ACL design defines NodePermissions bitmask flags covering Browse / Read / Subscribe / HistoryRead / WriteOperate / WriteTune / WriteConfigure / AlarmRead / AlarmAcknowledge / AlarmConfirm / AlarmShelve / MethodCall plus common bundles (ReadOnly / Operator / Engineer / Admin); 6-level scope hierarchy (Cluster / Namespace / UnsArea / UnsLine / Equipment / Tag) with default-deny + additive grants and Browse-implication on ancestors; per-LDAP-group grants in a new generation-versioned NodeAcl table edited via the same draft → diff → publish → rollback boundary as every other content table; per-session permission-trie evaluator with O(depth × group-count) cost cached for the lifetime of the session and rebuilt on generation-apply or LDAP group cache expiry; cluster-create workflow seeds a default ACL set matching the v1 LmxOpcUa LDAP-role-to-permission map for v1 → v2 consumer migration parity; Admin UI ACL tab with two views (by LDAP group, by scope), bulk-grant flow, and permission simulator that lets operators preview "as user X" effective permissions across the cluster's UNS tree before publishing; explicit Deny deferred to v2.1 since verbose grants suffice at v2.0 fleet sizes; only denied OPC UA operations are audit-logged (not allowed ones — would dwarf the audit log). Schema doc gains the NodeAcl table with cross-cluster invariant enforcement and same-generation FK validation; admin-ui.md gains the ACLs tab; phase-1 doc gains Task E.9 wiring this through Stream E plus a NodeAcl entry in Task B.1's DbContext list.
Dev-environment doc inventories every external resource the v2 build needs across two tiers per decision #99 — inner-loop (in-process simulators on developer machines: SQL Server local or container, GLAuth at C:\publish\glauth\, local dev Galaxy) and integration (one dedicated Windows host with Docker Desktop on WSL2 backend so TwinCAT XAR VM can run in Hyper-V alongside containerized oitc/modbus-server, plus WSL2-hosted Snap7 and ab_server, plus OPC Foundation reference server, plus FOCAS TestStub and FaultShim) — with concrete container images, ports, default dev credentials (clearly marked dev-only since production uses Integrated Security / gMSA per decision #46), bootstrap order for both tiers, network topology diagram, test data seed locations, and operational risks (TwinCAT trial expiry automation, Docker pricing, integration host SPOF mitigation, per-developer GLAuth config sync, Aveva license scoping that keeps Galaxy tests on developer machines and off the shared host).
Removes consumer cutover (ScadaBridge / Ignition / System Platform IO) from OtOpcUa v2 scope per decision #136 — owned by a separate integration / operations team, tracked in 3-year-plan handoff §"Rollout Posture" and corrections §C5; OtOpcUa team's scope ends at Phase 5. Updates implementation/overview.md phase index to drop the "6+" row and add an explicit "OUT of v2 scope" callout; updates phase-1 and phase-2 docs to reframe cutover as integration-team-owned rather than future-phase numbered.
Decisions #129–137 added: ACL model (#129), NodeAcl generation-versioned (#130), v1-compatibility seed (#131), denied-only audit logging (#132), two-tier dev environment (#133), Docker WSL2 backend for TwinCAT VM coexistence (#134), TwinCAT VM centrally managed / Galaxy on dev machines only (#135), cutover out of v2 scope (#136), dev credentials documented openly (#137).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
