Group related action buttons into btn-group/btn-group-sm on Alerts, Certificates,
ApiKeys and ScriptEdit; promote the RoleGrants Delete from btn-link to
btn-outline-danger. Replace the two inline style="border-color:var(--alert)"
no-ops with the .notice-alert class, and the undefined --surface-2 token in
Scripts with the theme's shipped --zebra-bg.
Delete unconditional documentation prose now covered by docs/ (Redundancy,
Telemetry, AlarmTracking, security, Reservations, AlarmHistorian, ScriptEditor),
keeping state banners and live captions. Correct the LDAP config key on
RoleGrants to Security:Ldap:GroupToRole (LdapOptions.SectionName) and drop the
same wrong key from Account with its deleted block; reword the stale
"Engine emit (F8/F9) is pending" script-log empty state.
DriverStatusPanel decides whether to subscribe exactly once, in
OnInitializedAsync (`if (!Enabled) return;`), and exposes no OnParametersSet
hook. The detail row was keyed only by DriverInstanceId, so a live config edit
that flipped a row's Enabled true->false — surfaced on the page by the 5 s
LoadConfigAsync refresh — reused the same panel instance: the markup correctly
switched to "Disabled - not deployed" while the panel's two store SnapshotChanged
subscriptions and its 5 s staleness timer stayed wired underneath, until the
operator happened to collapse the row.
Including the flag in the detail row's key recycles the component instead. Both
directions verified against the panel's own lifecycle: true->false disposes the
old instance (unsubscribing both stores, draining both timers) and mounts one
that skips subscription setup entirely; false->true disposes an instance that
never subscribed (the unsubscribes are no-ops, both timers null) and mounts one
that subscribes and primes from the stores.
The data row's key is unchanged. No behaviour change when Enabled is stable.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
DriverStatusPanel was orphaned — zero references repo-wide — so the Restart and
Reconnect driver commands had NO reachable UI at all, despite working end to end
over the new gRPC mesh transport. Nothing failed to build, test or deploy while
that was true, which is why it went unnoticed.
The panel is now reachable per driver row on /hosts, behind a per-row "Controls"
expander that is collapsed by default: the table stays scannable, and only the
opened panels hold snapshot-store subscriptions. Expansion state is a HashSet
keyed by DriverInstanceId held on the page, so it survives the 5 s refresh that
replaces every row record. Both rows are @key'd by instance id so the panel —
which binds its DriverInstanceId once in OnInitializedAsync — can never be diffed
onto a different driver.
The panel's Enabled parameter is fed from real config rather than defaulted:
HostsDriverInstanceInfo/HostsDriverRow now carry DriverInstance.Enabled, which
LoadConfigAsync already had in hand. A snapshot with no matching configured
instance is treated as enabled — the row exists only because live health arrived,
so "Disabled — not deployed" would contradict the same row.
The expander is visible to every AuthenticatedRead viewer; the panel self-gates
only its Reconnect/Restart buttons on DriverOperator.
A source-scan pin (HostsPanelWiringTests) asserts /hosts still renders the panel
and still binds it to the row's own driver, cluster and enabled state — removing
the tag would silently restore the orphaned state.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
Found on the docker-dev live gate, not in tests. Two drivers that faulted
during initialise (rtu-gate, opcua1) each rendered "0 tags" on /hosts against
two authored tags apiece, because a ledger that had never committed returned
SkippedTagReport.Empty.
A zero report is a positive claim -- "this driver skipped nothing" -- and
making it on behalf of a driver that never got as far as looking is exactly
the quiet inaccuracy #541 exists to remove. GetSkippedTags() and
SkippedTagLedger.Snapshot() now return null until the first committed build,
so the column renders the same em-dash it already used for a driver that
cannot report at all. Both are 'no answer'; neither is 'nothing skipped'.
Knock-on: a FOCAS driver whose only init threw now reports null rather than a
zero report, which is strictly more honest than the assertion the test
originally made.
A driver builds its RawPath -> definition table at init and tolerates a
per-tag miss: an unmappable TagConfig, an unparseable address, a
capability-matrix rejection. That tolerance is right -- one bad tag must not
take down the other few thousand. What was missing is any statement of the
fact afterwards. A skip is not an error and happens before any read, so the
driver stays Healthy, errors/5 min stays 0, Last error stays empty, and Last
read advances live off the tags that did map. On the wonder Makino in #540
that reading held while focas-z-34184 ignored 20 of its 22 tags.
New optional capability ISkippedTagReporter, backed by a shared
SkippedTagLedger so the reset/commit/cap rules are one implementation rather
than one per driver. The report -- authored count, exact skipped count, and a
capped sample of RawPath + reason -- rides DriverHealthChanged to a new Tags
column on /hosts, over the Phase 5 telemetry stream. No table: a driver-only
node has no ConfigDb to write to, the lesson from #521.
The issue named eight drivers. It is twelve -- every driver in
DriverTypeNames.All has an authored-tag skip path. Calculation (no scriptId),
MTConnect (no readable DataItem id), Galaxy (no attributeRef) and OpcUaClient
(no nodeId) were unlisted, and OpcUaClient's was the quietest of the twelve:
NamespaceMap drops such an entry with a bare `continue` and not even a log
line. SkippedTagReporterFleetTests pins the invariant reflectively over every
IDriver in src/Drivers/, so a thirteenth cannot re-introduce the silence.
Sql drops a tag at TWO points and its report is the union of both: a blob
that does not map, AND an identifier the 8.1 catalog gate rejects against the
live catalog. The second is what schema drift produces -- a renamed column, a
dropped view -- months after a deployment sealed green, and reporting only
the first would have that driver claim "0 skipped" while polling half its
tags, which is worse than reporting nothing because the column would then be
actively reassuring.
Deliberately additive to driver state, never a change of it. Latching
non-Healthy for a config problem would satisfy both halves of the #527
comms-loss conjunction -- 90 s without a successful read AND non-Healthy --
and a driver whose tags were ALL skipped has no successful reads by
construction, so it would reconnect-loop forever against a healthy device.
Three details that are load-bearing rather than incidental:
- The skip digest is part of the publish fingerprint. A skipped tag leaves
every other fingerprint component identical to a clean driver's, so without
it PublishHealthSnapshot's dedup swallows exactly the publish carrying the
signal -- the trap that already bit the rediscovery and host-status
channels. The digest covers the sample, not just the counts: a redeploy
that fixes one tag and breaks another leaves both counts unchanged.
- The count is exact; only the sample is capped, and the tooltip says so when
it is showing fewer than it counted. A truncated list that looked complete
would have an operator fix twenty tags and believe the job done.
- The ledger stages and commits, so an init that throws part-way leaves the
previous report standing. A partial snapshot would read as "we now skip
fewer tags", the opposite of the truth.
The proto field needs no companion presence flag, unlike host_statuses: a
singular message field carries real presence in proto3, and a has_ flag would
collide with protoc's generated HasSkippedTags.
Verified red-first three ways: dropping SkippedTagDigest from the fingerprint
fails the two dedup tests, removing the seam from one driver fails the fleet
guard, and dropping the catalog-gate leg fails the Sql union test. Full
solution builds with zero new warnings against 4e22f024.
An area or line could be named "Packaging" or "Line 1", save cleanly, and then
fail the NEXT deployment with UnsSegmentInvalid. Because a deployment snapshots
the whole database, one badly-named area blocked EVERY cluster's deploy - and
whoever hit that was usually not whoever typed the name. Only the equipment form
carried the rule; the deploy gate held its own private copy.
The rule now lives once, on Configuration.Validation.UnsSegment, and both ends
call it. DraftValidator no longer restates it.
Enforced in UnsTreeService, not just on the forms:
- Create/Update Area, Line and Equipment reject an invalid name before touching
the row.
- The CSV import reports a bad name as an ERROR, not a skip - a skip means "you
already have this row", which would tell the operator the equipment exists
when it does not. Good rows in the same batch still insert.
A form attribute could never have covered the import, and with no bUnit in this
repo a rule only a form enforces is also a rule no test can reach. The forms
keep an attribute for the immediate message, but it now references the shared
pattern rather than restating it - a second copy is how these drifted apart.
One behaviour change beyond the fix: UnsSegment.AttributePattern admits
"_default", which the equipment form's hand-written literal rejected. The form
was stricter than the gate it was mirroring, so a _default row was uneditable
through the AdminUI.
Tests: 41, falsified with three production mutations - dropping the CreateArea
guard reds exactly the CreateArea rejections, turning the import error back into
a skip reds only the import test, and narrowing AttributePattern reds only the
attribute/IsValid agreement. Every rejection is paired with a name that must
still be accepted, or a guard that refused everything would pass.
Live-verified on docker-dev: the area modal now refuses "Packaging" in place
with the rule spelled out, "packaging-b" saves, and a CSV import of two rows
reports Inserted 1 / Skipped 0 / Errors 1 naming the offending row - the path no
form attribute reaches. Rig cleaned up and a further deployment sealed.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
The last stage of #520. Enforcement landed in stages 5-6; this closes the
authoring end, where a grant could be saved, deployed and sealed green while
resolving to nothing.
Scope kind and scope target are now chosen TOGETHER from a picker over the
cluster's raw and UNS trees (AclScopePickerModal -> AclScopeTree, backed by
IAclScopeService). They were previously an unrelated dropdown and a free-text
box, so "RawDevice + a TagId" was a well-formed row. Because the trees are
rooted at the grant's own cluster and each node supplies its own kind,
NodeAclScopeCrossCluster, NodeAclScopeIdUnexpected, NodeAclScopeIdMissing and
NodeAclScopeKindRetired all become unauthorable by construction.
CheckScopeAsync mirrors DraftValidator.ValidateNodeAclScopes rule for rule and
blocks the save when a scope resolves to nothing - re-checked on submit, not
trusted from form load, because a row whose entity was deleted since is exactly
where the operator never touches the picker. The list page marks such rows
unresolved with the reason. The principal field suggests known principals and
reports how many live keys reach the one typed; reaching nobody warns rather
than blocks, since authoring ahead of minting is legitimate.
Deliberate departures from the plan line, all recorded in the design doc:
- The banners are reshaped, not removed. "Not enforced" stopped being true at
stage 6, but enforcement is still a per-node flag the AdminUI cannot see, so
a narrow grant really does confer nothing on a default-configured node.
- A Cluster row produces a NULL ScopeId. The deploy gate rejects one that
carries an id, so filling in the cluster id would author undeployable rows.
- AclScopeTree is a new component rather than a third mode on RawTree, which
already carries the /raw editing tree and the equipment reference picker.
- UNS tags are not offered: a UNS signal is a UnsTagReference, and a Tag grant
already covers the raw node and every UNS projection of it.
Also fixed: the ACL editor had a DataAnnotationsValidator and no
ValidationSummary, so an invalid NodeAclId made Create a silent no-op.
Tests: 30 in AdminUI.Tests/Acls, falsified with six production mutations -
each turned exactly the intended tests red and no others.
Live gate PASSED on docker-dev, 11 legs; both central containers asserted on
the same image by container id. The pair that matters is legs 8 and 11: the
page and the deploy gate reject the same row with the same reason. Legs 5 and
9 are the positive controls - without them the gate passes against a page that
refuses everything. Not covered: UNS-realm scope selection (SITE-A has no UNS
areas). Rig restored to zero ACL rows.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Completes data-plane enforcement behind Security:Acl:Enabled. Read (every
attribute, not just Value), Browse, TranslateBrowsePath, CreateMonitoredItems,
SubscribeToEvents and SetMonitoringMode now consult scoped NodeAcl grants.
With the flag off nothing changes.
Four things went beyond the stage as written, each because leaving it out
would have made the feature look like it worked:
- Browse needed ancestor visibility. The trie inherits downward, and a client
reaches a deep node by browsing the nodes above it, so without this every
grant narrower than the cluster was authored, shipped and unreachable. It is
a separate non-inheriting marker, NOT a synthesized Browse grant on each
ancestor: the additive downward walk would carry such a grant from Plant onto
Plant/Siemens/dev9 and every other sibling subtree. Pinned by a test that
goes through the evaluator — probing the trie helper directly passes against
the broken design, because a sibling is absent from the trie either way.
- Revocation had to reach LIVE subscriptions. Every other operation re-asks per
request; a subscription is authorized once and then streams, and streaming is
how machine consumers actually read this server — so stopping only the
re-asking operations would have made revocation close to cosmetic.
IDataPlaneAuthoritySource gained a Changed event.
A denied item is queued BadUserAccessDenied and then DETACHED from its
MonitoredNode2 fan-out, not set MonitoringMode.Disabled. Disabling discards
the item's queued notifications, so the client is silenced without ever being
told why. The over-the-wire test caught this; the unit-level path reports the
item as stood down either way. Detaching is also reversible, so a restored
grant resumes the feed with no client action.
- The decision cache holds the grant WALK, not the decision. Grants and the
trie are fixed for a generation; a key's ExpiresUtc passes with the clock, so
caching the whole decision would let an expired key keep working until the
next deploy — the stage-5 open-session hole in a subtler form.
- TranslateBrowsePath is gated, without which browse filtering is decorative: a
client refused a browse asks TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds for the same path.
Found en route: UserAuthorizationState's staleness ceiling couples two clocks.
MembershipResolvedUtc is stamped from DataPlaneAuthorizer's TimeProvider while
IsStale is evaluated against TriePermissionEvaluator's; they are the same
instance in production and diverge the moment anything injects a test clock, at
which point the evaluator denies EVERYTHING with a verdict indistinguishable
from "no grant matched". Stage 5's claim that these predicates cannot fire was
accidentally true; they are now disabled explicitly.
Also fixed: ContinuationPoint.NodeToBrowse is the manager HANDLE, not a
NodeState. The declared type is object, so the wrong cast compiled cleanly and
silently yielded null — skipping the browse source gate entirely.
Falsified: disabling the transit marking reddens exactly the three tests that
assert transit works; implementing transit as an ancestor grant reddens the
sibling-leak test; skipping the fan-out detach reddens the revocation test.
Full solution suite green.
The stage 8 live gate has NOT run yet.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
`Security:Acl:Enabled` (default false) makes scoped `NodeAcl` grants decide
data-plane authorization at the three seams that have one, and gives HistoryRead
a check it never had. Read, Browse and Subscribe stay ungated — stage 6.
The ACL decision REPLACES the server-wide role check rather than chaining with
it. Chained, a grant would have to confer the role as well as pass the scope
check, and only Cluster-scoped grants confer a role — so every narrow grant
would have stayed inert and the flag would have looked inert too. The
load-bearing test is an ALLOW: a session carrying no roles at all writing
successfully on the strength of its grant. A deny-only test passes against a
build where the ACL is never consulted, because the role gate denies too.
Found en route: the principal never reached the session. The authenticator
passed it as OpcUaUserAuthResult.DisplayName, but RoleCarryingUserIdentity
derives DisplayName from the presented token — for a key-bearing client that is
the static username `apikey`, identical fleet-wide. So the trie's matching key
was dropped at the identity boundary, and the audit ClientUserId on a rejected
write recorded `apikey` for every consuming system. Principal and ApiKeyId are
now carried explicitly.
Beyond the stage as sketched:
- Revocation reaches an OPEN session. Every decision re-checks the
authenticating key against the current snapshot; without it a key revoked by a
deployment kept its authority until the client chose to reconnect, which for a
machine-to-machine consumer can be indefinitely.
- UserAuthorizationState is built per CALL, not per session. The per-session
shape exists so an LDAP session can re-resolve membership that changed out of
band; nothing can change out of band under API keys, so the generation stamp is
the whole invalidation signal and a per-call record picks it up for free.
IsStale/NeedsRefresh therefore cannot fire here and are documented as vestigial.
- The trie is built inside DataPlaneAuthorityState.Apply, under the same
generation as the snapshot, rather than by a second wiring at the publish
actor. An uninstalled trie denies everything — indistinguishable from working
enforcement. Deleting the install turns 13 of the 22 new tests red.
- The deploy log reports what the BUILD dropped instead of re-deriving it. The
old count agreed with the builder on one of its four drop reasons; a rule with
a blank ScopeId, a retired scope kind, or a path not starting at a realm
vanished with the log reading zero.
Both IApiKeyStore implementations widened to the full grant set. The narrowing
was redundant — ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper applies the same filter itself — and
became a trap once scope was enforced. Pinned by asserting the roles are
unchanged, with the two grants carrying different flags so it cannot pass by
accident.
Falsified by mutation: enforcement never engaging, the write seam ignoring the
ACL, the realm dropped from the scope, the revocation check removed, and the
trie never installed each turn the intended tests red and no others.
Full solution suite green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Makes the /raw device tree addressable by an ACL rule, and builds the
scope-path producer PermissionTrieBuilder has accepted since it was written
but which had no caller anywhere.
The plan for this stage said "add NodeHierarchyKind.Raw, whose path is the
RawPath segments Folder/Driver/Device/TagGroup/Tag". That shape is wrong.
RawFolder.ParentRawFolderId and TagGroup.ParentTagGroupId are both
self-referencing, so folders and tag groups each nest without bound and a real
RawPath is folder…/Driver/Device/group…/Tag. NodeScope was fixed-arity and
PermissionTrie.CollectMatches was five hardcoded steps, so the scope model
could not address a real raw tree at all. NodeScope is now {ClusterId, Kind,
Segments} and the walk is a segment loop. The trie STRUCTURE was already
variable-depth (NodeAclPath.Segments is a list, Children is a recursive
dictionary), so only the walker and the scope record had to change.
Four decisions worth keeping:
- The namespace level became the realm. Level 1 gated on NodeScope.NamespaceId,
but v3 has no Namespace entity — the snapshot was retired when the address
space went dual-namespace, and the identifier appears nowhere in production
outside NodeScope. So the level could only ever fail to match, which silently
made every sub-cluster grant unreachable while cluster grants kept working.
It is now a realm token derived from the scope's Kind, not carried on it, so
the walk and the producer cannot disagree about its spelling.
- Provenance comes from the granting row's own ScopeKind, recorded on TrieGrant
at build time. Depth-derived provenance could not name a raw level at all,
since the depth of "Device" varies with folder nesting.
- The trie comparer moved from OrdinalIgnoreCase to Ordinal. Raw sibling-name
uniqueness is ordinal, so Speed and speed can both exist under one device and
a grant on either would have matched both.
- The null-scopePaths "deterministic test mode" is deleted. It planted
unresolvable rows at a direct child of the trie root, a position the walker
cannot reach, so the grant looked placed and could never match — and every
test using that mode proved nothing about production placement. scopePaths is
now required, and a row that does not resolve is dropped with a diagnostic.
A scope resolves to a LIST of paths: a raw tag projected into N equipments is
reachable at N+1 NodeIds and a write through any of them lands on the same
driver reference, so a Tag-scoped grant covering only the raw node would be
bypassable through a UNS one. The lookup is keyed on (ScopeKind, ScopeId), not
ScopeId alone — ScopeId has no FK and no type discriminator, so an id collision
across entity types would hand a grant the wrong node's paths.
Also closed here, all found by review rather than asked for:
- NodeAcl rows had no deploy-time validation of any kind and were not reachable
from DraftValidator at all (DraftSnapshot carried no NodeAcls). They are now
gated for dangling ids, cross-cluster scopes, blank/contradictory ScopeId, the
retired FolderSegment kind, and undefined ordinals.
- ConfigDbApiKeyStore conferred roles from Cluster-scoped grants authored in ANY
cluster, because it filtered on scope kind with no ClusterId predicate while
ArtifactApiKeyStore read an already-cluster-filtered snapshot. On a fused
admin+driver node that was a cross-cluster over-grant. Its doc comment claimed
the two stores matched.
- The two AdminUI ACL banners still said enforcement was LDAP-group -> role
mapping, which stages 1/2 made false in both directions.
- The /apikeys page was never classified in PageAuthorizationGuardTests, so that
test has been red since the key-minting commit merged — I did not run
AdminUI.Tests before merging stage 4.
Falsified rather than assumed: 8 mutations against the trie tests, 5 against the
deploy gate (including one proving a cross-cluster row is not silently
mis-diagnosed as unresolved), a staged red->green for the over-grant regression,
and the realm gate, the comparer and the malformed-path guard each broken
individually to confirm only their own tests go red.
Node ACLs are still not ENFORCED — nothing constructs a NodeScope or calls the
evaluator yet. That is stages 5 and 6; this stage makes the model able to
express what those will enforce.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
The /apikeys page claimed revocation "takes effect on a node only after the next
deployment". The live gate showed that is wrong for the node the operator is
most likely looking at: revoking through the UI denied the key on the VERY NEXT
request against the fused admin+driver node, because ConfigDbApiKeyStore reads
per request. The deployment delay applies only to driver-only nodes, whose keys
ride the artifact.
Reworded to say both, and to tell an operator to assume the slower behaviour when
revoking a compromised key — which is the decision the warning exists to inform.
Found by doing the thing rather than reasoning about it: the previous wording
looked obviously correct until the revoked key was actually re-presented.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Pulled forward from stage 7 because without it the feature is unusable and
un-live-gateable: there was no way to create a key short of hand-inserting a row
and computing an HMAC by hand.
The minting logic is an IApiKeyAdminService in Core.Authorization, NOT logic in
the Razor page — this repo has no bUnit, so anything only a page can reach is
untestable, and minting credentials is not where that belongs. The page is a thin
shell over it.
Moved to Core.Authorization so both ends can reach them: ApiKeyOptions (was in
Host) and OpcUaPrincipals (was in OpcUaServer.Security). The OPC UA server
resolves principals; the AdminUI must refuse to mint a key claiming a reserved
one. OpcUaServer already gained a Core reference in stage 1b, so no new edge —
AdminUI gains one.
ApiKeyOptions is now bound UNCONDITIONALLY rather than in the driver branch: a
driver node needs the pepper to VERIFY keys and an admin node needs it to MINT
them, and getting that wrong on either side is a silent authentication failure
rather than a startup error.
Validation rules, all covered: the reserved 'anonymous' principal is refused
case-insensitively (so "ANONYMOUS" cannot slip past into a distinct principal
that the evaluator would then match case-INsensitively against anonymous's
grants); blank name/principal; a principal longer than the column, rejected
rather than truncated, because silent truncation yields a key that authenticates
and is granted nothing with no visible cause; a past expiry. Generation runs
BEFORE the DbContext is opened so an unconfigured pepper surfaces as a clear
error instead of a stored row whose hash nothing can verify.
The page shows the plaintext ONCE and says so; it is held in component state and
written nowhere else, because the server keeps only a hash. Revocation is flagged
in the UI as taking effect only after the next deployment — driver-only nodes
have no ConfigDb, so keys ride the artifact.
FleetAdmin-only (Administrator), not ConfigEditor: this mints credentials.
Core.Tests 68 green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Stage 1a of the API-key ACL design. Behaviour-neutral: the trie walker already
matched an opaque string, so only what produces that string changes. No
enforcement is wired by this commit and none of the two live role gates move.
Renamed through the ACL model: NodeAcl.Principal, TrieGrant.Principal,
MatchedGrant.Principal, AuthorizationDecision.Principal,
UserAuthorizationState.Principals, and PermissionTrie.CollectMatches's parameter.
LdapGroupRoleMapping is a DIFFERENT entity that also has an LdapGroup column and
is deliberately untouched — it backs AdminUI login, which keeps LDAP.
The migration is the interesting part. EF scaffolds RenameColumn/RenameIndex, so
rows survive — but it cannot know that dbo.sp_ComputeGenerationDiff checksums
NodeAcl.LdapGroup. That proc is created in V3Initial.StoredProcedures and never
redefined since, and SQL Server does not validate a procedure body when a column
is renamed out from under it: the object keeps reporting healthy and fails at
CALL time with Invalid column name, silently breaking config-drift detection.
Verified against the live dev DB that the deployed proc really does reference the
column. The migration therefore re-emits the proc, as one parameterised template
shared by Up and Down so the two cannot drift.
Prose that describes what is enforced TODAY (fleet-wide LDAP group -> role) is
left alone, because it is still accurate until stage 2 lands.
UserAuthorizationState's refresh machinery is retained unchanged but now carries
a note that it is LDAP-shaped and largely vestigial here: an API-key principal
set cannot change out of band, since keys and ACL rows both ride the deployment
artifact, so the generation stamp rather than the freshness timer is the real
invalidation signal.
41 authorization tests pass; solution builds clean.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Live /run verification of #521 on the docker-dev rig (this repo has no bUnit, so a Razor
binding bug passes every unit test and review). Findings:
- The Hosts column renders all three states correctly against real drivers: "—" for the
probe-less Calculation drivers, "1 host" for healthy Modbus/Sql, and a "1 / 1 DOWN" warn chip
for the faulted OpcUaClient, whose tooltip reads
"opc.tcp://10.100.0.35:50000: Unknown since 2026-07-30 08:51:23Z".
- That tooltip vindicates counting HostState.Unknown as degraded: the faulted driver's probe
never completed a tick, so it reports Unknown — treating Unknown as healthy would have shown
the one genuinely broken driver in the fleet as "1 host", fine.
- **The cross-mesh gRPC telemetry path is verified, not assumed.** site-a is a separate Akka
mesh, so its telemetry crosses the Phase 5 gRPC stream the proto change targets, rather than
central's in-mesh DPS. It initially showed "—", which is also what a broken mapper would
produce; rebuilding site-a turned it into "1 host", proving the has_host_statuses presence
flag round-trips over the real wire and that the earlier "—" was version skew.
- Mixed-version behaviour is therefore graceful by construction: an old node's payload has the
flag clear, which decodes to null and renders "—" — not a crash, and not a false "0 hosts".
- The DropDriverHostStatusTable migration applied cleanly (the table is gone from the rig's
ConfigDb; DriverInstance / DriverInstanceResilienceStatus intact).
Only fix needed: "1 hosts" → "1 host".
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
`IHostConnectivityProbe` was a dead surface: eleven drivers implement it, `GetHostStatuses()`
had ZERO production call sites, and `OnHostStatusChanged` had no subscriber outside the Galaxy
driver's own aggregator. Per-host connectivity was computed by every driver and read by nobody.
The issue offered "build the publisher or delete it". The publisher as its entity doc described
it — driver nodes upserting `DriverHostStatus` rows — is not buildable: per-cluster mesh Phase 4
gates `AddOtOpcUaConfigDb` on the `admin` role, so a driver-only node has no ConfigDb connection
to write rows with. So the capability is kept and the transport changed.
`DriverHealthChanged.HostStatuses` now carries the probe result to `/hosts` as a Hosts column.
That channel already reached the page, already survives the mesh split via the Phase 5 gRPC
telemetry stream, and already replays a last-value snapshot on re-subscribe — so per-host state
re-primes after a reconnect without a durable store. Both halves of the interface finally do
what they are for: the event triggers a prompt publish, the pull is the source of truth.
The point of the column is the case the driver-level state chip structurally cannot express: a
multi-device driver stays aggregate-Healthy while ONE of its devices is unreachable.
Two traps, both pinned by tests that were falsified against the prod code:
- The host digest MUST be in the publish fingerprint. On a single-host-down transition every
other fingerprint component is unchanged, so the dedup would swallow exactly the publish
carrying the news — the trap that already bit the rediscovery signal. Removing it turns the
guard test red, verified.
- null (no probe) must stay distinct from empty (probe with no hosts). proto3 cannot tell an
absent repeated field from an empty one, hence the explicit `has_host_statuses` flag;
collapsing them would render every probe-less driver as one whose devices are all fine.
Dropped: the DriverHostStatus entity, enum, DbSet, model config and table (migration
DropDriverHostStatusTable — empty on every deployment, so the scaffolder's data-loss warning is
moot, and Down() recreates it exactly).
Found en route, NOT fixed here: `DriverInstanceResilienceStatus` is the identical defect — no
writer, no reader, only a DbSet declaration, while the live data rides the
`driver-resilience-status` telemetry channel. Its doc-comment now states that rather than
describing the sampler and AdminUI join that were never built. Filed as #524 rather than widening
this schema change beyond what was asked.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Nine drivers raise IRediscoverable.OnRediscoveryNeeded when they observe that
a remote's tag set may have changed — a Galaxy redeploy, a TwinCAT
symbol-version bump, an MTConnect agent restart, a Sparkplug rebirth. Nothing
in src/ subscribed, so every raise went into the void. Drivers even wrap the
invoke in try/catch for "subscriber threw"; there has never been a subscriber.
DriverInstanceActor now attaches the event in PreStart and detaches in
PostStop, mirroring AttachAlarmSource/DetachAlarmSource. Attach is per-actor,
not per-connect: the raise has no connection affinity and can land while the
driver is between connects. The detach is load-bearing rather than tidy — the
IDriver instance outlives the actor when the host respawns a child around the
same driver object, so a missing -= accumulates one handler per respawn, each
holding a dead Self.
The signal rides the existing driver-health snapshot to /hosts as a
"re-browse" chip. It is ADVISORY: the served address space is deliberately not
rebuilt, because v3 authors raw tags explicitly through the /raw
browse-commit flow and a runtime graft would materialise nodes no operator
approved and no deployment artifact records.
Two things worth knowing:
- PublishHealthSnapshot dedups on a health fingerprint, and a rediscovery
raise on an otherwise-healthy driver changes none of the four fields it
hashed. Without adding the timestamp to that tuple the dedup swallows the
exact publish carrying the signal. Reverting that one line turns 3 of the 5
new tests red, which is how it was confirmed rather than assumed.
- The new test stub implements IDriver from scratch instead of deriving from
the shared StubDriver, whose GetHealth() returns DateTime.UtcNow — its
fingerprint differs on every call, so the dedup never engages and the dedup
test would have passed vacuously either way.
The planned discovery-result drift detector was NOT built. Modbus, S7, MQTT,
AbLegacy and Sql all echo authored config from DiscoverAsync rather than
browsing the device, so a discovered-vs-authored diff is permanently empty for
them — it would have been another plausible-looking inert seam, which is the
class this audit exists to remove. IRediscoverable is the trustworthy signal
because the driver asserts it deliberately.
DriverHealthChanged, IDriverHealthPublisher.Publish and HostsDriverRow gain
defaulted optional parameters, so no existing call site changed. telemetry.proto
gains fields 8/9 and both Phase-5 mappers carry them.
Runtime.Tests 512 passed / 31 skipped.
deferment.md §8.1 asked for a decision: wire IPermissionEvaluator into the node
manager, or say plainly that ACLs are not enforced. Decision: the latter. The
evaluator stays in the tree; #520 tracks the wire-up.
Verifying the claim turned up four things worse than the audit recorded:
- docs/security.md, not ReadWriteOperations.md, was the highest-risk doc. It
claimed an anonymous session is "default-denie[d] any node a session has no
ACL grant for". The opposite holds: anonymous can Browse/Read/Subscribe/
HistoryRead the entire address space, and is refused writes and alarm acks
only because it carries no roles.
- Three of five documented data-plane role strings do nothing.
OpcUaDataPlaneRoles declares exactly WriteOperate and AlarmAck; ReadOnly,
WriteTune and WriteConfigure are compared against nowhere in src/. The doc
called all five "exact, case-insensitive, and code-true".
- ReadWriteOperations.md was fiction beyond the ACL claims. OnReadValue has
zero occurrences in src/ — the documented read path did not exist. Reads
never reach a driver: the node manager is push-model and the SDK serves a
Read from the cached pushed value. WriteAuthzPolicy, _sourceByFullRef,
_writeIdempotentByFullRef and IRoleBearer are likewise zero-hit, and
CapabilityInvoker is not referenced by the OpcUaServer project at all. This
file is rewritten rather than bannered.
- v2-release-readiness.md claimed a whole enforcement layer shipped —
FilterBrowseReferences, GateCallMethodRequests, MapCallOperation,
AuthorizationBootstrap, Node:Authorization:* keys. None exist. Whatever
landed on the v2 branch did not survive into the shipped tree.
The UI change is the operative one: ClusterAcls.razor and AclEdit.razor now
warn that a grant is saved and shipped in every deployment artifact but never
evaluated, so an operator cannot author a deny rule believing it works.
deferment.md gains a §9 execution log tracking §8 remediation.
Both defects are PRE-EXISTING (present on master, unrelated to #499) and were found
live-verifying the #499 guard, which lives on this page and was unreachable without
them fixed.
1. **HTTP 500 on load.** `FormModel.ServiceLevelBase` was `byte` to match the
entity, and `InputNumber<T>`'s static constructor throws outright for
`System.Byte` — "The type 'System.Byte' is not a supported numeric type". That
escapes `BuildRenderTree` unhandled, which in Blazor takes the WHOLE page down,
not one field. `/clusters/{id}/nodes/{nodeId}` and `.../nodes/new` have never
rendered. Now `int` with the same `[Range(0, 255)]` and a cast on the way to the
entity, so the stored type is unchanged. (Same failure mode as #504: an
unhandled throw inside the render tree is a page-kill.)
2. **Save did nothing, silently.** `NodeId` was validated against
`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$`, which forbids the colon — but every NodeId in this system is
`host:port` (`ClusterRoleInfo` and `ConfigPublishCoordinator` derive it as
`member.Address.Host:Port`, the seed writes `central-1:4053`, and
`NodeDeploymentState.NodeId` is FK-bound to it). So every existing node failed
validation, `OnValidSubmit` never ran, and the button was inert. Pattern now
allows `:` and `.` (hostnames may be dotted).
3. **Added the missing `<ValidationSummary/>`.** The form had a
`DataAnnotationsValidator` but nothing rendering its output, so a validation
failure produced no feedback at all — which is precisely how (2) stayed
invisible. This is the change that stops the next such defect being silent.
Live-verified on docker-dev (both central nodes rebuilt, since :9200 round-robins
the pair): page 500 → 200 on both routes, and a real edit now persists.
`ClusterNode.DriverConfigOverridesJson` is the third surface a Sql driver's config
is persisted on, and the only one nothing gated. It is a map keyed by
`DriverInstanceId` merged onto the cluster-level `DriverConfig`, so a literal
`connectionString` pasted there leaks exactly as one pasted into the driver — the
leak #498 closed for `DriverInstance.DriverConfig` and `Device.DeviceConfig`.
Gated at the SAVE, not at the deploy — a deliberate departure from both options the
issue offered:
- `DraftSnapshot` carries no `ClusterNode` rows, and adding them would widen the
snapshot and every builder of one for a single rule about a value that never
enters the artifact.
- More to the point, a deploy gate is the wrong instrument here. Node overrides are
not in the artifact, so blocking a deploy would not stop the credential being
stored — it is already in the database and replicated by then. Refusing the save
is the only point where "refuse to store it" is literally true, which is #498's
own framing: discarding a secret on read is not the same as refusing to store it.
The check moves into a shared `SqlCredentialGuard` so the two enforcement points
cannot drift; `DraftValidator` now calls it instead of its own private helper.
Kept deliberately narrow — the `Sql` driver's `connectionString` only, and only for
instance ids that ARE Sql drivers. The issue asked whether to generalise to
credential-shaped keys across every driver type; not doing that, for the same
reason #498 did not: a broader sweep would start refusing configs that are
legitimate today for drivers which never made an indirect-credential guarantee,
which is a regression rather than defence in depth. Widen per driver, as each gains
its own contract.
The error names the offending driver instance(s) and NEVER the value — it reaches
the AdminUI and the audit trail.
14 new cases cover both halves, including the case variants (System.Text.Json binds
`ConnectionString` to `connectionString`, so a case variant is the same key, not a
bypass), non-Sql ids being ignored, and every blank/malformed/non-object shape.
`Scripts.razor` rendered a hash prefix as `@s.SourceHash[..12]…`. `SourceHash`
is a plain nvarchar(64) with no length floor, so any value shorter than 12
characters threw ArgumentOutOfRangeException out of BuildRenderTree — unhandled
in Blazor, which takes the WHOLE page to an HTTP 500, not just the offending
row. Live-reproduced on docker-dev, where two Script rows carry `h1` and
`h-abs-hr200`: /scripts was a hard 500.
New `Components/Shared/DisplayText.Abbreviate(string?, int)`:
- null/blank renders the Admin UI's em-dash placeholder rather than throwing;
- a value already within budget renders verbatim with NO ellipsis, so the
display never implies text that isn't there (the old markup appended "…"
unconditionally, outside the slice — `h1` would have shown as `h1…`);
- a maxLength < 1 is clamped, so a display bug cannot become a page crash.
Applied to every unguarded range-operator slice over a DB-sourced string found
by sweeping the AdminUI for `[..N]`:
Scripts.razor SourceHash (the reported crash)
Certificates.razor Thumbprint (read off the on-disk store)
Deployments.razor x2 RevisionHash
Clusters/ClusterOverview.razor RevisionHash
The other `[..N]` hits are safe and untouched: Guid.ToString("N") slices
(always 32 chars) and the `Length > 60 ? [..60]` ternaries that self-guard.
NOTE — the issue text blamed the docker-dev seed; that was wrong and is
corrected on #504. `seed-clusters.sql` inserts only ServerCluster, ClusterNode
and LdapGroupRoleMapping. The short-hash rows came from earlier live-gate
authoring. A freshly seeded rig is fine; the trigger is any Script row that did
not go through ScriptEdit / UnsTreeService.HashSource — REST-API authored,
hand-inserted, or migrated in.
Tests: 14 new in DisplayTextTests, covering the short/null/blank/clamped cases
and a never-throws sweep over every value x budget combination. AdminUI suite
739/739.
Live-verified on docker-dev (AdminUI has no bUnit): /scripts 500 -> 200 across
both central nodes, rendering `hash=h1` and `hash=h-abs-hr200` in full;
/deployments still truncates 64-char hashes at 12 with the ellipsis;
/certificates and /clusters/MAIN unchanged.
Redundancy.md: KNOWN-LIMITATION (per-Akka-cluster election) marked RESOLVED;
new 'Per-cluster meshes (Phase 6)' section + pair-local secrets note; manual-
failover mesh-scope caveat removed; auto-down 1-vs-1 note updated (every mesh is
now two nodes, drill deferred to Phase 7). IManualFailoverService + ClusterRedundancy
razor caveats updated to pair-local reality. Configuration.md documents the
cluster-{ClusterId} role, per-pair self-first seeds, SplitTopologyTransportValidator,
and the intentional Dps default. Program + design status tables + CLAUDE.md marked
Phase 6 DONE.
(Task 8 subagent completed the edits but died on an API error before committing;
reviewed and committed by the controller.)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
Build: 0 errors solution-wide, and 0 warnings from every project this branch
touches. The ~816 solution-wide warnings are pre-existing xUnit1051 /
OTOPCUA0001 / CS86xx in untouched driver + client test projects.
Tests: full solution run compared against a full run on a detached worktree at
the pre-branch baseline 2e46d054. The two failure SETS are identical -- all 13
tests, same names, zero new failures. Net +26 tests: +3 Core.AlarmHistorian
(drain gate), +6 Runtime (role view), +17 Host.IntegrationTests (migrator +
convergence). Set comparison rather than counts, because the suite carries
standing environment- and load-dependent failures a count would hide.
The greps found real drift Task 6 missed -- eight live sites still naming the
deleted SqliteStoreAndForwardSink, including the AdminUI /alarms/historian
panel text, which is user-visible, and a <see cref> in HistorianAdapterActor
that resolved to nothing without warning. All repointed at
LocalDbStoreAndForwardSink; CLAUDE.md's alarm-history paragraph now also
records the LocalDb buffer and the primary-gated drain, and drops DatabasePath
from the knob list. docs/AlarmTracking.md still promised an
AlarmHistorianOptions.Validate() startup warning for a relative DatabasePath
and an empty SharedSecret; both branches are gone, so it now says so.
Code references to AlarmHistorian:DatabasePath reduce to exactly two intentional
ones: AlarmSfLegacyMigrator.LegacyPathKey and its test. No `new SqliteConnection`
remains anywhere in Core.AlarmHistorian.
Recon doc gains the durable verification record: guard-deletion evidence for
both vacuous passes, the two exact-set replicated-table pins (both assert set
equality, so an added or a dropped registration fails), and the baseline test
comparison with a per-failure account of why each of the 13 is not this
branch's.
Stops here per the plan. Task 8's live gate needs explicit go-ahead; nothing on
this branch is to be merged.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
The Secrets.Ui RCL's routable page was routed directly, but this host's
router is deliberately static (cookie SignInAsync needs SSR) with per-page
@rendermode opt-in - a directive the RCL page cannot carry, because the
other three family hosts render it under a globally interactive router
where a nested render mode throws. Routing straight to the RCL page
therefore rendered /admin/secrets with no circuit: it displayed, but every
@onclick was silently dead.
Fix: a host-side wrapper page (Pages/SecretsAdmin.razor) now owns
/admin/secrets, carries the standard per-page InteractiveServer render
mode, re-states the RCL page's own authorization policy (the router only
enforces [Authorize] on the routed component, which is now the wrapper),
and renders the RCL page as an ordinary child. The RCL assembly is
de-registered from both AdditionalAssemblies sites (router + endpoint) so
the route is unambiguous.
Guards: SecretsPageWiringTests pins the render mode (the #483 regression),
route parity with the RCL page, and policy parity; the page census in
PageAuthorizationGuardTests classifies the new page and admits the
secrets:manage policy. AdminUI.Tests 665/665.
Live-verified on the rebuilt docker-dev rig with Playwright: /_blazor
circuit negotiated on /admin/secrets and Add secret opens the editor
(before the fix: zero interactive markers, no circuit, dead click).
Closes#483.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts
Materialize each native alarm ONCE at the raw tag (ConditionId = RawPath, Raw
realm); wire the single condition as an SDK event notifier of each referencing
equipment's UNS folder so one ReportEvent fans to every root without
re-reporting per root (which would break Server-object dedup + Part 9 ack
correlation).
- New sink method WireAlarmNotifiers(alarmNodeId, alarmRealm,
notifierFolderNodeIds, notifierFolderRealm) on IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink,
forwarded through DeferredAddressSpaceSink + SdkAddressSpaceSink +
NullOpcUaAddressSpaceSink (the forwarding-trap guard); auto-covered by the
DeferredSinkForwardingReflectionTests realm + forwarding guards + a
hand-written forward test.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager: the normative AddNotifier(isInverse) pair + idempotent
EnsureFolderIsEventNotifier per equipment folder; tracked per condition in
_alarmNotifierWiring. Teardown symmetry: RemoveNotifier(bidirectional:true) on
RebuildAddressSpace, RemoveAlarmConditionNode, and RemoveEquipmentSubtree so no
inverse-notifier entry leaks across redeploys.
- AddressSpaceApplier.MaterialiseRawSubtree wires notifiers for each native alarm
tag, resolving its ReferencingEquipmentPaths (Area/Line/Equipment) to the
EquipmentId folder NodeIds via BuildEquipmentIdByFolderPath.
- AlarmTransitionEvent gains ReferencingEquipmentPaths (empty default); /alerts
renders the referencing-equipment list as display metadata.
- Un-skipped + rewrote the native-alarm dark tests
(DriverHostActorNativeAlarmTests x6, DriverHostActorNativeAlarmAckRoutingTests
x1) for the v3 raw-condition model; new NodeManagerMultiNotifierAlarmTests
proves multi-notifier wiring + teardown symmetry (no leaked duplicates after a
re-trip) + applier wiring test.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LVneM3eh1UtJxEisFXgmox
Replace the Batch-1-stubbed authored-tag flow with a UnsTagReference list on the
equipment page's Tags tab (v3 reference-only equipment): columns are effective name,
computed raw path, inherited datatype/access (read-only), display-name override
(editable), and remove. The retired equipment-authored-tag editor (TagModal.razor)
is deleted; the VirtualTag and ScriptedAlarm flows are untouched.
- "+ Add reference" opens a new AddReferenceModal that reuses RawTree in a new opt-in
PickerMode (Tag-leaf checkboxes + Device/TagGroup "select all tags below"), scoped
structurally to the equipment's cluster via LoadReferencePickerRootAsync (a single
cluster root — cross-cluster tags are unreachable, not merely hidden). Default /raw
usage is byte-unchanged (PickerMode defaults false).
- UnsTreeService (+ IUnsTreeService) gain the reference mutations:
LoadReferencesForEquipmentAsync (computes each RawPath via the shared RawPathResolver),
AddReferencesAsync (cluster-checked, all-or-nothing), RemoveReferenceAsync,
SetReferenceOverrideAsync, plus the picker helpers LoadReferencePickerRootAsync /
LoadDescendantTagIdsAsync.
- Consume IEffectiveNameGuard (constructor-injected, no-op fallback when unregistered):
AddReferences, SetReferenceOverride, and the VirtualTag + ScriptedAlarm create/update
mutations now call CheckAsync before persisting and surface a collision as the failure.
WP2 supplies the implementation + DI registration.
- Drop the retired equipment↔driver binding: remove DriverInstanceId from EquipmentInput,
the ImportEquipmentModal CSV column, the EquipmentPage Details driver select, and the
dead decision-#122 driver-cluster guard.
Tests: new UnsTreeServiceReferenceTests (add/remove/override, cross-cluster + duplicate
rejection, guard-consumed rejection via a fake guard, RawPath projection, picker helpers);
Equipment/Import test suites rewritten to drop the retired driver-guard cases. AdminUI
suite green (639 passed, 3 skipped); full solution builds 0 errors.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LVneM3eh1UtJxEisFXgmox
Part 1 — rewire the three DriverType dispatch maps from hand-authored string
literals to the canonical DriverTypeNames constants (single source of truth):
- TagConfigEditorMap, TagConfigValidator (AdminUI)
- EquipmentTagConfigInspector (ControlPlane)
This FIXES the live drift ("TwinCat"->TwinCAT, "Focas"->FOCAS). The maps are
OrdinalIgnoreCase so behavior is identical; the value is no future drift.
Calculation is not added to the inspector (no CalculationTagDefinitionFactory.Inspect).
Added TagConfigDriverTypeNameGuardTests pinning the maps to the constants.
Part 2 — retire the routed /clusters/{id}/drivers driver-authoring flow (/raw
Waves A-C now cover driver/device/tag authoring end-to-end):
- Deleted DriverTypePicker, DriverEditRouter, the 8 *DriverPage shells, and the
ClusterDrivers list page.
- Removed the "Drivers" tab from ClusterNav. Routes /clusters/{id}/drivers* now
simply do not exist -> clean 404.
- The Forms/DeviceForms bodies, shared driver sections, and address pickers used
by the /raw modals are untouched.
Part 3 — updated PageAuthorizationGuardTests census: removed the 10 deleted
ConfigEditor pages + ClusterDrivers, updated group-count comments (ConfigEditor
21->11, AuthenticatedRead 17->16). Removed the now-dead Clusters.Drivers usings
from the 4 *DriverPageFormSerializationTests + the guard test.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LVneM3eh1UtJxEisFXgmox
Extract the 8 typed driver pages into embeddable <Driver>DriverForm bodies
(channel/protocol config) and add per-driver <Driver>DeviceForm bodies
(connection endpoint -> Device.DeviceConfig, v3 endpoint split). New
DriverConfigModal + DeviceModal dispatch by DriverType (DriverTypeNames) for
the /raw tree; Test-connect inside DeviceModal builds the merged Driver+Device
config transiently via DriverDeviceConfigMerger. Routed pages now host the
form bodies and keep working. Round-trip + enum-serialization guard tests for
the Modbus driver form + Modbus device model; retargeted the existing
page-form serialization tests + the _jsonOpts converter guard to the forms.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LVneM3eh1UtJxEisFXgmox
Wave-A reviewer findings (no Critical/High):
- M-2: GlobalRaw auto-expands Enterprise roots so the Cluster level is visible on load (mirrors GlobalUns.ExpandStructural); clusters stay lazily collapsed.
- L-1: create mutations route SaveChanges through SaveCreateAsync — a lost sibling-name race (filtered-unique-index clash) becomes a friendly failure instead of an uncaught DbUpdateException.
- L-2: SaveDeleteAsync no longer leaks raw EF/SQL text; operator-friendly guidance.
- L-5: RawNode.ChildCount doc clarified (direct children only).
- Regression fix: PageAuthorizationGuardTests classifies the two new routable pages (/raw → ConfigEditor, /dev/context-menu-demo → AuthenticatedRead).
M-1 (ordinal vs SQL-collation sibling uniqueness) assessed benign: name indexes use the DB default collation and the server-side pre-check runs under that same collation, so pre-check and index agree — no case-variant rows can coexist, so runtime ordinal RawPath keying never collides.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LVneM3eh1UtJxEisFXgmox
Wave-0 reviewer findings (no Critical/High):
- T0-1 M: ContextMenuItem.OnClick Action→Func<Task> (kills async-void at menu call sites Wave A/B/C need); keyboard-activated ⋯ now anchors below the button instead of viewport (0,0); focus returns to trigger on close; backdrop closes on native right-click too.
- T0-3 M: guard test now discovers *DriverFactoryExtensions.Register by convention from the deployed driver assemblies instead of a hand-copied list, so a future driver lacking a constant is actually caught.
- T0-2 L: corrected the round-trip 'sole non-round-trippable shape' comment (any table whose final row is a lone empty field).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LVneM3eh1UtJxEisFXgmox
Adds a reusable right-click / context menu Blazor component for the AdminUI:
- ContextMenu.razor: right-click surface (browser menu suppressed) + optional
ellipsis fallback trigger, both anchoring the menu at the pointer; keyboard
nav (arrows/Enter/Esc), transparent backdrop outside-click close (no JS).
- ContextMenu.razor.css: scoped styles on the shared theme tokens.
- ContextMenuItem.cs: Label/OnClick/Icon/Disabled/IsSeparator model + Separator().
- Dev demo page at /dev/context-menu-demo.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LVneM3eh1UtJxEisFXgmox
Namespace entity + NamespaceKind retired; DriverInstance dropped NamespaceId;
Tag is raw-only (no EquipmentId/DriverInstanceId/FullName/FolderPath); driver
options replaced pre-declared Tags with RawTags. Stub the retired surfaces so
the AdminUI + Host build green; real Raw/UNS authoring arrives in v3 Batch 2/3.
- ClusterNamespaces/NamespaceEdit: bodies replaced with 'Namespaces retired' banner
- DriverIdentitySection: dropped Namespace dropdown + NamespaceId model field
- 8 driver pages: dropped Namespace binding; retired the pre-declared Tags editor
(replaced with a '/raw Batch 2' note); multi-device pages keep their Devices editor
- UnsTreeService: equipment-tag counts/list -> empty; Create/UpdateTag -> failure
result ('Tag authoring moved to the Raw tree (/raw) in v3 Batch 2'); Namespace/
driver-binding queries removed
- IScriptTagCatalog: project surviving Tag columns only (path from TagConfig FullName, else Name)
- OpcUaClientTagConfigEditor: rebind stale FullName -> model's NodeId
- ClusterDrivers: drop retired NamespaceId column
AdminUI + Host build 0/0. AdminUI.Tests / Host.IntegrationTests remain red (WP6).
AbCip/TwinCAT/FOCAS driver-config pages host the same *AddressPickerBody as the /uns TagModal but
did not pass GetConfigJson, so their universal Browse button would capture against an empty {} (no
device). Thread SerializeCurrentConfig through. DriverType is left to the picker-body default
(canonical registered type) rather than the page's DriverTypeKey const, whose TwinCAT/FOCAS values
("TwinCat"/"Focas") are non-canonical casing that could miss the factory TryCreate lookup.
HistorianGateway is now the sole historian backend (read + alarm SendEvent +
continuous WriteLiveValues). Document the final state and retire the Wonderware
sidecar from the docs/config/labels:
- CLAUDE.md: rewrite the Historian section — ServerHistorian /
ContinuousHistorization / AlarmHistorian config keys, the IHistorianProvisioning
EnsureTags hook, the GatewayAlarmHistorianWriter SendEvent path + ReadEvents
dependency on gateway RuntimeDb:EventReadsEnabled=true, gateway-side
prerequisites (RuntimeDb flags + historian:read/write/tags:write scopes),
migration note, and two KNOWN-LIMITATION callouts (live-validation gate +
empty historized-ref-set recorder follow-on).
- appsettings.json: fix the stale ServerHistorian block (Host/Port/SharedSecret/
ServerCertThumbprint -> Endpoint/ApiKey/UseTls/AllowUntrustedServerCertificate/
CaCertificatePath/CallTimeout, keep MaxTieClusterOverfetch); add a disabled
ContinuousHistorization block; prune the orphaned Wonderware keys from
AlarmHistorian (keep the SQLite knobs). ApiKey env-supplied via
ServerHistorian__ApiKey (commented; valid strict JSON via _comment keys).
- README.md + docs (Historian.md, AlarmHistorian.md, Configuration.md,
ServiceHosting.md, DriverLifecycle.md, drivers/README.md, Uns.md, VirtualTags.md,
AlarmTracking.md, Client.UI.md, README.md, TestConnectProbes.md): retire the
Wonderware historian backend from current-backend descriptions; fix the stale
ServerHistorian/AlarmHistorian config tables (now gateway shape); convert
drivers/Historian.Wonderware.md to a retired stub pointing at the gateway.
- Source/UI labels (descriptive text only, no behavior change):
OtOpcUaServerHostedService.cs, HistoryPaging.cs, OtOpcUaSdkServer.cs,
HistorianAdapterActor.cs, VirtualTagModal.razor, ScriptedAlarmModal.razor,
AlarmsHistorian.razor now name the HistorianGateway backend.
Build clean (0 errors); AdminUI.Tests green (514 passed).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012SDSQ3AcaXqPcBtDESBRii
The HistorianGateway driver is now the sole historian read/write+alarm backend, so the
Wonderware sidecar projects are dead code. Removes the 5 Wonderware projects (driver,
.Client, .Client.Contracts, + their 2 test projects) from the solution and tree, and fully
retires the vestigial 'Historian.Wonderware' driver type (UI/probe-only; it had no driver
factory): the Host probe registration, the AdminUI driver-config surface (driver page,
tag-config editor/model/validator entry, address picker/builder, driver-type catalog +
dropdown + edit-router entries), and their tests. Prunes the now-unused Wonderware
connection fields (Host/Port/UseTls/ServerCertThumbprint/SharedSecret) from
AlarmHistorianOptions (keeping Enabled + the SQLite store-and-forward knobs) and refreshes
the stale XML docs that named Wonderware as the production backend.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012SDSQ3AcaXqPcBtDESBRii
AdminUI driver-instance pages serialized enum config fields (S7 CpuType,
Modbus DataType/Region, AbCip PlcFamily, ...) as JSON *numbers* because each
page's _jsonOpts lacked a JsonStringEnumConverter. The driver factories,
however, deserialize into string-typed DTOs (+ lenient ParseEnum) and throw
when binding a JSON number to a string? — so an AdminUI-authored config
containing any enum field produced a blob the driver could not parse,
faulting the driver on deploy. Proven end-to-end for S7 and Modbus; latent
for AbCip/AbLegacy/TwinCAT/FOCAS/Galaxy/Historian. Only OpcUaClient was safe
(its factory + probe already carried the converter).
Add JsonStringEnumConverter to all 9 driver-instance pages' _jsonOpts and the
8 missing driver probes' _opts (factories unchanged — already string-via-
ParseEnum; strictly more permissive, also lets pages load hand-seeded
string-enum configs back into the form).
Also fix DriverProbeHandshakeE2eTests.AbCip_Green_AgainstSim to probe a real
sim tag (TestDINT) — the no-tags @raw_cpu_type fallback is rejected by the
ab_server sim with ErrorBadParam (a real ControlLogix returns ErrorNotFound,
which the probe treats as reachable; hardware-gated follow-up).
Tests: reflection guard over all driver pages' _jsonOpts (AdminUI.Tests);
factory round-trip + numeric-form-throws guards for S7 and Modbus.
Found by running the never-before-run FB-9/FB-10 live verifies.
Joseph Doherty