Seen RED against a T3-reverted build: all 4 failed, Created[1].SubscribeCount == 0
on the headline case. 20x isolation run green after the fix was restored.
MapZbLocalDbSync returns IEndpointRouteBuilder, not an IEndpointConventionBuilder,
so .AllowAnonymous() cannot be chained onto it the way the other four mesh maps
are (T2). app.MapGroup(string.Empty).AllowAnonymous().MapZbLocalDbSync() carries
the same convention while leaving the gRPC route pattern byte-identical -
verified directly (LocalDbSync_AllowAnonymousGroup_LeavesTheRoutePatternByteIdentical).
The census's RealMethodEndpoints filter had to move off a "route pattern starts
with /" heuristic to an exact-route-pattern-set match: inside the empty-prefix
group, grpc-dotnet's own "Unimplemented service"/"Unimplemented method" fallback
endpoints also gain a leading "/", so the heuristic let them back in and
over-counted (caught by DriverOnly_WithASyncPort_AlsoMapsTheLocalDbSyncEndpoint
and LocalDbSync_AllowAnonymousGroup_LeavesTheRoutePatternByteIdentical going red
against the naive filter before this fix).
All five mesh gRPC endpoints now carry IAllowAnonymous (archreview 03/S14, T3).
.AllowAnonymous() on DeploymentArtifactGrpcService, CentralCommandGrpcService,
TelemetryStreamGrpcService and NodeCommandGrpcService — the four MapGrpcService
maps that are chainable. On a login-enabled admin node the global cookie
FallbackPolicy (RequireAuthenticatedUser) applies to every endpoint without
explicit authorization metadata, gRPC included; the PSK bearer interceptors run
INSIDE the endpoint invocation, strictly after that middleware, so a
correctly-keyed node call was challenged before the interceptor's verdict could
matter. Safe because all four interceptors fail closed on an unset key.
The census now asserts IAllowAnonymous on all four (red before this change,
green after) plus a scope guard proving the opt-out never leaks onto an
unrelated endpoint. MapZbLocalDbSync (T3) is not chainable the same way and is
asserted absent here on purpose, so this test cannot start passing for the
wrong reason once T3 lands.
Behaviour-preserving: Program.cs:743-784 collapses to a single call, same gates,
same order, every existing per-map rationale comment carried over. A new
endpoint-metadata census (MeshGrpcAnonymousMetadataTests) drives the SAME
production mapper across all three role shapes (admin-only / driver-only /
fused), so the guard can never assert a shape production no longer has -
archreview 03/S14, T1.
Every round-2 finding re-verified against code (73 closed / 31 partial / 97 carried);
matrix 19/28 cells up, one down. New Critical 03/S14 (AdminUI FallbackPolicy 401s every
mesh gRPC map on a login-enabled central; masked on every rig gate by DisableLogin=true).
New Highs 03/S15, 05/STAB-19, 05/STAB-18, 03/S16 — the stale-Good family at four seams.
The XML remark above OtOpcUaNodeManager.Browse still carried the exact claim the
security.md correction in 22ae1836 removed: there is ONE shared root folder
(V3NodeIds.SharedRootFolderId, raw namespace) fronting both realm trees, not one
per namespace. Rewritten to name the anchor, the ns=0 listing behaviour, and the
zero-segment realm-root mapping that now admits transit holders.
Also completes the BuildScope collision remark (code-review Minor): the degenerate
raw folder literally named OtOpcUa loses the accidental grant leak onto the
anchor's Read/Write that the old one-segment scope allowed — a narrowing,
fail-closed side effect, now recorded.
Comment-only change; addresses the code review's sole Important + Minor.
CLAUDE.md's "Browse needs ancestor visibility" bullet and docs/security.md's
ancestor-visibility bullet now name the topmost ancestor: the single shared
root folder (s=OtOpcUa, raw namespace) that both realm trees hang under, its
mapping onto the trie's zero-segment realm-root scope, the either-realm transit
(it fronts both trees), and the realm qualification.
Also corrects the adjacent security.md bullet that claimed "the two namespace
root folders remain visible" — there is one anchor, not one per namespace, and
what an ungranted session sees is the ns=0 Objects listing of it rather than a
browse into it. Flagged rather than silently left, since it contradicts the
mechanism the new bullet documents.
With Security:Acl:Enabled=true, a session holding any grant narrower than
Cluster could not browse the served address space at all — confirmed by the
live gate.
Mechanism. Both realm trees hang under ONE anchor folder minted in
CreateAddressSpace: NodeId("OtOpcUa", <raw ns>). ResolveParentFolder parents
every top-level raw folder AND every top-level UNS area under it, and the
Browse override throws BadUserAccessDenied for the WHOLE call when its source
node is denied. DataPlaneAuthorizer.BuildScope split that identifier like a
path, producing {Kind: Raw, Segments: ["OtOpcUa"]} — but trie grant paths are
["raw", <RawPath segments…>] and "OtOpcUa" is never a path segment, so
PermissionTrie.HasBrowseTransit failed at the realm-child lookup and
CollectMatches yielded only Cluster-scoped grants. Deny, at the front door.
The trie already handled a zero-segment scope as "the realm root, itself an
ancestor of everything granted in that realm" (PermissionTrie.cs:101-118) —
no production path had ever produced that scope. This wires it up.
- V3NodeIds.SharedRootFolderId names the anchor identity; CreateAddressSpace
now mints the NodeId/BrowseName/DisplayName from it (behaviour-identical,
makes the coupling explicit).
- BuildScope maps that identifier (realm-qualified to Raw — in the UNS
namespace s=OtOpcUa is an ordinary Area) onto the zero-segment Raw scope.
- Evaluate adds a second-realm OR-leg for Browse on the anchor only: it fronts
both trees, so a principal whose only Browse grant lives in the UNS tree
still enters through this raw node. Browse only; transit confers navigation,
never read/write/subscribe.
- No trie, evaluator or builder change. No reordering above the decision cache
— key revocation is still re-checked before the lookup — and the cache key
is unchanged (the combined verdict caches under the anchor's own
identifier/realm; a generation advance clears it).
Falsifications actually run (implement-then-revert-the-line, plus one
genuine red-first):
- DataPlaneAuthorizerTests: the 7 new facts were written BEFORE the fix and 4
went red (the 3 deny-only ones passed vacuously, as a deny-only test must).
- Deleting the UNS OR-leg reddens exactly one fact,
The_shared_root_folder_is_browsable_on_a_uns_only_browse_grant (26/27 pass).
- Dropping the realm qualification from IsSharedRootFolder reddens exactly
A_uns_area_named_like_the_anchor_gets_no_anchor_semantics. Its first draft
did NOT catch this — a raw-only grant is refused either way; the
discriminating grant had to be an unrelated UNS one, whose own transit marks
the zero-segment UNS scope the un-qualified mapping would land on.
- Disabling the BuildScope anchor branch reddens the new end-to-end fact
NodeManagerStage6EnforcementTests.The_shared_root_folder_is_browsable_on_a_narrow_grant_and_still_filters
(real booted server, real Browse dispatch: BadUserAccessDenied on the whole
call), which also pins that the reference filter still withholds the
non-granted sibling.
- Core PermissionTrieBrowseTransitTests gains 3 characterization facts pinning
the previously-dead realm-root branch (transit true for the granting realm's
root, false for the other realm's, false without the Browse bit). These were
green on arrival — the trie was always correct; nothing called it.
Tests: Core 351 -> 354 passed; OpcUaServer 482 -> 490 passed. Build clean.
Review follow-ups to 34829ea0.
IMPORTANT - the leak filter had its own flake vector. This test saturates the
thread pool by design, and TimedScriptEvaluator starts its 5s clock at WaitAsync
rather than when the inner Task.Run gets a thread, so a legitimately-enqueued
evaluation can blow the budget while still queued and surface "script timed out
after 5.0s". The reason != exhaustion filter classified that as a raw disposed
escape and hard-failed on it - handing the test back the load-fragility the
reshape removed. Timeouts are now their own bucket, tolerated and rate-bounded
exactly as exhaustions are; a raw disposed escape still fails on first occurrence.
Doc-comment names this second residual vector alongside the exhaustion calibration.
MINOR (scope extension authorised by review) - "evaluator disposed during
evaluation" existed as three unshared literals. Promoted to
ScriptEvalFailureReasons alongside VirtualTagEvalResult in Commons.Engines (the
assembly all three already reference) and referenced from both evaluators and the
test. The timeout prefix joins it, since the test now classifies on it too. String
values are byte-identical - no behaviour change.
Falsified: with a 12ms script budget the race produced real timeouts (3/2695).
Classified as leaks (the pre-review filter) they hard-failed the test 6/6 items;
bucketed as starvation they sit 0.11% under the 10% bound and the test is green.
Live gate on the local OrbStack docker-dev rig (branch tip images, fresh
down -v + up -d --build).
404: did NOT reproduce through deploy.sh on a fresh boot — the readiness
gate passed on its first poll, and compose's depends_on: service_healthy
serialization means up -d returns ~30 s after Traefik starts, so the window
is already closed. Reproduced it directly instead, by rapid-polling :9200
across a traefik container restart: connection-refused -> 404 for ~65-160 ms
-> 200. Body is exactly Go's "404 page not found" (19 bytes) and the access
log records it with an EMPTY RouterName/ServiceName at 0ms, so no router
matched and no backend was dialled. Mechanism: the entrypoint binds before
the dynamic file-provider config is loaded. The competing candidate (health-
checked service with no healthy server) is excluded — that is a matched
router answering 503, and there are zero 503s in the log. Caveat recorded:
the earliest 404s predate the accesslog handler itself and are not logged,
so an empty access log does not prove absence.
No-body POST: verified, not 400. The minimal-API DeployRequest? binds both
a missing body and a Content-Length: 0 body as null; the handler falls back
to createdBy = "rest-api". A bare ./docker-dev/deploy.sh answered 202
Accepted and the Deployment row carried CreatedBy = rest-api.
deploy.sh's header NOTE goes from "unverified" to the observed truth.
Joseph Doherty