ModelBackedCsvDriverTagMap.ApplyTypedColumns round-tripped the row's free-form
TagConfigJson cell through a driver model's FromJson/ToJson to fold the typed
columns in. That load is deliberately lenient — it has to be, so a poisoned blob
can be opened and repaired — so a typo'd value under a key the model owns
("dataType":"Intt16") came back out as the model's DEFAULT, before the #551
import gate or any later gate could judge it. The row imported clean and the tag
the operator described was gone. Only keys the model did not own survived to be
judged, which is why RawTagConfigGateTests looked like it covered this.
MTConnect carried the same defect from the export end. It is the one driver whose
blob accepts several spellings per field, and the runtime PREFERS driverDataType
over the dataType key the MtDataType column writes. The export residual carried
that alias (the map owned only the canonical key), so a re-imported row let it
out-rank the very column the operator had just edited — accepted, then silently
ignored at the driver — while the exported cell printed the spelling the driver
was ignoring, or nothing at all.
The fix preserves evidence; it does not move the verdict:
- ApplyTypedColumns writes the base cell's own tokens back over the model's
serialisation for every key no non-blank typed column overrode. The model still
stamps defaults for keys the row declares nowhere, so fragment cells compose
exactly as before.
- CsvTypedColumn gains ReadKeys / OwnedJsonKeys: the full ordered set of spellings
the RUNTIME reads for that column, mirroring TryFromTagConfig's FirstNonBlank
pairs. A firing column clears the out-ranking aliases; the export residual drops
them; the export cell shows the EFFECTIVE value.
- The review grid's override provenance reads the whole owned set, so an
overridden driverDataType is announced as an overridden dataType would be.
Nothing here decides which values are legal. The verdict stays with
TagConfigValidator on the assembled blob and with IRawTreeService.ImportTagsAsync
behind it — the deliberate reason NOT to follow the issue's own "run the validator
over the pre-merge cell" direction, which would have imposed completeness on a
cell that is legitimately a fragment and false-rejected every typed-column row.
Semantics chosen for the override contradiction: a cell token that a non-blank
column overrides is ACCEPTED with the column winning, and reported by name in
TypedOverrodeFallback. Typed-column-wins is the map's documented contract, the
override is announced rather than silent, and erroring would remove the only way
to repair a poisoned tag through the CSV surface. Every token that reaches the
stored blob is judged; a token the operator overrode is discarded openly.
Falsification: neutering the restore loop + alias handling turns exactly 7 of the
15 new tests red, while RawTagConfigGateTests (#551), RawTagCsvRoundTripTests and
CsvColumnMapReflectionTests all stay green — layering, not replacement.
AdminUI 1248, MTConnect 534, Modbus 373, S7 285, TwinCAT 205 — all green.
Verified against the live mapper: every browsable driver's browse-committed
TagConfig passes the gate the commit now runs, EXCEPT Sql — its branch emits a
WideRow blob with no rowSelector, which SqlTagConfigModel and
SqlEquipmentTagParser both refuse. That tag was never readable; the gate only
moves the failure from the deploy gate to the commit. Reported for its own fix
rather than special-cased here.
Gitea #551.
1. CSV import ran no driver-typed config gate. Its typed columns were always
strictly parsed, but the free-form TagConfigJson column reached the database
unread, so a CSV could author a tag the driver rejects — one that deploys
green and reads BadNodeIdUnknown forever. RawTagCsvMapper.Parse now names the
offending row in the staged review grid, and RawTreeService enforces the same
gate on CreateTag/UpdateTag/ImportTags: a form cannot be the guarantee (the
API and any future caller reach none of them, and this repo has no bUnit).
A rejected import row is an ERROR — the batch inserts nothing and the row is
named — never a skip.
Note the brief's premise that manual entry rides ImportTagsAsync is wrong:
RawManualTagEntryModal commits row-by-row via CreateTagAsync, which is why
the gate had to land on all three write paths.
2/3. The seven pre-#549 Inspect methods ran a hand-list of DescribeInvalidEnum
checks, so every rejection cause not on the list was invisible. They are now
ACCEPT-GATE-FIRST (the MTConnect/Sql/OpcUaClient/Calculation shape): ask the
driver's own reader for the verdict, then explain the refusal, with a
catch-all so "the parse rejects but Inspect said nothing" is unreachable.
That closes S7's absent dataType, AbCip members[], Modbus stringByteOrder and
the type-dependent guards, plus causes the issue did not name (absent
region/address/tagPath/symbolPath/topic, TwinCAT Structure, MQTT's Sparkplug
tuple). FOCAS and MQTT keep advisories about ACCEPTED blobs, so they
diagnose rather than return empty.
Authoring half: ModbusTagConfigModel gains stringByteOrder;
AbCipTagConfigModel asks the new AbCipTagDefinitionFactory.DescribeInvalidMember;
S7TagConfigModel captures whether the SOURCE blob declared dataType and asks
S7TagDefinitionFactory.DataTypeKey/DeclaresDataType. One authority per rule.
4. Doc sweep: the six factory Inspect summaries, EquipmentTagConfigInspector's
class remarks and AdminOperationsActor's comment all claimed invalid enums are
"silently defaulted by the lenient runtime" — false since R2-11 Phase C made
the runtime reads strict. They describe rejections now.
MTConnectTagDefinitionFactory.TryFromTagConfig resolves the coercion type as
FirstNonBlank(blob.DriverDataType, blob.DataType) — driverDataType OUT-RANKS
dataType — while MTConnectTagConfigModel read and wrote dataType alone. That
broke in both directions at once:
* a blob carrying "driverDataType": "Strng" was accepted at authoring while
the runtime rejected the tag (the residual slice of #549), and
* a VALID driverDataType silently overrode whatever type the editor displayed
and saved, so the editor showed a lie and a save RETYPED the tag.
Both halves land together, mirroring the existing IdKeys pattern:
* FromJson reads DataTypeKeys = [driverDataType, dataType] in the runtime's
precedence, with the runtime's own per-key semantics — absent/JSON-null and
present-but-blank fall through, a non-string token stops the walk (the
runtime deserialise throws JsonException on it and rejects the whole tag),
and the raw TOKEN is captured so Validate() judges what the driver judges.
* ToJson drops every non-canonical DataTypeKeys entry and writes dataType as
the enum NAME, so the alias can never out-rank the key the editor writes on
the next load.
* Validate() now names the offending spelling rather than always saying
"dataType".
Doing only one half silently retypes existing tags on their next save; the
falsification runs recorded in the PR confirm each half-fix reddens a distinct
test.
MTConnectTagConfigModel read `dataType` with TagConfigJson.GetEnum, which falls
back to String on ANY unrecognised value. A misspelled name ("Strng") from a
hand-authored blob, a CSV import or the API was therefore accepted at authoring
and silently rewritten, while the driver's strict parse rejected it and the tag
died with BadNodeIdUnknown. Found by the G-7 parity tests' falsifiability
control, which had to use the digits-only shape to have a case that failed.
The rule is not restated in the AdminUI. MTConnectTagDefinitionFactory exposes
its parse as `IsAcceptedDataTypeName`, documented as the one authority the
driver, the deploy gate and the authoring model all consult; the model's
Validate() asks it about the raw value the blob carries. The old digits-only
message is NOT retained as a special case: the runtime draws no distinction
between a bare number and a typo — one predicate, one Inspect warning — so a
second message here would be a second statement of a rule this model does not
own. The raw value is captured as the JSON TOKEN, because the runtime
deserialises the key into a `string?` DTO field and an unquoted number throws
there too.
The survey found the same asymmetry at six more editors, contrary to the
assumption that those runtimes silently default: R2-11 Phase C moved every
driver's TagConfig enum read to TagConfigJson.TryReadEnumStrict, which REJECTS
the tag on a present-but-invalid string, while the editors kept loading them
with a silent fallback. Modbus (region/dataType/byteOrder), S7, AbCip, AbLegacy,
TwinCAT and FOCAS now check their enums in Validate() through the runtime's own
TagConfigJson.DescribeInvalidEnumText — added alongside a public
ClassifyEnumText that TryReadEnum now delegates to, so the JSON-token door and
the string door reach one implementation. Mqtt and Sql already carried
equivalent strict checks and are untouched.
Care taken NOT to become stricter than the runtime: a present-but-non-string
token stays accepted for those six (TryReadEnum calls it absent), as does an
absent key, each pinned by a test.
Also adds a direct ProjectReference to Core.Abstractions from the AdminUI — the
save gate now leans on a type it was consuming only transitively.
G-7 wired OpcUaClientTagDefinitionFactory.Inspect into the deploy-time TagConfig
gate, which gave ControlPlane a ProjectReference to
Driver.OpcUaClient.Contracts — and with it, transitively, the whole OPC UA client
stack (5 OPCFoundation packages) into every host that loads the control plane.
NamespaceMap was the only reason Contracts carried
OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Client: its entire public surface is
ISession/NamespaceTable/NodeId-typed. It moves to a new leaf project,
ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.Session, referenced by the runtime .Driver
and by .Browser. Contracts is left with Core.Abstractions and NOTHING else —
the same shape as Calculation.Contracts.
The namespace stays ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient, so no consumer's
`using` changed. The .Session -> .Contracts direction is deliberate: the blob
read NamespaceMap needs is OpcUaClientTagDefinitionFactory.TryReadNodeId, the
one authority it shares with the deploy gate, and that must stay in the
dependency-light half.
Why a new project rather than folding NamespaceMap into the runtime .Driver and
having .Browser reference it (the Driver.Mqtt.Browser #512-style deliberate
exception): the AdminUI project-references .Browser and NOT .Driver, so that
shape would pull the OpcUaClient driver runtime — plus Core,
Opc.Ua.Configuration and Secrets.Abstractions — into the AdminUI's build/deploy
graph. That is exactly the violation #512 spent two extractions removing from
Mqtt.Browser; re-introducing it to save one csproj is a bad trade.
Guard: ContractsIsDependencyLightTests (Driver.OpcUaClient.Tests) asserts the
Contracts manifest names no Opc.Ua* assembly, plus a counterpart asserting
.Session does. An ABSENCE assertion is sound on the manifest where a presence
one is not — the compiler elides an unused reference, but it MUST emit one the
moment Opc.Ua-typed code is added. Falsified by temporarily re-adding the
package plus an Opc.Ua.NodeId-typed member: red on Opc.Ua.Types, green again on
removal.
Evidence — `dotnet list ControlPlane package --include-transitive | grep -i opc`:
before: OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.{Client,Configuration,Core,
Security.Certificates,Types} 1.5.378.106
after: none (and 0 Opc.Ua*.dll in ControlPlane's output directory)
Adds the Sql / MTConnect / Calculation / OpcUaClient Contracts ProjectReferences to
ControlPlane and their entries to EquipmentTagConfigInspector, closing the G-7 asymmetry: the
deploy gate now checks every driver the AdminUI checks. Galaxy is the sole remaining unmapped
type and is so by design — its dotted tag_name.AttributeName reference has no typed shape, and
the AdminUI has no typed editor for it either, so the two gates agree.
Adding the ProjectReference is what makes EquipmentTagConfigInspectorCoverageTests demand a map
entry (its sweep scans the output directory, so an unreferenced Contracts assembly is invisible
to it). Falsified: deleting the Sql entry fails
Every_driver_shipping_an_Inspect_is_wired_into_the_dispatch_map with
["SqlTagDefinitionFactory"]; restored.
Tests: three cases per driver in EquipmentTagConfigInspectorTests (canonical valid config warns
nothing / present-but-invalid field draws a warning naming it / broken JSON warns without
throwing), plus a Calculation control pinning that the two shapes the runtime accepts and the
editor refuses draw nothing. OpcUaClient moved out of the unmapped-driver theory.
New TagConfigAuthoringDeployParityTests (in AdminUI.Tests, the only suite that sees both gates)
pins the direction that matters: a config the AdminUI model's own ToJson produces and Validate
accepts draws no deploy warning. Its falsifiability control — the same driver types warning
about a blob the editor refuses — caught a pre-existing, unrelated authoring-side gap:
MTConnectTagConfigModel reads dataType leniently, so a misspelled name loads as String and
saves clean while the strict runtime rejects it. Left alone (rewriting the editors is out of
scope); the control uses the digits-only shape both gates refuse, and the case is documented
inline.
Deferment-register G-7: these four were validated by the AdminUI's TagConfigValidator at
authoring but by nothing at deploy, so config arriving by CSV import or API met no gate at
all. The deploy gate dispatches to a driver's *TagDefinitionFactory.Inspect in its Contracts
assembly, and none of the four had one.
Rather than mirror the AdminUI models (a mirror of an accept/reject boundary drifts silently,
with the gate describing a shape the driver no longer reads), each Inspect is built on the
driver's own runtime parse:
- Sql wraps the existing SqlEquipmentTagParser, which already lived in Sql.Contracts. The
P3-deferred Query model stays refused; Inspect surfaces the refusal rather than weakening it.
- MTConnect's blob reader MOVED out of MTConnectDriver (it was private, with a private DTO)
into MTConnectTagDefinitionFactory; the driver now calls it. Behaviour unchanged.
- OpcUaClient's nodeId read MOVED off NamespaceMap into OpcUaClientTagDefinitionFactory;
NamespaceMap now calls it. Behaviour unchanged.
- Calculation gains a Contracts assembly it never had. Only the JSON reading moved there
(CalculationTagDefinitionFactory.TryReadTagConfig); building a CalculationTagDefinition
still needs EquipmentScriptPaths from Commons and stays in the driver, so the split is at
the blob boundary. The new project is deliberately reference-free — a calc blob is strings,
a bool and an int, with no Core.Abstractions type in it.
Each Inspect runs the parse FIRST and returns empty on success, so "never stricter than the
runtime" is structural rather than a promise: a warning is only reachable for a blob the
driver would have refused and then skipped silently. Calculation additionally reports two
present-but-silently-discarded fields (a non-boolean changeTriggered reads as true; a
non-positive-integer timerIntervalMs is dropped), and deliberately does NOT warn about a
trigger-less tag or a sub-50ms timer — the editor refuses both, the runtime honours both, and
the deploy gate follows the runtime.
Blazor does not serialize OnParametersSetAsync against its own outstanding
task, and the modal's `_open` bool cannot tell two opens apart. ResetAndResolveAsync
awaits LoadMergedProbeConfigAsync and ResolveGroupContextAsync and then wrote
_driverType/_mergedConfig/_effectiveDeviceId/_groupPrefix/_canBrowse/_disabledReason
with no staleness re-check, so a close-reopen onto another device let the first
open's late continuation install its device's browse context under the displayed
modal — "Connect & browse" would silently dial the wrong controller and the commit
would land under the wrong tag-group.
Ports the per-open `_openGeneration` counter proven in the two sibling modals
(RawManualTagEntryModal, RawTagModal, 2026-08-05) to every post-await write here:
after both awaits, in the catch's error banner, and in the finally. The finally is
the one departure from the sibling shape and it is load-bearing — this modal resolves
inside a try/finally, so a stale `return` still runs the tail and would drop the LIVE
open's spinner mid-resolve.
Pinned by four RawBrowseModalStaleOpenTests facts, each observed red before the guard
and each re-falsified afterwards by reverting only its own guard. The modal calls
StateHasChanged on the open path, which throws without a render handle, so the test
attaches an inert Renderer subclass (file-local BL0006 pragma); [Parameter]s are set
by reflection per the BL0005 convention.
AdminUI suite 1117/1117 green.
Follow-up to 20a816db: mxaccessgw published the full MxStatusDetail enum
(gateway.md @ 75c71ad, "MxStatus Detail Vocabulary", lifted from
Interop.aaMxDataConsumer.MxStatusDetail), confirming the live-captured codes
(1007 = MX_E_NotWriteable, 1008 = MX_E_WriteAccessDenied). FromCategory now
maps the write-relevant band per code before falling back to the category
bucket: 1004 -> BadOutOfRange, 1005 -> BadTypeMismatch, 1006 -> BadNotReadable,
1007 -> BadNotWritable, 1008/1012/1013/1016/1017 -> BadUserAccessDenied,
1010/1011 (initializing, transient) -> BadOutOfService. 8000
(MX_E_AutomationObjectSpecificError) deliberately stays category-level — the
object supplies its own semantics. Codes <= 0xFF are value-ambiguous with the
OPC DA quality-byte space and keep the quality path (still Bad-family).
Four new named constants, all validated by StatusCodeParityTests against the
pinned SDK. Live refusal smoke re-run green (read-only refusal now surfaces
BadNotWritable instead of generic Bad).
The mxaccessgw OnWriteComplete correlation is live (server b948e69, worker
53f69cd — all four unary write kinds), so every write reply's statuses[0] now
carries the real COM commit outcome. Live-gating the cutover on windev found
and fixed three defects:
- StatusCodeMap.FromMxStatus truncated the correlated failure row's MxStatus
detail code to a byte (1007 & 0xFF = 239 -> OPC DA Good band), mapping a
REFUSED write to Good. New invariant: a row that is not IsSuccess() never
maps Good — details > 0xFF (and contradictory Good-band substatuses) route
by category (SECURITY_ERROR -> BadUserAccessDenied, named const covered by
StatusCodeParityTests; COMMUNICATION/CONFIGURATION keep their codes).
- The borrow-from-subscription-registry write optimization could never commit:
a subscription handle is plain-advised, and MXAccess refuses both the
no-login write through it (SECURITY_ERROR detail 1008, live-captured) and
the supervisory advise upgrade (E_INVALIDARG) — one advise per HANDLE, not
per attribute. Removed: writer subscribedHandleSource ctor param + borrow
branch, GalaxyDriver wiring, SubscriptionRegistry.TryResolveItemHandle +
its forward index and test file. The writer always AddItems its own
supervisory-advised handle, which commits fine while the same attribute is
subscribed (live-proven; pinned by the new write-while-subscribed smoke).
- (gateway-side, fixed there) the correlation initially covered WriteSecured
only, while the dominant no-login path emits plain Write.
Live gate, all legs PASSED against windev: happy write Good off a confirmed
status row with galaxy.writes.unconfirmed + advise_failed both FLAT; read-only
refusal surfaces Bad-family (the #5 node-revert input Galaxy could never
produce before); WriteCompletionWaitMilliseconds=0 control -> provisional Good
+ metered unconfirmed (override removed after, restoration re-verified). New
env-gated smokes: Live_correlated_write_statuses_confirm_commit_and_surface_refusal,
Live_write_to_subscribed_tag_commits_via_own_handle (replaces the borrow
smoke), GatewayGalaxyWriteMeterLiveTests (run filtered — meters are
process-wide).
The connect path was the one capability call the resilience pipeline never
saw, so a driver that could not connect contributed zero breaker input and
the /hosts resilience panel read 'All targets healthy' against a dead
endpoint. InitializeAsync now routes through the invoker as
DriverCapability.Initialize, keyed on the driver-instance id.
- No pipeline retry: the actor's RetryConnect timer is the retry loop
(parser forces retryCount overrides to 0, same funnel as write-shaped).
- Breaker threshold 2, not the Read-sized 5: the breaker samples 30 s and
the reconnect timer fires every 10 s, so at most three attempts fit one
window — threshold 5 could never open. Pinned by its own test.
- An open breaker fast-fails into the same InitializeFailed path as a real
connect failure; the 15 s break window costs at most one extra tick.
The best-effort teardown ShutdownAsync stays unwrapped.
- Companion fix: DriverCapabilityInvokerFactory.Create now invalidates the
instance's tracker snapshots with its pipelines — a respawn during an
outage discarded the only breaker whose OnClosed could clear the OPEN
flag, stranding a false 'Breaker OPEN' chip forever.
Live gate PASSED on docker-dev (image symbol-verified per container):
rtu-gate against dead 10.100.0.35:5021 opened its Initialize breaker on
both centrals with the red 'BREAKER OPEN' chip on /hosts; a socat
5021→5020 forwarder recovered it (both breakers closed within 1 s, panel
back to 'All targets healthy'); healthy MAIN-modbus recorded zero breaker
events. Full suite 50/50 green. Evidence:
docs/plans/2026-08-07-adminui-followups-and-live-gates.md §7.
The Secrets:Replication _comment claimed the feature was KNOWN NON-FUNCTIONAL
against ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.AkkaDotNet 0.2.0 and said "do not enable
until the library is fixed". That has been false since 0.2.2 — 0.2.1 fixed the
shadowed ISecretReplicator registration and 0.2.2 the hosted-process DI
deadlock — and the 2026-08-07 three-mesh live gate proved replication works
(PASS 4/4, docs/plans/2026-08-07-secrets-pair-local-live-gate.md).
Replaced with the truthful operator-facing note: functional since 0.2.2, still
default-off, PAIR-LOCAL in scope (mesh Phase 6 gives each application cluster
its own 2-node mesh, so a secret converges within its pair and nowhere else),
same KEK required per pair, and rewrap-all runs per node because re-wraps do
not replicate.
Comment-only; no behaviour change.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
The two items deferment.md §0.1 named as the remaining untracked engineering.
adminui-followups (19 pending / 0 completed) — CLOSED by the overlap audit the plan
itself asks for first, with no code written. All 19 tasks are shipped, superseded by
v3, or moot. WS1's premise had also expired: it assumed driver-embedded tag lists in
DriverConfig are the runtime source of truth, which v3 ended (the artifact populates
RawTags). Its capability shipped in the v3 shape — TagConfigEditorMap + DeviceFormMap,
both verified reachable from RawTagModal/DeviceModal rather than merely present.
Live gates on docker-dev (image rebuilt: the rig was running a build 3 h older than the
last code commit; parity asserted per container plus a positive check that the symbols
under test are in the shipped DLLs):
- R2-03 T11 PASSED — build 0 errors, Runtime.Tests 555/555, RoslynVirtualTagEvaluator 20/20.
- R2-03 T12 PASSED — VT 42 -> 0x80020000 -> 42, staged WITHOUT a deployment (a Modbus
register flipped on the fixture) so the VT child survived; a deploy-driven trip creates
a fresh child with no last value, which is correct-by-design and masked the result twice.
P7 confirmed: two byte-identical redeploys, zero disturbance.
- driver-reconfigure Task 3 PASSED — a faulted driver adopted a corrected config and
connected with the node's startedAt unchanged and RestartCount=0.
- R2-10 T10 still OPEN, but the recorded cause was wrong. Not ConnectionBackoff
throttling (the breaker opens on 2 failures / 30 s): the dead-endpoint failure mode
never enters the resilience pipeline. IDriver.InitializeAsync is not invoker-wrapped
(DriverInstanceActor.cs:707) and ModbusDriver swallows per-tag failures in BOTH
directions, so even the plan's fallback trigger cannot work. Live-proven: a driver
timing out every read against a blackhole reported ConsecutiveFailures=0 while the
panel read "All targets healthy."
Finding from T12: the Bad publish's documented "carrying the last-known value" is
unobservable by any client — subscription and a raw Read service call both return NULL.
The actor is correct; every existing failure assertion checked StatusCode alone, so the
value half was asserted nowhere. Adds
VirtualTagActorTests.The_Bad_result_carries_the_last_known_value, which proves the actor
emits it. The documentation is what overstates.
Re-gates Akka peer-to-peer secret replication on the current three-mesh docker-dev
rig and supersedes the 2026-07-18 six-node gate (lmxopcua#482, c878fbbd) as evidence.
That gate proved convergence to all five peers on the old single fleet-wide mesh;
after mesh Phase 6 (2839deb5) partitioned the rig into three independent 2-node
meshes, six-node convergence would be a FAILURE, not a pass. Phase 6's own leg 6
recorded "PASS (by fallback criterion)" — it inferred pair-locality structurally and
never seeded a secret. This replaces that inference with direct evidence.
All four checks PASS, on master @ 21009874 with one image (OtOpcUa.Host.dll
a434b04f byte-identical on all six nodes), Secrets libs 0.2.3:
1. Pair convergence — seeded on site-a-1 alone, on site-a-2 in <=7s (budget 60s),
byte-identical ciphertext + kek_id + updated_utc, decrypt-verified on the partner.
2. No cross-pair propagation — absent from site-b and central across 8 samples /
240s / 48 announce intervals, and clean in the reverse direction too. Isolation
controls seeded on site-b-1 and central-1 converged within their OWN pairs, so
the absence is isolation rather than a dead replicator.
3. Delete propagates within the pair — issued on site-a-2 (the receiving node, so
this also covers the reverse intra-pair direction); tombstone on site-a-1 in <1s.
4. Clean pair restart (both together) — mesh re-formed in 7s, no resurrection of the
tombstone, live secret survived and decrypted correctly on both nodes.
Zero secret-related warnings or errors fleet-wide across the whole run. Satisfies the
scadaproj#3 precondition for the OtOpcUa production topology (Akka pair-local).
Secrets:Replication:Enabled remains default-false in the product; the rig KEK is dev-only.
Rig config: SqlitePath moved onto each node's existing per-node /app/data volume. The
appsettings default resolves to /app, inside the image's writable container layer, so
the store was destroyed by any `up -d --build` recreate and was unreachable from the
host — seeding or inspecting a node meant stopping the container to docker cp the file
out. Still one private store per node; replication is still what syncs them.
Residuals in the gate doc: the live-push path is not covered (anti-entropy is what a
driver-only node can be gated on), and appsettings.json still carries a stale
"KNOWN NON-FUNCTIONAL against 0.2.0 / do not enable" comment that this gate disproves
— left uncorrected here because this run is config-only.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
A CNC can report duplicate sibling names — the wonder Makino returns two
axes both called AA — which made the Axes/ subtree untrustworthy: the
browser offered two identical folders the commit gate had to refuse, and
the poll loop's name-keyed snapshot cache let the second axis silently
overwrite the first. Spindles and servo loads had the same collision in
their own keying, plus a resolve-to-first-match on the spindle read path.
Scheme: every member of a collision set gets a 1-based occurrence-ordinal
suffix in slot order (AA_1, AA_2); unique names stay bare. Chosen over the
alternatives deliberately:
- Names, not slot numbers, stay the primary identity — the segment map is
re-derived from the live device each session, so a name-keyed path
follows the physical axis across config changes, where a slot-qualified
path would silently rebind on any axis-list shift and rename every axis
on every machine for one pathological CNC.
- The WHOLE collision set is suffixed: bare AA ceases to exist when
ambiguous, so a tag authored against it reads BadNodeIdUnknown rather
than one arbitrary axis's data — the #534/#540 silent-wrongness class.
- Occurrence ordinal, not absolute slot: inserting/removing an unrelated
axis never renames an existing duplicate pair. If the collision-set
membership itself changes, segments change on the next browse and stale
authored segments read Bad, never another axis's data.
One pure helper (FixedTreeNames.Disambiguate, collision-proof against
genuine names by suffix escalation) feeds FocasFixedTreeCache.AxisSegments
/ SpindleSegments, and the emitter, axis snapshot keys, servo-load keys
(cnc_rdsvmeter answers in slot order, so the k-th AA load belongs to the
k-th AA axis) and the spindle read resolution all consume those — they can
no longer disagree. The nameless-spindle S{n} fallback applies before
disambiguation so a fallback name colliding with a real one is handled
like any other duplicate.
Tests are red-first on the pre-fix driver (all five driver-level tests
fail on master's code): browse emits AA_1/AA_2 and no bare AA, each
duplicate reads its own position and servo load, duplicate spindles
resolve per slot, bare AA reads Bad. The wire half runs live against
focas-mock (duplicate names survive the managed wire parse and publish as
suffixed segments); the mock's dynamic store is name-keyed so the
distinct-values half stays with the offline tests. FOCAS 327/327,
integration 11/11, FOCAS.Cli 52, AdminUI 1113, ControlPlane 231.
Closes#548.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
The summary list still described the pre-#520 world: NodeAcl/PermissionTrie
'built and unit-tested but never wired', reads/browse/subscribe/HistoryRead
carrying no authorization at all, and UserName tokens authenticated by LDAP
bind. The body had been updated by #520 stages 5-7 but the summary, the
Anonymous auth-table row, the LDAP bind-flow paragraph (still routing the OPC
UA UserName path through the deleted LdapOpcUaUserAuthenticator), the
'sourced from Security:Ldap:GroupToRole' role-source section, and the
'Dispatch gate (no such gate exists)' section all contradicted it — a reader
who stopped at any of them got the pre-#520 answer.
All now state the flag-gated reality: with Security:Acl:Enabled false (the
default) the only enforcement is the two coarse server-wide role gates and
reads are ungated; with it true, scoped NodeAcl grants decide every
data-plane operation via DataPlaneAuthorizer -> TriePermissionEvaluator.
Data-plane roles derive from cluster-scoped NodeAcl grants
(ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper); GroupToRole and LdapGroupRoleMapping feed AdminUI
login only. The acl-design.md pointer no longer calls the design 'unshipped
work'.
Closes#547.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
The two discovery-path libplctag tags (@tags symbol-list enumerator, @udt
template reader) still passed the bare Gateway host, so a browse against a
device authored on a non-default port silently browsed whatever answers on
44818 — #534's defect surviving in its discovery half. Both sites now consume
AbCipTagCreateParams.LibplctagGateway, with the Tag construction extracted
into internal static builders so the seam is unit-assertable (the #534 tests
pinned the property's composition but nothing pinned each site's consumption,
which is exactly how these two survived).
New guard: LibplctagGatewayConsumptionGuardTests scans both AB drivers'
sources and fails on any libplctag Tag built from the bare Gateway, so a
future call site cannot reintroduce the silent 44818 redirect.
Live-gated against the fixture host: browse of ab://10.100.0.35:44818
returns the nine-tag symbol table; browse of ab://10.100.0.35:44999 (nothing
listening — the issue's exact repro) now fails ErrorTimeout where it
previously returned the 44818 fixture's table.
Closes#539.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
Ran on master @ 0b194003, post-deletion image d2a290fc5711 (provenance-guarded).
PSK matrix 7/7 incl. unset-key boot refusal; command matrix with Restart/Reconnect
driven from the real /hosts panel (#546 closed the 1A composition carry-forward by
direct evidence); exactly-once ack matrix sealed 6/6; central-kill + site-kill drills
honest (one loud WRN, +2:00 deadlines, boot-replay, no retro-ack); mid-deploy
coordinator kill: recovered coordinator fired the deadline at exactly +2:00, all
landed acks preserved, zero dupes; boundary: 3 established :4053 associations, all
pair-internal, zero site↔central; full-rig restart transport grep = 0 on all six
(one non-mesh observation: central pair reproduced the documented guard-off
cold-start split-brain, healed by single-node rejoin); MeshGrpcBoundaryTests 3/3;
terminal full suite RC=0 direct capture, 50/50 suites, 9,333/0.
I-4 cold-PSK-cache re-carried out of the program (unmeasurable on docker-dev).
No new defects.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
ConfigServeAuthInterceptor and LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor gained HasExactlyOnePublicConstructor
pin tests in this branch but lacked the sibling-standard <remarks> paragraph naming them
(TelemetryStream/MeshCommand/CentralCommand all carry it). Cosmetic consistency item from the
#543 code review.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
The proxyOptions local in WithOtOpcUaControlPlaneSingletons was already unused on master
(pre-existing dead code, not orphaned by the deletion commit — every registration passes
singletonOptions); removed while the file is open. The phase-6-1 compliance script still
Assert-Deferred'd the FleetStatusHub /hosts follow-up — an item that is now deleted, not
deferred — replaced with a retirement comment.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
DriverStatusPanel decides whether to subscribe exactly once, in
OnInitializedAsync (`if (!Enabled) return;`), and exposes no OnParametersSet
hook. The detail row was keyed only by DriverInstanceId, so a live config edit
that flipped a row's Enabled true->false — surfaced on the page by the 5 s
LoadConfigAsync refresh — reused the same panel instance: the markup correctly
switched to "Disabled - not deployed" while the panel's two store SnapshotChanged
subscriptions and its 5 s staleness timer stayed wired underneath, until the
operator happened to collapse the row.
Including the flag in the detail row's key recycles the component instead. Both
directions verified against the panel's own lifecycle: true->false disposes the
old instance (unsubscribing both stores, draining both timers) and mounts one
that skips subscription setup entirely; false->true disposes an instance that
never subscribed (the unsubscribes are no-ops, both timers null) and mounts one
that subscribes and primes from the stores.
The data row's key is unchanged. No behaviour change when Enabled is stable.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
#542 filed FleetStatusBroadcaster as blind to site nodes since the Phase 6 per-cluster mesh
split: it derives "the fleet" from central's own Akka gossip ring, which after the split is
just central's own pair. Scoping the cross-mesh rewrite found the deeper truth — the whole
chain is dead end to end, so this deletes it rather than reviving it.
- Zero consumers. FleetStatusBroadcaster published FleetStatusChanged on the DPS
"fleet-status" topic; FleetStatusSignalRBridge forwarded it to FleetStatusHub
("/hubs/fleet-status"); nothing anywhere connected. The AdminUI bans self-connecting
HubConnections, no browser JS subscribes, and /fleet (Fleet.razor) reads
NodeDeploymentState from the ConfigDb plus IClusterRoleInfo on a 5 s poll instead.
- Its second input never existed. DriverHostStatusHeartbeat had no production sender —
only the broadcaster's own test told it — so CurrentRevision was always null and the
30 s staleness -> Degraded flip could never fire.
- Post-Phase-6 DPS is pair-local, so even the central-only view it did produce was an
accident of topology rather than a design.
The fleet visibility that actually works is unchanged and already cross-mesh-correct:
/fleet over NodeDeploymentState, and the four Phase 5 per-node telemetry dials.
Precedent for deleting inert machinery rather than activating it: #522 (driver stability
tiers), #507 (discovered-node injection), #525 (GetMemoryFootprint).
Deleted: FleetStatusBroadcaster (+ its nested DriverHostStatusHeartbeat), its admin
singleton registration and FleetStatusBroadcasterKey, FleetStatusSignalRBridge and its
key, FleetStatusHub and its route mapping, and the FleetStatusChanged / FleetNodeStatus /
FleetNodeHealth messages. Both Fleet/ directories survive — ControlPlane keeps
ClusterNodeAddressReconciler, Commons keeps GetDiagnostics. Docs swept where they claimed
a fleet-status channel exists (Telemetry.md's Phase 5 non-migrated channels,
Configuration.md, CLAUDE.md); completed-program plan docs under docs/plans and docs/v2 are
left as the historical record they are.
Build 0 errors, 868 warnings — byte-identical to master's rebuild baseline.
ControlPlane.Tests 231/231, AdminUI.Tests 1109/1109.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
DriverStatusPanel was orphaned — zero references repo-wide — so the Restart and
Reconnect driver commands had NO reachable UI at all, despite working end to end
over the new gRPC mesh transport. Nothing failed to build, test or deploy while
that was true, which is why it went unnoticed.
The panel is now reachable per driver row on /hosts, behind a per-row "Controls"
expander that is collapsed by default: the table stays scannable, and only the
opened panels hold snapshot-store subscriptions. Expansion state is a HashSet
keyed by DriverInstanceId held on the page, so it survives the 5 s refresh that
replaces every row record. Both rows are @key'd by instance id so the panel —
which binds its DriverInstanceId once in OnInitializedAsync — can never be diffed
onto a different driver.
The panel's Enabled parameter is fed from real config rather than defaulted:
HostsDriverInstanceInfo/HostsDriverRow now carry DriverInstance.Enabled, which
LoadConfigAsync already had in hand. A snapshot with no matching configured
instance is treated as enabled — the row exists only because live health arrived,
so "Disabled — not deployed" would contradict the same row.
The expander is visible to every AuthenticatedRead viewer; the panel self-gates
only its Reconnect/Restart buttons on DriverOperator.
A source-scan pin (HostsPanelWiringTests) asserts /hosts still renders the panel
and still binds it to the row's own driver, cluster and enabled state — removing
the tag would silently restore the orphaned state.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
OtOpcUa runs five internal gRPC planes between its own processes, all of
them cleartext HTTP/2 (h2c) with a shared-bearer interceptor: the live
telemetry stream, config-serve artifact fetch, LocalDb pair sync, mesh
commands and mesh deploy acks. The bearer therefore crosses the wire in
the clear on every one of them. That was true and undocumented; the two
mesh planes are command surfaces, so it is worth saying out loud rather
than leaving to be rediscovered per plane.
docs/security.md gains "Internal gRPC planes (h2c) — accepted cleartext
posture" under Transport Security (whose existing content is entirely
about the OPC UA endpoint). It carries a five-row table — service name,
listener config key, credential config key, interceptor — the honest
read-vs-write breakdown per plane, and the decision itself.
Decision (issue #545, option 1): risk ACCEPTED 2026-08-06, once, for all
five planes together, on the trusted-link assumption every plane already
makes (VPN / dedicated WAN). Per-cluster PSKs already bound blast radius
on the two command planes — a captured SITE-A key cannot drive SITE-B —
and production keys arrive as ${secret:...} references that must never be
reused across clusters. Recorded future work: a UseTls/scheme option,
which if built must cover all five planes together, since a mixed posture
is harder to reason about than either uniform answer.
docs/Configuration.md's MeshTransport section gains one cross-reference
paragraph pointing at the new subsection.
Docs only — no code, no behaviour change. Every service name, config key,
interceptor name and shared-listener claim was verified against the
source; ports 4056/4055 are phrased as the docker-dev rig's values of
Telemetry:GrpcListenPort / ConfigServe:GrpcListenPort, not as hardcoded
ports.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
DeadlineElapsed_for_current_deployment_marks_TimedOut carried two races,
both test-side. ConfigPublishCoordinator itself is untouched.
(a) The NodeDeploymentState row was inserted AFTER Sys.ActorOf. The
coordinator's PreStart reads NodeDeploymentStates to recover the
expected-ack set, and it runs as soon as the actor is scheduled — so if
PreStart won, the expected-ack set was empty and the coordinator could
short-circuit to Sealed instead of ever reaching TimedOut. The row is now
seeded before the spawn.
(b) The applyDeadline was 150 ms of real wall clock, and it arms a real
Akka timer. Under load that timer could fire on its own and race the
test's explicit DeadlineElapsed tell — so the test was intermittently
exercising the timer rather than the message handler it names. The
deadline is now TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5), matching the other two tests in
this class, which makes it un-hittable inside the test's own 3 s
AwaitAssert bound and leaves the explicit tell as the only deadline
signal the coordinator ever sees. That tell, and the AwaitAssert bound,
are unchanged.
Verified: the single test 5/5 green in a row, then the whole class 3/3.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
TelemetryStreamAuthInterceptor, ConfigServeAuthInterceptor and
LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor all decided "is a key configured?" with
string.IsNullOrEmpty. A whitespace-only configured value therefore passed
that guard and fell through to the constant-time comparison — where it is
satisfied by a whitespace-only bearer token. The gate would be open to
anyone who guessed a blank credential.
This backports the check the two NEW mesh interceptors already use:
MeshCommandAuthInterceptor (and its central-side clone) validate with
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace, so the four/five planes now answer the same way
to the same misconfiguration. Nothing else changes — the denial status
codes (PermissionDenied / Unauthenticated / PermissionDenied respectively)
and every denial message are untouched, and no key material is logged.
No deployment configures a whitespace key: the docker-dev rig and
production both set real keys, so this is a fail-closed hardening of an
unreachable-today misconfiguration rather than a live exposure.
Tests: each of the three test files gains a ..._WithBlankKeyConfigured_IsDenied
fact mirroring MeshCommandAuthInterceptorTests.ExecuteMethod_WithBlankPskConfigured_IsDenied
(configured key " ", presented "Bearer "), verified red before the fix.
ConfigServeAuthInterceptor and LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor also gain the
HasExactlyOnePublicConstructor pin their two siblings already had —
Grpc.AspNetCore silently stops invoking an interceptor with more than one
public constructor, which would disable auth without failing anything.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
MeshTransport:Mode is now Dps | Grpc only; the retired ClusterClient value
fails validation loudly. CentralContactPoints, both receptionist
registrations, the akka.cluster.client HOCON block and the central/node
client machinery are deleted; SplitTopologyTransportValidator requires Grpc
on cluster-role nodes. MeshGrpcBoundaryTests replaces the old boundary test
and pins that no cross-mesh Akka association forms. Docs swept (incl. the
scadaproj index, pushed separately on its main).
Task 3.1 spec+code reviews closed (1 Important fixed: MeshPaths collapse);
Task 3.2 docs-accuracy review closed. DoD full suite: exit 0, 50/50 suites,
9326 passed / 0 failed on 8e25ed55.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
Joseph Doherty