TagConfigJson.ClassifyEnumText classified via Enum.TryParse(text, ignoreCase: true),
which accepts a numeric STRING for any enum: "1" returns the member at that ordinal
and an out-of-range "99" parses just as happily. Every driver contract's strict enum
read inherits that, so a Sql tag authored "type":"99" was ACCEPTED, carried
(DriverDataType)99, and SqlPollReader.TryCoerce fell through its switch to the String
arm — a stringified cell published Good under a type nothing can map.
Refuse a digit- or sign-leading spelling before the parse (judged on the TRIMMED text,
because Enum.TryParse trims), and require Enum.IsDefined — which covers what the
leading-character check cannot, since TryParse also ORs a comma-separated list for a
non-[Flags] enum. Mirrors RawBrowseCommitMapper.ParseNativeType and
MTConnectTagDefinitionFactory.TryParseDataType, which already guard their own parses.
Three AdminUI restatements of the same rule now ask ClassifyEnumText instead of
Enum.TryParse (TagConfigJson.GetEnum, SqlTagConfigModel.ReadEnumStrict,
MqttTagConfigModel.DescribeInvalidEnum/GetEnumNullable) — leaving them would have opened
the #549 direction the moment the runtime tightened: a blob the modal accepts and the
driver skips.
RED first: 10 failing in Core.Abstractions.Tests, 4 in Driver.Sql.Tests, and 10 of the
11 new fleet-wide parity cases (re-confirmed by reverting the Core fix).
MTConnectTagConfigModel read `dataType` with TagConfigJson.GetEnum, which falls
back to String on ANY unrecognised value. A misspelled name ("Strng") from a
hand-authored blob, a CSV import or the API was therefore accepted at authoring
and silently rewritten, while the driver's strict parse rejected it and the tag
died with BadNodeIdUnknown. Found by the G-7 parity tests' falsifiability
control, which had to use the digits-only shape to have a case that failed.
The rule is not restated in the AdminUI. MTConnectTagDefinitionFactory exposes
its parse as `IsAcceptedDataTypeName`, documented as the one authority the
driver, the deploy gate and the authoring model all consult; the model's
Validate() asks it about the raw value the blob carries. The old digits-only
message is NOT retained as a special case: the runtime draws no distinction
between a bare number and a typo — one predicate, one Inspect warning — so a
second message here would be a second statement of a rule this model does not
own. The raw value is captured as the JSON TOKEN, because the runtime
deserialises the key into a `string?` DTO field and an unquoted number throws
there too.
The survey found the same asymmetry at six more editors, contrary to the
assumption that those runtimes silently default: R2-11 Phase C moved every
driver's TagConfig enum read to TagConfigJson.TryReadEnumStrict, which REJECTS
the tag on a present-but-invalid string, while the editors kept loading them
with a silent fallback. Modbus (region/dataType/byteOrder), S7, AbCip, AbLegacy,
TwinCAT and FOCAS now check their enums in Validate() through the runtime's own
TagConfigJson.DescribeInvalidEnumText — added alongside a public
ClassifyEnumText that TryReadEnum now delegates to, so the JSON-token door and
the string door reach one implementation. Mqtt and Sql already carried
equivalent strict checks and are untouched.
Care taken NOT to become stricter than the runtime: a present-but-non-string
token stays accepted for those six (TryReadEnum calls it absent), as does an
absent key, each pinned by a test.
Also adds a direct ProjectReference to Core.Abstractions from the AdminUI — the
save gate now leans on a type it was consuming only transitively.
The connect path was the one capability call the resilience pipeline never
saw, so a driver that could not connect contributed zero breaker input and
the /hosts resilience panel read 'All targets healthy' against a dead
endpoint. InitializeAsync now routes through the invoker as
DriverCapability.Initialize, keyed on the driver-instance id.
- No pipeline retry: the actor's RetryConnect timer is the retry loop
(parser forces retryCount overrides to 0, same funnel as write-shaped).
- Breaker threshold 2, not the Read-sized 5: the breaker samples 30 s and
the reconnect timer fires every 10 s, so at most three attempts fit one
window — threshold 5 could never open. Pinned by its own test.
- An open breaker fast-fails into the same InitializeFailed path as a real
connect failure; the 15 s break window costs at most one extra tick.
The best-effort teardown ShutdownAsync stays unwrapped.
- Companion fix: DriverCapabilityInvokerFactory.Create now invalidates the
instance's tracker snapshots with its pipelines — a respawn during an
outage discarded the only breaker whose OnClosed could clear the OPEN
flag, stranding a false 'Breaker OPEN' chip forever.
Live gate PASSED on docker-dev (image symbol-verified per container):
rtu-gate against dead 10.100.0.35:5021 opened its Initialize breaker on
both centrals with the red 'BREAKER OPEN' chip on /hosts; a socat
5021→5020 forwarder recovered it (both breakers closed within 1 s, panel
back to 'All targets healthy'); healthy MAIN-modbus recorded zero breaker
events. Full suite 50/50 green. Evidence:
docs/plans/2026-08-07-adminui-followups-and-live-gates.md §7.
#542 filed FleetStatusBroadcaster as blind to site nodes since the Phase 6 per-cluster mesh
split: it derives "the fleet" from central's own Akka gossip ring, which after the split is
just central's own pair. Scoping the cross-mesh rewrite found the deeper truth — the whole
chain is dead end to end, so this deletes it rather than reviving it.
- Zero consumers. FleetStatusBroadcaster published FleetStatusChanged on the DPS
"fleet-status" topic; FleetStatusSignalRBridge forwarded it to FleetStatusHub
("/hubs/fleet-status"); nothing anywhere connected. The AdminUI bans self-connecting
HubConnections, no browser JS subscribes, and /fleet (Fleet.razor) reads
NodeDeploymentState from the ConfigDb plus IClusterRoleInfo on a 5 s poll instead.
- Its second input never existed. DriverHostStatusHeartbeat had no production sender —
only the broadcaster's own test told it — so CurrentRevision was always null and the
30 s staleness -> Degraded flip could never fire.
- Post-Phase-6 DPS is pair-local, so even the central-only view it did produce was an
accident of topology rather than a design.
The fleet visibility that actually works is unchanged and already cross-mesh-correct:
/fleet over NodeDeploymentState, and the four Phase 5 per-node telemetry dials.
Precedent for deleting inert machinery rather than activating it: #522 (driver stability
tiers), #507 (discovered-node injection), #525 (GetMemoryFootprint).
Deleted: FleetStatusBroadcaster (+ its nested DriverHostStatusHeartbeat), its admin
singleton registration and FleetStatusBroadcasterKey, FleetStatusSignalRBridge and its
key, FleetStatusHub and its route mapping, and the FleetStatusChanged / FleetNodeStatus /
FleetNodeHealth messages. Both Fleet/ directories survive — ControlPlane keeps
ClusterNodeAddressReconciler, Commons keeps GetDiagnostics. Docs swept where they claimed
a fleet-status channel exists (Telemetry.md's Phase 5 non-migrated channels,
Configuration.md, CLAUDE.md); completed-program plan docs under docs/plans and docs/v2 are
left as the historical record they are.
Build 0 errors, 868 warnings — byte-identical to master's rebuild baseline.
ControlPlane.Tests 231/231, AdminUI.Tests 1109/1109.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
MeshPaths.CentralCommunication / .NodeCommunication (the "/user/..." full-path constants) had
ZERO production consumers after the ClusterClient deletion: both gRPC services resolve their
comm actor through ActorRegistry by typed key, never by ActorSelection over a path. Only the
path-probe test still read them, while the class doc went on calling them "the wire contract
of the central↔node boundary" — a claim that stopped being true the moment nothing addressed
an actor across a process boundary by name.
- The two full-path constants are deleted; the two Name constants remain.
- MeshPaths' doc now says what it is (the local actor-naming convention the registry-keyed
services are spawned under) and records what it stopped being, so the next reader does not
re-derive a contract from the file's history.
- MeshCommActorPathTests composes "/user/" + Name itself — the absolute path is that test's
own addressing detail now, not something the product declares. Renamed
Both_mesh_comm_actors_exist_at_their_contract_paths ->
..._are_spawned_under_their_declared_names, because what it still pins is that the two
registration sites actually ran on a real booted node; a rename is now a compile error, so
"contract" was the wrong word for what would break.
- NodeCommunicationActor's summary no longer cross-references the deleted constant or calls
the name an address. CentralCommunicationActor was checked and makes no such claim.
MeshGrpcBoundaryTests replaces the MeshClusterClientBoundaryTests deleted in step 1. Three
self-seeded single-member clusters sharing the ActorSystem name, joined ONLY by gRPC, driving
the REAL CentralCommunicationActor -> MeshGrpcCommandDialer -> Kestrel h2c ->
MeshCommandAuthInterceptor -> NodeCommandGrpcService -> NodeCommunicationActor -> EventStream:
1. No_cross_mesh_Akka_association_forms_between_central_and_either_site — the program's own
point, kept as a test rather than a live-gate note: each cluster stays single-member and
none ever holds another's address as a member.
2. One_dispatch_through_central_reaches_a_node_in_every_cluster_mesh — the fan, with each
site holding its OWN per-cluster PSK, so a dial that selected the wrong cluster's key
would be refused at the far side.
3. Falsifiability_control_a_dial_carrying_the_wrong_cluster_key_delivers_nothing — without
it, (2) cannot distinguish "the gRPC boundary carried it" from "something else in the
process did". The same node then accepts the right key, so the silence is the auth gate
and not a dead endpoint.
All three run fully offline — no Docker fixture — and pass.
Comment sweep across every remaining clusterclient|receptionist hit in src/ and tests/:
the program label becomes "mesh gRPC command plane", and every comment that described the
deleted transport as live now describes what actually runs (Dps = pair-local default,
Grpc = cross-mesh). mesh_transport.proto's header/service comments are reworded; no message,
field or enum is touched — the contract is locked. MeshCommActorPathTests is reshaped rather
than retired: the two paths still exist and still matter, but what a mismatch costs is now a
misleading Unavailable from the gRPC ingress rather than a silently dropped receptionist send.
The only surviving mentions of the old names are the ones that must survive: the fail-closed
rules that name "ClusterClient" as a retired value refused at boot, their tests, and this
test class's own account of what it replaces.
MeshTransportOptions.ModeClusterClient is gone. MeshTransportOptionsValidator accepts Dps or
Grpc and nothing else, so a node left carrying the string "ClusterClient" is now REFUSED at
boot naming MeshTransport:Mode and both remaining values — deliberately fail-closed rather
than falling back to Dps, which on a split-topology node would deliver nothing at all. A new
fact pins exactly that.
SplitTopologyTransportValidator tightens from an allow-list of two to Grpc only, as its own
comment said it would once ClusterClient was deleted. Dps on a cluster-role node stays
refused; the rule is still an explicit allow-list, so a typo'd mode fails too.
Tests: the two ClusterClient-mode facts in MeshTransportOptionsValidatorTests are deleted
(their Dps siblings already assert the same rule for the one remaining non-Grpc mode), the
SplitTopology fixtures move to Grpc, and the three-mode Theories in
ControlPlaneStarterOrderTests / CentralCommunicationActorTests become two-mode.
The property, the four validator rules that graded it (empty / non-akka.tcp / actor-path
suffix / one-bad-among-good) and all twelve docker-compose entries (6 nodes x 2) are gone.
The compose comment blocks that explained "/system/receptionist is appended at construction
time" and the client's contact rotation go with them, and the surrounding prose now
describes the Grpc command plane it actually runs.
CentralGrpcEndpoints' doc no longer says it "replaces" the Akka contact points — there is
nothing left to replace — and ContactRefreshSeconds' failure message names the node
dispatch set rather than the ClusterClient contact points.
`rg CentralContactPoints src tests docker-dev` is now empty.
akka.extensions loses ClusterClientReceptionistExtensionProvider and the whole
akka.cluster.client block (buffer-size / reconnect-timeout / receptionist.role) goes with
it. The DistributedPubSub extension and the maximum-frame-size / log-frame-size-exceeding
canary both stay — DPS is the pair-local transport and the frame canary guards every
remoting message, neither of which the cross-mesh deletion touches.
MeshTransportHoconTests drops its three ClusterClientSettings/ClusterReceptionistSettings
asserts and keeps the frame-size pin and the DPS-extension pin, renamed since it no longer
has a receptionist to survive alongside.
Found on the docker-dev live gate, not in tests. Two drivers that faulted
during initialise (rtu-gate, opcua1) each rendered "0 tags" on /hosts against
two authored tags apiece, because a ledger that had never committed returned
SkippedTagReport.Empty.
A zero report is a positive claim -- "this driver skipped nothing" -- and
making it on behalf of a driver that never got as far as looking is exactly
the quiet inaccuracy #541 exists to remove. GetSkippedTags() and
SkippedTagLedger.Snapshot() now return null until the first committed build,
so the column renders the same em-dash it already used for a driver that
cannot report at all. Both are 'no answer'; neither is 'nothing skipped'.
Knock-on: a FOCAS driver whose only init threw now reports null rather than a
zero report, which is strictly more honest than the assertion the test
originally made.
A driver builds its RawPath -> definition table at init and tolerates a
per-tag miss: an unmappable TagConfig, an unparseable address, a
capability-matrix rejection. That tolerance is right -- one bad tag must not
take down the other few thousand. What was missing is any statement of the
fact afterwards. A skip is not an error and happens before any read, so the
driver stays Healthy, errors/5 min stays 0, Last error stays empty, and Last
read advances live off the tags that did map. On the wonder Makino in #540
that reading held while focas-z-34184 ignored 20 of its 22 tags.
New optional capability ISkippedTagReporter, backed by a shared
SkippedTagLedger so the reset/commit/cap rules are one implementation rather
than one per driver. The report -- authored count, exact skipped count, and a
capped sample of RawPath + reason -- rides DriverHealthChanged to a new Tags
column on /hosts, over the Phase 5 telemetry stream. No table: a driver-only
node has no ConfigDb to write to, the lesson from #521.
The issue named eight drivers. It is twelve -- every driver in
DriverTypeNames.All has an authored-tag skip path. Calculation (no scriptId),
MTConnect (no readable DataItem id), Galaxy (no attributeRef) and OpcUaClient
(no nodeId) were unlisted, and OpcUaClient's was the quietest of the twelve:
NamespaceMap drops such an entry with a bare `continue` and not even a log
line. SkippedTagReporterFleetTests pins the invariant reflectively over every
IDriver in src/Drivers/, so a thirteenth cannot re-introduce the silence.
Sql drops a tag at TWO points and its report is the union of both: a blob
that does not map, AND an identifier the 8.1 catalog gate rejects against the
live catalog. The second is what schema drift produces -- a renamed column, a
dropped view -- months after a deployment sealed green, and reporting only
the first would have that driver claim "0 skipped" while polling half its
tags, which is worse than reporting nothing because the column would then be
actively reassuring.
Deliberately additive to driver state, never a change of it. Latching
non-Healthy for a config problem would satisfy both halves of the #527
comms-loss conjunction -- 90 s without a successful read AND non-Healthy --
and a driver whose tags were ALL skipped has no successful reads by
construction, so it would reconnect-loop forever against a healthy device.
Three details that are load-bearing rather than incidental:
- The skip digest is part of the publish fingerprint. A skipped tag leaves
every other fingerprint component identical to a clean driver's, so without
it PublishHealthSnapshot's dedup swallows exactly the publish carrying the
signal -- the trap that already bit the rediscovery and host-status
channels. The digest covers the sample, not just the counts: a redeploy
that fixes one tag and breaks another leaves both counts unchanged.
- The count is exact; only the sample is capped, and the tooltip says so when
it is showing fewer than it counted. A truncated list that looked complete
would have an operator fix twenty tags and believe the job done.
- The ledger stages and commits, so an init that throws part-way leaves the
previous report standing. A partial snapshot would read as "we now skip
fewer tags", the opposite of the truth.
The proto field needs no companion presence flag, unlike host_statuses: a
singular message field carries real presence in proto3, and a has_ flag would
collide with protoc's generated HasSkippedTags.
Verified red-first three ways: dropping SkippedTagDigest from the fingerprint
fails the two dedup tests, removing the seam from one driver fails the fleet
guard, and dropping the catalog-gate leg fails the Sql union test. Full
solution builds with zero new warnings against 4e22f024.
A browse-committed AB CIP / TwinCAT / FOCAS tag bound with its model's DEFAULT
data type, not the one the device reported. A browsed REAL committed as
`{"tagPath":"Pump_1_Speed","dataType":"DInt"}` — and those three drivers decode
the wire bytes by that field, not by the raw row's OPC UA DataType — so the tag
read four bytes of a float through an integer decoder and published a plausible
wrong number with no error raised anywhere. FOCAS was missed when #536 was filed.
The type is CARRIED, not derived. Reverse-mapping the leaf's driver-agnostic
DriverDataType looks like the smaller fix and is wrong: SInt/Int/DInt/USInt/UInt
all collapse into Int32 on the way out of the driver, so that version would bind
a 16-bit INT as a 32-bit DINT while appearing to fix the REAL. Drivers now state
their own type name on DriverAttributeInfo.NativeDataType, which reaches the
picker as AttributeInfo.AddressFields["dataType"] and the commit mapper from
there. A leaf that states nothing keeps the model default — the pre-#536
behaviour, kept deliberately as the fallback rather than a guess.
Numeric strings are refused before parsing: Enum.TryParse accepts "9" for any
enum and Enum.IsDefined then confirms it, so an unguarded parse would bind a tag
to a type nobody named. A test caught this in the first version of the guard.
--- and the other half, which the fixture was hiding ---
Test Connect on a device with NO authored tags — every AB CIP device at the
moment an operator first presses the button — reported "CIP handshake failed"
against a healthy controller. That was written down as a fixture limitation
("ab_server doesn't implement @raw_cpu_type"). Both halves of that were wrong:
* @raw_cpu_type is not a libplctag special tag at all (only @raw, @tags and
@udt/ are), so it goes out as an ordinary symbolic name that no controller
defines, and the controller's "tag does not exist" IS the successful answer.
* ab_server answered an unresolvable tag path with CIP 0x03 where a Logix
controller answers 0x04 — ErrorBadParam vs ErrorNotFound, which the probe
classifies oppositely. Fixed in vendored patch 0002.
* With the fixture then telling the truth, the real defect surfaced:
AbCipDriverProbe.IsReachableException matched the native C status spellings
("STATUS_NOT_FOUND"), but libplctag.NET throws with the MANAGED enum name
("ErrorNotFound"). Those substrings can never match, so the reachable
classification could not fire on the exception path — which is the path every
no-authored-tags probe takes. This was failing on real hardware too, not just
against the sim. It now recovers the Status and defers to IsReachableStatus,
so there is one classification rather than two that can drift.
Rejected: switching the fallback to @tags. libplctag builds a tag-listing tag
with NO network I/O, so it reports OK against any TCP listener — measured green
against a Mosquitto broker.
Verification: full solution suite green. Falsification runs confirm exactly the
intended tests go red — 9 for the type carry, 3 (the reachable statuses only) for
the probe classification. Live on docker-dev: browse-committed TestString/
Motor_Run/TestSINT now store String/Bool/SInt, alongside last session's
Pump_1_Speed still holding the wrong DInt. TestSINT is the falsifier — its row
DataType is Int32, identical to TestDINT's, so no reverse map could have produced
"SInt".
Known consequence: pre-existing browse-committed tags keep their wrong dataType;
the fix applies to new commits only.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
An area or line could be named "Packaging" or "Line 1", save cleanly, and then
fail the NEXT deployment with UnsSegmentInvalid. Because a deployment snapshots
the whole database, one badly-named area blocked EVERY cluster's deploy - and
whoever hit that was usually not whoever typed the name. Only the equipment form
carried the rule; the deploy gate held its own private copy.
The rule now lives once, on Configuration.Validation.UnsSegment, and both ends
call it. DraftValidator no longer restates it.
Enforced in UnsTreeService, not just on the forms:
- Create/Update Area, Line and Equipment reject an invalid name before touching
the row.
- The CSV import reports a bad name as an ERROR, not a skip - a skip means "you
already have this row", which would tell the operator the equipment exists
when it does not. Good rows in the same batch still insert.
A form attribute could never have covered the import, and with no bUnit in this
repo a rule only a form enforces is also a rule no test can reach. The forms
keep an attribute for the immediate message, but it now references the shared
pattern rather than restating it - a second copy is how these drifted apart.
One behaviour change beyond the fix: UnsSegment.AttributePattern admits
"_default", which the equipment form's hand-written literal rejected. The form
was stricter than the gate it was mirroring, so a _default row was uneditable
through the AdminUI.
Tests: 41, falsified with three production mutations - dropping the CreateArea
guard reds exactly the CreateArea rejections, turning the import error back into
a skip reds only the import test, and narrowing AttributePattern reds only the
attribute/IsValid agreement. Every rejection is paired with a name that must
still be accepted, or a guard that refused everything would pass.
Live-verified on docker-dev: the area modal now refuses "Packaging" in place
with the rule spelled out, "packaging-b" saves, and a CSV import of two rows
reports Inserted 1 / Skipped 0 / Errors 1 naming the offending row - the path no
form attribute reaches. Rig cleaned up and a further deployment sealed.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Completes data-plane enforcement behind Security:Acl:Enabled. Read (every
attribute, not just Value), Browse, TranslateBrowsePath, CreateMonitoredItems,
SubscribeToEvents and SetMonitoringMode now consult scoped NodeAcl grants.
With the flag off nothing changes.
Four things went beyond the stage as written, each because leaving it out
would have made the feature look like it worked:
- Browse needed ancestor visibility. The trie inherits downward, and a client
reaches a deep node by browsing the nodes above it, so without this every
grant narrower than the cluster was authored, shipped and unreachable. It is
a separate non-inheriting marker, NOT a synthesized Browse grant on each
ancestor: the additive downward walk would carry such a grant from Plant onto
Plant/Siemens/dev9 and every other sibling subtree. Pinned by a test that
goes through the evaluator — probing the trie helper directly passes against
the broken design, because a sibling is absent from the trie either way.
- Revocation had to reach LIVE subscriptions. Every other operation re-asks per
request; a subscription is authorized once and then streams, and streaming is
how machine consumers actually read this server — so stopping only the
re-asking operations would have made revocation close to cosmetic.
IDataPlaneAuthoritySource gained a Changed event.
A denied item is queued BadUserAccessDenied and then DETACHED from its
MonitoredNode2 fan-out, not set MonitoringMode.Disabled. Disabling discards
the item's queued notifications, so the client is silenced without ever being
told why. The over-the-wire test caught this; the unit-level path reports the
item as stood down either way. Detaching is also reversible, so a restored
grant resumes the feed with no client action.
- The decision cache holds the grant WALK, not the decision. Grants and the
trie are fixed for a generation; a key's ExpiresUtc passes with the clock, so
caching the whole decision would let an expired key keep working until the
next deploy — the stage-5 open-session hole in a subtler form.
- TranslateBrowsePath is gated, without which browse filtering is decorative: a
client refused a browse asks TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds for the same path.
Found en route: UserAuthorizationState's staleness ceiling couples two clocks.
MembershipResolvedUtc is stamped from DataPlaneAuthorizer's TimeProvider while
IsStale is evaluated against TriePermissionEvaluator's; they are the same
instance in production and diverge the moment anything injects a test clock, at
which point the evaluator denies EVERYTHING with a verdict indistinguishable
from "no grant matched". Stage 5's claim that these predicates cannot fire was
accidentally true; they are now disabled explicitly.
Also fixed: ContinuationPoint.NodeToBrowse is the manager HANDLE, not a
NodeState. The declared type is object, so the wrong cast compiled cleanly and
silently yielded null — skipping the browse source gate entirely.
Falsified: disabling the transit marking reddens exactly the three tests that
assert transit works; implementing transit as an ancestor grant reddens the
sibling-leak test; skipping the fan-out detach reddens the revocation test.
Full solution suite green.
The stage 8 live gate has NOT run yet.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
`Security:Acl:Enabled` (default false) makes scoped `NodeAcl` grants decide
data-plane authorization at the three seams that have one, and gives HistoryRead
a check it never had. Read, Browse and Subscribe stay ungated — stage 6.
The ACL decision REPLACES the server-wide role check rather than chaining with
it. Chained, a grant would have to confer the role as well as pass the scope
check, and only Cluster-scoped grants confer a role — so every narrow grant
would have stayed inert and the flag would have looked inert too. The
load-bearing test is an ALLOW: a session carrying no roles at all writing
successfully on the strength of its grant. A deny-only test passes against a
build where the ACL is never consulted, because the role gate denies too.
Found en route: the principal never reached the session. The authenticator
passed it as OpcUaUserAuthResult.DisplayName, but RoleCarryingUserIdentity
derives DisplayName from the presented token — for a key-bearing client that is
the static username `apikey`, identical fleet-wide. So the trie's matching key
was dropped at the identity boundary, and the audit ClientUserId on a rejected
write recorded `apikey` for every consuming system. Principal and ApiKeyId are
now carried explicitly.
Beyond the stage as sketched:
- Revocation reaches an OPEN session. Every decision re-checks the
authenticating key against the current snapshot; without it a key revoked by a
deployment kept its authority until the client chose to reconnect, which for a
machine-to-machine consumer can be indefinitely.
- UserAuthorizationState is built per CALL, not per session. The per-session
shape exists so an LDAP session can re-resolve membership that changed out of
band; nothing can change out of band under API keys, so the generation stamp is
the whole invalidation signal and a per-call record picks it up for free.
IsStale/NeedsRefresh therefore cannot fire here and are documented as vestigial.
- The trie is built inside DataPlaneAuthorityState.Apply, under the same
generation as the snapshot, rather than by a second wiring at the publish
actor. An uninstalled trie denies everything — indistinguishable from working
enforcement. Deleting the install turns 13 of the 22 new tests red.
- The deploy log reports what the BUILD dropped instead of re-deriving it. The
old count agreed with the builder on one of its four drop reasons; a rule with
a blank ScopeId, a retired scope kind, or a path not starting at a realm
vanished with the log reading zero.
Both IApiKeyStore implementations widened to the full grant set. The narrowing
was redundant — ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper applies the same filter itself — and
became a trap once scope was enforced. Pinned by asserting the roles are
unchanged, with the two grants carrying different flags so it cannot pass by
accident.
Falsified by mutation: enforcement never engaging, the write seam ignoring the
ACL, the realm dropped from the scope, the revocation check removed, and the
trie never installed each turn the intended tests red and no others.
Full solution suite green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Two independent defects surfaced in review of #520 stage 3.
#532 — Cluster:Roles had no OTOPCUA_ROLES fallback, despite two doc sites
promising one. A node configured only through the env var — which drives ALL of
Program.cs's conditional wiring, so it reads as the authoritative knob — bound an
empty Roles array and joined the cluster carrying no Akka roles at all. It ran,
served, and logged nothing wrong, while central reported "no driver-role nodes
are Up" and every deployment to it timed out. Not hypothetical: the field fix on
wonder-app-vd03 was to hand-add Cluster__Roles__0/1 to a Windows service's
registry environment. Anyone reading the code to diagnose that box would have
concluded from the XML doc that the fallback was already applied.
AddOtOpcUaCluster now post-configures AkkaClusterOptions through the shared
RoleParser.ResolveEffectiveRoles, so BuildClusterOptions (Akka's own member
roles), ClusterRoleInfo, the ControlPlane singleton scope and
ConfigDbApiKeyStore's ClusterId all see one answer. Two sibling validators
(ConfigSource, Telemetry) read Cluster:Roles directly and were exempting the
exact node they exist for — an env-only driver-only node has no ConfigDb and
could sit on ConfigSource:Mode=Direct unchallenged. They resolve the same way now.
Also collapsed the four open-coded `Roles.FirstOrDefault(IsClusterRole)` +
ClusterIdFromRole copies into RoleParser.ClusterIdFromRoles. They had drifted:
three classified the cluster role ordinally, so a verbatim-bound `Cluster-SITE-A`
yielded a null ClusterId — and a null ClusterId applies NO cluster filter, which
made #528's cross-cluster over-grant guard fail OPEN. IsClusterRole is now
case-insensitive; the ClusterId suffix keeps its authored spelling, because
normalizing it would silently rename the Akka role of a running deployment.
#533 — three string-identity rules in one authorization path. AclScopeRef used
default (ordinal) equality while the trie builder filtered ClusterId and hashed
principals OrdinalIgnoreCase; the deploy gate's cross-cluster check was ordinal
too, which was the worse half — it could reject a whole deploy over a ClusterId
case difference the runtime would have accepted. It only worked because resolver
and builder were handed the same NodeAcl instances.
The rule is now stated once, on AclScopeRef, and applied throughout:
identifiers (ScopeId, ClusterId, Principal) compare OrdinalIgnoreCase; path
segments compare Ordinal. AclScopePathResolver re-keys its own maps rather than
documenting a comparer contract for callers, so the two independent producers —
EF at the gate, artifact JSON on the node — cannot diverge from the outside.
PermissionTrieNode.Children stays Ordinal: those are browse names, and Speed /
speed are two nodes that can coexist under one device.
Split PermissionTrieBuildDiagnosticReason.RetiredScopeKind out of
UnresolvedScope. A legacy FolderSegment row and a typo'd id had the same message
and different remedies.
Falsified: five mutations, each reddening only its own guard — remove the
PostConfigure (3 tests), revert IsClusterRole to ordinal (3), revert AclScopeRef
equality (1), revert the resolver's map comparer (6), revert the gate's
comparisons (2), remove the FolderSegment short-circuit (1).
Test isolation: OTOPCUA_ROLES is process-global and xUnit runs classes in
parallel, so the three validator suites that now resolve effective roles share a
non-parallel collection. Without it, cases passing no roles would intermittently
observe another class's env var.
Full solution build clean; full suite green apart from two pre-existing failures
confirmed identical on 3a6b2a1d (PrimaryGateFailoverTests, and
DriverProbeRegistrationTests expecting 10 probe types where 12 now register)
plus the AbLegacy integration suite, which needs a docker fixture.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Makes the /raw device tree addressable by an ACL rule, and builds the
scope-path producer PermissionTrieBuilder has accepted since it was written
but which had no caller anywhere.
The plan for this stage said "add NodeHierarchyKind.Raw, whose path is the
RawPath segments Folder/Driver/Device/TagGroup/Tag". That shape is wrong.
RawFolder.ParentRawFolderId and TagGroup.ParentTagGroupId are both
self-referencing, so folders and tag groups each nest without bound and a real
RawPath is folder…/Driver/Device/group…/Tag. NodeScope was fixed-arity and
PermissionTrie.CollectMatches was five hardcoded steps, so the scope model
could not address a real raw tree at all. NodeScope is now {ClusterId, Kind,
Segments} and the walk is a segment loop. The trie STRUCTURE was already
variable-depth (NodeAclPath.Segments is a list, Children is a recursive
dictionary), so only the walker and the scope record had to change.
Four decisions worth keeping:
- The namespace level became the realm. Level 1 gated on NodeScope.NamespaceId,
but v3 has no Namespace entity — the snapshot was retired when the address
space went dual-namespace, and the identifier appears nowhere in production
outside NodeScope. So the level could only ever fail to match, which silently
made every sub-cluster grant unreachable while cluster grants kept working.
It is now a realm token derived from the scope's Kind, not carried on it, so
the walk and the producer cannot disagree about its spelling.
- Provenance comes from the granting row's own ScopeKind, recorded on TrieGrant
at build time. Depth-derived provenance could not name a raw level at all,
since the depth of "Device" varies with folder nesting.
- The trie comparer moved from OrdinalIgnoreCase to Ordinal. Raw sibling-name
uniqueness is ordinal, so Speed and speed can both exist under one device and
a grant on either would have matched both.
- The null-scopePaths "deterministic test mode" is deleted. It planted
unresolvable rows at a direct child of the trie root, a position the walker
cannot reach, so the grant looked placed and could never match — and every
test using that mode proved nothing about production placement. scopePaths is
now required, and a row that does not resolve is dropped with a diagnostic.
A scope resolves to a LIST of paths: a raw tag projected into N equipments is
reachable at N+1 NodeIds and a write through any of them lands on the same
driver reference, so a Tag-scoped grant covering only the raw node would be
bypassable through a UNS one. The lookup is keyed on (ScopeKind, ScopeId), not
ScopeId alone — ScopeId has no FK and no type discriminator, so an id collision
across entity types would hand a grant the wrong node's paths.
Also closed here, all found by review rather than asked for:
- NodeAcl rows had no deploy-time validation of any kind and were not reachable
from DraftValidator at all (DraftSnapshot carried no NodeAcls). They are now
gated for dangling ids, cross-cluster scopes, blank/contradictory ScopeId, the
retired FolderSegment kind, and undefined ordinals.
- ConfigDbApiKeyStore conferred roles from Cluster-scoped grants authored in ANY
cluster, because it filtered on scope kind with no ClusterId predicate while
ArtifactApiKeyStore read an already-cluster-filtered snapshot. On a fused
admin+driver node that was a cross-cluster over-grant. Its doc comment claimed
the two stores matched.
- The two AdminUI ACL banners still said enforcement was LDAP-group -> role
mapping, which stages 1/2 made false in both directions.
- The /apikeys page was never classified in PageAuthorizationGuardTests, so that
test has been red since the key-minting commit merged — I did not run
AdminUI.Tests before merging stage 4.
Falsified rather than assumed: 8 mutations against the trie tests, 5 against the
deploy gate (including one proving a cross-cluster row is not silently
mis-diagnosed as unresolved), a staged red->green for the over-grant regression,
and the realm gate, the comparer and the malformed-path guard each broken
individually to confirm only their own tests go red.
Node ACLs are still not ENFORCED — nothing constructs a NodeScope or calls the
evaluator yet. That is stages 5 and 6; this stage makes the model able to
express what those will enforce.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
A driver-only node has had no ConfigDb since per-cluster mesh Phase 4, so it
registered NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator and denied every UserName token. Its keys
now ride the deployment artifact instead.
- ConfigComposer snapshots ApiKeys alongside the NodeAcls it already carried.
Only the peppered HMAC ships, never a secret, and the pepper is node config
that is deliberately not in the artifact.
- DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority decodes both node-side. Grants are
scoped to the node's own cluster; keys are not, because ApiKey carries no
ClusterId — a key is a fleet-wide credential and the ACL rows are what bind it.
- OpcUaPublishActor installs them on DataPlaneAuthorityState on every apply,
BEFORE its plan.IsEmpty early-return: an artifact that only revokes a key
produces an empty address-space plan, so feeding after that return would leave
the revoked key working until an unrelated structural change redeployed.
- ArtifactApiKeyStore serves them to session activation; a node with a ConfigDb
keeps ConfigDbApiKeyStore, whose per-request read is what makes revocation
immediate there.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager gains DataPlaneAuthority — the cluster identity blocker #4
named. NodeScope.ClusterId is required and the evaluator fails closed on a
mismatch, so until now no scope it built could have evaluated. Nothing reads it
until stages 5/6.
The generation is a node-local COUNTER driven by the RevisionHash, not derived
from its bits. PermissionTrieCache treats the highest GenerationId as current, so
a generation taken from hash bytes would install a lower number about half the
time and the cache would go on serving the previous deployment's ACLs, silently.
Sessions are not stamped with it yet — that belongs with the first seam that
reads a UserAuthorizationState, in stage 5, rather than being built now and
consulted by nothing.
Live-gated on docker-dev against site-a-1 (driver-only, no ConfigDb): key
authenticates, wrong secret denied, both halves of the revocation asymmetry
observed, and a SITE-A grant confirmed not to reach site-b-1. Key minted with an
independent Python HMAC so the verifier was checked against something other than
itself. Rig left clean.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Pulled forward from stage 7 because without it the feature is unusable and
un-live-gateable: there was no way to create a key short of hand-inserting a row
and computing an HMAC by hand.
The minting logic is an IApiKeyAdminService in Core.Authorization, NOT logic in
the Razor page — this repo has no bUnit, so anything only a page can reach is
untestable, and minting credentials is not where that belongs. The page is a thin
shell over it.
Moved to Core.Authorization so both ends can reach them: ApiKeyOptions (was in
Host) and OpcUaPrincipals (was in OpcUaServer.Security). The OPC UA server
resolves principals; the AdminUI must refuse to mint a key claiming a reserved
one. OpcUaServer already gained a Core reference in stage 1b, so no new edge —
AdminUI gains one.
ApiKeyOptions is now bound UNCONDITIONALLY rather than in the driver branch: a
driver node needs the pepper to VERIFY keys and an admin node needs it to MINT
them, and getting that wrong on either side is a silent authentication failure
rather than a startup error.
Validation rules, all covered: the reserved 'anonymous' principal is refused
case-insensitively (so "ANONYMOUS" cannot slip past into a distinct principal
that the evaluator would then match case-INsensitively against anonymous's
grants); blank name/principal; a principal longer than the column, rejected
rather than truncated, because silent truncation yields a key that authenticates
and is granted nothing with no visible cause; a past expiry. Generation runs
BEFORE the DbContext is opened so an unconfigured pepper surfaces as a clear
error instead of a stored row whose hash nothing can verify.
The page shows the plaintext ONCE and says so; it is held in component state and
written nowhere else, because the server keeps only a hash. Revocation is flagged
in the UI as taking effect only after the next deployment — driver-only nodes
have no ConfigDb, so keys ride the artifact.
FleetAdmin-only (Administrator), not ConfigEditor: this mints credentials.
Core.Tests 68 green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Stage 1b. Still no enforcement wired — this adds the credential model the
identity cutover (stage 2) will read.
ApiKey holds one principal per key, deliberately. The reason to separate keys
from principals is so many keys share a grant set and rotating a key never
touches an ACL row, and that holds with one principal per key since nothing stops
two keys naming the same principal. A key belonging to several principals at once
buys little and costs a join table. UserAuthorizationState.Principals stays a
list, so adding it later needs no ACL-side change.
ApiKeySecret is the security-critical half and is pure, so it is tested on its
own: otua_<keyId>_<secret>, peppered HMAC-SHA256, FixedTimeEquals. Notes why a
plain HMAC rather than an iterated KDF (the secret is 32 bytes of CSPRNG, and the
call runs inline on session activation, which the SDK serializes server-wide
behind its SessionManager event lock), and fails closed on an unset pepper rather
than hashing under an empty key.
Found and fixed a bug in my own first draft: the key id was url-safe base64,
whose alphabet maps '/' to '_' — the very character TryParse splits on. Roughly
one key in five would have had its id truncated at a random position, an
intermittent auth failure reproducing only for SOME keys. The id is hex now, and
the guard is falsified: reverting the alphabet reds both
The_generated_key_id_never_contains_the_separator and, as a bonus signal,
Two_generated_keys_never_collide, because truncated ids collide.
ApiKeyId is NOT NULL, unlike the nullable NodeAclId precedent whose filtered
unique index would admit two NULL ids. Fine for a config row, not for a
credentials lookup key.
OpcUaServer.csproj now references Core. Until now it did not, so
IPermissionEvaluator was literally uncallable from the node manager — the place
enforcement has to happen. No new transitive package surface.
Schema doc updated for both, and its NodeAcl block flagged for pre-existing drift
(it still documents the GenerationId column v3 dropped) without fixing it here.
Core 247, OpcUaServer 364, Configuration 128 — all green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Stage 1a of the API-key ACL design. Behaviour-neutral: the trie walker already
matched an opaque string, so only what produces that string changes. No
enforcement is wired by this commit and none of the two live role gates move.
Renamed through the ACL model: NodeAcl.Principal, TrieGrant.Principal,
MatchedGrant.Principal, AuthorizationDecision.Principal,
UserAuthorizationState.Principals, and PermissionTrie.CollectMatches's parameter.
LdapGroupRoleMapping is a DIFFERENT entity that also has an LdapGroup column and
is deliberately untouched — it backs AdminUI login, which keeps LDAP.
The migration is the interesting part. EF scaffolds RenameColumn/RenameIndex, so
rows survive — but it cannot know that dbo.sp_ComputeGenerationDiff checksums
NodeAcl.LdapGroup. That proc is created in V3Initial.StoredProcedures and never
redefined since, and SQL Server does not validate a procedure body when a column
is renamed out from under it: the object keeps reporting healthy and fails at
CALL time with Invalid column name, silently breaking config-drift detection.
Verified against the live dev DB that the deployed proc really does reference the
column. The migration therefore re-emits the proc, as one parameterised template
shared by Up and Down so the two cannot drift.
Prose that describes what is enforced TODAY (fleet-wide LDAP group -> role) is
left alone, because it is still accurate until stage 2 lands.
UserAuthorizationState's refresh machinery is retained unchanged but now carries
a note that it is LDAP-shaped and largely vestigial here: an API-key principal
set cannot change out of band, since keys and ACL rows both ride the deployment
artifact, so the generation stamp rather than the freshness timer is the real
invalidation signal.
41 authorization tests pass; solution builds clean.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Layer 4 of the condition-Quality chain (#477 -> #478). #478 gave a scripted
condition the worst quality of its input tags, but only for inputs whose driver
PUBLISHES a Bad data change. A poll driver whose device goes unreachable
publishes nothing — it raises ConnectivityChanged(false) and goes silent — so
the engine held its last Good value, WorstInputStatus stayed Good, and worse,
AreInputsReady stayed true, so the predicate went on evaluating a stale value
after the source had died.
`DriverHostActor.FanCommsLossToDependencyMux` pushes a synthetic
BadNoCommunication with a null value into the dependency mux for every value ref
the disconnected driver owns.
The issue asked for a driver -> all-tag-refs map to be built for this. It
already exists: `_nodeIdByDriverRef`, keyed (DriverInstanceId, RawPath) and
rebuilt from the composition on every apply. Alarm-bearing tags live in the
separate `_alarmNodeIdByDriverRef` and are deliberately excluded — a native
condition is not a mux value and takes the Part 9 quality path instead.
Nothing is pushed on reconnect, deliberately: publishing Good would assert a
value quality this actor has not observed. Recovery rides the driver's own
republish, and the mechanism was verified rather than assumed — the
Connected -> Reconnecting edge calls DetachSubscription, which nulls the
subscription handle, so the reconnect's ResubscribeDesired builds a FRESH
subscription whose PollGroupEngine initial push runs with forceRaise: true.
Without that detach the poll engine would compare against its retained
LastValues, see an unchanged value, raise nothing, and strand these refs Bad
forever — the value-dedup trap that bit the v3 Batch 4 virtual-tag reassert.
Closes#478 Finding 3, which the above depends on. WorstInputStatus skipped
every input whose VALUE was null as "no data yet" — and Bad-with-no-value is
exactly the shape a comms-lost driver produces, so the skip was hiding the case
that matters most; without this half the fan-out above would be silently inert.
The upstream source now stamps a never-pushed path BadWaitingForInitialData —
the honest Part 4 code for that state — and the engine skips that specific code
rather than every null value.
Deleting the null-skip outright is the obvious fix and is wrong in the other
direction: it makes every not-yet-published input drag its condition Bad at
deploy, flooding the quality path with load-time annotations, which is what the
skip existed to prevent. Both mistakes are pinned by a test pair that goes red
under the opposite error, and both were falsified by reverting the production
code:
old null-skip restored -> A_pushed_Bad_carrying_no_value RED
null-skip deleted outright -> An_input_that_was_never_pushed RED
fan-out call removed -> the three DriverHostActor tests RED (1 of 7)
The never-pushed test was vacuous on first writing and is worth recording: the
quality bucket only emits on CHANGE, so the load-time evaluation is the one that
flashes Bad, and subscribing to OnEvent after LoadAsync made the assertion
unfalsifiable — it passed against the broken behaviour. It now subscribes first.
`FakeUpstream.ReadTag` returned 0x80340000 (BadNotConnected) for an unset path,
a different Bad code from production's placeholder. Harmless while any Bad
behaved alike; load-bearing now, so it is aligned and pinned by a reflection
guard asserting the engine's private constant agrees with what the production
source stamps.
Behaviour change to weigh, flagged in the issue and confirmed: virtual tags
computed from a comms-lost input now go Bad too. That follows from using the
shared mux and reads as correct, but it is broader than scripted alarms.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Both `IDriver` members had no production call site. Their only consumer was
`MemoryTracking`, deleted with the driver-tier recycle machinery in #522, and
`GetMemoryFootprint`'s doc-comment claimed "polled every 30s by Core" — which
had not been true since v3, even before #522 removed the poller.
Owner decision on #525 was (a) delete rather than (b) build the process-wide
watchdog that would consume them. The driver-side implementations are in git
history and were mostly reusable; what was always missing is the trigger, and a
member nobody calls is how the misleading doc-comment survived this long.
Removed from `IDriver`, all 12 driver implementations, and every test stub —
plus the support code that existed only to feed them, which is the part a
member-only deletion would have left behind as dead weight:
- MTConnect's three per-entry byte-weight constants, its cached
`ProbeModelDataItemCount`, and `CountDataItems` — a full device-tree walk run
on every cache fill to populate a number with no remaining reader.
- OpcUaClient's `_discoveredNodeCount` field and the discovery-pass write to it.
- MQTT's `ApproxBytesPerAuthoredTag`.
Two behavioural notes, neither a change in what the software does:
- `AbCipTemplateCache` now has no production reset path. Its only caller was
AB CIP's flush, which itself had no caller — so nothing changes except how
visible the fact is. Recorded on the type, along with the correction that its
comment's claim about a device `ReinitializeAsync` also flushing it was never
true. A UDT redefined on a live controller keeps its stale shape until the
driver instance is rebuilt.
- MTConnect's `/probe` cache is still dropped, by `InvalidateProbeModel()` on an
Agent restart. That is now `internal` rather than `private` so the tests which
used the flush purely to empty the cache drive the real path instead — they
now cover a case that actually occurs in production. Several unrelated doc
comments cited `FlushOptionalCachesAsync` as the canonical CAS example and are
repointed to it.
Tests: the ones that existed only to assert on the removed members are deleted
(3 OpcUaClient, 3 Galaxy, 2 MQTT, 1 MTConnect, 1 AbCip). Worth noting one was
vacuous — `FlushOptionalCachesAsync_resets_footprint_counter` asserted a
footprint of 0 before the flush and 0 after with no discovery in between, so it
would have passed against a flush that did nothing at all.
Full suite green except 7 failures verified identical on master before and
after (4 AbLegacy integration with the compose profile down, 3
Host.IntegrationTests), checked by name rather than assumed.
Docs corrected where they described this as live: `DriverLifecycle.md` (which
carried the #525 placeholder), `drivers/AbCip.md`, `drivers/AbLegacy.md`, and
`v2/driver-stability.md` — whose "polls this every 30 s" + per-driver
`DriverConfig` memory budget were never built as written and are now banner-ed
as design intent rather than description.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
`ActAsPrimaryHost` was accepted by config and by the AdminUI form and did nothing but
log a warning. It now delivers the whole three-part contract or none of it: a retained
`ONLINE` on `spBv1.0/STATE/{hostId}`, a matching retained `OFFLINE` armed as the MQTT
Last Will, and an explicit `OFFLINE` on a clean stand-down.
**The claim is a dedicated connection, not a message.** A Will can only be registered in
the CONNECT packet — it cannot be added to a live session, changed, or withdrawn. So a
claim that is acquired and released at runtime cannot ride the long-lived ingest session.
`SparkplugPrimaryHost` opens its own connection (client id `{clientId}-spbhost`, forced
clean-session) when the node gains Primary and closes it when the node loses Primary; the
connection's lifetime *is* the claim, so every leg follows from its lifecycle. Ingest is
untouched by a role change — no dropped subscriptions, no lost birth cache, no data gap at
the Secondary->Primary transition.
**Primary-gated** (owner decision, recorded on the issue). Both pair nodes subscribe
independently, so an ungated claim means both claim the same host id — and the sharp
failure is not the two fighting over the retained STATE, it is that the SECONDARY's death
fires its Will and publishes OFFLINE while the Primary is healthy, stopping every edge node
in the group. Registering the Will only on whichever node is Primary at connect time fails
the other way: a node that later gains Primary would publish ONLINE with no Will behind it.
New seam: `IDriverPrimaryRoleSource` (`Core.Abstractions`) carrying the *data-plane* verdict
(`PrimaryGatePolicy.ShouldServiceAsPrimary`), not the alarm-drain verdict — an unknown role
with a driver peer present must deny. Registered unconditionally by `AddOtOpcUaRuntime`,
deliberately NOT alongside `IRedundancyRoleView`, which `AddAlarmHistorian` registers only
when that section is enabled: piggybacking would leave a pair with no alarm historian
falling back to "claim unconditionally". Polled on a 1s timer rather than evented — a
process singleton raising events at per-instance drivers outlives every driver it holds.
Accepted trade: a brief edge-visible OFFLINE window during failover. That is a genuine
state transition, not a glitch to hide.
Live-gated 5/5 against the Mosquitto fixture, including the Will leg — `AbandonForTests`
drops the socket with no DISCONNECT, because a clean disconnect makes the broker discard
the Will by protocol rule, so a test driven through `StopAsync` would observe the
stand-down OFFLINE and pass against an implementation that never armed a Will. Falsified:
removing the Will turns that leg and only that leg red.
Also corrects two stale claims found en route: the AdminUI form still said MQTT tags are
read-only (#508 shipped), and the driver doc still said nothing consumes `IRediscoverable`.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
#519 — a driver's OPC UA status code now reaches a client with its sub-code intact.
DriverInstanceActor projected the driver's uint onto a 3-state Good/Uncertain/Bad enum
and OtOpcUaNodeManager re-expanded Bad to a bare 0x80000000, so BadNoCommunication,
BadTypeMismatch and BadNotSupported were indistinguishable on the wire and every
driver's status constants (incl. the 16 #497 had just corrected) were diagnostic in
logs only. Resolved by option (b): the raw uint rides AttributeValuePublished ->
AttributeValueUpdate -> IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink.WriteValue, OpcUaQuality is deleted, and
severity classification is a helper (OpcUaStatus.IsGood/IsUncertain/IsBad).
The surface was wider than the issue costed (41 files, not "the sink and 3
implementations"): OpcUaQuality had non-driver producers with no uint to carry.
Each got its natural code — BadInternalError for a failed virtual-tag script,
BadNoCommunication for driver comms loss — and ScriptedAlarmHostActor's pair of
mutually-inverse uint<->enum mappers is deleted, having round-tripped a code the
engine already held. AddressSpaceApplier's removal writes deliberately keep the
generic Bad: not losing a code the driver had is this issue; inventing one for the
deploy path is a separate call.
Behaviour change: WriteAlarmQuality fires its Part 9 event on a status-code change
rather than a severity-bucket change. While the annotation was 3-state those were the
same predicate; now a move between two Bad reasons changes what a subscriber reads.
New SDK-free named constants live on Commons.OpcUa.OpcUaStatus, and
StatusCodeParityTests is widened to cover them — that guard is reflection-driven, so
it can only see a named constant, never an inline literal.
#517 — the symptom is real but the issue named the wrong path and its fix was unsafe.
ShutdownAsync cannot race: DriverInstanceActor calls it from PostStop, after the
mailbox drains. (Core/Hosting/DriverHost, the one class with a concurrent GetHealth,
has no production call site.) InitializeAsync can: it runs on a fire-and-forget
Task.Run, and MTConnectDriver writes Healthy then starts loops that can throw into a
catch which disposes the client before writing Faulted.
Moving the write earlier, as suggested, inverts the terminal state — teardown drains
in-flight loops that write health as they unwind, so a late loop could leave Healthy at
rest with every connection closed. The fix is a bracket (conservative before, terminal
after), applied to MTConnect's init-failure path only; shutdown keeps its single
trailing write, and the rule plus the reachability table are documented on
IDriver.ShutdownAsync.
CalculationDriver.GetHealth returned a hard-coded Healthy that consulted nothing —
Healthy before initialize, after shutdown and after dispose. Now derived from _running.
Its test, named Health_is_always_Connected, asserted the defect and is replaced.
Every new guard was falsified by breaking the production code and watching it go red.
The two sub-code tests each assert two different Bad codes, since a single-code
assertion could pass against a hard-coded constant under the old projection.
Pre-existing failures, verified unchanged on a stashed tree and not chased: 4 in
Driver.AbLegacy.IntegrationTests (slc500/micrologix/plc5 fixtures not up) and 3 in
Host.IntegrationTests.
Closes#517Closes#519
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
The sibling of #521's DriverHostStatus, dead for exactly the same reason. Before this change the
only reference in the entire repo was the DriverInstanceResilienceStatuses DbSet declaration: no
writer, no reader, and the table empty on every deployment.
Its entity doc described two components that were never built — a HostedService sampling the
tracker every ~5 s into this table, and an AdminUI that left-joined it on DriverHostStatus for
display. There is no sampler, that join exists in no razor file, and DriverHostStatus itself was
removed in #521.
Per-cluster mesh Phase 4 also makes the design unbuildable now: AddOtOpcUaConfigDb is gated on the
admin role, so a driver-only node has no ConfigDb connection to write rows with. Any per-node
runtime-status table has this problem.
The live data was never missing — it just does not go through SQL. Resilience counters reach the
AdminUI's DriverStatusPanel as DriverResilienceStatusChanged over the driver-resilience-status
telemetry channel into the in-memory IDriverResilienceStatusStore. Verified consumed: the panel
injects the store, fed by both DriverResilienceStatusBridge (DPS) and TelemetryDialSupervisor
(gRPC).
If breaker HISTORY across a central restart is ever wanted — the one thing the last-value-only
store cannot give — it needs a CENTRAL-side writer fed by that stream, never a driver-node writer.
Keeping an empty table now bought nothing toward that.
Migration DropDriverInstanceResilienceStatusTable; the scaffolder's data-loss warning cannot bite
on a table nothing ever inserted into, and Down() recreates it exactly.
Also corrected: DriverResilienceStatusTracker's doc-comment claimed CurrentInFlight fed
DriverInstanceResilienceStatus.CurrentBulkheadDepth "until the full telemetry observer lands". The
observer landed in Phase 5; the table never had a writer.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Joseph Doherty