity doc described two components that were never built — a HostedService sampling the tracker every ~5 s into this table, and an AdminUI that left-joined it on DriverHostStatus for display. There is no sampler, that join exists in no razor file, and DriverHostStatus itself was removed in #521. Per-cluster mesh Phase 4 also makes the design unbuildable now: AddOtOpcUaConfigDb is gated on the admin role, so a driver-only node has no ConfigDb connection to write rows with. Any per-node runtime-status table has this problem. The live data was never missing — it just does not go through SQL. Resilience counters reach the AdminUI's DriverStatusPanel as DriverResilienceStatusChanged over the driver-resilience-status telemetry channel into the in-memory IDriverResilienceStatusStore. Verified consumed: the panel injects the store, fed by both DriverResilienceStatusBridge (DPS) and TelemetryDialSupervisor (gRPC). If breaker HISTORY across a central restart is ever wanted — the one thing the last-value-only store cannot give — it needs a CENTRAL-side writer fed by that stream, never a driver-node writer. Keeping an empty table now bought nothing toward that. Migration DropDriverInstanceResilienceStatusTable; the scaffolder's data-loss warning cannot bite on a table nothing ever inserted into, and Down() recreates it exactly. Also corrected: DriverResilienceStatusTracker's doc-comment claimed CurrentInFlight fed DriverInstanceResilienceStatus.CurrentBulkheadDepth "until the full telemetry observer lands". The observer landed in Phase 5; the table never had a writer. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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cbb882293b |
refactor(drivers): delete the inert driver-tier recycle machinery (#522)
The tier system was documented, operator-authorable, and inert. Deleted rather than activated,
because its premise is gone rather than merely unused.
"Tier C" meant a driver running out-of-process behind an IDriverSupervisor that could restart its
Host without tearing down the OPC UA session. No such process exists anywhere: Galaxy reaches
MXAccess over gRPC to the external mxaccessgw sidecar (PR 7.2 retired the in-process
Galaxy.Host/Proxy/Shared projects) and FOCAS has run in-process since its managed wire client
landed 2026-04-24. Consistently, IDriverSupervisor had ZERO implementations and there was nothing
for one to implement against.
The issue understated the inertness. It says the Tier-C-only protections never engaged, implying
the Tier A/B parts did. They did not: nothing constructs MemoryTracking, MemoryRecycle or
ScheduledRecycleScheduler outside their own unit tests, so the whole Core/Stability recycle layer
was dead — meaning option (a), "pass real tiers", was never a flag flip. It would have meant
writing the wiring that never existed AND arming it.
Deleted: MemoryTracking, MemoryRecycle, ScheduledRecycleScheduler, IDriverSupervisor, the
vestigial DriverTypeRegistry (referenced only by its own tests), and the RecycleIntervalSeconds
knob — which the AdminUI let an operator author and the parser validated while it configured
nothing.
DriverTier itself SURVIVES and is load-bearing: DriverResilienceOptions.GetTierDefaults supplies
the real per-capability timeout/retry/breaker policies via DriverFactoryRegistry.GetTier and
DriverCapabilityInvokerFactory. Only the isolation-and-recycle layer above it is gone.
Deliberately NOT deleted:
- WedgeDetector came along in the same directory and is equally dead in production, but it is
tier-agnostic and is not recycle machinery — it only shares the folder. Restored rather than
swept up in a decision that was not about it.
- IDriver.GetMemoryFootprint() and FlushOptionalCachesAsync() lose their only consumer here.
Removing them touches all 12 drivers and every test stub, so they are documented as
consumerless and filed as #525 instead of buried in this diff.
Compatibility: a deployed ResilienceConfig blob still carrying "recycleIntervalSeconds" parses
cleanly (unknown keys are ignored — guarded by a new test, because a blob that suddenly failed to
parse would fall back to tier defaults and silently discard the operator's real overrides), and
the AdminUI's preserve-unknown-keys bag keeps the key rather than rewriting stored config on an
unrelated edit.
The 01/U-6 knob-inertness guard carried an explicit carve-out admitting RecycleIntervalSeconds was
dormant and out of scope; that carve-out is now gone, so the expected set is literally what the
test's name claims.
Note: Host.IntegrationTests has 2 failures (DriverProbeRegistrationTests.is_idempotent,
PrimaryGateFailoverTests) — verified pre-existing by reproducing both on clean master
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Joseph Doherty
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30d0697c28 |
feat(hosts): surface per-host connectivity on /hosts; drop the unwritable table (#521)
`IHostConnectivityProbe` was a dead surface: eleven drivers implement it, `GetHostStatuses()` had ZERO production call sites, and `OnHostStatusChanged` had no subscriber outside the Galaxy driver's own aggregator. Per-host connectivity was computed by every driver and read by nobody. The issue offered "build the publisher or delete it". The publisher as its entity doc described it — driver nodes upserting `DriverHostStatus` rows — is not buildable: per-cluster mesh Phase 4 gates `AddOtOpcUaConfigDb` on the `admin` role, so a driver-only node has no ConfigDb connection to write rows with. So the capability is kept and the transport changed. `DriverHealthChanged.HostStatuses` now carries the probe result to `/hosts` as a Hosts column. That channel already reached the page, already survives the mesh split via the Phase 5 gRPC telemetry stream, and already replays a last-value snapshot on re-subscribe — so per-host state re-primes after a reconnect without a durable store. Both halves of the interface finally do what they are for: the event triggers a prompt publish, the pull is the source of truth. The point of the column is the case the driver-level state chip structurally cannot express: a multi-device driver stays aggregate-Healthy while ONE of its devices is unreachable. Two traps, both pinned by tests that were falsified against the prod code: - The host digest MUST be in the publish fingerprint. On a single-host-down transition every other fingerprint component is unchanged, so the dedup would swallow exactly the publish carrying the news — the trap that already bit the rediscovery signal. Removing it turns the guard test red, verified. - null (no probe) must stay distinct from empty (probe with no hosts). proto3 cannot tell an absent repeated field from an empty one, hence the explicit `has_host_statuses` flag; collapsing them would render every probe-less driver as one whose devices are all fine. Dropped: the DriverHostStatus entity, enum, DbSet, model config and table (migration DropDriverHostStatusTable — empty on every deployment, so the scaffolder's data-loss warning is moot, and Down() recreates it exactly). Found en route, NOT fixed here: `DriverInstanceResilienceStatus` is the identical defect — no writer, no reader, only a DbSet declaration, while the live data rides the `driver-resilience-status` telemetry channel. Its doc-comment now states that rather than describing the sampler and AdminUI join that were never built. Filed as #524 rather than widening this schema change beyond what was asked. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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5fff597324 |
revert(drivers): remove the periodic 5-minute device re-browse (#523)
Removes the tag-set drift detector shipped in |
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Joseph Doherty
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e77c8a3569 |
feat(drivers): tag-set drift detection, gated on SupportsOnlineDiscovery
The second thing #516/§8.2 deliberately did not build. The original objection stands — Modbus, S7, MQTT, AbLegacy and Sql echo authored config from DiscoverAsync, so diffing discovered against authored is a tautology for them — but it is now ENCODED rather than used as a reason not to build. The discriminator already existed: ITagDiscovery.SupportsOnlineDiscovery is documented as "enumerates the tag set from the live backend rather than replaying pre-declared/authored tags", and it separates the fleet cleanly — FOCAS, TwinCAT, MTConnect and AbCip true; the five config-echo drivers explicitly false. The check runs only for a driver that is SupportsOnlineDiscovery AND reports the new AuthoredDiscoveryRefs. That is nullable rather than empty-by-default on purpose: an empty collection legitimately means "nothing authored, everything discovered is new", so conflating the two would report total drift for a driver that never opted in. Where the value is: AbCip and FOCAS browse a live backend but implement no IRediscoverable, so before this they had no change signal at all. A periodic compare is the only way to notice a PLC re-download. A finding that changed the design: FOCAS, TwinCAT and AbCip all re-emit their authored tags into the same DiscoverAsync stream as device-derived ones, so the browse picker can show an operator their existing tags. Discovered is therefore always a superset of authored, and a VANISHED tag can never appear missing — one whole direction is structurally undetectable for three of the four. Shipping a Vanished list that is permanently empty for them would have been the half-inert seam this whole exercise removes. So the driver declares DiscoveryStreamIncludesAuthoredTags, the detector does not compute the undetectable half, and the operator message says "missing-tag detection unavailable for this driver" rather than letting the absence of a missing-tag clause read as reassurance. MTConnect is the only driver where both directions work — its stream is purely probe-model-derived. Behaviour: a failed browse is not drift (an unreachable device would otherwise report every authored tag as vanished); a truncated capture is skipped for the same reason; an unchanged drift is reported once rather than re-stamping its timestamp; drift that resolves clears the prompt. Interval defaults to 5 minutes — it browses a real device, and a tag set changing is an engineering event, not a runtime one. It reuses the Stage-2 surfacing, raising the same /hosts re-browse prompt, and never rebuilds the served address space. Comparison logic is a pure, separately-tested type rather than actor-inline. 14 new tests. The gate was verified load-bearing by deleting the SupportsOnlineDiscovery half: the tautology-driver test goes red, and it asserts discovery was never invoked rather than merely "no prompt raised", which would have passed for the wrong reason if the timer never fired. Full suite green except the same three pre-existing fixture-gated integration suites, identical counts. |
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Joseph Doherty
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6a01358b9a |
fix(adminui): guard the driver dispatch maps and close G-1..G-6 (§8.4)
A parity guard already existed for DriverTypeNames <-> the /raw driver picker, but not for the two dispatch maps downstream, so a driver could be registered, offered in the picker, and then have no config form. That is exactly what happened to Calculation (G-1) and to Sql/MTConnect/Calculation on the device modal (G-2) — both survived review because nothing could see them. The maps had to become data first. A Razor @switch compiles into BuildRenderTree's IL, so no test can enumerate its cases; the picker guard works only because RawDriverTypeDialog keeps its data in a field the markup enumerates. Both modals now render from DriverConfigFormMap / DeviceFormMap through <DynamicComponent>, and being public those maps need none of the picker test's BindingFlags.NonPublic fragility. - G-1 CalculationDriverForm.razor — RunTimeout was unauthorable via the UI. - G-2 Sql/MTConnect/Calculation declared single-connection rather than given hollow device forms; each holds one connection at the driver level. - G-3 DriverConfigModal's hardcoded "Galaxy or Mqtt" -> IsSingleConnection, so Sql/MTConnect authors are no longer sent to a device form with no endpoint. - G-4 DriverFormMapParityTests (5, both directions) + DriverDispatchMapParityTests. - G-5 CsvColumnMap entries for Sql, Mqtt, MTConnect. - G-6 RawBrowseCommitMapper Sql branch — and the browser end, which the audit missed: SqlBrowseSession emitted NO AddressFields, so a browsed leaf carried only a column name, and a column alone cannot address a Sql tag. It now travels schema/table/column and the mapper builds a WideRow config from them. A branch alone would have produced a half-built blob. Two findings while writing the guards. The G-6 test showed Modbus and Calculation also hit the generic address fallback — correctly, as neither is browsable — so it asserts the fall-through set EQUALS a documented non-browsable list in both directions; a one-way check would let a newly browsable driver be quietly added to the exclusion list. And TagConfigDriverTypeNameGuardTests was hollow: it enumerated a hand-written TheoryData that had already drifted (omitting Galaxy, Sql and Mqtt), guarding renames but not gaps. Now enumerated from the map with a coverage test facing the other way. Live-verified on docker-dev, since this repo has no bUnit and no unit test reaches Blazor parameter binding: opened Calculation's config (previously "No typed config form"), typed 3500, saved, reopened — the value persisted, so the DynamicComponent two-way binding round-trips. Sql's form renders fully and now reads "This driver holds a single connection, authored above". AdminUI.Tests 930 passed. |
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Joseph Doherty
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09a401b881 |
feat(drivers): consume IRediscoverable as an operator re-browse prompt (§8.2, #518)
Nine drivers raise IRediscoverable.OnRediscoveryNeeded when they observe that a remote's tag set may have changed — a Galaxy redeploy, a TwinCAT symbol-version bump, an MTConnect agent restart, a Sparkplug rebirth. Nothing in src/ subscribed, so every raise went into the void. Drivers even wrap the invoke in try/catch for "subscriber threw"; there has never been a subscriber. DriverInstanceActor now attaches the event in PreStart and detaches in PostStop, mirroring AttachAlarmSource/DetachAlarmSource. Attach is per-actor, not per-connect: the raise has no connection affinity and can land while the driver is between connects. The detach is load-bearing rather than tidy — the IDriver instance outlives the actor when the host respawns a child around the same driver object, so a missing -= accumulates one handler per respawn, each holding a dead Self. The signal rides the existing driver-health snapshot to /hosts as a "re-browse" chip. It is ADVISORY: the served address space is deliberately not rebuilt, because v3 authors raw tags explicitly through the /raw browse-commit flow and a runtime graft would materialise nodes no operator approved and no deployment artifact records. Two things worth knowing: - PublishHealthSnapshot dedups on a health fingerprint, and a rediscovery raise on an otherwise-healthy driver changes none of the four fields it hashed. Without adding the timestamp to that tuple the dedup swallows the exact publish carrying the signal. Reverting that one line turns 3 of the 5 new tests red, which is how it was confirmed rather than assumed. - The new test stub implements IDriver from scratch instead of deriving from the shared StubDriver, whose GetHealth() returns DateTime.UtcNow — its fingerprint differs on every call, so the dedup never engages and the dedup test would have passed vacuously either way. The planned discovery-result drift detector was NOT built. Modbus, S7, MQTT, AbLegacy and Sql all echo authored config from DiscoverAsync rather than browsing the device, so a discovered-vs-authored diff is permanently empty for them — it would have been another plausible-looking inert seam, which is the class this audit exists to remove. IRediscoverable is the trustworthy signal because the driver asserts it deliberately. DriverHealthChanged, IDriverHealthPublisher.Publish and HostsDriverRow gain defaulted optional parameters, so no existing call site changed. telemetry.proto gains fields 8/9 and both Phase-5 mappers carry them. Runtime.Tests 512 passed / 31 skipped. |